Causes Consequenc Suggeste

es d/
required
actions,
comment
1.1 Tail gas No harmful Add
s EM-
flow to AFB2 consequences in SD
too high fuel side triggered
downstream. by high
temperat
ure after
EVA1.

1.1 Tail gas Failures of Add EM-

flow to AFB2 AFB2/EVA1 are SD
too high possible (to be triggered
covered in by high
connection with temperat
tail gas/heating ure after
system). EVA1.

1.2 EtOH-1 No harmful Change

flow to AFB2 consequences in control of
too high fuel side DP1 from
downstream. TI-FP5 to
EVA1
outlet
temperat
1.2 EtOH-1 Failures of
flow to AFB2 AFB2/EVA1 are
too high possible (to be
covered in
connection with
tail gas/heating
system).

1.3 Fuel flow No harmful

to EVA1 too consequences in
low fuel side
downstream.
2.1 Tail gas No complete Add EM-
flow to AFB2 vaporization in SD
too low (to be EVA1 → problems triggered
covered in in SRR, no by low
connection reforming because temperat
with tail of low ure after
gas/heating temperature. EVA1.
system). Serious problems
downstream.

2.2 No EtOH-1 No complete

to AFB2 when vaporization in
needed or EVA1 → problems
amount of in SRR, no
EtOH-1 too reforming because
low (to be of low
covered in temperature.
connection Serious problems
with tail downstream.
gas/heating
sys-
tem).
2.3 Fuel flow No complete
to EVA1 too vaporization in
high EVA1 → problems
in SRR, no
reforming because
of low
temperature.
Serious problems
downstream.

2.4 Fouling of No complete Use of

EVA1 heat vaporization in EVA1 deionized
exchange → problems in SRR, water.
surfaces, no reforming EtOH
because of because of low must not
impurities in temperature. contain
water or in Serious problems sediment.
EtOH.
downstream.
Doesn´t happen
immediately, slow
process.

3.1 Tail gas No harmful Add EM-

flow to AFB1 consequences in SD
too high (to fuel side triggered
be covered in downstream. by high
connection temperat
with tail ure after
gas/heating EVA2.
system).
3.1 Tail gas No serious
flow to AFB1 consequences to
too high (to HX3/EVA2.
be covered in
connection
with tail
gas/heating
3.2 SU-EtOH-3 No harmful Commen
flow to AFB1 consequences in t: SU-
too high (to fuel side EtOH-3
be covered in downstream. designed
connection not to be
with tail used in
gas/heating steady
system). state.
3.2 SU-EtOH-3 No serious
flow to AFB1 consequences to
too high (to HX3/EVA2.
be covered in
connection
with tail
gas/heating
3.3 Fuel flow No harmful
to EVA2 too consequences in
low fuel side
downstream.
4.1 Tail gas No complete Add EM-
flow to AFB1 vaporization in SD
too low (to be EVA2 → problems triggered
covered in in SRR, no by low
connection reforming because temperat
with tail of low ure after
gas/heating temperature. EVA2.
system). Serious problems
downstream.
4.2 No SU- No complete
EtOH-3 to AFB1 vaporization in
when needed or EVA2 → problems
amount of SU- in SRR, no
EtOH-3 too low reforming because
(to be covered of low
in con- temperature.
nection with tail Serious problems
gas/heating
downstream.
system).

4.3 Fuel flow No complete

to EVA2 too vaporization in
high EVA2 → problems
in SRR, no
reforming because
of low
temperature.
Serious problems
downstream.
4.4 Fouling of No complete Use of
EVA2 heat vaporization in EVA2 deionized
exchange → problems in SRR, water.
surfaces, no reforming EtOH
because of because of low must not
impurities in temperature. contain
water or in Serious problems sediment.
EtOH
downstream.
Doesn´t happen
immediately, slow
process.

Comme
nt: Not
very
probable
because
dosing of
both H2O
6.1 Small No serious Carry
leakage after consequences. out
the mixer Contact of fuel with pressure
electronic equipment tests with
can cause harm. nitrogen
Consequences and at least
related detection and after any
safeguards of ethanol modificati
leakage to be covered on to the
later more detail in system.
section Leaks from Add
system inside EtOH
container. detector
inside the
container,
because
small
leakage
can be
difficult to
detect.
6.2 Leakage Fuel flows to AFB2 Verify if
in EVA1 or (leakage in EVA1) or the fuel
EVA2 to HX3 (leakage in can burn
EVA2) and possibly in AFB2.
burns in AFB2.
Possible “extra flue
gas” generated by
fuel burning in AFB2
or non-burned fuel
flows with other flue
gases to exhaust gas
vent line. Possibly
explosive gas
mixture at the top of
vent line.
6.3 Blockage Pressure before
in filter F1 or the filter
F2 because of increases. Product
impurities in gas output
H2O or in decreases.
EtOH. If only one of the
filters is blocked,
the fuel flow goes
through the other
one causing
changes in EVA1
and EVA 2
temperatures.

7.1 Broken Both fuel and Add EM-

pipeline or product gas start to SD
fitting escape from the triggered
system. by PI-01
Temperature low
increase in SRR. pressure
(6 bar(g))
Add
after the
tail gas
tank a
shut-off
valve that
closes if
7.2 Both feed System stops. the
Comme
pumps FFP1 nt: Not
and FFP2 very likely
inoperable that both
feed
pumps
fail
simultane
ously.
8.1 Blockage Equipment design Add
in SRR or pressure can be emergenc
equipment exceeded. Pumps y shut
after it due to are able to down
catalyst generate 16 triggered
flaking. bar(g). by PI-01
Design pressure high
for components
pressure
(9 bar(g)).
(in FP) is 10
bar(g).

9.1 Big Both fuel and Add

leakage product gas start to emergenc
escape from the y shut
system. down
Temperature triggered
increase in SRR. by PI-01
low
pressure
(< 6
bar(g)),
Add
after the
tail gas
tank a
10.1 Water Coking in SRR. shut-off
Locate
tank empty WGS reaction the low
conditions not level
optimal, too high CO indicator
concentration for in water
PSA. tank so
that
enough
water is
still
available
for
normal
shut
down.
10.2 Water Coking in SRR. Add
pump FFP2 WGS reaction H2O/C
not operating conditions not ratio
due to air optimal, too high CO
calculatio
bubbles concentration for n which
component PSA. triggers
failure. EM-SD, if
ratio goes
below 3.
Consider
adding
alarm
related to
limits of
FFP2
control
10.3 Leakage Coking in SRR. Consider
in water line WGS reaction carrying
conditions not out
optimal, too high CO pressure
concentration for test
PSA. before
Consequences and start up, if
related detection possible.
and safeguards of
water leakage to be
covered later in
section Leaks from
system inside
container.
10.4 Blockage Coking in SRR.
in water line WGS reaction
due to conditions not
impurities in optimal, too high CO
H2O tank. concentration for
PSA.

