The counsel seeks permission to approach the bench.

Much obliged

the council seeks to address the bench COLLECTIVELY as your lordshipS.

Much obliged.}

This is the counsel for the petitioners in the case Jitendra Jagga v. Jagannath Salvi

This is council no. 1 and the council will be dealing with issue 1 and will be taking 10 minutes of
this honorable court’s time and my Co counsel will be addressing issues 2 and 3 and will be
taking 18 minutes time of this honorable court and we have respectfully reserved 2 minutes for
rebuttals. our researcher is also present.
If your lordships are well versed with the facts, the council seeks permission to proceed with the
issues/
{The counsel seeks permission to state the facts. Much Obliged}
Facts:
A post-poll alliance known as Gramin Uday Aghadi (GUA) was formed between SSP, (RJP), and
(IJP) with Jitendra Jagga as the CM.

Internal ideological differences within SSP led to a split into factions led by Mr. Jagga and Mr.
Jagganath Salvi. Both factions claimed legitimacy and made contradictory appointments to key party
positions.

The Deputy Speaker, nazim zohari faced a motion of removal from office.

Amidst the turmoil, a floor test was initiated by the Governor, leading to Mr. Jagga's resignation and
Mr. Salvi's appointment as Chief Minister with the support of a coalition.

Mr. ramlal Norway after being elected as the speaker approved the meetings and appointments made
by salvis faction.

Mr. jaggas faction issued a notice of removal to the speaker. Mr. Samay Prakash filed the
disqualification petitions against 39 MLS of salvis faction for defying his whip and Mr. indu gogoi
filed disqualification petitions against 14 MLA's of jagga’s faction.

subsequent writ petition before the Supreme Court was filed.

The council seeks permission to proceed with the first issue if the bench does not have any
preliminary query. Much obliged.
The first issue being:
 I. Whether the Anti-Defection law under the 10th Schedule of the Constitution affects

legislators' ability to make decisions? Does change in ideology after the elections by a

political party entitle the elected members to quit their party/switch sides without

being penalized under the Anti-Defection Law?

 It is most humbly and respectfully submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the anti-defection laws

under 10th Sch of the const., rightfully and legitimately restricts the defecting legislators' ability

to make decisions and penalizes the elected members of a party for quitting or switching sides for

whatsoever reason it may be, be it for the change in ideology or going against the directions of the

Chief whip.

 Your lordships this political phenomenon gave birth to the infamous phrase “Aaya Ram, Gaya

Ram” after an MLA from the state of Haryana defected 4 times within a fortnight in 1967. The

angst and anguish of the public was answered by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment in 1985

which inserted the Tenth Schedule containing anti-defection laws into the Indian Constitution.

1. Constitutional Background: your lordships under Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule a

member of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified from being a

member of the House–

a) If he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party; or

b) If he votes or abstains from voting contrary to directions issued by the political

party to which he belongs without obtaining prior permission of such party and

such act has not been condoned by the political party within 15 days from the date

of such voting.

c) If An elected member of a House joins any political party after such election.
 The law was enacted to address the problem of political defections, which were seen as

detrimental to the functioning of democracy. Therefore, it serves a legitimate

constitutional purpose and does not unduly infringe on legislators' decision-making

ability but rather regulates it within the bounds of party discipline and democratic norms.

 The constitutional validity of anti-defec law has been established by the SC in various cases.

Your Lordship, in the case Kihoto Hollohon v. Zachilhu1 the Supreme Court in a 3:2 judgment

upheld the Constitutional validity of the Anti-Defection law. The majority view held that the

purpose of Schedule Tenth is to provide a “remedy for the evil of unprincipled and unethical

political defections”.

 However, Paragraph 7 which puts restriction on the power of judicial review was held to be

invalid and severed from the rest of the schedule by applying doc of severability.

 The Hon’ble Court also held that the X Schedule of the Constitution did not violate the freedom

of speech, freedom of vote and conscience, of the elected Members of the Parliament and

Legislatures of the states.

 Hon’ble Justice Venkatachaliah, writing for the majority stated that the freedom of speech of a

member is not an absolute freedom.

