Cognitive Approach

Cognitive Processing
Cognition: The mental processes involved in gaining knowledge and comprehension
Core Principles
1. Humans are active information processors
2. Mental Processes can be studied scientifically
3. Mental representations guide behaviour
4. Models can be used to understand complex processes such as memory & decision making

Schema Theory
Schemas: mental representations derived from prior experience & knowledge
Scripts: patterns of behaviour that are learnt through our interaction with the environment ­ developed
within cultural contexts & thus aren’t universal
Schema Theory: theory of how humans process incoming information, relate it to existing knowledge
and use it ­ based on assumption that humans are active processors of information

BARTLETT (1932)
● AIM: Investigate how the memory of a story is affected by previous knowledge
● PROCEDURE:
○ P. told a native american legend ­ P. were british, thus unfamiliar with the names and
concepts
○ P. allocated one of two conditions
■ Repeated reproduction: P. heard story and told to reproduce it after a short time &
then repeat this after a period of days, weeks, months and years
■ Serial reproduction: Recall story & repeat to other P.
● FINDINGS:
○ No significant difference between the way groups recalled story
○ Three patterns of distortion ­ 1) became more consistent w/ P.’s own cultural
expectations. 2) became shorter (after 6/7 reproductions, it was 180 words). 3) change the
order of the story in order to make sense of it using terms more familiar to the culture of
P. ­ and added details/emotions
● EVALUATION:
○ No standardized intervals of reproducing the story
○ No Significant independent variable
○ Low reliability
○ No standardized procedure

BREWER AND TREYENS (1981)

● AIM: investigate role of schema in the encoding and retrieval of memory
● PROCEDURE:
○ 86 university psych students
 ○ Sealed in a room made to look like an office ­ P. asked to wait in the professor’s office
while the R. checked to make sure the previous participant had completed the experiment
(did not realize experiment had already begun)
○ All P. had the same vantage point
○ After 35 seconds P. called into another room & asked to remember what was in the office
­ P. given a questionnaire asking if they expected to be asked to recall the office
○ P. allocate 1 of 3 conditions
■ Recall: asked to write & describe as many objects possible ­ location, shape &
size
● After, given a verbal recognition test in which they had to rate items in a
booklet for how certain they were that the object was in the room
■ Drawing: P. given an outline of room & asked to draw what they could remember
■ Verbal recognition: P. asked to read a list of objects and simply asked whether
they were in the room/not
● FINDINGS:
○ 93% did not expect to recall
○ When P. asked to recall by writing/drawing: more likely to remember items incongruent
w/ an office ­ more likely to forget incongruent items (skull, bark, screwdriver) in
comparison to the verbal recognition
○ When asked to select items on a list, P. more likely to remember incongruent items even
though they might not have recalled it in verbal recall
■ But also had a higher rate of identifying congruent items not in the room

EVALUATION OF SCHEMA THEORY

● Seems useful for understanding how people categorize and interpret information ­ contributes to
understanding of memory distortion and false memories
● Not clear how schemas are acquired in the first place or the exact way they influence cognitive
processes
● Cannot account for why the schema­inconsistent info is sometimes recalled
● However, seems like a robust theory that has/still does generate a lot of research

Multi­store memory model ­ Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968)

Assumptions of the M­SMM
1. Separate memory stores
2. Stores are sequential
3. Each store is independent
Primary effect: ability to recall words at the beginning of a list as they have been transferred to LTM
Recency effect: ability to recall words that have just been said as they are in STM

GLANZER AND CUNITZ (1966)

● AIM: Show there are two processes involves in retrieving information
● PROCEDURE:
○ Free recall of a list of 15 items combined w/ and interference task
○ P. had to recall words under three conditions ­ recall w/ no delay, recall w/ 10s delay and
recall w/ 30s delay (for 10s and 30s participants had to count backwards)
● FINDINGS:
○ No delay ­ first 5 and last 3 words recalled best
○ 10s/30s delay ­ little effect on words at the beginning but poor recall of later items
■ Suggests that later words were held in STM and lost bc of interference ­ while
earlier words were passed to LTM
○ Primary and recency effect