10.5 EtOH Coking in SRR. Consider

feed too high WGS reaction adding
due to failure conditions not alarm
of FI-01 optimal, too high CO
related to
concentration for
limits of
PSA. FFP1
control
voltage
(RPM
control)
using on
lookup
table or
formula
based on
normal
10.6 Water Coking in SRR. If
tank contains WGS reaction needed,
traces of conditions not samples
ethanol (or optimal, too high of
some alike CO concentration condense
reaction for PSA. d water
intermediate) should be
originating
taken
from
from product
VLS1.
gas line Analyse
vapour-liquid the
separator compositi
(VLS1) due to on of
incomplete condense
reformation in d water
SRR. during
system
initial
testing at
VTT
laboratori
es.
Comme
nt:
Ethanol
traces
may start
to
accumula
11.1 Ethanol No product gas Configur
tank empty flow to PSA, e in the
temporary automati
increase in on system
EVA1&2 and SRR appropria
temperatures. te scripts
AUTO-SD takes for
place.
automatic
shut
down
(AUTO-
SD) and
for
emergenc
y shut
down
(EM-SD).
11.2 Air in Temporary or Configur
ethanol pump permanent e
inlet due to following
decrease/stop of
leakage in ethanol feed.functional
pipe fittings AUTO-SD takesities in
e.g. place. the
automati
on
system:
Short-
term
decrease
of ethanol
11.3 Ethanol No product gas Configur
pump FFP1 flow to PSA, e
not operating temporary following
due to increase in functional
diaphragm EVA1&2 and SRR ities in
rupture e.g. temperatures. the
AUTO-SD takes automati
place.
on
system:
Short-
term
decrease
of ethanol
flow (FI-
01)
triggers
alarm for
operator,
11.4 Leakage Too little or no Configur
in ethanol line product gas flow, e
(after pump) increase in following
EVA1&2 and SRR functional
temperatures. ities in
Consequences the
and related automati
detection and
on
system:
safeguards of
Short-
ethanol leakage to term
be covered later decrease
in section Leaks of ethanol
from system inside flow (FI-
container. 01)
triggers
alarm for
operator,
longer-
lasting
decrease
triggers
AUTO-SD.
Carry
out
pressure
test
before
start up, if
possible.

11.5 Blockage Too little or no Configur

in ethanol line product gas flow, e
due to increase in following
impurities in EVA1&2 and SRR functional
ethanol tank. temperatures. ities in
the
automati
on
system:
Short-
term
decrease
11.6 Water Decrease in EVA1&2 Consider
feed too high and SRR adding in
due to failure temperatures, the
of FI-02 product gas automati
composition may on system
change. automatic
Higher water feed monitorin
not a problem, g of feed
lower temperatures pump
in reactors might control
cause problems. signals or
limiting
pump
controller
output
signals to
certain
value, e.g.
30 %.

12.1 Ethanol SRR catalyst Ethanol

tank contains in deactivation and should be
addition to later WGSR purchase
ethanol small catalyst d from
amounts of deactivation. reliable
higher alcohols supplier
or other heavier or
or- analysed
ganic in detail.
impurities.
13.1 Heat SRR catalyst
generation in damage and
AFB1 too high further equipment
damage possible.

14.1 Heat Product gas

generation in composition
AFB1 too low wrong.

Comme
nt: Not
very
probable
because
dosing of
both H2O
and EtOH
should be
16.1 Leakage Less product gas to Carry
in SRR or HX1 PSA, WGSR out
temperatures pressure
possibly decrease. tests at
Gas burns in both least after
cases in AFB1 any
causing temperature modificati
increase in on to the
AFB1/SRR, possible system.
equipment damage.
16.2 Leakage Less product gas, Carry
in pipeline WGSR temperatures out
between SRR possibly decrease. pressure
and WGSR Consequences and tests at
related detection least after
and safeguards of any
combustible gas modificati
discharge into on to the
system surroundings system.
to be covered later
more detail in
section Leaks from
system
inside container.

17.1 Blockage No product gas. Add EM-

in SRR or HX1 SD
due to coking triggered
in SRR or SRR by PI-01
catalyst high
flaking. pressure
(9 bar(g))
17.2 Major No product gas. Add
pipe failure Consequences emergenc
between SRR and related y shut
and WGSR. detection and down
safeguards of triggered
combustible gas by PI-01
discharge into low
system
pressure
(6 bar(g))
surroundings to
be covered later
more detail in
section Leaks from
system
inside container.

18.1 Too low Change in the Add

air flow behaviour of AUTO-SD
through HX1, WGRS, product down
fouling of heat gas contains too triggered
exchanger much CO. by high
surfaces Possible damage WGSR
to WGSR catalyst. inlet
temperat
ure
(inside
reactor).
19.1 Too high Product gas Add
air flow contains too much AUTO-SD
through HX1 CO. triggered
Possible damage by low
to WGSR catalyst. WGSR
inlet
temperat
ure

20.1 Blockage Equipment design Add

in WGSR or pressure might be emergenc
equipment exceeded. y shut
after it due to Product gas down
SRR or WGSR composition triggered
catalyst changes (methane by PI-01
flaking. increases). high
pressure
(> 9
bar(g)).
Consider
adding
pressure
relief
valve to
the inlet
side of
21.1 Big Product gas Add EM-
leakage escapes from SD
system. triggered
Consequences by PI-01
and related low
detection and pressure
safeguards of (< 6 barg).
combustible gas
Add
after the
discharge into
tail gas
system tank a
surroundings to shut-off
be covered later valve that
more detail in closes if
section Leaks from the
system inside system
container. pressure
goes too
low. SV5
should
open
simul-
taneously
.
22.1 SRR WGSR feed
catalyst contains too high
deactivation/d amount of CO,
amage due to causing CO in
too high SRR excess of 1-vol %
temperature, to flow to PSA.
higher WGSR feed
alcohols etc. contains too much
in fuel CH4. Complete
processor system efficiency
feed mixture is decreased with
lower H2 yield.
23.1 SRR Ethanol and possibly
catalyst other residues in
deactivation WGSR feed gas.
(see above) Deactivation/
leading to possible damage to
unreacted WGSR catalyst.
impurities Change in the
flowing to
behaviour of WGRS:
Possibly reforming
WGSR
of ethanol or coke
(ethanol and formation.
other organic Wrong FP product
compounds) gas composition
(contains e.g. too
much CO).

Comme
nt: Not
very
probable
because
dosing of
both H2O
and EtOH
25.1 Small Less product gas. Add
leakage in Increase of AUTO-SD
WGSR combustible gas to triggered
AFB2. by high
H2concentration in temperat
AFB2 increases. If ure at
leak large enough, AFB2 inlet
flame front may (> 750
proceed upstream °C).
up to HX2. Add
AUTO-SD
triggered
by high
temperat
ure at
AFB2
outlet (>
300
°C).
Comme
nt: HX2
temperat
ure below
H2autoig
nition
temperat
ure (536
°C), so
combusti
on takes
25.2 Small Comme
leakage in nt:
COND1. Unlikely
because
condense
r can
25.3 Small Combustible gas Comme
leakage in may flow to H2O tank. nt:
DV1 due to Gas vented from
tank malfuncti
malfunctionin into container. oning of
g Less product gas. DV1 very
Consequences unlikely,
and related because
detection and
liquid
does not
safeguards of
contain
combustible gas objects
leakage to be above 1
covered later mm size
more detail that could
in section Leaks block the
from system inside valve
container. open.

