UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

SOVIET B'l‘GMs:
CAPABILITIES &
COUNTERIVIEASURES

APRIL 1915

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNITED STATES ARIVIY
TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
BULLETIN NO. 2‘-I

SOVIET IITGMS
CAPABILITIES & COUNTERMEASURES

Page
The Modern Battlefield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Soviet Antitank Guided Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

\
This TRADOC BULLETIN is intended to provide
to commanders, and others concerned with
military training, timely technical information on
weapons, tactics, and training. It is not intended to
supplant doctrinal publications, but to supplement
material on "how to fight" with data derived from
tests, recent intelligence, or other sources, which
probe “why."
TRAINERS’ NOTE: The format of this bulletin is
designed to help trainers identify and extract
needed information. Charts, illustrations, and other
key data are unclassified, clearly marked and are
boxed-in by a bold line.
Comment or criticism is welcome, and should be
directed to:
COMMANDER
US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
ATTN: ATTNG-CON (TEL: AUTOVON 680-2972/3153)
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651
\ J

1 .
 I
THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD

Modern warfare is a contest of measures and countermeasures—fire and counterfire,

maneuver and countermaneuver. FOR EVERY MODERN WEAPONS SYSTEM THERE IS AN
EFFECTIVE COUNTERWEAPON OR SYSTEM. For the fighter there is the surface-to-air missile
(SAM); for the tank there is the antitank missile or gun; for artillery fire there is counterbattery fire,
and so on. Of course, weapons systems are defeated by countermeasures other than weapons. The
SAM, for instance, is often defeated by electronic countermeasures (ECM). Direct fire weapons are
defeated through the effective use of terrain to shield oneself from enemy fire. Obscuration can also
degrade the effect of some enemy weapons. This, of course, assumes that if he can't see you, he can't
hit you. Also, if the enemy is effectively suppressed—if he is too busy ducking incoming fire to fire
his weapon—his weapons systems are defeated. Thus, we must realize and accept the fact that there is
no “ultimate” or invincible weapon. The modern battlefield is a contest of measures and
countermeasures which, taken together, and on balance will determine the outcome of the battle.
Thus, these dynamics are analogous to the ancient oriental game of rock-paper-scissors:

BREAKS

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ATTACKS SUPPFIESSES

DYNAMICS OF MODERN BATTLEFIELD - MEASURE 8: COUNTERMEASURE

2
 TRADOC BULLETIN NO. Zu CHAPTEHI i

All the modern armies of NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the Arab and Israeli nations generally
agree that the main offensive weapon of ground forces is the tank. With its heavy armament, armor
protection, and cross-country mobility, only the tank can break through an enemy force and engage
or defeat it decisively. While the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 (The “Yom Kippur War")
reaffirmed the offensive potential of the tank, it has also dramatized the lethality of modern antitank
weapons—particularly the high velocity tank cannon and the long range antitank guided missile
(ATGM). The effect of these modern antitank weapons in this war was devastating. Not since the
Battle of Kursk between the German and Russians in World War ll has there been a comparable loss
of tanks in such a short period of time. If the rate of loss which occurred in the Yom Kippur War
during the short 20 days of battle were extrapolated to the European battlefields over a period of
60-90 days, the resulting losses would reach levels for which the United States Army is totally
unprepared. While it is impossible to say precisely how many losses were attributable to a certain
weapons system, we can say, particularly in view of the vast numbers of ATGMs employed, that the
antitank guided missile was responsible for a high percentage of the Israeli tank losses at the beginning
of that war. In the Arab/Israeli War of 1967, the Israelis were able to dominate the battlefield
principally with‘ tanks and fighter aircraft. Extensive Arab air defenses in I973, however, seriously
degraded effective close air support. Thus in the first several days of the 1973 war, Israeli armor units,
advancing without close air, infantry or artillery support, attacked in the face of large numbers of
Soviet-made ATGMs and suffered wholesale destruction. This same situation is, of course, possible on
European battlefields. Thus, we should conclude that:

On today's battlefield, unsupported tank attacks face mass

destruction from accurate and lethal antitank guided missiles.

