PANZER III

T-34
Eastern Front 1941

PETER SAMSONOV
PANZER III
T-34
Eastern Front 1941

PETER SAMSONOV
CONTENTS
Introduction 4
Chronology 7
Design and Development 8
Technical Specifications 21
The Combatants 35
The Strategic Situation 48
Combat 52
Statistics and Analysis 70
Aftermath 75
Bibliography 77
Index 80
 INTRODUCTION
While no one could have predicted what a war between the Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany would look like ahead of time, a well-informed observer could be certain
that it would be a war of armour. The Soviet Union’s Red Army quickly realized the
potential of a mechanized force. Tank factories were among the most important
facilities established when the Soviet government began its breakneck programme of
industrialization in the late 1920s. The Large Kiev Manoeuvres of 1935 advertised the
might of Soviet armour to the world; and tanks featured prominently in military
parades held in Moscow’s Red Square.
The Germans were more subtle. Prohibited from development of a wide variety of
weapons under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles (1919), German arms giants
continued to operate in secret through their foreign subsidiaries. Curiously enough,
the Red Army ended up with a very good understanding of German tank development
before the start of the Great Patriotic War (1941–45) as a result. Prototypes of the
Leichttraktor light tank and Grosstraktor medium tank were tested in Kazan. Even after
the German testing programme was terminated, Soviet forces captured a PzKpfw I
Ausf. A light tank during the Spanish Civil War (1936–39). A PzKpfw II light tank
was stolen in Nazi-occupied Poland in 1939 and a PzKpfw III medium tank was
purchased from Germany in 1940. These tanks were studied and tested thoroughly,
so that by June 1941 the Red Army had a fairly good idea of the composition and
characteristics of German tank forces.
Conversely, the Germans knew next to nothing about the Soviet Union’s newest
armoured vehicles. The KV-1 heavy and T-34 medium tanks were developed in such
great secrecy, that the only hint such tanks existed came in the form of the SMK heavy
tank prototype (precursor to the KV-1) photographed by the Finns during the Winter
4 War (1939–40). The Germans were only aware of the T-26 and BT-7 light tanks that
made up the core of the Soviet tank force, but these designs were already considered The PzKpfw III Ausf. A was the first
obsolete by the Red Army. step towards Germany’s main
Despite not being prepared for the KV-1 and T-34 specifically, the German medium tank. (Scherl/
Süddeutsche Zeitung Photo/
Panzerwaffe (armoured force) was already composed of combat veterans. German tank
Alamy Stock Photo)
production also increased at a rapid pace. For example, only 51 PzKpfw III tanks were
available for the invasion of Poland, most of which were experimental vehicles. Some
19 months later, at the start of Operation Barbarossa – the Axis invasion of the Soviet
Union in late June 1941 – 1,440 PzKpfw III tanks were available, over 1,000 of which
had improved guns and thicker armour to deal not just with the firepower of Soviet
tanks that the Germans expected to see, but also with prospective threats.
By contrast, the Red Army was only just starting its major expansion. Confident
that the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, signed on 23 August 1939, had bought him
enough time, Stalin approved a modernization of the Red Army’s tank forces that was
expected to take several years. The vast majority of Soviet tank crewmen serving in
1941 had never seen combat, however, and a shortage of experienced instructors and
NCOs meant that the lessons learned during the border clashes with Japanese tank
forces at Lake Khasan (July–August 1938) and Khalkhin Gol (May–September 1939),
the invasion of Poland and the Winter War were spreading slowly through the swelling
ranks of Soviet tankers. 5
 A typical 1940-production T-34. Mastery of new tanks was also lagging behind. The T-34 had been in production
Note the night-fighting spotlight for little more than a year by the time Operation Barbarossa began, and thus even
mounted on top of the gun commanders who were lucky enough to receive these brand-new tanks were reluctant
mantlet. This feature was
to use them for training, meaning that the inevitable ‘growing pains’ were slow to
prevalent among Soviet tanks in
the late 1930s, but had all but surface and thus slow to be resolved.
vanished by the end of the decade. The German invasion of the Soviet Union threw a sizeable spanner into the works
Only the earliest T-34 tanks had of the modernization of the Red Army’s tank forces. Deliveries of new tanks including
the night-fighting spotlight. the T-34 prioritized units positioned along the border, which were overwhelmed and
(Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvenniy
destroyed piecemeal as German forces advanced into Soviet territory. Rather than
Voyenniy Arkhiv)
building new tanks that suddenly became more important than ever, Soviet factories
had to be dismantled and evacuated to safety vast distances away. In addition, the Red
Army now had to raise an even larger cohort of raw recruits, having lost many of its
experienced officers and NCOs. Nevertheless, the German steamroller heading east
first slipped, then stalled altogether. Fortunes turned on the Soviet–German Front,
albeit at a terrible cost as the Red Army began a counter-offensive at the gates of
Moscow against a German force that the whole world had considered to be unbeatable
only weeks before.
Among the tens of thousands of armoured vehicles that clashed in these vital
months, two types stood out: the T-34 and PzKpfw III, both of which were chosen by
their respective armies to be the backbone of their armoured force. Despite this,
however, both had to share their glory with a sizeable proportion of supporting tanks;
both were the subject of political intrigue, reflecting the people and systems that
produced them; and both started out as much smaller and lighter vehicles but ended
their service lives with thicker armour and more-powerful armament. This study
explores the first months of the Great Patriotic War through the lens of a duel between
6 these two formidable tanks.
CHRONOLOGY
1934 1939
27 January Wa Prüf 6 begins work on the Z.W. 1 June Trials of the A-20 tank begin.
(Zugführerwagen), a replacement for 2 July Trials of the A-32 tank begin.
the Leichttraktor. 1 September Nazi Germany invades Poland.
World War II begins.
1935 19 December The T-34 is accepted into Red Army
August Z.W. prototypes are completed. service.
1937 1940
April Experimental batch of ten 13 February Trials of the A-34 tanks begin.
PzKpfw III Ausf. A tanks are 12 March Two A-34 prototypes head to
completed. Moscow for demonstration to top
8–9 April Red Army ABTU prepares Soviet government officials.
requirements for a next-generation 31 March Design of the T-34 is approved for
medium tank based on combat production.
experience during the Spanish Civil June Production of the T-34 begins.
War.
1941
1938 22 June Nazi Germany invades the Soviet
December Production of the Z.W.38 Union. The Great Patriotic War
(PzKpfw III Ausf. E) begins. begins.
9–10 December Designs of T-34 prototypes are 30 September German forces draw closer to the
presented to the Supreme Military Soviet capital. The battle of Moscow
Council of the Red Army. begins.
5 December The German offensive on Moscow
is stopped. The Red Army begins
the offensive phase of the battle of
Moscow.

Production of PzKpfw III tanks, 1940. This was the year when the
PzKpfw III began its transition from a series of shaky prototypes to Tanks built at Factory No. 183. Left to right: BT-7; experimental A-20; T-34
becoming the backbone of the Panzerwaffe (Heinrich Hoffmann/ullstein typical of pre-March 1941; and T-34 produced between March and August
bild via Getty Images) 1941. (Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvenniy Voyenniy Arkhiv) 7
 DESIGN AND
DEVELOPMENT

PzKpfw III
During the 1920s, Krupp and Rheinmetall developed 8-tonne tanks codenamed
Leichttraktor (‘light tractor’) that were secretly tested in the Soviet Union during
1930–32. It was clear that a new concept was needed and work on a heavier tank
codenamed Z.W. (Zugführerwagen or ‘platoon commander’s vehicle’) began on
27 January 1934. This tank kept the Leichttraktor’s 3.7cm Rheinmetall gun, but
placed the driver’s compartment and transmission in the front, fighting compartment
in the centre and the engine in the rear.
Daimler-Benz and MAN each received a contract to build an experimental
chassis while Krupp and Rheinmetall-Borsig were responsible for the turrets. MAN
dropped out of the competition soon after. Two Zugführerwagen prototypes (Z.W.1
and Z.W.2) were completed in August 1935, both with Daimler-Benz hulls. While
the layout was copied from the British Carden-Loyd VAE 393 tractor, the large
roadwheels with an individual coil-spring suspension suggested some influence from
J. Walter Christie’s high-speed tanks. A 300PS (221kW) Maybach HL100 TR
petrol engine gave the Zugführerwagen an impressive power-to-weight ratio. Other
features, such as the turret, had many similarities to the German Neubaufahrzeug
(‘new construction vehicle’) and Begleitwagen (‘escort vehicle’) tanks. The
Zugführerwagen was heavier than originally estimated: 12 tonnes instead of
8 10 tonnes.
 Leichttraktor (‘light tractor’). The
Z.W. programme that resulted in
the PzKpfw III was launched after
it became clear that the
Leichttraktor was deeply
unsatisfactory and could not be
salvaged. (Universal Art Archive/
Alamy Stock Photo)

In April 1936 the Zugführerwagen was redesignated the PzKpfw III (3.7cm) and
given the index SdKfz 141. An order for a batch of ten pilot tanks (PzKpfw III
Ausf. A) was placed. These tanks, completed by April 1937, were even heavier:
15 tonnes. There were a number of changes compared to the Z.W.1 and Z.W.2
prototypes: the drive sprockets and idlers were smaller, the commander’s cupola
and gun mantlet were changed slightly and a deflector was added to prevent the
turret machine guns from hitting the radio antenna when firing. The pilot tanks
were powered by the weaker 250PS (184kW) Maybach HL108 TR petrol engine.
Shock absorbers were added to the suspension to help deal with the worsening
vibrations resulting from the tank’s greater weight, although the fact that the idea
of vertical coil springs was dropped after this variant suggests that they were not
effective enough.
A second Zugführerwagen type was ordered in late 1935, shortly after the delivery
of the first two prototypes. The Z.W.3 and Z.W.4 tanks both had leaf-spring
suspensions. The Z.W.3 had eight wheels per side grouped into bogies; and two large
leaf springs were used instead of individual coil springs. The Z.W.4 had a similar
suspension, but it had three leaf springs: short ones in the front and rear and a full-
length one in the middle. The Z.W.3 entered production as the PzKpfw III Ausf. B
(2./Z.W.Serie), but the order was still conservative at 15 chassis: ten built as tanks and
five as PzSfl III (sPaK) vehicles (a precursor to the StuG III assault gun). The
PzKpfw III Ausf. B looked very similar to the PzKpfw III Ausf. A bar the suspension,
but there was one other major visual change: the hatches in the front hull for servicing
the brakes were round instead of square and had hinges. The PzKpfw III Ausf. B was
once again heavier than its predecessor, weighing 16 tonnes. The ten tanks were
completed and delivered by the end of 1937.
The Z.W.4 was put into production as the PzKpfw III Ausf. C (3./Z.W.Serie).
This variant had the same square-shaped brake-maintenance hatches as the
PzKpfw III Ausf. A, but there were other visual differences including a new driver’s
observation device and a commander’s cupola from the PzKpfw IV Ausf. B with a
30mm-thick armoured ring. A variant with improved leaf springs entered 9
 A PzKpfw III Ausf. D makes its way
along a forest road, winter
1941/42. Tanks of this series still
had an experimental leaf-spring
suspension. (SA-kuva)

production as the PzKpfw III Ausf. D (3b./Z.W.Serie), with the PzKpfw III Ausf. C
retroactively changing to 3a./Z.W.Serie; 15 examples of the Ausf. C and 25 of the
Ausf. D were ordered, with production completed in November 1938. In addition,
five PzKpfw III Ausf. D were built instead of the five PzKpfw III Ausf. B tanks that
were used to build assault guns. Production of these extra vehicles was completed
in October 1940.
While these experimental tanks were being built, work was progressing on a
revision of the Zugführerwagen concept, resulting in the Z.W.38. Instead of coil or leaf
springs, it had a torsion-bar suspension that had already proved itself on the Swedish
Landsverk L-60 light tank. Six individually sprung roadwheels were installed per side.
The tracks were also different: rubber pads and lubricated track pins were designed to
make driving on roads as smooth as possible. A 256PS (188kW) Maybach HL120 TR
petrol engine and a ten-speed semi-automatic Maybach Variorex gearbox gave the
Z.W.38 exceptional mobility for its class. Unfortunately, the sophisticated track links
proved unreliable and had to be replaced with conventional metal ones; and the
OPPOSITE roadwheels quickly wore out at high speeds. Although the Z.W.38 was capable of
A PzKpfw III Ausf. E tank. While
reaching 67km/h, its top speed had to be capped at just 40km/h to prolong the
the PzKpfw III Ausf. A to Ausf. D
were experimental vehicles built
lifespan of its running gear.
in small batches, the Ausf. E can The Wehrmacht ordered production of the Z.W.38 – given the production
be considered the first truly index PzKpfw III Ausf. E (4./Z.W.Serie) – in much greater numbers than its
mass-produced variant. This was predecessors: 759 on 11 June 1938, and 440 more on 6 December. Production got
the first PzKpfw III to have six off to a slow start, however, with just one tank delivered in 1938 and only 50 by
wheels per side with an individual
1 September 1939. In total, 96 PzKpfw III Ausf. E tanks were built, 41 by Daimler-
torsion-bar suspension, as used
on all subsequent variants of the Benz and 55 by MAN.
vehicle. Production began in 1938 A total of 435 tanks of the PzKpfw III Ausf. F (5./Z.W.Serie) variant were produced
and the tanks were first used in by Henschel, Daimler-Benz, MAN, MIAG, FAMO and Alkett. There were only a few
combat against Poland in 1939. visible changes: air intakes were added to the front of the hull to help cool the brakes;
Even though superior models
an observation port was added for the radio operator on the right side of the hull; and
were available, PzKpfw III Ausf. E
tanks were still in service for the
a Nebelkerzenabwurfvorrichtung (‘smoke-grenade launcher’) was mounted on the rear
invasion of the Soviet Union in of the hull. The engine was replaced with the 265PS (195kW) Maybach HL120 TRM,
10 June 1941. which, unlike its predecessor, had impulse magneto ignition.
PzKpfw III Ausf. E

11
 ABOVE LEFT The Ausf. E and Ausf. F were also the first PzKpfw III variants to be fitted with
PzKpfw III Ausf. E, France, 1940. improved main armour. The front and sides of the hull and turret were thickened from
The Ausf. E incorporated the most
14.5mm to 30mm, which was enough to withstand contemporary light anti-tank
important change over its
predecessors: an independent
weapons, including the Polish 7.92mm Karabin wz. 35 and Finnish 20mm Lahti L-39
torsion-bar suspension with six anti-tank rifles, and even low-velocity cannon such as the French 37mm SA 18.
roadwheels per side. This The main armament of the PzKpfw III was upgraded when production of the
suspension was used on all PzKpfw III Ausf. G (6./Z.W.Serie) began in March 1940. This tank was initially very
subsequent PzKpfw III variants. similar to the PzKpfw III Ausf. F, but in July 1940 the 3.7cm KwK L/45 was replaced with
(Scherl/Süddeutsche Zeitung
the 5cm KwK L/42. The campaign in France had shown that the 3.7cm gun could only
Photo/Alamy Stock Photo)
penetrate the 40mm-thick armour of French tanks due to the armour’s low quality, and
ABOVE RIGHT even then only at close range. The new gun was much more powerful, and was capable of
PzKpfw III Ausf. J, Vadim penetrating up to 75mm of armour. Although the old 3.7cm gun remained in production
Zadorozhny Technical Museum.
and service, older tanks were re-armed as supplies of the 5cm gun increased. Out of a total
This was the most advanced
variant of the PzKpfw III available
of 1,440 PzKpfw III tanks deployed by July 1941, 1,090 had 5cm guns.
on the front lines in 1941. Combat experience in Poland and France prompted the Germans to reinforce the
(Author) tank’s armour. The front hull armour was increased from 30mm to 60mm by the
addition of appliqué armour. This was an effective way to protect the tank, but it came
at a cost. The first of the new variants, designated the PzKpfw III Ausf. H
(7./Z.W.Serie), 286 of which were produced until April 1941, weighed 21.8 tonnes
and needed a reinforced suspension and 400mm-wide track links to compensate for
the increased mass. A simpler design, the PzKpfw III Ausf. J (8./Z.W.Serie), entered
OPPOSITE
production in March 1941. Instead of multi-layered armour, its front armour was
The PzKpfw III Ausf. J entered
production in March 1941 and
composed of one 50mm-thick plate. The front of the turret was also reinforced to
was the most advanced variant 50mm. The first tanks of this variant began to enter service just as Operation
available during Operation Barbarossa began. During 1941, 1,322 PzKpfw III Ausf. J tanks armed with the 5cm
Barbarossa. This tank had thicker KwK L/42 gun were built.
armour than earlier PzKpfw III It is important to note that due to parallel production and parts compatibility
variants and was equipped with a
between series, it was common to see hybrid tanks. For instance, early-production
longer 5cm gun starting in
December 1941, although PzKpfw III Ausf. J tanks were built with a PzKpfw III Ausf. H turret and some
production of tanks with a short PzKpfw III Ausf. G tanks received a driver’s observation device and commander’s
12 gun continued until May 1942. cupola from the PzKpfw III Ausf. F.
PzKpfw III Ausf. J

13
 T-34
By the late 1930s the Red Army’s armoured force was at a crossroads. Slightly improved
by the use of sloped armour and appliqué armour plates, the T-26 light infantry-
support tank had been in production since 1933; the T-46 was supposed to replace it,
but was cancelled in 1938. The T-28 medium tank had only 30mm of armour and a
short 76mm KT-28 gun that was capable of dealing with light field fortifications, but
not enemy tanks; attempts to install a larger gun failed. The T-28 was supposed to be
replaced by the T-29 medium tank, but this project was also cancelled in 1938.
The third tank in common use with the Red Army was the BT. The high mobility
provided by the BT’s Christie suspension and a series of powerful engines (first a copy
of the Christie tank’s Liberty engine, then the improved M-17 type) was deemed
satisfactory. Requirements for a tank designated BT-20 were approved on 13 October
1937. In terms of protection, the BT-20 light cavalry tank was a step forward compared
to the BT-7, with armour up to 25mm thick placed at an angle of at least 18 degrees.
The BT-20 would be armed with a 45mm or a 76mm gun, just like its predecessor.
Requirements changed on 13 May 1938, however. The BT-20 now needed to have
up to 30mm of sloped armour, and also a gun mantlet thick enough to withstand fire
from 37mm guns. A fourth crewman was also added. He would sit in the hull and
operate the BT-20’s radio and a 7.62mm DT machine gun.
On 21 August 1938, NKOP (People’s Commissariat of Defence Industry) order
#335ss instructed Factory No. 183 in Kharkov to produce three experimental tanks: one
with a convertible drive and two with only tracks. The design for these tanks was
presented on 27 August 1938. Instead of a distinct break in the tank’s silhouette, the
front armour was composed of one sharply sloped plate. The sides were also sloped. This
tank was now referred to as the A-20 rather than BT-20. As requested by the NKOP, a
variant with tracks was also presented. This tank was called A-20 (tracked). Dropping
the convertible-drive mechanism saved nearly 1 tonne of weight compared to the basic

