Mind Association

Socrates Dissatisfied. An Analysis of Plato's Crito by Roslyn Weiss

Review by: Richard Kraut
Mind, New Series, Vol. 110, No. 437 (Jan., 2001), pp. 293-296
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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 Book Reviews 293

Socrates Dissatisfied. An Analysis of Plato's Crito, by Roslyn Weiss.

New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. 187. H/b ?35.00.

The Crito is a dialogue that has perplexed many contemporary students of

Plato because its arguments for the conclusion that Socrates ought not to
escape from jail seem, at least on firstreading,to be completelyout of keeping
with the basic philosophical orientation of the Socrates portrayed in other
earlyworks of Plato. In the Crito,we are told that Socratesought to submit to
his city and its laws in the way a child submits to his parents,or a slaveto his
master (5od-51c).And yet, in the Apology-a work that was presumablywrit-
ten about the same time as the Crito-he tells his jurorsthat he will obey a god
ratherthan submit to a legal decree that conflicts with that divine command
(29c-d). The apparent authoritarianismof the Crito is difficult to reconcile
with the policy Socratesadopts elsewhereof living by his own lights.
Many scholars,including this reviewer,have respondedto this difficultyby
insisting that when we read the Critomore carefully,we will recognizethat its
authoritarianismis not absolute,but in fact leavesroom for a limited amount
of principled disobedience. For example, one of the guiding principles of the
argument against escape is that agreements must be respected-so long as
they arejust (49e). These last words can be understoodto leaveroom for diso-
beying the law when obedience would require acting unjustly. Similarly,the
analogybetween citizen and child leads to the conclusionthat one must either
obey or persuadethe city (5ib)-and the availabilityof this second alternative
can be takento leave room for disobedience.
The approachtaken by Roslyn Weiss in SocratesDissatisfiedis quite differ-
ent. Her point of departureis that the argumentagainstescape is propounded
not by Socrateshimself but by the personifiedLawsof Athens.And her princi-
pal goal is to show that Socrates does not accept the argument of the Laws
because it allows no room whatsoeverfor disobedience.Socratesbelievesthat
it would be wrong for him to try to escape-but not for reasonsset out by the
Laws.
What possible reason could Plato have had for writing the dialogue in this
way?Weiss'sreplyis that the dialogue'seponymous interlocutoris too conven-
tional to acceptSocrates'sreal argumentagainstescape,and must thereforebe
given a vulgarargumentthat speaksto his own concerns.Crito has an unphil-
osophical temperament;he cares little for doing what is just, and is far more
concernedwith longevity,reputation,friendship,and other superficialgoods.
At first, Socrates does what he can to persuade Crito that the opinion of the
many counts for nothing, and that escapeshould be attemptedonly if it would
be just (47-49). When Crito shows that he does not understandthis point of
view, Socratesgives up (5oa), and cedes the stage to new interlocutors-the
Laws-who propose a completely differentkind of argument, one that rests
on assumptionsalien to Socrates,but appealingto Crito'sthoughtlessconven-
tionalism.

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294 BookReviews

An objection to this line of interpretation naturally suggests itself: Why

would Plato write a dialogue that deliberatelygives a false answerto the vital
question it raises?Weiss's reply is that if we know where to look-namely,
before the Lawsstart speaking-we will find Socrates'sreal reasons for refus-
ing to escape. So the dialogue, as she reads it, contains both good and bad
argumentsfor remainingin jail. The good argumentsare intended for the dia-
logue's philosophical readers-those who care for justice above all, and who
refuse to bow to authority. The bad arguments are included in the dialogue
because it is important that non-philosophicalreadersaccept the authorityof
the legal system.Plato wrote the Critoin a way that allows philosophicalread-
ers to see through the argumentsof the Laws,even though more obtuse read-
ers would accept those arguments and would be persuadedby them to obey
the law in a spirit of servility.
Does this approachreallysucceed in reconcilingthe Apologyand the Crito?
In the former,Socratesproclaimsthat the unexaminedlife is not worth living
for man (38a), and he assuresthe jury that his mission has been to challenge
the conventionalism of every Athenian citizen-not merely a small elite of
special students (22d). But Weiss readsthe Critoas a document that teaches a
different lesson to different audiences-a vulgar authoritarianism to the
many, and an anti-authoritarianismto the elite. So her interpretivestrategy
seems ill designed to accomplishwhat it sets out to do-namely, to reconcile
the apparentdifferencesbetween the Apologyand the Crito.
In any case, Weiss's hypothesis that the latter work is intended for two
opposed audiencesis difficultto accept,becausethe Critogoes out of its way to
belittle the moral intelligence of the many (47a-d). Weiss would have us
believe that this is the audience for whom the most important part of the dia-
logue, the speech of the Laws,is intended.Her idea is that Plato hopes they will
miss his real message, which is that one must never obey the city when doing
so conflictswith the promptingsof one's own conscience;and that by misread-
ing him in this way,they will become more respectfulof the law. But she fails
to address a simple question: what are these conventional readers to think,
when they come to the passagesin which Plato openly condemns them?Hav-
ing been insulted by Plato in the first part of the dialogue,what would induce
them to read on, and to become slaves of the city because the speech of the
Lawstells them to obey ordersregardlessof their content?
There is an even more difficult problem for her reading:The Lawsaccept
the position of Crito and Socratesthat the many who tried and convictedSoc-
rates are guilty of injustice (44d, 54b-c). The vulgar reader,who agrees with
the verdictof the court, will thereforefind himself at odds with the Lawsabout
the fundamental question raised by the trial of Socrates: was he guilty as
charged?It is hard to believe that this is the sort of readerPlato was trying to
reach. Surelythe Critois addressednot to the many who agree that Socrates
was guilty, but to the few who consider him innocent, and who wonder why
the injustice done to him does not provide him with an excellent reason for