PETERSON AND PETERSON (1959)

● AIM: Investigate duration of STM & provide empirical evidence for M­SMM
● PROCEDURE:
○ Lab experiment ­ 24 P. had to recall trigrams, meaningless three­consonant syllables
○ Prevent rehearsal ­ P. asked to count backwards in 3s/4s from a specified number until a
red light appeared
● FINDINGS:
○ Longer interval delay, less trigrams recalled ­ P. could recall 80% after 3s, less than 10%
after 18s
○ STM has limited duration when rehearsal is prevented
○ STM is different from LTM in terms of duration ­ supports M­SMM
● EVALUATION:
○ Low ecological validity ­ people don’t recall trigrams IRL

HM ­ MILNER (1966)
● CASE STUDY
○ Example of biological evidence that STM and LTM are located in a different store in the
brain
○ HM had anterograde amnesia
■ Could not transfer new information into LTM ­ but still had access to many of his
memories prior to his surgery
■ Fact that he could create new procedural memories shows that mem. may be
more complex than the M­SMM predicts
EVALUATION OF MULTI­STORE MEMORY MODEL
● STRENGTHS:
○ Significant supporting research (both cognitive and biological case studies of patients w/
brain damage)
○ Model’s historical importance ­ gave psychologists a way to talk about memory & much
of the research which followed was based on the model
● LIMITATIONS:
○ Over­simplified: assumes that each store works as an individual unit
○ Does not explain memory distortion
○ Does not explain why some things may be learnt w/ minimal rehearsal
■ Or why sometimes it is repeatedly rehearsed but not transferred to LTM

Working Memory Model­ ­ Baddeley and Hitch (1974)

Central Executive: Attention control system that monitors and coordinated the operations of the other
subordinate compounds
Phonological Loop: (Verbal STM) Auditory component of STM
Visuospatial Sketchpad: Visual component of STM (inner eye) ­ temporary store for visual and spatial
information
Episodic Buffer: Temporarily holds several sources of information active at the same time, while one
considers what is needed in the present situation

LANDRY AND BARTLING (2011)

● AIM: Investigate if articulatory suppression would influence recall of a list w/ phonologically
dissimilar letters in serial recall
● PROCEDURE:
○ 34 P. assigned 1 of 2 groups ­ tested individually
○ Control group which performed no concurrent task, Experimental group which performed
articulatory suppression while memorising a list
 ○ Exp. grp: given a list of letters to recall while saying ‘1’ & ‘2’ at a rate of two #/s
○ Control: viewed list for 5s, wait 5s then write correct order ­ repeated 10x (both grps had
10 trials)
○ 10 lists consisting of 7 phonetically dissimilar letters
○ R. presented 1 letter series at a time, then received a paper w/ 7 blocks in each row
○ P. presented with a sample list to acquaint them with the experiment
● FINDINGS:
○ Experimental scores much lower than control scores
■ Mean % accuracy in control was 76% while experimental was 45%
■ Standard deviation nearly identical
○ Supports WMM, disruption of phonological loop creates less accurate working mem.

KF ­ WARRINGTON AND SCHALICE (1970)

● CASE STUDY
○ KF’s LTM in­tact but showed impairment of STM
■ Problem recalling lists of words/numbers but was able to learn
○ Clearly moved information from STM to LTM
● FINDINGS:
○ Although KF quickly forgot words/numbers when presented orally, he could remember
them when presented visually ­ supports theory that there are separate STM stores
○ Longitudinal ­ Warrington and Schalice could later find that although KF could not recall
words or letters orally, he had no difficulty recalling cats meowing or telephones ringing
■ R. concluded that accident had resulted in damage due to a STM store that was
auditory & not visual, and also verbal rather than non­verbal
● Supports theory that STM is much more complicated that suggested my
M­SMM

