A landlord leased an apartment to a tenant by written lease for two years ending on the last day of a

recent month. The lease provided for $700 monthly rental. The tenant occupied the apartment and paid
the rent for the first 15 months of the lease term, until he moved to a new job in another city. Without
consulting the landlord, the tenant moved a friend into the apartment and signed an informal writing
transferring to the friend his "lease rights" for the remaining nine months of the lease. The friend made
the next four monthly $700 rental payments to the landlord. For the final five months of the lease term,
no rent was paid by anyone, and the friend moved out with three months left of the lease term. The
landlord was on an extended trip abroad, and did not learn of the default and the vacancy until last
week. The landlord sued the tenant and the friend, jointly and severally, for $3,500 for the last five
months' rent.

What is the likely outcome of the lawsuit?

(A) Both the tenant and the friend are liable for the full $3,500, because the tenant is liable on privity of
contract and the friend is liable on privity of estate as assignee.

(B) The friend is liable for $1,400 on privity of estate, which lasted only until he vacated, and the
tenant is liable for $2,100 on privity of contract and estate for the period after the friend vacated.

(C) The friend is liable for $3,500 on privity of estate and the tenant is not liable, because the landlord's
failure to object to the friend's payment of rent relieved the tenant of liability.

(D) The tenant is liable for $3,500 on privity of contract and the friend is not liable, because a sublessee
does not have personal liability to the original landlord.
A correct - An assignment arises when a tenant transfers all or some of the leased premises to another
for the remainder of the lease term, retaining no interest in the assigned premises. In this case, prior to
the agreement with the friend, the tenant had privity of contract with the landlord because of the lease.
The tenant also had privity of estate because the tenant was in possession of the apartment.
Subsequently, an assignment arose when the tenant transferred the premises to the friend for the
remainder of the lease term of nine months. The friend was then in privity of estate with the landlord as
to all promises that run with the land, including the covenant to pay rent. The tenant was not released
by the landlord, however, and thus remained liable on privity of contract.
A landowner conveyed his land by quitclaim deed to his daughter and son "as joint tenants in fee
simple." The language of the deed was sufficient to create a common-law joint tenancy, which is
unmodified by statute. The daughter then duly executed a will devising her interest in the land to a
friend. Then the son duly executed a will devising his interest in the land to a cousin. The son died, then
the daughter died. Neither had ever married. The daughter's friend and the cousin survived.

After both wills have been duly probated, who owns what interest in the land?

A. the cousin owns the fee simple

B. the daughter's friend and the cousin own equal shares as joint tenants

C. the daughter's friend and the cousin own equal shares as tenants in common

D. the daughter's friend owns the fee simple

D correct - A joint tenancy is not devisable or inheritable, and cannot be severed by a will. In this case,
the son and the daughter received title as joint tenants with right of survivorship. On the death of the
son, the interest of the daughter swelled and she then owned the land alone and in fee simple. She had
the right to devise that interest by her will to the friend.
A landowner died, validly devising his land to his wife "for life or until remarriage, then to" their
daughter. Shortly after the landowner's death, his daughter executed an instrument in the proper form of
a deed, purporting to convey the land to her friend. A year later, the daughter died intestate, with her
mother, the original landowner's wife, as her sole heir. The following month, the wife re-married. She
then executed an instrument in the proper form of a deed, purporting to convey the land to her new
husband as a wedding gift.

Who now owns what interest in the land?

A. the daughter's friend owns the fee simple

B. the wife owns the fee simple

C. the wife's new husband has a life estate in the land for the wife's life, with the remainder in the
daughter's friend

D. the wife's new husband owns the fee simple

A correct - The landowner's wife had a determinable life estate, evidenced by the words "for life" and
"until remarriage" in the landowner's will. The daughter had a vested remainder and an executory
interest. Both of the daughter's interests could be assigned to the friend. On the remarriage of the
landowner's wife, the wife's life estate ended and it automatically went to the holder of the future
interest, who was then the daughter's friend.
On a parcel of land immediately adjacent to a woman's 50-acre farm, a public school district built a
large consolidated high school that included a 5,000-seat lighted athletic stadium. The woman had
objected to the district's plans for the stadium and was particularly upset about nighttime athletic events
that attracted large crowds and that, at times, resulted in significant noise and light intensity levels. On
nights of athletic events, the woman and her family members wore earplugs and could not sleep or
enjoy a quiet evening until after 10 p.m. In addition, light from the stadium on those nights was bright
enough to allow reading a newspaper in the woman's yard.

Which of the following doctrines would best support the woman's claim for damages?

A. constructive eviction

B. private nuisance

C. public nuisance

D. waste
B correct - Damages may be awarded if a private nuisance is proven. A private nuisance is a substantial
and unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of one's land. The facts demonstrate a non-
trespassory invasion of the woman's property rights.
Thirty years ago, a landowner conveyed land by warranty deed to a church (a charity) "so long as the
land herein conveyed is used as the site for the principal religious edifice maintained by said church."

Twenty years ago, the landowner died intestate, survived by a single heir.
One year ago, the church dissolved and its church building situated on the land was demolished.

There is no applicable statute. The common law Rule Against Perpetuities is unmodified in the
jurisdiction.

In an appropriate action, the landowner's heir and the attorney general, who is the appropriate official to
assert public interests in charitable trusts, contest the right to the land.

In such action, who will prevail?

A. the landowner's heir, as successor the landowner's possibility of reverter

B. the landowner's heir, because a charity cannot convey assets donated to it

C. the attorney general, because cy pres should be applied to devote the land to religious purposes to
carry out the charitable intent of the landowner

D. the attorney general, because the landowner's attempt to restrict the church's fee simple violated
RAP
A correct - The conveyance to the church created a fee simple determinable. The future interest retained
by the grantor is a possibility of reverter. The church's right to possession ended automatically when the
church stopped using the land as the site for its principal religious edifice. The heir inherited the
possibility of reverter retained by the landowner and is entitled to possession.
A rectangular parcel of undeveloped land contained three acres and had 150 feet of frontage on a public
street. The applicable zoning ordinance required that a buildable lot contain at least two acres and have
frontage of not less than 100 feet on a public street.

A brother and sister owned the land as tenants in common, the brother owning a one-third interest and
the sister owning a two-thirds interest. Neither of them owned any other real property.

The sister brought an appropriate action to partition the land and proposed that a two-acre rectangular
lot with 100 feet of frontage be set off to her and that a one-acre rectangular lot with 50 feet of frontage
be set off to the brother. The brother's defense included a demand that the land be sold and its proceeds
be divided one-third to the brother and two-thirds to the sister.

Who will prevail?

A. the brother, because partition by sale is the preferred remedy, unless a fair price is not the likely
result of a sale

B. the brother, because the zoning ordinance makes it impossible to divide the land fairly

C. the sister, because partition by sale is not appropriate if the subject property can be physically
divided

D. the sister, because the ratio of the two lots that would result from her proposal conforms exactly to
the ownership ratio
B correct - A tenant in common may bring an action to partition the property. Partition in kind, in which
there is a physical division of the common property, is preferred; however, a partition by sale is allowed
when a fair and equitable physical division of the property is impossible. The applicable zoning
ordinance requires a frontage of 100 feet on a public street in order to build. It would not be fair or
equitable to convey only 50 feet of frontage to the brother, who then could not build on his lot.
A landlord and a tenant orally agreed to a commercial tenancy for a term of six months beginning on
July 1. Rent was to be paid by the first day of each month, and the tenant paid the first month's rent at
the time of the agreement.

When the tenant arrived at the leased premises on July 1, the tenant learned that the previous tenant had
not vacated the premises at the end of her lease term on May 31 and did not intend to vacate. The
tenant then successfully sued the previous tenant for possession. The tenant did not inform the landlord
of the eviction action until after the tenant received possession.

The tenant then sued the landlord, claiming damages for that portion of the lease period during which
the tenant was not in possession.

If the court finds for the landlord, what will be the most likely explanation?

A. By suing the previous tenant for possession, the tenant elected that remedy in lieu of a suit against
the landlord

B. the landlord had delivered the legal right of possession to the tenant

C. the tenant failed to timely vacate as required to sue for constructive eviction

D. the tenant had not notified the landlord before bringing the eviction action
B correct - The landlord granted the legal right of possession to the tenant, which means that neither the
landlord nor anyone holding of the landlord prevented the tenant from going into possession at the
commencement of the lease term. The previous tenant's lease term had ended before the new lease term
began. The previous tenant then became a trespasser and was not holding of the landlord. The court
found for the landlord, and thus there is no rule in this jurisdiction that the landlord need also put the
tenant into actual possession.
A mother who died testate devised her farm to her son and her daughter as "joint tenants with right of
survivorship." The language of the will was sufficient to create a common law joint tenancy with right
of survivorship, which is unmodified by statute in the jurisdiction. After the mother's death and with the
daughter's permission, the son took sole possession of the farm and agreed to pay the daughter a
stipulated monthly rent.

Several years later, the son defaulted on a personal loan, and his creditor obtained a judgment against
him for $30,000. The creditor promptly and properly filed the judgment.

A statute of the jurisdiction provides: "Any judgment properly filed shall, for 10 years from filing, be a
lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the
judgment is rendered."

Six months later, the son died.

There are no other applicable statutes.

Is the creditor entitled to enforce its judgment lien against the farm?
A. No, because the daughter became sole owner of the farm free and clear of the creditor's judgment
lien when the son died

B. No, because the son's interest was severed from the daughter's interest upon filing the lien

C. Yes, because a joint tenancy cannot be created by devise and the son died owning a 50% undivided
interest in the farm as a tenant in common

D. Yes, because the son died owning a 50% undivided interest in the farm as a joint tenant with the
daughter
A correct - the recording of a judgment against a joint tenant with right of survivorship allows the
judgment creditor to obtain a writ of execution but does not effect a severance of the joint tenancy. The
son's creditor failed to execute on the judgment against the son before his death, and the daughter, as
the survivor, became the sole owner of the farm.
Seven years ago, a man, his sister, and his cousin became equal owners, as tenants in common, of a
house. Until a year ago, the man lived in the house alone. The sister and the cousin are longtime
residents of another state.

One year ago, the man moved to an apartment and rented the house to a tenant for three years under a
lease that the man and the tenant both signed. The tenant has since paid the rent each month to the man.

Recently, the sister and the cousin learned about the rental. They brought an appropriate action against
the tenant to have the lease declared void and to have the tenant evicted. The tenant raised all available
defenses.

What will the court likely decide?

A. the lease is void, and the tenant is evicted

B. the lease is valid, and the tenant contains exclusive occupancy rights for the balance of the term

C. the lease is valid, but the tenant is evicted because one-third of the lease term has expired and the
man had only a one-third interest to transfer

D. the lease is valid, and the tenant is not evicted but must share possession with the sister and the
cousin
D correct - An individual tenant in common may transfer his or her undivided interest by a lease for a
term of years. The tenant obtains only the transferor's concurrent right of possession with the other
tenants in common. The man, as a tenant in common, validly transferred his interest in the tenancy in
common to the tenant by a lease for a term of years. The tenant must, however, share the right of
possession with the other cotenants, the sister and the cousin, for the term of the lease. The man must
share the rental income with the sister and the cousin.
A woman died, devising land that she owned in another state to her daughter, who was then 17 years
old.

A neighbor who owned the property immediately adjacent to the land wrongfully began to possess the
land at that time. For 24 of the next 25 years, the neighbor planted and harvested crops on the land,
hunted on it, and parked cars on it. However, in the sixth year after he first took possession of the land,
the neighbor neither planted crops nor hunted nor parked cars on the land because he spent that entire
year living in Europe. The neighbor built a small gardening shed on the land, but he never built a
residence on it.

When the daughter was 28, she was declared mentally incompetent and had a conservator appointed to
oversee her affairs. Since then, she has continuously resided in a care facility.

The applicable statute of limitations provides as follows: "An ejectment action shall be brought within
21 years after the cause of action accrues, but if the person entitled to bring the cause of action is under
age 18 or mentally incompetent at the time the cause of action accrues, it may be brought by such
person within 10 years after attaining age 18 or after the person becomes competent."

If the daughter's conservator wins an ejectment action against the neighbor, what will be the most likely
explanation?

A. the daughter was age 17 when the neighbor first took possession of the land

B. because the daughter is mentally incompetent, the statute of limitations has been tolled

C. the neighbor never built a residence on the land

D. the neighbor was not in continuous possession of the land for 21 years
D correct - The time period to acquire title by adverse possession in this jurisdiction is a minimum of
21 years. The neighbor has not been in continuous adverse possession for the entire 21-year period
required because the neighbor spent one year in Europe after the first five years of possession.
A woman died testate. In her will, she devised a farm she owned to her husband for life, remainder to
her niece. Her will did not specify the duties of the husband and the niece with regard to maintenance
and expenses related to the farm. The husband took sole possession of the farm, did not farm the land,
and did not rent the land to a third person, although the fair rental value was substantial.

For two years in a row after the woman died, the county assessor sent the tax bills to the niece, but the
niece did not pay the bills, because she and the husband could not agree on who should pay them.
Finally, the niece paid the taxes to avoid a tax foreclosure sale.

The niece then sued the husband for reimbursement for the two years' worth of property taxes. There is
no applicable statute.

Is the niece likely to prevail?

A. no, because remaindermen are solely responsible for the payment of property taxes

B. no, because the county assessor sent the bills to the niece

C. no, because the woman's will was silent on responsibility for payment of property taxes

D. yes, because the niece paid an obligation that was the sole responsibility of the husband
D correct - In the absence of a contrary direction in the document creating the life estate—in this case,
the will—it is the duty of the life tenant to pay all general property taxes that accrue during the
continuance of the life estate. The only limitation on this duty is that the life tenant has no duty to
expend more than the income that can be generated from the land. Because the fair rental value of the
farmland was substantial, this limitation does not apply. If the remainderman does pay any property
taxes due during the life tenancy, he or she is entitled to a judgment against the life tenant for
reimbursement.
Under the terms of his duly probated will, a testator devised his house to his "grandchildren in fee
simple" and the residue of his estate to his brother. The testator had had two children, a son and a
daughter, but only the daughter survived the testator. At the time of the testator's death, the daughter
was 30 years old and had two minor children (grandchildren of the testator) who also survived the
testator.

A third grandchild of the testator, who was the child of the testator's predeceased son, had been alive
when the testator executed the will, but had predeceased the testator. Under the applicable intestate
succession laws, the deceased grandchild's sole heir was his mother.

A statute of the jurisdiction provides as follows: "If a devisee, including a devisee of a class gift, who is
a grandparent or a lineal descendant of a grandparent of the testator is dead at the time of execution of
the will or fails to survive the testator, the issue of such deceased devisee shall take the deceased's share
under the will, unless the will expressly provides that this statute shall not apply. For this purpose,
words of survivorship, such as 'if he survives me,' are a sufficient expression that the statute shall not
apply."

Who now owns the house?

A. the testator's brother

B. the testator's two surviving grandchildren

C. the testator's two surviving grandchildren and all other grandchildren who are born to the testator's
daughter

D. the testator's two surviving grandchildren and the deceased grandchild's mother
B is correct - The testator devised his house, which he owned at his death, to his grandchildren as a
class gift. The testator was survived by two grandchildren who became the sole surviving members of
the class. The deceased grandchild's interest lapsed because the grandchild, though alive at the time of
the will execution, died before the testator. The deceased grandchild would qualify under the anti-lapse
statute, but he was not survived by any issue who would be substituted for him under the statute.
A farmer, being fee simple owner of a farm, devised it to his niece and her husband as tenants by the
entirety. The niece and her husband took immediate possession of the farm and lived there with their
daughter and son. Thereafter, the husband died in an automobile accident.

