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Beyond “who pays?”: stadium Stadium

development
development and and urban
governance
urban governance
Michael T. Friedman
Kinesiology, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, USA, and
Received 8 April 2020
Adam S. Beissel Revised 16 July 2020
Kinesiology and Health, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, USA 25 August 2020
Accepted 25 August 2020
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to reframe analyses of stadium and arena subsidization policies from
perspectives centered upon economic and financial issues toward a perspective focused on broader issues of
urban governance and the public purposes of sports facilities. Such assessments would provide a better
understanding of whether such use of public resources represents good public policy.
Design/methodology/approach – To demonstrate this, the paper uses an integrated literature review to
offer a historical analysis of sport facility development within the context of the broader assumptions that
shape public policy and how sports have been used toward achieving particular public goals. This history
provides a foundation for an analysis of sports facility development within the current moment as cities require
team owners to invest in redevelopment activities in the neighborhoods surrounding sports facilities.
Findings – This paper asserts that focusing on the economic and financial aspects of sports facility
development is a perspective that is too narrow. Instead, this paper shows that a more holistic approach,
beginning with the dominant mode of urban governance and how its assumptions underlie the public purposes
for which stadiums and arenas are used, provides a better explanatory framework and a deeper understanding
of the issue in the contemporary moment.
Originality/value – Moving beyond the question of economic efficacy, the public purpose-centered approach
of this paper seeks to place subsidization policies into a broader dialog with other priorities toward maximizing
the public good among the broadest population.
Keywords Baseball stadiums, Urban development, Sports facility subsidization, Sport policy, Keynesianism,
Neoliberalism, Network governance
Paper type Research paper

Since the 1930s, state and local governments in the US have spent more than $18 bn to
subsidize venues for major league sports teams (Long, 2013). Civic leaders have approved this
spending for several public purposes: to burnish their city’s status, reinforce the centrality of
downtown, provide a public amenity or encourage economic (re)development. Yet, as most
research on sports facilities and public policy has focused on economic questions (see Coates
and Humphreys, 2008; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997), the question of economic efficacy has
become the dominant factor in assessing whether subsidies are good public policy. This
paper suggests that this economic focus examines the issue too narrowly and recommends a
more holistic approach that begins with the mode of urban governance and focuses on the
breadth of public purposes.
Between 1990 and 2010, local governments subsidized 121 sports facilities occupied by
teams in the four major leagues in more than 50 American cities as they followed the
principles of urban entrepreneurialism which prioritize market-oriented policy solutions
(Harvey, 1989; Long, 2013). Subsidies were intended to encourage economic development
through attracting additional private investment, but a mixed record of success for these
International Journal of Sports
Marketing and Sponsorship
© Emerald Publishing Limited
1464-6668
We thank the anonymous referees for their useful suggestions and guidance. DOI 10.1108/IJSMS-04-2020-0053
IJSMS projects has burdened many local governments with expenses for debt service and ongoing
operations (Humphreys, 2018; Matheson, 2018). With most teams playing in new or renovated
venues, growing media skepticism and increased citizen opposition to projects, the issue of
public subsidies for major league sports venues had largely receded from the policy agenda
during the past decade.
Yet, a new era of stadium development is emerging, one recognizing previous failures and
promoting more comprehensive planning and integrated projects (Demause, 2018;
Rosentraub, 2010). Rather than providing subsidies and hoping market forces respond,
local governments are moving to a network approach involving multiple actors and requiring
binding commitments at the project’s start. Atlanta’s Truist Park, whose construction was
subsidized with $320 m, exemplifies this approach by anchoring a $1.1 bn mixed-use project
in which Braves’ owner Liberty Media is the lead developer. Marketed as Atlanta’s premier
lifestyle destination, Battery Atlanta features high-end retail stores, chef-driven restaurants,
a major music venue, an Omni hotel, 550 residential units and a nine-story Class A office
building (Burleyson, 2014). Similar sport venue-centered projects are underway in many
places, including Detroit, Los Angeles and Arlington, Texas and proposed in Oakland and
Tampa. While questions remain about the long-term sustainability and public risks about
these projects, integrated stadium development projects (ISDs) may finally produce elusive
economic benefits. Even so, this paper suggests that subsidies for ISDs still may not qualify
as “good” public policy due to broader social and political concerns.
As Taras (2007) argues, “public policy analysis requires scholars to grapple with the elusive
question ’what matters?,” (p. 567), this paper proposes reframing the way in which researchers
understand the history of sports facility development and evaluate the efficacy and impacts of
subsidization policies through an approach combining public purpose with the mode of urban
governance. Focusing on baseball stadiums [1], this paper examines their public uses as
expressed through design, location and the allocation of costs and benefits in four periods:
(1) Laissez-faire ballparks as private concerns (1900–1920s).
(2) Keynesian super stadiums as public amenities (1930–1980s).
(3) Neoliberal postmodern stadiums as development anchors (1990–2000s).
(4) Network integrated stadiums as development guarantors (2010s–beyond).
This paper argues that evaluations of stadium subsidization decisions must move beyond the
economic question of “who pays?” and advocates an approach that examines (1) the
underlying purposes policymakers intend to achieve through these policies; (2) the position of
sport on the broader policy agenda and (3) the political context shaping the fundamental
assumptions that define public priorities and structure policy development (Houlihan, 2012;
Chen, 2018). The first part of this approach has particular relevance within sports marketing
as facilities and events are often justified for their urban branding and promotional benefits
(Puente-Diaz, 2018; Green et al., 2003). By moving beyond a focus on economic benefits,
research on stadium subsidization decisions can better provide insight into their social
impacts and effectiveness, including the civic branding and reimaging initiatives of urban
marketers (Crompton, 2001; Liu, 2017; Smith, 2005). Moreover, by assessing public purposes,
the position of sport within public policy and the broader political context, policymakers and
researchers will be better informed to respond to this issue when it reemerges.