EVALUATION OF WMM
● STRENGTHS
○ Supported by considerable experimental evidence
○ Brain scans have shown that a different area of the brain is active carrying out verbal
tasks than w/ visual tasks ­ supports idea that there are different parts of memory for vis.
& ver. Tasks
○ Case studies of patients w/ brain damage supp. Theory that there is more than one STM
store
○ Helps us understand why we are able to multitask in some situations
● LIMITATIONS
○ Role of Central Executive is unclear, although Baddeley and Hitch suggest it’s the most
important part
○ How various components of the model interact is unclear
○ Only explains STM and so tells us v. little about processes involved in LTM
○ Does not explain memory distortion of role of emotion in mem. formation
Thinking and decision making
Decision making: the process of identifying and choosing alternatives based on the values and
preferences of the decision maker
Problem­solving: thinking that is directed tow

DUAL PROCESS MODEL­ STANOVICH AND WEST (2000)

SYSTEM 1 SYSTEM 2

Context dependant ­ focus on existing evidence & Abstract

ignores absent evidence

Concerns everyday decision making Conscious reasoning

Generates impressions & inclinations Logical and reliable

Not logic bases & prone to error Slow & requires effort

Operates quickly/automatically w/ little/no effort Transfers info from one situation to another

WASON (1968)
● AIM: illustrate intuitive system one thinking → prove S1 is prone to error
● PROCEDURE:
○ Participants shown four cards, two numbers and two colored cards & asked which card(s)
must be turned over to test idea that if a card shows an even number, it is red
● FINDINGS:
○ Most choose 8 & red, incorrect
■ Decision based on matching bias, in an abstract problem we tend to be overly
influenced by wording/context of the question
○ Evan & Wason (1976) found that when asked, P. could not clearly explain their choice ­
provides important evidence for the dual process model

GOEL (2000)
● AIM: intended to provide biological support for the dual process model
● PROCEDURE:
○ Participants carried out a logic task as w/ Wason
■ Some cases, task was abstract in nature, some concrete in nature
● (Griggs & Cox (1982) found that w/ non­abstract tasks, we tend to not
show matching bias)
■ P. had to decide correct choices in an fMRI
● FINDINGS:
○ Although there were many common areas of the brain that were active in solving the
problems, there was a clear difference
○ Abstract: the parietal lobe was active ­ spatial processing
 ○ Concrete: the left hemisphere temporal lobe was active
○ Indicates that the brain processes these two types of info differ ­ may not be seen as
support for the model

EVALUATION OF THE DUAL PROCESS MODEL

● STRENGTHS
○ Biological evidence that different types of thinking may be processed in different parts of
the brain
○ Wason selection task & other tests for cognitive biases are reliable
● LIMITATIONS
○ Overly reductionist: does not clearly explain (or even if) these models of thinking interact
or how our thinking & decision making could be influenced by emotion
○ Definitions of S1 and S2 are not always clear
■ Fast processing indicates use of system 1 processing but experience can influence
system 2 processing to go faster
Reliability of Cognitive Processes
Essential Understandings
1. Memory is a reconstructive process & is therefore open to distortion
2. Emotion may affect memory
3. Humans are cognitive misers
4. Biases affect our abilities

LOFTUS AND PICKERELL (1995)

● AIM: determine if false memories of autobiographical events can be created through the power of
suggestion
● PROCEDURE:
○ 24 participants ­ mostly female
○ Before the study ­ parents/siblings asked for 3 childhood memories of the P. and if the P.
ever remembered being lost in a mall, data only used if they weren’t ever lost in a mall
○ P. received a questionnaire in the mail asking to write about 4 memories & mail reply
■ 3 real events and 1 false (about getting lost in a mall) ­ if didn’t recall, simply
instructed to write ‘I do not remember this’
○ P. interviewed 2x over a period of 4 weeks
■ Asked to recall as much information as possible for the events ­ and asked to rate
information on confidence from 1­10
○ After 2nd experiment P. debriefed & asked if they could guess which was the false mem.
● FINDINGS:
○ 25% recalled the false memory ­ but also less confident in the memory
 ● EVALUATION:
○ Although the study is often seen as strong evidence in the power of suggestion in creating
false memories, only 25% recalled the event
○ Study does not tell us why some P. more susceptible to these memories than others
■ But does show that the creation of false mem. is possible

