Title: Success and Failure of National Dialogue Selected Countries Cases Study: General

Lesson to Ethiopia
Surafel Getahun (M.A)
senior lecturer and researcher at Department of Political Science and International
Relations
Dire Dawa University
Ethiopia
Tel-0912356664/0935322526
Email:[email protected]

Abstract
This paper aims to analyze the common features of National Dialogues, as well as the political
and procedural factors and conditions that have enabled or constrained the negotiated outcomes
of National Dialogues. The qualitative research approach is used to explore common patterns
given phenomenon. Document analyses were used to extract the information about the analysis
of selected countries cases of National Dialogues held between 1990 and 2014. The research
revealed that while most of the National Dialogues studied reached agreements, half of the cases
failed to implement those agreements or only implemented them to a limited degree. Driven from
the experience of national dialogue in the following selected countries such as, South Africa,
Afghanistan, Sudan, Yemen, Iraq and Tunisia this paper argued that Ethiopia’s national
dialogue to be successful and to resolve the existing conflict for meaningful conversation and
ways to holistically address the underlying drivers of conflict; national dialogue should be seen
beyond the usual group of elite decision makers. This paper identified the risk of national
dialogues is when deliberately misused by leaders seeking to further consolidate their grip on
power. The paper generally, suggest that national dialogues will have a higher likelihood of
success if they incorporate the following principles: inclusion, transparency and public
participation, a far-reaching agenda, a credible convener, appropriate and clear rules of
procedure and an implementation Plan.
Key Word: Consensus. Peacebuilding. Dialogue. Outcome. Transformation

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1. INTORDUCTION
National dialogues have emerged in recent years as powerful tools for peace-building across
Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America (Christopher, 2016). From South Africa (1991)
to Yemen (2013–2014) National dialogues provide important extra-constitutional mechanisms
for developing alternative frameworks and types of „self-mediation structures‟ for fixing the
national systems and contributing to constitution drafting processes. In a fragile or post-conflict
environment, political settlements are crucial to consolidate primacy of politics as the non-
violent means to deal with conflicts over interests, ideology and power (USIP, 2021; IPTI, 2017).

National Dialogue processes can also provide an opportunity to address root causes of conflict
and issues caused by failures of the previous constitutions to provide a basis for an inclusive
social contract, and for satisfying the needs of the citizens (USIP, 2021; IPTI, 2017). As the
result, today, in need of alternative methods for conflict transformation, conflict management
organizations have turned to national dialogues for peace-building and to resolve deep-seated
conflicts in divided societies. However, national dialogues are not restricted to open conflicts.
National dialogues take many forms including: national conferences (Benin, Congo, Togo, Mali,
Niger, Zaire, Chad), multi-party negotiations (The Convention for a Democratic South Africa),
roundtables (Poland, Germany), constituent assemblies (Bolivia, Afghanistan) and National
dialogues can also be deployed in contexts such as a political stalemate or where political
institutions are de-legitimized – as in Bahrain, Yemen, Tunisia, and Lebanon(Blunck et al., 2017;
Harlander, 2016; Berghof Foundation, 2017).

After dragging its feet for over years and repeated calls by various opposition parties, the
Ethiopian government has finally made a crucial move to initiate a National Dialogue. On the
29th of December 2021, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia‟s House of Peoples‟
Representatives approved the establishment of the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission.
The Bill setting up the Commission states that the commission is meant to “pave the way for
national consensus and keep the integrity of the country (SIHA, 2022). According to Awol(2022)
for Ethiopians, the national dialogue an opportunity to chart a new path for peace, political
tolerance, national unity, political and economic equality and a shared Ethiopian destiny (Awol,
2022). Further, the national dialogue also seen as solution to many problems that have plagued

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Ethiopian politics particularly since the 1960s, including the official historical narrative of the
country, the institutional features of linguistic self-determination, the power balance between
national and regional governments, the manner of representation of regions and linguistic groups
in the center, the distribution of national revenue, dispute resolution mechanisms, and
arrangements to ensure institutional representation of minorities in the regions (Adem,2021).

Taking countries such as South Africa, Afghanistan, Sudan, Yemen, Iraq and Tunisia as case
study. This paper discusses the factors that have enabled or constrained National Dialogues to
reach agreements and to achieve sustainable outcomes after an agreement is concluded and
implemented. In each case study cover the historical context, establishment and mandate,
preparatory phase, agenda, delegates, structure, convening and facilitation, public participation
opportunities, political and conflict developments during the dialogue, international involvement,
immediate outcomes, and implementation and longer-term implication.

.
1.2. Methodology
This paper presents overall patterns concerning how National Dialogues have evolved from their
initiation to implementation. The data concerning the process of national dialogue were collected
from secondary sources such as books, article, online journal, conference reports, magazine
newspapers and websites. Patterns identified are based on an inductive, in-depth, qualitative data
analysis, rather than large n-statistical assessments. For this, a process tracing approach was first
applied to each of the 6 cases. I have delineated the process surrounding each National Dialogue
in order to see how they began and evolved, who took part, and with what effects. In each case, I
also sought to determine where the National Dialogue was situated in relation to other major
events of the overall political transition. Thereafter, patterns were identified across the cases.
These particularly focused on a number of inductively identified factors that played an important
role in affecting the outcomes of National Dialogues, notably the attainment and implementation
of agreements.
2. National Dialogues: The Concept
National Dialogues are nationally owned political processes aimed at generating consensus
among a broad range of national stakeholders in times of deep political crisis, in post-war
situations or during far reaching political transitions. Depending on the context, National

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Dialogues can be employed as mechanisms for (a) crisis prevention and management, a shorter-
term endeavor, undertaken strategically as a means to resolve or prevent the outbreak of armed
violence, breaking political deadlocks and re-establishing minimal political consensus (e.g.
Tunisia); or (b) fundamental change, with a longer-term trajectory, envisioned as a means to
redefine state society relations, or establish a new „social contract‟ through institutional and
constitutional changes (e.g. Yemen) (Berghof Foundation, 2017; IFSS, 2020; Haider,
2019;USIOP, 2015; ).