Periodizing stadium development

Researchers have been examining issues surrounding the public investment in major league
sports facilities since the 1970s. Although some localized impacts have been identified,
independent analyses have found little evidence of increases at the metropolitan level in total
economic activity, job creation, tourism, property values and tax revenues (Chapin, 2004; Stadium
Coates and Humphreys, 2008; Rosentraub, 2010). Examinations of intangible benefits have development
found positive externalities such as civic pride and raising the city profile, but these often
relate to team play rather than particular stadium factors and can be offset by negative
and urban
externalities, such as crime and traffic (Bale, 2001; Danielson, 1997; Johnson and Whitehead, governance
2000). Other research examines the mechanics and public costs of stadium deals through the
structures of public–private partnerships and subsidies (Long, 2005, 2013; Zimbalist and
Long, 2006).
Researchers also have examined stadiums from multiple perspectives, namely political,
geographic, historical and cultural. Starting with economic analyses showing meager
benefits, politically-focused analyses explain stadium subsidization through variants of
public choice theory, suggesting powerful groups promote subsidies in support of their self-
interest against the common good (Eisinger, 2000; Quirk and Fort, 1999; Shropshire, 1995).
Historical and geographic analyses work toward understanding sports facilities within
broader trends of urban development (Lisle, 2017; Riess, 1998), while social and cultural
analyses often focus on the contribution of stadiums to community and civic identity
(Danielson, 1997; Ingham et al., 1987).
Research on stadium development has identified three main eras generally corresponding
to the early 20th century (1900–1930), the mid 20th century (1950–1990) and the current era
beginning around 1990. Several histories of baseball stadiums have defined eras through
aesthetics and locations (Gershman, 1993; Goldberger, 2019), while Riess (1989) defines eras
through stages of urban development. Long’s (2013) divisions are based on the allocation of
costs between private and public actors with an “entrepreneurial period” (1900–1930) of team
owner finance; a civic infrastructure period (1950–1980) of local government finance and the
current public–private partnership period (1980–present) of shared costs.
While this paper recognizes the value of each approach, none emphasizes the broader
political trends in urban governance which this paper argues as presuppose decisions
regarding financing, location and design (see Table 1). The public’s financial involvement is
closely linked to broader assumptions regarding taxation and public spending. A sports
facility’s location impacts traffic and commerce and can raise questions about appropriate