In 1972, two years after her father's death, the daughter moved to another state. The son lived with his
mother on the farm until her death intestate in 1980. The son continued in exclusive possession of the
farm until his death in 2001. In his will, the son devised the farm to a local charity. When he was alive,
the son was unaware that his sister was still alive and that title to the farm had descended to the two of
them as their mother's sole surviving heirs. Since his mother's death in 1980 the son has held himself
out as the owner of the farm, maintaining it and paying all of the taxes on the property. The sister had
not communicated with either her mother or her brother since her redomiciling in 1972.
The jurisdiction in which the farm is located has a 20-year limitation period for the acquisition of
property by adverse possession. What interest, if any, does the sister have in the property?

A. none, because of her own laches

B. none, because the brother acquired title to the farm by adverse possession

C. an undivided one-half interest because the brother's possession was not adverse to her title

D. an undivided one-half interest because the 20 year limitation period did not run against her because
she was unaware of the brother's exclusive possession
C is correct - Here, the brother and sister acquired title to the farm as tenants in common (by descent
from their mother). In a tenancy in common, each tenant owns an undivided fractional part of the
property and none owns the whole (as in joint tenancy). The brother will not own the property outright
because the brother's conduct never amounted to an ouster of his sister. An ouster occurs where one co-
tenant manages to wrongfully exclude the other co-tenants from possession of the property. When one
co-tenant ousts from possession her co-tenant, the ousted tenant has a cause of action against the
possessor, not to put her out, but to regain possession for herself with the possessor. Where one co-
tenant stakes a claim for exclusive possession of any part of the property, the claim alone may amount
to an ouster. The brother's living on the property alone will not be enough to oust the sister of her
undivided one-half interest because the brother's possession was not adverse to his sister's title.
A landlord is the owner in fee simple of a tract of land on which is situated a large office building. The
landlord leases the land and building thereon to a tenant for a term of seven years, commencing on
August 1, 2001, and terminating at midnight on July 31, 2008. The lease contains the following
provisions

"(1) The tenant covenants to keep the building on the leased premises insured against fire in the amount
of $100,000."

After three years of the lease had expired, the tenant assigned the entire balance of the lease period to a
doctor, who took immediate possession of the leased property. Then in 2005, the doctor assigned his
leasehold interest to a dentist. The dentist went into possession, but failed to pay any rent for two
months.

Soon afterwards, a fire spread from an adjoining building to the leased property, completely destroying
the building thereon. While the tenant was in possession of the leased property, he carried a fire
insurance policy on the premises in the amount of $100,000. However, the tenant allowed the policy to
lapse after his assignment to the doctor. The doctor did carry insurance on the leased building, but only
in the amount of $50,000. When the dentist took possession of the building, he did not obtain any fire
insurance.

The landlord learned that the building was not insured at the time of the fire as per the original
agreement.

In an action by the landlord against the tenant to recover for the fire loss, the landlord will most
probably

A. recover because in accordance with the Rule in Spencer's Case, the covenant to maintain fire
insurance would 'touch and concern' the land
B. recover because the tenant's obligation to maintain fire insurance did not terminate after his
assignment to the doctor

C. not recover, because the covenant to provide fire insurance did not run with the land

D. not recover, because the dentist, as assignee, would be liable for the fire loss
B is correct - A covenant in a lease to pay (fire) insurance is held to "run with the land." In this regard,
a covenant to pay insurance is capable of running if and only if the landlord is bound to use the
proceeds for repair or replacement. It is important to understand that the tenant's assignment of his
leasehold interest to the doctor did not relieve or extinguish the tenant's contractual obligations under
his lease with the landlord. In short, an assignment does not release the tenant from his contract
obligations to the landlord under the terms of this original leasehold agreement. To be sure, a lease is a
contract as well as a conveyance.
A landlord is the owner in fee simple of a tract of land on which is situated a large office building. The
landlord leases the land and building thereon to a tenant for a term of seven year , commencing on
August 1, 2001, and terminating at midnight on July 31, 2008. The lease contains the following
provisions:

"(I) The tenant covenants to pay the rent of $750 per month on the first day of each month."

After three years of the lease had expired the tenant assigned the entire balance of the lease period to an
attorney, who took immediate possession of the leased property. Then in 2005, the attorney assigned his
leasehold interest to a doctor. The doctor went into possession. but failed to pay any rent for two
months.

After the doctor failed to make his rental payments for the first two months of the lease, the landlord
brought suit against the tenant to recover for the unpaid rent.

Judgment should be for

A. the landlord because the tenant's contractual obligation under the lease survived the assignments

B. the landlord because he did not object to the assignments

C. the tenant, because the doctor, as assignee, would only be held liable

D. the tenant, because his assignment to the attorney constituted a novation, thereby extinguishing his
obligation to pay rent
A is correct - Where a tenant-assignor transfers all of his leasehold interest to an assignee, such
assignment does not release the original tenant from his contract obligations to the landlord under the
terms of the lease. This is true even when the assignee, thereafter, assigns/transfers his leasehold
interest to a sub-assignee.
A landlord was the owner of a two-story dwelling house and leased it completely furnished to a tenant
for a 10-year period. Two years after the tenant entered into the leasehold agreement with the landlord,
he subleases the house to his cousin. Thereafter, the cousin defaults on the rental payments. If the
landlord brings an action to recover the past rent due from the cousin, the landlord will:

A. recover, because privity of estate exists between a landlord and sublessee

B. recover, because there is privity of contract between a landlord and sublessee

C. recover, because there is both privity of estate and privity of contract between a landlord and
sublessee

D. not recover because privity of estate does not exist between the landlord and sublessee
D is correct - The landlord may not recover for rent due from sublessee because there is no privity of
estate between landlord and sublessee. The landlord's only cause of action remains against the tenant
under their original leasehold agreement.
A landowner owned a large building in the city. On January 15, the landowner leased the building to a
tenant for a period of 20 years at a rental of $10,000 per month. The leasehold agreement between the
landowner and tenant provided that the latter was not permitted "to assign this lease to anyone except a
corporation with an 'A' credit rating from a well-known credit rating company." On February 1 of the
following year, the tenant leased the premises to a corporation that did not have the required credit
rating. The tenant-corporation lease was for a period of five years, with a rental of $15,000 per month,
payable by the corporation to the tenant. In addition, the corporation agreed to abide "by all of the
terms and conditions of the lease between the landowner and tenant."

What is the legal effect of the non-assignability clause on the tenant-corporation contract?

A. the non-assignability provision had no legal effect

B. the non-assignability provision made the assignment from the tenant the corporation ineffective

C. the tenant-corporation lease did not effectuate a breach of the landowner-tenant contract

D. although the tenant-corporation lease constituted a breach of the landowner-tenant contract, the
landowner would nevertheless be required to recognize the validity of the transfer (of the premises) to
the corporation
A is correct - The non-assignability provision had no legal effect. Because the tenant's transfer (of the
premises) to the corporation constituted a sublease, not an assignment, the said provision would have
no legal effect. Students must know the distinction between an assignment and a sublease. An
assignment is a transfer of a tenant's entire leasehold estate to another; whereas a sublease is a transfer
of anything less than a tenant's entire leasehold estate.
As a high school graduation present, a father presented his daughter with a signed document that stated,
"I give my beach house to my daughter until she graduates from college. Then, the beach house shall
go to my brother and his heirs. If my brother attempts to convey the beach house, then it shall go to my
sister and her heirs." The father gave copies of the signed document to his brother and sister. The
daughter changed her major several times; however, 10 years later, she graduated from college with a
degree in journalism. At her college graduation party, she handed her uncle (her father's brother) the
house keys, saying, "It's all yours now." The father's brother married his childhood sweetheart. He then
executed a signed document transferring the beach house to himself and his new wife "as joint tenants."
The father's sister recently learned of the transfer and filed suit to have herself declared the true owner
of the beach house.

What is the state of the title to the beach house?

A. the father's sister holds the beach house in fee simple

B. the father's sister, father's brother, and his new wife are tenants in common

C. the father's sister and the brother's new wife are tenants in common

D. the father's brother and his new wife are joint tenants
D is correct - As a general rule, any direct restraint imposed upon a fee simple is invalid. Only estates
less than fees may be subject to restraints upon their alienation. Here, the father's original document
provided that his brother and his heirs would receive the beach house once his daughter graduated from
college. Because the father used words of inheritance, even in a common law jurisdiction, the brother
would receive the beach house in fee simple following the daughter's graduation. The document further
stated that if the brother tried to convey the beach house, the property would go to his sister and her
heirs. This provision is a forfeiture restraint, which is automatically invalid only where a fee is
involved. Here, as noted, the brother received the property in fee and, as such, the forfeiture restraint
was invalid. Thus, the brother was free to transfer the property to his wife and himself as joint tenants.
A seller entered into a written contract to sell a tract of land to an investor. The contract made no
mention of the quality of title to be conveyed. Thereafter, the seller and the investor completed the sale,
and the seller delivered a warranty deed to the investor. Soon thereafter, the value of the land increased
dramatically. The investor entered into a written contract to sell the land to a buyer. The contract
between the investor and the buyer expressly provided that the investor would convey a marketable
title. The buyer's attorney discovered that the title to the land was not marketable, and had not been
marketable when the original seller conveyed to the investor. The buyer refused to complete the sale.
The investor sued the original seller on multiple counts. One count was for breach of the contract
between the seller and the investor for damages resulting from the seller's failure to convey to the
investor marketable title, resulting in the loss of the sale of the land to the subsequent buyer.

Who is likely to prevail on this count?

A. the investor, because the law implies in the contract a covenant that the title would be marketable

B. the investor, because the original seller is liable for all reasonably foreseeable damages

C. the original seller, because her contract obligations are to title merged into the deed

D. the original seller, because she did not expressly agree to convey marketable title
C is correct - Although a marketable title will be implied in a contract for the sale of land, the doctrine
of merger provides that one can no longer sue on title matters contained in the contract of sale after the
deed is delivered and accepted. The investor's remedy, if there is one, would be based on the deed he
received and not on the contract of sale.
A buyer validly contracted in writing to buy land from a seller. The contract had no contingencies and
was silent as to risk of loss if there were damage to, or destruction of, property improvements between
contract and closing, and as to any duty to carry insurance. As soon as the parties signed the contract,
the seller (who had already moved out) canceled her insurance covering the land. The buyer did not
know this and did not obtain insurance. A few days later, three weeks before the agreed closing date,
the building on the land was struck by lightning and burned to the ground. There is no applicable
statute. In an appropriate action, the buyer asserted the right to cancel the contract and to recover his
earnest money. The seller said the risk of fire loss passed to the buyer before the fire, so the buyer must
perform.
If the seller prevails, what is the most likely explanation?

A. once the parties signed the contract, only the buyer had an insurable interest and so could have
protected against this loss

B. the buyer's constructive possession arising from the contract gave him the affirmative duty of
protecting against loss by fire

C. the seller's cancellation of her casualty insurance practically construed the contract to transfer the
risk of loss to the buyer

D. upon execution of the contract, the buyer become the equitable owner of the land under the doctrine
of equitable conversion
D is correct - Although jurisdictions differ on which party has the risk of loss, a finding for the seller in
this case means the jurisdiction hearing the case places the risk of loss on the equitable owner of the
property, the buyer, under the doctrine of equitable conversion.
An uncle was the record title holder of a vacant tract of land. He often told friends that he would leave
the land to his nephew in his will. The nephew knew of these conversations. Prior to the uncle's death,
the nephew conveyed the land by warranty deed to a woman for $10,000. She did not conduct a title
search of the land before she accepted the deed from the nephew. She promptly and properly recorded
her deed. Last month, the uncle died, leaving the land to the nephew in his duly probated will. Both the
nephew and the woman now claim ownership of the land. The nephew has offered to return the
$10,000 to the woman.

Who has title to the land?

A. the nephew, because at the time of the deed to the woman, the uncle was the owner of record

B. the nephew, because the woman did not conduct a title search

C. the woman, because of the doctrine of estoppel by deed

D. the woman, because she recoded her deed prior to the uncle's death
C is correct - Estoppel by deed applies to validate a deed, and in particular a warranty deed, that was
executed and delivered by a grantor who had no title to the land at that time, but who represented that
he or she had such title and who thereafter acquired such title. In this case, estoppel by deed would
apply in the woman's favor to estop the nephew from claiming ownership of the land upon the death of
his uncle.
A seller who owned land in fee simple entered into a valid written agreement to sell the land to a buyer
by installment purchase. The contract stipulated that the seller would deliver to the buyer, upon the
payment of the last installment due, "a warranty deed sufficient to convey a fee simple title." The
contract contained no other provision that could be construed as referring to title.
The buyer entered into possession of the land. After making 10 of the 300 installment payments
obligated under the contract, the buyer discovered that there was outstanding a valid and enforceable
mortgage on the land, securing the payment of a debt in the amount of 25 percent of the purchase price
that the buyer had agreed to pay. There was no evidence that the seller had ever been late in payments
due under the mortgage and there was no evidence of any danger of insolvency of the seller. The value
of the land was then four times the amount due on the debt secured by the mortgage.
The buyer quit possession of the land, stopped making payments on the contract, and demanded that
the seller repay the amounts that the buyer had paid under the contract. After the seller refused the
demand, the buyer sued the seller to recover damages for the seller's alleged breach of the contract.
In such action, should damages be awarded to the buyer?

A. yes, because in the absence of a contrary express agreement, an obligation to convey marketable
title is implied

B. yes, because an installment purchase contract is treated as a mortgage and the outstanding mortgage
impairs the buyer's equity of redemption

C. no, because an installment purchase contract is treated as a security device

D. no, because the time for the seller to deliver marketable title has not arrived
D is correct - Title does not have to be marketable until the closing date when all payments have been
received. The buyer still has 290 payments to make. A mortgage can render title unmarketable but it is
most likely that title will be marketable when all payments have been made by the buyer under the
agreement. The seller has made all mortgage payments timely. The amount of the mortgage debt is 25
percent of the purchase price the buyer will pay, and the land is four times more valuable than the debt
owed, so it is likely that the mortgage debt will be paid off by the time the seller must provide the
warranty deed, and thus the buyer is not entitled to damages at this time.
A niece inherited vacant land from her uncle. She lived in a distant state and decided to sell the land to
a colleague who was interested in purchasing the land as an investment. They orally agreed upon a
price, and, at the colleague's insistence, the niece agreed to provide him with a warranty deed without
any exceptions. The price was paid, the warranty deed was delivered, and the deed was promptly and
properly recorded. Neither the niece nor the colleague had, at that point, ever seen the land.

After recording the deed, the colleague visited the land for the first time and discovered that it had no
access to any public right-of-way and that none of the surrounding lands had ever been held in common
ownership with any previous owner of the tract of land.

The colleague sued the niece for damages. For whom will the court find?

A. the colleague, because lack of access makes title unmarketable

B. the colleague, because the covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment in the deed were breached

C. the niece, because no title covenants were breached

D. the niece, because the agreement to sell was oral

C is correct - Lack of access may render title unmarketable under the contract of sale; however, the
time to challenge marketable title is prior to the acceptance of the deed. Under the doctrine of merger,
the remedy, if any, is on the title covenant in the deed. Lack of access does not violate any of the title
covenants. The colleague received the title the niece said she had. No one had a superior title and thus
the covenants of seisin, right to convey, quiet enjoyment, and general warranty were not breached. The
covenant against encumbrances provides protection for interests held by third parties such as easements
for access. The land was not subject to an express easement nor may any easement be implied based on
either prior use or necessity because the lands were never held in common ownership.
A rancher owned a large ranch in fee simple. After working the land for 40 years, the rancher sold the
property to a worker and a ranch-hand as tenants in common for $1.2 million. Conveyance was by
quitclaim deed, which the buyers failed to record.

Several years later, a disagreement arose between the worker and the ranch-hand as to the best use for
the land. When they were unable to resolve the dispute, the ranch-hand conveyed his one-half interest
in the property to an investor by special warranty deed, which the investor properly recorded.