The A-20 tank was based on the

BT series concept with its four
roadwheels per side and
convertible drive. The hull was
widened to allow for a radio
operator/hull gunner to sit next to
the driver. (Rossiyskiy
Gosudarstvenniy Voyenniy
14 Arkhiv)
 The A-32 tank was a departure
from the A-20, featuring five
roadwheels per side instead of
four and no convertible drive.
Unlike the A-20, this A-32 also has
a 76mm gun. (Rossiyskiy
Gosudarstvenniy Voyenniy
Arkhiv)

A-20 tank. In this early concept, the weight saving was used to increase the ammunition
capacity from 160 45mm shells to 200 and 48 7.62mm machine-gun magazines to 58.
The two projects quickly diverged. ABTU Chief Dmitriy G. Pavlov’s report to the
Supreme Military Council of the Red Army, made on 9 December 1938, already
described the tracked design as having a 76mm gun while the convertible-drive design
retained a 45mm gun. The name of the vehicle also changed. At first the word
gusenichniy (‘tracked’) was shortened to just ‘G’, making the designation of the
prototype A-20G. Later, the tank received an entirely new designation: A-32.
The designs continued to diverge. Although the A-32 was supposed to be lighter
than the A-20, even with the extra ammunition, the decision to use a 76mm gun
instead of a 45mm gun made it heavier than its convertible-drive sibling, which
retained the 45mm gun. The A-32 also had slightly thicker armour at 30mm, whereas
the A-20’s armour thickness remained at 25mm. The fully loaded A-20 now weighed
18 tonnes, but the A-32 weighed 19 tonnes.
This was not the end of the A-32’s transformations. Trials had shown that the
500PS (368kW) V-2 diesel engine was more than sufficient for a vehicle of this weight.
As a consequence, in July 1939 Pavlov ordered an investigation into the possibility of
increasing the A-32’s armour. Preliminary calculations showed that increasing the
armour thickness all-around by 10mm would increase the weight of the A-32 to
19.5–19.6 tonnes. Pavlov gave the order to build an A-32 with 45mm-thick armour
all-around. Trials with a second A-32 prototype loaded to a weight of 24 tonnes
showed that the V-2 engine could deal with this extra weight.
A contract for two tanks with 45mm-thick armour was signed on 28 September
1939. This new tank received the designation A-34. On 19 December 1939 decree
#443ss marked the acceptance of a number of new vehicles into service, including
the improved A-32. The final variant of the tank with 45mm of armour and a new
76mm F-32 gun would be designated T-34.
At the time this decree was signed, the two A-34 prototypes were still in the early
stages of assembly. The first prototype was delivered to the Red Army on 10 February
1940, with the second following two days later, and trials began on 13 February. The
two tanks had a 2,500km-long course ahead of them, including 300km of driving on
paved roads, 1,000km on dirt roads and 1,200km off-road. Special obstacle trials were 15
 also conducted. Other components such as the 76mm L-11 gun (used as a replacement
for the F-32 until production of the latter was under way) and 71-TK-3 radio coupled
with the TPU-2 intercom were also tested.
While the mobility of the A-34 proved satisfactory, the Red Army requested many
changes to be made to the gun mount. The radio was deemed to be satisfactory, enabling
communication between the two tanks at ranges of up to 18–20km, even in motion. The
biggest problem with the radio was its location. As it was placed in the turret bustle, it had
to be operated by the commander (who also doubled as the gunner), which distracted him
from other tasks. The Red Army requested that the radio be moved to the hull and operated
by the hull gunner. Additionally, a TPU-3 instead of a TPU-2 intercom should be used.
Having received the military’s seal of approval, it was time to present the two
A-34 prototypes to the Soviet government. Marshal Voroshilov ordered that the
tanks not be transported from Kharkov to Moscow by train, but make the drive of
some 800km under their own power. A convoy comprising the two tanks and a
Voroshilovets tractor carrying spare parts set out on 12 March 1940. Owing to
snowy conditions and longer-than-expected maintenance halts, the three vehicles
were more than a day late, arriving in Moscow at 1745hrs on 17 March.
Even though the original programme called only for driving from Kharkov to
Moscow and back, the two tanks made a detour to the NIBT (Scientific Institute
for Armoured Equipment) Proving Grounds at Kubinka on 24 March. Senior
officials gathered to observe how the tanks’ 45mm-thick armour dealt with modern
anti-tank guns. A 37mm Bofors gun taken from a Finnish Army Vickers Mark E
Type B light tank captured during the Winter War and a 45mm Model 1934 gun
used in a BT-7 tank were employed for the trials, with the first A-34 prototype
chosen as their target. Each gun fired two shots from a range of 100m. The 37mm
gun could not penetrate the A-34’s armour, but destroyed the left-side observation
device. The 45mm gun could not penetrate the armour either. A shot to the side of
the turret only left a dent, although a shot that hit the welding seam between the
turret bustle floor and turret side resulted in spalling that damaged a mannequin
placed inside the tank. This shot also jammed the turret, although the jam was
cleared by the crew with the help of a jack. These trials showed that the A-34 could
indeed resist fire from modern anti-tank weapons, although more thorough trials
would be conducted in the future.
Agreements to begin production of the A-34 were concluded during 29–31 March
1940. The two tanks departed for Kharkov at 0130hrs on 2 April and arrived at
Factory No. 183 at 0900hrs on 10 April. They remained in use for testing while
Factory No. 183 got to work setting up production of the tank.
Even though decree #443ss described the T-34 as an A-32 with thicker armour and
an F-32 gun, the tanks that were first assembled in June 1940 were very different
vehicles. F-32 production lagged behind schedule and the gun was not available until
January 1941. The first T-34s were stuck with using the L-11 gun. Another difference
was the driver’s station. Rather than having a cabin, the driver on the production T-34
OPPOSITE
received his own hatch that was flush with the front of the hull. The hatch had one
An early-production T-34. Tanks
similar to this example were built
periscope inside it and two more on the flanks, giving the driver a combined range of
between June 1940 and March vision of 127 degrees. Outside of combat, the hatch could be locked open to make it
16 1941. easier for the driver to see where he was going.
EARLY-PRODUCTION T-34

17
 An A-34 tank undergoing Molotov
cocktail trials. This tank looks like
a T-34, but there are several
differences, one of the most
prominent being the driver’s
cabin. (Rossiyskiy
Gosudarstvenniy Voyenniy
Arkhiv)

There were also major changes to the turret. The initial turret used on the two A-34
tanks was too narrow. Factory No. 183 was asked to find more room for the crew
without sacrificing the slope of the armour plates or widening the hull. This was
achieved by changing the geometry of the turret, giving an extra 160mm of width for
the fighting compartment. These wider turrets (only 38 narrow-width turrets were
built) can be distinguished by a rectangular patch of armour below the pistol port.
Another major change resulted from measures taken to accelerate production. The
turret made up of rolled plates welded together was complicated to assemble, so a cast
turret was developed to simplify the production process. Trials showed that cast
armour was slightly weaker than rolled armour, however, and so the cast turret had
nominally 52mm-thick sides (due to the imprecision of the casting process, the
thickness could vary between 51mm and 55mm) to offer equivalent protection to the
45mm-thick rolled plates. This increased the turret weight from 1,885kg to 2,035kg.
The hull was also changed to simplify production. Originally, the whole front hull
was made from one large curved piece of armour. Shaping such a large and thick piece
of armour was time-consuming, and so a simpler solution was developed by which the
upper and lower front plates were cut separately and connected with a 100mm-thick
cast beam. The beam was welded to the hull plates and the weld seam was reinforced
with rivets. Trials showed that this joint withstood repeated hits from 45mm and
76mm guns. This composite hull was put into production in June 1940. The rivets
were later removed as the welding was considered sufficiently strong. A fully cast front
hull was also designed, but never produced.
Another major change had to do with the radio. Work to find an acceptable
OPPOSITE location for the radio began after the first trials of the A-34, but nowhere had been
A typical T-34 produced after found by the time T-34 production started. A compromise was reached: the T-34
March 1941. Of note are the cast would be built with a radio in the turret and Factory No. 183 would refurbish existing
turret, which was easier to tanks at its own cost once a way to fit the radio into the hull was found. Experiments
produce than the welded type, a
began in August 1940 but only finished on 14 October 1940. Trials of five T-34 tanks
longer and more powerful 76mm
F-34 gun, and the absence of a fitted with 71-TK-3 radios in the hull to the right of the bow gunner showed that the
backup commander’s periscope tanks could communicate at ranges of 18–19km while moving in third or fourth gear
18 in the turret hatch. or up to 26km when stationary.
LATER-PRODUCTION T-34

19
 A typical pre-war production T-34.
Changes included a new 76mm
F-34 gun, cast turret and cast
connecting beam separating the
upper and lower front hull plates.
Note the presence of a PTK
periscope at the loader’s station.
This periscope was nearly identical
to the commander’s PT-4, but it
was not linked to the gun.
(Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvenniy
Voyenniy Arkhiv)

Large-scale trials of T-34 production tanks were held during October–December

1940. Three September–October production tanks were selected and run through
trials of 2,706km (132 hours 27 minutes), 2,571km (120 hours 35 minutes) and
2,680km (129 hours exactly) respectively. The trials report acknowledged that the
T-34 had much room for improvement. A number of changes were requested,
including the installation of an improved 76mm F-34 gun and 600PS (441kW) V-2K
diesel engine, and an increase of the tank’s lifespan to 7,000km or 250 hours of
operation. Some of the desired changes were implemented on the existing T-34, while
others were postponed for implementation on the T-34M tank that was expected to
replace the T-34 in production by the end of 1941. Owing to the Axis invasion,
however, this never took place.
The T-34 continued to evolve during 1941, the most notable change being the
introduction of the F-34 gun. This gun not only had improved ballistics compared to
the L-11, but was also more reliable. The last of 286 T-34 tanks armed with the L-11
gun was produced in March 1941.
Another component of the T-34 tank that evolved throughout 1941 was the driver’s
hatch, which was vulnerable to jamming and damage. The hatch was sealed to be airtight
to resist Molotov cocktails, and splash protection strips were added around the edges. In
August an entirely new hatch flap entered production. It was made of 60mm-thick cast
armour with a thick flange instead of 45mm rolled armour. Instead of one periscope in the
middle of the hatch, there were now two with overlapping fields of vision. Both periscopes
were equipped with armoured shutters. The driver could close one in combat and operate
the T-34 by looking through the other. If that periscope was damaged, he could switch to
a second one and replace his back-up. The right-hand periscope offered a field of vision of
95 degrees, the left 85 degrees (the range of the latter periscope was partially obscured by
the tank’s fender). The two periscopes installed around the driver’s hatch were removed.
These and other changes were introduced into the T-34 gradually without discrete
breaks in series, making attempts to split production by year (Model 1940, Model 1941,
etc.) or type (T-34A, T-34B, etc.) pointless. The close attention paid to maintaining
parts compatibility meant that both newly built and refurbished T-34 tanks could be
20 visually different depending on where and when their components were built.
TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS
Several production series of the PzKpfw III were in service at the time of the Axis
invasion of the Soviet Union and the tank continued to change over the course of the
next several years, both to meet new threats and adapt to its changing role on the
battlefield. This chapter describes the most advanced model of the PzKpfw III tank
available on the front lines during the battle of Moscow (September 1941–January
1942), the PzKpfw III Ausf. J.
The T-34 entered production in June 1940. Even though production was not
divided into multiple discrete series, the design remained in flux throughout the Great

A T-34 tank stuck after ramming a

PzKpfw II tank, August 1941. Even
though the T-34’s F-34 gun could
effortlessly dispatch this light
tank, shortages of 76mm
ammunition often left Soviet
tankers with no other weapon
except this desperate
manoeuvre. (Daily Mirror Library/
Mirrorpix/Mirrorpix via Getty
Images) 21
 Patriotic War. Specifications differed based on the factory and year (or even month)
of production. Owing to careful attention paid to parts compatibility, a T-34 could be
built with a turret, hull and running gear all from different factories, resulting in a
large number of visually distinct variants being fielded throughout the Great Patriotic
War. This chapter describes a typical T-34 built with parts produced at Factory
No. 183 that would be commonly encountered in late 1941.

LAYOUT
The hull of the PzKpfw III followed the same layout for all German tanks of the
period. It consisted of a tub with a superstructure in the middle, which formed the
turret platform. The front of the hull formed a complicated shape to make room
A mock-up of a T-34 showing the for the Maybach SSG 77 transmission. The transmission was located in the front
layout of the fighting and engine and the engine in the rear, with a shaft connecting the two running under the
compartments, Park Pobedy, fighting compartment. Two crewmen, the driver and the radio operator/hull
Moscow. The driver and radio gunner, sat in the front of the hull. The commander sat below the cupola and
operator/hull gunner sat in the
behind the gun. The loader and the gunner flanked the gun. Observation ports for
front of the hull with the
commander/gunner and loader the latter two crewmen were cut into the front half of the side and large hatches
behind them on seats suspended with two flaps in the rear half. The front flap had another observation port; the rear
from the turret ring. (Author) flap had a pistol port. These hatches were used by the loader and the gunner to enter

22
 A closer view of the T-34’s crew
compartment. This tank, on
display at Patriot Park, Kubinka,
lacks the ammunition crates that
made up the floor of the fighting
compartment. The loader’s seat
(left rear) and commander/
gunner’s foot rest (right rear) can
be seen behind the seats of the
radio operator/hull gunner (left
front) and driver (right front).
(Author)

and exit the tank. Two more pistol ports were cut into the rear of the turret and
covered by conical plugs when not in use. Evacuation hatches were cut into the sides
of the hull. These came in handy, because the driver and radio operator entered the
tank via the turret.
While the T-34’s layout was reminiscent of those of its ancestors, the BT tanks,
it was greatly simplified. The upper hull was in the shape of a bisected pyramid,
providing sloped armour on every side. While the lower front and rear plates were
also sloped to improve protection, the lower sides still had to be vertical in order
to accommodate the roadwheels. As in the BT tanks, the driver sat in the front of
the tank. Since the T-34 had a radio operator/hull gunner in the driver’s
compartment, the driver and his hatch were located in the front left corner with
the other crewman to his right. The turret and fighting compartment were located
right behind them. The engine compartment was located behind the fighting
compartment, separated by a firewall. The transmission was in the very back
of the tank.
The T-34’s turret sat towards the front of the hull on a turret ring with an inner
diameter of 1,420mm. Three pistol ports (one in each side and one in the rear) were
available for close defence. When not in use, the pistol ports were sealed with a conical
plug. The T-34 commander sat to the left of the gun. Because there were only two
crewmen in the turret, the commander also performed the duties of a gunner, aiming
through either a periscopic or a telescopic gun sight. The loader sat on the other side
of the turret from the commander. In addition to loading the gun, the loader’s role
included servicing the coaxial 7.62mm DT machine gun. On some tanks, the loader
used the same periscope as the commander/gunner. 23
 PzKpfw III Ausf. H, Musée des
Blindés, Saumur. In addition to
the appliqué armour installed on
this variant, this particular tank
has been retrofitted with
additional spaced armour on the
front of the hull. This tank already
has the 5cm KwK 38 L/42 gun, a
considerable improvement over
earlier PzKpfw III variants’ 3.7cm
gun. (Author)

FIREPOWER AND ARMOUR

The PzKpfw III’s armament consisted of a 5cm KwK 38 L/42 gun with a coaxial
MG 34 machine gun in the turret and a second MG 34 in the hull. In total, 78 rounds
of fixed ammunition for the gun were carried in the hull: 22 in a bin at the rear of the
fighting compartment on the right side; 24 in a bin on the left side; 14 on the left side
of the engine compartment, accessible through a door in the bulkhead; two in a bin
on the bulkhead; eight on the left wall of the fighting compartment; and eight more
under the commander’s seat. In addition, 4,950 rounds of ammunition for the two
machine guns were carried in 33 150-round belts spread between bags hanging on the
left and right walls of the fighting compartment.
The PzKpfw III’s front turret armour was 50mm thick and angled at 15 degrees,
although early tanks of this series still had older turrets with 30mm-thick armour. The
rounded gun mantlet was 50mm thick. An observation port (covered with an
armoured shutter when not in use) was cut into the right side of the turret. The sides
and rear were also 30mm thick and angled at 25 degrees and the rear at 12 degrees
respectively. The roof of the turret was 10mm thick. The front half was angled at
OPPOSITE
85 degrees and the rear was horizontal. A commander’s cupola with 50mm-thick walls
The 5cm KwK 38 L/42 gun was was installed towards the back of the roof. There was a hatch covered by a pair of
installed in PzKpfw III tanks 10mm-thick flaps in the top for use by the commander.
starting in July 1940. This gun The PzKpfw III’s lower front hull plate was 50mm thick and sloped forwards at an
had greater armour penetration angle of 22 degrees. Above it was a small plate that was also 50mm thick, sloped
than the 3.7cm gun used on early
backwards at an angle of 55 degrees. This plate housed the tank’s headlights as well as
PzKpfw III tanks, but it still turned
out to be insufficient for fighting ventilation openings for the final drives. The plate above the transmission was 25mm
T-34 and KV-1 tanks encountered thick and nearly horizontal at an angle of 85 degrees. Two hatches for servicing the
24 in 1941. transmission were cut into this plate. The front of the superstructure was also 50mm
 1