Development
Private concern Public amenity Development anchor guarantor

Mode of Laissez faire Keynesianism Neoliberal Network

governance entrepreneurialism
Time period 1890–1920s 1930–1980s 1990–2010s 2010s–present
Public None Status; public use UED development Mixed-use
purpose andamenity development
Location Urban residential Rural; suburban; Downtown UED Suburban UED
neighborhood urban periphery and and urban
downtown periphery
Funding Private Public Public–private Private–public
partnership (direct) partnership
(indirect)
Type of Ballpark Super stadium Postmodern Integrated
stadium
Tenant/ Single Multiple Single Single
usage Table 1.
Benefit Public Public Private Private–public Model of stadium
Cost Private Public Public Private–public development
IJSMS uses of public authority and resources. Even design decisions cannot be separated from
urban governance as esthetic and functional choices are influenced by a facility’s public
purposes and financial constraints. A broader perspective beginning with urban governance
would enable a fuller assessment of the impacts of sports facilities and whether subsidies
represent good public policy.
In order to examine contemporary trends in stadium development, this paper conducts a
historical analysis of sport facility development within the context of the broader
assumptions that shape public policy and how sports have been used toward achieving
particular public goals. We use an integrative literature review to examine, critique and
synthesize existing frameworks defining the periodization of stadium development and to
provide a foundation for an analysis of contemporary sports facility developments.
According to Torraco (2005), an integrative literature review addresses new and emerging
developments that would benefit from a holistic conceptualization and synthesis of the
literature to date. This method of analysis can lead to reconceptualization of previous models
based on the expanding and more diversified knowledge of the topic as it continues to
develop. In our case, the integrative literature review reconceptualizes the historical
periodization of stadium development based on recent developments in urban governance.
This historical reframing provides a foundation for better contextualizing and analyzing of
contemporary sports facility development and conceptualizing a new era of ISD in which
cities require team owners to invest in redevelopment activities in the neighborhoods
surrounding sports facilities.

Eras of urban governance

The early 20th century was a period of rapid economic growth and social reform in the US.
The economy generally operated as a minimally regulated laissez-faire system. With market
forces directing investments and determining the prices of goods and services, state activity
tended toward protecting property rights and maintaining law and order (Altshuler and
Luberoff, 2003). Urban governments were dominated by political machines that bestowed
jobs and favor upon well-connected groups and individuals (Riess, 1999). As progressive
reformers advocated an active government response to the problems caused by
industrialization and urbanization, the nascent field of urban planning focused on
improving infrastructure (water, sewer and street), incorporating nature through public
parks and urban beautification through grand boulevards, monuments and imposing public
buildings (Gutheim and Lee, 2006).
However, the laissez-faire approach was insufficient against the Great Depression, which
required robust government involvement in regulating and stimulating economic activity
(Harvey, 2005). Rather than relying on market forces for economic development, the
principles of Keynesian economics suggest that government should actively intervene in the
economy for public benefit, promote the general welfare and serve as the guardian of social
life. Locally, this managerial approach focused on the “provision of services, facilities and
benefits to urban populations” (Harvey, 1989), which greatly expanded the range of public
policy concerns and legitimized public spending on social welfare programs (Altshuler and
Luberoff, 2003). Cities invested considerable power in urban planners to create and manage
comprehensive development plans, ensure widespread provision of public goods and solve
the problems of urban life (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003; Bustad, 2014).
Despite Nixon’s 1971 declaration that “we are all Keynesians now,” Keynesianism was
showing signs of strain due to the costs of the Vietnam War, demographic changes and low
returns on capital for wealthy (Harvey, 2005). At the urban level, Keynesianism was
challenged by suburbanization, deindustrialization and reduced transfers from the Federal
government (Bustad, 2014; Harvey, 1989). As disinvestment devastated urban tax bases and
forced reductions in public services, cities entered into an accelerating spiral of decay. Stadium
Changing urban realities demanded a new form of governance. Harvey (1989) describes the development
emergence of urban entrepreneurialism as moving away from the Keynesian managerial
approach that prioritized the needs of residents to a model positioning private sector-led
and urban
economic growth as the necessary precursor for improving public services and general governance
welfare (Hubbard, 1996). This shift occurred as a part of the rise of neoliberalism, which
blamed government for economic problems and promoted free markets, competition,
deregulation and privatization as solutions (Harvey, 2005). Within this new framework, local
governments would “invest” public resources in private-sector projects promising to produce
higher tax revenues than otherwise would have been collected, thus providing greater
resources to cities with which to improve services.
David Harvey (1989) identified consumption-based efforts as one of four basic
entrepreneurial development strategies as many cities transformed downtown areas into
“urban entertainment districts” (UED) (see also Frieden and Sagalyn, 1989; Judd and
Fainstein, 1999). In this effort, cities began investing in amenities, such as convention centers,
museums, hotels, festival marketplaces, restaurants and entertainment venues, which are
marketed to suburban, national and international visitors (Hannigan, 1998; Zukin, 1997). As
people consume in cities, a market-driven cycle of urban growth and renewal replaces the
spiral of decay as it encourages the creation of new businesses, provides jobs for residents
and attracts young adults and older couples to move into the city (Gibson, 2005).
The baseball stadiums built in each era reflect broader modes of urban governance. In
Long’s “entrepreneurial period,” the laissez-faire approach made government subsidization of
a stadium as unlikely as government subsidization of a factory. In Long’s period of “civic
infrastructure,” government officials practicing Keynesianism built sports facilities for their
contributions to the quality of urban life. In Long’s period of “public–private partnerships,”
entrepreneurial civic leaders subsidized stadiums as marketing tools for major attractions
within broader consumption-focused redevelopment efforts. This section examines stadium
development during each era to prefigure a detailed discussion of the current era of network
governance and ISD.