Reconstructive Memory

LOFTUS AND PALMER (1974)

● AIM: Investigate where the use of leading questions would affect an eyewitness’ estimate of
speed
● PROCEDURE:
○ 45 students divided into 5 groups of 7 students
○ 7 short films of traffic accidents shown (taken from driver’s education films)
○ When P. had watched the film twice they were asked to give an account of the accident
seen & then answered a questionnaire about the accident
■ 1 critical Q.: asked P. to estimate speed ­ asked in the same way using different
verbs of different intensities
● FINDINGS:
○ Mean estimates highest in the ‘smashed’ condition (40.8mph), lowest in
‘contacted’(31.8mph)
○ More intense verb ­ higher the speed estimate
SECOND EXPERIMENT
● PROCEDURE:
○ 150 students randomly allocated 1 of 3 conditions
■ P. asked one of 2 questions ­ had to estimate speed of car ­ either smashed or hit
each other
■ Control group ­ was not asked anything
○ P. asked to come back a week later w/o rewatching the video
○ Asked if there was broken glass at the scene of the car crash
● FINDINGS:
○ Those w/ originally more intensive verb were more likely to recall seeing broken glass
○ Loftus argues ­ when different verbs used, schemas are activated which have a different
sense of meaning
● EVALUATION:
○ Controlled lab experiment ­ low ecological validity, situation is v. artificial ­ lowers
external validity
○ When watching a video of a car the same emotions as IRL aren’t triggered
○ Problem in using closed questions
○ All sample P. are students ­ sample bias
○ Research begs Q. of how well people can estimate speed
YUILLE AND CUTSHALL (1966)
● AIM: investigate whether leading Q. would affect memory of eyewitnesses at a crime scene
● PROCEDURE:
○ Crime scene in vancouver
○ Took place in front of the shop → had 21 eyewitness interviews
○ Researchers contacted eyewitnesses four months after the event, 13 gave their account of
the incident & asked questions
○ 2 leading Q. used, ½ group asked if they saw a yellow panel on the car
○ Asked to rate stress on a 7­point scale
● FINDINGS:
○ P. v. reliable
○ Recalled large amount of detail that can be continues by police reports
○ Did not make errors resulting from leading questions ­ most distressed P. had more
accurate memories
● EVALUATION:
○ Field study ­ very strong ecological validity compared to L&P

BAHRICK ET AL. (1975)

● AIM: Investigate reliability of autobiographical memory over time (specifically the names and
faces of people)
● PROCEDURE:
○ Nearly 400 P. aged 17­74 tested
○ Some P. out of school HS for 2 weeks, or 57 years
○ In order for P. to be selected, a published yearbook for the graduating class had to be
available
○ Completed 5 tests
■ Free recall test: name as many people as possible from the grad. class
■ Photo recognition test: 10 cards, each with 5 pictures taken from the yearbook
■ Name recognition test: 10 lists of names, w/ only one name from the graduating
class ­ P. asked to identify which one
■ Matching tests: 10 cards each w/ 5 pictures and a name written at the top of the
page. P. asked to match name to picture
■ Picture cueing test: P. presented w/ 10 portraits one by one and asked to write the
name of the person in the portrait
○ Free recall test always given first
○ For each test, P. asked to rate their confidence on a 3 point scale (1=guess, 3=certain)
● FINDINGS:
○ P. tested within 15 years of graduation were 90% accurate in recalling faces & names
■ After 48 years, 80% were accurate in identifying faces and names
○ Free recall was worse
■ 15 years: 60%, 48 years: 30% accurate
● EVALUATION:
 ○ Cross­sectional study: cannot account for P. variability
○ Large sample size: able to establish a trend in the data
■ Demonstrates that facial recognition has high reliability

Emotion and Memory

Flashbulb Memory Theory: a highly detailed, exceptionally vivid ‘snapshot’ of the moment when a
surprising & emotionally arousing event happens

BROWN AND KULIK (1977)