11

10

5
9

5cm KwK 38 L/42

1. Barrel 7. Traverse flywheel 7
2. Gun mantlet 8. Elevation flywheel 8
3. Coaxial MG 34 machine gun 9. Elevation gearbox mechanism 6
4. Semi-automatic sliding breech 10. TZF 5d gunsight
5. Recoil guard/brass deflector 11. Recoil system armoured cover
6. Spent brass bag
 thick but sloped much less radically at an angle of only
10 degrees. This plate housed the MG 34 machine gun in a
Kugelblende 50 ball mount with a hemispherical gun shield and
a Fahrersehklappe 50 driver’s vision device. The vertical sides of
the hull and superstructure were 30mm thick. The horizontal
superstructure roof was 10mm thick and the slightly sloping
engine deck (the front half was angled at 85 degrees, the rear
77 degrees) was 15mm thick. The rear armour had a complex
shape just like the front. Plates 30mm thick were presented at
angles of 15 degrees (top), 10 degrees (middle) and
65 degrees (bottom).
The T-34’s F-34 gun was located in the centre of the turret.
The gun mount afforded it depression to -5 degrees and
elevation to +28 degrees. A coaxial DT machine gun was
installed to the right of the F-34. A second DT was installed in
a ball mount on the right side of the upper front hull plate and
operated by the hull gunner, but he could observe the battlefield
only through the sight of his machine gun.
The T-34 carried 77 rounds of ammunition for the gun. Three
rounds were stowed horizontally on the left turret wall and six on
the right; the remainder were spread between eight bins located on
the floor. The rubberized lids of the bins made up the floor of the
fighting compartment. The T-34 also carried 3,906 rounds of
ammunition for the machine guns in 62 63-round magazines. On
tanks without a radio, the extra space was used for 13 additional
magazines. The turret bustle accommodated 16 magazines, making
it easier for the loader to reload the coaxial DT machine gun.
German sub-calibre armour- The T-34’s turret armour was 45mm thick all-around if welded armour was used
penetrating shot consisting of a and 52mm thick if it was cast. The sides and rear were angled at 30 degrees and the
lightweight sabot carrying a
front was rounded. The roof of the turret and hull was 15mm thick. The 40mm-thick
tungsten-carbide core. (Author)
upper sides of the T-34 were sloped at an angle of 40 degrees. A 45mm-thick vertical
plate with four cut-outs for suspension arms (the front wheel on each side lacked a
cut-out) made up the lower hull. Each suspension arm was accompanied by a bump
stop. A 20mm-thick horizontal plate ran above the tracks and formed a floor for the
pannier. The front of the T-34’s hull was composed of 45mm-thick rolled upper and
lower plates sloped at an angle of 60 degrees, with a rounded 100mm-thick cast
connecting beam between them. A large cut-out was made for a driver’s hatch on the
OPPOSITE
left side of the upper front plate. The 60mm-thick hatch flap contained two
The 76mm F-34 gun was used in
T-34 tanks from March 1941 until observation periscopes in quick-release slots. Each periscope was protected by an
the T-34 was phased out in favour armoured shutter. The rear of the hull also featured sloped armour. The lower rear
of the T-34-85 in 1944. The F-34 armour was fixed in place, but the upper rear armour was held on with two hinges.
was an exceptional weapon for its German tank ace Otto Carius described the T-34 and its F-34 gun as ‘magnificent’,
time, delivering both a potent
‘universally feared’ and ‘a threat to every German tank up until the end of the war’
high-explosive shell and an
armour-piercing shell that allowed
(Carius 2020: 10). Even the PzKpfw III’s 50mm surface-hardened front armour was
it to fight any contemporary tank no match for the T-34’s gun. In trials held against captured tanks, firing at this kind
26 at long range. of armour from a range of up to 800m and an angle of 20 degrees resulted in large
 1

11
3

4
10

9
6 5
8

76mm F-34
1. Barrel 7. Elevation flywheel
2. Gun mantlet 8. Elevation gearbox mechanism
3. Coaxial DT machine gun 9. TMFD-7 gunsight
4. Semi-automatic sliding breech 10. Trunnion
5. Recoil guard/brass deflector 11. Recoil system armoured cover
6. Brow pad
 breaches with a diameter of 90–100mm. On the second hit, the German plate cracked
in half. High-explosive shells fired from 800m could breach the PzKpfw III’s side
armour or knock the commander’s cupola clean off.
The armour of earlier PzKpfw III tanks (30mm with another 30mm-thick plate
welded on) fared no better. As with the monolithic armour, a large breach (110–
165mm in diameter) formed on the first hit at a range of 900m and an angle of
20 degrees. On the second hit the plates shattered. A hit with a high-explosive shell
fired under the same conditions blew out the roof of the turret platform. Hits to the
PzKpfw III’s side armour resulted in breaches up to 400mm in diameter. Penetration
trials at longer ranges were not conducted, but extrapolations showed that even the
toughest armour of the PzKpfw III could be penetrated at a range of nearly 2,000m.
Meanwhile, the PzKpfw III’s KwK 38 L/42 gun had a much harder time against
the T-34. German manuals show that an ‘honest’ penetration of its opponent’s front
hull armour was impossible. If firing head-on, PzKpfw III gunners were instructed to
aim for weak points (machine-gun ball, gun recuperator or driver’s vision port) in
order to damage the T-34 somehow. It was also possible to aim at the small section of
the turret face where the armour was nearly vertical. This part of the T-34’s turret
could be penetrated at ranges of 100m or less with the 5cm PaK 38 towed anti-tank
gun. The PzKpfw III’s weaker 5cm KwK 38 was less useful. Generalmajor Willibald
von Langermann und Erlencamp, commander of the 4. Panzer-Division, noted: ‘Our
5cm KwK tank guns can only penetrate weak spots in very specific conditions at very
small ranges, up to 50m. Our tanks can be penetrated at a range of hundreds of
metres’ (quoted in Ulanov & Shein 2013: 160). The reality was not quite so grim
however, because a lucky shot could penetrate the T-34’s side and rear at ranges of up
to 500m. Nevertheless, until PzKpfw III variants armed with the longer 5cm KwK 39
L/60 and tungsten-carbide armour-piercing shot became widely available in 1942,
there was little recourse but to aim at the T-34’s turret ring and try to jam it, or
attempt to hit the T-34 from the side at uncomfortably close range.

Segment cut out of a T-34 tank,

T-34 Tank Museum, Russia. While
the armour plate was 45mm
thick, placing it at an angle of 60
degrees gave it a line-of-sight
28 thickness of 90mm. (Author)
MOBILITY
The PzKpfw III was powered by a Maybach HL120 TRM petrol engine, which
produced 265PS (195kW) at 2,600rpm and 300PS (221kW) at 3,000rpm. The
engine was connected to a transmission with a Zahnradfabrik SSG 77 six-speed
(plus one reverse) gearbox and a differential turning mechanism. Top speed was
limited to 40km/h, as the running gear could only withstand higher speeds for a
very short time. The running gear consisted of six double roadwheels 520mm in
diameter with an individual torsion-bar suspension and three return rollers 310mm A captured PzKpfw III Ausf. H
in diameter per side. The first and last wheel on each side had a hydraulic shock during obstacle trials. The
absorber. Each track consisted of 93–94 (depending on the degree of track wear) PzKpfw III had a weaker engine,
identical track links. Each link was 400mm wide at the pin, but narrowed to 360mm narrower tracks and worse
traction than the T-34, giving the
to slot into the next track.
latter a considerable advantage in
The PzKpfw III carried 320 litres of petrol inside a single fuel tank in the engine off-road mobility. (Tsentralniy
compartment, which was enough for 155km of driving on a paved road, 115km on a Arkhiv Ministerstva Oborony
dirt road or 85km off-road. Rossiyskoy Federatsii)

29
 The V-2 engine, T-34 Tank
Museum. This 500PS (368kW)
V-12 diesel provided the T-34 with
unprecedented mobility. (Author)

The T-34’s gearbox allowed for four speeds forward and one reverse. At 1,700rpm,
the V-2 engine developed normal power of 400PS (294kW). Maximum speed at this
power was 48.30km/h forward and 6.90km/h in reverse. At 1,800rpm the engine
produced 500PS (368kW) and the T-34 could achieve a speed of 53.85km/h. The
engine could idle at as low as 600rpm and accelerate to 2,050rpm.

Assembled T-34 track segment,

Kubinka Technical Centre.
Coupled with the powerful V-2
engine, the T-34’s wide tracks
gave it superior off-road mobility
compared to other contemporary
30 tanks. (Pavel Borovikov)
 The T-34’s upper rear armour could be flipped open to extract the transmission. A Early-model T-34 with a 76mm
small maintenance hatch was cut out in the centre of the plate to allow easier access L-11 gun negotiating an anti-tank
trench during trials, spring 1941.
when extraction of the transmission was not required. Final drives were housed in two
The T-34’s wide tracks with good
bulges in the lower rear plate. A pin gear with rollers on the pins to reduce friction grip and the powerful V-2 engine
made up the drive sprocket. In addition to the idler and drive sprocket, five wheels allowed it to climb the toughest
were installed on each side, with the gap between the second and third being slightly slopes. (Tsentralniy Arkhiv
larger than the rest. A total of 72 550mm-wide track links were used per side, 36 with Ministerstva Oborony Rossiyskoy
a guide horn and 36 without. Each of the upper side plates had attachment points for Federatsii)

two external fuel tanks with a total capacity (assuming four fuel tanks carried) of
134 litres of diesel.
The powerful V-2 diesel engine was one of the most impressive features of the T-34,
and one that the Germans took note of. Indeed, the engine allowed the T-34 to
develop a considerably higher top speed than the PzKpfw III, even without pushing
the engine to its limit. The economy of the engine also bestowed a considerable
advantage. The T-34 carried enough fuel to travel almost twice as far as the PzKpfw III
without refuelling: 300km compared to 155km on a paved road and 250km compared
to 115km on a dirt road.
The superior engine power of the T-34 also helped it when overcoming natural and
artificial obstacles. In trials conducted against packed-snow walls 1.7m high and 4m
thick, a captured PzKpfw III Ausf. H took seven minutes and five attempts to
penetrate the first wall. It took a total of eight attempts and 16 minutes to penetrate
two of the walls. The T-34 used in the trials penetrated three walls on the first attempt.
The total time taken to overcome this obstacle was just ten seconds. 31
 The T-34 showed a superior ability to negotiate trenches as well as walls. The obstacle
in this trial consisted of a relatively easy downward slope that ended in a steep 3m-high
wall. Neither the T-34 nor the PzKpfw III was capable of navigating the obstacle
unassisted (nor could the Matilda III or Valentine II tanks that also took part in the trials).
The T-34 equipped with grousers managed to climb out of the trench if one fascine was
thrown in first. The PzKpfw III was unable to get out even with the use of four fascines.
The T-34’s superior engine power also allowed it to sweep aside a strip of
fortifications made up of two layers of Czech ‘Hedgehogs’ (anti-tank obstacles made
from girders welded together). The PzKpfw III was also able to navigate through the
layers of ‘Hedgehogs’, but it took longer to do so. An attempt by the PzKpfw III to
ram straight through the layers failed and the driver had to back up and carefully move
the individual ‘Hedgehogs’ aside in order to pass through safely.
The T-34 also showed superior mobility when driving in regular snow. During the
aforementioned trials, the PzKpfw III was unable to climb a 13-degree slope even after
it was cleared of snow. In the same conditions, the T-34 was able to climb a 15-degree
slope that had not been cleared. The T-34’s wide tracks allowed it to move in snow up
to 1.8m deep. The tank would sink to a depth of 42cm, but could still be driven in
first gear.
The climbing ability of the PzKpfw III was generally limited due to its narrow
tracks and their poor traction. Trials showed that the tank slipped on a dry 35-degree
incline, even if it had sufficient engine power to allow it to complete the climb. The
maximum incline the PzKpfw III could overcome was 30 degrees. The T-34 could
climb a slope of 38 degrees.

VISION AND COMMUNICATIONS

One of the greatest advantages of the PzKpfw III over its contemporaries was not its
gun or its armour, but the presence of a commander who could dedicate his full
attention to surveying the battlefield. Although he had no rotating periscope and had
to twist his body around in a confined space to change his field of view, he still had a
70-degree field of view, albeit without magnification. The T-34’s commander/gunner
observed the battlefield through his 2.5× PT-4-7 periscope with a 26-degree field of
view. An auxiliary periscope in the turret hatch offered him a 120-degree field of view
to the right and the fixed periscope in the side of the turret gave a 90-degree field of
view to the left. Despite lacking periscopic magnification, the PzKpfw III’s commander
had a wider field of view available to him without having to swap between
different devices.
The two loaders had a similar number of vision devices. The T-34’s loader looked
through a fixed periscope that offered a 90-degree field of view to the right. Similarly,
the PzKpfw III’s loader had an observation slit that offered him an 80-degree
field of view.
The primary vision device available to the PzKpfw III’s gunner was the Leitz 2.4×
TZF 5d monocular telescopic sight that offered a 25-degree field of view. The T-34’s
32 commander/gunner could use his PT-4-7 periscope to aim the gun or switch to the
 The PzKpfw III’s most powerful
weapon: the commander’s cupola
perched on top of the turret,
allowing him to survey the
battlefield while the gunner and
loader were focused on servicing
the gun. (Author)

TMFD-7 telescopic sight that offered the same 2.5× magnification, but only a
15-degree field of view. He had the advantage of being able to combine 360-degree
vision with handling the gun, meaning that he did not have to hand off a target he
spotted, but also had to do two crew members’ jobs. A T-34 commander/gunner could
either look for a target or engage one, but not both at the same time.

The PzKpfw III’s driver’s vision

port could be closed by means of
a thick steel shutter when in
combat. The driver could then see
through a device behind the two
narrow holes in the front armour.
(Author) 33
 It is often claimed that the quality of Soviet gun sights was inferior to that of German
sights, but contemporary evaluations do not support this theory. British wartime reports
commend the quality of Soviet gun sights. Light transmission was high: 26.3 per cent
for the periscopic sight and 39.2 per cent for the telescopic sight, compared to just
20.1 per cent for the German 2.4× TZF 5b telescopic sight. The Americans also had a
Two vision diagrams composed high opinion of the T-34’s gun sights, even calling them the ‘best in the world’ and
by Engineer-Major L.S.
‘incomparable to any sights currently known or under development in America’.
Tolokonnikov for Vestnik
Tankovoy Promyshlennosti
(TsAMO RF F.38 Op.11355 D.1712 L.93) Nevertheless, a good gun sight only helps if
(Armoured Industry Journal), the gunner had already spotted the target. Until then, the PzKpfw III had an advantage
1944. At left is a 1941-production and could very well withdraw if it could not engage the T-34 on favourable terms.
T-34; the 360-degree observation Another advantage held by the PzKpfw III was its radio equipment. While the range
provided by turret periscopes and of the FuG 5 was less than that of the T-34’s 71-TK-3, the German set was much more
gun sights is not shown. At right
widely fitted. This meant that every PzKpfw III was able to remain in radio contact with
is a PzKpfw III Ausf. H; the vision
provided by gun sights and pistol the rest of its platoon. Meanwhile, only 40 per cent of all T-34 tanks were built with
ports is not shown. The vision radios prior to 1943. If a 71-TK-3 was fitted, the T-34’s hull gunner operated it. If
provided by the PzKpfw III necessary, the commander could patch into it directly through the TPU-3 intercom. The
commander’s cupola is marked in T-34 platoon commander could remain in communication with his superiors at a longer
red on the top-down view to avoid
range (over 20km vs 6.4km by voice), but the only ways of communicating with his
confusion. Note that not every
observation device provided its
subordinates were by visual means: signal flags, flares and tracers. This meant that T-34
full range of vision without tanks would have to remain within line of sight of each other in order to maintain combat
movement of the head. (Author) effectiveness as a unit, whereas PzKpfw III tanks could split up and stay in contact.

34
THE COMBATANTS

GERMAN ARMOUR ORGANIZATION

After nearly two years of combat in World War II, the organization of German forces
was well established by the start of Operation Barbarossa. The structure of the
armoured division was created in 1935. The Wehrmacht built each Panzer division
around two tank regiments and one regiment of motorized infantry. Unlike the Red
Army, the German Army stressed the importance of infantry and supporting units in
these divisions. The engineering organization was expanded in 1938 and another
regiment of infantry added after that.
Following the campaigns in Poland and France, the organization changed again. Now
the Panzer division had one tank regiment of two battalions. Each battalion had one
company of PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV medium tanks and two companies of PzKpfw II
light tanks. The artillery assets were also reinforced. Because some Panzer divisions were
upgraded from light divisions (armed only with the PzKpfw I and PzKpfw II) and
others were tailor-made for specific missions, the exact numbers and types of tanks could
differ. Panzer divisions equipped with Czech PzKpfw 35(t) and PzKpfw 38(t) light tanks
also had slightly different compositions. In addition, by 1941 some Panzer divisions
featured an extra tank battalion. As a result, while the weakest Panzer division (9.) had
only 135 tanks, the strongest (7.) had 258. These numbers do not include PzKpfw I
tanks that had been excluded from tank regiments and given to the division’s sappers.
The Panzer division’s tanks were supported by an impressive amount of artillery:
24 10.5cm light howitzers, 12 15cm heavy howitzers, four 15cm heavy infantry guns,
20 7.5cm light infantry guns, 30 8cm mortars and 48 3.7cm PaK and 5cm PaK 38
anti-tank guns. The tanks were also supported by about 6,000 men in the infantry units. 35
 The Panzer division also had a large number of wheeled vehicles – 561 cars, 1,402
trucks and 1,289 motorcycles – to transport its men and supplies. Additional vehicles
in excess of the authorized amount were also common. The Panzer division also
included 44 armoured cars (chiefly in the reconnaissance battalion) and between 109
and 115 half-tracks. The half-tracks are often forgotten when comparing Soviet and
German tank divisions, but this is a serious mistake. A T-26 Model 1931 tank with
twin turrets each mounting a 7.62mm DP light machine gun was no more useful on
the battlefield than a PzKpfw I light tank or SdKfz 251 half-track with similar
armament. Arguably, the ability of the latter vehicle to carry a squad of infantry made
it even more useful. The SdKfz 251 could also be armed with a more substantial
weapon like a 3.7cm PaK, making it more than a match for Soviet light tanks. The
2cm KwK 30 and KwK 38 autocannons mounted on vehicles such as the SdKfz 222
armoured car also posed a major threat to light tanks like the T-26, which were only
expected to resist rifle bullets.
On average, a Panzer division had 182 tanks in its regiments, and a few dozen
armoured vehicles that could face Soviet light tanks as equals. An average Red Army
tank division with 111 tanks in each of its two regiments was about equal in terms of
German tank crewmen gathered raw tank numbers, but lacking in everything else. The Panzer division had twice as
around their immobilized many motorized infantrymen, twice as many light howitzers, five times as many light
PzKpfw III, winter 1941/42. The infantry guns, two-thirds more medium mortars, and an incomparably higher number
tank’s narrow tracks, poor
of cars, trucks and half-tracks. The greatest artillery advantage was in anti-tank guns.
traction and low power-to-weight
ratio limited its off-road mobility
The Red Army tank division had no anti-tank assets of its own at all. As practice
in winter. (Arthur Grimm/ullstein showed, the motorized rifle divisions of the mechanized corps could not be relied
bild via Getty Images) upon to fill that gap.

