SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 173088, June 25, 2008 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. IMPERIAL CREDIT
CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Court, assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
78240. The said decision affirmed the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 74, which granted respondent's application for
land registration in LRC Case No. 00-2493.
The following factual antecedents are matters of record.
Herein respondent Imperial Credit Corporation is a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. On 07 March 1966,
respondent purchased from a certain Jose Tajon a parcel of land situated in
Barrio Colaique (now Barangay San Roque), Antipolo City, Rizal for the sum
of P17,986.00 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Mortgage.[4] In
December 1997, through judicial consignation, respondent paid the
remaining balance of P1,909.00, caused the release of the mortgage
constituted thereon and consolidated ownership in its name.[5] The property
was thereafter privately surveyed under PSU-178075 and approved on 25
January 2000.[6]
On 14 February 2000, respondent filed before the RTC of Antipolo City a
petition[7] for the registration of a parcel of land, as shown on Plan PSU-
178075 containing an area of 8, 993 sq.m. The application was docketed as
LRC Case No. 00-2493 and raffled off to Branch 74 of said RTC. The petition
alleged, among others, that respondent was "subrogated [to] former owner
Jose Tajon, who has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the parcel of land, x x x being a part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of ownership since 12 June 1945, by virtue of Deed of Sale with Mortgage
executed on 07 March 1966,"[8] After allowing respondent presented
evidence establishing the jurisdictional facts, the RTC issued an order of
general default against the whole world and directed respondent to present
its evidence in chief ex parte.[9]
At the hearing, Ricardo Santos, respondent’s duly authorized attorney-in-
fact, testified on the fact of respondent’s actual possession through its
caretaker, Teodisia Palapus, who had been overseeing said property since its
acquisition from Jose Tajon. Palapus also corroborated Santos’ testimony and
added that except for some trespassers, no one else had laid possessory
claim on the property.[10]
Aside from the transfer documents, the other documentary evidence
submitted consisted of a 1993 tax declaration, a tracing cloth plan, a survey
description, a certification from the Land Management Sector in lieu of the
geodetic engineer’s certificate and a report by the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) stating that the property falls within
the alienable and disposable zone "under Land Classification Project No. 1-A
Blk-1 per L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on March 11, 1927."[11]
On 21 November 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting respondent’s
application for registration. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, from the evidence presented both testimonial and
documentary, the Court is satisfied that the applicant has a registerable title
over the parcel of land applied for and after affirming the order of general
default against the whole world, hereby adjudicates the parcel of land more
specifically identified in Plan Psu 178075 containing an area of [EIGHT]
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY THREE (8,993) SQUARE METERS in favor
of the applicant IMPERIAL CREDIT CORPORATION with business address at
Unit 3-C-2, JMT Corporate Condominium, ADB Ave., Ortigas Center, Pasig
City, Metro Manila.
Once this decision becomes final, let an Order issue directing the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, Quezon City, to issue the
corresponding Decree of Registration.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), seasonably appealed from the RTC’s Decision to the Court of
Appeals, contending that respondent failed to present incontrovertible
evidence that respondent and its predecessor-in-interest had been in open
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.[13]
On 02 June 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the
appeal. Hence, the instant petition, assigning a lone error, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC DECISION WHICH
GRANTED RESPONDENT’S APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF
TITLE, HOLDING AS BASIS THEREOF PARAGRAPHS (2) AND (4) OF SECTION
14 OF PD 1529 (“THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE”).[14]
In affirming the registration of the property under the Torrens system, the
Court of Appeals essentially held that through extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, respondent obtained title to the property and, therefore, was
qualified to register the same under paragraphs (2) and (4) of Section 14,
[15] of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.[16]
Petitioner argues that contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals,
respondent's application for registration was actually based on paragraph (1)
of Section 14, P.D. No. 1529,[17] the conditions under which have not been
sufficiently established by respondent's evidence. Although petitioner
concedes that respondent was able to show that the land applied for has
been reclassified as alienable public agricultural land from forest or timber
land, respondent’s evidence failed to satisfy the requirement under
paragraph (1) of Section 14, P.D. No. 1529, that is, that it must have been in
possession and occupation of the property for the length of time and in the
manner required by law.
The petition is meritorious.