● AIM: Investigate whether shocking events are recalled more vividly than other events
● PROCEDURE:
○ Interviews w/ 80 P.
○ Given a series of nine events and asked about the circumstances where they first heard
about the event ­ when yes, P. asked to write an account of their memory & rate it on a
scale of personal importance
○ Asked if they had a flashbulb memory of personal events
● FINDINGS:
○ P. sait they had v. clear memories of where they were/what they did/ what they gelt
○ 99% of P. recalled circumstances from when they heard the news
○ 73/80 P. had flashbulb memories associated w/ a personal shock
○ Observed much lower rate of FBM among white P. than black P. to the assacinations of
Malcolm X & MLK Jr.
■ Shows link between personal imp. of an event in creation of FBM
● EVALUATION:
○ No way to determine whether mem. Are accurate
○ No way to test P. level of surprise upon hearing the event
○ Probability of demand characteristics is v. high ­ bc. National events

SHAROT ET AL. (2007)

● AIM: Determine potential role of biological factors in the FBM
● PROCEDURE:
○ 3 years after 9/11
○ 24 P. in New York during 9/11
○ Brain activity observed using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
■ Presented word cues: including ‘summer’ or ‘september’ to link events of their
summer or 9/11 with the other word
● Brain activity recorded
○ After fMRI P. rated memories for vividness, detail, confidence & arousal
■ & asked to write personal memories
● FINDINGS:
○ Only ½ of participants reported having Flashbulb memories
■ This ½ was also closer to World Trade Center at the time of event
● Included more specific details
 ○Activation of amygdala was higher when recalling memories of the terrorist attack for P.
closer to the event
■ P. further away had equal levels of response for events of preceding summer &
attack
○ Strength of amygdala activation correlated w/ FBM
■ Suggests close personal experience may be critical in engaging neural
mechanisms which produce vivid memories s.a. those of FBMT
● EVALUATION:
○ Dot not explain why someone who simply saw it on TV may claim to have a FBM
○ Correlational: does not establish a cause and effect relationship w/ memory attribution in
the amygdala
■ Post hoc ergo propter hoc

NEISSER AND HARSCH (1992)

● AIM: Investigate the reliability of FBM theory
● PROCEDURE:
○ 28 Jan. 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger incident
■ 24 hours after the accident student were investigated for their mem.
○ P. interviewed 2 ½ years later ­ 2nd questionnaire: P. also had to rate confidence in mem.
● FINDINGS:
○ P. v. confident in their memories
○ But 40% of P. hat distorted mem.
○ Post­event info. Could influence mem.
○ Emotional intensity associated w/ greater confidence in memories ­ but not accuracy

KULKOFSKY ET AL. (2011)

EVALUATION OF FBM
● STRENGTHS
○ Biological evidence which supports the role of emotion in memory formation
■ McGAUGH & CAHILL (1995) and SHAROT (2007)
● LIMITATIONS
○ Neisser argues that it’s one level of confidence ­ not accuracy which defines FBM
○ Often w/ real­life research on the topic, impossible to verify accuracy of mem.
○ Research indicates that cultural diff. may show that rehearsal may play most important
role in formation
○ Not possible to measure emotional state at the time of event ­ making it impossible to
demonstrate a clear causal explanation

Biases in thinking and decision making

Cognitive biases: patterns of decision making/thinking that’re consistent, but inaccurate
Anchoring bias: tendency to rely too heavily on the 1st piece of information offered when making
decisions
STRACK AND MUSSWEILER (2001)
● AIM: test influence of AB on thinking & decision making
● PROCEDURE:
○ 69 german P.
○ P. answered q. on computers ­ had 2 components; make comparative judgement (question
acted as anchor) and asked to make an absolute estimate for target information
■ Did Mahatma Gandhi die after the age of 9? [low anchor, implausible] Or Did
Mahatma Gandhi die before or after the age of 140? [high anchor, implausible]
along with two plausible and low and high anchors
○ Final question was how old was Mahatma Gandhi when he died?
● FINDINGS:
○ P. anchored by most recent/relevant info
○ Implausible anchor also affected info
○ Implausible low anchor had more influence than implausible high anchor (age 50.1 vs
66.7)
■ High implausible anchor could have seemed impossible instead of implausible
Peak­end Rule: people just an experience based on how it felt as its peak and end, instead of the whole
experience