Today, national dialogues are a popular tool for structural reforms, as they provide access for
parties and groups often excluded from or under-represented in political negotiations (Harlander,
2016). They are usually accompanied by broader, inclusive societal consultations aimed at
channeling people‟s concerns and demands into the process; and enhancing legitimacy and
ownership over the process and its outcomes (CEG, 2017; Paffenholz et al., 2017; Papagianni,
2014). National dialogues have clear structures (often a mix of plenary sessions and working
groups) and defined rules and procedures for dialogue and decision-making. Their size and
composition can vary considerably and they can last from several days to several years. Their
objective can involve broad-based change processes (e.g. negotiating a new social contract,
redefining state society relations, establishing new political institutions; and/or determining the
process through which reforms will take place etc.) (Blunck et al., 2017; Kaplan and Freeman,
2017; Paffenholz et al., 2017; Harlander, 2016).

National dialogues with shorter-term endeavors and/or a more narrow set of objectives (e.g.
establishing security arrangements, constitutional amendments, truth commissions etc.; and/or
geared specifically for resolving or preventing the outbreak of violence) are usually more limited
in their mandates, smaller in size and shorter in duration. National dialogues pass through three
successive phases: preparation, process and implementation (Blunck et al., 2017). The
preparation phase can be as long, or longer, than the official process, as it often entails mini-
negotiation processes in itself to establish key parameters and the institutional framework (i.e.
mandate, agenda, participant selection, decision-making procedures, etc.)(Paffenholz et al.,
2017).

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2.2. Key principle in National Dialogue
2.2.1. The degree of inclusion and participation
The degree of inclusiveness, and extent to which different political actors and segments of
society are included, shapes significantly whether stakeholders view the national dialogue as a
valid way in which to address their grievances and aspirations (Blunck et al., 2017; CEG, 2017 ).
There is a growing interest in and recognition of the importance of including women, young
people and minorities in transition processes, which has resulted in more representatives of such
groups appointed to delegations and the incorporation of their views and needs into the agenda
(Blunck et al., 2017; Kaplan and Freeman, 2015).
2.2.2. Agenda that Address the Root Causes of Conflicts.
National dialogue thought to kick its goal does not dangle on superficial and one sided interest
based agenda. Rather, it should be based on key issues which are and can be actual or potential
root causes of violent conflicts a country is confronting or likely to confront and which can be
reached upon with long time (months or even years) negotiating (Haider, 2019, USIOP, 2015,
Berghof Foundation, 2017).
2.2.3. Transparency and Public Participation
A national dialogue cannot be successful if it does not facilitate and give adequate opportunity
for the public to be informed and participate. Even a dialogue that includes all major interest
groups risks losing legitimacy if there are not sufficient opportunities for the public to remain
informed about and feed into the dialogue (Haider, 2019, USIOP, 2015, Berghof Foundation,
2017).
2.2.4. Representation and selection criteria
An established selection criteria and procedures for participants in national dialogues can support
or hinder the broad representation of different social and political groups. Transparency in the
criteria is significantly important.
2.2.5. Clear Mandate and Appropriately Tailored Structure, Rules, and Procedures
If it is needed to undergo a national dialogue which can achieve its set goals, it should have its
own clear mandate which gives purpose and authority to a national dialogue, set of transparent
and carefully tailored procedures with mechanisms to break deadlocks and rules so that
transparent decisions should be made and composes the nature of far-reaching agenda (Haider,
2019, USIOP, 2015, Berghof Foundation, 2017).

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2.2.6. The Role of External Actors and National Ownership
Although national dialogues are widely recognized as a nationally owned process, support or
resistance of external actors can also influence the degree of success of national dialogues
(Odigie, 2017; Paffenholz et al., 2017). To conduct national dialogue that can be fruitful for its
purpose, the responsible body should keep the balance between external interference like in
support ( political, financial and Technical support) or resistance of external actors and national
ownership which is more decisive than the former (Haider, 2019, USIOP, 2015).
2.2.7. Institutional framework and support structures
a comprehensive support structure of important actors close to competing parties can help
participants to be prepared (with the necessary expertise and tools), to compromise and to build
coalitions, allowing them time to agree on common positions. Such structures do not, however,
necessarily improve the quality of participation or guarantee implementation (Haider, 2019,
USIOP, 2021, Berghof Foundation, 2017).

2.2.8. A Credible and Neutral Convener

Credible, respected and political interest-free convener which can take a form of an organization,
or a coalition of organizations, a single person, a group of people is of the extreme importance as
it is a key to bring stake holders to the dialogue by reducing and avoiding the perception of bias
(Haider, 2019, USIOP, 2015, Berghof Foundation, 2017). A credible, broadly accepted,
independent, respected and charismatic convenor, mediator or facilitator can significantly affect
the strength of the national dialogue, indicating seriousness and trust in the process.

2.2.9. Agreed Mechanism for Implementation of Outcomes

The success of national dialogue is judged not only on the dialogue process and the dialogue
itself but also on the interpretation of the dialogue outcomes into practice. Therefore, national
dialogues to be successful should put agreed upon plans that can ensure that the recommendation
gained from the dialogue can be implemented, being incorporated in new constitution, policy,
law, and other programs (Haider, 2019, USIOP, 2015, Berghof Foundation, 2017).