36
 The number of heavy guns was close: 12 Soviet 152mm howitzers to 12 German PzKpfw III Ausf. A during training
15cm heavy howitzers, plus four 15cm heavy infantry howitzers. Considering the Red exercises at Wünsdorf, November
1938. (dpa picture alliance/Alamy
Army’s shortages of artillery tractors, however, the German heavy howitzers enjoyed
Stock Photo)
far greater mobility on the battlefield.
The Wehrmacht’s greatest advantage over the Red Army was not in the number of
tanks or riflemen. The Germans had the luxury of being able to hone their organization
and refine the equipment of their armoured divisions through two relatively short-
lived campaigns. Hitler saw the need to expand the Wehrmacht before the invasion of
the Soviet Union and he had plenty of time to do so. Expansion of the number of tank
and motorized infantry units was ordered by the OKH on 26 September 1940,
although some began to form sooner than that. Rather than break up cohesive units,
established Panzer divisions each ‘donated’ one regiment of their tanks to newly
forming Panzer divisions; a relatively quick way to expand the motorized force. Even
though individual Panzer divisions lost some of their striking power, the German
Army as a whole remained healthy and even the most lagging Panzer divisions were
ready for battle by the spring of 1941. 37
 LUDWIG BAUER
Ludwig Bauer was born on 16 February 1923 in Künzelsau, fascines made from demolished log houses. His PzKpfw II
Baden-Württemberg. As his father and grandfather were advanced in the second wave alongside the motorized
both officers, Bauer had little doubt about his career path. infantry. Bauer’s tank climbed a hill so close to the city that
After a brief stint in the Reichsarbeitsdienst’s he could make out the lights of tramcars. Deprived of cover,
Arbeitsgruppe 354 during September–November 1940 he the tank was hit by Soviet anti-tank guns and caught fire.
was posted to Reserve-Panzer-Abteilung 33, stationed at The driver and radio operator were killed, but Bauer
Sankt Pölten-Spratzern. The four months he spent there successfully baled out. His wounds included a shell splinter
were allocated to basic training as well as the study of in an eye and several shards in one of his hips. Bauer was
PzKpfw I, II, III and IV tanks. Basic training was followed by taken back to Yasnaya Polyana for treatment, then further
gunner training at a tank school in Putlos. back from the front lines to Orel.
In August 1941, Bauer volunteered for active service. He Two weeks later he was well enough to be transported to
was sent to Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521, armed with Grünberg, Silesia (modern-day Zielona Góra, Lubusz
Panzerjäger I tank destroyers, where he took the role of Voivodeship), and after a four-week-long recovery at home
commander of one of the four PzKpfw II light tanks attached he returned to the 3. Kompanie/Reserve-Panzer-
to the battalion to protect the tank destroyers, since he had Abteilung 33 for three weeks of officer-candidate training.
prior experience with tanks. Bauer was eager to get back to his comrades on the front
Bauer first encountered the T-34 at Mtsensk on line, but upon completion of the training, he was sent to a
11 October 1941. He remembered the situation well, as he different unit. Bauer returned to the Eastern Front as a
was outside of his tank at the time delivering a report and gunner in a PzKpfw III in Panzer-Regiment 33, 9. Panzer-
armed only with a pistol. In his experience, the appearance Division. His tank was a new variant armed with the 5cm
of the T-34 changed everything and turned the Soviet tank KwK 39 L/60 cannon.
forces into a serious threat. In later battles, he learned that As a tank gunner, Bauer took part in the offensive on
the PzKpfw III’s 5cm gun was helpless against the T-34 even Voronezh in June 1942. He experienced near-constant
at close range, but the PzKpfw IV armed with a long 7.5cm fighting, even at night, mixed together with heavy labour
gun could confidently knock it out at a range of up to 800m. carrying petrol canisters (lorries were forbidden from
Bauer’s toughest battle in Operation Typhoon was not approaching the front line) and maintenance duties.
Mtsensk, but Tula. His unit neared the city in late November Pervitin (a form of methamphetamine developed in
1941. He recalled powerful defences surrounding the city, Germany) was issued to compensate for lack of sleep.
including a massive anti-tank trench. A wave of German On 28 June, Bauer’s tank was knocked out, killing the rest
tanks rushed to beat Soviet guns and fill the trench with of the crew aside from him and radio operator Sepp Lackner.

THE GERMAN TANK CREWMAN

Prior to the Third Reich, the German Empire practised conscription with a mandatory
two- or three-year conscription term and ten years in the reserves. Article 173 of the
Treaty of Versailles abolished this practice, but it was reintroduced in 1935 when
Hitler shrugged off the restrictions of the treaty. Men aged 18–45 (55 in Prussia) could
be conscripted for a period of two years, with the exception of Jews, Catholics who
had taken holy orders and various categories of criminals.
Much like the Soviet conscript, a German’s introduction to the Army began at a
school age. Paramilitary training was conducted through units of the Hitlerjugend
38 (Hitler Youth) organization. A course with a motorized unit of the Hitlerjugend
Bauer and Lackner’s new PzKpfw III was destroyed by a PzKpfw IV tanks, but the 1. Kompanie that Bauer assumed
KV-1 a week later. The company commander assigned them command of on 4 December had Sturmgeschütze.
to another PzKpfw III together, but this tank was destroyed In his Sturmgeschütz, Bauer fought at Bastogne in
on 24 August. Bauer was wounded once again, but lightly. January 1945. This was where he began to suspect that
He returned to service only a few days later. After serving there was no way to win the war. In his opinion, the
with Panzer-Regiment 33 until the end of February 1943, Americans might not have fought as well as the Red Army,
Bauer returned to study at Sankt Pölten, where his officer but they had better weapons, particularly artillery. Bauer’s
training began. Sturmgeschütz was knocked out on 11 March, after which
On 1 March, Bauer was promoted to Unteroffizier and then he was reassigned to command a small group of Panther
to Fahnenjunker on 1 April. He continued his training at medium tanks that were gathered for a counter-attack at
Wünsdorf and then Groß Born (modern-day Borne Erndtebrück. His Panther was hit by mistake on 6 April by a
Sulinowo). Fahnenjunker training consisted of military ‘friendly’ Hetzer tank destroyer and caught fire. Bauer
science and leadership courses in addition to the study of thought that his luck had run out because the Panther’s
armament and matériel. Upon completion of these courses, hatch was blocked by a camouflage net, but the net burned
Bauer became an Oberfähnrich on 1 July, but that was not up quickly and he was able to escape.
the end of his studies. Immediately upon promotion, he Panzer-Regiment 33 was disbanded on 16 April 1945.
began company commander courses in Berlin and Surviving troops split up into small groups and tried to slip
graduated as a Leutnant on 1 October. through enemy lines. Bauer came across a farmhouse,
Bauer returned to Panzer-Regiment 33 as a platoon where civilians treated the burns he had sustained when
commander in the 3. Kompanie, this time with a PzKpfw IV. baling out from the Panther and handed him over to the
His promotion to an officer did not harm his luck, as he Americans. He spent a year in POW camps, where he
successfully cheated death at Krivoy Rog twice, on 10 and learned that he had been awarded the Knight’s Cross for
12 January 1944 – the sixth and seventh times Bauer had his fighting at Iserlohn in April. During his career, Bauer
survived the destruction of his tank. After celebrating his earned the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross, Iron Cross
21st birthday on the front line, Bauer and the 9. Panzer- 1st Class, Iron Cross 2nd Class, silver tank combat badge,
Division were withdrawn to Vienna and then Nîmes to gold wound badge, and the Winter Warfare on the Eastern
re-form. The division was still training when D-Day came on Front medal.
6 June, and so it was only deployed westward on 27 July. After his release, Bauer returned to his home town. His
On 6 August, the division arrived at Alençon and engaged status as a cavalier of the Knight’s Cross helped him get a
units of the Third US Army. The 9. Panzer-Division was job with Opel. He later joined the Bundeswehr reserve and
recalled once again to Sankt Pölten at the end of August. retired in the rank of Oberstleutnant in 1975. He died on
The 2. and 3. Kompanien of Bauer’s battalion received new 20 May 2020 in Künzelsau, Baden-Württemberg.

generally provided 80 hours of driving time and 105 hours of mechanic training.
Ideally, after leaving the Hitlerjugend, a prospective tank crewman would move on to
the NSKK (Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps, National Socialist Motorized Corps)
in which he would continue his studies as a driver or a mechanic, but this was not
always the case. The RAD (Reichsarbeitsdienst, Reich Labour Service) also provided
paramilitary training. Men aged 18–20 were given paramilitary training by the SA
(Assault Detachment) even after the ‘Night of the Long Knives’ in mid-1934 when
the SA was purged and the power of the organization diminished.
Training over the course of the first year of military service was aimed at
developing the soldier’s physical and mental capacity in order to make him a
vollwertiger Kämpfer (‘fully capable fighter’) with the support of more experienced
soldiers. During the second year, the goal was to train the soldier as a selbstständiger 39
 Einzelkämpfer (‘independent fighter’).
During this year, the soldier also
mastered his speciality and promising
troops received supplemental training
to become NCOs.
Unlike the Red Army, which would
routinely thrust a conscript into a
company of unfamiliar soldiers, the
German system was based on the
concept of Wehrkreise (military districts).
Recruits were drawn from the district
where a particular division was based.
This assignment was persistent, and
even sick or wounded soldiers returned
to the same division after recovery
if possible.
Once assigned to a division, the
conscript would complete basic
training as a part of the division’s
replacement battalion. Future tank
crewmen followed the same six-month
basic training course as the infantry. In
general, the Germans urged tank and
German tank crewmen, including anti-tank crews to train closely together so that each group understood the strengths
one standing on a PzKpfw III, and limitations of the other. The value of combined arms in general was emphasized.
warm themselves at a fire,
To that extent, training during the first year involved training on foot including
November–December 1941.
(Arthur Grimm/ullstein bild via
marching drill and use of the pistol, rifle, grenades, a machine gun for fighting when
Getty Images) dismounted and the 3.7cm PaK. Unlike the infantry, future tank crewmen would
learn the strengths and limitations of armoured vehicles, including how to
disable them.
The recruits would be split up according to their speciality. Around 40 out of 100
men would be chosen to be gunners, 30 as tank drivers, 15 as radio operators and 15
as wheeled-vehicle drivers. The actual content of the training depended on what
vehicles were available for the unit. For instance, PzKpfw I drivers would also serve as
auxiliary radio operators. If PzKpfw III or IV tanks were available in the unit, some
men selected as gunners would first be trained as loaders in these tanks. There was also
some amount of cross-training; for example, drivers received basic instruction on
firing the weapons in the PzKpfw I and PzKpfw II. Note that these proportions were
established according to regulations published in 1938, when very few PzKpfw III and
IV tanks were available.
Specialist training was both theoretical and practical. Lessons from military
campaigns were integrated into the training programme quickly. Recruits were trained
by officers with combat experience gained during the campaigns in Spain, Poland and
France specifically so that the mistakes of those campaigns would not happen again.
Tank troops would receive 21 weeks of training at the tank school in Münster or
40 in Wünsdorf.
SOVIET ARMOUR ORGANIZATION
Following the Soviet campaign in Poland and the introduction of new tank types, the
Red Army’s mechanized corps were disbanded and re-formed into new mechanized
(later tank) corps. In 1941, each consisted of two tank divisions, one motorized
infantry division, one motorcycle regiment, two corps artillery regiments, one signals
battalion, one battalion of motorized engineers and even an air wing.
The tank division consisted of 63 KV heavy tanks, 210 T-34 medium tanks, 48
light tanks and 54 chemical (flamethrower) tanks: 375 tanks in total split between two
tank regiments, each with one KV battalion, two T-34 battalions and one battalion of
chemical tanks. Tank divisions also had a three-battalion motorized rifle regiment and
an artillery regiment. This made for about 3,000 riflemen accompanying the tanks
plus 12 152mm howitzers, 12 122mm howitzers, four 76mm regimental guns, 12
37mm anti-aircraft guns and 18 82mm mortars.
The motorized rifle division contained two motorized rifle regiments, one tank
regiment, one artillery regiment, one reconnaissance regiment, one anti-tank gun
battalion and one battalion of 37mm antiaircraft guns, plus support units. This gave
the motorized rifle division approximately 6,000 fighting men plus 12 152mm
howitzers, 16 76mm guns, eight 37mm anti-aircraft guns, 12 82mm mortars and 60
50mm mortars.
In theory, the full-strength mechanized corps fielded 1,031 tanks, 546 of which
would have been new types (T-34 and KV), plus 172 cannons of all types, 186
mortars, 5,161 cars, 352 tractors and 1,679 motorcycles. Out of the more than 36,000
men, about 9,000 were riflemen. In practice, however, the compositions of the
mechanized corps were somewhat poorer. Out of 22 mechanized corps available as of
June 1941, just two (the 1st and 6th) had over 1,000 tanks, for an average of 555 tanks
per corps. The situation with new tanks was even worse: no mechanized corps had
even close to the authorized amount; the 4th and 6th were the closest with 416 and
352 vehicles respectively. Over one-third of the mechanized corps had no new tanks
at all. On average, there were only 114 KV and T-34 tanks per mechanized corps, with
the rest made up chiefly of T-26 and BT tanks. Three of the mechanized corps had
fewer than 100 tanks – less than one-tenth of the authorized amount – and no new
tanks at all.
The number of old tanks alone does not accurately represent the state of these
corps. Some of the BT and T-26 tanks had seen a decade of service and required work
to keep running. Out of 12,223 tanks available to the Red Army in the Soviet Union’s
western military districts, just 2,145 were in the first category, meaning that they were
brand new and ready for service. The majority of tanks, 7,900 vehicles, were in the
second category, requiring light repairs that could be carried out by the crew provided
they had the parts. A total of 1,199 tanks were in the third category and 979 in the
fourth, meaning that they were in need of an overhaul at regional workshops and
repair factories respectively. Spare parts for these tanks simply did not exist.
The transition from old types of tanks to new ones meant that insufficient
quantities of parts were delivered for both. No parts for M-17 or V-2-34 engines were
delivered at all, while 25–30 per cent of tanks urgently needed new tracks, which 41
 could not be provided. These defective tanks would have to remain in service for years
to come, as the Soviet Union’s industry at its pace in 1941 would only produce enough
tanks to bring its new mechanized corps to authorized strength by the end of 1943.
Replacement of obsolete tanks with new models could only start then. At that point,
the BT series would make room for the T-34, the KV-1 would be replaced with the
KV-4 or KV-5 and the T-26 would be replaced by a new infantry-support tank,
potentially the T-50. At the start of the Great Patriotic War, a replacement for the T-26
had not yet been decided.
Consumables were also in short supply; for example, out of 550,000 76mm
armour-piercing shells ordered in 1940–41, only 146,000 had been delivered by
1 June 1941. Ammunition and fuel were also largely stored centrally. In peacetime,
mechanized corps had only one or two loads of fuel and ammunition on hand.
There were also shortages of wheeled transport, tracked prime movers and
motorcycles. Much like the tracked vehicles, a considerable percentage of wheeled
ones were inoperable due to a lack of spare tyres; and existing tyres were
heavily worn.
The staffing situation was equally poor. Not a single mechanized corps reached
authorized strength. Just six mechanized corps, less than one-third, counted over
30,000 men; three had fewer than 20,000. On average, a mechanized corps had just
26,500 men – a far cry from a full fighting force.
Individual tank divisions within the same mechanized corps could also vary widely
in strength. For instance, the 8th Tank Division of the 4th Mechanized Corps was
relatively well staffed, but the 32nd Tank Division of the same corps was in a disastrous
state. Out of 58 authorized senior officers, the division had only 29, 110 junior
officers out of 621, 897 NCOs out of 2,166, and just seven out of a total 69 authorized
medical personnel.
The Red Army was well aware of its manpower problems in its new mechanized
corps and was rapidly trying to resolve them, but it was no easy feat to grow the
numbers of tankers from 90,000 in 1938 to 650,000 in 1941. This process was
delayed by a lack of experienced personnel and training facilities. Although some
officers and NCOs were transferred from existing tank units and already had
experience with armour, this was not always the case. These new personnel were not
evenly distributed. For example, the 17th Mechanized Corps reported that some of its
units were filled entirely with raw recruits conscripted in the spring of 1941.
Newly formed mechanized corps and tank divisions set up up living quarters,
organizing shooting ranges, ordering manuals, training aides and turning new recruits
into soldiers and seasoned soldiers into NCOs. All of this took time. For example, the
aforementioned 17th Mechanized Corps estimated that its battalions would reach full
cohesion by September 1941. Around the same time, Zhukov expected the
7th Mechanized Corps of the Moscow Military District, a corps that began forming
in the summer of 1940, to be ready for practical exercises that would allow the General
Staff to refine the composition of the mechanized corps and the tactics they would
use. By this metric, one could expect newly formed mechanized corps to complete
cohesion exercises by mid-1942 at the earliest. Even mechanized corps with a lower
percentage of fresh conscripts were not in a much better state by the start of the Great
42 Patriotic War.
 A typical T-34 built in mid–late
1941. This particular tank already
has the F-34 gun introduced in
March 1941 and tow hooks
typical of wartime-production
T-34 tanks, but does not yet have
the driver’s hatch with two vision
periscopes. The rivets reinforcing
the connecting beam between
the upper and lower front plates
are also indications of an early-
production T-34. (Author)

The men with prior experience among these tank divisions were unlikely to be
experienced with the T-34 tank. Production was ramped up slowly, and even though
960 T-34 tanks had been issued by the end of June 1941, 402 – almost one-half of the
total – only left the factory in May or June. This means that some of the Soviet tankers
who went into battle on 22 June 1941 would have received their tank mere weeks or
even days prior. The Red Army was stuck in the unenviable position of having to fight
with inexperienced tank crews that had to learn the ins and outs of their tanks on the
battlefield or die trying.

