David v.
Arroyo
Facts: On February 24, Arroyo placed the country under a state of national emergency, claiming that
they want to bring down or to take over her administration. A week after, the president issued PP 1017,
declaring that the alleged “conspiracy” has been successfully dealt with and that peace and order has
been restored.
Following the issuance of PP 1017, University of the Philippines professor and Inquirer columnist Randy
David, Akbayan national president Ronald Llamas, and members of the Kilusang Mayo Uno
were arrested without warrant while they were holding street protests in celebration of the 20th
anniversary of Edsa 1. The Court said that the warrantless arrests of David and Llamas and the dispersal
and warrantless arrests of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members were illegal ” in the absence of proof that
(they) were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880 (or
the Public Assembly Act).”
The Supreme Court further declared General Order No. 5, which implemented PP 1017, as partly valid.
“G.O. No. 5 is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP (Philippine
National Police) should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is ‘necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence,”‘ the ruling said, “(c)onsidering that ‘acts of
terrorism’ have not yet been defined and made punishable by the legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5
is declared unconstitutional.”
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is
totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their
audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the
NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military
aid.
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of graduated powers. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,112 the
Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that "whenever it becomes
necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion." Are these conditions present in the instant cases? As stated earlier, considering the
circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her
Office’s vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the
country.
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act
that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a
President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he
wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the
greater are the limitations.
Issue: Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate "decrees"?
Ruling: The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017’s
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the
AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on
the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of
the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public
utility and private business affected with public interest.
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically
states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees.
This view is supported by the rules of statutory construction. The particular passage in PP 1017 reads
""to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations," with the phrases "all
the laws and to all decrees" separated by a comma from "orders and regulations promulgated by me."
Inherently, laws and those decrees issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers,
and even those executive issuances of President Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers, belong
to the same class, superior in the hierarchy of laws than "orders and regulations." The use of the
conjunction "and" denotes a joinder or union, "relating the one to the other." 33 The use of "and"
establishes an association between laws and decrees distinct from orders and regulations, thus
permitting the application of the doctrine of noscitur a sociis to construe "decrees" as those decrees
which at present have the force of law. The dividing comma further signifies the segregation of concepts
between "laws and decrees" on one hand, and "orders and regulations" on the other.
Note:
PP 1017 states in part: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction."
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the following:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character
in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive
orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental
operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to
depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government
shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration,
which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies,
bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in
memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.
President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot
issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees
are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the
President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973
Constitution.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives ." To be sure, neither
Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the military
to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property
relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017,
to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to
"other national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the
President the authority to declare a "state of national... emergency" pursuant to Section 18, Article VII
(calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then
the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the
President before... he can declare a "state of national emergency." The logical conclusion then is that
President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence
of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over
of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally
reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the
"the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest," it refers to Congress, not the President.
Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term "emergency" under Section 17, Article XII refers
to "tsunami," "typhoon," "hurricane" and "similar occurrences."
The 78-page ruling was penned by Justice Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez.
Those who concurred were Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban and Associate Justices Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Conchita Carpio
Morales, Romeo J. Callejo Sr., Adolfo S. Azcuna, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, and Cancio C. Garcia.
Panganiban and Justice Ynares-Santiago both wrote separate concurring opinions.
Justice Dante O. Tinga issued a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Justices Renato C. Corona and
Presbitero Jr. Velasco Jr. Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, meanwhile, was on leave.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630
Facts: The petitions questioned the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax (E-VAT) Law. This law sought to widen the tax base of the existing VAT
system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) . The
progress of the case involved various petitions filed by different stakeholders including legislators, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), press institutions, and real estate associations, all questioning the
procedure and substance of the E-VAT Law’s enactment.
Initially, House Bill No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives, passed three readings, and was
then sent to the Senate. The Senate, however, did not pass it on second and third readings but instead
approved its own version (Senate Bill No. 1630), which was significantly different from the House
version. Both versions were subsequently reconciled in a conference committee, resulting in a final
version signed into law by the President. Petitions were filed at the Supreme Court challenging the
constitutionality of the E-VAT Law on several grounds, including procedural issues related to its
origination, certification by the President for its immediate enactment, and substantive issues regarding
the law’s content.
Issue: Wether RA 7716 is unconstitutional
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the law in fact distributes the tax burden to as many goods and
services as possible particularly to those which are within the reach of higher-income groups, even as
the law exempts basic goods and services. It is thus equitable.
A tax measure, like the expanded VAT law, is enacted by Congress and approved by the President in the
exercise of the State's power to tax, which is an attribute of sovereignty. And while the power to tax, if
exercised without limit, is a power to destroy, and should, therefore, not be allowed in such form, it has
to be equally recognized that the power to tax is an essential right of government. Without taxes, basic
services to the people can come to a halt; economic progress will be stunted, and, in the long run, the
people will suffer the pains of stagnation and retrogression.
RESOLUTION
In 1995, the SC denied with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners. The Court
held that it is inherent in the power to tax that the State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it
has been repeatedly held that inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.
the Senate passed another bill on the same subject matter
Ang Nars Party List v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 215746, October 8, 2019
Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013
Abakada Guro Party-list v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251
FACTS:
Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and contend that by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives when they exceed their revenue targets, the law (1) transforms the officials and employees of
the BIR and BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2) violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection as it limits the scope of the law to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to the President the
power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards; and (4) violates the doctrine of separation of
powers by creating a Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the law’s implementing rules.
ISSUE:
Is R.A. No. 9335 constitutional?
HELD:
YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for Section 12 of the law which creates a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to review the law’s IRR.
That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials into “bounty hunters and mercenaries”
is purely speculative as the law establishes safeguards by imposing liabilities on officers and employees
who are guilty of negligence, abuses, malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal protection clause violated
since the law recognizes a valid classification as only the BIR and BOC have the common distinct primary
function of revenue generation. There are sufficient policy and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets as the revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected
of the BIR and the BOC.
However, the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpose of reviewing the IRR
formulated by agencies of the executive branch (DOF, DBM, NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional since it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers since Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself.
Facts: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled
the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and
reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA
No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third
time the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for
the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of
the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization
of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the
following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections,
including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must
pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies
to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its
final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve
the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in
the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold
over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special
elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013]
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective
terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the
incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision
states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net
result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view –
like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly
what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents.
Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for
the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion
into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is
viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover
can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists;
it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the
holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a
policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,
except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no
authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on
any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials,
except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom
Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the
execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections
and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential,
congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the
exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering
special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call
without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is
not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for
having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is
merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to
mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover,
the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the
Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for
special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice
itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third
group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of
RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative
officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is
an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than
real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the
elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective
ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the
May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only
for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And
this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous
facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure
responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965