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3. Result and Discussion of Selected Case Study
3.1. South Africa Multi-Party Negotiation Process 1993
The Apartheid system was crumbling amid economic crisis, international isolation and its own
educational and psycho-social ramifications. The end of the Soviet Union posed a predicament
for the liberation movement, which saw its financial and political support dwindling. So both
sides were locked in a mutually „hurting stalemate‟ and under enormous international pressure to
resolve the conflict. The peace process was kicked off on February 2, 1990 with an
announcement by the then president FW de Klerk to unban all banned political movements and
start negotiations for a „new South Africa‟. These included formal meetings between the ANC
and the government in Groote Schuur and Pretoria, followed by a National Peace Accord that
was signed by 27 political, trade union and government leaders. It set out a code of conduct for
the transition period and paved the way for the first multi-party forum Convention for a
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) (USIOP, 2021, Berghof Foundation, 2017).

After CODESA I and II failed, negotiations were brought back on track through continued
bilateral talks between the ANC and the government, and the convention of the Multi-Party
Negotiation Process (or Multi-Party Negotiating Forum), where an interim constitution was
adopted. Free and fair elections on April 27, 1994 mandated a constitutional assembly that
adopted the constitution in 1996. Combining elements of crisis management (containing
violence) and fundamental change, the peace process famously set out to create the new
„Rainbow Nation‟ by achieving a new consensus on society‟s basic principles, norms and
procedures. Probably one of the most famous peace processes, it is particularly noteworthy for
the quality of leadership of both top leaders, and leaders on all societal levels and sectors (note
the high importance of the Consultative Business Movement as well as religious leaders); serious
efforts also to vertical inclusivity despite its essentially elite character; and its high level of
national ownership through self-mediation (Berghof Foundation, 2017).

Objective: To negotiate a Constitution for the Transition, develop and adopt constitutional
principles binding for the Constitutional Assembly (CA) and thus contribute to the primary
objective of creating a new constitution for South Africa.

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Mandate: Mandated by a Record of Understanding between ANC and NP and a subsequent all-
party planning conference following the failed predecessor talks CODESA I and II.
Participation and selection criteria: The MPNP was attended by 26 parties, including political
groups, national and homeland government representatives and traditional leaders. The process
was more inclusive than the previous two efforts, with the KwaZulu homeland government, the
Conservative Party and the Volksunie participating. The Pan Africanist Congress attended with
reservations. Only a number of extreme Afrikaner parties and the far-left Azanian People„s
Organisation did not join.
Facilitation: While the earlier CODESA talks were chaired by senior judges, MPNP meetings
were chaired by members of the negotiation teams on a rotating basis, thus increasing the sense
of inclusion of the parties.
International support: Both main parties, the NP government and the ANC, were opposed to
international mediation. As a result, the process was largely self-mediated, with the notable
exception of the Kenyan academic Washington Okumu, who managed to broker an end to a
boycott by the IFP after a failed negotiation attempt by former US Secretary of State, Henry
Kissinger, and former British Foreign Minister, Lord Carrington, in March 1994(Berghof
Foundation, 2017).
Outcomes: :The MPNP‟s output included a Constitution for the Transition, as well as four other
draft bills on transition structures for the run-up period to the elections (Transitional Executive
Council, Independent Electoral Commission and Independent Media Commission) and a
permanent body to control broadcasting (Independent Broadcasting Authority). Delegates also
agreed on a new electoral act to govern the elections for the Constitutional Assembly (USIOP,
2021, Berghof Foundation, 2017).
Challenges/ lessons learned: The 1990 national dialogue opened a unique window of
opportunity for South Africa to address its intractable conflict .The parties had drawn lessons
from CODESA and redesigned the negotiation process and structures accordingly in an all-party
preparation conference in March 1993. Their lessons included the importance of having a simple
structure with one negotiating and one decision-making body; the use of technical experts to
enable „interest-based‟ discussion; the establishment of a trusted „coordinating committee‟ to
function as guardians of the process, anticipate and pre-empt problems; and the seminal role of
deadlock-breaking mechanisms that the parties had agreed on beforehand. Local peace

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committees in South Africa played an important role in bringing the process closer to the people
and in diffusing tensions and preventing the violence from expanding (USIOP, 2021, Berghof
Foundation, 2017).

3.2. The Comprehensive National Dialogue Conference in Yemen (2013–2014)

Following Tunisia and Egypt, Yemen was rocked by the Arab Spring in January 2011 and has
not managed to transition to a democratic and peaceful state. Popular protests to topple President
Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been in power for thirty-three years, began in January 2011.
Eventually, Saleh was forced to agree to a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-brokered deal to
hand over power in April 2011. However, he refused to sign it until November 2011. The GCC
deal specified that Saleh leave office in thirty days and make way for his Vice-President Abd
Rabbuh Mansour Hadi in return for full immunity from prosecution for Saleh. Hadi was to form
and preside over a Government of National Unity which would govern the country before
presidential elections took place within ninety days ((Haider, 2019; Berghof Foundation, 2017).

The deal also established a two-year transitional period during which the military and security
institutions were to be restructured and a national dialogue would be convened to prepare the
ground for new elections to be held by February 2014. According to the GCC agreement, the
national dialogue was to provide an opportunity for representatives from all walks of Yemeni
society to voice their concerns and stances, including women and youth groups, the Southern and
Houthi movements and other political parties and civil society representatives. A Preparation
Committee of twenty-five members, including women and youth, was formed in July 2012 and
started working in August to prepare the national dialogue (Lackner 2012).

objective: To discuss the process of drafting a new constitution, including the establishment of a
constitutional drafting commission; formulate the underlying principles of constitutional reform;
address issues of a national dimension (Southern and Sa‟ada issue); address topics related to
transitional justice, societal reconciliation, HR protection, advancement of women and
sustainable development. The broader aim of the NDC was to lay the foundations for a social
contract aiming at national unity and social cohesion in Yemen.