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3
CHAPTER! TRADOC BULLETIN NO.2u

This bulletin is designed, therefore, to discuss the Soviet antitank guided missile and to
propose tactics and techniques that can be used to degrade its effectiveness. Before being able to
counter a system, we must first know it. To this end, the SWATTER and SAGGER antitank guided
missile systems are discussed in detail, by showing how they are employed, how they operate, how
effective they are, how they are integrated into an offense or defense on the battlefield, and what
strengths and weaknesses they have. The countermeasures proposed are based on the combat results
of Israeli techniques and a study of U.S. tactics vis-a-vis Soviet doctrine.

Data in this bulletin is from Defense Intelligence Agency sources and from various official
reports on the Yom Kippur War. Technical data on the SAGGER missile is derived from exploitation
tests conducted by the U.S. Army Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama and, therefore,
represents the system's capabilities under ideal conditions. Foreign sources state that under the
normal stress of combat and faced by countermeasures, the SAGGER system's effectiveness is
considerably reduced. Nonetheless, the system is capable of performing as shown, and technical
improvements in SAGGER and other Soviet ATGMs are probable.

4
 II
SOVIET ANTITANK GUIDED IVIISSILES

The Soviets have fielded three antitank guided missile (ATGM) systems since the early
1950s. They are the SNAPPER, SWATTER and SAGGER. Since the SNAPPER is obsolescent and
unlikely to be found in significant numbers on the modern battlefield, it will not be discussed. The
SAGGER is available to the WARSAW Pact Nations and other Soviet client states. Let's compare the
two systems:

Characteristic SW ATT E R SA G G E R

Length (in) 45.8 34

Diameter (in) 5.2 4.7

Weight (lbs) 65 24.9

Ranges (meters) at least

Max eff range ._-----..-----_--___.._--._. 3000 _______--3000
Min eff range _-__--___--.._-_-_______ -amund 500.__ __--.. 500
Time of Flight (sec) to Max Range 23.2 27

Armor Penetration (in @ O Deg) 20 16

Guidance System Radio Wire

Average Velocity (m/sec) 150 120

Warhead HEAT HEAT

This data tells us that:

SWATTER and SAGGER are small and can

hit at long ranges - as far as 3 km. Both are
lethal enough to penetrate any known armor,
but are relatively slow compared
to a tank

5
-—-CHAPTER ll TRADOC BULLETIN N0.2 U

However, there are some important differences:

The SWATTER is

guided by radio signals.

The SAGGER is guided by wire.

SAGGER
The SAGGER is a wire-guided missile with a shaped charge warhead. It is considered a “first
generation" ATGM system. The gunner must visually track the missile and the target and manually
control the missile flight to the target. To fly the missile and simultaneously track the target requires
considerable manual dexterity and a high level of training. Operators are carefully selected and
reportedly fire 2300 simulated rounds to qualify as a SAGGER gunner. Thereafter, 50 to 60
simulated rounds are fired each week to maintain proficiency. In the Yom Kippur War it was reported
that the Egyptians brought mobile simulators mounted in truck vans immediately to the rear of the
front lines and required each gunner to fire 20~30 simulations daily.

The SAGGER is employed in three principal modes:

I Manpacked and ground-mounted (the so-called "suitcase" version)
I Mounted on the BRDM scout vehicle
- Mounted on the BMP armored personnel carrier

6
TRADOC BULLETIN NO. 2" CHAPTER ll —

TH E "SU|TCASE" SAGGER

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In this version, the SAGGER system is easily manpacked by its crew. Its light weight and
small size make it easy to transport, set up, and camouflage. In the Mideast War (Oct 73) Arab
infantry were equipped with literally thousands of suitcase SAGGERS.

7
— CHAPTER ll TRADOC BULLETIN NU. Zu

BRDMs WITH SAGGERS MOUNTED

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The SAGGER, mounted on a modified chassis of the BRDM, provides a significant antitank
capability to the Soviet motorized rifle regiment. The AT battery organic to the motorized rifle
regiment is made up of nine ATGM launcher vehicles AT 2/3. These are modified BRDMs that carry
SWATTER/SAGGER missiles. The AT-2 vehicle carries 4 SWATTER missiles while the AT-3 vehicle
carries 14 SAGGER missiles. The vehicle carries a two man crew and is capable of speeds of 60 mph
on surfaced roads and 6 mph in water. The reaction time to fi re from a completely buttoned-up travel
mode to actual launch is one minute. It can refire within 5 seconds of the first missile's impact on the
target.