The same T-34 from the rear. This

tank still has a rectangular
transmission maintenance hatch
and a removable rear turret plate
for extracting the F-34 gun
without having to remove the
entire turret. (Author) 43
 THE SOVIET TANK CREWMAN
The first decrees mandating service in the Red Army were made in 1918. Mandatory
military service was enshrined into Soviet law in 1925. Conditions and duration of
service were modified several times before the Great Patriotic War; and the criteria for
service were expanded in 1935 in response to Nazi Germany officially shrugging off
the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. The 1936 Constitution of the USSR,
adopted on 5 December that year, declared that ‘the defence of the Motherland is a
sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR’. There were still some exemptions for service:
members of the ‘exploiting classes’ (children of former nobility, Tsarist officers and
bourgeois), Cossacks, kulaks, clergy, the children of poor families and orphans.
Students could also defer their service until the completion of their education. The
conscription age was lowered from 21 to 19.
This changed on 1 September 1939. A new law titled ‘On general duty of service’
was passed, removing all prior restrictions. Now, military service was the duty of all
male Soviet citizens. Deferments were given to those with infirm parents and criminals
serving prison sentences. A service term for privates was set for two years starting on
1 January after their conscription, and three years for NCOs. Upon completion of
their service, privates and NCOs remained in the reserve until the age of 50. Women
Soviet recruits studying the with specialized medical, veterinary and technical backgrounds could also be
design of tank armament. This conscripted.
appears to be a relatively well- Preparations for service in the Red Army would begin in school. Two hours per
equipped classroom, but not all
week were dedicated to preliminary military training in grades 5–7 and pre-
conscripts recruited in 1941 had
the luxury of such training. conscription training in grades 8–10 and post-secondary institutions (with the
(Istoriko-Memorialniy Muzeyniy exception of post-secondary students who had already completed military service).
Kompleks Bobriki) Before starting their military service, students would already know the basics of the

44
organization of the Red Army and its role in Soviet society. More practical training Senior Lieutenant Dmitry F.
included physical fitness (including swimming and skiing), hygiene, first aid, marching Lavrinenko (far left) and one of
his tank crews. Lavrinenko is
drill and navigation. Older students learned the basics of marksmanship, first with
credited with knocking out 52
small-calibre rifles and then military rifles, the use of hand grenades and defence enemy tanks during his short
against chemical warfare. career. (Wikimedia/Public
Voluntary pre-military training at OSOAviaKhim (Society of Cooperation with Domain/Unknown)
Defence, Aircraft and Chemical Construction) could also be conducted. Through
this organization, Soviet citizens that passed a series of physical tests would be
awarded achievement badges, including the prestigious ‘Ready for Labour and
Defence’ (GTO) for general fitness and ‘Voroshilov’s Marksman’ for marksmanship
with a rifle. The OSOAviaKhim could also train students for specialist roles in the
Red Army, although the quality and availability of this training could greatly vary
by region.
Once conscripted, Soviet tankers would undergo 1,400 hours of training over the
course of ten months. All tank crewmen went through political, tactical and physical
training in addition to specialized tank training. The duration of training depended
on the specialty. For example, a tank driver received 100–120 hours of classroom
instruction on driving, while other crewmen received only 15–30 hours. Tank
drivers would also spend 15 hours driving light tracked vehicles (tractors or
tankettes) and ten hours driving light tanks. Owing to the relative scarcity of
medium and heavy tanks, only five hours of driving would be completed with such
vehicles. Other tank crewmen would take a condensed version of the course
consisting of 15 hours of driving tracked vehicles, and three hours in a tank. 45
 DMITRY FEDOROVICH LAVRINENKO
Dmitry F. Lavrinenko was born on 14 October 1914 in the 19 August 1941 at Prudboy, just west of Stalingrad. The
Cossack village of Besstrashnaya in Krasnodar Krai. After brigade received 22 T-34 tanks built at the Stalingrad Tractor
completing school, he studied to become a teacher. He Factory and seven KV-1 tanks built in Chelyabinsk when the
volunteered for service in the Red Army and joined its ranks order was given to move to Kubinka. There, the brigade
on 1 November 1934. Initially allocated to the cavalry received the rest of its vehicles: 31 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks.
branch, he later enrolled in the tank school in Ulyanovsk. Lavrinenko was lucky to end up with a T-34.
Lavrinenko began the Great Patriotic War as a platoon In October 1941, Lavrinenko finally had a chance to even
commander with the rank of lieutenant in the 15th Tank his score with the Germans. The 4th Tank Brigade was
Division of the 16th Mechanized Corps. This corps was poor defending positions at Perviy Voin, south-west of Mtsensk.
in matériel, being equipped with fewer than one-half of its His first mission consisted of supporting the brigade’s
authorized number of tanks. The division chiefly fielded motorized infantry battalion that came under attack by
obsolescent BT tanks with a handful of T-28 tanks formerly elements of the 4. Panzer-Division on 6 October.
belonging to the 14th Heavy Tank Brigade. Only about 30 per Lavrinenko’s platoon of four T-34 tanks made the best of
cent of the corps’ vehicles were in fighting shape at the their vehicles’ mobility advantage by emerging from behind
start of the Great Patriotic War, and all Lavrinenko’s unit a hill, striking quickly and disappearing again, only to
could do in the first days was withdraw to the east. appear elsewhere a short time later. This tactic yielded
Contemporaries recall that his tank broke down along the results and Lavrinenko claimed four enemy tanks in this
way, but he refused orders to scuttle it. His crew managed engagement, successfully withdrawing with wounded
to keep the tank limping long enough to break out of the infantrymen carried on his engine deck and no losses
encirclement at the battle of Uman. Lavrinenko’s among his tanks.
stubbornness may have saved his life, as a considerable Individual tactical successes like these did not stop the
part of the 15th Tank Division could not break out and was German advance, but at the very least they slowed the
destroyed. invaders down, making an opening for additional raids.
Surviving tankers were reorganized into newly forming Over the next few days, Lavrinenko’s platoon made good
tank brigades. Personnel from the former 15th Tank Division use of tank ambushes. A combination of thorough
were allocated to the 4th Tank Brigade, including camouflage and dummy tanks built from logs allowed his
Lavrinenko. The 4th Tank Brigade began to form on tankers to attack and withdraw without losses. By

Owing to the scarcity of motor vehicles and the sudden start of the Great Patriotic
War, Soviet tankers would likely have had considerably less practical experience than
required in the summer of 1941.
Gunners received as much as 315 hours of instruction on firing a tank gun, while
a tank driver would receive as little as 50 hours. Radio operators would spend as much
as 270 hours on the topic of radio communication, while other tankers devoted just
30 hours to this task. A tank commander required 240 hours of additional instruction
delivered over the course of his ten months.
The Red Army also filled in for education that soldiers might not have received
before being conscripted. Troops who were illiterate or barely literate would take night
classes to bring them up to speed. Soldiers who did not speak sufficient Russian would
46 learn the language instead of taking part in some of the political training or study of
11 October, his crew had claimed seven enemy tanks Thanks in part to Lavrinenko’s performance, the 4th Tank
destroyed. The front line continued to move east, and by Brigade became the 1st Guards Tank Brigade in November
this time the 4th Tank Brigade retreated to Mtsensk, 1941. Lavrinenko was promoted to Guards senior lieutenant.
taking a place in the second line of defence of the His platoon continued to fight on the approaches to Moscow.
50th Army. The total number of kills scored by Lavrinenko In part, Lavrinenko supported Major-General Ivan V.
in the fighting for Mtsensk is unknown, but various Panfilov’s 316th Rifle Division on the Volokolamsk axis. His
sources credit him with up to 17 enemy tanks destroyed. bold fighting style of rapid thrusts and surprise ambushes
What is certain is that his performance in the defence of paid dividends, but it was a dangerous tactic. On
Mtensk was exceptional. Major-General Dmitry D. 18 November 1941, Lavrinenko’s tank was destroyed and
Lelyushenko, the commander of the 1st Special Guards the rest of his crew was killed. Lavrinenko himself escaped,
Rifle Corps that the 4th Tank Brigade was attached to at but he could not cheat death forever. He was not killed in a
Mtsensk, compared Lavrinenko and his men to the tank duel, however, as would be likely for a tank ace. After
soldiers of the Imperial Russian Army who had fought successfully completing his mission on 18 December, he
Napoleon’s forces here some 150 years previously. returned to Goryuny (modern-day Anino) to report his
Soon after, on 16 October, the 4th Tank Brigade received success to his brigade’s commander. As he exited his tank,
orders to return to Kubinka. Lavrinenko’s tank was left the village came under mortar fire; Lavrinenko was fatally
behind, temporarily assigned to the 50th Army to guard its wounded by a mortar shell splinter. He was buried in a mass
headquarters. On his way to catch up with the 4th Tank grave located in Denkovo, Istra district.
Brigade, he was delayed by a traffic jam caused by a In total, Lavrinenko’s crews claimed 52 enemy tanks
stream of refugees and retreating Red Army units. When destroyed over 2½ months of combat, an exceptional result
he reached Serpuhkov, the tank and its crew were that was not surpassed by any other Soviet tank ace for the
commandeered by garrison commander Colonel (later duration of the Great Patriotic War. Lavrinenko was nominated
Lieutenant General) Pavel A. Firsov. Firsov received news for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on 5 December 1941;
about an approaching German vanguard, but he had no but the commander of the 16th Army, General Konstantin K.
resources to counter it, aside from the single T-34. Rokossovsky, authorized only a lesser award, the Order of
Lavrinenko set up another successful ambush, returning Lenin. The award was announced on 22 December, by which
to Serphukov with a wealth of trophies including an anti- point Lavrinenko was already dead. The title of Hero of the
tank gun and a German staff bus carrying valuable maps Soviet Union was finally awarded to Lavrinenko by President
and documents. Mikhail Gorbachev, nearly 50 years later on 5 May 1990.

manuals. Tank commanders who had not completed secondary education would
attend night classes to make up for the missing curriculum. Tank commanders who
had received secondary and post-secondary education would spend this time learning
a foreign language.
Reservists could be called up for refresher training lasting two months (for privates)
or three months (for privates training to become NCOs or NCOs training to become
officers). This training could take place as often as annually for privates and NCOs
under the age of 35 or junior officers under the age of 40; the age limit went up by
five years for every two steps in rank to 60 for division commanders or their equivalents.
Older men could still be called up for training, but only a handful of times. Reservists
called up for training would retain their civilian jobs and receive half of their regular
salary in addition to their Red Army pay. 47
 THE STRATEGIC
SITUATION
Drawn up in 1940, the German plan to invade the Soviet Union (Operation
Barbarossa) took into account the Soviet Union’s enormous size and relied on the rapid
progress of armoured spearheads to encircle Red Army units stationed in the European
part of the Soviet Union, prevent them from manoeuvring, and destroy them. The
rapid progress of a significant force to such depth through the Soviet Union required
a powerful tank arm.
Germany spent the better part of a decade developing such a force. The PzKpfw III
finally took its intended place at the head of the Panzerwaffe by 22 June 1941. By this
date, 1,440 PzKpfw III tanks were available for battle, 1,090 of which were the latest
types armed with 5cm guns. They were joined by 517 PzKpfw IV medium tanks with
similar armour and short 7.5cm guns, as well as 754 PzKpfw 38(t) light tanks
produced in occupied Czechoslovakia. The PzKpfw 38(t)’s 50mm-thick frontal
armour made it difficult to engage with the Soviet 45mm gun, while its 3.7cm gun
could penetrate the armour of Soviet light tanks at long range. As far as German
intelligence indicated, this was sufficient armament to take on any tank or armoured
vehicle used by the Red Army. Also available were 160 PzKpfw 35(t) light tanks, less
well armoured but armed with the same 3.7cm gun.
Older vehicles remained in German service: 337 PzKpfw I and 1,074 PzKpfw II
light tanks were deployed to take part in Operation Barbarossa. The PzKpfw I was
considered obsolescent and conversion into more useful vehicles, particularly the
Panzerjäger I tank destroyer, had already started. The Czech 4.7cm KPÚV vz. 38 gun
48 mounted on the Panzerjäger I was powerful enough to combat the T-34 successfully,
although the Germans did not know it yet. The same weapon was also installed on the A PzKpfw III moving to the front
chassis of captured French Renault R 35 tanks. lines, July 1941. In the first
weeks of the Axis invasion of the
Confident that the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact had bought him a few years of peace,
Soviet Union, the Germans could
Stalin turned to expanding the Red Army. A large part of this modernization consisted often move uncontested carrying
of a complete renewal of the tank fleet. The more common BT-7 and T-26 light tanks infantry riders, as the Red Army
as well as the specialized T-28 medium and T-35 heavy tanks were declared obsolete had no idea where the Axis forces
and a multi-year production programme was undertaken to replace them. This was a were. (SA-kuva)
slow process, however. In 1941, the Red Army was authorized to field 2,100 KV-1,
4,200 T-34, 8,273 BT, 15,872 T-26 and 3,681 T-37/-38 tanks in time of war; but
projections showed that 1,093 KV-1 and 2,850 T-34 tanks – just 52 per cent and
67.8 per cent of the authorized strength respectively – could be delivered by 1 January
1942. Only 7,752 BT tanks and 9,987 T-26 tanks were available, which also fell short
of wartime requirements. This figure would only decline as spare parts for these old
types of tanks were not available in adequate quantities and no longer produced. The
BT would eventually be replaced with the T-34, but the T-26’s future was less certain.
The new T-50 infantry-support tank was a good candidate to replace it, but only 500
such vehicles were ordered for 1941. At this pace, it would take until at least 1943 to
prepare the Red Army for war.
The number of tanks available by 1 June 1941 was even smaller: 370 KV-1 and 134
KV-2 tanks joined 59 ageing T-35 tanks to make up a heavy-tank force less than one-
quarter of the size that was required. Similarly, just 892 T-34 tanks were available, just
over one-fifth of the required number. The bulk of the Red Army’s tank fleet was made 49
 Obstacle trials involving a typical up of obsolete models. Of the 9,987 T-26 tanks on hand, 7,486 were traditional gun
T-34 in production by the end of tanks; the rest consisted of outdated two-turret tanks armed only with machine guns
1941. (Tsentralniy Arkhiv as well as specialized vehicles such as remotely controlled unmanned teletanks and
Ministerstva Oborony Rossiyskoy
chemical tanks that would have little value in a tank-on-tank battle. Similarly, out of
Federatsii)
7,752 BT tanks available, just 702 were the most advanced variant of the series, the
BT-7M; 3,858 more were the older BT-7s, with the rest made up of outdated BT-5 or
BT-2 light tanks.
It is also worth considering that the Soviet Union’s armoured force was spread
across the country’s military districts and was not concentrated in the western areas to
pre-empt a German invasion. Fewer than half of the Red Army’s total number of tanks
OPPOSITE (12,223 gun tanks and 1,758 special vehicles) were present in western military
This map shows the German and districts, of which only 1,301 were T-34 or KV tanks.
Soviet formations equipped with The number of tanks available to the Red Army further dwindles when one
either the PzKpfw III or the T-34 on considers their technical condition. Out of 13,981 AFVs stationed in border districts,
the eve of Operation Barbarossa. On
only 2,157 were brand-new; 8,986 vehicles were used or in need of light repairs; and
the German side, the following 11
Panzer-Divisionen fielded the
a further 2,838 were in need of serious repairs. The spare-parts shortage seriously
PzKpfw III: 1. (71), 3. (110), 4. depleted the latter category, and as much as 25 per cent of Soviet tanks in need of light
(105), 9. (71), 10. (105), 11. (71), repairs were not combat-capable due to missing tracks. A shortage of some 500,000
13. (71), 14. (71), 16. (71), 17. wheeled vehicles, 51,653 tractors and 69,691 trailers also meant that even where spare
(106) and 18. (115). On the Soviet parts were available, they could not be delivered. A similar situation was observed with
side, the following eight mechanized
fuel and ammunition supplies. The defence of the Soviet Union was built on the idea
corps were equipped with the T-34:
2nd (50), 3rd (50), 4th (313), 6th that a small number of elite border units should be able to hold the line long enough
(238), 8th (100), 11th (28), 15th for general mobilization to take place – an assumption that was to prove
50 (72) and 19th (9). catastrophically wrong.
 Memel

XX
1

Kaunas
Vilnius
XXX
3

Minsk

XXX Bobruysk
XXX Bialystok
11
6

Warsaw Pinsk
Brest
XX
10

XX
13 XX
SOVIET UNION
3
4
XX 14
GERMAN REICH 17
9 18 Lutsk
XX
XX
11
16
XXX Zhitomir

15
XXX XXX
4 Lviv
19

Ternopil
XXX
8 Vinnitsa

Ivano-Frankovsk

0 100 miles Tiraspol XXX

2
0 100km

51
 COMBAT

A WILD-GOOSE CHASE
Germany began final preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union on the
evening of 21 June 1941. Tank and mechanized formations replaced infantry
stationed at the Soviet border. Just after midnight, small groups of German
commandos crossed the border to prevent demolition of key bridges. As enemy
movements on the other side of the border became of more and more concern,
orders from Moscow stood firm: ‘Do not fall for German provocation.’ Some Soviet