Soon thereafter, the rancher sold the property to a speculator for $900,000, its fair market value in a
depressed market. The rancher presented the speculator with a general warranty deed, which the
speculator duly recorded. The recording statute in effect in the jurisdiction provided: "Every
conveyance of real property, other than a lease for a term not to exceed one year, is void as against any
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property or any part thereof in good faith and for
valuable consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded."

The jurisdiction in which the ranch property was located used grantor-grantee and grantee-grantor
indexes.

In a suit to quiet title, who will be determined to be the owner of the ranch?

A. the speculator, because he cannot be charged with constructive knowledge of the investor's claim to
the property

B. the worker and the investor, because the speculator can be charged with inquiry notice of the
investor's interest in the property

C. the investor, because the investor paid value for the property

D. the investor and the speculator as tenants in common, because they both have valid claim to the
property
A is correct - The speculator, because he cannot be charged with constructive knowledge of the
investor's claim to the property. Under the facts presented, the jurisdiction has a "race-notice" recording
statute. To prevail under a race-notice statute, a claimant of real property must prove the following four
elements: 1) that the claimant took subsequent
in time to another person claiming ownership of the real property in question; 2) that the claimant was a
bona fide purchaser for value; 3) that the claimant took the property without actual, constructive, or
inquiry notice; and 4) that the claimant recorded first. In this case, the speculator took title to the ranch
subsequent in time to the investor. In addition, given that the worker and the ranch-hand never recorded
their title to the ranch, the speculator took without actual, inquiry, or constructive notice of the ranch-
hand's conveyance to the investor and/or of the investor's claim to the property. Finally, the speculator
was the first party to record. Therefore, in a suit to quiet title, the speculator will prevail.
A gambler executed and delivered to his gullible cousin a warranty deed to a large castle in exchange
for a substantial amount of money. The cousin immediately recorded this deed. The castle was, in fact,
owned by, and record title to it was held by, a famous writer. In a surprising turn of events, two months
after the purported gambler-cousin transaction, the writer lost a massive poker game to the gambler and
conveyed the castle to the gambler via a general warranty deed, which the gambler recorded. The
gambler subsequently sold and conveyed the property to a young couple for its fair market value. The
couple, who knew nothing of the gambler-cousin transaction, immediately recorded their deed. The
jurisdiction has a "race-notice" recording act and imposes a limited search burden on a purchaser of
land.

After all the events in question, who is the owner of the castle?

A. the cousin, because "first in time is first in right"

B. the cousin, under the doctrine of estoppel by deed

C. the couple, because the cousin was not a subsequent bona fide purchaser

D. the couple, because the jurisdiction imposes a limited search burden on a purchaser of land
D is correct - The couple, because the jurisdiction imposes a limited search burden on a purchaser of
land. This fact pattern is a typical "deed recorded early" scenario, in which the dispute between the
cousin and the couple is determined by the extent of the search burden placed upon the couple by the
relevant jurisdiction. The majority of states (including this hypothetical one) impose a limited search
burden; the couple need search the grantor-grantee index for the gambler's name as a granter only after
the date where the grantor appears as a grantee. Thus, the couple is assured that the gambler did not
convey the castle to anyone after he became its owner. Under the limited search view, the couple
prevails because, although the gambler-cousin deed is recorded, it is considered outside the chain of
title as to the couple.
A state has the following recording statute in effect: "No conveyance is good against a subsequent
purchaser for a valuable consideration and without notice unless the same be recorded prior to
subsequent purchase."

An owner is the fee simple the owner of a 20-acre tract of unimproved land, situated in the state. On
May 1 the owner sold the tract to a buyer for the purchase price of $40,000 under a quitclaim deed. The
owner delivered the deed to the buyer who did not record the deed. After the sale to the buyer, the
owner found himself in desperate need of money because he lost his job. So the owner in consideration
of the sum of $75,000 conveyed the tract to an investor by warranty deed. This transaction took place
on August 1.

When the investor acquired title to the tract, he had no actual knowledge of the buyer's deed (which
was still unrecorded). On August 10, the buyer recorded his deed to the tract. The investor did not
record the deed he received from the owner until August l5.

In an appropriate action to quiet title to the tract in which all interested parties have been joined, title
will be found to be in

A. the buyer, because his deed preceded the investor's deed

B. the buyer, because his deed was recorded prior to the investor's deed

C. the investor, because he is protected by the recording statute

D. the investor, because he took title by warranty deed and the buyer took title by quitclaim deed
C is correct - The key to this question is carefully interpreting the wording of the recording statute.
According to the statutory language, the state's recording act protects subsequent bona fide purchasers
for value and without notice. As such, this is an example of a pure "notice" type recording statute,
which generally provides that an unrecorded conveyance or other instrument is invalid as against a
subsequent bona fide purchaser for value and without notice. Under this type of recording statute, the
subsequent bona fide purchaser prevails over the prior interest whether the subsequent purchaser
records or not. As a consequence, the investor will prevail over the buyer because the investor was a
subsequent bona fide purchaser without notice of the buyer's deed.
A deed executed by a grantor conveyed his property for a consideration of one dollar, receipt of which
was acknowledged, "to my brother for life, then to the heirs of my brother.' A life interest in the
property for the life of the brother is worth $20,000 on the date of the conveyance. The total worth of
the property is $50,000. The brother accepted but didn't record the deed.

The recording statute in this jurisdiction provided 'unless recorded, all written instruments affecting
title to land are void as to subsequent purchasers who paid value and without notice."

Four years later, the grantor purported to convey his property in fee simple absolute to his two sons, by
a warranty deed as a gift. The two sons recorded the deed. Shortly thereafter the brother ascertained
that the grantor's sons were about to take possession of the property. As a consequence, the brother
promptly recorded his deed.

In a dispute between the brother and the grantor's children as to the ownership of the property, if the
brother prevails it will be because

A. the brother paid valuable consideration for his deed

B. the brother recorded his deed before the grantor's children sought to oust him from the land

C. the grantor's sons are not protected by the recording statute

D. the grantors knowledge is imputed to his children

C is correct - In order to be a bona fide purchaser protected under the recording act, one must (a) be
subsequent; (b) pay value; (c) be without notice (the value must have actually been paid before notice);
and (d) be of good faith. Recording statutes do not protect a subsequent claimant who has not paid
more than a nominal consideration because he is not a purchaser. Therefore, in our case, the grantor's
children are not protected by the recording statute because they are not purchasers (as the grantor
purportedly conveyed the property to them as a gift). The brother will ultimately prevail because he
was the first in time to take the property from the grantor.
A father died leaving a will by which he devised a 100-acre tract to his daughter. At the time of the
father's death, he believed that he owned all of the 100-acre tract. However, the father actually owned
95 acres of the tract. The other five acres were owned by a farmer. After tacking possession of the tract,
the daughter executed and delivered a warranty deed to a buyer, purporting to convey all 100 acres of
the tract. The agreed purchase price was $100,000.

According to the terms of the sale, the buyer paid the daughter a down payment of $25,000, with the
unpaid portion of the purchase price (i.e., $75,000) secured by a mortgage. The mortgage instrument
described the property interest as covering all 100 acres of the tract. After the daughter-buyer
transaction was completed, the farmer came forward and informed the parties that she was the true
record owner of five acres of the 100-acre tract. Upon the farmer's threat to sue to quiet title, the
daughter negotiated a deal whereby she paid the farmer $5,000 for the five-acre tract.
As part of their agreement, the farmer executed and delivered a quitclaim deed quitclaiming to the
buyer all of her interest in the five-acre parcel. Thereafter, the buyer defaulted on the mortgage debt,
and the daughter properly consummated foreclosure proceedings, becoming the purchaser of the tract at
her own foreclosure sale. The description of the deed in the foreclosure sale referred to the tract as
consisting of all 100 acres. After the foreclosure sale was finalized, the buyer brought suit claiming title
in fee simple to the five-acre tract, formerly owned by the farmer.

In an appropriate action to determine the title to the said five-acre tract, the buyer will

A. lose, because the daughter did not have good and marketable title at the time she purported to
convey the 100-acre tract to the buyer

B. lose, because the doctrine of after-acquired title controls

C. win, because the deed from the farmer to the buyer was a quitclaim deed

D. win, because the quitclaim deed from the farmer to the buyer was subsequent to the deed from the
daughter to the buyer to and to the mortgage
B is correct - Under the doctrine of estoppel by deed (sometimes referred to as the "after-acquired title"
doctrine), when a person executes a deed purporting to convey an estate in land that he does not have
(or which is larger than he has), and such person at a later date acquires such estate in such land, then
the subsequently acquired estate will, by estoppel, pass to the grantee. In this example, once the
daughter purchased the five-acre tract from the farmer, title inured to the benefit of the buyer as
evidenced by the farmer's quitclaim deed to the buyer. Most importantly, the daughter held a mortgage
on the 100-acre tract. The mortgage instrument described the property interest as covering all 100 acres
of the tract. Thus, when the buyer defaulted and the daughter foreclosed, she purchased back the entire
tract of land (including the five acres previously owned by the farmer).
1. Nowadays, a landlord whose tenant has stopped paying rent while remaining in possession would be
well advised to:
A. change the locks in a peaceable manner while the tenant is out grocery shopping
B. ask the sheriff for advice about the most peaceable manner in which to change the locks
C. before changing the locks, provide written notice to the tenant that the landlord has terminate the
lease pursuant to a right of entry term in the lease
D. initiate eviction proceedings in court
D is correct - the old rule under which a landlord who was legally entitled to possession could use
peaceable self help to recover possession has since been rejected by many courts and legislatures
1. Olga owned Blackacre, a one acre-tract of land that contained a roadside restaurant. Thirty years ago,
she delivered a deed of Blackacre to "Amy for so long as alcohol is never served at the restaurant. My
daughter was killed by a drunk driver, and I do not want people to drink and drive." The deed was
promptly and properly recorded. A few years later, Olga died, leaving Sam, her son, as her only heir-at-
law. She devised all of her property to her cousin, Carl, by a duly probated will. Shortly thereafter, Carl
sold "all my interest in Blackacre" to Wanda. The next year, Amy began selling alcohol at the restaurant
located on Blackacre.
In a jurisdiction in which the common law Rule Against Perpetuities is unmodified by statute, who
currently has title to Blackacre?
a) Wanda, because alcohol is now being sold on Blackacre.
b) Amy because no party has taken any action to terminate her interest in Blackacre.
c) Sam, because Carl received an executory interest that was void under the Rule Against Perpetuities
rule.
d) Carl, because the interest he holds in Blackacre is not transferable during one's lifetime.
A is correct - The conveyance from Olga to Amy created a fee simple determinable, and a possibility of
reverter in Olga. As a future interest in the grantor, possibilities of reverter are not subject to the RAP.
When Olga died, her future interest was transferred by will to Carl, who subsequently transferred it to
Wanda. When Amy violated the "no alcohol" condition, the future interest then owned by Wanda
became the present possessory interest.
1. Imagine that, early in the 20th century, courts in the exercise of their equitable jurisdiction extended
the cy pres doctrine from the context in which it was originally developed (future interests) to the new
context of equitable servitudes. Which of the following would be the most plausible application of the
newly extended doctrine?

a) Invoking cy pres to hold that the benefit of a servitude may be enforced by a successor to the
originally benefited party who is not in vertical privity with the original beneficiary.
b) Invoking cy pres to hold that the burden of a servitude runs even against a successor who did not
have any type of notice.
c) Invoking cy pres to establish a default rule that the burden of a servitude runs when the original
parties' intent regarding the running of the burden is unclear.
d) In a case involving a conveyance between two landowners, A and B, in which A, the grantor, said to
B, "On behalf of myself and my successors and assigns and for the benefit of yourself and your
successors and assigns, I hereby grant you the right to an unobstructed view from your house across my
property," the court invokes cy pres to treat the agreement as a promise from A (on behalf of himself
and his successors and assigns) not to interfere with B's views, rather than as a grant of the right to
unobstructed views.
e) Invoking cy pres to eliminate the requirement of horizontal privity for the running of the burden of
an equitable servitude.
D is correct - b/c the conveyance is technically a negative easement (invalid), but can be saved by
treating the "grant" as a "promise" (rendering the agreement a real covenant / equitable servitude).
1. Bonnie enters into a purchase and sale agreement to buy Blackacre from Clyde. The contract
requires Bonnie put down 5% of the purchase price as a deposit, and it specifies that Clyde may retain
the deposit as liquidated damages if Bonnie breaches the contract. The contract does not mention any
warranty against encumbrances. In fact, it nowhere uses the term "encumbrance," nor does it say
anything about "easements" or "servitudes." There is only one contingency in the contract: Bonnie
reserved the right to have a roofer inspect the project and confirm that the roof of the house on
Blackacre in good condition.
During the inspection period, Bonnie discovers that Darius has a right of way easement across
Blackacre. While the roof turns out to be just fine, Bonnie wants to withdraw from the agreement
because she's unhappy about the idea of neighbor Darius driving across her property day in and day
out. If Bonnie withdraws from the agreement, may Clyde retain the deposit or must he return it to
Bonnie?
a) He must return the deposit because he breached the warranty of marketable title.
b) He must return the deposit because he failed to disclose a physical defect.
c) He may retain the deposit because Bonnie withdrew for a reason other than material defects in the
roof.
d) He may retain the deposit because deposits are nonrefundable.
A is correct - b/c nonpossessory interests are per-se encumbrances. The fact that the contract doesn't
include an express warranty about encumbrances or servitudes is irrelevant, because the warranty of
marketable title is implied when a purchase-and-sale agreement is silent on the question.
L leases a property to Alpha for a term of 10 years. The lease says nothing about sublease or
assignment. After using the property for 6 months, Alpha assigns her interest in the lease to Beta. L
then sells the property to Zeta in fee simple absolute, conveying the property by general warranty deed
without exceptions. Zeta had no actual notice of the lease at the time of the sale. Next, Beta assigns her
interest in the lease Gamma. Zeta files a lawsuit to evict Gamma. Zeta acknowledges that neither
Gamma nor the predecessor tenants violated the terms of the original lease between L and Alpha.
However, Zeta asserts that her right to possess the property is superior to Gamma's, so Gamma must
leave. Which of the following statements is a true under traditional common law principles?

I. Zeta's claim to possession is superior to Gamma's because Zeta's interest is first in time.
II. Zeta claim to possession is superior to Gamma's because Zeta bought the property without notice of
the lease.
III. Zeta must honor Gamma's right of possession because the lease predated Zeta's purchase of the
property and the common law favors free alienability of property including leaseholds

a) I only
b) II only
c) III only
d) I and II only
doesn't say on sheet
Olivia, who owns Blackacre in fee simple absolute, conveys Blackacre "to Alice and her heirs." Alice
then conveys Blackacre "to Bob and his heirs so long as the property is used as a nature preserve."
Following this second conveyance, Alice's interest may best be described as a:
a) contingent remainder
b) vested remainder subject to divestment
c) executory interest
d) none of the above is correct
D is correct - alice hold's a possibility of reverter
Amy, the owner of Blackacre, and Brent, the owner of Whiteacre, were neighbors. In 2009, they enter
into a contract stating: "Amy and Brent, their successors and assigns, hereby promise to use Blackacre
and Whiteacre for residential purposes only." Amy and Brent both signed the agreement and recorded
it. In 2015, Amy sold Blackacre to Carrie, who intends to build a convenience store on the property. If
Brent sues Carrie and seeks damages, which of the following arguments would be Carrie's best defense
if the jurisdiction follows the traditional American law of real covenants?
a. There was no intent, implied or express, that the covenant run with the land to subsequent owners
b. There was no vertical privity
c. There was no horizontal privity
d. The covenant did not touch and concern the land
c is correct - There is no horizontal privity because the promise to restrict the use of the properties to
residential uses wasn't made in a deed conveying a traditional, grantable interest in property. Horizontal
privity between the original parties is required for the burden of the promise to run to a successor under
the traditional "bar exam" law of real covenants.
Serena conveyed Viewacre, a tract of land adjoining the Pacific Ocean, to Bryce by general warranty
deed without exceptions. Prior to this conveyance, Esther had acquired from Serena an express written
easement to enter Viewacre for the purpose of performing jumping jacks while enjoying the fabulous
ocean view. This easement was properly recorded. Esther, a carefree and quirky spirit, does not own
anything except her easement, which she has never used.