8
TRADOC BULLETIN N0. 2“ CHAPTER ll —

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The gunner can either operate from within the vehicle or from a remote firing position up to 80
meters away. The gunner may rapidly fire up to six missiles without reloading by simply turning the
selector switch mounted on the fire control and sighting device. From within the vehicle the gunner
fires from a fully protected position. When the BRDM is in a defilade position only a cross section of
approximately one by four feet of the vehicle is exposed to the enemy. When in a remote firing
position and dug in, only a cross section of one by four inches of the 8X monocular periscope is
exposed to the enemy!

BMP WITH SAGGER MOUNTED

<\_:_\
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The Soviet BMP armored infantry combat vehicle features a 73mm smoothbore gun capable
of firing HEAT ammunition and a 7.62mm coaxial machinegun as well as the SAGGER missile. There
is only one launch rail and the vehicle carries a basic load of 4-5 missiles.
The SAGGER system is readily adaptable to almost any vehicle. It has been mounted on the
BMD airborne amphibious combat vehicle.

9
— CHAPTER ll TRADOC BULLETIN N0. 2"

METHOD OF OPERATION OF SAGGER

The general method of operation of both the ground and vehicle launched systems is similar
except that for vehicle systems the gunner can operate either inside the vehicle or from a remote
location. One difference is that the vehicle system allows the gunner remote operation to a maximum
distance of 80 meters; whereas the suitcase SAGGER has only a 15 meter connecting cable.

It is important to know the SAGGER gunner's location with respect to the launcher, so that
countermeasures will be more effective. Therefore, we should:

Look for a SAGGER Gunner to be:

I Up to 15 METERS away from a suitcase SAGGER Launcher; or

I Up to 80 METERS away from a BRDM Launcher

MIN RANGE %

MAX RANGE 3000 METERS :-—i—

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The main problem of controlling the SAGGER is to "capture" it and bring it onto the line
of sight after launching it from a remote position. Depending on the skill of the gunner and the
distance he is remoted from the launcher, the missile can be captured at ranges of 500-800 meters
from the launch site. However, under combat conditions, most gunners will probably be able to
successfully engage targets only between 1000-3000 meters.

Normally "SU|TCASE" SAGGERs are employed by a 3-man firing team and are deployed in
groups of four missiles per team. One man is the senior gunner and he fires the missiles; the second
man is the junior gunner who assists in the system checkout procedures and deploys nearby to
protect the gunner or he can also fire missiles; the third man moves well forward of the firing position
with an RPG-7 to engage the target if the SAGGER fails to hit. The time required for the team to set
up, check out the missiles, and fire is normally 12-15 minutes for all four missiles. It can be done in 5
minutes for a single missile.

I0
TRADOC BULLETIN N0.Zu CHAPTER //-

A typical layout for a SAGGER ATGM team is:

DIRECTION OF ENEMY ATTACK RPG GUNNER

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SAGGER EFFECTIVENESS
The SAGGER system is considered to be a highly accurate and lethal system. Although
accuracy is a function of the operator's skill, the thoroughness of training for the gunners is likely to
ensure a high level of system accuracy. The warhead, capable of penetrating any known armor in the
free world, gives it a very high degree of lethality. The probability of a first round kill against a
stationary, fully exposed M60Al tank at ranges from I000 to 3000 meters is over 60%.

PROBABILITY OF FIRST ROUND KILL

Against Stationary, Fully-Exposed M60A1
1.0 -

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Pk SAGGER
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500 _i O__-__-O O 1500 2000 2500 3000
METERS

ll
— CHAPTER ll TRADOC BULLETIN NO. ZU

The SAGGER's effectiveness drops off somewhat at short ranges against moving targets. It
drops off markedly against targets in hull defilade. At 1500 meters it is only half as effective (31%)
against tanks in hull defilade as it is at the same rang against tanks fully exposed (61%).

PROBABILITY OF FIRST ROUND KILL

SAGGER Shooting at M60A1
1.00 i

.90 —

.80 —-'

70 -— TARGET, FULLY
EXPOSED 61%
STATIONARY)
Pk .60 —-

_5Q __ W TARGET FULLY EXPOSED, MOVING 12 MPH

‘4° _ 31%
.30 -—

-2° - TARGET STATIONARY, uuu DEFILADE

.10 "-

O I l l l l
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000

I The SAGGER is highly effective between 1000 and 3000 meters. At close ranges
its effectiveness falls off rapidly.
I Therefore, use cover and concealment to close on enemy SAGGER positions.
I Don't give him long range shots. Make him fight at close quarters.
I Get in hull defilade whenever possible. It makes you 2 to 3 times less vulnerable.