PzBefWg III Ausf. H, Vadim

Zadorozhny Technical Museum,
Moscow. This was a command
tank based on the PzKpfw III
Ausf. H. The small 3.7cm gun is a
dummy, the tank’s only real
weapon being a single 7.92mm
MG 34 machine gun in a ball
52 mount. (Author)
commanders gave orders to open the so-called ‘red envelopes’ regardless. These PzKpfw III tanks from the
envelopes contained plans to deploy forces in border regions in order to establish a 11. Panzer-Division advance
defence against an enemy vanguard. In practice, however, this meant very little. It across the steppe. With 1,440
Pz.Kpfw III tanks available to the
took nine hours to execute those plans – nine hours that the Red Army simply did
Panzerwaffe in July 1941, the
not have. It was also not the vanguard they would be facing, but the entire German tank enjoyed a considerable
invasion force. numerical advantage over the
Bombs and artillery shells began to fall on Soviet border installations at around T-34. (Arthur Grimm/ullstein bild
0400hrs. One hour later, Ribbentrop handed a diplomatic note with a declaration of via Getty Images)
war to the Soviet ambassador in Berlin, Vladimir G. Dekanozov. Around the same
time, the German ambassador in Moscow, Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, was
instructed to deliver a similar message to Molotov. At 0700hrs, Directive #2 signed by
People’s Commissar of Defence Semyon K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General
Staff Georgy K. Zhukov finally permitted offensive action against German forces. It
is unlikely that the border units that had already been fighting for three hours had ever
seen the message.
At the border, chaos reigned. The 6th Mechanized Corps was deployed to intercept
a German Panzer division at Bielsk (south of Białystok). The corps left its motorized
infantry behind to protect the Narew River and began an arduous journey that ended
up taking ten hours due to a complete lack of traffic organization. Considerable losses
were taken from German air attacks, as large numbers of Soviet aircraft were destroyed
on the ground in a series of surprise attacks at dawn on 22 June. The Germans now
had complete control of the skies.
Having arrived at their destination, the 6th Mechanized Corps discovered that
there were no German tanks at Bielsk. Efforts to gather delayed and disabled vehicles
were interrupted by new orders to intercept the enemy between Grodno and Sokolka.
No enemy tanks were found there either, but the Germans received yet another 53
 German cavalry pass a T-34 and a opportunity to bomb Red Army tank columns. To make matters worse, the
T-26 flamethrower tank. It is 6th Mechanized Corps reported that they only had one-quarter load of fuel remaining
possible that these tanks were
– the fuel allocated to this corps was still held at a depot in Baranovichi, some 150km
lost without ever firing a shot, as
Soviet tank forces were subjected
away. In addition, the corps reported that they had no ammunition. The
to marches for days under a rain 6th Mechanized Corps ceased to be a viable combat unit, essentially dissolving in the
of German bombs without time to steppe as its subunits dashed from one phantom German tank unit to another under
sleep, let alone conduct a rain of bombs.
preventive maintenance to keep The troops of the 8th Mechanized Corps found themselves in a similar situation.
their tanks running. (Scherl/
The corps was mobilized at 0540hrs on 22 June, moving out to Chyshky. At 2040hrs,
Süddeutsche Zeitung Photo/
Alamy Stock Photo) while still en route, the corps was redirected to Kurovychi to counter an enemy attack
at Brody, but by midday on 23 June the destination was changed yet again, this time
to Yavoriv. The corps had a six-hour break before being sent to Busk, a journey that
took nearly a full day due to the chaos on the roads. From Busk, the corps was
redirected to Stanislavchik and Razhniv. As a result, the corps’ tanks covered a distance
of 495km on average without ever seeing the enemy. There was no time to conduct
maintenance or get some sleep, as a result of which the corps left half of its tanks by
the side of the road. The 12th Tank Division had a particularly rough time, as its
drivers went for four days without sleep.
By the morning of 26 June, two-thirds of the 12th Tank Division’s tanks had
been abandoned. This was not due to design or manufacturing flaws but because
54 the tanks were running for extended periods of time without preventive maintenance.
For example, regular maintenance of the V-2 engine included oiling it and cleaning A PzKpfw III fording a river, July
the air filters every 50 hours of operation. (In peacetime, this procedure was 1941. A portion of the fender is
missing, suggesting that this
performed after as little as 30 hours, but in the first days of the war the tanks could
tank had travelled over some
go for twice the maximum period without time even to clean the filters.) These rough ground. The usual section
pointless dashes back and forth without a clear objective had a devastating effect on of spare tracks on the front is
the division’s combat readiness. Tanks were abandoned due to minor and preventable also missing, with only a small
mechanical issues, and even though they could have been evacuated and repaired portion remaining on the turret
relatively easily in optimal conditions, the odds of this happening in the chaos of platform front. (SA-kuva)

late-June 1941 were slim.

The experience of the 6th and 8th Mechanized corps was not atypical. A report
composed by the commander of the tank forces of the South-Western Front, Major-
General Rodion N. Morgunov, painted a bleak picture of the first few days of fighting
in his sector:

In peacetime, a number of mechanized corps were located too close to the border. After
the enemy’s sudden attack, they couldn’t be deployed forward, but had to retreat and then
engage.
Frequent and rushed changes in location ordered by superior staffs (70–80km away
from the previous location in the span of one day) led to the units not being able to
gather at the specified location and had to enter battle piecemeal. [...] A number of corps
had to conduct 500km-long super-expedited marches in 3–4 days without keeping to
elementary maintenance procedures and rest periods prescribed in manuals. As a result,
40–50% of the vehicles were out of action for technical reasons and the remaining
materiel was not in a battle-ready condition. (TsAMO RF F.229 Op.157 D.8 L.217–29,
quoted in Ulanov & Shein 2011: 228–29) 55
 BORDER BATTLES
It would be inaccurate to say that T-34 tanks did not get to fight at all during the first
days of the Great Patriotic War. An engagement took place between Generalmajor
Ludwig Crüwell’s 11. Panzer-Division and Major-General Sergei I. Ogurtsov’s
10th Tank Division at Radekhiv. Crüwell’s regiments fielded 45 PzKpfw II, 71
PzKpfw III, 20 PzKpfw IV and eight command tanks. The 11. Panzer-Division was
formed in July 1940 and judged ready for service that October. Although the
15th Mechanized Corps to which the 10th Tank Division belonged began to form
only in February 1941, Ogurtsov had a fair number of new tanks at his disposal. In
total the 10th Tank Division had 63 KV, 37 T-34, 44 T-28, 147 BT-7 and 27
T-26 tanks.
As with the earlier border battles, chaos reigned. The 10th Tank Division was
instructed to engage a German airborne landing force near Radekhiv and sent a small
force consisting of two tank battalions to deal with it. Rather than facing a lightly
armed group of paratroopers, however, the Soviet tankers were confronted with the
11. Panzer-Division as well as Kampfgruppe Riebel and Kampfgruppe Angern, which
quickly swept aside the few Soviet tanks. In the meantime, German forward
reconnaissance discovered the approach of the rest of the 10th Tank Division. The
Germans laid an ambush, but it was not as effective as they had hoped. According to
Unteroffizier Gustav Schrodek, a tank crewman of Panzer-Regiment 15: ‘Despite
repeated hits, our fire had no effect. It appears as if the shells are simply bouncing off.
The enemy tanks disengaged without fighting and retreated’ (quoted in Forczyk 2013:
110). This Red Army contingent was only an advance force. Ogurtsov was under
orders to retake Radekhiv, and he was not about to give up this objective easily. He
decided to attack the town, even though only one battalion from the 20th Tank
Regiment and one battalion from the 10th Motorized Rifle Regiment had arrived,
both without any artillery at all.
The 10th Tank Division’s T-34 and KV-1 tanks opened fire on the Germans at a
range of 800–1,000m, from which their 76mm guns easily defeated the armour of the
PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV tanks. Unfortunately for Ogurtsov, the Germans had
brought more than just tanks; 8.8cm anti-aircraft guns from I./Flak-Regiment General
Göring and heavy artillery of Artillerie-Regiment 119 were more than enough to
penetrate even the thick armour of the new Soviet tanks. PzKpfw IV tanks also fired
high-explosive shells in the hope of igniting fuel stored in the T-34’s external fuel tanks.
The guns of the PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV were more than enough to take on the
Soviet light tanks that made up the majority of the 10th Tank Division’s forces, and
the Soviet attack petered out. The 10th Tank Division lost 46 tanks that day; but even
if Ogurtsov’s assault had proved successful, he would not have been able to hold the
position for long. The 15th Mechanized Corps’ riflemen were left far behind as they
had to proceed to the border on foot; and the 37th Tank Division was sent six hours
away to Adamovka to fight an enemy force that turned out to not have been there at all.
Another battle took place between the 5th Tank Division of the 3rd Mechanized
Corps and the 7. Panzer-Division of the XXXIX. Armeekorps (mot.). In this instance,
56 however, the Red Army had the advantage of knowing where the enemy was going to
be. The 5th Tank Division was pulled out of its corps and attached directly to the Reproduction of an illustration
11th Army, which was ordered to hold bridges across the Neman River at the town of accompanying a report compiled
by the 297. Infanterie-Division
Alytus, some 50km from the Soviet–German border.
regarding a new type of Soviet
The 3rd Mechanized Corps was one of the better-equipped units of this type with tank discovered on the south-
a total of 672 tanks, 110 of which were the KV and T-34. Specifically, the 5th Tank western outskirts of Radekhiv,
Division had 50 T-34, 170 BT-7, 18 T-26 and 30 T-28 tanks plus 76 armoured cars. near the Bug River. The report
Even these tanks did not get to fight together, however, as the division was dispersed incorrectly overestimates the
even further upon arrival. A battalion of motorized infantry supported by BA-10 weight of the tank at 35–40
tonnes, but this is unmistakably
armoured cars was sent to hold the Kaniūkai bridge south of Alytus. The 9th Tank
a T-34. (Author)
Regiment, commanded by Colonel Ivan P. Verkov, was sent to hold the northern
bridge going through Alytus itself.
Verkov’s tanks were opposed by the 7. Panzer-Division of Panzergruppe 3, which
fielded 17 PzKpfw I, 55 PzKpfw II, 30 PzKpfw IV and 174 PzKpfw 38(t) tanks
plus 64 armoured cars. The German division also spread out when approaching
Alytus. The northern bridge was attacked by Oberst Karl Rothenburg’s Panzer-
Regiment 25 supported by Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 37 and a group of
flamethrower tanks.
Unfortunately for the Red Army, the Germans got to the bridges first. The
11th Army did not have the time to demolish the bridges to prevent the Germans’
advance, nor to set up a proper echeloned defence. Panzer-Regiment 25 only came
under attack when 20 tanks had already crossed to the eastern side. A T-34 tank in
ambush easily destroyed one of the tanks and shrugged off return fire from 30
PzKpfw 38(t) tanks. The Soviet tank retreated, leaving the Germans a patch of land 57
58
59
 PREVIOUS PAGES
east of the bridge. The T-34s were able to hold them there. In particular, a T-34 tank
An early-production T-34 rams a
PzKpfw III Ausf. E. The T-34’s
commanded by Sergeant Makogon knocked out six German tanks that day, an
76mm gun was powerful enough impressive result considering that the 5th Tank Division had no 76mm armour-
to destroy the PzKpfw III at piercing shells. The division’s 10th Tank Regiment, commanded by Colonel Terentiy
ranges of nearly 2km, but Soviet Ya. Bogdanov, also engaged a battalion from Panzer-Regiment 25 and Oberst Carl-
tank forces were plagued with Hans Lungershausen’s Schützen-Regiment 7. Five German tanks were destroyed
shortages of 76mm armour-
as a result.
piercing ammunition during the
early stages of the Great Patriotic Despite having a numerical advantage in armour at Alytus, the Germans could not
War. One solution was to fire high- break through that day. Unfortunately, the lack of supporting infantry and artillery
explosive shells that would still hampered the Soviet forces. Attempts to mount a counter-attack across the Neman
deliver lethal damage to German without proper support resulted in Soviet losses, not so much from German tanks as
tanks, but in the absence of
from 10.5cm guns of Artillerie-Regiment 78. Elements of the 20. Panzer-Division that
those the only solution was
ramming. This was a dangerous
arrived by nightfall tipped the scales in the Germans’ favour. Enough German tanks
manoeuvre and almost always crossed the northern bridge to break out of the bridgehead and encircle the defenders
resulted in the loss of both tanks. on the southern flank. Alytus fell and the 5th Tank Division was forced to retreat.

60
 Holding back a numerically superior force took a toll on the 5th Tank Division’s
armour: 73 tanks were left behind that day, including 27 T-34s out of the 44 that took
part in the battle. The Germans also took significant losses. Only 11 tanks were
written off completely, but the 7. Panzer-Division had no more than 150 operational
tanks remaining after the battle and the II. Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 25 (the same
unit that first encountered the T-34s on the northern bridge) was disbanded. This was
little consolation to the 5th Tank Division. Pursued by two German armoured
divisions on its retreat to Vilnius, the Soviet division rapidly disintegrated into small
groups of tanks acting on the initiative of junior officers.
Interestingly enough, Generaloberst Hermann Hoth took no note of the T-34
tanks his men encountered at Alytus. According to Hoth, the T-34 tanks first turned
up during the crossing of the Berezina River at Barysaw in early July. Generaloberst
Heinz Guderian, the commander of Panzergruppe 2, also recalled first seeing them
here, even though photographic evidence suggests that his tankers had first encountered
the T-34 in the earliest days of the Great Patriotic War. Some consider these to have
been T-34 tanks attached to the 1st Moscow Proletarian Order of the Red Banner
Motorized Rifle Division commanded by Colonel Yakov G. Kreizer. Interestingly
enough, according to Kreizer’s own memoirs, he did not receive any T-34 tanks until
some time later, during the defence of Orsha.
Other German generals ‘discovered’ the T-34 much later. For example, Generalmajor
Friedrich von Mellenthin mentions the appearance of T-34 tanks only in October. The
presence of T-34 tanks was considered a formidable enough obstacle upon which to
blame one’s failures. The significance of T-34 tanks as a tactical threat was also felt by
rank-and-file troops, who eagerly reported any enemy tank impeding their progress as
being a T-34. Photographs of knocked-out tanks ranging from MS-1 (T-18) light
tanks to Valentine infantry tanks with ‘heavy Russian tank T-34’ written on the back
survive to this day. The Great Patriotic War was just beginning, however, and Guderian
would get his fill of real T-34 tanks yet.

WEATHERING THE TYPHOON

The Stavka did not take long to react to the disastrous performance of the Red Army
at the start of the Great Patriotic War. Upon reviewing the experience passed on by
surviving tankers, mechanized corps were judged to be ‘too massive, insufficiently
mobile, clumsy, and ill-suited for manoeuvre, not to mention that they make easy
targets for enemy aviation’ (TsAMO RF F.48a Op.3408 D.4 L.1940–42, quoted in
Ulanov & Shein 2011: 372). The surviving mechanized corps were dissolved into
their composite divisions in mid-July 1941. The divisions themselves did not last OPPOSITE
long, however. By the end of August 1941, the Red Army began to form tank Luftwaffe soldiers looting a T-34.
brigades instead of divisions, each consisting of just seven KV, 22 T-34 and 32 Various elements of its equipment
including grousers and
small or light tanks. The number of infantry was reduced to just one motorized
ammunition bins have been
rifle battalion. removed and thrown into a
The new formations arrived just in time for the Germans’ renewed assault nearby ditch. (INTERFOTO/Alamy
towards Moscow. After Operation Barbarossa failed to achieve its objectives, the Stock Photo) 61
 Germans organized a new thrust towards the Soviet capital codenamed Operation
Typhoon. The plan called for a large-scale envelopment by three of the four
Panzergruppen. In part, Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 (2. Panzerarmee as of 5 October
1941) was tasked with attacking from the south through Orel, Tula and Ryazan and
finally linking up with Panzergruppe 1 east of Moscow. This was a distance of some
600km, comparable to what it took to get from the border to where Guderian’s
tanks stood at the end of September 1941, but the fighting ahead would be much
more difficult. Instead of collapsing after the first blow as the Germans hoped, Red
Army forces were bolstered by high morale and its commanders were eager to apply
what they had learned during the first few months of defeat after defeat. One of the
commanders was Colonel Mikhail Ye. Katukov, whose 4th Tank Brigade stood
against Generalmajor Willibald von Langermann und Erlencamp’s 4. Panzer-
Division at Orel.
After breaking through the Soviet defences east of the Desna River on 30 September,
Panzergruppe 2 split up. The XXXXVII. Panzerkorps turned north in order to close
the Bryansk Pocket and General der Panzertruppe Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg’s
XXIV. Panzerkorps continued north-east towards Moscow. The commander of the
Bryansk Front, Colonel-General Andrey I. Yeremenko, considered the
XXXXVII. Panzerkorps to be the primary striking force, and thus dedicated relatively
few resources to combating the XXIV. Panzerkorps.
At first, Schweppenburg moved at a brisk pace, covering the 240km distance to
Orel in just four days. Realizing that Orel was under serious threat, the Stavka ordered
the formation of the 1st Guards Rifle Corps under the command of Major-General
Dmitry D. Lelyushenko on 2 October. Given that the XXIV. Panzerkorps was already
in the vicinity of Orel by 3 October, Lelyushenko considered it senseless to throw the
1st Guards Rifle Corps at the Germans piecemeal. Instead, he decided to fight a
delaying action and meet the Germans at a new line of defence at Mtsensk. The effect
of the delay was significant, as it took another week for Schweppenburg to move a
mere 35km from Orel to Mtsensk.
The 1st Guards Rifle Corps was a quite impressive formation. It included the 5th
and 6th Guards Rifle divisions, 4th and 11th Tank brigades, 36th Motorcycle
Regiment, a regiment of Katyusha multiple rocket launchers and two regiments-worth
of anti-tank guns. The 4th Tank Brigade was the first to arrive, however, and took the
greatest part in the delaying actions, as well as a significant part in the battle for
Mtsensk itself.
On paper, Katukov’s 4th Tank Brigade was a much weaker force than the pre-war
tank divisions. It consisted of just seven KV-1, 22 T-34 and 26 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks,
a battalion of 16 anti-aircraft guns, and technical support units. The brigade fought
in a manner different from that of the tank divisions, however. This time, Soviet
troops knew where the enemy was, where he was going, and how he was getting there.
Reconnaissance groups from the brigade were sent to Orel on the night of 3/4 October
as the core of the brigade arrived at Mtsensk, taking out targets of opportunity. Around
Mtsensk, Katukov’s troops built fake artillery positions that attracted the attention of
OPPOSITE German bombers. Soviet tankers ambushed and eliminated German reconnaissance
This map shows the fighting for elements, thereby denying the Germans detailed information about the nature of the
62 Mtsensk, 3–11 October 1941. real defences.
 xx
xx
xx
xx
xx x
x
German front line, 3 October 1941
xx
xx
xx
xxxxxxxxx Soviet defences xx

xxxxxx
4 October 1941 XX
5 October 1941 3

xx xxxxxxxxxx
6 October 1941 X
9 October 1941 4
10 October 1941

xxxxxxx
11 October 1941

xxxxx x
Mtsensk

x xx
X

x
xx
x xx
11 xx

x
xx
N x
X

xxx
X
4 (-)

xxx
0 4 miles 4 (-)

x
xxx
XX

xx

x
xx

xxx
0 4km Golovlevo 4 (-)

xxx

x
X xx

xx
xx
XX xx

x
xx

x
11 xx
x xx
Sheino xx
xx
X x xx 4 (-)
xxxx
xxxx
4 (-) xxxx
xx
X

Perviy Voin 4 (-)

