MAGNO vs.

COMELEC and MONTES

[G.R. No. 147904. October 4, 2002.]

FACTS:

This petition originated from a case filed by private respondent on

March 21, 2001 for the disqualification of petitioner Nestor Magno
as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May
14, 2001 elections on the ground that petitioner was previously
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery
penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.

Thereafter, petitioner applied for probation and was discharged on

March 5, 1998 upon order of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija.

On May 7, 2001, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

rendered a decision granting the petition of private respondent
and declaring that petitioner was disqualified from running for the
position of mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. In ruling against
petitioner, the COMELEC cited Section 12 of the BP 881 or the
Omnibus Election Code.

The above provision explicitly lifts the disqualification to run for

an
elective office of a person convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude after five (5) years from the service of sentence.
According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as petitioner was
considered to have completed the service of his sentence on
March 5, 1998, his five-year disqualification will end only on March
5, 2003.

Position of Petitioner: Petitioner argues that direct bribery is

not a crime involving moral turpitude. Likewise, he cites Section
40 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, which he claims is the law applicable to the case at bar, not
BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code as claimed by the
COMELEC.
Petitioner insists that he had already served his sentence as of
March 5, 1998 when he was discharged from probation. Such
being the case, the two-year disqualification period imposed by
Section 40 of the Local Government Code expired on March 5,
2000. Thus, petitioner was qualified to run in the 2001 elections.

The Solicitor-General filed his manifestation and agreed with

petitioner that COMELEC should have applied Section 40 of the
Local Government Code.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the crime of direct bribery involves moral turpitude

and
(2) Whether it is the Omnibus Election Code or the Local
Government Code that should apply in this situation.

RULING:

1) Yes.

By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all

the
elements of the crime of direct bribery:

1. the offender is a public officer;

2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift
or
present by himself or through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or
present be received by the public officer with a view
to committing some crime, or in consideration of the
execution of an act which does not constitute a crime
but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing
something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he
executes is connected with the performance of his official
duties.
 Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The
fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and
deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from
performing an official duty in exchange for some favors,
denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to
renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and
society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes
advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust
reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary
to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and
good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime
involving moral turpitude.

2) The Local Government Code should prevail over the Omnibus

Election Code.

There appears to be a glaring incompatibility between the

five-year disqualification period provided in Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code and the two-year disqualification
period in Section 40 of the Local Government Code.

It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881)

was approved on December 3, 1985 while the Local
Government Code (RA 7160) took effect on January 1, 1992.
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of
irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment
must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative
will.
In enacting the later law, the legislative is presumed to have
knowledge of the older law and intended to change it.

Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of RA 7160

or the Local Government Code states that:

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or
 modified accordingly. In accordance therewith, Section 40 of
RA 7160 is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of BP 881.
Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws
are repealed only by subsequent ones, and not the other
way around.
When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject
matter of the former enactment, the latter is deemed
repealed.
Supreme Court, in one case, declared that RA 7160 is a
codified set of laws that specifically applies to local
government units. Section 40 thereof specially and definitely
provides for disqualifications of candidates for elective local
positions. It is applicable to them only. On the other hand,
Section 12 of BP 881 speaks of disqualifications of
candidates for any public office. It deals with the election of
all public officers. Thus, Section 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it
governs this disqualifications of candidates for local
positions, assumes the
nature of a special law which ought to prevail.

Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved

moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless could not be
disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40
of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioner's
disqualification
ceased as of March 5, 2000 and he was therefore under no
such disqualification anymore when he ran for mayor of San
Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001 elections.

VILLABER vs. COMELEC and CAGAS

[G.R. No. 148326. November 15, 2001.]

FACTS:

Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were

rival
candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao
del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his
certificate of candidacy for Congressman on February 19, 2001, 1
while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001.

On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial

Election Supervisor, Commission On Elections (COMELEC), Davao
del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel
the latter's certificate of candidacy.

Position of Respondent: Cagas alleged in the said consolidated

petition that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 86-
46197 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and was sentenced
to suffer one (1) year imprisonment. The check that bounced was
in the sum of P100,000.00. Cagas further alleged that this crime
involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. Cagas
also asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in
his certificate of candidacy that he is "Eligible for the office I seek
to be elected" — which false statement is a ground to deny due
course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

Position of Petitioner: In his answer to the disqualification suit,

Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has not become final
and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded
to the trial court for promulgation in his presence. Furthermore,
even if the judgment of conviction was already final and
executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.

On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division), finding merit

in
Cagas' petition, issued the challenged Resolution 10 in SPA 01-
058 declaring Villaber disqualified as "a candidate for and from
holding any elective public office" and canceling his certificate of
candidacy.
The COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
involves moral turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc
in the administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda.

ISSUE:
Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.

RULING:

Yes.

The COMELEC believes it is a crime involving moral turpitude. In

disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for
Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently

adopted
the definition in Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.''

The Supreme Court, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs.

Commission on Elections that "not every criminal act involves
moral turpitude," and that "as to what crime involves moral
turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine."