I2
TRADOC BULLETIN NO. 2)’ CHAPTER ll —

The horizontal field of fi re for an individual SAGGER missile shows the approximate degree
to which the missile can be guided in flight.

n . 2000
I?) | METERS
/ 1000 M 2000 M 3000 M
/ I

_L
In terpret this picture with care."
I The SAGGER is easy to shift to cover targets to the right or left of the relatively narrow cone
shown.
I The SAGGER leaves its launcher armed, and can detonate and kill at very short ranges.

The signature of the SAGGER missile is extremely difficult to detect. Altough it does give
off a cloud of gray smoke and a loud roar at launch, it is hard to detect on the battlefield. In fact, in
the Yom Kippur War, there was not a single recorded incident of the detection of the missile's
signature. Most Israeli tank commanders (70% of those polled in a survey) could, however, detect the
missile in flight as it was being fired at them. The reported percentage of SAGGE RS detected in flight
compared to the area of operations was:

Long Range Medium Range Short Range

GOLAN 34% 36% 30%
SINAI 20% 40% 39%

25

The SAGGE R's 29

relatively slow time of
flight is depicted in
this graph. 6
G
SECONDS
5

0
METERS-> 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000

Finally, from exploitation tests done in the United States, we know that the system is highly
reliable. The number of malfunctions experienced were negligible considering the number of firings
completed.

13
— CHAPTER // TRADOC BULLETIN mo. 2"

SWATTER
MODES OF EMPLOYMENT

SWATTER is the NATO designation for the second antitank guided missile known to exist
in the Soviet Union. There are two versions - SWATTER A and SWATTER B. SWATTER B is
considered the best and the data contained herein pertains to this version. It is still considered,
however, a first generation antitank guided missile.

It has been observed in only two modes - mounted on a BRDM reconnaissance vehicle and
the HIND-A assault helicopter.

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OF SWATTER ATGMs HIND-B

14
TRADOC BULLETIN N0. 2" CHAPTER // -

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SWATTER

Hard data on the hit/kill probabilities is unavailable for the SWATTER, but is reported to be
the best of the three Soviet ATGMs.

Th e SWATTER launcher on the BRDM has a lateral traverse of +45- and has a field of fire as
shown below. The missile does not arm until it has flown 500 meters from the launch site.

HORIZONTAL FIELD or Fins

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METERS V

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BRDM

5000 METERS

To date there is no indication of it being employed from a ground mount.

15
—6‘HAPTE/i’ // TRADOC BULLETIN no
METHOD OF OPERATION
The gunner must optically track both the target and the missile simultaneously. The
operator guides the missile using an aircraft type control stick with a radio-link between the control
box and the missile. The threat of countermeasures is reduced by the availability of three radio
frequency options for the gunner.

Like the SAGGER, the SWATTER

needs a highly trained gunner.

Any distraction to the gunner

can seriously affect the system.

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16
 TRADOC BULLETIN no. 2" CHAPTER //—
EMPLOYMENT OF SOVIET ATGMs
Essential to the development of effective countermeasures is a consideration of the manner
in which ATGMs are deployed on the battlefield. For this discussion, the employment of SAGGER
and SWATTER ATGMs is considered to be essentially the same. First, the Soviet doctrine of
employment is examined and then a combat example of a variant of this doctrine as employed in the
Mideast is illustrated.

TYPICAL SOVIET EMPLOYMENT

Let us look at one typical deployment of Soviet ATGMs which would likely face the
battalion commander of an attacking US armor/mechanized force. This situation depicts a hasty
defense in which the enemy has not had sufficient time to dig all the trenches, lay all the mines, etc.,
as he would in a deliberate defense.