X
X 4 (-)
11
X
4 X
LÜTTWITZ 4
Otrada EBERBACH X
X 4
4
GROLIG
EBERBACH

X
4
Spasskoye
Ivanovskoye

X
4
EBERBACH

I
X
4
4 GUSEV
LAUCHERT

I
Orel 4
BURDA

63
 Katukov fought with bold, well-placed strikes. Tanks positioned in ambush
positions along roads would destroy a German tank column, perform a shallow
counter-attack and then quickly withdraw. The first such counterstroke was delivered
on 4 October by a group led by Senior Lieutenant Alexandr F. Burda against a German
vanguard. Larger German attacks that took place on 5 and 6 October were countered
in the same way. Nevertheless, the area the 4th and 11th Tank brigades were tasked
with defending was far too wide to protect forever. Despite weathering a much larger
German attack on 9 October, Lelyushenko gave the order to withdraw to Mtsensk,
because the Germans had broken through the Soviet lines nearby and threatened to
encircle the 4th Tank Brigade.
Once again threatened with encirclement, Katukov’s men and tanks stood their
ground in front of Mtsensk, but the Germans broke through into the city from the
south-east where the front was held by volunteer cadets from the Tula artillery
school. The bulk of the 4th Tank Brigade retreated with only a small rearguard of
six of the most trusted tank crews left behind. Crews led by Burda, Lieutenant
Dmitry F. Lavrinenko, Senior Politruk Aleksandr S. Zagudayev, Lieutenant Grigoriy
I. Timofeev, Sergeant Nikolai P. Kapotov and Captain Pavel A. Zaskalko roamed the
city, using the brigade’s favoured tactics of ambushes and bold short-range thrusts
to delay the enemy. They also had a secondary mission: recovery of the brigade’s
disabled tanks.
Destroyed German vehicles At 0200hrs on 11 October the last of the 4th Tank Brigade’s T-34 tanks crossed the
including a PzKpfw III at Devil’s Bridge with knocked-out tanks in tow, after which the bridge was demolished
Smolensk. German progress to cover their escape. Although Mtsensk fell, the performance of the brigade and its
eastwards during Operation personnel was considered outstanding. The brigade was awarded the title of 1st Guards
Typhoon was not as swift or
Tank Brigade and the aforementioned tankers received honours up to and including
bloodless as it was in the first
months of the Great Patriotic War. the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
(Starominskiy Istoriko- Even though the 4. Panzer-Division took Mtsensk, the German victory came at
Krayevedcheskiy Muzey) great cost. Panzer-Regiment 35 was down to 30 tanks out of 59 that were still in

64
service on 4 October. The damage to vehicles not written off completely was severe T-34 and T-26 tanks stuck in a
enough that the 4. Panzer-Division was forced to stop its advance for two weeks in swamp outside of Talachyn
between Minsk and Smolensk.
order to recover and refit. Red Army tank units also suffered significant losses. The
These tanks were lost not in
4th Tank Brigade lost 25 tanks, nine of which were written off and six could not be battle, but due to driving into an
recovered from the battlefield. The 11th Tank Brigade lost 16 tanks on the approach impassable swamp as a result of
to Mtsensk and during counter-attacks aimed at retaking the city. poor reconnaissance.
As the once-rapid progress of the German armoured spearheads slowed, the (Tsentralniy Arkhiv Ministerstva
advantages enjoyed by their opponents’ tanks became more and more obvious. A Oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii)

report from Langermann und Erlencamp to Guderian read:

In our battles, the 4. Panzer-Division often encountered Russian heavy tanks. At first
they appeared rarely and could be stopped with concentrated artillery fire or bypassed.
In some successful cases, lone heavy tanks were destroyed with a direct hit from artillery.
After Orel was taken, the Russians first used heavy tanks en masse. There were cases
of very heavy tank battles, as the Russians no longer allowed themselves to be stopped by
artillery.
For the first time during the war in the East, the absolute superiority of Russian 26-
and 52-tonne tanks over our PzKpfw III and IV was felt.
Russian tanks usually line up in a semicircle and open fire at our tanks at a distance
of 1,000m using their 7.62cm guns that combine incredible penetration and high
precision.
[...]
In addition to superior effectiveness of the armament and more powerful armour, the
26-tonne Christie tank (T-34) is faster and more manoeuvrable, its turret traverse
mechanism has an obvious advantage. This tank’s wide tracks allow it to ford rivers that
our tanks cannot cross. The ground pressure is better than on our tanks, and despite the
Russian tank’s greater weight it can cross the same bridges that our tanks can. 65
 PzKpfw III GUNSIGHT VIEW

A PzKpfw III gunner aims at the side of a T-34 using his 2.4× side at close range. Several vehicles from the platoon would
TZF 5d telescopic gun sight. The PzKpfw III’s 5cm gun could distract the T-34 while one or two crept up from the flanks
not reliably penetrate the front armour of a T-34 at any where the T-34 commander, focused on the battle, would not
range, the only solution being to engage the T-34 from the see them coming.

66
 T-34 GUNSIGHT VIEW

A T-34 gunner aims at a PzKpfw III platoon through his The T-34’s powerful V-2 engine allowed it to withdraw
2.5× TMFD-7 telescopic sight at a range of 2,000m. From after firing well before the German tanks came into
here, he is guaranteed to score a killing shot while effective range.
remaining well out of range of his opponents’ 5cm guns.

67
 The exceptional diesel engine also deserves attention. Not a single Russian tank left
behind due to mechanical damage was found between Glebov and Minsk. To compare,
Panzer-Regiment 35 alone left behind about 20 tanks on the way due to mechanical
issues. Of course, we must remember that the Russian tanks are relatively new. (Quoted
in Ulanov & Shein 2013: 160)

The report was not entirely negative, however. The officers of the 4. Panzer-Division
were experienced soldiers and understood that any enemy has weaknesses. The report
suggested installing a more powerful 5cm gun on the PzKpfw III, transplanting 76mm
guns from captured T-34 tanks to the PzKpfw IV, as well as developing an anti-tank
version of the 10.5cm field gun, which was effective against the T-34 but also large,
heavy and very vulnerable. Despite offering these solutions, notes of panic began to
creep through:

These facts and the impression that the Russians know about the technical supremacy of
A T-34 leads a column of old-
their armoured forces must be addressed in a timely manner in order to avoid damage
model light tanks towards the
front lines, Moscow, November done to our tank forces.
1941. While the T-34 proved itself The energy and high spirit of our attacks will weaken and be lost due to a feeling of
as one of the Red Army’s most inadequacy. Crews know that enemy tanks can knock them out at a long range, but they
useful tanks, it would be a long can only have a minimal effect on enemy tanks despite the use of special ammunition at
time before it would make up the
close range. (Quoted in Ulanov & Shein 2013: 161)
majority of the Red Army’s
armoured force. (Smolenskiy
Gosudarstvenniy Muzey- In his memoirs, Guderian gives the T-34 its due: ‘The superiority of Russian T-34
Zapovednik) tanks became evident for the first time. The [4. Panzer] division took heavy losses.

68
The planned offensive towards Tula had to be delayed’ (Guderian 1960: 212). The T-34 tanks in winter camouflage
Germans treated the situation at Mtsensk very seriously. A commission headed by during the defence of Tula, winter
1941. (Archive PL/Alamy Stock
Ferdinand Porsche, the head of the Panzer Commission, arrived at Mtsensk to
Photo)
survey the battlefield and inspect captured weapons, especially T-34 tanks. This
commission included a number of high-ranking figures: Oskar Hacker, Porsche’s
deputy and director of Steyr-Werke AG; Oberst Sebastian Fichtner, head of
Wa Prüf 6; Heinrich Kniepkamp, the civilian head of Wa Prüf 6; and senior
representatives of the leading arms companies Krupp, Daimler-Benz, Henschel,
MAN and Rheinmetall. Officers present on the trip were impressed by the T-34
to the point of wanting a copy of it to be put into production in Germany. This
was never done, as the industry representatives in the Panzer Commission
estimated that a copy would take nearly as much time to put into production as a
brand-new design. Nevertheless, various design elements of Soviet tanks were
copied by German designers as a result of the Panzer Commission’s work
at Mtsensk.
Even though Katukov’s blow made an impact on not just Guderian, but the whole
Wehrmacht, it was just one tactical success on a very wide front. Nevertheless, Soviet
tankers were getting a feel for their new tanks and their commanders were starting to
learn what to do with them. These small successes became more and more frequent,
and Operation Typhoon began to slip. Less than two months after the battle at
Mtsensk, the German offensive ran out of steam and the Red Army launched a massive
assault westward. The end of the Great Patriotic War was still far off, but the Red
Army’s armoured forces found their footing and showed that they were a worthy
opponent to the German Blitzkrieg. 69
 STATISTICS
AND ANALYSIS
It is difficult to describe Soviet losses in armour during the summer of 1941 as
anything but staggering. As of 1 August, the Red Army had lost an estimated
1,303 T-34 tanks. As the Red Army found its footing, however, losses decreased.
In the remaining five months of 1941, only 540 additional tanks were lost. Even
though the fighting grew fiercer as the Germans neared Moscow, Soviet tankers
were learning what their tanks and tank units were truly capable of, combined-
arms commanders were learning how to support their tanks in combat with
infantry and artillery, and technical personnel were learning how to recover and
repair tanks in the chaos of battle. A shortage of technical personnel was a
significant contributor to Soviet losses sustained in the early summer of 1941, as
only 66 T-34 tanks were delivered to repair bases by 1 August; a tiny number
compared to the number of broken tanks left behind German lines. Production
barely kept up with T-34 losses, delivering 1,886 tanks between 1 July 1941 and
1 January 1942.
To put the losses in perspective, the Red Army’s other new tank, the KV, was
produced in much smaller numbers. The Red Army had about 500 KV-1 and
KV-2 tanks on hand in June 1941 and 600 by December, having built almost
1,000 tanks in the interim. The majority of the Red Army’s tank forces were still
composed of light tanks, over 6,000 of which remained in service, both pre-war
stock and newly produced examples of the T-60. This was still not enough. The
Red Army needed another 2,997 KV-1, 7,541 T-34 and 5,747 T-50 or T-60 tanks
70 in order to rebuild its strength. The GABTU estimated that this number of tanks
could be provided in 10–11 months, not counting losses. For the time being, Fragment of a German instruction
however, this shortfall had to be covered by light tanks alone. The T-34 would not manual on fighting the regular
T-34 and the ‘reinforced’ T-34
become the Red Army’s main tank until a conscious effort was made in the
(likely referring to later-model
summer of 1942 to increase its production even at the cost of light- and heavy- tanks with cast turret armour).
tank output. Solid black indicates areas where
The Germans, who were able to recover and repair knocked-out vehicles, were in the T-34 can be penetrated with
much better shape. Out of 1,440 PzKpfw III tanks available at the start of Operation regular armour-piercing
ammunition and tungsten-
Barbarossa, only 782 had been written off as permanent losses by the end of 1941.
carbide sub-calibre shot. Hatched
Unlike Soviet tank losses, however, the rate of German losses did not decrease as the areas indicate areas that should
Great Patriotic War wore on: 246 PzKpfw III tanks were written off by 1 August be shot at with high-explosive
1941, and 536 during the rest of the year. German industry was able to absorb the shells to degrade the
losses and the number of PzKpfw III tanks available increased to 1,849 by the end performance of the T-34. The
of 1941 out of a total of 4,896 tanks. The quantity of other German tanks only PzKpfw III’s gunner had very few
options when engaging a T-34
decreased. By the end of 1941, 513 PzKpfw IV tanks were still on the field,
outside of suicidal close range,
compared to 517 available at the start of Operation Barbarossa, with 348 having unless he managed to score a hit
been written off. Only 381 PzKpfw 38(t) tanks remained compared to the 722 on its lower hull from the side.
vehicles of this type available at the beginning of the invasion; 769 PzKpfw 38(t) (Author)
tanks were destroyed during the second half of 1941, while 148 out of 189
PzKpfw 35(t) tanks were destroyed. As production at Škoda ended, it was impossible
to replace them. 71
 While Soviet losses were considerably greater in the summer of 1941, the tide
began to turn at the end of the year. German forces reported a total loss of 506 tanks
(including 208 PzKpfw III) and 19 Sturmgeschützen in December 1941. The number
of German tanks available for battle dropped even more, from 4,084 to 2,758. To
compare, Soviet tank losses in operations that took place in December 1941 numbered
541 vehicles. These figures only give an approximate impression of losses in armoured
vehicles, however, as the strategic operations in question do not precisely line up with
calendar months (for example, the Tikhvin Offensive Operation lasted from
11 November to 30 December). The figures for German tanks also omit all foreign
and captured tanks with the exception of the PzKpfw 38(t) and self-propelled guns on
tracked and half-tracked chassis. Writing off a vehicle as a total loss also did not
necessarily take place as soon as it was destroyed, so the total for December could
include tanks from the end of November and likewise omit tanks lost at the very end
of December. Nevertheless, the order of magnitude of the losses was comparable for
both sides.
The high rate of Soviet tank losses is often attributed to the superior designs of
German tanks, and yet analysis of figures shows otherwise. The T-34 and PzKpfw III
tanks that clashed at the border in late-June 1941 were exactly the same tanks as those
that met at Mtsensk or at Moscow. There were no changes made to the T-34 that
bolstered its fighting ability, nor some deficiency introduced into the PzKpfw III that
reduced its effectiveness. Likewise, the claim that the Red Army won due to superiority
in numbers alone does not stand up to scrutiny, as the number of PzKpfw III tanks
only grew while the number of T-34 tanks on the battlefield remained approximately
the same. By the start of 1942, the PzKpfw III outnumbered the T-34 nearly 2:1. If
the quality of tanks was the only factor that decided the outcome of a battle, then the
Germans would have broken through the Red Army tank brigades guarding Moscow
as easily as they had the mechanized corps at the border. The Germans’ reversal of
fortune in December 1941 had nothing to do with the technical specifications of any
type of tank, but the growing skill of Soviet commanders.
That is not to say that German commanders passively stood by as their opponent
grew in strength. In addition to using heavy artillery including 8.8cm and 10.5cm
towed guns to combat the T-34, sophisticated tactics were developed to allow German
medium tanks to combat the T-34 despite having thinner armour and a weaker gun.
Letter #126/42, sent by the OKH on 26 May 1942, demonstrates both an appreciation
of the T-34’s abilities and an understanding that there is no such thing as a tank
without weaknesses:

Tactics of Russian tanks:

In defence and during retreating battles, the T-34 tanks are dug in including the turret
on dominating heights, near roads, in forest clearings and in settlements in such a way
that after a quick artillery barrage it can retreat. Knowing its superiority in armament,
the T-34 opens fire at attacking tanks from 1200–1800 metres. Since the T-34 is faster
than the German tanks, it can choose the engagement distance.
Tactics of our tanks:
Since it is only possible to penetrate the T-34 from the flanks from a short distance with
72 the 50mm gun, the correct way to engage T-34 tanks is with the following tactics:
 Translation of a Soviet pamphlet
detailing the weaknesses of the
PzKpfw III. While the PzKpfw III
was vulnerable to 57mm and
76mm guns at essentially any
range, these weapons were
relatively rare in 1941. The latest
PzKpfw III Ausf. J tanks with up to
50mm of armour were decently
protected against every other
weapon in the Soviet arsenal.
(Author)

1. Tie up the tank with three Pz.III tanks that engage in a firefight. Taking up positions
on a reverse slope or moving constantly will make it harder to engage the enemy.
2. Meanwhile, two more Pz.III tanks using all cover rush to the T-34 from the left and
right flanks or come in from the rear and fire from a short distance using Pz.Gr.40 shot,
aiming for the sides or the rear of the tank. 73
 3. If there is a Pz.IV among our tanks, it is used to tie up the T-34 from the front. Using
a smokescreen, the Pz.IV can blind the T-34 or cover the approach of other tanks. It is
likely that the enemy will mistake the smoke for chemical weapons and disengage on its
own.
When meeting tanks that are superior in quality and quantity to our own tanks (T-34
and KV), success is obtained only if the entire tank unit forms a single front of fire and
blinds the enemy with fire. Even if not a single tank was knocked out, the enemy still
almost always disengaged under the precision and speed of German tank fire. (TsAMO
RF F.3181 Op.1 D.6 L.44)

German infantry was also quite concerned about facing the T-34. Extensive
experiments were carried out to develop tactics ranging from ingenious to suicidal.
German manuals suggested ‘blinding’ a T-34 by wrapping two smoke grenades tied
together with string around the gun barrel. Particularly brave soldiers could climb up
on the tank with a bucket of mud and cover up the viewports, although the manual
did not describe what to do if the tank was in motion. Other tactics, such as breaking
open the engine grille with an axe and throwing a grenade inside or pouring a canister
of petrol inside, were just as risky. All of these methods required perfect knowledge of
the T-34’s blind spots, a steel will and a good amount of luck to carry out. Eike
Middeldorf, a staff officer of the 4. Panzer-Division and future Bundeswehr
Generalmajor, wrote:

The path of suffering of German infantry against Russian T-34 tanks is drawn from the
37mm gun that the Army called ‘door knocker’, through a 50mm gun, and to the
mechanized 75mm gun. Perhaps it will never be known why in the 3½ years since the
first appearance of the T-34 in August of 1941 and until April of 1945 an acceptable
anti-tank weapon for the infantry was not created. (Middeldorf 2000: 16)

74
AFTERMATH
While the Red Army’s organization required drastic changes, the armour and
armament of the T-34 proved themselves in battle in 1941. Barring small batches of
tanks given appliqué armour, the T-34 retained the same level of protection until A 1942-production T-34, Patriot
production ceased in 1944. The 76mm F-34 gun was also found to be sufficient. The Park. As the T-34’s armour and
firepower were generally
57mm ZIS-4 gun in development was cancelled, and the F-34 and ZIS-5 (which had
satisfactory, most changes made
equivalent ballistics) remained as the primary weapons of Soviet medium and heavy after 1941 were aimed at
tanks until 1943, when they were found to be unsatisfactory in trials against the simplifying production. What
Tiger tank. used to be a disjointed group of
factories each working under a
different People’s Commissar was
brought together under one NKTP
(People’s Commissariat of Tank
Production), capable of
organizing the evacuating tank
factories into a series of powerful
industrial centres, including the
legendary Tankograd (‘Tank City’,
Chelyabinsk). These new
factories answered to only one
boss, making it much easier to
organize the production of tanks
in sufficient quantities to rebuild
the Red Army’s depleted tank
fleet. Direct control over the
factories also made it that much
easier to propagate design
changes and ensure high-quality
output. (Author) 75
 PzKpfw III Ausf. N, The Tank Attempts were made to remedy other aspects of the T-34. In 1942 the T-34S, with
Museum, Bovington. Because the an improved five-speed transmission, third turret crewman and commander’s cupola,
PzKpfw III could not
entered trials and a transmission with a five-speed gearbox was put into production.
accommodate a high-velocity gun
to compete with contemporary
In 1943 a commander’s cupola entered production and the T-34-85, with a three-man
Soviet tanks, the Ausf. N was turret and 85mm D-5T gun, was accepted into service. Medium tanks were now
repurposed for close-support commanded only by officers and crewed by NCOs, with a senior lieutenant
duty and received the same low- commanding a medium-tank platoon and a captain commanding a company.
velocity 7.5cm KwK L/24 that the The Germans faced different challenges. Their tactics and organization worked well
PzKpfw IV had, while the
enough, but the armour and armament of their tanks was found to be lacking.
PzKpfw IV became the new main
medium tank. (Author) Production of a PzKpfw III armed with a longer 5cm gun began by the end of 1941,
but even this was insufficient. A long-barrelled 7.5cm gun was required to combat the
T-34 and KV-1. Such a gun could fit in a PzKpfw IV without considerable design
changes, but not in a PzKpfw III, leading to its replacement.
The armour of the PzKpfw III was also augmented. Spaced armour in front of the
turret platform and gun shield offered some protection against the T-34’s 76mm gun,
but the plates and the bolts holding them in place cracked and broke off when hit.
Schürzen (spaced armour) introduced in 1943 to protect the sides was only effective
against anti-tank rifles. In short, the encounters with the T-34 in the summer of 1941
marked the beginning of the end for the PzKpfw III. Production of the PzKpfw III
tapered off and ceased in August 1943, although existing tanks and special vehicles
76 built on their chassis continued to fight until the end of the Great Patriotic War.
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 INDEX
References to illustrations are shown in bold. divisions 4, 28, 35–36, 37, 46, 53, 62, 64, 65, 68, tank brigades 61, 72: 1st Guards 47, 64; 4th 46,
74: 1. 51; 3. 51, 63; 4. 28, 46, 51, 62, 63, 64, 47, 62, 63, 64, 65; 11th 62, 63, 64, 65; 14th
A-20/-32/-34 medium tanks 7, 7, 14–16, 14, 15, 18, 65, 68, 74; 7. 35, 56–57, 61; 9. 35, 38, 39, 51; Heavy 46
18 10. 51; 11. 51, 53, 56; 13.–14. 51; 16.–18. 51; tank divisions 36, 41, 42, 43, 56, 57, 62: 5th 56–
anti-tank guns: (Ger) 16, 28, 35, 36, 40, 47, 56, 74; 20. 60 57, 60, 61; 8th 42; 10th 56; 12th 54; 15th 46;
(Sov) 38, 62 losses 57, 60, 61, 64–65, 71, 72 32nd 42; 37th 56
anti-tank rifles 12: (Sov) 73, 76 regiments: 35, 56: 25. 57, 60, 61; 33. 38, 39; 35. tank regiments 41: 9th 57; 10th 60; 20th 56
artillery pieces: (Ger) 35, 36, 37, 56, 60, 65, 72; (Sov) 64–65, 68 Renault R 35 light tank 49
37, 41, 56, 60, 70 tank strength 5, 38, 48–49, 53, 71, 72 Reserve-Panzer-Abteilung 33 38
Poland, German campaign in 5, 7, 11, 12, 40 Rothenburg, Oberst Karl 57
Bauer, Lt Ludwig 38–39; Begleitwagen 8 PzBefWg command tank 52, 56
PzKpfw I light tank 4, 35, 36, 38, 40, 48 Schrodek, Unteroffizier Gustav 56
BT light tanks (Sov) 14, 23, 42, 46, 49, 50
service/use 48, 57 Schweppenburg, Gen Leo Geyr von 62
BT-2 50
PzKpfw II light tank 4, 35, 38, 40 SMK heavy tank 4
BT-5 46, 50, 62 Sturmgeschützen 9, 10, 39, 72
BT-7 4–5, 7, 14, 16, 46, 49: service/use 50, 56, service/use 21, 48, 56, 57
57, 62 PzKpfw III medium tank
T-26 light tank 4–5, 14, 36: service/use 41, 42, 49, 50,
BT-7M 50 ammunition 24, 24, 26, 28, 56, 68, 71, 73
54, 56, 57, 65
BT-20 14 armament 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 24, 24, 25, 25, 26,
T-28/-29 medium tanks 14, 46, 49, 56, 57
Burda, Snr Lt Alexandr F. 64 28, 33, 38, 48, 52, 56, 66, 67, 68, 73, 76, 76
T-34 medium tank
armour 5, 12, 13, 24, 24, 26, 28, 56, 73, 76 ammunition 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 42, 60, 60
chemical/flamethrower tanks (Ger) 57; (Sov) 41, 50, 54 crew, positions/roles 9, 10, 12, 22–23, 24, 28, 32, armament 6, 14, 15, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 20, 21, 23,
Christie medium tanks 8, 14 33, 33, 34, 34, 36, 38, 40, 55, 66, 66, 71 26, 27, 28, 31, 33, 36, 38, 43, 43, 46, 50, 56,
Crüwell, Generalmajor Ludwig 56 engine/transmission 8, 9, 10, 22, 24, 26, 28, 29 58–59, 65, 68, 72, 73, 75
observation/vision devices 9, 12, 22, 24, 26, 32, 33, armour 16, 18, 20, 23, 26, 28, 28, 56, 65, 66, 75
Erlencamp, Generalmajor W. L. von 28, 62, 65 34, 34, 66 crew, positions/roles 5, 6, 16, 18, 20, 22, 22, 23, 23,
origins/development 6, 7, 8–9, 38: experimental/ 26, 28, 32–33, 34, 38–39, 40, 43, 44, 46, 64, 66,
France, German campaign in 12, 12, 40 pilot tanks 5, 7, 9, 11, 37 67, 68, 69, 76
performance 29, 36: mobility/traction 29, 29, 30, engine/transmission 14, 15, 23, 30, 30, 31, 32, 41,
31, 32, 36; shortcomings/vulnerability 26, 28, 55, 67, 68, 76
Grosstraktor medium tank 4
29, 31, 32, 36, 38, 56, 73, 76; testing/trials 26, German assessment of 5, 48–49, 57, 65, 68–69, 71,
Guderian, Generaloberst Heinz 61, 62, 65, 68–69
28, 29, 31, 32 72–73
production 5, 7, 7, 9–10, 11, 12, 13, 21, 71, 76 observation/vision devices 16, 18, 20, 23, 26, 32–33,
Hetzer tank destroyer 39
running gear/suspension 9, 10, 10, 11, 12, 12, 29, 34, 34, 43, 67
29, 32, 36, 55 origins/development 4, 6, 7
Kapotov, Sgt Nikolai P. 64
service/use 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 12, 21, 28, 35, 36, 38, performance 30, 31–32, 56: mobility/traction 29,
Katukov, Col Mikhail Ye. 62, 64, 69 31, 31, 32, 65; shortcomings/vulnerability 28,
40, 48, 49, 53, 55, 56, 58–59, 64, 65, 66, 67,
KV heavy tanks 56, 57, 61, 70, 74 38, 48–49, 71, 72–74; testing/trials 16, 18, 20,
72: change of role 21, 76; combat effectiveness
KV-1 4, 5, 46, 49, 75: service/use 25, 39, 41, 42, 23, 26, 28, 31–32, 31, 50
34, 66, 66; losses 36, 38–39, 64–65, 64, 68, 71,
49, 56, 62, 70, 76 production 6, 6, 7, 7, 16, 17, 17, 18, 19, 19, 20, 20,
72; tactics 28, 66, 66, 71, 72–74, 76; training on
KV-2 49, 70 21–22, 31, 34, 43, 46, 49, 50, 50, 58–59, 70,
37, 38, 40
KV-4/-5 42 Soviet assessment/testing of 4, 73 71, 71, 75, 75
specifications/weights 9, 12, 29, 73 running gear/suspension 26, 30, 31, 31, 32, 65
Landsverk L-60 light tank 10 variants: Ausf. A 5, 7, 9, 11, 37; Ausf. B 9, 10, 11; service/use 5, 6, 7, 19, 21, 34, 38, 41, 42, 43, 46–
Lavinrenko, Snr Lt Dmitry F. 45, 46–47, 64 Ausf. C 9, 10, 11; Ausf. D 9–10, 10, 11; Ausf. E 47, 49, 50, 53–55, 54, 56, 57, 58–59, 60–61,
Leichttraktor light tank 4, 7, 8, 9 7, 9, 10, 11, 11, 12, 12, 58–59; Ausf. F 10, 12; 60, 62, 65, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 69, 70, 71, 72–
Lelyushenko, Maj-Gen Dmitry D. 47, 62, 64 Ausf. G 12; Ausf. H 12, 24, 29, 31, 32, 34, 52; 74, 75, 76: combat effectiveness 25, 26, 28, 34,
Ausf. J 12, 12, 13, 13, 21, 73; Ausf. N 76; 56, 58–59, 67, 68, 72, 75; kills 46, 47, 57, 58–
Matilda III infantry tank 32 59, 60; losses 6, 47, 53, 54, 54, 60, 61, 65, 65,
hybrid tanks 12
Middledorf, Generalmajor Eike 74 69, 70; tactics 46, 47, 58–59, 64, 72–74;
PzKpfw IV medium tank 35, 38: armament/
MS-1/T-18 light tank 61 training on 5, 6, 38–40, 44–45, 44, 46–47
ammunition 38, 48, 56, 68, 76, 76; armour 56;
specifications/weights 22, 31, 56, 57
losses 39, 71; service/use 39, 40, 48, 56, 57, 65, 71,
Neubaufahrzeug tanks 8 T-34-85/34M/-34S medium tanks 20, 27, 76
74; tactics 74
T-35 heavy tank 49
PzKpfw 35(t) light tank 35, 48, 71 T-37/-38 light tanks 49
Ogurtsov, Maj-Gen Sergei I. 56 PzKpfw 38(t) light tank 35, 48, 57, 71, 72 T-46 light tank 14
Operation Barbarossa 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 35, 46, 48, 49,
T-50 light tank 42, 49, 70
51, 52–57, 53, 54, 58–59, 60–61, 60, 65 Red Army armoured force 46 T-60 light tank 70
Operation Typhoon 6, 7, 38, 47, 57, 61–62, 63, 64–65, anti-tank gun battalions 41 tank producers/factories: (Ger) 8, 10, 69; (Sov) 4, 6, 7,
64, 68, 69, 69, 70, 72 armies: 11th 57; 16th/50th 47 14, 16, 18, 22, 46, 75
conscripts/recruits, training of 5, 6, 16, 39, tankettes/teletanks (Sov) 45, 50
Panther medium tank 39 42–47, 44 Timofeev, Lt Grigoriy I. 64
Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 37 57 mechanized corps 36, 41, 42, 53–55, 57, 61, 72: 1st
Panzerarmeen: 2. 62 41; 2nd 51; 3rd 51, 56–57; 4th 41, 42; 6th 41, Valentine infantry tank 32, 61
Panzergruppen: 1. 62; 2. 61, 62; 3. 57 51, 53, 54, 55; 7th 42; 8th 51, 54, 55; 11th 51; Verkov, Col Ivan P. 57
Panzerjäger I tank destroyer 38, 48 15th 51, 56; 16th 46; 17th 42; 19th 51; Vickers Mark E Type B light tank 16
Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521 38 divisions 61
Panzerkorps: XXIV./XXXXVII. 62 modernization of 5, 6, 41, 49 Zaskalko, Capt Pavel A. 64
Panzerwaffe armoured force overhaul/repair of 41–42, 50, 64, 70–71 Zagudayev, Snr Politruk Aleksandr S. 64
80 battalions 35 tank battalions 41, 42, 56 Zugführerwagen medium tank 7, 8–9
OSPREY PUBLISHING Acknowledgements
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc The author would like to thank Bernhard Kast for his help with German-
Kemp House, Chawley Park, Cumnor Hill, Oxford OX2 9PH, UK language sources used in this book as well as Pavel Borovikov, Yuri Pasholok
29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland and Artem Drabkin for photographs included in it.
1385 Broadway, 5th Floor, New York, NY 10018, USA
E-mail: [email protected] Editor’s note
www.ospreypublishing.com Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the Russian are the author’s own.
All degree measurements relating to armour are degrees from vertical, while all
OSPREY is a trademark of Osprey Publishing Ltd those relating to climbing ability are degrees from horizontal. Both German
and Soviet tank designers used metric horsepower (PS), which is converted in
First published in Great Britain in 2024 the text into kilowatts (kW) for clarity.
This electronic edition published in 2024 by Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
Glossary
© Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2024 ABTU  Avto-bronetankovoye Upravleniye, Automobile, Armoured
Vehicle, and Tank Directorate, formed on 22 November 1934
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or to manage design and production of vehicles for the Red
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including Army. See also GABTU.
photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, Ausf.  Ausführung, ‘implementation’. The suffix Ausf. followed by a
without prior permission in writing from the publishers. letter was used to differentiate between German tank variants.
BT Bystrokhodnyi tank, ‘fast-moving tank’.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. FAMO  Fahrzeug- und Motoren-Werke, Automobile and Engine Works.
Flak Fliegerabwehrkanone, ‘anti-aircraft gun’.
ISBN: PB 9781472860934; eBook 9781472860941; GABTU  Glavnoye Avto-bronetankovoye Upravleniye, Main Automobile,
ePDF 9781472860958; XML 9781472860965 Armoured Vehicle, and Tank Directorate, formed from
ABTU (q.v.) on 26 June 1940.
Maps by bounford.com Kampfgruppe A German battlegroup organized to carry out a specific
Index by Rob Munro mission.
Typeset by PDQ Digital Media Solutions, Bungay, UK KwK Kampfwagenkanone, ‘tank gun’.
MAN Maschinenfabrik Augsburg Nürnberg AG.
Osprey Publishing supports the Woodland Trust, the UK’s leading woodland MIAG Mühlenbau und Industrie AG.
conservation charity. NKO  Narodnyi Komissariat Oboronnoy, People’s Commissariat of
Defence.
To find out more about our authors and books visit www.ospreypublishing.com. NKOP  Narodnyi Komissariat Oboronnoy Promyshlennosti, People’s
Here you will find extracts, author interviews, details of forthcoming events Commissariat of Defence Industry. This Soviet ministry was
and the option to sign up for our newsletter. responsible for all military development until 1939 when it
was dissolved into four separate ministries.
Front cover, above: OKH  Oberkommando des Heeres, High Command of the
A PzKpfw III Ausf. J moves past an emplaced T-34. The most vulnerable parts German Army.
of the T-34 were the vertical sides of the lower hull. In a defensive position, PaK  Panzerabwehrkanone, ‘anti-tank gun’.
these could be hidden by driving the tank into a tank trench or caponier. The German tank troops.
Panzertruppe 
T-34 became harder to spot and harder to destroy, but its mobility was also Panzerwaffe German tank forces.
limited. A German tank platoon could combat such a defensive position by PzKpfw  Panzerkampfwagen, ‘armoured fighting vehicle’.
‘blinding’ the T-34 with smoke and attacking from the side at close range. SdKfz Sonderkraftfahrzeug, ‘special purpose vehicle’.
SMK  A Soviet heavy tank named after Communist Party official
Front cover, below: Sergei Mironovich Kirov, assassinated on 1 December 1934.
A platoon of T-34 tanks drives into battle. This tank had no equal in its weight Stavka  Stavka verkhovnogo glavnokomandyvaniya, Office of the
class when it entered service, but its effectiveness in battle was hampered by Supreme Command. This was the most senior military
the poor organization of the Red Army in the summer of 1941. More often council in the Red Army.
than not, these tanks fought without support from infantry or artillery and StuG Sturmgeschütz, ‘assault gun’.
without adequate supplies of fuel and ammunition. TPU  Tankovoye Peregovornoye Ustroystvo, Tank Intercom Device.
Wa Prüf 6 Waffen Prüfen 6, 6th Department of the Waffenamt (German
Title page: Weapons Office) responsible for the design of tanks.
A PzKpfw III tank navigates a bridge deployed by field engineers, 27 June Z.W.  Zugfuhrerwagen, ‘platoon commander’s vehicle’.
1941. The tank is pulling a trailer with two 200-litre fuel drums. Armoured
spearheads often outran their supply lines and could only rely on what they
carried themselves. (ullstein bild/ullstein bild via Getty Images)