Immediately following the conveyance of Viewacre to Bryce, which of the following statements is true
on the facts as given:
I. Bryce has a claim against Serena for breach of the covenant against encumbrances
II. Bryce has a claim against Serena for breach of the of the covenant of general warranty
III. Bryce has no claim against Serena if this jurisdiction does not allow noncommercial easements in
gross.
a) I & II only
b) II & III only
c) I & III only
d) All three statements are true
c is correct - II is not correct because the covenant of general warranty is breached, if at all, only when
the party who has an interest in the property asserts it. The question asked what is true immediately
following the conveyance. I is correct because any private nonpossessory interest is an encumbrance
for purposes of the present covenant against encumbrances, and there were no exceptions in the deed.
III is correct because the covenants in the deed warranty only against lawful claims
How will the proceeds from a partition sale of property initially held by four joint tenants (A, B, C, and
D) be divided if A had sold her property to E, B had gifted his property to F, and D had died leaving his
property to G?

a) E has ¼, F has ¼ and C has ½

b) E, F, and C each have 1/3
c) E, F, C and G each have ¼
d) E, B, and C each have 1/3
A is correct - After the conveyance to E, E owns a ¼ interest a TIC with (B, C, D) who are joint tenants
among themselves. B's conveyance to F means that E's interest (1/4) and F's interest (1/4) are both TIC
interests. When D dies, his interest "vanishes," leaving the other remaining joint tenant, C, owning ½ of
the property.
Jack and Kate own neighboring parcels of land. Underneath them is a large pool of natural gas. 95% of
the pool lies below Jack's land and 5% lies below Kate's land. Kate erects a massive pump on her
property and starts extracting huge amounts of natural gas. The operation is quiet and does not release
noxious fumes. At common law, what cause of action is available to Jack to enjoin Kate's extraction?
A. Trespass
B. Nuisance
C. Waste
D. None
D is correct - none, its the rule of capture
Carrie, an expert craftsperson, promises her neighbor, Danny, that in exchange for a one-time payment
of $5,000, she and her heirs and assigns will maintain in perpetuity the stone wall that marks the
boundary between their two properties. The payment is made, and the covenant is put in writing and
duly recorded. The covenant states that Carrie and her heirs and assigns have discretion to make repairs
to the wall themselves, or to hire someone else to make the repairs. After diligently maintaining the
wall for three decades, Carrie passes away. Her son, Charles, who inherits the property pursuant to
Carrie's will, lets the wall fall into disrepair. Danny brings suit, seeking a court order requiring Charles
either to fix the wall himself or to pay for a stone-wall repairperson to do regular maintenance. In a
jurisdiction that follows the traditional American law of real covenants and equitable servitudes, which
of the following must be true for the plaintiff to prevail in this action:
I. The benefit of the covenant must "run with the land."
II. The burden of the covenant must "run with the land."
III. The covenant must "touch and concern the land."
a) all of the above
b) I and II only
c) II and III only
d) I only
e) III only
C is correct - It doesn't matter whether the benefit runs, because the plaintiff in this case is the original
benefited party. The burden must run from Carrie to her son, and the covenant must touch and concern,
so II and III are correct.
In a jurisdiction that has adopted the rule and reasoning of Johnson v. Davis (abandoning the old
doctrine of caveat emptor), in which of the following scenarios is the buyer of a 100-year old house
most likely to be able to back out of a "purchase and sale" contract, which includes no inspection
contingencies, on account of the seller's failure to satisfy disclosure duties? Assume that the seller knew
of the problem in question at the time that she entered the purchase-and-sale agreement with the buyer.

a) The house's old floor joists had failed to provide sufficient support for a large, modern bathtub that
the seller had installed in the first-floor bathroom, and which recently fell through the bathroom floor,
leaving a large hole in the floor of the bathroom.
b) A chimney inspector that the seller had hired two years ago determined that the fireplace in the living
room was unsafe to use because of subtle, gradual deterioration in the grout that holds the bricks of the
chimney together.
c) A sex offender lives just down the street. He's listed on a public registry of sex offenders.
d) The drawers in the original, 100-year old, built-in cabinets in the dining room have warped a little
over the decades. While they are still useable, they no longer open and close smoothly.
e) Under Johnson v. Davis, the seller's failure to disclose any of the above defects is likely to entitle the
buyer to back out of the agreement.
B is correct - The first answer, (a), is a patent defect, which sellers aren't required to disclose under the
reasoning of Johnson. Answer (b) is likely a latent defect, since the defect isn't readily observable, and
the defect was known to the seller making it subject to the seller's duty to disclose. Answer (c) is
doubtful since it's about a neighborhood condition, not a condition of the property, and it's also easy
enough for the buyer to discover from public records. Answer (d) probably doesn't rise to the level of a
"material" defect. The drawers are still usable, unlike the fireplace.
A fee-simple owner of a house provided in her will that the property should go on her death "in fee
simple to my friend, but if during my friend's lifetime my cousin, Alex, has children and those children
are alive when my friend dies, then to said living children." When the owner dies, the friend moved
into the house.

Several years later, the friend dies. The friend devises all of her property to her son. At the time of the
friend's death, the cousin has two living daughters. Who will take title to the house?

a) The friend's son, because the attempted gift to the cousin's children is invalid under the Rule Against
Perpetuities
b) The cousin's daughters, because their interest will vest, if at all, within a life in being plus 21 years.
c) The cousin's daughters, because their interest is not contingent, being a possibility of reverter.
d) The cousin's daughters, because their interest is vested, subject to partial divestment.
B is correct - The vesting event for Alex's children's executory interest is the friend's death, and the
friend was a life in being at the time of the conveyance so the friend is the validating life.
1. In which of the following scenarios does T have a plausible claim for constructive eviction?
I. L leased to T a residential apartment in a four-floor, four-unit building, for a one-year term. L lives in
the unit on the ground floor. Above this unit are three apartments, accessed by a stairway which all the
tenants use. The rental unit occupied by T is on the top floor. One day, while walking down the shared
stairwell, T heard a sharp cracking noise and a board gave way beneath his feet. By grabbing onto the
railing, T narrowly avoided a big tumble down the stairs. T notified L of the broken stair, but L refused
to do anything about it. T promptly moved out, notifying L that he was surrendering the premises and
would no longer pay rent. May T now assert constructive eviction? (This jurisdiction has not adopted
the implied warranty of fitness or the implied warranty of habitability, and the lease contains no express
warranties concerning maintenance of the stairway.)
II. T leased a commercial greenhouse from L for a 5-year term. One year into the lease term, L
constructed a drive-in movie theater on land adjoining the greenhouse. The towering projection screen
casts a large shadow over the greenhouse for much of the day. Three months later, all of T's sun-loving
cacti were dead. T thought about trying to grow something more shade-tolerant but she couldn't make
up her mind. After the 5-year term ends, T consults a lawyer about whether she has a remedy for L's
interference with the greenhouse she had leased. May T now assert constructive eviction? (This
jurisdiction recognizes an implied warranty of fitness.)
III. T, who loves hot weather, leased a one-bedroom apartment in East Dakota from L for a term of two
years. T successfully negotiated (and paid a substantial premium for) for an unusual covenant by which
L promised to pay for heat and to maintain the apartment at a temperature of 90 -95 degrees. Three
months into the term of the lease, the price of fuel oil quadrupled, and L reduced the apartment's
temperature to 60 degrees. T notified L right away that unless L boosted the temperature back up to the
promised 90-95 degree range, T would move out and terminate the lease. L refused to turn up the heat,
pointing out that under the East Dakota "habitability" code for residential apartments, a landlord is only
obliged to provide tenants with a unit capable of being heated to 65 degrees. L told T that he should be
grateful that L was keeping the apartment adequately heated—and paying for it, no less. Shortly
afterwards, T moved out, surrendering the premises. May T now assert constructive eviction? (This
jurisdiction also recognizes an implied warranty of fitness.)
a) Scenario I only.
b) Scenario II only
c) Scenario III only
d) Scenarios I and III only.
e) Scenarios I and II only.
D is correct - Scenario (I) is a plausible CQE violation (failure to maintain common areas), and it's a
serious breach because the condition of the stairs is dangerous. T did not delay moving out. In Scenario
(II), the lease is over, so it's too late for T to move out and claim constructive eviction. The third
scenario involves an express term. Given that T is paying a substantial premium for this "hot home"
condition, and given the larger difference between the temperature of the apartment and the
temperature promised in the lease, it's plausible that T could argue that this breach is serious enough for
constructive eviction. And, as the doctrine requires, T moved out reasonably soon after it became clear
that the L wouldn't fix the violation.
Alvin is the fee simple owner of Earthacre. In 1990, Alvin divided his land into two parcels, Wateracre
and Fireacre. Alvin retained Wateracre but conveyed Fireacre to Beulah. In the deed to Beulah, Alvin
included a covenant stating that Fireacre could only contain a single-family home. Alvin and Beulah
indicated their intent for this covenant to run with the land. In 1995, Alvin made the following grant of
Wateracre: "Alvin to Candace, but if Candace ever smokes on the property, then to Dorinda." In 1996,
Beulah leased Fireacre to Eunice for a term of ten years. Eunice was aware of the covenant at the time
of the lease. In 1998, Eunice began building an enormous corn dog manufacturing plant on Fireacre.
This jurisdiction follows traditional covenants analysis.
1. Candace brings suit to enforce the covenant against Eunice, seeking damages. Does the benefit of
this covenant run to Candace?

a) Yes, because of horizontal privity between Alvin and Beulah

b) Yes, because of relaxed vertical privity between Beulah and Eunice
c) Yes, because of relaxed vertical privity between Alvin and Candace
d) Yes, because of strict vertical privity between Alvin and Candace
C is correct - b/c running of the benefit of a real covenant only requires the person bringing the claim to
have received a voluntary transfer of some portion of the original benefited owner's durational interest.
Thus, the fact that D has a future interest does not destroy vertical privity between A and C.
Alvin is the fee simple owner of Earthacre. In 1990, Alvin divided his land into two parcels, Wateracre
and Fireacre. Alvin retained Wateracre but conveyed Fireacre to Beulah. In the deed to Beulah, Alvin
included a covenant stating that Fireacre could only contain a single-family home. Alvin and Beulah
indicated their intent for this covenant to run with the land. In 1995, Alvin made the following grant of
Wateracre: "Alvin to Candace, but if Candace ever smokes on the property, then to Dorinda." In 1996,
Beulah leased Fireacre to Eunice for a term of ten years. Eunice was aware of the covenant at the time
of the lease. In 1998, Eunice began building an enormous corn dog manufacturing plant on Fireacre.
This jurisdiction follows traditional covenants analysis.
Candace brings suit to enjoin construction of the corn dog manufacturing plant. What is the likely
result?
a) Candace will win because Eunice took the property with notice of the covenant
b) Candace will lose because of the lack of strict vertical privity between Beulah and Eunice
c) Candace will lose because the covenant does not touch and concern the land
d) Candace will win because of horizontal privity between Alvin and Beulah
A is correct - Candace is seeking an injunction, which means she's seeking to enforce the promise as an
equitable servitude. Equitable servitudes do not require horizontal privity, so (d) is in correct. It's is a
negative servitude, so there's no requirement of vertical privity on burden side, making (b) incorrect.
Single-family home restrictions are commonplace, so it's unlikely that one would be held not to touch
and concern, making (c) a poor choice. However, notice / recording acts is generally a requirement, so
the fact that E had notice of the covenant is important and likely a factor that a court would point to in
vindicating C's claim.
A landowner of a large parcel of land was declared incompetent and committed to a mental hospital 25
years ago. Five years after the declaration, a trespasser entered onto the land. He built a fence to divide
the large parcel. The trespasser began grazing goats on the western part of the parcel. He collects
wildflowers from the eastern parcel for his herbal tea business. The best time to pick wildflowers is at
night. No one else entered either parcel. Ten years ago, the landowner was declared competent and
released from the hospital. He moved in with his sister, and did nothing about his land until this year,
when he brought an action to eject the trespasser. The trespasser counterclaims to quiet title to himself.
The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession is 15 years.
In this action, is the trespasser likely to prevail?
a) Yes, because he has acquired title to the entire parcel by adverse possession
b) Yes, but only as to the western parcel, because that is the portion of the land he occupied in an open
and notorious way
c) The answer may depend on whether the jurisdiction has a disabilities statute that modifies the
adverse possession doctrine
d) No, because the trespasser did not use the entire parcel of land in an open and notorious way.
C is correct - It's possible that the trespasser's claim is not open and notorious as to part of the parcel,
but (c) is a better answer than (b) because whether the trespasser will prevail at all depends on whether
there is a disabilities statute that protects owners who were mentally incompetent at the time of entry,
and, if so, whether the time period under the disabilities statute exceeds 10 years.
Buster bought a house from Sally, who is an electrician. A few months after the purchase, Buster
notices that the lights are flickering. He hires an electrician to figure out what's going on. The
electrician discovers that the several rooms in the house were rewired without permits, in a manner that
violates the electrical safety codes. The wiring appears to be about 2 years old, and it is unsafe. Buster
accuses Sally of having installed faulty wiring and of not disclosing it him. She admits that she
installed the wiring, but she says she thought she had done it properly. Buster sues her to recover the
cost of replacing the faulty wiring. Which of the following, if true, would be most helpful to Buster's
case against Sally?

a) The courts in this jurisdiction now treat the "covenant of quiet enjoyment" in leases as a warranty of
fitness.
b) Sally conveyed the property to Buster by special warranty deed, not general warranty deed.
c) The merger doctrine does not bar claims for violation of sellers' disclosure duties even though the
claim is brought after delivery of the deed.
d) The courts in this jurisdiction require sellers to disclose neighborhood nuisances of which they're
aware.
C is correct - Deed warranties protect the buyer against title defects, not physical defects. The wiring
issue is a physical defect. Sally may have had an express or implied duty to disclose the defect under
the purchase and sale agreement. But Buster may only sue on the purchase and sale agreement after
closing if his claim falls within an exception to the "merger" doctrine.
T, who sells tomatoes, leases a stall at the market from L for a term of 1 year beginning January 1,
2004. The lease agreement specifies that the rent of $12,000 is to be paid in twelve monthly
installments of $1000, each installment being due on the first of the month. At the end of the year, T
remains in possession and on Jan. 1, 2005 sends L a check marked "January rent" for $1000. On Jan. 2,
2005, L deposits the check. In a modern jurisdiction, it is most likely that T:
a) is now a tenant at sufferance.
b) is now bound to a new periodic tenancy, with a one month period.
c) is now bound to a new periodic tenancy with a one year period.
d) owes $2000/month in rent for so long as he remains in possession, unless T and L subsequently
agree to modify the rent.
e) More than one of the above answers is correct.
B is correct - The offer and acceptance of a rent payment by a person who is in possession w/o a
tenancy creates a tenancy. The default tenancy is a periodic tenancy, with the period defined by the
frequency of rent payments. The notation on the check "January rent" suggests that rent will be paid
monthly, and thus that the tenancy is month-to-month.
Harold and Hector purchased a parcel of land, taking title as joint tenants. Two years later, they married
and adopted a son. Several years after that, Harold and Hector divorced. After the divorce, Harold and
the son continued to occupy the land, although title remained in the names of both Harold and Hector.
When Hector moved out of state, he conveyed his title and interest in the land to the son by deed.
Shortly, thereafter, Hector was killed in a hunting accident. Hector's will devises all his property to his
sister-in-law, Helen. Who has title to the land?

