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[No. 5270. January 15, 1910.]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. H. N. BULL,

defendant and appellant.

1. AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE WAR,

TREATIES, AND TO ACQUIRE TERRITORY; STATUS OF
ACQUIRED TERRITORY.—The Constitution confers upon the
United States the power to make war and treaties, and to acquire
territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to
the United States, but does not become a part of the United States
until formally incorporated therein by Congress. Until this is done,
it is the duty of Congress to provide all needful rules and
regulations for its government, and in legislating with reference
thereto, Congress is limited only by those provisions of the
Constitution which go to the very root if its power to act at all,
irrespective of time or place.

2. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS;

NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS.—The Government of the
Philippine Islands is not that of a State or a Territory, although its
form and organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands
outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States and
Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and
maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United States,
which, however, operates on the President and Congress, and not
on the inhabitants of the Philippines and the Philippine
Government.

3. ID.; POWERS AND LIMITATIONS; SOURCE OF ITS

ORGANIC LAWS.—For its powers and the limitations thereon the
Government of the Philippines looks to the orders of the President
before Congress acted, and the Acts of Congress after it assumed
control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and legally
expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the
sovereign constituency which lies back of American constitutions.

4. ID.; A COMPLETE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISM WITH

THE USUAL DEPARTMENTS.—Within the limits of its authority
the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental
organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments
exercising the functions commonly-assigned to such departments.

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5. ID.; LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT.—The

legislative power delegated to the Government of the Philippines is
granted in general terms, subject to specific limitations. The grant is
not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise
the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated.

6. ID.; VALIDITY OF LEGISLATIVE ACTS.—An act of the

legislative authority of the Philippine Government which has not
been ex

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United States vs. Bull.

pressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subjectmatter

has been covered by Congressional legislation, or its enactment
forbidden by some provision of the organic law.

7. ID.; ID.; RESERVATION BY CONGRESS OF POWER TO

SUSPEND ACTS UNTIL APPROVED.—The reservation by
Congress of the power to suspend valid Acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature, does not operate to suspend such
Acts until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or
by acquiescence, make them the laws of Congress. They are valid
Acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands until annulled.

8. ID.; ID.; POWER TO REGULATE FOREIGN COMMERCE.—

The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and
by virtue of its power to govern the territory belonging to the
United States it may regulate foreign commerce with such territory.
It may do this directly, or indirectly through the legislative body
created by it, to which its power in that respect is delegated.
Congress has not, except in certain specific instances, legislated
directly upon the subject, but, by the grant of general legislative
power, it has authorized the Government of the Philippines to enact
laws with reference to matters not covered by the Acts of Congress,
and report its action to Congress for approval or disapproval. The
limitations upon the power of the Commission or Legislature to
legislate do not affect the authority with respect to the regulation of
commerce with foreign countries.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACT No. 55.—Act No. 55 was enacted before
Congress took over the control of the Islands and was amended by
Act No. 275 after the Spooner Amendment of March 2, 1901, was
passed. The Military Government and the Civil Government
instituted by the President had the power, whether it be called
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legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign

countries and the ports of the territory. The Act passed in
furtherance of this power has remained in force since its enactment,
without annulment or other action by Congress, and must be
presumed to have met with its approval.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; OFFICERS AND CREWS OF SHIPS IN

TERRITORIAL WATERS.—When a foreign merchant ship enters
territorial waters, the ship's officers and crew are subject to the
jurisdiction of the territorial courts, subject to such limitations only
as have been conceded by the territorial sovereign through the
proper political agencies.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRANSPORTATION OF ANIMALS ON SHIPS.—

The offense of failing to provide suitable means for securing
animals while transporting them on a ship from a foreign port to a
port of the Philippine Islands is within the jurisdiction of the courts
of the Philippines when the forbidden conditions existed during the

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United States vs. Bull.

time the ship was within territorial waters, regardless of the fact
that the same conditions existed when the ship sailed from the
foreign port and while it was on the high seas.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION UNDER ACT No. 55.—In a
prosecution under Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, the
information need not allege that the court was sitting at a port
where the cattle were actually disembarked. The allegation in the
information that an act was done willfully includes the allegation
that it was done knowingly.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Smith, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, J.:

The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a

violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act
No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this
court, where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that

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the complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction

upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was
without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No.
55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of
this case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the
conviction.
The information alleges:

"That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the
said H. N. Bull was then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as
the steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there engaged in
carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign
port, to wit, the port of Ampieng, Formosa, to the port and city of Manila,
Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N. Bull, while master of said
vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of December, 1908, did

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then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carry, transport, and
bring into' the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of
Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and
carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while
in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said
animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did
then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable
means for tying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did then
and there cause some of said animals to be tied by means of rings passed
through their noses, and allow and permit others to be transported loose in
the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in
stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and
failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals
while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and
many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said
vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
"All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the
Philippine Commission."

Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901,
provides that—

"The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or

transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the
Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such
animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable

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sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the

vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and
shall cause such animals to be provided with. adequate forage and fresh
water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the animals
are embarked to the time of their final debarkation."

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United States vs. Bull.

By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was
amended by adding to section 1 thereof the following:

"The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or

transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the
Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such animals
while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suff ering to the
animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle
or other animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported,
without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawf ul to load
or unload cattle upon or f rom vessels by swinging them over the side by
means of ropes or chains attached to the horns."

Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that—

"Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who

knowingly and willfully fails to comply with the provisions of section one,
shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of not less than one
hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, United States money,
for each offense. Prosecutions under this Act may be instituted in any Court
of First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in
which such animals are disembarked."

1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it

does not state that the court was sitting at a port where the
cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed
on board a vessel registered and licensed under the laws of
the Philippine Islands.

Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on

Courts of First Instance or any provost court organized in the
province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is
nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides
generally for the organization of the courts of the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts
over

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certain offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the

jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the
Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with
the laws thereof. (U. S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This
jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any
province into which such ship or water craft upon which the offense
or crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof.
Had this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine
registry, there could have been no doubt of the jurisdiction of the
court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance
with well recognized and established public law. But the Standard
was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered
or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have
then the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense
of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master
thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense
continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters
of the United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had
jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on the high seas or
within the territorial waters of any other .country, but when she came
within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlands which embrace
the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a
new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana
ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec. 490 et seq.; Latour,
La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the
jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as
have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper political
agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters. From
the line which determines these waters the Standard must have
traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part
of her voyage the violation of the statute continued, and as far as the
jurisdic-

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United States vs. Bull.

tion of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same

conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the high seas.
The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in
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Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to

constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters.
The completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and
the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
offense and the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, but the objection to the jurisdiction raises
the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact
of the nationality of the ship. Every state has complete control and
jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal right,
even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power
without permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a
prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public ships of
all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from local
jurisdiction while within such waters was not established until
within comparatively recent times. In 1794, Attorney-General
Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to
the effect that "the laws of nations invest the commander of a
foreign ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the
country into which he comes." (1, Op. U. S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.)
This theory was also supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given
by him to the British Government as late as 1820. In the leading case
of The Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U. S.), 116,
144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under
which such vessels enter a friendly port may reasonably be
construed as "containing exemption from jurisdiction of the
sovereign within whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality."
The principle was accepted by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal,
which announced that "the privilege of exterritoriality accorded to
vessels of war has been

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admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as

a proceeding founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual
deference between nations." (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and
254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip.
de la Mer, 2. C. X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to
come and go freely. Local officials exercise but little control over
their actions, and offenses committed by their crews are justiciable
by their own officers acting under the laws to which they primarily
owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of
territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and
convenience, and finds its justification in the fact that experience
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shows that such vessels are generally careful to respect local laws
and regulations which are essential to the health, order, and well-
being of the port. But comity and convenience does not require the
extension of the same degree of exemption to merchant vessels.
There are two well-defined theories as to the extent of the
immunities ordinarily granted to them. According to the French
theory and practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship
which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign
to the crew, are justiciable only by the courts of the country to which
the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive
jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant
vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against another.
(See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens, Le
Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p.
292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never
been admitted or claimed by Great Britain as a right, although she
has frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's
ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who
consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to
restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading
English authority, says that—
"It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of

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United States vs. Bull.