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Political mandate: Negotiations and subsequent agreement between the Yemeni ruling party
and the main opposition bloc (JMP) Formal mandate: GCC implementation mechanism and
subsequent Presidential Decree No.30 (July 12, 2012)
Participation and selection criteria:The criteria for participation were defined by the Technical
Committee for the Preparation of the NDC. The main constituencies were defined in the GCC
initiative implementation mechanism. No constituencies were excluded although some were or
felt underrepresented such as the Hirak movement. During the selection process, political parties
and components were each asked to nominate their own delegates in line with the quota of the
NDC mandate (30% women, 20% youth, 50% Southeners). Independent women, youth and
CSOs delegates were chosen by the Technical Committee after a call for applications and
review. Criteria, such as age (18-40 for youth) and non-political affiliation had to be met. The
remaining 61 delegates were chosen by the President without clear criteria (Haider, 2019).

Facilitation: Each of the nine working groups of the NDC elected their own chairperson and
vice chairperson and rapporteur who acted as facilitator
International support: International support was provided by the “G10 + countries” (permanent
members of UNSC, EU and GCC). Good office support was delivered through the team of
UNSESGY Jamal Benomar. The role of the UN and Special Envoy was mandated by the GCC
initiative implementation (USIOP, 2021; Berghof Foundation, 2017).

Outcomes: The NDC outcomes document summarizes the results of the working groups and
served as guiding reference for the new constitution. Discussions on the draft constitution could
not take place because of the outbreak of the civil war ((Haider, 2019; USIOP, 2021; Berghof
Foundation, 2017).

Challenges/ lessons learned: The National Dialogue Conference 2013 in Yemen was successful
in achieving inclusiveness in its dialogue process. It enabled a diverse group of political and
social actors in Yemeni society (including smaller political parties, youth, women and other
groups traditionally been excluded from political decision-making) to sit at the same table on an
equal footing and to be involved in decision-making processes (Elayah et al., 2018; Hartmann,
2017; Gaston, 2014; Hassan and Eshaq, 2014). Some of the criticism was related to the
underrepresentation of the South, especially with regard to the Hirak movement. Furthermore,

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the absence of confidence-building measures especially in the South and Sa‟ada, lack of
community involvement and interaction as well as the broad mandate of the NDC compromised
implementation of the NDC outcomes. In addition, the weak stance of the central government
and presidency also hindered and slowed down the materialization of the NDC outcomes
Berghof Foundation, 2017).

3.3.Afghanistan Constitutional Loya Jirga 2003–2004

Following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent fall of the Taliban regime in
late 2001, the Constitutional Loya Jirga was part of the country‟s transitional framework (better
known as Bonn Process) brokered by 25 prominent Afghan and international actors during the
UN-sponsored International Conference on Afghanistan held in Bonn in December 2001. The
Constitutional Loya Jirga was thus part of the Bonn Process of nation-building in Afghanistan.
The Constitutional Loya Jirga was mandated to adopt a new constitution for Afghanistan, after it
had been drafted by the 9-member Drafting Committee and finalized by the 33-member Drafting
Commission(Berghof Foundation, 2017)..

Initially not foreseen in the Bonn Agreement, this body was inaugurated in April 2003 in a
critical step to increase both inclusivity of the drafting body and public participation in the
drafting process. The Commission‟s task was to broadly consult with the public and extensively
rework and finalize the constitutional draft according to the outcome of the consultation.
Although the CLJ aimed for certain fundamental normative changes relating to more inclusivity,
gender-sensitivity and multi-ethnicity (as anchored in the Bonn Agreement), it was mainly a tool
for crisis management to enable the quick establishment of functioning governance structures.
The Constitutional Loya Jirga is seen as a process that created a high level of Afghan ownership,
allowing for debate among political actors, but also creating forums for public participation.
Inclusivity and legitimacy of the process however sufered from the exclusion of the Taliban and
Hizb-I Islami.

Objective: Draft a constitution based on a societal consensus Nation-building in Afghanistan

Mandated :Mandated by peace agreement following US invasion (Bonn Agreement)

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Participation and selection criteria:502 delegates; 450 to be elected, remaining 50 (25 women
and 25 experts) to be appointed by president; 2 additional persons appointed to represent the
disabled community; 33 members of the judiciary and transitional administration invited as
observers without the rights to vote or speak. Senior government, army and police officials not
eligible to participate. The 450 elected delegates were chosen as follows: 344 members elected
through secret ballot by district representatives of the Emergency Loya Jirga process; 42
members elected by representatives of refugees in Pakistan and Iran, internally displaced people,
Kuchis, Hindus and Sikhs (15% women); 64 women members to be elected by women
representatives in the 32 province (Berghof Foundation, 2017;Haider, 2019).

Facilitation: Chair (Leadership Bureau and CLJ): Hazrat Sibghatullah Mujadeddi

International support:: Despite some international advisors, foreign technical assistance was
kept to a minimum to prevent the perception that the constitution was being written by non-
Afghans. The process was assisted by IGOs (UNAMA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNOPS, ISAF),
national and foreign NGOs, the Ministry of Interior and the security firm Global Risk Strategies.
The US and the UN played a key role throughout the Bonn Process (Berghof Foundation, 2017;
Haider, 2019

Outcome: The constitution was ratified by the president on January 26, 2004. The 162 articles of
the constitution provide for a centralized presidential system with a bicameral parliament, strong
minority rights, and a strengthening of women‟s rights, as well as a framework for the
establishment of the rule of law

Challenges/ lessons learned: The design and structure of the transitional process and the
Constitutional Loya Jirga in particular enabled a reasonable range of political actors to have a
political debate owned and essentially driven by Afghan actors and involving popular
consultations. However, significant groups were excluded – the Taliban and Hizb-I Islami.
Women‟s participation at the CLJ reached approximately 20 percent. Despite this high
representation, women‟s active engagement and participation was limited due to warlord
intimidation. The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission prepared a very detailed
framework to establish clear Rules of Procedure. Implementation however turned out to be
challenging, with warlords trying to dominate the working groups and exert undue pressure.