25.4 Small Less product gas. Carry

leakage in Consequences out
pipeline and related pressure
between detection and tests at
WGSR and safeguards of least after
PSA feed inlet combustible gas any
discharge into modificati
system
on to the
system.
surroundings to
be covered later
more detail
in section Leaks
from system inside
container.
25.5 Small Less product gas. Vent
leakage Combustible gas pipe
through PRV1 flows through vent should be
due to line out of container. located so
triggered that, it is
relief valve not
not resealing hazardou
properly.
s to
people or
property
even in
case of
gas
ignition.
26.1 Big Product gas Add EM-
leakage escapes from SD
system. triggered
Consequences by PI-04
and related and PI-05
detection and low
safeguards of pressure
combustible gas
(6 barg).
discharge into
system
surroundings to
be covered later
more detail in
section Leaks from
system
inside container.

26.2 Combustible gas Add EM-

Malfunctioning flows through vent SD
of SV2, valve line out of triggered
opens. container by PI-04
and PI-05
low
pressure
(6 barg).
Vent
pipe
should be
located so
 Comme
nt: Heat
up of gas
not
possible
Comme
nt: Low
temperat
ure not
detriment
29.1 PSA gas Pressure increase Add EM-
consumption in system SD
stops due to upstream PSA. triggered
malfunction in by PI-04
PSA cycle. and PI-05
high
pressure
(10 barg)
Add
AUTO-SD
when PSA
stops
running.
30.1 Big Product gas Add EM-
leakage escapes from SD
system. triggered
Consequences by PI-04
and related and PI-05
detection and low
safeguards of pressure
combustible gas
(6 barg)
discharge into
system
surroundings to
be covered later
more detail in
section Leaks from
system
inside container.

30.2 Combustible gas Add EM-

Malfunctioning flows through vent SD
of SV2, valve line out of triggered
opens. container by PI-04
and PI-05
low
pressure
(6 barg).
Vent
pipe
should be
located so
30.3 SV1 Pressure Add EM-
closes due to downstream SV1 SD
malfunction. decreases slowly triggered
due to feed tank by PI-05
volume. low
(Pressure in pressure
system upstream (6 barg)
SV1 increases
much faster.)

31.1 Feed Fluctuations in FP Check

tank hand pressure. Small feed tank
valve MV6 temperature hand
unintentionall and/or gas valve
y closed. composition MV6
fluctuations. position
Feed pump (= open)
control signals
before
start-up.
fluctuating under
Comme
PID control. nt: Point
of
examinati
on in this
deviation
is
between
SV1 and
feed tank
pipe
branch.
32.1 WGSR Too high CO Add
reaction concentration in AUTO-SD
conditions hydrogen fed to H2 triggered
wrong, too high tank. by high
temperature. Reduced efficiency WGSR
WGSR catalyst of FCS due to anode outlet
deactivation. catalyst poisoning. temperat
ure (> 350
°C)

33.1 No/low Steam enters PSA Add EM-

coolant flow to and causes water SD
COND1. Coolant condensation in triggered
circuit/pipeline adsorbent columns. by TI-05
failure. High temperature high
Coolant gas may damage temperat
temperature components ure (> 30
too high. downstream. °C).
Cooling system Add
not functioning. AUTO-SD
triggered
by TI-06
high
temperat
ure (> 15
°C).
 Comme
nt: PSA
malfuncti
ons if H2
concentra
tion in
PSA feed
gas < 50
%, due to
valves
Add anot
35.1 Droplets enter
designed
water
Malfunctioning PSA. PSA for high
of VLS1. adsorbents start coalescin
flooding. More CO in gas g filter
feed to H
2 tank.
upstream
PSA inlet.
Droplets
detected
from filter
inspectio
n
port.
35.2 COND1 Condensing taking Add
not cooling place downstream warning
enough. VLS1. Droplets enter triggered
PSA. by TI-05
PSA adsorbents start and TI-07
flooding. More CO in high
gas feed to H2tank. temperat
ure (> 25
°C).
Add EM-
SD
triggered
by TI-05
high
temperat
ure (> 30
°C).
Add
AUTO-SD
triggered
by TI-07
36.1 Components Add a
Impurities in downstream WGSR coalescin
FP product are not likely to g filter
gas flow due block due to large upstream
to SRR or channel dimensions, PSA inlet.
WGSR catalyst but WGSR operation Droplets
flaking e.g. is disturbed. are
Particle impurities detected
washed away in from filter
VLS1, and may inspectio
accumulate to H2O n port
tank or proceed to during
F1 and F2. shutdown
Small particle period.
impurities may
accumulate to PSA
adsorbent beds
without
considerable effect
to functionality.
37.1 PSA adsorbent not Consider
Malfunctioning fully regenerated, adding
of valve CV1 because too high pressure
(does not pressure, > 0.5 sensor for
open or opens bar(a), at end of absolute
limitedly) and desorption phase. ambient
vacuum pump Too high CO content pressure.
VP1 not
in product H2.
PSA shuts
running.
automatically down
if pressure inside
vessel > 100 mbar(g)
at end of desorption
phase. No reformate
intake and tail gas
pro-
duction. System
shuts down.
37.2 VP1 not able to Consider
Malfunctioning generate vacuum. eliminatin
of valve CV1, PSA adsorbent not g CV1 and
permitting fully regenerated, running
flow in because too high only with
opposite pressure, > 0.5 VP1.
direction. bar(a), at end of Check if
desorption phase. VP1 can
Too high CO content pass
in product H2. enough
PSA shuts flow
automatically down through
if pressure inside in case of
vessel > 100 mbar(g) CV1
at end of desorption malfuncti
phase. No reformate on.
intake and tail gas
production. System
shuts down.

38.1 Can be Comme

caused only nt: PSA
by high operation
ambient isotherma
temperature l. Tail gas
in container. temperat
To be covered ure does
later in
not
deviate
section
from PSA
Conditions inlet.
inside
container.
39.1 Particles possibly Comme
Adsorbent getting in tail gas nt:
released from tank are not very Adsorben
PSA. harmful. t particles
Filter may be not large
clogged over long enough to
period of time. cause e.g.
pipeline
blockages
. Would
possibly
be
harmful
to MFM4
and
MFM5.
Comme
nt: Not
relevant
deviation.
41.1 Pump Pressure in PSA tail
VP1 gas outlet increases
malfunctionin > 100 mbar(g), and
g. causes PSA to stop.
System shuts down.
41.2 Leakage Tail gas tank Perform
after VP1 and pressure starts to leak test
before tank. decrease. for tail
Less tail gas for gas line
combustion in FP. when
Temperatures compone
decrease in FP nts
reactors. changed
Consequences and or fittings
related detection opened.
and safeguards of
combustible gas
discharge into the
system surroundings
to be covered later
in section Leaks
from system inside
container.