a) Harold owns the land in fee simple

b) Harold owns ½ and Helen owns ½ as tenants in common.
c) Harold owns ½ and son own ½ as tenants in common.
d) Harold owns ½ and son owns ½ as joint tenants.
C is correct - A joint tenant w/ right of survivorship may convey their interest by deed, which creates a
tenancy in common between the grantee and the other original joint tenant(s). So when Hector
conveyed his interest in the property to his son, the son and Harold became TIC owners of the property,
each owning ½. Hector thus has no interest in the property to convey by will.
Deena rented an apartment from Ed in January 2000. Deena and Ed agreed to a twelve-month term of
years with a monthly rent of $1,000. Deena's initial inspection revealed that the apartment was in fine
condition. In early February 2000, the radiator stopped working. It was an extremely cold winter, and
temperatures in the apartment approached freezing. Deena informed Ed of this problem in early
February, but he refused to fix it. In April 2000, Deena moved out of the apartment. Based on these
facts, which of the following is not available to Deena as the basis for a cause of action or defense
against Ed?

a) Breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment

b) Breach of general warranty deed
c) Constructive eviction
d) Breach of the implied warranty of habitability
B is correct - Leasehold interests are not conveyed by general warranty deed. The other answers are all
plausibly correct.
Perry owns a large farm. An express easement runs across Perry's land for the benefit of an adjoining 5-
acre parcel of land called Greenacre, which is currently owned by Alice. After a few years, Alice buys a
15-acre parcel adjoining Greenacre, effectively making it a 20-acre parcel of property. She also builds a
second house on the Greenacre addition (the 15-acre tract), all while continuing to use the easement
across Perry's farm. Perry has another neighbor, Brian, who operates a small oil refinery that generates
a foul odor that Perry can smell on his farm. Perry's other neighbor, Carl, has recently erected an
enormous water tower on his property that blocks Perry's view of a nearby stream. Perry is fed up with
all of these irritations. If Perry sues each of the following individuals, who is most likely to be held
liable for trespass?

a) Alice
b) Brian
c) Carl
d) None—they are all equally unlikely to be held liable for trespass
A is correct - Use of an easement of way which is appurtenant to parcel A in order to access parcel B is
beyond the scope of the easement, and thus a trespass. Brian's odors are a nuisance (intangible
invasion), not a trespass (tangible invasion). Carl's water tower is probably not even a nuisance, since it
doesn't invade (cross the boundaries of) Perry's farm at all.
A landlord leased an apartment to a tenant by written lease for two years ending on the last day of a
recent month. The lease provided for $700 monthly rental and was silent on assignments and subleases.
The tenant occupied the apartment and paid the rent for the first 15 months of the term and then moved
away and stopped paying the rent. Without consulting the landlord, the tenant let a friend move in for
the duration of the lease, and they signed an informal agreement conveying the tenant's remaining lease
rights to the friend. The friend made two $700 payments to the landlord and then moved out, and no
one paid the landlord for the last seven months of the lease term. When the landlord realized he had not
been paid, he sued the friend for $4,900 for the last seven months' rent.
What is the likely outcome of the lawsuit?
a) The friend is liable for the full $4,900 as an assignee.
b) The friend is liable for the full $4,900 on a privity of contract theory
c) The friend is not liable for any of the rent because he did not have an agreement with the landlord.
d) The friend is only liable to the tenant, not to the landlord, and so the landlord must bring suit against
the tenant for recovery.
A is correct - Because the friend assumed all of the original tenant's remaining durational interest, the
friend and the landlord are in privity of estate, which means that the L can enforce any term in the
original lease that satisfies "touch and concern" against the friend. The rent-payment term certainly
satisfies touch and concern.
In 1970, Pam buys a parcel of land to create a residential subdivision in a suburb of a Los Angeles,
California. Pam records a plat map indicating that all lots in the subdivision may only contain a single-
family house. Pam subdivides her land, and in 1980 she conveys 12 parcels to new homebuyers. The
deeds in these conveyances include a covenant restricting those parcels to single-family houses. Pam
retains the rest of the land. In 1990, Pam conveys a parcel from this retained land to Quinn. Quinn's
deed does not include a covenant restricting his parcel to use for a single-family house. Quinn proceeds
to build a gas station on his lot. Rick, one of the homeowners who bought in 1980, sues to enjoin this
construction. What is the most likely outcome?

a) Rick will prevail because of an express covenant in Quinn's chain of title restricting his lot to use for
a single-family house
b) Rick will prevail because Quinn is breaching an implied reciprocal negative servitude
c) Quinn will prevail because he purchased his lot with no notice of the restriction
d) Quinn will prevail because the burden of the covenant does not run to his land
B is correct - The covenant is not in Quinn's chain of title because there's no deed from the original
subdivider to Quinn, or a predecessor of Quinn, that mentions the covenant. California recognizes the
doctrine of implied reciprocal servitudes if the original plat map describes the servitude, providing
notice to subsequent purchasers. This one does. The implied reciprocal servitude was created when
Pam conveyed parcels in 1980 with the restriction, consistent with the "common plan" of development
shown in the plat map.
Farmer S sells his 300-acre farm to Buyer B, who does not record the deed. Six months later, B sells
the farm to hunting club C, and C promptly records the deed from B. Six months after that, Farmer S,
hoping to make a little more money off the property, sells it again, this time to developer D, even
though he no longer owns the property. D is unaware that the property has been sold to anyone else and
promptly records his deed.

The jurisdiction in which the farm property was located used grantor-grantee and grantee-grantor
indexes. The recording statute in effect in the jurisdiction provided: "Every conveyance of real property
is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property or any part thereof in
good faith and for valuable consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded."
In a suit to quiet title, who will be determined to be the owner of the ranch?
a) C owns the property, because he was the first to record
b) B owns the property, because he was first to get the property from S.
c) D owns the property, because the B to C deed was recorded too early.
d) D owns the property, because he does not have notice of the B to C deed.
D is correct - The B to C deed, though recorded, is a "wild deed" because S to B deed was not recorded.
Wild deeds generally don't count as properly recorded, because they're too hard for subsequent BFPs
like D to find. Therefore, D is likely protected by the recording act.
Fairview Acres is a common interest community in the City of Ravis, which was developed in the
1980s. The original Conditions, Covenants, and Restrictions of Fairview Acres, which were properly
recorded, state that no dwelling unit may be constructed on a lot that's smaller than 10,000 square feet,
that only one dwelling unit may be constructed on a lot, and that a dwelling unit must include at least
2500 square feet of living space. Fairview Acres is located in the R1-5 zoning district, which allows
single family homes with a minimum lot size of 5,000 square feet. The city's zoning ordinance does not
establish a minimum home size for any zoning district.
A homeowner in Fairview Acres, who owns a 10,000 square foot lot which has a 3000 square foot
house on it, wants to split her lot into two parcels of 5000 square feet each and build a 1000 square foot
home on the vacant lot. She says wants to create opportunities for more affordable housing in the
community, and that this is a matter of racial justice given the racial wealth gap and the historical
exclusion of African Americans from neighborhoods of single-family homes.
The Fairview Acres CC&Rs do not include any racial restrictions, and there's no evidence that they
were established for the purpose of excluding African Americans or any other racial, religious, or
national-origin group, or any family type.
What's her strongest argument?
a) The homeowners' association may not enforce the CC&Rs because it is not in vertical privity with
the original developer.
b) The homeowners' association may not block the homeowner's project because zoning ordinances
take precedence over real covenants, and the zoning allows her project.
c) The CC&Rs may not be enforced in court, because the U.S. Supreme Court held in Shelley v.
Kraemer that racial restrictions are unenforceable.
d) The CC&Rs may violate public policy or the Fair Housing Act if they can plausibly be characterized
as arbitrary.
D is correct - This is a tough question, probably best answered by process of elimination. (a) is wrong
b/c it's standard for HOAs to be authorized to enforce CC&Rs, and courts have approved this
arrangement (Neponsit). (b) is wrong because homeowners must comply with zoning and the CC&Rs
if it's possible to comply with both. (c) is wrong because the CC&Rs do not restrict use or transfer of
the property on the basis of race. That leaves (d). An arbitrary covenant might be held not to "touch and
concern" or, under the Restatement, to be unenforceable because contrary to public policy, and an
arbitrary covenant with a racially disparate impact might be held to be discriminatory in violation of the
Fair Housing Act.
Another homeowner (O) in the R1-5 zoning district of the City of Ravis, who has a 5000 square foot lot
with a single-family home on it, wants to split off her backyard into a separate 2000 square foot lot and
donate the new lot to Habitat for Humanity (HH), a nonprofit organization that develops affordable
housing for low-income households. O's lot is not subject to any restrictive servitudes. O and HH
jointly apply to the City of Ravis for a variance authorizing the lot split and the construction of a small
duplex (2-unit building) on the rear lot. If the state has a standard zoning enabling act and the city
follows the law, will the variance be granted?

a) Yes, because variances are supposed to be issued to prevent hardship, and Habitat for Humanity's
new homes will prevent hardship that would otherwise be suffered by low-income households.
b) No, because the R1-5 zoning limitation wouldn't cause substantial hardship to a reasonable person
who owned O's lot.
c) Yes, because variances are discretionary, and these are good facts for the city to exercise discretion in
the public interest
d) No, because there's no conflict between the zoning ordinance and a private servitude in this case.
B is correct - Variances are supposed to be granted only where necessary to prevent substantial
hardships that any owner of the property would experience, and only where the purpose of the zoning
ordinance wouldn't be vitiated by the variance. Here, the duplex would undermine the purpose of the
zoning restriction (single-family home neighborhood) and the inability to split the lot and add a duplex
wouldn't cause great hardship to a typical owner of a lot in the R1-5 zone.
A landowner and her neighbor owned large adjoining properties. The boundary line between the
properties was never clearly marked. Twenty-five years ago, the landowner built a she-shed (a type of
storage shed) on a section of the property that she thought was hers, but in fact was her neighbor's. The
landowner used and maintained the she-shed on a regular basis ever since.

The neighbor died fifteen years ago. His three-year-old daughter inherited the property. Now that she is
eighteen, she has filed suit to eject the landowner and quiet title. The jurisdiction's statute of limitations
for adverse possession is 20 years.
With respect to the land on which the she-shed is placed, which of the following is correct?

a) The landowner has acquired title by adverse possession if her possession was open and notorious
b) The landowner has an implied easement in the land.
c) The landowner cannot claim title as an adverse possessor because she did not enter with hostile
intent
d) The landowner cannot acquire title because the daughter was a minor
A is correct - Assuming the possession was open-and-notorious, every other element of adverse
possession is probably met (there may be a question about mental state, but in most states the mental
state element is irrelevant, and very few states require bad faith so (c) is likely incorrect). Tacking
across subsequent owners of the trespassed-upon property is always allowed. The fact that one owner
was three years old is irrelevant, because disabilities statutes conventionally protect the owner only if
the disability existed at time of entry, and here it did not.
Tenant T moves into an apartment and signs a two-year lease. After six months in the apartment, the
apartment's old radiators stop working well, and the apartment no longer stays warm at night. T braves
the cold for another two months, but when winter arrives and the temperatures outside drop below
freezing, she writes a strongly worded letter to the landlord L asking him to repair the heater to make
the apartment livable. L sends her a winter coat and tells her he is not willing to fix the radiator. The
cold kills several of T's prize houseplants, and she eventually buys three space heaters in an effort to
make it through the winter. When spring comes, T files suit against L seeking damages for the lack of
heat in the apartment.

Which of the following doctrines would best support T's claim for damages?

a) Constructive eviction.
b) Private nuisance.
c) Implied warranty of habitability.
d) Waste.
C is correct - A failure to repair radiators in a cold climate may violate IWH insofar as it renders the
apartment poorly suited for human habitation. Constructive eviction isn't relevant because the tenant
hasn't moved out. Nuisance isn't relevant b/c we don't have an intangible invasion. Waste isn't relevant
because the tenant isn't damaging the property or changing it in a way that interferes with the landlord's
future interest.
R is walking in downtown Ravis, a college town, and encounters an adorable baby rhinoceros who's
wearing a rhino-collar and ambling down the street. R affixes a leash to the rhino's collar and walks it
home, claiming the rhinoceros as his pet. Under the common law, R likely:

a) owns the rhinoceros under the rule of capture because it was ferae naturae.
b) owns the rhinoceros as against all but the original owner and any prior possessors.
c) has no ownership interest in the baby rhinoceros.
d) has a claim for the value of the rhino-oil but must pay a salvage fee in order to assert it.
B is correct - The Rhino is likely owned by a prior possessor (hence the collar). But anyone who has
possession of personal property has good title in that property by virtue of their possession "against the
world" except for prior possessors.
The City of Ravis has enacted an historic preservation ordinance. The ordinance establishes strict limits
on how owners may use or alter buildings that the city's Historic Preservation Commission puts on the
city's official Inventory of Historic Landmarks. Which of the following facts, if true, would be most
helpful for a property owner arguing that the ordinance effects an unconstitutional "taking" of her
property without just compensation:
a) The ordinance requires owners of Historic Landmark buildings to install "interpretive signs" (issued
by the Historic Preservation Commission) inside their building, and further requires the owner to allow
members of the public to enter and tour the building during regular business hours unless the building
is used as a single-family home.
b) The ordinance reduces the value of the owner's building by 50% in comparison to nearby and
otherwise similar parcels of land to which the ordinance does not apply.
c) The ordinance does not authorize members of the public to enter Historic Landmark buildings.
d) The ordinance requires owners of Historic Landmark buildings to obtain a "certificate of appropriate
use" from the Historic Preservation Commission before altering the exterior of the building
A is correct - Takings claims rarely exceed unless they can be fit into one of the supplemental-doctrines
boxes. The facts described in (a) probably constitute a "permanent physical invasion" of the property,
which is a per-se taking. The facts described in (b), (c), and (d) don't fit any of the supplemental
doctrine categories, so the takings claim would have to be argued on Penn Central territory, where it's
unlikely to succeed.
Fred, a real estate broker, advertises a house for sale. The house is in a racially diverse city. The
advertisements for the house show pictures of white people in the house, white people walking down
the street outside the house, white people congregating in the neighboring park, white people skiing
and sailing and playing golf, and no people of color anywhere. The advertisements also state that the
house is located "near a traditional country club whose membership consists of very fine people." A
young African American couple tours the house and tells Fred they'd like to submit an offer. Fred relays
their offer to the seller and encourages the seller to accept it, which the seller does. Fred handles the
sale professionally, treating the buyers with respect. Soon thereafter, a civil rights organization sues
Fred for violating the federal Fair Housing Act. Which of the following statements is correct:
a) Fred did not violate the FHA, because he treated the African American buyers the same way he
would have treated equally qualified white buyers
b) Fred did not violate the FHA, because he did not deprive the African American buyers of housing
c) Fred did not violate the FHA, because his actions did not have a disparate impact on the African
American buyers
d) Fred may have violated the FHA, by placing advertisements that a reasonable person would interpret
as manifesting a preference for white buyers
D is correct - Though Fred did not discriminate against this buyer, the FHA also prohibits publication
of advertisements that a reasonable observer would regard as manifesting a preference for or against a
class of persons defined by a protected characteristic. Race a protected characteristic, and these adds
plausibly convey a preference for white buyers.
Sammy owned a house in fee simple. Sammy granted a life estate in the house to Leisia, who promptly
recorded her life estate. Sammy then sold the house in fee simple to Brandon, by general warranty deed
without any exceptions. Which of the following statements most accurately describes the state of
ownership and liabilities following delivery of the deed from Sammy? Assume that Sammy, Leisia, and
Brandon are all still alive.

a) Brandon owns a future interest in the house and has a claim against Sammy for damages
b) Brandon owns the house in fee simple absolute and Leisia has a claim against Sammy for damages
c) Brandon owns no interest in the house but has a claim against Sammy for damages
d) Brandon and Leisia own the house as tenants in common
A is correct - The first answer is correct. Leaisia's interest is first in time and properly recorded, so it's
enforceable against Brandon. Though the deed to Brandon purported to convey the fee simple, all that
Sammy was able to convey was his future interest (the reversion). The existence of the life estate
violates the covenant of seisin and against encumbrances in the deed, giving Brandon a cause of action
against Sammy for damages.
1. "Peaceful Acres" is a Common Interest Community (CIC) consisting entirely of large single-family
homes. The CC&Rs provide for the creation of a Homeowners Association (HOA), which, under the
CC&Rs, is authorized to adopt aesthetic regulations "in the interest of preserving the overall social and
visual harmony of Peaceful Acres." Over the years, the HOA has used this authorization to regulate the
colors in which members may paint their homes; the kinds of tiles and shingles that members may use
in constructing or replacing roofs; and even the varieties of flowers that may be planted in
homeowners' front yards. Recently, the HOA issued an "aesthetic regulation" barring members from
displaying in their front yards any "poster or placard endorsing or otherwise promoting a candidate for
national or statewide elected office, such as the Presidency, the Governorship, or a seat in Congress or
the State Assembly." For purposes of answering this question, you may assume that such a regulation,
if enacted by a state legislature or Congress, would violate the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. You may also assume that "Peaceful Acres" is located in a state whose courts have
adopted the Restatement (3d) of Property--Servitudes.