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Following initial difficulties to fund the CLJ, a donor friends group to the process was
established. Since the Constitutional Commission was not independent of the Afghan President,
the draft constitution deliberated by the CLJ was strongly influenced by President Karzai, rather
than by the Commission‟s public consultation efforts (Berghof Foundation, 2017; Haider, 2019).

3.4. Sudanese National Dialogue and National Dialogue Conference (2014–2016)

The Sudanese National Dialogue emerged in the context of a protracted civil war (South Blue
Nile, South Kordofan and Darfur) paired with internal crises and instability. The conflict
between government and the various opposition forces had reached a hurting stalemate, and
neither side had a clear advantage over the other. Against this backdrop, in January 2014 the
Sudanese president called upon political forces in the country, including opposition parties and
armed groups, to join a National Dialogue process.

The National Dialogue aimed at re-establishing the constitutional and political foundation of the
state through a cooperative approach involving all Sudanese. The National Dialogue‟s specific
objective was to elaborate a constitution which protects and reaffirms the fundamental rights,
freedoms and social justice of all Sudanese. It resulted in the adoption of the National Document
of Sudan, which is meant to serve as the basis for elaborating a new constitution. The process
continues to suffer from a lack of inclusivity in terms of representation and substance. Notably,
the largest opposition parties and armed movements withdrew from the process, and were absent
from the National Dialogue Conference (Berghof Foundation, 2017; Haider, 2019).

Objective: To establish a constitutional, political and community foundation which would

underpin a just state, built on the cooperation and solidarity amongst all Sudanese

Mandate: call for dialogue came from President El Bashir in January 2014 as a response to war,
political conflicts and economic difficulties

Participation and selection criteria: The General Assembly of the National Dialogue
Conference included about 250 members from registered political parties, armed movements and
national figures and community leaders. They were selected by consensus by the High
Coordination Committee. Each party to the Dialogue nominated one representative and one

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deputy. Their exact numbers varied throughout the process, as some parties, movements and
figures joined in the course of the conference, while others left to boycott the National Dialogue.

Facilitation: The General Assembly and all three preparatory Consultative Meetings were
chaired by President El Bashir. Each committee was chaired by a high-ranking member of the
government or opposition whose deputy came from the other side, i.e. either opposition or
government

International support: The process was nationally owned with AUHIP, UN and international
partners providing assistance as possible. The final session was attended by the presidents of
Egypt, Mauritania, Chad and Uganda, the prime minister of Ethiopia and the secretary-general of
the Arab League (Berghof Foundation, 2017).

Outcomes: The National Document, which is meant to form the basis for a new constitution,
was adopted by the General Assembly on October 10, 2014.

Challenges/ lessons learned: The entire process was characterized by a lack of viability and the
absence of political will to adhere to the conditions agreed upon, including ceasefires and the
governmental decrees aimed to allow free opposition political activity. The preparatory process
and the National Dialogue Conference itself were marred by issues of non-representation. Even
though a great multitude of movements were part of the process, the strongest opposition parties,
including the Umma party, the Reform Now Movement and the National Unity Parties Alliance,
withdrew from the process. They formed a new alliance, “Sudan Call”, which boycotted the
process and also included the Sudanese Communist Party, the Sudanese Congress party, unionist
and Baath parties, the Naserists, CSO initiatives, the Sudanese Revolutionary front which
included the SPLM/N, JEM, the SLM, Abdel Wahid, Meni Arkawi and others (Berghof
Foundation, 2017).

3.5.Iraqi National Conference 2004

The Iraqi National Conference was part of the transitional framework installed after the US-led
invasion of Iraq by the US-appointed Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA). The National Conference was mandated by the Law of
Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL), which was contested by a

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number of actors and did not represent a wide political agreement. The National Conference was
mandated to establish the Interim National Council, a non-legislative oversight body of the
Interim Government with a limited mandate. Another objective was to initiate a national
dialogue process and create national consensus. While the first objective was more intended as
crisis management, the latter was geared towards fundamental change. While the Conference
succeeded in establishing a National Council, it neither expanded political participation in the
National Council, nor did it create national consensus, owing to a lack of public awareness, and a
lack of political agreement on the TAL, directly resulting in the exclusion of key national
stakeholders. This led to a political marginalization of the National Conference, rendering it
effectively meaningless (Berghof Foundation, 2017).

Objective: To establish the Interim National Council as an oversight body to the Interim
Government, and to create national consensus.

Mandated: Mandated by the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) by the US appointed Iraqi
Governing Council (IGC) following the US invasion of Iraq.

Participation: change 1st paragraph to 1,200 to 1,500 delegates. Participants included

representatives from Iraq's political parties, regions, women's groups and other civil society
organizations, universities, as well as Iraq's main tribes, ethnic groups and religious sects,
including Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, and Christians. About half the participants were selected by the
Provincial Supervisory Committees. In each of Iraq‟s 18 regions, the committees reviewed
applications and nominations and submitted delegates‟ names to the High Preparatory
Commission (HPC). The provincial preparatory selection process was often criticized as flawed.
Other delegates were directly nominated by members of the HPC. In the final stages of planning,
UN representatives assisting the Iraqis further requested to expand the number of participants
beyond the originally scheduled 1,000 delegates in order to better represent minorities and other
underrepresented groups (Berghof Foundation, 2017).

International support: Strong involvement by international parties. US representatives were

attending as observers and US officials helped with security, accommodations, and logistics of
the National Conference. The US gave the entire process a strong directive impulse by
appointing the members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) which subsequently shaped and

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dominated the entire process (through TAL, HPC and the selection of participants of the
National Conference). The United Nations provided assistance during the planning and process
phase. Muad Massum chaired the High Preparatory Commission and subsequently the National
Conference plenum

Outcome: The Conference established the Interim National Council, body acting from August
2004 to January 2005 to oversee the Iraqi Interim Government. It was widely perceived as a
cosmetic act to legitimize preexisting transitional arrangements.