There is no dispute that respondent's petition for registration was based on
paragraph (1) of Section 14, P.D. No. 1529,[18] as can be gleaned from the
contents of its petition.[19] As a matter of fact, the RTC's decision concluded
that respondent's evidence satisfied all the conditions under the said
provision.[20]
Section 14, paragraph (1) of P.D. No. 1529 states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
It is doctrinally settled that a person who seeks confirmation of an imperfect
or incomplete title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself
and his predecessors-in-interest shoulders the burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence compliance with the requirements of Section 48 (b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.[21] Accordingly, applicants for
confirmation and registration of imperfect title must prove: (a) that the land
forms part of the alienable lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 12 June 1945.[22]
The date "12 June 1945" under the aforequoted provision is a reiteration of
Section 4[23] of P.D. No. 1073,[24] which, in turn, amended Section 48 (b)
[25] of the Public Land Act.[26] The reckoning date under the Public Land
Act, as amended, for the acquisition of ownership of public lands is likewise
12 June 1945 or earlier, and evidence of possession from that date or earlier
is essential for a grant of an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title.[27]
Respondent's evidence based on the CENRO certification conclusively proved
that the property sought to be registered had been released into the
alienable and disposable zone of the public domain as early as 1927. Thus,
there is no longer any question that the property may be registered under
the Torrens system. However, a perusal of the records leads the Court to
reverse the RTC's conclusion that respondent's predecessor-in-interest
possessed and occupied the property as early as 12 June 1945. Respondent
was able to trace back its alleged possession and occupation of the property
only as far back as 1966 when it acquired the same from Jose Tajon. Other
than the bare allegation in the petition, respondent's evidence failed to show
that Jose Tajon, respondent's predecessor-in-interest, had occupied the
property on 12 June 1945 or earlier.
The CENRO certification does not help respondent's cause. In Republic v. San
Lorenzo Development Corporation,[28] the Court held that all the CENRO
certification evidences is the alienability of the land involved, not the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof by
the respondent or its predecessors-in-interest for the period prescribed by
law.
Moreover, respondent's evidence on its alleged open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the property falls short of the
requirements under the law. Possession is open when it is patent, visible,
apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse
possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation
of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that
it is generally known and talked off by the public or the people in the
neighborhood. Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious.[29]
The openness and notoriety of respondent's occupation could have been
persuasively established by the owners of the lands adjacent to the subject
property. Although the petition stated and identified these neighbors, not
even one of them was presented as a witness. Only the respondent's
caretaker and its attorney-in-fact testified on respondent's possession. But
said possession started only after respondent acquired the property.
The tax declaration submitted in evidence could have clearly manifested
respondent's adverse claim on the property. While a tax declaration by itself
is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for
inferring possession.[30] After all, the voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest
desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim
against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to
contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens
one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[31] However, respondent
submitted only one tax declaration filed belatedly in the year 1993. If
respondent genuinely and consistently believed its claim of ownership, it
should have regularly complied with its real estate tax obligations from the
start of its alleged occupation.
All told, respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving that
respondent or its predecessor-in-interest had occupied and possessed the
property in an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious manner since 12
June 1945 or earlier. While it is true that the issue of possession and
occupation is a question of fact which ordinarily cannot be entertained in a
Rule 45 petition, one of the exceptions to the rule obtains in the instant case,
that is, the evidence on record does not support the conclusion made by the
RTC. Besides, on many occasions where warranted by the circumstances of
the case, the Court has not hesitated to review the findings and reverse the
conclusions of the trial courts and appellate court approving the registration
of lands.[32]
Now, if respondent does not qualify for registration under paragraph (1) of
Section 14, P.D. No. 1529, may it still qualify under paragraphs (2) and (4) of
Section 14, P.D. No. 1529? The Court of Appeals' answer is in the affirmative,
premised on its finding that the property is private which may be acquired
through extraordinary prescription. It held that since respondent has been in
possession of the property in the concept of an owner since 1966, it acquired
ownership thereof after the lapse of thirty years and, therefore, qualified for
registration under paragraph (2) of Section 14, P.D. No. 1529.
Paragraph (2) of Section 14, P.D. No. 1529[33] is inapplicable because the
property sought to be registered has not been clearly shown to be a private
land. For a piece of land to be qualified for registration under paragraph (2)
of Section 14, P.D. No. 1529, the applicant must conclusively prove that the
land is private and not part of the public domain. Otherwise, if the land is
part of the disposable zone of the public domain, as in the instant case, the
applicant must prove that he has complied with the conditions under
paragraph (1) of Section 14, P.D. No. 1529.[34] This is premised on the basic
doctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[35]
Of course, it is possible that a piece of land may be segregated from the
mass of public land and, therefore, converted into a private land under the
laws of prescription. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. In extraordinary prescription
ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty (30) years
without need of title or of good faith.[36] With such conversion, such
property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under
Section 14 (2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have
acquired ownership through prescription.[37] However, as already explained
above, respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove its
uninterrupted adverse possession of the property for thirty years. Neither
has it been established that respondent's predecessor-in-interest possessed
the property for the length of time required for prescription to set in.
Respondent may neither apply for registration under paragraph (4) of
Section 14, P.D. No. 1529.[38] Said provision contemplates registration of
lands acquired through modes other than those specifically enumerated
under Section 14, P.D. No. 1529. Respondent acquired an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, thus, its application for registration
must comply with the requisites under paragraph (1) and not paragraph (4)
of Section 14.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78240
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition in LRC Case No. 00-2493 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, Antipolo City is hereby DISMISSED.