Which of the following are plausible legal arguments that the homeowner who wishes to challenge the
regulation might advance?

I. Because the no-poster regulation was not recorded in the chain of title (assume this is true), it is void
and therefore cannot be enforced against the homeowner.

II. The regulation may not be enforced as a matter of public policy, in view of the First Amendment
values at stake.

III. The regulation may not be enforced because it violates the U.S. Constitution.

IV. The regulation may not be enforced because its burdens on the Peaceful Acres homeowners
outweigh its benefits to the Peaceful Acres homeowners, as is evidenced by these facts: (1) as a general
matter, it is not uncommon for homeowners in this state to display political campaign placards in their
front yards; (2) there are tens of thousands of CICs across the state that are very similar to Peaceful
Acres (all of whose HOAs have authority to issue aesthetic regulations for "social and visual
harmony"), not one of which has ever sought to limit the display of political posters or placards; (3)
there is no record evidence indicating that the benefits of a no-campaign-placard regulation would be
any greater for the residents of Peaceful Acres than for the residents of any of the other, similar CICs
across the state. (Assume these facts are true.)

a) All of the above are plausible arguments that the homeowner might advance.
b) I & II only
c) II & III only
d) II only
e) II & IV only
E is correct - I is incorrect. The authority to issue aesthetic regulations is recorded in the chain of title,
which provides inquiry notice at least of this regulation (a reasonable buyer could ask the HOA if
they'd exercised the authority). II is correct, because the restatement encourages courts to consider
constitutional values under the rubric of the "public policy" inquiry. III is technically incorrect, since
nearly all provisions of the constitution govern only "state actors," and the HOA is not a state actor. IV
is plausibly correct. This is a later-adopted regulation, not an original CC&R, and courts are somewhat
more demanding in policing later-adopted regulations that create burdens without advancing
substantial, legitimate purposes.
1. An alien from Planet Contract Law lands on Planet Property Law. Looking around, she observes
many things that look similar to what she knew from her own planet, and some things that look a little
different. Which of the following stand out as differences?

I. The denizens of Planet Property Law are more focused on ensuring that third parties can see and
understand the terms of a deal.
II. The denizens of Planet Property Law think injunctive remedies (what the denizens of Planet
Contract Law call "specific performance") are normal, not exceptional.
III. The denizens of Planet Property Law are more insistent that those who suffer a wrong mitigate their
damages.

a) I only
b) I and II only
c) I and III only
d) II only
e) III only
B is correct - Notice is a central concern of property law (a corollary of the "in rem" nature of the
rights). The standard remedy for a property rights violation is an injunction, whereas injunctions are
exceptional remedies in the contracts context. III is wrong because the mitigation principle has been
incorporated into property law, as we saw in the landlord-tenant cases.
1. A farm and an orchard are adjoining tracts of land located in a county. In 2006, a farmer purchased
the farm, a 10-acre tract in fee simple absolute. The orchard, a 20-acre tract situated to the north of the
farm, was owned by a rancher in fee simple absolute. A remote predecessor of the farmer had granted
to a shepherd a way for egress and ingress across the farm under such terms and circumstances that an
easement appurtenant to the orchard was created. This right-of-way was executed by deed and properly
recorded. The shepherd however, never made any actual use of the right-of-way.

In 2010, the rancher conveyed the orchard to the farmer. The next year, the farmer conveyed the
orchard by deed to an investor for a consideration of $250,000, receipt of which was acknowledged.
Neither the rancher-farmer deed nor the farmer investor deed contained any reference to the easement
for right-of-way. The investor has now claimed that she has a right-of-way across the farm. The farmer,
on the other hand, has informed the investor that no such easement exists.

Assume that both the farm and the orchard abut a public highway and that ingress and egress are
afforded the investor by that highway. In an appropriate action by the investor to determine her right to
use the right-of-way across the farm, she should

A) lose bc the easement was extinguished by merger when the farmer acquired the orchard from the
rancher
B) lose bc the right of way was abandoned inasmuch as there were was any actual use made
C) win because the farmer had constructive notice of the easement
D) win because the investor acquired an easement by implication
A is correct - This Multi state questions deals with extinguishment of an easement by merger. When an
easement appurtenant exists and both the dominant and servient tenements come under the ownership
of the same person, the easement is terminated by operation of law. The apparent rationale is that one
cannot have an easement in his own property. Therefore, when the farmer (who was already the owner
of the farm) acquired the orchard from the rancher, the easement in effect merged in his fee simple
ownership of both properties.
A millionaire owned two adjacent l0-story commercial buildings. One building housed medical offices,
and the other building housed dental offices. The first floors of both buildings were occupied by
various retail establishments. The buildings' other floors were rented to professionals and used as
offices. There was an enclosed walkway that connected the second floor of each building. Thus,
shoppers and office staff could walk across the common walkway and gain access to each building.

While the buildings were being used in this manner, the millionaire sold the dental building to an
investor by warranty deed, which made no mention of any rights concerning the walkway. The
walkway continued to be used by the occupants of both buildings. Thereafter, the walkway became
unsafe as a consequence of wear and tear.

As a result, the investor hired a contractor to repair the walkway area. When the millionaire saw the
contractor removing the carpeting along the walkway, he demanded that the investor discontinue the
repair work. After the investor refused, the millionaire brought an action to enjoin the investor from
continuing the work. The most likely result will be a decision for

A) the millionaire because the investor does not have rights in the walkway

B) the millionaire because the investor's rights in the dental building do not extend to the walkway

C) the investor because the investor had an easement in the walkway and an implied right to keep the
walkway in repair

D) the investor, because he has a right to take whatever action is necessary to protect himself from
possible tort liability from persons using the walkway
C is correct - The investor would have an implied easement in the walkway. An implied easement is
created and proved, not by the words of the conveyance, but by all the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the conveyance. It is based on the intention of the parties as inferred from the surrounding
circumstances. There are five distinct requirements for the existence of an implied easement, all of
which are present in the facts of this example. First, there must be two properties owned by one person
who uses one of the pieces of property to serve the other piece of land. Second, there must be a
conveyance of one part of the property to another person, the other part being retained by the conveyor.
Third, the quasi-easement must be apparent at the time of the conveyance. Fourth, the quasi-easement
must be continuous, which means that the use of the quasi-servient tenement must be permanently
adapted to serve the needs of the quasi-dominant tenement. Fifth, the quasi-easement must be (a)
"reasonably necessary" to the convenient enjoyment of the quasi-dominant land if that tract is the
property conveyed to the grantee, and (b) "strictly necessary" to the enjoyment of the quasi-dominant
tenement if that tract is retained by the grantor. By virtue of the implied easement, the investor has the
right to enter the walkway for the purpose of repairing, maintaining, and improving the means by
which the easement is enjoyed.
A rancher is currently the owner of record of a parcel of land designated as "A." It is the higher of two
neighboring properties on a mountain. A farmer is the owner of parcel "B," which is situated lower than
"A" on the mountainside. In 2000, the rancher, who owned both parcels of land, constructed a private
drainage system. This system consisted of an underground pipeline that extended across both parcels of
land. Sewage from parcel "A" drained through the system to a municipal sewer, which was located at
the bottom of the mountain.
In 2005, the rancher sold parcel "B" to the farmer. The deed to the farmer did not contain any mention
of the rancher's drainage system. Located on each of the parcels are large ranch-style homes occupied
by the respective owners.

Lately, the sewage drain has begun to emit an unpleasant odor across parcel "B." As a result, the farmer
sued the rancher in trespass praying for damages caused by the drainage system.

Judgment should be for

A) the rancher, because the deed to the farmer did not contain any covenants restricting the racher's use
of the land

B) the rancher, because the farmer's proper cause of action would be for nuisance, rather than trespass

C) the farmer, because the drainage system was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages as a
matter of law

D) the farmer, because the rancher did not have the right to improve his own land
B is correct - The farmer's proper cause of action should be based on nuisance, rather than trespass. The
basic distinction that is now recognized is that trespass is an invasion of the plaintiff's interest in the
exclusive possession of his land, whereas nuisance is an interference with his use and enjoyment of it.
In all likelihood, the rancher has an implied easement for his sewer pipe from parcel "A" across parcel
"B." It is generally agreed that in cases involving an implied reservation (or quasi-easement) in favor of
the grantor, there must be reasonable necessity for the existence of the implied easement. Choice (A) is
incorrect. Just because the deed contained no covenants restricting the rancher's use, that doesn't allow
the rancher to use the easement in such a way as to interfere with the use and enjoyment of the farmer's
property. The holder of an easement may make reasonable use of the servient tenement so long as her
conduct does not unreasonably interfere with the use of the servient tenement owner. Because the type
of harm that the farmer is suffering is more appropriately redressed under a nuisance action, Choice (B)
is better.
A man is the owner of record of a parcel of land designated a "A." It is the highest of three neighboring
properties on a mountain. The man's friend is the owner of parcel "B," which is situated lower than "A"
on the mountain side. The man's cousin owns parcel "C," which lies below parcels "A" and "B" on the
mountain slope.

In 2000 the man who originally owned all three parcels of land constructed a private drainage system.
This system consisted of an underground pipeline that extended across all three parcels of land.

Sewage from parcel "A" drained through the system to a municipal ewer which was located at the
bottom of the mountain.

In 2005 the man sold parcel "B" to his friend. The following year, the cousin purchased parcel "C"
from the man. The deeds to the friend and the cousin did not contain any mention of the man's drainage
system. Located on each of the parcels are large ranch-style home occupied by the respective owners.

From the standpoint of the friend and the cousin, the drainage system would most likely be defined as a
(an)

A) easement appurtenant
B) easement by implication

C) prescriptive easement

D) express easement
B is correct - An easement may arise by implication if the existence of the easement is strictly (or
reasonably) necessary for the beneficial use of the land. The creation of such an easement is based upon
the presumed intent of the grantor and grantee. If the claim is made that the easement arose out of a
prior conveyance, there must be proof of the fact that at one time both the dominant and servient estates
were under one ownership. Technically, choice (A) is correct, but choice (B) is preferred because the
present example is an illustration of an implied easement appurtenant.

A bar owner sells the bar and the building in which it is located. The new owner has plans to revamp
the bar and tum it into a brewpub. When she makes inquiries at City Hall regarding the permits she will
need, she learns that the bar is in an area zoned exclusively for residential uses. No variance has ever
been granted to the bar, which seems to have escaped the city's notice for several years. The city tells
the new owner that she will not be allowed to remodel or continue to operate the bar without obtaining
a zoning variance from the city. The new owner brings a lawsuit against the prior owner for breach of
warranty.

Will the new owner win her suit?

A) yes because the zoning violation rendered title to the property unmarketable

B) yes because the zoning restriction violated the covenant against encumbrances

C) no because the zoning restriction was not encumbrance

D) no because the new owner had constructive notice of the zoning restriction
A is correct - The existence of a zoning restriction on property does not render title unmarketable.
However, in a majority of jurisdictions, a violation of a zoning ordinance does render title
unmarketable.
A landowner died, validly devising his land to his wife "for life or until remarriage, then to" their
daughter.
Shortly after the landowner's death, his daughter executed an instrument in the proper form of a deed,
purporting to convey the land to her friend. A year later, the daughter died intestate, with her mother,
the
original landowner's wife, as her sole heir. The following month, the wife remarried. The wife then
executed an instrument in the proper form of a deed, purporting to convey the land to her new husband
as
a wedding gift.
Who now owns what interest in the land?
Choose matching definition
The daughter's friend owns the fee simple.
The wife owns the fee simple.
The wife's new husband has a life estate in the land for the wife's life, with the
remainder in the daughter's friend.
The wife's new husband owns the fee simple.

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Term
In the most recent deed in the chain of title to a tract of land, a man conveyed the land as follows: "To
my
niece and her heirs and assigns in fee simple until my niece's daughter marries, and then to my niece's
daughter and her heirs and assigns in fee simple."
There is no applicable statute, and the common law Rule Against Perpetuities has not been modified in
the jurisdiction.
Which of the following is the most accurate statement concerning the title to the land?
Choose matching definition
The niece has a life estate and the daughter has a contingent remainder.
The niece has a fee simple and the daughter has no interest, because after the grant of
a fee simple there can be no gift over.
The niece has a fee simple and the daughter has no interest, because she might not
marry within 21 years after the date of the deed.
The niece has a defeasible fee simple determinable and the daughter has an executory
interest.

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Thirty years ago, a landowner conveyed land by warranty deed to a church (a charity) "so long as the
land herein
conveyed is used as the site for the principal religious edifice maintained by said church."
Twenty years ago, the landowner died intestate, survived by a single heir.
One year ago, the church dissolved and its church building situated on the land was demolished.
There is no applicable statute. The common law Rule Against Perpetuities is unmodified in the
jurisdiction.
In an appropriate action, the landowner's heir and the attorney general, who is the appropriate official to
assert
public interests in charitable trusts, contest the right to the land.
In this action, who will prevail?
Choose matching definition
The landowner's heir, as successor to the landowner's possibility of reverter.
The landowner's heir, because a charity cannot convey assets donated to it.
The attorney general, because cy pres should be applied to devote the land to religious
purposes to carry out the charitable intent of the landowner.
The attorney general, because the landowner's attempt to restrict the church's fee simple
violated the common law Rule Against Perpetuities.

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Twenty-five years ago, a man who owned a 45-acre tract of land conveyed 40 of the 45 acres to a
developer by warranty deed. The man
retained the rear five-acre portion of the land and continues to live there in a large farmhouse.
The deed to the 40-acre tract was promptly recorded. It contained the following language:
"It is a term and condition of this deed, which shall be a covenant running with the land and binding on
all owners, their heirs and
assigns, that no use shall be made of the 40-acre tract of land except for residential purposes."
Subsequently, the developer fully developed the 40-acre tract into a residential subdivision consisting
of 40 lots with a single-family
residence on each lot.
Although there have been multiple transfers of ownership of each of the 40 lots within the subdivision,
none of them included a
reference to the quoted provision in the deed from the man to the developer, nor did any deed to a
subdivision lot create any new
covenants restricting use.
Last year, a major new medical center was constructed adjacent to the subdivision. A doctor who owns
a house in the subdivision
wishes to relocate her medical office to her house. For the first time, the doctor learned of the
restrictive covenant in the deed from the
man to the developer. The applicable zoning ordinance permits the doctor's intended use. The man, as
owner of the five-acre tract,
however, objects to the doctor's proposed use of her property.
There are no governing statutes other than the zoning code. The common law Rule Against Perpetuities
is unmodified in the
jurisdiction.
May the doctor convert her house in the subdivision into a medical office?
Choose matching definition
No, because the owners of lots in the subdivision own property benefitted by the original residential
covenant
and have the sole right to enforce it.
No, because the man owns property benefitted by the original restrictive covenant and has a right to
enforce it.
Yes, because the original restrictive covenant violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Yes, because the zoning ordinance allows the doctor's proposed use and preempts the restrictive
covenant.