KAHNEMANN ET AL. (1993)

● AIM: investigate the idea that P. will judge an experiment based on the peak & end of the
experience
● PROCEDURE:
○ P. had to hold their hand in painfully cold water ­ with the free hand, P. recorded the
strength of the pain with their fingers
○ Repeated measures ­ conditions: 60s, 14˚C at end, P. given a warm towel, or first 60s at
the same conditions, then 30s slightly warmer water entered the tub, raising temperature
by 1˚C
○ Had to then chose to repeat 1 or 2
● FINDINGS:
○ 80% chose condition 2 ­ even though 1 would be better
○ Clear example of Peak­end rule ­ based choice on how the condition ended
● EVALUATION:
○ Not ethical
Framing Effect: people react to choices depending of presentation, when we expect success we would
rather have a definite win, when defeat is expected we would rather have a uncertain loss

TVERSKY AND KAHNEMAN (1981)

● AIM: Test influence of positive and negative frames on decisions
● PROCEDURE:
○ 307 volunteers of self­selected students
 ○ Make a decision between two options in a hypothetical scenario of the outbreak of a
violent disease
○ Condition 1: given positive frame, certain (A)(200 people will be saved) less certain
(B)(⅓ probability that 600 people will be saved, ⅔ probability that no one will be saved)
○ Condition 2: given negative frame, certain (C), less certain (D)
○ All conditions pretty much the same
● FINDINGS:
○ 1st condition, 72% A, 2nd condition, 78% D
○ Demonstrates influence of frame
○ Positive ­ certain option, negative ­ uncertain option

EVALUATION OF BIASES IN DECISION MAKING

● Difficult to measure the actual use of biases in RLS
● Not very good at explaining thinking processes ­ explanations are most likely rationalizations
● Studies in this chapter are mostly completed w. Western university student samples ­ lack
ecological validity & cross­cultural support, assumes that cognitive biases are universal

Reliability of System 1 thinking

Thin slicing: making very quick inferences about the state, characteristics or details of a individual or
situation w/ minimal amounts of information
SPAFF: specific affect coding system developed by Gottman to thin slice the way married couples
communicate

CARRERE AND GOTTMAN (1999)

● AIM: test the usefulness of the SPAFF system to predict long­term relationship success based on
thin­slicing of interactions between couples
● PROCEDURE:
○ 124 newlywed couples requited
■ Purposive sampling method: range of economic and ethnic demographics in
seattle area
○ Completed a survey separately & discussed results w/ a researcher to identify 1 or two
problematic issues in their relationship ­ used as a basis for a 15­minute discussion
recorded & coded using SPAFF
○ Couples checked 1 time a year for 6 years to check marriage status
● FINDINGS:
○ SPAFF scored from og discussions compared for husbands & wives still married & those
divorced, results based on first 3 minutes of the discussion
○ Results clearly show that observers using SPAFF rated communication between couples
who would divorce as more negative ­ more indicators of negative emotions & fewer
positive emotions
○ True for both husbands and wives ­ more successful applied to husbands ­ tendency for
men to be less emotionally honest in terms of acknowledging negative aspects of
relations
 ○ Gottman’s research suggests we can learn to improve our intuitive thinking ­ what could
this mean in terms of relationship between S1 and S2 thinking

Emotion and decision making

DAMASIO, 1994: Somatic marker hypothesis

● suggests good decision making depends on an ability to access appropriate emotional information
linked to the situation in which the decision is made
● Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) involved in somatic markers of emotions associated with
thoughts and memories
○ Somatic markers: feelings in the body associated with emotions

BECHARA ET AL. (1999)