Challenges/ lessons learned: The whole process suffered from a lack of ownership,
inclusiveness and legitimacy, and was to a large extent elite-driven (and to some extent
perceived as foreign-driven). A lack of agreement on key principles in the preparation phase
(deep disagreement on the presence of foreign troops and the appointment of the Interim
Government) eventually resulted in the Conference‟s failure to build national consensus.

3.6. Tunisian National Dialogue 2013–2014

Following the ousting of President Zine El Abadine Ben Ali after mass demonstrations during
the so-called Dignity Revolution in January 2011, elections to determine the composition of the
National Constituent Assembly took place in October 2011. The Islamist political party Ennahda
won the elections, though only with 37 percent of the vote. This forced it to share power with
two secular parties in what became known as „the Troika‟ government. This power sharing
arrangement caused unending squabbles over a new Constitution inside the Constituent
Assembly. Ennahda‟s 89 delegates (out of a total of 217) were felt to be pressing their religious
agenda, and political wrangling ensued, which postponed the preparation of the Constitution
(Ottaway 2013:2).

On July 25, 2013, the drafting of a new constitution by the Constituent Assembly came to a
complete deadlock caused by the assassination of the party leader Mohamed Brahmi. It was the
second politically motivated assassination in 2013 after party leader Chokri Belaïd had been
killed in February outside his home. This increased the divide between the government, led by
the Islamist party Ennahda, and the new coalitions of left-wing and secular forces and parties. At
this critical moment, politicians and civil society actors engaged in a difficult but successful
National Dialogue: Tunisia‟s General Labour Union, which had in 2012 and 2013 already

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launched several initiatives aiming to initiate a National Dialogue, led the formation of a
Dialogue Quartet. The Quartet managed to break the political deadlock by successfully
facilitating negotiations for a roadmap. It articulated three issues which would be addressed
during the National Dialogue: the finalization of the constitution, replacement of the government
with a technocrat government, and preparation of elections. (USIOP, 2021, Berghof Foundation,
2017).Tunisia‟s 146-article draft constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on
January 26, 2014. The clear focus of the Tunisian National Dialogue was crisis management.
Therefore, it was an ad hoc process which was not planned and designed, with a number of
actors pushing and pulling in different directions at the same time to avoid further aggravation of
the situation. The process did not address other pressing issues raised by the population in the
uprising in 2010-2011 which had triggered the political reform process (USIOP, 2021, Berghof
Foundation, 2017).

Duration: 6 months (July 26, 2013–January 26, 2014). Being an ad hoc crisis management
mechanism, the Tunisian National Dialogue did not differentiate between preparation and
process phases (USIOP, 2021).

Objective: To finalize the drafting of a constitution, to replace the government with a technocrat
government, and to prepare elections.

Mandate: 23 out of 27 political parties represented in the National Constituent Assembly agreed
to enter into a process of National Dialogue mediated by the Quartet by signing the roadmap on
October 5, 2013

Participation: The Quartet addressed the 27 political parties in the National Constituent
Assembly and invited them to accept the roadmap and enter into a process of negotiations and
dialogue. Simultaneously, a wide number of individuals and organizations had meetings, corridor
talks, phone calls and negotiations to save the country from collapsing. Outside, activists, civil
society organizations, party supporters, intellectuals and politicians held demonstrations in an
attempt to influence the political process. Signatories to the roadmap included the Islamist party
Ennahda, heading the government, and Ettakatol, part of the government, as well as the strongest
contender, Nidaa Tounes. The government party Congress for the Republic (CPR) and the party

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Tayar Al Mahabba (former Aridha party) did not sign the agreement. Attayar Dimokrati and the
Wafa party refused to participate from the beginning (Berghof Foundation, 2017).

Facilitation: Tunisia‟s General Labour Union led the formation of the Quartet, a coalition of the
Tunisian General Labour Union, the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts,
the Tunisian Human Rights League and the Tunisian Bar Association. The Quartet managed to
break the political deadlock through a roadmap re-establishing a framework for the political
transition. The Quartet acted as a mediator during the National Dialogue.

International support: The process was supported by the UNDP, the EU, individual countries
through the UNDP programme, as well as international NGOs

Outcome: The constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on January 26, 2014. It
provides for a unitary semi-presidential representative democratic republic with a president
serving as head of state, a prime minister as head of government, and a unicameral legislature,
the Assembly of the Representatives of the People.

Challenges/ lessons learned: The Tunisian National Dialogue was acute crisis management and
addressed a political crisis. Therefore, it was not a planned and designed process, but unfolded in
an ad hoc manner. The process took place among politicians and elites and did not include the
wider population. It did not address the need for socio-economic reforms raised by the
population in the uprising in 2010 to 2011 (Berghof Foundation, 2017; Haider, 2019).

4. Success and failure of Nation Dialogues experience from Selected Case Study: General
Lessons to Ethiopia
Ethiopia‟s violence and instability have their roots in long-standing state-building deficits. These
primarily include divergent interpretations of the country‟s political history, a lack of social
cohesion, and an absence of national consensus on major state symbols and institutions.
Experiences from the above cases studies indicates, the process must account for realities on the
ground, in particular, conflicts elsewhere in Ethiopia. For a national dialogue to succeed, it
considers the following many valuable lessons drawn from the case studies such as:-

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A.Political will
Based on a comparative analysis of 6 cases of national dialogues held between 1990 and 2014,
Paffenholz et al. (2017) find that the support or resistance of elites to national dialogue is a
crucial factor determining the chances of reaching and implementing agreements (Paffenholz et
al., 2017). In such situations, for example in Sudan, negotiations can be conducted in bad faith;
with declared objectives of a national dialogue not necessarily reflecting the actual objectives of
the parties (Harlander, 2016; El-Battahani, 2014).