Further, the majority view in Sundaram’s case2 also held that Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule

is constitutionally valid And do not violate any rights of a member under Articles 105 and 194

of the constitution. In the words of judges:

“The provisions are salutary and are intended to strengthen the fabric of Indian parliamentary

democracy by curbing unprincipled and unethical political defections.”

Whether the Split in the SSP was due to change in ideology: YL, the
counsel contends that the split in the(SSP) was not due to ideological
differences. YL, there is no genuine ideological realignment, and therefore, the
defecting legislators should be disqualified under the anti-defection law.
In the present case, the defecting legislators have failed to demonstrate the
ideological disagreements within the SSP which could justify their defection as

1
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and others, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 651.
2
Ms. Sundaram Finance Ltd. v Regional Transport Officer, AIR 1993 SC 436
an ideological realignment. Also, the defecting legislators did not make any
attempt to resolve their alleged ideological differences within the party
internally.

There is no record of any internal party discussions, resolutions, or dialogues

that could substantiate the existence of genuine ideological differences within
the SSP prior to the defection. The defection appears to be a unilateral decision
by the legislators, motivated by personal or political gains, rather than a
genuine ideological realignment within the party.

2. Speaking abt the Legislators’ ability to make decisions: your lordships, the counsel

contends that the Anti-Defection law under the 10th Schedule restricts a legislator's freedom

to exercise their judgment, limiting democratic choice.

The decision-making ability of the legislators who are subjected to disqualification

proceedings has to be curtailed in every way to preserve the stability of the government as

well as to promote party discipline and hold the legislators accountable towards their party.

3. YL, the Anti-Defection law plays a crucial role in preserving the stability of governments.

The case Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary Governor of Maharashtra3 highlighted the

importance of preventing arbitrary defections that could lead to political instability and the

collapse of elected governments.

4. YL, by restricting the defecting legislators’ ability to make decisions, the law promotes party

discipline and strengthens the functioning of the parliamentary system.

5. YL, The Anti-Defection law enhances accountability by holding legislators accountable to

the party platform and manifesto on which they were elected.

6. YL, The Anti-Defection law protects the democratic mandate by preventing elected

representatives from betraying the trust of voters who elected them based on their party

affiliation and ideology. The defecting legislators' actions should lead to

disqualification to uphold democratic principles and prevent the erosion of

public trust in elected representatives.

3
7. YL, the Anti-Defection law strikes a balance between individual freedom and party

discipline.

8. It is most humbly and respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the elected

members quitting their party or switching sides have to be penalized to ENSURE

8.1. Preservation of electoral mandate:

8.2. Stability in the govt:

8.3. Party discipline:

8.4. Prevention of opportunism:.

The petitioners humbly request the honble court on the basis of the submissions made and
decisions referred to supra, to uphold the sanctity of the anti-defection law and
disqualify the defecting legislators.

If your lordships are satisfied with issue 1 and have no further queries the council would like
to call upon My co council to deal with issues 2 and 3
 The counsel seeks permission to approach the bench. Much obliged

Acknowledging the gracious presence of your ladyships, the council seeks to address the bench
COLLECTIVELY as your lordshipS. And ind as your ladyship
Much obliged.}

This is the counsel for the RESPONDENTS in the case Jitendra Jagga v. Jagannath Salvi

This is council no. 1 and the council will be dealing with issue 1 and will be taking 10 minutes of
this honorable court’s time and my Co counsel will be addressing issues 2 and 3 and will be
taking 18 minutes time of this honorable court and we have respectfully reserved 2 minutes for
surrebuttals. our researcher is also present.
If your lordships are well versed with the facts, the council seeks permission to proceed with the

issues.

your points!!!!!!!!!!!

The counsel seeks permission to proceed with issue no.1….. The first issue being:

I. Whether the Anti-Defection law under the 10th Schedule of the Constitution affects

legislators' ability to make decisions? Does change in ideology after the elections by a

political party entitle the elected members to quit their party/switch sides without being

penalized under the Anti-Defection Law?

1. It is most humbly and respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Anti-

Defection law, despite its well-intentioned purpose, significantly impairs legislators' ability

to make decisions autonomously and in the best interests of their constituents. It

undermines legislative independence, curtails freedom of expression, impedes

representational accountability, and hinders political evolution. Therefore, it is imperative

for the judiciary to carefully examine the constitutionality and practical implications of this

law in order to safeguard the fundamental principles of democracy.