A TYPICAL, HASTY DEFENSE OF A SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE

REGIMENT EOUIPPED WITH BMPs

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2d Echelon

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1st Echelon
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This would indicate a total in each battalion area of:
Q 3 BRDMs with 14 missiles each
‘ 1 Suitcase SAGGER Squad with 4 missiles each (employed in 2 teams
of 2 missiles each)
D 30 BMPs with 4 missiles each

TOTAL - 33 SAGGER equipped vehicles

166 SAGGER missiles for the battalion

I7
 CHAPTER//—

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area of armor attack. However, you must bear in mind that Soviet doctrine is to maintain antitank
/H so ~ \
SAGGER equipped vehicles (BMPs and BRDMs) and 2 (or possibly 3 if reinforced) suitcase SAGGER reserves at regimental and higher levels. This gives him the capability to thicken his AT defenses
teams (4-6 missiles). ln the forward positions you can expect to find roughly two-thirds of the wherever he chooses. Also it would be normal for a company of 13 tanks to be attached to the
enemy's ATGMs. ln blocking positions or trench lines to the rear you would expect to find the battalion and deployed throughout the battalion sector (not shown in the sketch).
remaining one-third. The attached antitank platoon (3 BRDMs) would be deployed in the most likely
4
 —6‘HAPTEH // TRADOC BULLETIN N0. 2"
ATGMs IN THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
"We were advancing and in the distance I saw specks dotted on the sand dunes. I couldn't make out
what they were. As we got closer, I thought they looked like tree stumps. They were motionless and
scattered across the terrain ahead of us. I got on the intercom and asked the tanks ahead what they
made of it. One of my tank commanders radioed back: ‘My God, they're not tree stumps. They're
men!’ For a moment I couldn't understand. What were men doing standing out there—quite
still—when we were advancing in our tanks towards them? Suddenly all hell broke loose. A barrage of
missiles was being fired at us. Many of our tanks were hit. We had never come up against anything like
this hefore...."
ISRAELI TANK COMMANDER IN THE SINAI,
October, 1973

Another type of antitank defense that capitalizes on extensive ATGM employment was seen
in the Sinai Desert during the Mideast War (Oct 73). According to one report, the Egyptians, with an
abundance of SAGGERs, established a defense that lured the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) into a Kill
Zone which optimized the potential of both SAGGERs and RPG-7s. The IDF tankers saw Egyptian
tanks in the far distance and closed to do battle; however, they were unaware of great numbers of
camouflaged RPG-7s and SAGGERs forward of the Egyptian tanks. The defense was disposed in this
manner:

EGYPTIAN
CAMOUFLAGED INTRENCHED INFANTRY TANKS
WITH RPG-7
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By employing their antitank weapons in this manner, the Egyptians caught IDF tanks within
the effective ranges of both the SAGGER and the RPG-7 at the same time. The effect of the onslaught
of vast numbers of these missiles was devastating.

I8
TRADUC BULLETIN N0. 2 ll CHAPTER //—
SUMMARY
The antitank guided missile must be considered a potent weapon. Specifically, it has these
main advantages:

STRENGTHS OF SOVIET ATGM SYSTEMS

Q Long range accuracy
Q High degree of lethality
O Ease of employment of suitcase SAGGERs
‘High reliability of the SAGGER
Oliwulherehility of the SAGGER wireguided
system to electronic countermeasures
Q Remote firing capability

The system does, however, have its weaknesses

WEAKNESSES OF SOVIET ATGM SYSTEMS

Q Need for highly trained gunners
Q Minimum range limitations
(especially for the SWATTER)
Q Slow speed of the missile
Q Susceptibility of the SWATTER to
electronic countermeasures
Q Requirement for good visual contact with
both target and missile during flight
Q Lack of responsiveness in tracking
erratic moving targets

You must remember that both the SWATTER and SAGGER are first generation
missiles—the gunner has to track the target and the miss/'/e simultaneous/y. The Soviets, however, have
the technology to develop a second generation missile, which would require the gunner to track only
the target. It's highly probable that you would face a second generation missile on the battlefield in
the future.

I9
 Ill
COUNTERIVIEASURES

L e t’ s examine the principal components of the antitank guided missile system to determine
where the system may be the most vulnerable. The three major components to consider are: the
warhead, the guidance mechanism, and the operator. Attempts have been made to devise a method of
defeating the shaped charge warhead, but to date no prac tical solutions have been found.

Th 6 9 uidance system of the SAGGER is considered immune to electronic countermeasures.

Therefore, the most vulnerable component of the system is the operator. The ultimate purpose of the
countermeasures discussed in this bulletin, therefore, is to defeat the operator.