42.1 Pump No tail gas for Consider

TGP1 not combustion in FP. adding
functioning Temperatures following
decrease in FP safety
reactors. function:
System AUTO-SD Opening
triggered by SRR of SV5
temperatures.
triggered
by P10
high
pressure,
> 400
mbar(g),
to
preserve
PRV2
gaskets.
42.2 Valve No tail gas for Consider
SV6 closed combustion in FP. adding
Temperatures following
decrease in FP safety
reactors. function:
System AUTO-SD Opening
triggered by SRR of SV5
temperatures.
triggered
by P10
high
pressure,
> 400
mbar(g),
to
preserve
PRV2
gaskets.

42.3 Filter F8 No tail gas for Comme

clogged combustion in FP. nt: Filter
Temperatures may be
decrease in FP clogged
reactors. over long
System AUTO-SD period of
triggered by SRR time.
temperatures.
43.1 Flow Temporarily too Consider
through pump much tail gas for controllin
TGP1 higher combustion in FP. g TGP1
than PSA tail temperatures speed by
gas increase in FP PI10.
production. reactors.
Vacuum generated
in tail gas tank. Air
may leak inside the
tank.

43.2 Valve Very low amount of

SV5 open due tail gas for
to malfunction combustion in FP.
or power loss. temperatures
decrease in FP
reactors.
System AUTO-SD
triggered by SRR
temperatures.
43.3 Small Less tail gas for Perform
leakage combustion in FP. leak test
outside More EtOH needed for tail
between to keep up FP gas line
pumps VP1 temperatures. when
and TGP1. Lower efficiency of compone
the system. nts
Consequences and changed
related detection or fittings
and safeguards of opened.
combustible gas
discharge into the
system surroundings
to be covered later
more detail in
section Leaks from
system inside
container.

44.1 Leak in Combustible and Ground

pipeline possibly explosive all
upstream VP1 mixture created compone
causing VP1 inside piping and nts in
to suck air tail gas tank. pipeline
into tail gas properly
line. to avoid
build-up
of static
electricity
.
Add
AUTO-SD
triggered
by PI-07 if
45.1 Pump Temporarily too Consider
TGP1 much tail gas for controllin
malfunctionin combustion in FP. g TGP1
g, gas temperatures speed by
throughput increase in FP PI10.
too high. reactors.
Vacuum generated
in tail gas tank. Air
may leak inside the
tank.

46.1 Pump Too little tail gas for Consider

TGP1 combustion in FP. adding
malfunctionin Temperatures following
g, gas decrease in FP safety
throughput reactors. function:
too low. Pressure increase in Opening
tail gas tank. of SV5
triggered
by P10
high
pressure,
> 400
mbar(g),
to
preserve
PRV2
gaskets.
46.2 Small Too little tail gas for Perform
leakage combustion in FP. leak test
outside Temperatures for tail
downstream decrease in FP gas line
pump TGP1. reactors. when
Consequences and compone
related detection nts
and safeguards of changed
combustible gas or fittings
discharge into opened.
system surroundings
to be covered later
more detail in
section Leaks from
system
inside container.

47.1 Valve No tail gas for Comme

SV6 closed combustion in FP. nt: TGP1
due to Temperatures max.
malfunction or decrease in FP pressure
power loss. reactors. increase
System AUTO-SD 1.38 bar
triggered by SRR above
temperatures.
inlet
level, not
detriment
al to
other
compone
nts.
Add
AUTO-SD
triggered
by PI-11
pressure
> 1 bar(g).
47.2 Filter F8 No tail gas for Comme
clogged combustion in FP. nt: Filter
Temperatures may be
decrease in FP clogged
reactors. over long
System AUTO-SD period of
triggered by SRR time.
temperatures.
Comme
nt: TGP1
max.
pressure
increase
1.38 bar
above
inlet
level, not
detriment
al to
other
Comme
nt: Both
tail gas
pipelines
49.1 Pump Too little tail gas for Consider
TGP1 combustion in FP. adding
malfunctionin Temperatures following
g, gas decrease in FP safety
throughput reactors. function:
too low. Pressure increase in Opening
tail gas tank. of SV5
triggered
by P10
high
pressure,
> 400
mbar(g),
to
preserve
PRV2
gaskets.
49.2 Leak Too little tail gas for Perform
outside combustion in FP. leak test
between Temperatures for tail
pump TGP1 decrease in FP gas line
and valve CV3 reactors. when
and/or CV4. Consequences and compone
related detection nts
and safeguards of changed
combustible gas or fittings
discharge into opened.
system surroundings
to be covered later
more detail
in section Leaks
from system inside
container.
50.1 Leak in First tail gas leaks Consider
pipeline/syste out from system into adding
m between container. AUTO-SD
pump VP1 / Once pressure in tail triggered
valve CV1 and gas tank by PI-10 <
pump TGP1. / in system (PI-10) 50
below atmospheric, mbar(g).
air starts to be
sucked from system
surroundings to gas
flow.
Formation of
explosive gas
mixture first inside
container then in tail
gas tank / in tail gas
system.
Consequences and
related detection
and safeguards of
combustible gas
discharge into
system surroundings
to be covered later
more detail in
section Leaks from
system
inside container.
50.2 Leak to First tail gas leaks Consider
vent line due out from system adding
to SV5 through vent line. AUTO-SD
malfunction. Once pressure in triggered
tail gas tank by PI-10 <
/ in system (PI-10) 50
below mbar(g).
atmospheric, air
starts to be
sucked from vent
line to gas flow.
Formation of
explosive gas
mixture in tail gas
tank / in tail gas
system.

Comme
nt: Should
not be
possible
assuming
Comme
nt: Not
likely
because
53.1 Too low WGSR inlet Comme
air flow rate temperature nt: WGSR
due to blower increases, may inlet 400-
AB1 affect FP product430 °C.
malfunctionin gas composition Add air
g. after WGSR. flow
Possible damage meter
to WGSR catalyst.
between
PI-03 and
airline
branch.
Add
AUTO-SD
triggered
by high
WGSR
inlet
temperat
ure (450
53.2 Too low WGSR inlet Add air
air flow rate temperature flow
due to PV2 increases, may meter
unintentionall affect FP product between
y open. gas composition airline
after WGSR. branch
Possible damage and PV2.
to WGSR catalyst.
Add
AUTO-SD
triggered
by high
WGSR
inlet
temperat
ure (450
°C).