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 Book Reviews 295

escapingfrom jail. Such readersform a philosophicalaudience, and Plato has

everyreasonto convincethem that refusingto escapewas the right decision.
Perhapsthe most important part of Weiss'sargumentlies in her attemptto
prove that Socrates has already explained his reasons for remaining in jail
before the speech of the Lawsbegins. His reasons,she thinks, are of two sorts:
First, escape would involve deceit and bribery-and these things are unjust.
Second, Socrateshas made a just agreementnot to escape, and it is wrong to
violatejust agreements.
Why would escaperequirebriberyand deceit?Becausethe jailerwould have
to be paid off, and Socrates's escape would have to be concealed until he
reachedforeign territory.I takeWeissto be sayingthat, accordingto Socrates,
paying the jailer would be wrong not because it is illegal, but in itself, apart
from its legality.For if paying the jailer is wrong because illegal, then we are
back where we started:why does Socratesobey the law?On the other hand, I
find it difficult to understandwhat possible objection Socratescould have to
paying the jailer, apart from questions of legality. Surely there is nothing
wrong in generalwith payingmoney for services.If it is wrong to pay the jailer,
that is becauseit is wrong to induce someone to subvertthe law.
What of the second argument against escape-the one that rests on the
principle that just agreements must be respected?It is important to Weiss's
argument that the agreement Socrates is bound to honour is one that he
explicitlymade at the time of this trial;it is not an implicit agreementunder-
taken by virtue of his lengthy and voluntary residencein Athens (as the Laws
allege:51c-53a).Rather,what Weisshas in mind is something Socratessaid at
his trial: afterhis offer of thirty minas is rejectedby the jury and the punish-
ment of death is adopted, he tells them that he accepts his death, just as they
accept their punishment, which is to continue to live in a state of corruption
(39b). As Weissreadsthis passage,Socratesis in effect promising the jury that
he will not try to escapefrom jail. And since there is nothing unjust about this
agreement-it does not require Socrates to do injustice-it must be
respected.
Severaldoubts can be raisedat this point. First,it is difficultto believe that
when Socratessays in the Critothat he must abide by just agreements (49e),
his statementhas nothing to do with the tacit agreementthe Lawssay he made
(51d-53a),but is only a referenceto somethingthat he had said at his trial. Sec-
ond, when we look more closely at the passagethat Weissthinks he is referring
to-Apology 39b-we may legitimatelydoubt that here Socratesis making an
agreementwith the jury not to evade the death penalty,as she thinks. Socrates
says that he accepts his penalty (death)just as thejury acceptstheirs(corrup-
tion of the soul). Surelythis contrastbetween what Socratesacceptsand what
the jury acceptsshows that acceptanceis something quite differentfrom mak-
ing an agreement.Socratesis not saying that the jury promisesto be corrupt;
his point, rather,is that they chooseit, becausethey think there is nothing bad
about doing injustice.And in preciselythis same way, Socratesis not promis-

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296 Book Reviews

ing the jury that he will die, but is rather choosing to die because he thinks
there is no harm in death. He is no more undertakinga commitment to others
than is the jury: each party to the dispute is accepting a course of action,
guidedby its conception of what is best.
If I understandWeiss correctly,Socrates might have said something quite
different to the jury, while remaining true to his principles. He might have
said, at Apology 39b: 'Youhave chosen to kill me, but I must assureyou that I
will not die, for I do not accept your unjust proceduresand unjust penalty. I
tell you openly that I will make everyeffortto escapefrom jail and to continue
to philosophizein other cities-not because I love life, but becauseI refuseto
be treatedunjustly'.Such a statementwould be entirelyconsistentwith Weiss's
idea that, according to Socrates, there is no reason why an unjust verdict
should be obeyed. She thinks that Socratesacceptshis penalty in part because
he had agreedto do so. But this leaves her interpretationwith an urgent and
unansweredquestion:why did he make that agreement?Why didn'the instead
denounce the verdict as an injustice and proclaim his intention to resist such
injusticeby escapingfrom jail?Surelythere is an answerto this question: it is
on the pages of the Crito, in the speech of the Laws.
I believe that the fundamentalerror of Weiss'sinterpretationderives from
her convictionthat when the Lawsenterthe dialogue,Socrateshas given up all
hope of persuading Crito, and cedes the stage to anti-philosophical spokes-
men. This is a forced reading, because the Laws begin by elaborating on a
point that Socrateshas been making:that escapewould harm those whom he
should not be harming (4ge-5oa). Weiss's argument that there is a radical
breakat this point restssolely on the fact that Socratesputs the rest of his case
againstescapeinto the mouth of the Laws.But there is a perfectlygood expla-
nation for this shift, and we need not suppose that it involves the abandon-
ment of a philosophical point of view. If Socratesthinks that there are times
when the ordersof the city must be obeyed, despite gravedeficienciesin those
orders,then he acknowledgeshis willingness to subordinatehis reason to the
reasoningof others. What betterway to dramatizethis doctrine than to put it
in the mouth of the idealizedothers to whom submission is due?Content and
form arethus united:a philosophyof limited submissionto an Otheris voiced
by that Other.
Though I am not persuadedby Weiss'sarguments,I find much to admirein
her book. Her interpretationof the Crito is as detailedand thorough as any that
exists.Her attentionto the text is meticulous,and her discussionof the second-
ary literatureis full and fair. Anyone who tries to understandthe Crito must
come to terms with Socrates Dissatisfied.

Department of Philosophy RICHARD KRAUT

Northwestern University
1818 Hinman Av.
Evanston, IL 60208-1315
USA

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