OPERATOR TO DEFEAT THE

ATGM SYSTEM:
_ _____ __ 11/ DEFEAT THE OPERATORII

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20
TRADOC BULLETIN N0.2u CHAPTER ///—

MIDEAST WAR RESULTS

Initial news media reports from the October War heralded the demise of the tank and the
ascendancy of the antitank guided missile. The Israeli tank losses in the war tended to support the
view that the tank was dominated by SAGGERs and RPG-7s. However, subsequent reports and
analysis indicate that, in fact, the tank was the principal tank-killer. The effect of the ATGM was
significantly degraded by the use of proper tactics and techniques.

During the first few days of the war, Israeli armor units attacked without adequate artillery
or infantry support. Few artillery units had been mobilized, and what few mechanized infantry units
were available were mostly mounted in halftracks and could not keep up with the tanks. The result
was devastating destruction of Israeli tanks by Arab ATGMs and RPG-7s.

The Israelis, however, soon modified their tactics to employ the combined arms
team—infantry, armor and artillery. By firing artillery on likely or suspected locations for SAGGERs
and employing infantry with the tanks to add suppressive fire to SAGGER and RPG-7 positions, the
effectiveness of the antitank guided missile was significantly reduced. The infantry was employed
with the tanks in the three ways described on the following page.

21
 -—CHAPTEFl’ /l/ TRADUC BULLETIN N0.Zu

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The role of the infantry in the attack was primarily to add more suppressive fire. Infantry
fought mounted, except only when heavy antitank fi re prevented forward movement.

These simple tactics were not, of course, invented nor developed independently by the
Israelis. They are US tactics. They represent the application of the combined arms team concept
which has long been taught in US Army schools. The lesson to be learned is that the October War has
once again proved the validity of the combined arms doctrine.

22
TRADOC BULLETIN NO. 2" CHAPTER /// -

Other more specific techniques th at can be used to counter the ATGM include:

THE SA GGER WA TCH

In both the offense and defense, one tank in the platoon is designated to be on "SAGGER
WATCH." His primary and most important duty is to watch for SAGGER missiles being fired at the
platoon. He attempts to determine, if possible, which tank is being fired upon, gives an immediate
warning over the radio, and then, immediate/y fires the main tank gun at the point from which the
SAGGER was fired. The idea is to "shake up" the SAGGE R gunner sufficiently ' ' to cause him to
overcorr ect and thereby lose control of the missile.

EXAMPLE SITUATION:

,V_ I7 Q
SAGGER Coming At You Number 2, 1 .,__,y
' .
Right Front 1%,.
/ ;e ‘\\i
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ANGE _____ ~ g ‘I I _
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0.12 / w T“ /, TIME OF
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if
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The tank being fired u p on ma k es an attempt to take evasive maneuvers or moves to cover
before the missile impacts.

23
—CHAPTEH /ll TRADOC BULLETIN N0. 2"

Some difficulties with this technique are:

-The missile signature is very hard to detect, especially by the tank being fired
upon. The missile does have a small vapor trail while in flight to the target. The
launch site, however, is extremely difficult to locate.

-The long range from launch site to target makes it very difficult to guess the
operator's location in order to place effective fire on his position.

I The gunner's capability to operate from a remote site (80m away from a BRDM
or 15m away for a suitcase SAGGER) and to be dug in reduces the probability of
return fire effectively harrassing him.

-ln the offense when the SAGGER alarm is given there may be a tendency for
every tank to move to cover or start evasive maneuvers, thus slowing the
momentum of the attack.

THE DODGE

Various type dodges can be used successfully to counter the ATGM. The most effective type
dodges are:

Q. "":) --—-F§::1I
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*Move immediately to natural cover. This includes simply backing down from a
hull defilade fi ring position to a complete hull down position.

24
TRADOC BULLETIN N0. 2" CHAPTER /// -

,. j‘ ._
4-5 SECS > _ 1O - 20 SECS FLIGHT '5
BEFORE IMPACT i TIME /_ I l
Illlilllm l II-_<—
' int:
lllmllmlynlpl ' ‘- '3' ‘=°i‘~—' _ _ _ ~
'3 ,.,_4_<: W‘
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*A violent turn to the right or left at the last few seconds of missile flight, since it
is then hard for the SAGGER gunner to correct for sudden, sharp moves by his
target.