53.3 Leak WGSR inlet Leak

outside temperature checking.
between increases, may affect
blower AB1 FP product gas
and HX1 or composition after
from HX1. WGSR. Possible
damage to WGSR
catalyst.
54.1 Too high WGSR inlet Add air
air flow rate temperature flow
due to blower decreases, meter
AB1 kinetics of WGS between
malfunctionin reactions slowed PI-03 and
g. down and FP airline
product gas may branch.
contain more CO.
Add air
flow
CO concertation of
meter
PSA product gas between
increases, FCS airline
efficiency branch
decreases. and PV2.
Add
AUTO-SD
triggered
by low
WGSR
inlet tem-
perature(
380 °C)
54.2 Too high WGSR inlet Add air
air flow rate temperature flow
due to PV2 decreases, kinetics meter
unintentionall of WGS reactions between
y closed. slowed down and FP PI-03 and
product gas may airline
contain more CO. branch.
CO concertation of Add air
PSA product gas flow
increases, FCS meter
efficiency decreases. between
airline
branch
and PV2.
Add
AUTO-SD
triggered
by low
WGSR
inlet
temperat
ure(380
°C)

54.3 Low air Comme

temperature nt: Not
at blower AB1 likely
intake. because
container
interior
heated by
waste
heat from
FP.
55.1 WGSR inlet Add air
Malfunctioning temperature flow
of blower AB1. decreases, kinetics meter
of WGS reactions between
slowed down and FP PI-03 and
product gas may airline
contain more CO. branch.
CO concertation of Add
PSA product gas AUTO-SD
increases, FCS triggered
efficiency decreases. by low
WGSR
inlet
temperat
ure(380
°C)
55.2 PV2 WGSR inlet Add air
unintentionall temperature flow
y closed. decreases, kinetics meter
of WGS reactions between
slowed down and FP PI-03 and
product gas may airline
contain more CO. branch.
CO concertation of Add air
PSA product gas flow
increases, FCS meter
efficiency decreases. between
airline
branch
and PV2.
Add
AUTO-SD
triggered
by low
WGSR
inlet tem-
perature(
380 °C)

56.1 WGSR inlet Add air

Malfunctioning temperature flow
of blower AB1. increases, may meter
affect FP product between
composition after PI-03 and
WGSR. Possible airline
damage to WGSR branch.
catalyst.
Add
AUTO-SD
triggered
by low
WGSR
inlet
temperat
ure(380
°C)
56.2 PV2 WGSR inlet Add air
unintentionall temperature flow
y open. increases, may meter
affect FP product between
gas composition airline
after WGSR. branch
Possible damage and PV2.
to WGSR catalyst
Add
AUTO-SD
triggered
by high
WGSR
inlet
temperat
ure (450
°C).

56.3 Leak WGSR inlet Leak

outside temperature checking
between AB1 increases, may affect
and HX1 or FP product gas
from HX1. composition after
WGSR. Possible
damage to
WGSR catalyst.
57.1 Blower No cooling to HX1. Add air
AB1 stopped. WGSR inlet flow
temperature meter
increases, may between
affect FP product PI-03 and
gas composition airline
after WGSR. branch.
Possible damage
Add
AUTO-SD
to WGSR catalyst.
triggered
No oxidant to by air
AFB1, to be flow
covered under meter
Fuel-air ratio (lambda <
(lambda) too rich. 1.5)
Add
AUTO-SD
triggered
by high
WGSR
inlet
temperat
ure (450
°C).
57.2 Pipeline No cooling to HX1. Comme
failure or WGSR inlet nt: Not
SUB2 rupture. temperature very
increases, may likely.
affect FP product Comme
gas composition nt:
after WGSR. temperat
Possible damage
ure
cycling of
to WGSR catalyst.
SUB2
No oxidant to could
AFB1, to be cause
covered under leaks in
Fuel-air ratio the long
(lambda) too rich. run
Carry
out
pressure
tests at
least after
any
modificati
on to the
system.
Add
AUTO-SD
triggered
by high
WGSR
inlet
temperat
ure (450
°C).

58.1 Blockage Comme

in pipeline nt: Not
between HX1 very
and AFB1. likely.
Blower
pmax ≈ 1
bar(g).
Check
pressure
tolerance
of SUBs.
59.1 Leak Less air or fuel-air Leak
outside mixture to AFB1. testing of
between HX1 Consequences tail gas
and AFB1. and related line when
detection and compone
safeguards of nts
combustible gas changed
discharge into
or fittings
opened.
system
surroundings to
be covered later
more detail in
section Leaks from
system
inside container.
60.1 Possibly explosive Carry
Reformate gas gas mixture out
leak inside downstream HX1. pressure
HX1. Temperature in HX1 tests of
close to main
H2autoignition process
temperature and line at
may ignite. In case least after
of combustion, HX1 any
not cooling process modificati
stream and WGSR on to the
inlet temperature system.
increase. Add
Less product gas to AUTO-SD
PSA. triggered
by AFB1
high inlet
temperat
ure (800
°C).
60.2 Air Possibly explosive Add
blower AB1 gas mixture inside EtOH
sucks in air blower AB1 and detector
and downstream it. Gas inside
combustible mixture may ignite container.
gases due to a in SUB2 because of Placeme
leak in catalyst. nt of air
system.
Explosive blowers
gases/vapours inside vertically
Container air
container. EtOH at middle
contains vapour stays bottom in
ethanol, (46.07 g/mol vs. container,
reformate or 28.97 g/mol of air) or routing
hydrogen. of container, H2 air intake
rises to upper part by tube to
of container (2.016 container
g/mol vs. 28.97 fresh air
g/mol of air) intake
grille.
Check if
separate
ventilation
blower(s)
is needed
at the floor
level of the
container
(for
possible
ethanol va-
pours).

61.1 Dust or Blockage of AB1, Add

particulates SUB2 and other filters to
from outside components AB1 (and
or inside of downstream. AB2)
container. intake
ports.
Add air
flow
meter
after PI-
03.
Comme
nt: No
identified
causes for
high
temperat
63.1 Impaired Afterburner AFB1 Internal
heat cools down. All insulation
insulation the fuel processor of FP
inside FP. components cool casing
down. should be
checked
for leaks
after
moving
casing or
container.