 It is an intra-party dissent.

YL, para 4 of the MP, it is stated that the core ideologies of SSP have always been ,ore like

that of ILP than that of RJP AND IJP. The counsel contends there was an ideological

change after the post poll alliance of ssp, rjp and ijp as GUA. It is clear that the factions

were fractured due to this intra party dissent.

The hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary Governor of

Maharashtra4 observed that the Tenth Schedule cannot be used to stifle intra-party dissent

amongst members of the same political party. Intra-party dissent cannot be termed as

defection. Therefore, the respondents did not indulge in prohibitory conduct under

Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule. Any act of expression of dissent against the

leadership of the party does not constitute ‘voluntarily giving up membership of the party’

under Paragraph 2(1)(a). Paragraph 2(1)(b) also has no applicability in the facts of the case

which likely resembles the facts of the present case.

Yl, In the cases Pratap Gouda Patil v. State of Karnataka and Speaker5, Haryana Vidhan

Sabha v. Kuldeep Bishnoi6, this Court observed that members should not be stopped from

taking part in the proceedings of the House merely because disqualification proceedings

were pending against them.

1.1 Violation of Legislative Independence: FURTHER, the counsel contends that the Anti-

Defection law operates as a sword hanging over legislators, coercing them to toe the party

line even when their conscience and the interests of their constituents dictate otherwise.

This violates the very essence of legislative independence, which is crucial for a vibrant

5
(2019) 7 SCC 463
6
(2015) 12 SCC 381
 democracy. Legislators must be empowered to deliberate freely on legislative matters

without fear of reprisal or penalty.

2. Curtailing Freedom of Expression: YL, the law effectively curtails legislators' freedom

of expression by mandating them to vote in accordance with the party whip, regardless of

their personal convictions or the wishes of their electorate. This undermines the principles

of democratic governance, as it stifles dissent and diversity of opinion within the

legislature.

3. Impeding Representational Accountability: YL, the legislators are elected to represent

the interests of their constituents, not the dictates of their political parties. The Anti-

Defection law, by penalizing legislators for dissenting or voting against party lines,

compromises their ability to faithfully discharge their representational duties. This erodes

the accountability of elected representatives to the people they serve.

4. Hindrance to Political Evolution: YL, democracies thrive on the exchange of ideas and

the evolution of political ideologies. However, the Anti-Defection law discourages

ideological fluidity within political parties by penalizing members who seek to align with

evolving ideologies or dissent from the party's stance. This stifles the democratic process

by inhibiting political evolution and innovation.

5. Violation of Democratic Principles: YL, The essence of democracy lies in the

representation of the people's will, as expressed through elections. If a political party

undergoes a significant change in ideology after the elections, it could be perceived as a

breach of the electoral mandate. Elected members should have the freedom to dissociate

from a party whose ideology no longer aligns with their own or the wishes of their

constituents. In Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar7, the court ruled that criminalization of

7
Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar, (2015) 3 SCC 467.
 politics is a lamentable situation that threatens democracy and has the potential to paralyze

and strangulate the purity of the system.

6. Right to Conscience: The elected representatives have a fundamental right to act in

accordance with their conscience. If the ideological shift within their party contradicts their

own beliefs or the promises made during the election campaign, penalizing them for

switching sides would infringe upon this right.

7. Representative Autonomy: elected representatives should be autonomous in their

decision-making process, especially when faced with a substantial change in their party's

ideology. Upholding the Anti-Defection Law in such cases would undermine the principle

of representative democracy by limiting the ability of elected members to respond to

changing circumstances and evolving public opinion.

8. Constituents' Interests: It is most humbly and respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble

Court that the elected representatives prioritizing the interests of their constituents is the

need of the hour. If a significant portion of their constituents no longer support the changed

ideology of their party, switching sides could be seen as a responsible and legitimate action

to better serve their constituents' interests.

The respondents humbly request the honble court on the basis of the submissions made and
decisions referred to supra,

If your lordships are satisfied with issue 1 and have no further queries the council would
like to call upon My co council to deal with issues 2 and 3