the territoriality of merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter

the ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local
jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the country are
touched." (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when
a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction
of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of
acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a
portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2
Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law
Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of The
Exchange, said that—
"When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would
be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society and would
subject the laws to continual infraction and the government to
degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary and
local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the
country."
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the
merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the
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purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern the

ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in
peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92
U. S., 520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are
imposed by article 13 of the treaty of commerce and navigation
between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827,
which concedes to the consuls, viceconsuls, or consular agents of
each country "the right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such
differences as may arise between the captains and crews of the
vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to
their charge, without the interference of the local authorities unless
the conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order
or tranquillity of the country." (Comp of Treaties in Force, 1904, p.
754.) This exception applies

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to controversies between the members of the ship's company, and

particularly to disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig.,
sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and
tranquillity of the country are affected by many events which do not
amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by
one member of the crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of
which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this
treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of the local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina
engaged in a "quarrel" on board the vessel in the port of Galveston,
Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the
United States district attorney was instructed by the Government to
take the necessary steps to have the proceedings dismissed, and the
aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard
against a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of
State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charge, May 16, 1876;
Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of
such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas,
but when in 1879 the mate of the Norwegian bark Livingston was
prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault and
battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port of
Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the treaty which
deprived the local courts of jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs.
Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were made through
diplomatic channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880,
Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the
Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
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"I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful
consideration in connection with the views and suggestion of your
note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827
between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations
contained in the

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United States vs. Bull.

last clause of that article * * * are those under which it is contended

by you that jurisdiction is conferred on the consular officers, not
only in regard to such differences of a civil nature growing out of the
contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of
controversies resulting from personal violence involving offenses for
which the party may be held amenable under the local criminal law.
"This Government does not view the article in question as
susceptible of such broad interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred
upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to their right to sit as
judges or abitrators in such differences as may arise between
captains and crews of the vessels, where such differences do not
involve on the part of the 'captain or crew a disturbance of the order
or tranquillity of the country. When, however, a complaint is made
to a local magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of the
crew of the vessel, involving the disturbance of the order or
tranquillity of the country, it is competent for such magistrate to take
cognizance of the matter in f urtherance of the local laws, and under
such circumstances in the United States it becomes a public duty
which the judge or magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to forego.
In all such cases it must necessarily be left to the local judicial
authorities whether the procedure shall take place in the United
States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there has been such
disturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and if the complaint is
supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the party
accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be
defined against the offense by the municipal law of the place."
(Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the, local courts of
jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a merchant vessel by
one member of the crew against another which amount to a
disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and
reasonable construction of the

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language requires us to hold that any violation of criminal laws

disturbs the order or tranquillity of the country. The offense with
which the appellant is charged had nothing to do with any difference
between the captain and the crew. It was a violation by the master of
the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus
find that neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place
of the commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or
general principle of public law, are the courts of the Philippine
Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the
information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it
does not allege that the animals were disembarked at the port of
Manila, an allegation which [Link] claimed is essential to the
jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the
appellant upon this issue would be to construe the language of the
complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation
of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed
offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the statute
confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the
animals are brought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial
so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the
disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional element in
the offense, but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it
fails to allege that the defendant knowingly and 'willfully failed to
provide suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so
as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the
complaint that the act was committed willfully includes the
allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in Woodhouse
vs. Rio Grande R. R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully'
carries the idea, when used in connection with an act forbidden by
law, that the act must be done knowingly or

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United States vs. Bull.

intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented to, designed,

and directed the act." So in Wong vs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon,
538), it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not show, in
the words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act
complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the
respondent's counsel—that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly'
conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies that it
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was done by design—done for a set purpose; and I think that it

would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the same
effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 111., 505), which seems to be
on all fours with the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were
knowingly done, but his defense rests upon the assertion that
"according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose
upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the
life and comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven that
what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58,
paragraph 3, it is only necessary to state the act or omission
complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary
and concise language, without repetition. It need not necessarily be
in the words of the statute, but it must be in such form as to enable a
person of common understanding to know what is intended and the
court to pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint which
complies with this requirement is good. (U. S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil.
Rep., 566.)
The Act, which is in the English language, imposes upon the
master of a vessel the duty to "provide suitable means for securing
such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to the animals." The allegation of the
complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant willfully,
unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle "without providing
suitable means for securing said