Commen
t: No
identified
causes for
high flow
65.1 Small Less combustible Consider
leakage after mixture for adding
TG1 or SU- afterburner AFB1. small
EtOH-3 mixing AFB1 temperatures ventilatio
point. decrease. See n hole to
deviation Low FP casing
temperature after to
SRR. prevent
Consequences and H2
related detection accumulat
and safeguards of ion inside
the gas discharge it.
into the system Leak
surroundings to be testing of
covered later in tail gas
section Leaks from lines
system inside when
container. compone
nts
changed
or fittings
opened.
Add
EtOH
detector
inside
container.
66.1 Broken Explosive gases Add
pipeline inside container. EtOH
between HX1 No combustible detector
and AFB1. mixture for AFB1, inside
temperatures container.
decrease. Consider
Consequences and adding
related detection small
and safeguards of ventilatio
combustible gas n hole to
discharge into FP casing
system surroundings to
to be covered later prevent
more detail in H2
section Leaks from accumulat
system ion inside
inside container it.
Pressure
testing of
air and
tail gas
lines
during on
system
commissi
oning.
67.1 Too high AFB1 catalyst Add air
TG1 or coking. AFB1 flow meter
SUEtOH-3 reactions decrease between
flows. and temperatures PI-03 and
decrease. airline
EVA2/HX3 branch.
temperatures Add
decrease. lambda
Combustible gas calculation
mixture proceeds to in AFB1
exhaust line and using and
after that to vent. AUTO-SD
triggered
by lambda
< 1.5.
Top of
the vent
line should
be located
high
enough to
prevent
personnel
or material
damage in
case of
ignition.
Entry of
water/impu
rities into
vent line
68.1 Too low AFB1 Add air
TG1 or temperatures flow
SUEtOH-3 decrease, causing meter
flows. problems in SRR between
and EVA2. PI-03 and
airline
branch.
69.1 Too low WGSR outlet Comme
air flow rate temperature nt: WGSR
due to blower increases slowing inlet 400-
AB2 down WGS 430 °C.
malfunctionin reactions. FP Add air
g. product gas flow
contains more CO. meter
CO concertation of
after PI-
02.
PSA product gas
Consider
increases, FCS adding
efficiency temperat
decreases. ure probe
Too rich fuel-air at
mixture fed to OFFGAS-1
AFB2. To be outlet
covered under (not easy
Fuel-air ratio to get
(lambda) too data that
rich. represent
s HX2
outlet).
69.2 Leak WGSR outlet Comme
outside temperature nt: WGSR
between increases, WGS inlet 400-
blower AB2 reactions limited 430 °C.
and HX2 or by equilibrium and Add air
from HX2. FP product gas flow
contains more CO. meter
CO concertation of
after PI-
02.
PSA product gas
Consider
increases, FCS adding
efficiency temperat
decreases. ure probe
Too rich fuel-air at
mixture fed to OFFGAS-1
AFB2. To be outlet
covered under (not easy
Fuel-air ratio to get
(lambda) too data that
rich. represent
s HX2
outlet)
70.1 Too high WGSR outlet Comme
air flow rate temperature nt: WGSR
due to blower decrease, kinetics of inlet 400-
AB2 WGS reactions 430 °C.
malfunctionin slowed down. FP Add air
g. product gas contains flow
more CO. meter
CO concertation of after PI-
PSA product gas 02.
increases, FCS Consider
efficiency decreases. adding
EtOH-1 not temperat
evaporating before ure probe
AFB2 (not very at
likely). OFFGAS-1
outlet to
detect if
EtOH-1 is
evaporate
d.

70.2 Low air Comme

temperature nt: Not
at blower AB2 likely
intake. because
container
interior
heated by
waste
heat from
71.1 WGSR outlet Comme
Malfunctioning temperature nt: WGSR
of blower AB2. decreases, inlet 400-
kinetics of WGS 430 °C.
reactions slowed Add air
down. FP product flow
gas contains more meter
CO.
after PI-
02.
CO concertation of
PSA product gas
increases, FCS
efficiency
decreases.
72.1 WGSR outlet Comme
Malfunctioning temperature nt: WGSR
of blower AB2. increases slowing inlet 400-
down WGS 430 °C.
reactions. FP Add air
product gas flow
contains more CO. meter
CO concertation of
after PI-
02.
PSA product gas
increases, FCS
efficiency
decreases.
Too rich fuel-air
mixture fed to
AFB2. To be
covered under
Fuel-air ratio
(lambda) too
rich.
72.2 Leak WGSR outlet Comme
outside temperature nt: WGSR
between AB2 increases, WGS inlet 400-
and HX2 or reactions limited 430 °C.
from HX2. by equilibrium and Leak
FP product gas checking.
contains more CO.
CO concertation of
PSA product gas
increases, FCS
efficiency
decreases.
Too rich fuel-air
mixture fed to
AFB2. To be
covered under
Fuel-air ratio
(lambda) too
rich.

73.1 Blower No cooling to Add air

AB2 stopped. WGSR. flow
No oxidant to meter
AFB2. To be after PI-
covered under 02.
Fuel-air ratio Add
(lambda) too rich. AUTO-SD
triggered
by air
flow
meter
(lambda <
1.5), or
PID not
reaching
SP.
73.2 Pipeline No cooling to Comme
failure or WGSR. nt: Not
SUB1 rupture. No oxidant to very
AFB2. To be likely.
covered under Pressure
Fuel-air ratio testing of
(lambda) too rich. the
system
during
commissi
oning
Comme
nt: Could
temperat
ure
74.1 Blockage
cycling
Comme of
in pipeline nt: Not
between HX2 very
and AFB2. likely.
Blower
pmax ≈ 1
bar(g).
Check
75.1 Leak Less air or fuel-air pressure
Leak
outside mixture to AFB1. tolerance
testing of
of
tailSUBs.
gas
between HX2 Consequences
and AFB2. and related line when
detection and compone
safeguards of nts
combustible gas changed
discharge into
or fittings
opened.
system
surroundings to
be covered later
more detail in
section Leaks from
system
inside container
76.1 WGSR Less product gas to Consider
leak to HX2 PSA. adding
Possibly explosive temperat
gas mixture already ure probe
downstream HX2. at
Temperature low OFFGAS-1
until AFB2, so outlet to
ignition before AFB2 detect
not probable. possible
However, combusti
combustion front on front.
may proceed Add
upstream if H2 AUTO-SD
concentration in triggered
WGSR/tail gas-air by AFB2
mixture is high high inlet
enough. temperat
ure (800
°C).
Leak
testing of
main
process
line after
modificati
ons or
addition
of new
compone
nts.
76.2 Air Possible explosive Add
blower AB2 gas mixture inside EtOH
sucks in air blower AB2 and detector
and downstream it. Gas inside
combustible mixture may ignite container.
gases due to a in SUB1 because of Placeme
leak in catalyst. nt of air
system.
Explosive blowers
gases/vapour inside vertically
Container air
container. EtOH at middle
contains vapour stays bottom in
ethanol, of container, H2 container,
reformate or rises to upper part or routing
hydrogen. of container. air intake
by tube to
container
fresh air
intake
grille.
Check if
separate
ventilatio
n
blower(s)
is needed
at the
floor level
of the
container
(for
possible
ethanolva
pours).

77.1 Dust or Blockage of AB2, Add

particulates SUB1 and other filters to
from outside components air
or inside of downstream. blowers
container. AB2 (and
AB1)
inlets.
Add air
flow
meter
after PI-
Comme
nt: No
identified
causes for
high
temperat
ure in
79.1 Impaired Afterburner AFB2 Internal
heat cools down. All insulation
insulation the fuel processor of FP
inside FP. components cool casing
down. should be
checked
for leaks
after
moving
casing or
container.
Comme
nt: No
identified
causes for
high flow
81.1 Small Less combustible Consider
leakage after mixture for adding
TG2 or EtOH-1 afterburner AFB2. small
mixing point. AFB2 temperatures ventilatio
decrease. See n hole to
deviation Low FP casing
temperature after to
EVA1. prevent
Consequences and H2
related detection accumulat
and safeguards of ion inside
combustible gas it.
discharge into Leak
system surroundings testing of
to be covered later tail gas
more detail in lines
section Leaks from when
system compone
inside container. nts
changed
or fittings
opened.
Add
EtOH
detector
inside
container.
82.1 Broken Explosive gases Add
pipeline inside container. EtOH
between HX2 No combustible detector
and AFB2. mixture for AFB2, inside
temperatures container.
decrease. Consider
Consequences and adding
related detection small
and safeguards of ventilatio
combustible gas n hole to
discharge into FP casing
system surroundings to
to be covered later prevent
more detail in H2
section Leaks from accumulat
system ion inside
inside container. it.