● AIM: determine the role of damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) on decision
making
● PROCEDURE:
○ Developed iowa gambling task to test SMH
○ P. saw four decks of cards on a computer screen, labelled A ,B, C & D
○ P. could click on any of four decks ­ everytime a deck was chosen the card’s face
appeared and P. was informed of how much money was won/lost
■ 100 trials, but not told the amount of trials
○ Test of skin conductance response given to test emotional response
○ 13 healthy P. w. vmPFC damage
○ A&B would give high rewards initially but deliver lg losses as the game progressed,
C&D deliver small initial rewards but v. small losses later ­ should favour these
● FINDINGS:
○ Control P. quickly learnt best strategy, but P. with vmPFC did not
○ Control developed anticipatory skin conductive responses to A&B
■ P. w/ damaged vmPFC had significantly lower SCR and no clear difference in
SCR between conditions
○ Increased emotion seems to be one way we can ‘know’ when we are making the right
decision

DE MARTINO ET AL. (2006)

● AIM: Explore the interaction of emotion in a financial decision­making topic
● PROCEDURE:
○ Volunteer sample of 20 British undergrads
○ Complete a simple financial decision­making task while brain activity was measured with
an fMRI scanner
○ Information presented in a positive or negative frame
■ Positive: you had 50€ and got to keep 20€
■ Negative: you had 50€ but lost 30€
● Outcome is the same, you didn’t have 20€ before
○ Positive frame: P. offered a chance to gamble (risky: outcome unknown) or keep 20€
 ■ ‘Loss aversion’ predicts people will prefer second option
○ Negative frame: P. offered a chance to gamble or lost 30€
■ Loss aversion predicts P. will chose 1st option
● FINDINGS:
○ P. more likely to chose to gamble in negative frame condition
■ Even though condition are the same
○ fMRI demonstrated a interesting pattern of activity in the amygdala (a part of the limbic
system, regarded to be central to emotion)
■ P. recorded a significant increase in activity whenever they selected the ‘loss
averse’ option (regardless of frame used)
● EVALUATION:
○ direction of causality
■ Difficult to be sure if the emotion associated w/ increased activity in the
amygdala is guiding decision making or if it is a consequence of decision making
● Either way it’s clear that emotion & decision making are interacting

EVALUATION OF SMH:
● Most research done uses Iowa gambling task ­ rases Q. of how robust the theory is in explaining
decision­making behaviour
● In one version of this study (Bechara et al (1997)) the team demonstrated that vmPFC patients
continued to select cards from from A&B even after telling researchers that they knew it was
disadvantageous
○ Indicates that it’s not solely a lack of emotional feedback leads to the patients poor
behaviour­making
● Wright and Racow (2017) computerized test, balloon analogue risk task (BART), P. presented w/
a balloon & offered chance to earn money by pumping the balloon ­ each pump gave greater risk
& reward
○ Found that ‘bad’ decisions did lead to increased emotional response (galvanic skin
response)
○ Did not find evidence that SMH helped to avoid bad decisions in future tasks
○ May demonstrate that decision making is improved by access to emotion which is
relevant to the specific decision
■ But what about decision making during periods of intense emotion not related to
the decision?
The Digital World
Essential understandings
1. Research on the effects of technology is relatively new and not yet highly reliable
2. Interacting with the digital environment has both positive & negative effects on our cognitive
processes
MUELLER AND OPPENHEIMER (2014)
● AIM: to test the theory if using a laptop or other devices, instead of taking notes by hand, may
hinder learning
● PROCEDURE:
○ 109 students, mainly female, given a laptop or pen and paper ­ instructed to take notes on
four lectures, a video of a graduate student reading from a teleprompter
○ Told that they would be tested in one week, half of each respected group couldn’t study,
and the other group had 10 minutes before the test to study
○ Test: 40 Q., both factual and conceptual
● FINDINGS:
○ Longhand study wass best, but was very similar to the laptop no­study (25.6 vs 20.6)
● EVALUATION:
○ Research is inconclusive ­ could be coincidence
○ Sample could be used to taking notes in other methods, leading to inefficient note­taking
○ Lectures disconnected from the interests of undergrads
○ Rather artificial: lacks ecological validity