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animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary

suffering to the said animals in this * * * that by reason of the
aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable
means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of
some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals
were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and
cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed."
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of
the information does not charge him with failure to provide
"sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios
suficientes" and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the
original complaint was prepared in English, and that the word
"suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado" "suficiente," and
"conveniente," according to the context and circumstances, we
determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the
fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the
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evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable means for the

protection of the animals."
2. The appellant's argument against the constitutionality of Act
No. 55 and the amendment thereto seems to rest upon a
fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law of
these Islands. The statute penalizes acts and omissions incidental to
the transportation of live stock between foreign ports and ports of
the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating commerce
with its ports been enacted by the legislature of one of the States of
the Union, it would doubtless have been in violation of Article I,
section 3, of the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People
(Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N, S., 1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the
United States is controlled by constitutional principles different from
those which apply to States of the Union, The importance of the
question thus presented requires a statement of the principles which
govern those relations, and consideration of the nature and extent of
the legislative

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power of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of the

Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of
opinion certain applicable constitutional doctrines are established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express
power to make war and treaties, and it has the power possessed by
all nations to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus
acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard against the
possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its government
being questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in
express terms that Congress should have the power "to dispose of
and make all needful rules and regulations respecting territory and
other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par.
3.) Upon the acquisition of territory by the United States, and until it
is formally incorporated into the Union, the duty of providing a
government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern the
territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local government, and
delegate thereto the ordinary powers required for local government.
(Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure.
Congress has provided such governments for territories which were
within the Union, and for newly acquired territory not yet
incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a
government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive,
legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain
general conditions in accordance with which the local government
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should act, The organic act thus became the constitution of the
government of the territory which had not been formally
incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted
by the local legislature was determined by its conformity with the
requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11
Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local government
Congress has delegated that portion of legislative power which in its
wisdom it deemed necessary for the government of the

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22 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

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territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action of the local
legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power
has been exercised during the entire period of the history of the
United States. The right of Congress to delegate such legislative
power can no longer be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U.
S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force
operate within such territory, although the liberality of Congress in
legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to create
an impression upon the minds of many people that it went there by
its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating
with reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited only
by those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of
its power to act at all, irrespective of time or place. In all other
respects it is plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes
vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197;
Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S.,
516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole
history of the United States, and legislation founded on the theory
was enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present Insular
possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides
that "The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are
not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within
all the organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter
organized, as elsewhere within the United States." When Congress
organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly
provided that this section of the Revised Statutes should not apply to
the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was
acquired by the United States as a result of the war with Spain, the
executive and legislative authorities have consistently proceeded in
conformity with the principles

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United States vs. Bull.

above stated. The city of Manila was surrendered to the United

States on August 13, 1898, and the military commander was directed
to hold the city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a peace
which should determine the control, disposition, and government of
the Islands. The duty then devolved upon the American authorities
to preserve peace and protect persons and property within the
occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders,
and on August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military
governor. The treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On
the 22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the
destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender of the city had
practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the
suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty
of peace the future control, disposition, and government of the
Islands had been ceded to the United States. During the period of
strict military occupation, before the treaty of peace was ratified, and
the interim thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. Nogueras,
214 U. S., 260), the territory was governed under the military
authority of the President as commander in chief. Long before
Congress took any action, the President organized a civil
government, which, however, had its legal justification, like the
purely military government which it gradually superseded, in the
war power. The military power of the President embraced
legislative, executive, and judicial functions, all of which he might
exercise personally, or through such military or civil agents as he
chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901—
"The military power in exercise in a territory under military
occupation includes executive, legislative, and judicial authority. It
not infrequently happens that in a single order of a military
commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different
powers—the exercise of the legislative powers by provisions
prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by determinations of
right;

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24 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

United States vs. Bull

and of executive power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed

and the rights determined."