83.1 Too high AFB2 catalyst Add air

TG2 and/or coking. AFB2 flow
EtOH-1 flows. reactions decrease meter
and temperatures after PI-
decrease. 02.
Combustible gas Add
mixture proceeds to lambda
exhaust line and calculatio
after that to vent. n in AFB2
using and
AUTO-SD
triggered
by
lambda <
1.5.
Top of
the vent
line
should be
located
high
enough to
prevent
personnel
or
83.2 Air flow AFB2 catalyst Add air
needed for coking. AFB2 flow
WGSR cooling reactions decrease
meter
too low for and temperature after PI-
AFB2. decreases. 02.
Combustible gas Add
mixture proceeds to
lambda
exhaust line andcalculatio
after that to vent.
n in AFB2
using and
AUTO-SD
triggered
by
lambda <
1.5.
Top of
the vent
line
should be
located
high
enough to
prevent
personnel
or
material
84.1 Too low AFB2 Add air
TG2 or EtOH-1 temperatures flow
flows. decrease, causing meter
problems in EVA1. after PI-
02.

84.2 Air flow Comme

needed for nt: Not
WGSR cooling very
too high for relevant.
AFB2. Can be
compensa
ted by
increasing
TG2 or
EtOH-
85.1 Heat DV2 gaskets may Comme
conduction damage. nt:
and Not enough temperat
convection condensed water, ure at
from AFB2 DV2 may dry up and AFB2 and
and HX3 start to leak gas to HX3
outlet. drain pipe leading outlets ≈
outside of container. 100200 °C
Pipeline
before
water
separatio
n should
be long
enough to
ensure
cooling of
the gas.
Pipelines
to be
located so
that
condense
d water
droplets
flow to
Comme
nt: Not
relevant
deviation.
Subzero
environm
87.1 Possibly explosive Top of
Combustible gas mixture in top the vent
components of vent line. line
in AFB should be
exhaust gas located
due to high
incomplete enough to
combustion in
prevent
personnel
AFB1 and/or
or
AFB2. material
damage
in case of
ignition.
Entry of
water/im
purities
into vent
line
Comme
nt: Not
very
probable
because
dosing of
both H2O
and EtOH
should be
89.1 Small Less product gas. Consider
leak outside in Consequences adding
PSA or and related AUTO-SD
pipeline detection and triggered
downstream. safeguards of by PI-06,
combustible gas if much
discharge into lower
system
than PI-
08 (<50
surroundings to
mbar
be covered later lower)
more detail in
section Leaks from
system
inside container.
90.1 Big No H2feed to FCS. Consider
leakage in Consequences and adding
PSA or related detection shut-off
pipeline and safeguards of valve
downstream. combustible gas inside
discharge into container
system surroundings to
to be covered later prevent
more detail in release of
section Leaks from whole H2
system inside tank
container. content
into
container.
Shut-off
valve
triggered
if
PI06more
than 50
mbar
lower
than PI08,
and in
AUTOSD
and EM-
SD.
Move PI-
08 and
TI10 to
the H2
tank in-
stead of
feed
pipeline.

91.1 No or less H2feed to Comme

Malfunctioning FCS. Possible nt: Not
of control damage to PSA. very
system of PSA likely.
unit: PSA takes Comme
in PSA product nt: H2
gas through H2 purge
purge port in used in
normal steady shut-
state run. down.
92.1 Restriction PSA conditions non- Comme
between PSA optimal, leading to nt: Some
product gas higher CO pressure
outlet and H2 concentration in PSA fluctuatio
tank, e.g. product gas. n is
partially closed If control pressure of normal.
MV2 and/or PSA product gas line
MV4. is not reached, PSA
Also H2 bottles control system
(that “form” H2 triggers PSA to go to
tank) have their STOP state.
own valves,
which can be
partially closed.

93.1 PSA not Reduced Comme

functioning as efficiency of FCS nt: Cause
expected, e.g. due to anode of low cell
adsorbent catalyst poisoning. voltages
performance investigat
decreased. ed
afterward
s. System
operation
should
not be
aborted
just
because
of
decreasin
g
cell
voltages.
94.1 Particles possibly Comme
Adsorbent getting in H2tank are nt:
released from not very harmful. Adsorben
PSA. t particles
not large
enough to
cause e.g.
pipeline
blockages
95.1 Hand No H2feed to FCS Restrict
valves MV4 or either immediately unauthori
MV5 (or both) or with a delay. zed
are closed FCS shuts down access to
unintentionall when voltage drops system
y or too low (~0.57 V). with a
deliberately fence.
by vandal etc.
Consider
adding
(Hand valve
locks to
MV3 normally MV4 and
closed during MV5, and
run.) to MV3.
Comme
nt: Hand
valve
MV3
normally
closed
during
run.
95.2 Big No H2feed to FCS. In
leakage, Formation of placemen
broken pipe explosive gas t of
etc. mixture inside or indicators
outside of container, PI-08 and
at least around TI-10 take
leakage point. into
Consequences and account
related detection results of
and safeguards of H2 tank
combustible gas EX-zone
discharge into classificati
system surroundings on.
to be covered later Pipeline
more detail in outside
section Leaks from container
system inside should be
container and Leaks properly
or grounded
gas release from to
system to outside prevent
build-up
of static
electricity
.

95.3 Large Formation of Comme

leakage in H2 explosive gas nt: H2
tank. mixture around bottles (2
leakage point. pcs.) that
“form” H2
tank,
specified
to hold
200
bar(g),
96.1 High Pressure increases in Add
ambient H2 tank and in pressure
temperature. related pipelines. relief
Max. pressure valve to
increase ~ 20 H2 tank.
%, when Opening
temperature pressure
changes from -20 to ca. 11
+35 °C. bar(g).
Comme
nt: No
harm to
FCS due
to
increased
PSA
product
gas
temperat
ure.