For national dialogue to work in Ethiopia at the current moment, the government needs to
recognize the enormity of the moment and create a political environment that would enable an
inclusive national dialogue. Ending the armed hostilities in Tigray, Oromia, and Benishangul-
Gumuz and releasing all political prisoners are among the necessary conditions for an inclusive
national dialogue (Awol, 2022). Its success, however, depends on how genuine the government
is. if the governments is planning on using the National Dialogue as a „fig leaf‟ and not engage in
it in good faith, it is doomed to fail. With this in mind, it is useful to analyze the National
Dialogue process so far using internationally accepted yardsticks (Buli 2022).

Drawing lesson from the cases studies discussed above the planned national dialogue of Ethiopia
must first agree to a process through which decisions and compromises will be reached. On the
other hand the initiative for the dialogue has been taken and some of the activities have been
done exclusively by the ruling parity, the opposition political parties should not seek to
impose preliminary substantive red lines, which would undermine the process.On the other hand,
the government should also accept that it is one of the participants in the dialogue, rather than
seeking to impose its way (Adem, 2021).

B.Neutrality Convener
Experience demonstrates that procedural fairness and inclusivity are key features of national
dialogues that are successful in transitioning toward lasting and sustainable peace. First and
foremost, a successful dialogue requires that the custodian is neutral. It is this body that plays the
essential function of deciding on the objectives, participants, agenda, and structure of the
process. Accordingly, for the dialogue to be legitimate, the custodian must build trust among

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participants by being neutral. A National Dialogue has three phases: preparatory, process, and
implementation. Each of these phases reinforces or undermines the other (Buli, 2022).

Experiences of countries such as Poland and Iraq show the significance of forming neutral
working groups or committees during the preparatory stage. Having credible conveners also
enhances the legitimacy of national talks. Consultation methods, vetting, selection and
appointment of the organizers are essential to the integrity of both the process and its outcomes.
For example, one of the failure of Sudan dialogue was the conveners were appointed by those
countries‟ presidents, with limited or no consultation with opposition parties and armed groups.
(Meressa and Dawit, 2020).Therefore, Public trust in who convenes a national dialogue is
especially critical in a deeply polarized society like Ethiopia. The whole process should depend
on the integrity, impartiality, and public perception of the convener.
C.Links to other transition processes
National dialogues must be embedded in larger change processes in order to stimulate real
structural change (Blunck et al., 2017; Murray, 2017). A national dialogue‟s mandate should
outline what powers it has and how it relates to the rest of the political process and to existing
institutions (Pagagianni, 2014). If a national dialogue is designed to play a role in the writing of a
new constitution or to reform problems with an existing document, for example, it needs to be
linked to a process and set of institutions that achieves one of these objectives (Blunck et al.,
2017). Establishing structured links between national dialogue and other political processes is
another vital measure, which helps avoid a competitive environment (Meressa and Dawit,
2020).In South Africa, political dialogues determined the constitutional framework and the
process for the establishment of a constitution-making body and holding of elections (Kaplan
and Freeman, 2015). In contrast Sudan national dialogues weren‟t sufficiently linked to other
ongoing processes.

The Ethiopian Government should ensure that the National Dialogues are not perceived as an
end goal, but rather as part of a larger transitional roadmap that is accompanied by economic,
structural, political, and judicial reform processes. Therefore, the Ethiopian government is
encouraged to facilitate the development and implementation of humanitarian relief measures
and economic stabilization programs, as these are immediate peace dividends.

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D.Common ground
Successful national dialogue processes have involved negotiating parties that had a strong
support base and credible claim of legitimacy in representing their constituency, alongside the
political will to implement what was agreed (El-Battahani, 2014). The different agendas of the
key conflict actors in Sudan during 2005- 2011 (El-Battahani, 2014), for example, and between
conflicting factions in Yemen (alongside an externally driven agenda) undermined the
development of a common view or shared objectives in dialogue. This, in turn, exacerbated
distrust among conflicting actors (Elayah et al., 2018).

Ethiopia is chronically divided along ethnic, religious, and political lines, which is why a
National Dialogue is essential. There are fundamental differences over its history, national
emblems, system of government, and so on (Buli, 2022). The country will only survive if its
leaders and the elite come together to forge a new national consensus and build a new political
order that will ensure the dignity, co-existence and solidarity of its people (Awol, 2022).Drawing
from failure and success of national dialogue from other countries, Ethiopia‟s National dialogue
process should consider where all stakeholders can come together such as key political actors,
armed groups and civil society and explore critical national issues to arrive at a shared and
sustainable political settlement. At the same time the planned national dialogue should consider
some critical differences among groups but the goal should be to arrive at a common national
agenda.

E.Public buy-in
Public support or lack thereof is another key element that either enables or constrains progress in
the national dialogue process (Paffenholz et al., 2017). Public information, good communication,
and media engagement are thus key elements, as they influence the degree of public support and
perceptions of legitimacy. In contrast, if the public is unaware of the national dialogue, it will
neither be able to provide input nor feel inclined to promote its results (Blunck et al., 2017). In
Iraq, for example, the national dialogue proceeded without any sound public information
campaign or public debate and with minimal media attention. In addition, the agenda was set in a
very short time, only days prior to the event. This lack of information sharing effectively

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hindered any meaningful participation by opposition groups and civil society, resulting in a
narrow, politically one-sided process involving immediate political elite (Paffenholz et al.,
2017).