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President McKinley desired to transform military into civil

government as rapidly as conditions would permit. After full
investigation, the organization of civil government was initiated by
the appointment of a commission to which civil authority was to be
gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority to
exercise, subject to the approval of the President, "that part of the
military power of the President in the Philippine Islands which is
legislative in its character" was transferred from the military
government to the Commission, to be exercised under such rules and
regulations as should be prescribed by the Secretary of War, until
such time as complete civil government should be established, or
Congress otherwise provided. The legislative power thus conferred
upon the Commission was declared to include "the making of rules
and orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by
taxes, customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation and
expenditure of public funds of the Islands; the establishment of an
educational system throughout the Islands; the establishment of a
system to secure an efficient civil service; the organization and
establishment of courts; the organization and establishment of
municipal and departmental governments, and all other matters of a
civil nature which the military governor is now competent to provide
by rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of legislative
power to the Commission was to be exercised in conformity with
certain declared general principles, and subject to certain specific
restrictions for the protection of individual rights, The Commission
were to bear in mind that the government to be instituted was "not f
or our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but
for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the
Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to
conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to
the fullest extent consistent with the accomplish-

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United States vs. Bull.

ment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective

government." The specific restrictions upon legislative power were
found in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
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punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy

for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself; that the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment
for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be
passed; that no law shall be passed abridging the f reedom of speech
or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble
and petition the Government f or a redress of grievances; that no law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship without discrimination or
preference shall forever be allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings
being raised, the Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation
Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all military, civil, and
judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands * * *
shall until otherwise provided by Congress be vested in such person
and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President
of the United States shall direct, f or the establishment of civil
government, and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of
said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty,

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26 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

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property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the office of

Civil Governor was created, and the executive authority, which had
been exercised previously by the military governor, was transferred
to that official. The government thus created by virtue of the
authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy continued to administer the affairs of the Islands under the
direction of the President until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress
assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a law which, in
connection with the instructions of April 7,1900, constitutes the
organic law of the Philippine Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substantial changes in the form
of government which the President had erected. Congress adopted
the system which was in operation, and approved the action of the
President in organizing the government. Substantially all the
limitations which had been imposed on the legislative power by the
President's instructions were included in the law, Congress thus
extending to the Islands by legislative act not the Constitution, but
all its provisions for the protection of the rights and privileges of
individuals which were appropriate under the conditions. The action
of the President in creating the Commission with designated powers
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of government, in creating the office of the Governor-General and

Vice-Governor-General, and through the Commission establishing
certain executive departments, was expressly approved and ratified.
Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before
and after the ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and
approved by Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902;
U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370; Lincoln vs. U. S., 197 U. S.,
419.) Until otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue
to be governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the
enact ing clause of all statutes should read "By authority of the
United States" instead of "By the authority of the President." In the
course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all
parts of the Islands not inhabited by

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United States vs. Bull.

Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a legislature

consisting of two houses—the Philippine Commission and the
Philippine Assembly. The government of the Islands was thus
assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired
territory not incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a
Territory, although its form and organization somewhat resembles
that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which
unites the States and Territories into the Union. The authority for its
creation and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the
United States, which, however, operates on the President and
Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It is the
creation of the United States, acting through the President and
Congress, both deriving power f rom the same source, but from
different parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon the
Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the President
before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed
control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and legally
expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the popular
sovereign constituency which lies back of American constitutions.
The power to legislate upon any subject relating to the Philippines is
primarily in Congress, and when it exercises such power its act is
from the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an
amendment of a constitution in the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the
Philippines is a complete governmental organism with executive,
legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions
commonly assigned to such departments. The separation of powers
is as complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State
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governments is this separation such as is implied in the abstract

statement of the doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government
the Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to some
extent

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28 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

United States vs. Bull.

controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the governor

is not a member of the legislative body, but the veto power enables
him to exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-
General, the head of the executive department in the Philippine
Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but as
executive he has no veto power. The President and Congress framed
the government on the model with which Americans are familiar,
and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the
public interests and the protection of individual rights and privileges.
In instituting this form of government the intention must have
been to adopt the general constitutional doctrines which are inherent
in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws
subject to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act
under the national Constitution, and the States under the national
and state constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are
constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments
operating under written constitutions, must determine the validity of
legislative enactments, as well as the legality of all private and
official acts. In performing these functions it acts with the same
independence as the Federal and State judiciaries in the United
States. Under no other constitutional theory could there be that
government of laws and not of men which is essential for the
protection of rights under a free and orderly government. Such being
the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, it is apparent that the courts must consider the question of
the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State legislature.
The Federal Government exercises such powers only as are
expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United
States, while the States exercise all powers which have not been
granted to the central government. The former operates under grants,
the latter subject to restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress
depends upon