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*An erratic path. This is designed to cause the gunner to overcorrect and thus lose
control of the missile.

GENERAL METHODS FOR COUNTERING ATGMS

If you are facing a strong antitank defense you must counter the enemy through the use of
one or more of the following general methods to be able to move against him:
a. Maximize the cover afforded by the terrain.
b. Destroy the A T weapon (s).
c. Suppress the enemy so he will not be able to effective/y fire at you.
d. Obscure the enemy's vision by employing smoke.
e. Move during periods of reduced visibility such as fog or nigh t.

25
'—CHAPTE/? lll TRADOC BULLETIN NO.2u

(NOTE: Recently developed night vision devices plus battlefield illumination

enable the enemy to see extremely well at night. Thus, maximum use of the terrain
is essential even at night.)

El TERRAIN
One of the most effective countermeasures to the Soviet ATGM is still the proper use of
terrain! Emphasis in training must be on:
IBounding and traveling overwatch as discussed in TCs 17-15-3, 17-36-2, 7-4 and 71-4-2.

I Firing from hull defilade positions.

IUsing covered routes of approach even at long ranges (3-4 km) from suspected enemy
positions.

E] DESTRUCTION
Obviously, antitank weapons that are destroyed are effectively countered. Many Soviet
ATGMs move about the battlefield on vehicles vulnerable to tank and antitank fire. Thus, destruction
of a BMP is more significant than the mere destruction of an armored personnel carrier-—it is the
destruction of 4 or 5 SAGGER missiles. Similarly, destruction of a BRDM represents the destruction
of 14 SA GGER missiles and not just the destruction of an enemy scout vehicle.
All aspects of good gunnery techniques, as outlined in appropriate field manuals and training
circulars, apply to the destruction of ATGMs. Several points, however, deserve special emphasis:

.Train to hit at long ranges. Since the ATGM is accurate at long ranges, it will
most likely be encountered there.

-Train to hit small targets. You are not likely to have many shots at fully exposed
vehicles. They will fi re from hull defilade. So train accordingly. Don't train on large
71/2' X 71/2' panels; use smaller ones (maximum of 3 1/2' X 31/2').

-Train to shoot FAST and hit. The old tank gunnery standards
of getting a round off within 15 seconds is too slow. To be able
to distract a SAGGER gunner while his missile is in flight you
have to fire w/'thin 5-10 seconds.
See TC 17-1 2-5

Mechanized infantry may be forced to dismount, attack and destroy ATGMs if they cannot
be countered by other means. This method, however, is time consuming and the momentum of an
attack may be lost. Training should be oriented to rapid (i.e., double time) movement of lightly
equipped dismounted troops.

26
TRADOC BULLETIN N0. Zu CHAPTER lll —

SUPPRESSION
First, we should define suppression as fires, direct and indirect, brought to bear on known or
likely enemy locations to interfere with his effective fire on friendly maneuver elements. Suppressive
fires can be immediate or planned. We must bear in mind that the principal suppressive weapons
available to the battalion commander are:

SUSTAINED MAXIMUM
WEAPON RATE OF FIRE EFFECTIVE
RDS/MIN RANGE (METERS)
, - as.-.~<»..~~.~t~'_~».:='

Machinegun 7.62mm I 100 1100

Machinegun cal .50 40 1825 L

40mm grenade launcher 350

81mm mortar 8 4737

4.2" mortar 2 5500

105mm Howitzer 201 rdS/hr 1 1,500

155mm Howitzer 69 rds/hr 14,600

8" Howitzer 33 rds/hr 16,800

The relationship between the ranges of available suppressive weapons and the locations on
the battlefield of Soviet ATGMs must be kept in mind. Only some (approximately two-thirds) of the
enemy's ATGMs are likely to be found in his forward defenses; the remainder will be found I-2 km to
the rear, but WITH THE 3000 METER RANGE OF HIS ATGMs HE CAN HIT YOU WHILE YOU
ARE ATTACKING HIS FORWARD POSITIONS. Thus, consider his positions in depth when
planning suppressive fi res.

27
— CHAPTER Ill TRADOC BULLETIN N0. Zu

You should:
-Make maximum use of tank and APC machinegun fire to provide direct fire
suppression in the assault.
-Consider available resources that can provide suppression and allocate a portion
to suppress dangerous and likely SAGGER positions BEHIND the forward defenses.
.Ensure correct timing. The maximum amount of suppressive fire must be
delivered during those moments the maneuver force is most exposed.
-Use VT fire to the maximum, particularly in loose sandy soil. On loose sandy
soil, point detonating rounds lose up to 60% of their effectiveness.