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4 of 31
Term
A grantor owned two tracts of land, one of 15 acres and another of 5 acres. The two tracts were a mile
apart.
Fifteen years ago, the grantor conveyed the smaller tract to a grantee. The grantor retained the larger
tract. The deed to the grantee contained, in
addition to proper legal descriptions of both properties and identifications of the parties, the following
language:
"I, the grantor, bind myself and my heirs and assigns that in the event that the larger tract that I now
retain is ever offered for sale, I will notify the
grantee and his heirs and assigns in writing, and the grantee and his heirs and assigns shall have the
right to purchase the larger tract for its fair
market value as determined by a board consisting of three qualified expert independent real estate
appraisers."
With appropriate references to the other property and the parties, there followed a reciprocal provision
that conferred upon the grantor and her
heirs and assigns a similar right to purchase the smaller tract, purportedly binding the grantee and his
heirs and assigns.
Ten years ago, a corporation acquired the larger tract from the grantor. At that time, the grantee had no
interest in acquiring the larger tract and by
an appropriate written document released any interest he or his heirs or assigns might have had in the
larger tract.
Last year, the grantee died. The smaller tract passed by the grantee's will to his daughter. She has
decided to sell the smaller tract. However,
because she believes that the corporation has been a very poor steward of the larger tract, she refuses to
sell the smaller tract to the corporation
even though she has offered it for sale in the local real estate market.
The corporation has brought an appropriate action for specific performance of the right of first refusal
after taking all of the necessary preliminary
steps in its effort to exercise its right to purchase the smaller tract.
The daughter has asserted all possible defenses.
The common law Rule Against Perpetuities is unmodified in the jurisdiction, and there are no
applicable statutes.
If the court rules for the daughter, what will be the likely reason?
Choose matching definition
The provision setting out the right to purchase violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The grantee's release 10 years ago operates as a waiver regarding any right to purchase that the
corporation might have.
The two tracts of land were not adjacent parcels of real estate, and thus the right to purchase is in gross
and is therefore
unenforceable.
Noncompliance with a right to purchase gives rise to a claim for money damages, but not for specific
performance.

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Term
A landowner conveyed his land by quitclaim deed to his daughter and son "as joint tenants in fee
simple." The language of the deed was sufficient to create a common law joint tenancy with right of
survivorship, which is unmodified by statute. The daughter then duly executed a will devising her
interest in the land to a friend. The the son duly executed a will devising his
interest in the land to a cousin. The son died, and later the daughter died. Neither had ever married. The
daughter's friend and the cousin survived.

After both wills have been duly probated, who owns what interest in the land?

(A) The cousin owns the fee simple.

(B) The daughter's friend and the cousin own equal shares as joint tenants with
right of survivorship.
(C) The daughter's friend and the cousin own equal shares as tenants in
common.
(D) The daughter's friend owns the fee simple.
Choose matching definition
(A) A variance was granted.
A variance permits a waiver from a zoning requirement. A variance will be granted
when an owner convinces a zoning appeals board that without the variance the
owner would suffer a hardship regarding the use of the land. In this case, the board
approved the woman's application to operate a court-reporting service in her
house, and thus this jurisdiction allows use variances that permit nonresidential
uses in areas that are otherwise zoned residential.
(B) The grantee, because the neighbor had a license that the
grantee could terminate at any time.
A license is permission to use the land of another. It is revocable and is
not subject to the statute of frauds. In this case, because the neighbor
had the landowner's permission to use the road and did not expend any
money, property, or labor pursuant to the agreement, the neighbor had
a license that was effectively revoked by the grantee.
(A) The daughter's friend owns the fee simple.

The landowner's wife had a determinable life estate, evidenced by the words "for life" and "until
remarriage" in the landowner's will. Thedaughter had a vested remainder and an executory interest.
Both of the daughter's interests could be assigned to the friend. On the remarriage
of the landowner's wife, the wife's determinable life estate ended and the land automatically went to the
holder of the future interest, the daughter's friend.
MBE Practice Question #15
(D) The daughter's friend owns the fee simple.

A joint tenancy with right of survivorship is not devisable or inheritable and cannot be severed by a
will. In this case, the son and the daughter received title as joint tenants with right of survivorship. On
the death of the son, the interest
of the daughter increased, and she then owned the land alone and in fee simple.
She had the right to devise that entire interest by will to her friend.

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Term
A mother who died testate devised her farm to her son and her daughter as "joint tenants with right of
survivorship." The language of the will was sufficient to create a common law joint tenancy with right
of survivorship, which is unmodified by statute in the jurisdiction. After the mother's death and with the
daughter's permission, the son took sole possession of the farm and agreed to pay the daughter a
stipulated monthly rent. Several years later, the son defaulted on a personal loan, and his creditor
obtained a judgment against him for $30,000. The creditor promptly and properly filed the judgment.
A statute of the jurisdiction provides: "Any judgment properly filed shall, for 10 years from filing, be a
lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the
judgment is rendered."

Six months later, the son died. There are no other applicable statutes.
Is the creditor entitled to enforce its judgment lien against the farm?
Choose matching definition
No, because the daughter became sole owner of the farm free and clear of the creditor's
judgment lien when the son died.
No, because the son's interest was severed from the daughter's interest upon the filing of the
lien.
Yes, because a joint tenancy cannot be created by devise, and the son died owning a 50%
undivided interest in the farm as a tenant in common.
Yes, because the son died owning a 50% undivided interest in the farm as a joint tenant with
the daughter.

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Term
Seven years ago, a man, his sister, and his cousin became equal owners, as tenants in common, of a
house. Until a year ago, the man lived in the house alone. The sister and the cousin are longtime
residents of another state.
One year ago, the man moved to an apartment and rented the house to a tenant for three years under a
lease that the man and the tenant both signed. The tenant has since paid the rent each month to the
man. Recently, the sister and the cousin learned about the rental. They brought an appropriate action
against the tenant to have the lease declared void and to have the tenant evicted. The tenant raised all
available defenses.

What will the court likely decide?

Choose matching definition
The lease is void, and the tenant is evicted.
The lease is valid, and the tenant retains exclusive occupancy rights for the balance
of the term.
The lease is valid, but the tenant is evicted because one-third of the lease term has
expired and the man had only a one-third interest to transfer.
The lease is valid, and the tenant is not evicted but must share possession with the
sister and the cousin.

Don't know?
8 of 31
Term
MBE Practice Question #16
A husband and wife acquired land as common law joint tenants with right of survivorship. One year
later, without his wife's knowledge, the husband executed a will devising the land to his best friend.
The husband subsequently died.
Is the wife now the sole owner of the land?
Choose matching definition
No, because a joint tenant has the unilateral right to end a joint
tenancy without the consent of the other joint tenant.
No, because the wife's interest in the husband's undivided 50%
ownership in the land adeemed.
Yes, because of the doctrine of after-acquired title.
Yes, because the devise to the friend did not sever the joint tenancy.

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A landlord leased an apartment to a tenant by written lease for two years ending on the last day of a
recent month. The lease provided for $700 in monthly rent. The tenant occupied the apartment and paid
the rent for the first 15 months of the lease term, until he moved to another city to take a new job.
Without consulting the landlord, the tenant moved a friend into the apartment and signed an informal
writing transferring to the friend his "lease rights" for the remaining nine months of the lease. The
friend made the next four monthly $700 rent payments to the landlord. For the final five months of the
lease term, no rent was paid by anyone, and the friend moved out with three months left of the lease
term. The landlord was on an
extended trip abroad, and did not learn of the default and the vacancy until the end of the lease term.
The landlord has sued the tenant and the friend, jointly and severally, for $3,500 for the last five
months' rent.

What is the likely outcome of the lawsuit?

Choose matching definition
Both the tenant and the friend are liable for the full $3,500, because the tenant is liable on privity of
contract and the friend is liable on privity of estate as assignee.
The friend is liable for $1,400 on privity of estate, which lasted only until he vacated, and the tenant is
liable for $2,100 on privity of contract and estate for the period after the friend vacated.
The friend is liable for $3,500 on privity of estate, and the tenant is not liable, because the landlord's
failure to object to the friend's payment of rent relieved the tenant of liability.
The tenant is liable for $3,500 on privity of contract, and the friend is not liable, because a sublessee
does
not have personal liability to the original landlord.

Don't know?
10 of 31
Term
Six years ago, a landlord and a tenant entered into a 10-year commercial lease of land. The written
lease provided that if a public entity under the power of eminent domain condemned any part of the
land but not all of it, the lease would terminate and the landlord would receive the entire
condemnation award. Thereafter, the city condemned approximately two-thirds of the land. The tenant
notified the city and the landlord that an independent appraisal of the value of the tenant's possessory
interest established that it substantially exceeded the tenant's obligation under the lease and that the
tenant was entitled to share the award. The appraisal was accurate.
In an appropriate action among the landlord, the tenant, and the city as to the right of the tenant to a
portion of the condemnation award, for whom will the court likely find?
Choose matching definition
The landlord, because the condemnation superseded and canceled the lease.
The landlord, because the parties specifically agreed as to the consequences of a
partial condemnation.
The tenant, because the landlord breached the landlord's implied warranty of quiet
enjoyment.
The tenant, because otherwise the landlord would be unjustly enriched.

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11 of 31
Term
A landlord and a tenant orally agreed to a commercial tenancy for a term of six months beginning on
July 1. Rent was to be paid by the first day of each month, and the tenant paid the first month's rent
at the time of the agreement. When the tenant arrived at the leased premises on July 1, the tenant
learned that the previous tenant
had not vacated the premises at the end of her lease term on May 31 and did not intend to vacate. The
tenant then successfully sued the previous tenant for possession. The tenant did not inform the
landlord of the eviction action until after the tenant received possession.
The tenant then sued the landlord, claiming damages for that portion of the lease period during which
the tenant was not in possession.

If the court finds for the landlord, what will be the most likely explanation?
Choose matching definition
By suing the previous tenant for possession, the tenant elected that remedy in lieu
of a suit against the landlord.
The landlord had delivered the legal right of possession to the tenant.
The tenant failed to timely vacate as required to sue for constructive eviction.
The tenant had not notified the landlord before bringing the eviction action.

Don't know?
12 of 31
Term
A landlord leased a building to a tenant for a 10-year term. Two years after the term began, the tenant
subleased the building to a sublessee for a 5-year term. Under the terms of the sublease, the sublessee
agreed to make monthly rent payments to the
tenant.
Although the sublessee made timely rent payments to the tenant, the tenant did not forward four of
those payments to the landlord. The tenant has left the jurisdiction and
cannot be found. The landlord has sued the sublessee for the unpaid rent.
There is no applicable statute.

If the court rules that the sublessee is not liable to the landlord for the unpaid rent, what will be the
most likely reason?
Choose matching definition
A sublessee is responsible to the landlord only as a surety for unpaid rent owed by the tenant.
The sublease constitutes a novation of the original lease.
The sublessee is not in privity of estate or contract with the landlord.
The sublessee's rent payments to the tenant fully discharged
Don't know?
13 of 31
Term
A tenant leased a commercial property from a landlord for a 12-year term. The property included a
large store and a parking lot.
At the start of the lease period, the tenant took possession and with the landlord's oral consent installed
counters, display cases,
shelving, and special lighting. Both parties complied with all lease terms.
The lease is set to expire next month. Two weeks ago, when the landlord contacted the tenant about a
possible lease renewal, she
learned that the tenant had decided not to renew the lease, and that the tenant planned to remove all of
the above-listed items on
or before the lease termination date. The landlord claimed that all the items had become part of the real
estate and had to remain
on the premises. The tenant asserted his right and intention to remove all the items. Both the lease and
the statutes of the jurisdiction are silent on the matter in dispute. At the time the landlord consented and
the
tenant installed the items, nothing was said about the tenant's right to retain or remove the items.

The landlord has sued the tenant to enjoin his removal of the items.
How is the court likely to rule?
Choose matching definition
For the landlord, because the items have become part of the landlord's real estate.
For the landlord as to items bolted or otherwise attached to the premises, and for the tenant as to items
not
attached to the premises other than by weight.
For the tenant, provided that the tenant reasonably restores the premises to the prior condition or pays
for
the cost of restoration.
For the tenant, because all of the items may be removed as trade fixtures without any obligation to
restore

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14 of 31
Term
A landowner lawfully subdivided his land into 10 large lots. The recorded subdivision plan imposed no
restrictions on any of the 10 lots. Within
two months after recording the plan, the landowner conveyed Lot 1 to a buyer, by a deed that contained
no restrictions on the lot's use. There was
then a lull in sales. Two years later, the real estate market in the state had generally improved, and
during the next six months, the landowner sold
and conveyed eight of the remaining nine lots. In each of the eight deeds of conveyance, the landowner
included the following language: "It is a
term and condition of this conveyance, which shall be a covenant running with the land for the benefit
of each of the 10 lots [with an appropriate
reference to the recorded subdivision plan], that for 15 years from the date of recording of the plan, no
use shall be made of the premises herein
conveyed except for single-family residential purposes." The buyer of Lot 1 had actual knowledge of
what the landowner had done. The landowner
included the quoted language in part because the municipality had amended its zoning ordinance a year
earlier to permit professional offices in any residential zone. Shortly after the landowner's most recent
sale, when he owned only one unsold lot, the buyer of Lot 1 constructed a one-story house on Lot 1 and
then conveyed Lot 1 to a doctor. The deed to the doctor contained no reference to any restriction on the
use of Lot 1. The doctor applied for an appropriate certificate of occupancy to enable her to use a part
of the house on Lot 1 as a medical office. The landowner, on behalf of himself as the owner of the
unsold lot, and on behalf of the other lot owners, sued to enjoin the doctor from carrying out her plans
and to impose the quoted restriction on Lot 1.
Who is likely to prevail?
Choose matching definition
The doctor, because Lot 1 was conveyed without the restrictive covenant in the deed to the first buyer
and the subsequent
deed to the doctor.
The doctor, because zoning ordinances override private restrictive covenants as a matter of public
policy.
The landowner, because the doctor, as a successor in interest to the first buyer, is estopped from
denying that Lot 1
remains subject to the zoning ordinance as it existed when the landowner conveyed Lot 1 to the first
buyer.
The landowner, because with the first buyer's knowledge of the facts, Lot 1 became incorporated into a
common scheme.

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15 of 31
Term
A landowner orally gave his neighbor permission to share the use of a private road on the landowner's
land so that the neighbor could have more convenient access to the neighbor's land. Only the landowner
maintained the road. After the neighbor had used the road on a daily basis for three years,
the landowner conveyed his land to a grantee, who immediately notified the neighbor that the neighbor
was not to use the road. The neighbor sued the grantee, seeking a declaration that the neighbor had a
right to continue to use the road.

Who is likely to prevail?

Choose matching definition
The grantee, because an oral license is invalid.
The grantee, because the neighbor had a license that the grantee could terminate at
any time.
The neighbor, because the grantee is estopped from terminating the neighbor's use
of the road.
The neighbor, because the neighbor's

Don't know?
16 of 31
Term
A man contacted his lawyer regarding his right to use a path that was on his neighbor's vacant land.
Fifteen years ago, after part of a path located on his land and connecting his cabin to the public
highway washed out, the
man cleared a small part of his neighbor's land and rerouted a section of the path through the neighbor's
land. Twelve years ago, the neighbor leased her land to some hunters. For the next 12 years, the hunters
and the man who had rerouted the path used the path for access to the highway.
A month ago, the neighbor discovered that part of the path was on her land. The neighbor told the man
that she had not given him permission to cross her land and that she would be closing the rerouted path
after 90 days. The man's land and the neighbor's land have never been in common ownership. The
period of time necessary to acquire rights by prescription in the jurisdiction is 10 years. The period of
time necessary
to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years.