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whether the Constitution of the United States contains a grant of

express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature
is valid unless the Federal or State constitution expressly or
impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative authority
of the Philippine Government which has not been expressly
disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been
covered by congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by
some provision of the organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is
granted in general terms subject to specific limitations. The general
grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to
exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is
true that specific authority is conferred upon the Philippine
Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and-that
Congress has itself legislated upon certain other subjects. These,
however, should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein
Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not as implying
any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other matters.
(See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts
of legislation by the Government of the Phillppines tends strongly to
confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government
of the Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of
enumerated legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new
government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To
relieve Congress from the necessity of legislating with reference to
details, it was thought better to grant general legislative power to the
new government, subject to broad and easily understood
prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if
they met with disapproval. It was therefore provided "that all laws
passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be reported
to Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul
the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.)

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30 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

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This provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the
Philippines until approved by Congress, or when approved,
expressly or by acquiescence, make them the laws of Congress.
They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands until
annulled. (Miners Bank vs. lowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then
ascertain whether the Legislature has been expressly or by
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implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the

Constitution of the United States operates only upon the States of
the Union. It has no application to the Government of the Philippine
Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in
Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern the territory
belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce
with such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through a
legislative body created by it, to which its- power in this respect is
delegated. Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties
which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it
has expressly authorized the Government of the Philippines to
provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors and
navigable waters. A few other specific provisions relating to foreign
commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its general
regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to the
reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not
meet with its approval. The express limitations upon the power of
the Commission and Legislature to legislate do not affect the
authority with respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign
countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the
control of the Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275
after the Spooner amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The
military government, and the civil government instituted by the
President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or
administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign nations and
the ports of the territory. (Cross vs. Harrison,

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United States vs. Bull.

16 How. (U. S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U. S.), 73,
87.) This Act has remained in force since its enactment without
annulment or other action by Congress, and must be presumed to
have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that the
Commission had, and the Legislature now has, full constitutional
power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce between foreign
countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No.
55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within
the meaning of the Act can not be left to the judgment of the master
of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court
from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull
brought into and disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain
cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without
providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit,
so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said animals,
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contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by

section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts,
all of which are fully sustained by the evidence:
"That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the
Norwegian steamer known as the Standard, for a period of six
months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, was
engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chinese
and Japanese ports to and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
"That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such
master and captain as aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila,
aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was anchored,
under the directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in
front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction
of this court; and that fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken
legs and three others of said cattle were dead, having broken legs;
and also that said cattle were transported and

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32 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

United States vs. Bull.

carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the deck
and in the hold of said ship, without suitable precaution and care for
the transportation of said animals, and to avoid danger and risk to
their lives and security; and further that said cattle were so
transported aboard said ship by the defendant and brought into the
said bay, and into the city of Manila, without any provision being
made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold thereof
to maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for such
transportation.
"That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport
cattle aboard steamships coming into Manila Bay and unloading in
the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle,
providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front,
sides, and rear thereof, and crosscleats upon the floor on which they
stand and are transported, so that in case of storms, which are
common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to stand
without slipping and pitching and falling, individually or
collectively, and to avoid the production of panics and hazard to the
animals on account of transportation in the manner in which said
animals or cattle were transported in this case. Captain Summerville
of the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced seaman,
has testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated
positively that since the introduction in the ships with which he is
acquainted of the stall system for the transportation of animals and
cattle he has suffered no loss whatever during the last year. The
defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that according
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to his experience the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks
and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort
of the animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable, either
by the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that,
for instance, three hundred cattle without supports for the feet and
without stalls or any other protection for them individually can be
safely and suitably carried in times of storm

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United States vs. Umali.

upon the decks and in the holds of ships; such a theory is against the
law of nature. One animal falling or pitching, if he is untied or
unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the wounding of half
the animals upon the ship if transported in the manner found in this
case."
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of
two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is
affirmed. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ.,

concur.

Judgment affirmed.

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