KRAMER ET AL. (2014)

● AIM: test the idea that info in an individual’s facebook feed could cause emotional contagion
● PROCEDURE:
○ Collaboration w/ facebook to alter the content of the news feed ­ almost 700,000
facebook users
○ Used an algorithm & software to identify posts w/ positive and negative language
○ Some P. had 10%­90% of positive posts omitted, and others had the same for negative
posts
○ Control group: proportion of feed omitted at random
○ R. never viewed/altered posts manually ­ done by algorithms
○ Words used by P. in own posts analysed during the week of experimental manipulation ­
% of positive & negative words used was recorded
● FINDINGS:
○ When positive content was omitted, P. were less likely to use positive language ­ and vice
versa
○ Concluded that the emotional content which we are exposed to does indeed affect our
own emotional state
● EVALUATION:
○ Ethics ­ reducing demand characteristics comes with a cost, lack ecological validity
○ Manipulation of facebook feeds to investigate emotional response ­ Kramer believed that
the significance of the research outweighs the costs of failing to provide consent
○ High ecological validity

Memory in the digital world

Google effect: the belief that people are using the internet as a personal memory bank
Transactive memory systems: system wherein data is dispersed across many different members of a
group which can then each be depended upon to supply that date when required ­ frequent reliance on
search engines & data bases may represent a new type of TMS

SPARROW ET AL. (2011)

● AIM: investigate idea that we would invest less effort in committing info to mem. If we believe
we can simply retrieve the info from an external memory story s.a. Google at a later date
● PROCEDURE:
○ P. asked to type 40 trivia facts into a computer, some facts expected to represent new
knowledge ­ some likely to already be known
○ 2x2 independent samples design ­ 2 IV at 2 diff. Levels
○ ½ of P. told computer would save everything, others told it would be erased
■ Within each of these groups, ½ of P. explicitly told to remember new info.
● FINDINGS:
○ Being asked to remember the info made no sig. Difference in P. ability to recall facts0 but
was significant difference if P. believed that the info was stored
○ P. who believed that they would be able to retrieve the info appeared to make far less
effort to remember the info
● EVALUATION:
○ Cannot measure ‘level of effort’

FOLLOW UP STUDY
● AIM: Measure how well people recall where info can be found compared to the info itself
● PROCEDURE:
○ P. asked to read & type a series of trivia facts
■ After typing, P. given the name of a specific folder that the info would be stored
in
● Six folders in total, but P. not explicitly given this info or asked to recall
folder names
○ P. given 10min to write down as much of the trivia facts as possible ­ then given part of a
statement & asked which folder it was located in
● FINDINGS:
○ % of correct answers regarding recall of facts/info ­ data not significant
○ P. more likely to recall folder than the statement itself ­ highest recall was for the folder
name when the fact was forgotten (30%)
■ P. prioritizing the mem. of where the info is stored, as expected ­ if we are using
internet as an external store in a TMS

STORM ET AL (2016)
● AIM: test the idea that successful use of google to retrieve info made it more likely that P. would
rely on google in the future than recalling info from individual memory stores
● PROCEDURE:
 ○ 60 undergrad volunteers randomly allocated to internet, memory or baseline
○ First phase of procedure:
■ Internet: told to use google to answer a series of eight difficult general knowledge
questions
■ Memory: answer the same Q.s but rely entirely on memory
■ Baseline: not asked Q.s
○ Second phase: P. asked to answer 8 easy general questions as fast as possible
■ All P. given access to google but w/o explicit instruction to use it
■ DP: proportion of Q. for which P. chose to use google in 2nd phase
● FINDINGS:
○ Results clearly suggest that using search engines to retrieve info makes us more likely to
do so (83% of internet P. used google) (less likely to use own memory)

EVALUATION
● Both studies clearly manipulate 1 or more IV & demonstrate a clear relationship between IV &
DV
○ But both rely on trivia information ­ does this compromise ecological validity
● Provide important information
● Research is relatively new
○ Need to be tested for reliability
○ Advisable not to draw definitive conclusions could open you up to confirmation bias