Transparency and public engagement are also central to the national dialogue process, and can
be achieved through public consultations, regular outreach and media coverage. Sudan and Iraq
had their own limitations in this regard. In Sudan, debates took place only in the conference
room used for the talks. Media coverage was inadequate and the government introduced
repressive measures such as arresting some key opposition figures (Meressa and Dawit, 2020).
On the other hand, the dialogues in Tunisia were centred on political elites, and public
participation was limited. In Sudan the talks were started by the incumbent presidents, without
much participation by some major opposition and armed groups. This proved to be a weakness,
undermining the dialogues‟ credibility in the preparation phase, and later hampering the
implementation of recommendations (Berghof Foundation, 2017). Drawing from the lesson, the
planned Ethiopia national dialogue process should consider public outreach programs and
consultation to citizens across the country, while the media should meticulously cover every
single step. Work could start with the reconciliation commission, which could educate the public
about the dimensions of reconciliation and what the commission aims to achieve.

F.Inclusiveness and broad based participation

For the National Dialogue Commission and the resultant national dialogues to have the desired
reconciliatory effect, there has to be inclusion of all stakeholders, including civil society actors,
women, youth, and marginalized groups in Ethiopia. Additionally, there must be inclusion of
power-holders from the informal and traditional sections of Ethiopia including religious leaders,
and cultural leaders (SIHA, 2022).Inclusivity and the participation of a wide range of
stakeholders during negotiations are crucial to accommodating divergent interests and needs. For
example one of the failures of Sudan national Dialogue is despite including many participants;
dialogues didn't adequately involve key opposition political parties and armed groups. The
groups were either excluded from the talks intentionally, or boycotted the processes due to
dissatisfaction regarding government‟s role (Meressa and Dawit, 2020). Inclusion and broad
based participation is most important as the lesson indicate one of the failures of Sudan national

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dialogue is the exclusion of the participant from the process. Therefore, in order to ensure the
credibility and legitimacy of the planned national dialogues in Ethiopia inclusiveness must exist
since the beginning starting from the initial formation of committees to the implementation of the
negotiated outcome.

Appropriate and clear rules of procedure and an implementation plan.

A dialogue process will not in itself solve the problems of the country. Effective implementation
of the dialogue‟s outcomes is needed, including of any recommendations to amend policy and
legislation as well as on accountability and reconciliation. The high expectations of the process
must be managed. The last lesson from countries in the South Africa and Sudan is that
implementation mechanisms for national dialogue outcomes must be clear from the start. The
value of the entire process ultimately lies in whether its recommendations are acted upon. For
instance, Sudan‟s national talks resulted in 994 recommendations none of which were
implemented by the government (Meressa and Dawit, 2020). In contrast, the South Africa
showed ways that dialogue outcomes could be implemented.

As the case study indicate appropriate and clear rules of procedure and an implementation plan
are important for the success of negotiated outcome of national dialogue. Hence, Ethiopia
national dialogue commission need established specialized institutions with the mandate of
executing suggestions agreed to in negotiations, and room should be created for civil society to
monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of implementation. In this regard, the working groups
should establish roadmap that may include rules and regulations, institutional arrangements, and
objectives of the dialogue.

H.External actors and national ownership

Although national dialogues are widely recognized as a nationally owned process, support or
resistance of external actors can also influence the degree of success of national dialogues
(Odigie, 2017; Paffenholz et al., 2017). Relevant external actors can include neighboring
countries, international support groups, or regional and international organizations. However, it
is important to strike a balance between external support and national ownership (POMEPS,
2013). It can be challenging to navigate the involvement of various external actors as they may

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have opposing objectives or views in supporting the national dialogue (Harlander, 2016). For
example, in Yemen, there were concerns among the local population that the NDC was more of
an externally driven process rather than a Yemeni national process (Kestement, 2017); and that
external actors differed from local actors and each other in their interests and objectives.

The lessons from the cases study discussed above shows for the successful conduct and
implement the negotiated outcome of national dialogue the planned national dialogue of Ethiopia
should consider where all stakeholders can come together and explore critical national issues to
arrive at a shared and sustainable political settlement. On the other hand, the national dialogue
should be the nationally owned but internationally support process (Awol, 2022). The
commissioners and technical support staff should take important lesson such as capacity building
training from international expertise in national dialogue as well as facilitation and negotiation.
Further, the National Dialogue Commission should ensure that there is national capacity to
effectively implement the mandate of the commission. This in turn will ensure national
ownership and that the dialogues are seen as an Ethiopian process and not an external imposition
(SIHA, 2022).

Conclusion
Initiatives that foster national dialogue are needed more than ever in Ethiopia. In Ethiopian past
regimes, including the one led by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) before 2018,
downplayed the need for such dialogue by saying that the timing was not right, and that Ethiopia
faced too many challenges at that moment. Drawing from a lesson from the cases studied
discussed, the research findings prevails that a national dialogue would provide a means for
competing ideologies and communities within Ethiopia to redefine their relationships and
promote greater understandings on divisive and polarizing issues. A national dialogue could help
bridge the gap between the different actors and foster a culture of communication and
collaboration. Nevertheless, there are some essential elements that are needed in order to engage
in a genuine National Dialogue initiative. These include a strong political will and broad support
from society; inclusiveness of all relevant stakeholders and a sense of national ownership among
government and state institutions, political actors, and civil society.
Recommendations

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  For the National Dialogue Commission and the resultant national dialogues to have the
desired reconciliatory effect, there has to be inclusion of all stakeholders, including civil
society actors, women, youth, and marginalized groups in Ethiopia. Additionally, there
must be inclusion of power-holders from the informal and traditional sections of Ethiopia
including religious leaders, and cultural leaders.
 National Dialogues have to clearly define their relationship to the state and the existing
constitution so that the outcome of the National Dialogue deliberations can be
implemented and will not challenge in the courts because of their unconstitutionality
 There must be recognition that a broad range of stakeholders have a legitimate role to
play in overcoming the crisis in Ethiopia.
 Indigenous practices of conflict resolution are recognized and incorporated.
 The agenda is set by the public and is free from political power plays and corruption.
.

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