What should the lawyer tell the man concerning his right to use the rerouted path on the neighbor's
land?
Choose matching definition
The man has fee title by adverse possession of the land included in the path.
The man has an easement by necessity to use the path.
The man has an easement by prescription to use the path.
The man has no right to use the path.

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17 of 31
Term
A businesswoman owned two adjoining tracts of land, one that was improved with a commercial rental
building and another that was vacant and abutted a river.
Twenty years ago, the businesswoman conveyed the vacant tract to a grantee by a warranty deed that
the businesswoman signed but the grantee did not. The deed contained a covenant by the grantee as
owner of the vacant tract that neither he nor his heirs or assigns would "erect any building" on the
vacant tract, in order to
preserve the view of the river from the commercial building on the improved tract. The grantee
intended to use the
vacant tract as a nature preserve. The grantee promptly and properly recorded the deed.
Last year, the businesswoman conveyed the improved tract to a businessman. A month later, the grantee
died,
devising all of his property, including the vacant land, to his cousin.
Six weeks ago, the cousin began construction of a building on the vacant tract. The businessman
objected and sued to enjoin construction of the building.
Who is likely to prevail?
Choose matching definition
The businessman, because the commercial building was constructed before the cousin began
his construction project.
The businessman, because the cousin is bound by the covenant made by the grantee.
The cousin, because an equitable servitude does not survive the death of the promisor.
The cousin, because the grantee did not sign the deed.

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18 of 31
Term
A woman died, devising land that she owned in another state to her daughter, who was then 17 years
old.
A neighbor who owned the property immediately adjacent to the land wrongfully began to possess the
land at that time. For 24
of the next 25 years, the neighbor planted and harvested crops on the land, hunted on it, and parked cars
on it. However, in the
sixth year after he first took possession of the land, the neighbor neither planted crops nor hunted nor
parked cars on the land
because he spent that entire year living in Europe. The neighbor built a small gardening shed on the
land, but he never built a
residence on it.
When the daughter was 28, she was declared mentally incompetent and had a conservator appointed to
oversee her affairs.
Since then, she has continuously resided in a care facility.
The applicable statute of limitations provides as follows: "An ejectment action shall be brought within
21 years after the cause of
action accrues, but if the person entitled to bring the cause of action is under age 18 or mentally
incompetent at the time the
cause of action accrues, it may be brought by such person within 10 years after attaining age 18 or after
the person becomes
competent."
If the daughter's conservator wins an ejectment action against the neighbor, what will be the most likely
explanation?
Choose matching definition
The daughter was age 17 when the neighbor first took possession of the land.
Because the daughter is mentally incompetent, the statute of limitations has been tolled.
The neighbor never built a residence on the land.
The neighbor was not in continuous possession of the land for 21 years.

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19 of 31
Term
A man owned a large tract of land. The eastern portion of the land was undeveloped and unused. A
farmer owned a farm, the
western border of which was along the eastern border of the man's land. The two tracts of land had
never been in common
ownership.
Five years ago, the farmer asked the man for permission to use a designated two acres of the eastern
portion of the man's land to
enlarge her farm's irrigation facilities. The man orally gave his permission for such use. Since then, the
farmer has invested
substantial amounts of money and effort each year to develop and maintain the irrigation facilities
within the two-acre parcel.
The man has been fully aware of the farmer's actions. Nothing regarding this matter was ever reduced
to writing.
Last year, the man gave the entire tract of land as a gift to his nephew. The deed of gift made no
reference to the farmer or the
two-acre parcel. When the nephew had the land surveyed and discovered the facts, he notified the
farmer in writing, "Your
license to use the two-acre parcel has been terminated." The notice instructed the farmer to remove her
facilities from the two-
acre parcel immediately. The farmer refused the nephew's demand.
In an appropriate action between the nephew and the farmer to determine whether the farmer had a
right to continue to use the
two-acre parcel, the court ruled in favor of the farmer.
What is the most likely reason for the court's ruling?
Choose matching definition
The investments and efforts by the farmer in reliance on the license estop the man, and now the nephew
as
the man's donee, from terminating the license.
The nephew is merely a donee.
The farmer has acquired an easement based on prior use.
The farmer received a license coupled with an interest.

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20 of 31
Term
For 22 years, the land records have shown a man as the owner of an 80-acre farm. The man has never
physically occupied the land.
Nineteen years ago, a woman entered the farm. The character and duration of the woman's possession
of the farm caused her to become the owner of the farm under the adverse possession law of the
jurisdiction. Three years ago, when the woman was not present, a neighbor took over possession of the
farm. The neighbor repaired fences, put up "no trespassing" signs, and did some plowing. When the
woman returned, she found the neighbor in possession of the farm. The neighbor vigorously rejected
the woman's claimed right to possession and threatened force. The woman withdrew.
The woman then went to the man and told him of the history of activity on the farm. The woman orally
told the man that she had been
wrong to try to take his farm. She expressly waived any claim she had to the land. The man thanked
her. Last month, unsure of the effect of her conversation with the man, the woman executed a deed
purporting to convey the farm to her son. The son promptly recorded the deed.
The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years.

Who now owns the farm?

Choose matching definition
The man, because the woman's later words and actions released title to the man.
The neighbor, because the neighbor succeeded to the woman's adverse possession title by privity of
possession.
The son, because he succeeded to the woman's adverse possession title by privity of conveyance.
The woman, because she must bring a quiet title action to establish her title to the farm before she can
convey
the farm to her son.

Don't know?
21 of 31
Term
A landowner executed an instrument in the proper form of a deed, purporting to convey his land to a
friend. The
landowner handed the instrument to the friend, saying, "This is yours, but please do not record it until
after I am
dead. Otherwise, it will cause me no end of trouble with my relatives." Two days later, the landowner
asked the
friend to return the deed to him because he had decided that he should devise the land to the friend by
will rather
than by deed. The friend said that he would destroy the deed and a day or so later falsely told the
landowner that
the deed had been destroyed. Six months ago, the landowner, who had never executed a will, died
intestate,
survived by a daughter as his sole heir. The day after the landowner's death, the friend recorded the
deed from
him. As soon as the daughter discovered this recording and the friend's claim to the land, she brought
an
appropriate action against the friend to quiet title to the land.
For whom should the court hold?
Choose matching definition
The daughter, because the death of the landowner deprived the subsequent recording of any
effect.
The daughter, because the friend was dishonest in reporting that he had destroyed the deed.
The friend, because the deed was delivered to him.
The friend, because the deed was recorded by him.

Don't know?
22 of 31
Term
A grantor executed an instrument in the proper form of a warranty deed purporting to convey a tract
of land to his church. The granting clause of the instrument ran to the church "and its successors
forever, so long as the premises are used for church purposes." The church took possession of the
land and used it as its site of worship for many years. Subsequently, the church decided to relocate
and entered into a valid written contract to sell the land to a buyer for a substantial price. The buyer
wanted to use the land as a site for business activities and objected to the church's title. The contract
contained no provision relating to the quality of title the church was bound to convey. There is no
applicable statute. When the buyer refused to close, the church sued the buyer for specific
performance and properly joined the grantor as a party.
Is the church likely to prevail?
Choose matching definition
No, because the grantor's interest prevents the church's title from being
marketable.
No, because the quoted provision is a valid restrictive covenant.
Yes, because a charitable trust to support religion will attach to the proceeds of the
sale.
Yes, because the grantor cannot derogate from his warranty to the church.

Don't know?
23 of 31
Term
MBE Practice Question #3
A seller and a purchaser signed a contract for the sale of a 60-year-old house. The contract required
a warranty deed to be given at closing. The contract was silent regarding the condition of the house,
and the purchaser did not ask. The purchaser received a warranty deed with all covenants of title at
the closing and promptly recorded the deed. Approximately one month after the closing, the furnace
in the house stopped working, the basement flooded, and the roof leaked so badly that the second
floor could not be occupied. The seller, when told of the house's condition, was genuinely surprised.
There is no applicable statute.
The purchaser has sued the seller for damages.
Will the purchaser likely be successful?
Choose matching definition
Yes, because with a conveyance of residential real property, a warranty of fitness
is implied.
Yes, based on the covenants of title contained in the deed the purchaser received.
No, because the seller gave no warranty regarding the condition of the house.
No, because of the doctrine of merger.

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24 of 31
Term
A seller entered into a written contract to sell a tract of land to an investor. The contract made no
mention of
the quality of title to be conveyed. The seller and the investor later completed the sale, and the seller
delivered a
warranty deed to the investor. Soon thereafter, the value of the land increased dramatically. The
investor
entered into a written contract to sell the land to a buyer. The contract between the investor and the
buyer
expressly provided that the investor would convey a marketable title. The buyer's attorney discovered
that the
title to the land was not marketable and had not been marketable when the original seller had conveyed
to the
investor. The buyer refused to complete the sale. The investor sued the original seller for breach of
contract,
claiming damages from the seller's failure to convey marketable title, which resulted in the investor's
loss of the
sale to the subsequent buyer.
Who is likely to prevail on this count?
Choose matching definition
The investor, because the law implies in such a contract a covenant that the title will be
marketable.
The investor, because the original seller is liable for all reasonably foreseeable damages.
The original seller, because her contract obligations as to title merged into the deed.
The original seller, because she did not expressly agree to convey marketable title.

Don't know?
25 of 31
Term
When a homeowner became ill, he properly executed a deed sufficient to convey his home to his
nephew, who was then serving overseas in the military. Two persons signed as witnesses to qualify the
deed for recording under an applicable statute. The homeowner handed the deed to his nephew's
friend and said, "I want [the nephew] to have my home. Please take this deed for him." Shortly
thereafter, the nephew's friend learned that the homeowner's death was imminent. One day before the
homeowner's death, the nephew's friend recorded the deed. The nephew returned home shortly after
the homeowner's death, learned about the deed, and took possession of the home. The homeowner had
died intestate, leaving a daughter as his sole heir. When she asserted ownership of the home, the
nephew brought an appropriate action against her to determine title. The law of the jurisdiction
requires only two witnesses for a will to be properly executed.
If the court rules for the nephew and against the daughter, what will be the most likely explanation?
Choose matching definition
The deed was delivered when the homeowner handed it to the nephew's friend.
The delivery of the deed was accomplished by the recording of the deed.
The homeowner's death consummated a valid gift causa mortis to the nephew.
The homeowner's properly executed deed was effective as a testamentary document.

Don't know?
26 of 31
Term
An uncle was the record title holder of a vacant tract of land. He often told friends that he would
leave the land to his nephew in his will. The nephew knew of these conversations. Prior to the
uncle's death, the nephew conveyed the land by warranty deed to a woman for $10,000. She did
not conduct a title search of the land before she accepted the deed from the nephew. She
promptly and properly recorded her deed. Last month, the uncle died, leaving the land to the
nephew in his duly probated will. Both the nephew and the woman now claim ownership of the
land. The nephew has offered to return the $10,000 to the woman.
Who has title to the land?
Choose matching definition
The nephew, because at the time of the deed to the woman, the uncle was the
owner of record.
The nephew, because the woman did not conduct a title search.
The woman, because of the doctrine of estoppel by deed.
The woman, because she recorded her deed prior to the uncle's death.

Don't know?
27 of 31
Term
A buyer and a seller entered into a written contract for the sale of an identified parcel of land. The
contract expressly
provided that the buyer was to pay $150,000 cash for the land at the time of the closing but did not state
the closing date.
The parties had not agreed on the closing date because the buyer was not sure at the time the contract
was signed how
she would raise the cash.
Fifteen days after the contract was signed, the seller learned that he could sell the land to a third party
for $200,000.
The seller asked the buyer if she would agree to rescind the contract. The buyer refused. The seller then
told her that he
would not complete the transaction, contending that the contract was unenforceable under the statute of
frauds because
an essential element (time for performance) was not agreed upon by the parties and was not expressly
stated in the
written agreement. The seller sold the land to the third party.
The buyer brought an appropriate action against the seller for breach of contract.
For which party is the court likely to find?
Choose matching definition
The buyer, because of the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
The buyer, because the court will infer that performance within a reasonable time was intended.
The seller, because the contract is unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
The seller, because time of performance is presumed to be of the essence.

Don't know?
28 of 31
Term
A rectangular parcel of undeveloped land contained three acres and had 150 feet of frontage on a public
street. The
applicable zoning ordinance required that a buildable lot contain at least two acres and have frontage of
not less
than 100 feet on a public street.
A brother and sister owned the land as tenants in common, the brother owning a one-third interest and
the sister
owning a two-thirds interest. Neither of them owned any other real property.
The sister brought an appropriate action to partition the land and proposed that a two-acre rectangular
lot with
100 feet of frontage be set off to her and that a one-acre rectangular lot with 50 feet of frontage be set
off to the
brother. The brother's defense included a demand that the land be sold and its proceeds be divided one-
third to
the brother and two-thirds to the sister.
Who will prevail?
Choose matching definition
The brother, because partition by sale is the preferred remedy, unless a fair price is not the
likely result of a sale.
The brother, because the zoning ordinance makes it impossible to divide the land fairly.
The sister, because partition by sale is not appropriate if the subject property can be physically
divided.
The sister, because the ratio of the two lots that would result from her proposal conforms
exactly to the ownership ratio.

Don't know?
29 of 31
Term
Twenty-five years ago, a man who owned a 45-acre tract of land conveyed 40 of the 45 acres to a
developer by warranty deed. The man retained
the rear five-acre portion of the land and continues to live there in a large farmhouse.
The deed to the 40-acre tract was promptly recorded. It contained the following language:
"It is a term and condition of this deed, which shall be a covenant running with the land and binding on
all owners, their heirs and
assigns, that no use shall be made of the 40-acre tract of land except for residential purposes."
Subsequently, the developer fully developed the 40-acre tract into a residential subdivision consisting
of 40 lots with a single-family residence on
each lot.
Although there have been multiple transfers of ownership of each of the 40 lots within the subdivision,
none of them included a reference to the
quoted provision in the deed from the man to the developer, nor did any deed to a subdivision lot create
any new covenants restricting use.
Last year, a major new medical center was constructed adjacent to the subdivision. A doctor who owns
a house in the subdivision wishes to
relocate her medical office to her house. For the first time, the doctor learned of the restrictive covenant
in the deed from the man to the
developer. The applicable zoning ordinance permits the doctor's intended use. The man, as owner of the
five-acre tract, however, objects to the
doctor's proposed use of her property. There are no governing statutes other than the zoning code. The
common law Rule Against Perpetuities is
unmodified in the jurisdiction.
May the doctor convert her house in the subdivision into a medical office?
Choose matching definition
No, because the owners of lots in the subdivision own property benefitted by the original residential
covenant and have
the sole right to enforce it.
No, because the man owns property benefitted by the original restrictive covenant and has a right to
enforce it.
Yes, because the original restrictive covenant violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Yes, because the zoning ordinance allows the doctor's proposed use and preempts the restrictive
covenant.

Don't know?
30 of 31
Term
A woman owned a house on a lot abutting a public street. Six months ago, the city validly revised
its zoning ordinances and placed the woman's lot and the surrounding lots abutting the public
street from the north in a zone limited to residential use; the lots abutting the public street on the
south side were zoned for both residential and light business use.
The woman asked the city's zoning appeals board to approve her proposal to operate a court-
reporting service from her house. This type of use would be permitted on the south side of the
public street and, in fact, one such business has existed there for several years.
The board approved the woman's proposal.
Why?
Choose matching definition
A variance was granted.
The doctrine of amortization applied.
The doctrine of change of circumstances applied.
The woman's use of her house was a nonconforming use.

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31 of 31