Additionally, the principles explained in TC 6-20-‘l concerning field artillery suppression of

direct fire weapons shol '"l be known and applied by maneuver and field artillery units in training.
These principles are:
* DEDICATE FIRING BATTERIES TO COMPANY TEAMS
* MONITOR MANEUVER COMPANY COMMAND NETS
*SlMPLIFY CALLS FOR FIRE
* DEVIATE FROM NORMAL FIRE PLANNING
*STANDARDIZE AND ENSURE THAT FOs POSSESS MANEUVER CONTROL
MEASURES
*FDC AND FIRING BATTERY PROCEDURES MODIFIED TO RESPOND
WITHIN 30-45 SECONDS
* TRADE SOME ACCURACY FOR SPEED

(See TC 6‘-20-7 for a full discussion of these principles)

@ OBSCURATION
It may prove difficult to suppress ATGMs through suppressive fire only. Shortages in
artillery ammunition and well protected enemy positions may require alternative means of degrading
ATGM effectiveness. Obscuration by smoke offers an attractive option. Commanders should:

.Know the capabilities and limitations. Different rounds have different effects
under different conditions. You should know what smoke can and cannot do. As a

28
TRADOC BULLETIN N0. Z" CHAPTER /// —

rough guide, you can figure that an artillery round of smoke (HC) will give you
about 5-6 minutes of obscuration when there is little or no wind. White
phosphorous rounds, on the other hand, will only provide 1-1 1/2 minutes of
obscuration since it dissipates rapidly.
.Train to use smoke. Training exercises should include the use of smoke.
Extensive training with live fire smoke rounds is ideal; however, this will not always
be possible. When conducting field exercises, ARTEP, and ORTTs, the use of
smoke should always be played to the maximum extent possible.
.Plan for the use of smoke. You must think through the amount of smoke you
will need to move on the battlefield. It will be a lot. Present FMs do not give a
reliable guide because past experience on smoke usage did not include countering
ATGM. Smoke will be more important, and its use will be more extensive than ever.
Look at your basic load. Are you ready?
I Plan your smoke to coincide with your tactical move. Timing is critical! Planning
a smoke mission is more complicated than the normal HE mission—it takes more
time to process and to build up on the ground. Once obtained, the obscuration will
have to be maintained during the move. Don't get caughtin the open!

More reliable data on the effects of smoke are forthcoming. Tests are presently being
conducted and future bulletins and/or training circulars will address this subject in more detail.

E] neouceo VISIBILITY
With recently developed night vision devices now available to the enemy, the "cover of
darkness" no longer provides the protection it once did. However, to counter the effects of known
Soviet ATGMs there still is an advantage to moving on the battlefield at night instead of during the
day because:
.There is apparently no night sight for present Soviet ATGMs, which must rely on
artificial illumination.
.Current Soviet night vision devices are apparently only effective out to 1500
meters.
.Fog, especially at night, effectively degrades enemy ATGMs even at close range.

Future bulletins and/or Training Circulars will treat this important subject in greater detail.

29
— CHAPTER /// TRADOC BULLETIN N0. 2"

CONCLUSION
Certain techniques, such as the “SAGGER WATCH" and the dodge which are developed in
the heat of battle, are more effective in some situations than in others. There are, however,
countermeasures which we should consider more universally valid. We can say that:

To survive against Soviet ATGMs vve must:

I Employ the Combined Arms Team
I Maximize the use of terrain for cover
and concealment
I Use fast, accurate gunnery to destroy ATGMs
I Suppress enemy ATGM positions using indirect
and direct fires.
I Obscure the enemy's vision
I Take advantage of periods of reduced
visibility for battlefield movement

30
 TRADOC BULLETIN N0. 2"

TRAINERS’ NOTE:

Each TASO has master copies of the diagrams and pictures in this Bulletin, from which you can order
color Vu-graph transparencies for use in officer schools or other training.

3'l
 TRADOC suttstuv No.2"

W E DePUY
General, United States Army
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, ARNG, USAR: To be distributed to each DA Form 12-11 account (10
copies each).

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