96.2 Fire or Pressure increases in Add

other H2 tank and in pressure
unexpected related pipelines. relief
intense heat Possible failure of valve to
source nearbySV3, SV4, MFM3 H2 tank.
H2 tank. (max operating Opening
pressure 10bar(g)), pressure
PR1 etc. or rupture ca. 11
of H2 tank. bar(g).
Place
MFM3
downstre
am PR1
(allows
usage of
11 bar(g)
relief
valve).
Consider
adding
controlled
valve in
parallel
with
pressure
97.1 Low Cooling capacity Comme
ambient needed by FCS nt: In case
temperature. decreases. of low
No harm for ambient
system. temperat
ure PSA
product
gas most
probably
cools
down
98.1 May cause blockage Comme
Impurities of microporous nt: Under
released from structures in anode normal
H2 tank electrodes. operation
surfaces at Presumably washed ,
low pressure. away with water pressures
droplets. < 1 bar(g)
No considerable at H2tank
effects during first not likely.
5000 hours of FCS stops
operation. at 1
May cause MFM3 bar(g)
malfunction. H2tank
pressure.
Pay
attention
that when
H2bottles
emptied
e.g. for
transport
/storage,
residual
gas is not
directed
into
system
but is
vented
into
atmosphe
re e.g.
Comme
nt:
Particles
not large
enough to
98.2 May cause blockage Comme
Adsorbent of microporous nt:
released from structures in anode Adsorben
PSA. electrodes. t particles
Presumably washed not large
away with water enough to
droplets. cause e.g.
No considerable pipeline
effects during first blockages
5000 hours of .
operation. Consider
May cause MFM3 adding
malfunction. filter
before
MFM3.
99.1 Solenoid Significant amount Add
valve or or all of H2 flows to AUTO-SD
valves (SV vent through SV triggered
FCS3 and SV FCS3 / SV FCS2, and by FI-03 if
FCS2) not through stack. reading
unintentionall Loss of H2in stack, very high
y open inside cell voltages for
FCS.
decrease. extended
H2starvation may period (>
cause damage to 100 nlpm
cathode catalyst. for 510 s).
99.2 Big H2released inside
leakage inside FCS and eventually
FCS. to container.
Consequences and
related detection
and safeguards of
combustible gas
discharge into
system surroundings
to be covered later
more detail in
section Leaks from
system
inside container.
100.1 Small Less H2feed to FCS. Consider
leakage in FCS shuts down if adding
pipeline after voltage drops too system
pipe branch low (~0.57 V) or if AUTO-SD
downstream inlet pressure is low triggered
MV3 and MV5 (<0.7 bar(g)). by PI 09
(i.e. after the Consequences and low
previous point
related detection pressure
and safeguards of (< 0.7
of
combustible gas bar(g)).
examination). discharge into
system surroundings
to be covered later
more detail in
section Leaks from
system
inside container.
101.1 SV3 or No H2feed to FCS.
SV4
unintentionall
y closed,
malfunctionin
g of PR1.
101.2 Big No H2feed to FCS.
leakage in Consequences and
pipeline after related detection
pipe branch and safeguards of
downstream combustible gas
MV3 and MV5 discharge into
(i.e. after the system surroundings
previous point
to be covered later
more detail in
of
section Leaks from
examination). system
inside container.

102.1 No harmful Comme

Malfunctioning consequences nt: Not
of PR1 because of very
safeguards. likely.
Consider
adding
system
AUTO-SD
if PI-09 >
103.1 Not enough H2feed 5 bar(g).
Comme
Malfunctioning to FCS. nt: PR
of PR1. FCS1
requires
0,7 bar(g)
to
function.
103.2 Small Not enough H2feed Consider
leakage in to FCS. adding
pipeline after Consequences and AUTO-SD
pipe branch related detection triggered
downstream and safeguards of by PI 09
MV3 and MV5 combustible gas low
(i.e. after the discharge into pressure
previous point
system surroundings (< 0,7
to be covered later bar(g)).
of
more detail in
examination). section Leaks from
system
inside container.

104.1 PSA not Inert accumulation Comme

working as in FCS. Slightly nt: Inert
specified. decreased FCS gases
performance. from the
point of
view of
FCS
e.g. CH4,
CO2.
Comme
nt: High
105.1 MV3 Gas not mixing Restrict
CO
open, flow properly in H2 tank. unauthori
concentra
shorts through Cell voltages may zed
it. fluctuate. access to
system
with a
fence.
Consider
adding
lock to
MV3.
106.1 No Water not Comme
condensation collected, system nt: No
in COND2 due runtime reduced. detection
to low coolant Hot and humid of low
flow or high exhaust gas goes coolant
coolant to vent (70 °C, RH flow.
temperature. = 100 %). Comme
Condensation of
nt:
Exhaust
water in vent
air cooled
pipe. to 30 °C.
Consider
adding
temperat
ure
indicator
in air
exhaust
line after
COND2.

106.2 Water not Comme

Malfunctioning collected, system nt:
of VLS3. runtime reduced. Droplets
Droplets entering may also
vent line. back-flow
to VLS3
due to
gravity.

107.1 Wash- Particle impurities Comme

out of eroded proceed to H20 tank, nt:
FCS cathode and possibly to H20 feed. Chemical
catalyst contamin
carrier. ants from
Impurities air intake
from air not (e.g.
caught in FCS
sulphur
compoun
air intake
ds) very
filter. unlikely.
Fluor traces Placeme
from FCS nt of AFB
membrane or exhaust
membrane vent as
humidifier far
MH1. possible
from FCS
air intake.
108.1 High VP1 diaphragm may Add
ambient be damaged > 60 °C. system
temperature, Electrical equipment EM-SD
fire near or inside FCS may triggered
inside overheat. by TI-13
container, high
insufficient temperat
ventilation.
ure (> 80
°C).

Possible damage Prevent

e.g. to electrical access of
equipment or animals
plastic pipelines. inside
container
by
appropria
te means,
installing
chicken
wire
to large
openings
110.1 Heavy Flooding of Take
of
rain and container floor, care of
container
related possible damage possibility
flooding in to electrical of
surroundings equipment. flooding
of container. in
placemen
t of
container.

FCS unaffected. Consider

Grid outage installatio
triggers FP and n of 2nd
PSA emergency UPS to
shutdown. enable
AUTO-SD
for
FP and
PSA.
112.1 Liquid spills on Add
Equipment container floor or EtOH
failure equipment below detector
leakage, possibly inside
causing damage container.
to electrical Check if
equipment. liquid can
EtOH vaporizes
flow out
of
and accumu-
container
lates at the floor.
bottom of the
container.

113.1 Liquid spills on Check if

Equipment container floor or liquid can
failure equipment below flow out
leakage, possibly of
causing damage container
to electrical floor.
equipment.
114.1 Depending on Add
Equipment leakage location, EtOH
failure state of leaking detector
substance may be inside
liquid or gaseous container.
and thus can exit Consider
casing as liquid or installing
vapour. perforatio
In case of fuel n at top
leakage and if EtOH of FP
vapour separates casing for
from H2O vapour, ventilatio
EtOH vapour may n of
ignite. combusti
In case of reformate ble gases.
gas leakage, gas may Place
ignite from hot additional
surfaces. H2
detector
close to
perforatio
ns.
During
H2or
EtOH
alarm,
personnel
should
not enter
in
container.
Personn
el
entering
container
should
carry
115.1 Combustible gas During
Equipment released inside H2alarm,
failure container. personnel
should
not enter
in
container.
Personn
el
entering
container
should
carry
portable
CO
detectors
and
container
doors
should
be open
for CO
ventilatio
n.
116.1 Released During
Equipment hydrogen H2alarm,
failure accumulates near personnel
container roof, should
forming explosive not enter
mixture. in
container.
Personn
el
entering
container
should
keep
container
doors
open for
H2
ventilatio
n.
117.1 Water vapour
Equipment released into
failure container, which
may condense on
surfaces, possibly
causing damage to
electrical
equipment.
Oxygen content
inside container
decreases.

118.1 Released
Equipment hydrogen forms
failure with air explosive
gas mixture near
leak source.

119.1 Too Explosive gas

high pressure mixture at vent
in system line outlet.
causing some
pressure relief
valve to open.