The Supreme Court reiterated here the ruling in Dela Torre that
the determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is
a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.

In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect,
he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was
convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime
involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its
elements alone, as we did in Dela Torre which involves the crime
of fencing punishable by a special law.

The elements of the offense under the above provision are:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to

account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he
or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.

The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In

People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda 20 we held that a conviction for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person. . . . "

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the

landmark case of Lozano vs. Martinez, through Justice Pedro L.
Yap, "transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to
the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public" since the
circulation of valueless commercial
papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest."

Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an

unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he
owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted
and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good
morals.
Petitioner contends that this Court's pronouncement in People v.
Atty. Fe Tuanda , insofar as it states that conviction under B.P. Blg.
22 involves moral turpitude, does not apply to him since he is not
a lawyer. This argument is erroneous.

In that case, the Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Fe Tuanda's

conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and, in addition, suspended
her from the practice of law pursuant to Sections 27 and 28 of
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Her motion seeking the
lifting of her suspension was denied by this Court on the ground
that the said offense involves moral turpitude. There the Supreme
Court said in part:

"We should add that the crimes of which respondent was

convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility, under both of which
she was bound to 'obey the laws of the land.'
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in
the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the
exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates
to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of
such offense. . . . . "

Clearly, in Tuanda, this Court did not make a distinction whether

the
offender is a lawyer or a non-lawyer. Nor did it declare that such
offense constitutes moral turpitude when committed by a
member of the Bar but is not so when committed by a non-
member.

TY-DELGADO vs. HRET and PICHAY

[G.R. No. 219603. January 26, 2016.]

FACTS:

The Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 161032 and

161176, entitled "Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, " convicting
Pichay by final judgment of four counts of libel. In lieu of
imprisonment, he was sentenced to pay a fine in the amount of
Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for each count of libel and One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages. This Decision
became final and executory on 1 June 2009. On 17 February 2011,
Pichay paid One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages
and Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) as fine for each count of
libel.

On 9 October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the

position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Sur for the 13 May 2013
elections.

On 18 February 2013, petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado (Ty-

Delgado) filed a petition for disqualification under Section 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before the Commission
on Elections (Comelec), on the ground that Pichay was convicted
of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. Ty-Delgado argued that
when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year
period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse.

Position of the Respondent: Pichay, through his counsel,

alleged that the petition for disqualification was actually a petition
to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy under
Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code, and it was filed out of time. He admitted his conviction by
final judgment for four counts of libel, but claimed that libel does
not necessarily involve moral turpitude. He argued that he did not
personally perform the acts prohibited and his conviction for libel
was only because of his presumed responsibility as president of
the publishing company.

In a Decision dated 18 March 2015, the HRET held that it had

jurisdiction over the present quo warranto petition since it
involved the eligibility of a Member of the House of
Representatives due to a
disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.
However, the HRET held that there is nothing in Tulfo v. People of
the Philippines which found that Pichay directly participated in
any way in writing the libelous articles, aside from being the
president of the publishing company. Thus, the HRET concluded
that the circumstances surrounding Pichay's conviction for libel
showed that the crime did not involve moral turpitude.

ISSUE:

Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal gravely

abused its discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction
in failing to declare respondent Pichay ineligible or disqualified
from holding the position of Member of the House of
Representatives by reason of his conviction of libel, a crime
involving moral turpitude.

RULING:

Yes.

A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral

turpitude is a ground for disqualification under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to

justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general. Although not every criminal
act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the
general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while
crimes mala prohibita do not.

To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to

exist:

(a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition

concerning another;
(b) publication of the charge;
(c) identity of the person defamed; and
(d) existence of malice.
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty
but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and
implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is
bad faith or bad motive and it is the essence of the crime of libel.
To
determine actual malice, a libelous statement must be shown to
have been written or published with the knowledge that it is false
or in reckless disregard of whether it is false or not. Reckless
disregard of what is false or not means that the defendant
entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication or
possesses a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity.

In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of
libel. In Tulfo v. People of the Philippines , the Court found Pichay
liable for publishing the four defamatory articles, which are
libelous per se, with reckless disregard of whether they were false
or not. The fact that another libelous article was published after
the filing of the complaint can be considered as further evidence
of malice. Thus, Pichay clearly acted with actual malice, and
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. He committed an
"act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which
he owes his fellow men, or society in general," and an act which is
"contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."

The Revised Penal Code provides that: "Any person who shall
publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for
the same. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the
editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or
serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author
thereof."

Accordingly, we find that the HRET committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it
failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime
involving moral turpitude. Since Pichay's ineligibility existed on
the day he filed his certificate of candidacy and he was never a
valid candidate for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives, the votes cast for him were considered stray
votes. Thus, the qualified candidate for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections who received the
highest number of valid votes shall be declared the winner. Based
on the Provincial Canvass Report, the qualified candidate for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections
who received the highest number of valid votes is petitioner Mary
Elizabeth Ty-Delgado.