Laissez faire ballparks as private concerns (1890–1920s)

Within the context of laissez-faire urban governance, sports fell outside the matters
prioritized for public investment and baseball stadiums were built by team owners. Urban
governance still impacted ballparks as many team owners were connected to political
machines and benefitted from inside information about urban growth, reduced fees and
regulatory barriers and minimized local opposition (Goldberger, 2019; Riess, 1998). Yet,
stadiums were not designed to fulfill, or did they intentionally achieve, broader public
purposes as owners chose locations, acquired land, designed stadiums and financed
construction (see Table 2).
Ballparks were generally located on marginal sites in underdeveloped neighborhoods due
to cost concerns, site acreage requirements and proximity to public transportation and fans.
When opened, Wrigley Field was criticized for its “remote location” as the North Side was
outside the experiences of Chicago residents (Gershman, 1993). The site of Brooklyn’s Ebbets
Field had been a garbage dump. Site selection also was influenced by team owner
investments in public transportation or real estate and the challenges of acquiring land
without government assistance, while also being constrained by preexisting street grids and
property owners who would not sell (Neilson, 1995). With ballparks being private ventures,
ancillary development remained a private concern. While neighborhoods in Chicago,
Brooklyn and Philadelphia may have developed around ballparks, such growth has been
attributed more to relative underdevelopment within rapidly growing cities rather than the
IJSMS Stadium City Year 2010 cost (millions) Public % Location

Shibe Park Philadelphia 1909 42 0 Urban neighborhood

Forbes Field Pittsburgh 1909 185 0 Urban park
Sportsman’s Park St. Louis 1909 8.7 0 Urban neighborhood
League Park Cleveland 1910 n/a 0 Urban neighborhood
Comiskey Park Chicago 1910 66 0 Urban neighborhood
Griffith Park Washington 1911 n/a 0 Urban neighborhood
Polo Grounds New York 1911 n/a 0 Urban neighborhood
Tiger Stadium Detroit 1912 n/a 0 Urban neighborhood
Crosley Field Cincinnati 1912 21 0 Urban neighborhood
Fenway Park Boston 1912 39 0 Urban neighborhood
Ebbets Field Brooklyn 1913 63 0 Urban neighborhood
Wrigley Field Chicago 1914 24 0 Urban neighborhood
Braves Field Boston 1915 n/a 0 Urban neighborhood
Table 2. Yankee Stadium New York 1923 102 0 Urban neighborhood
Laissez-faire ballparks Source(s): Gershman (1993); Long (2013)

ballpark’s presence (Goldberger, 2019; Riess, 1989). Bars and restaurants often opened near
ballparks but relied on year-round patronage from local residents rather than the fans
attending 80 games per season. Ballparks also provided economic opportunities to
entrepreneurial neighbors, who in several cities set up wildcat bleachers on roof tops, sold
street food or rented their driveways as parking spaces (Gershman, 1993; Westcott, 1996).
Although governments were uninvolved in ballpark development, cities received public
benefits from teams and stadiums. The very first all-professional team, the 1869 Cincinnati
Red Stockings, was sponsored by a group of civic leaders who believed that the team would
raise the city’s national profile beyond its status as “Porkopolis” (Voigt, 2010). Similarly, when
the American League bypassed Buffalo in favor of Boston during its transition into a major
league in 1901, the city was relegated into second tier status and into a century-long failed
pursuit to attract a team through expansion, relocation or within new major leagues. Yet,
consistent with laissez-faire ideology, such urban marketing efforts remained within the
purview of private actors and civic boosters.
Between 1909 and 1923, 15 ballparks were built by team owners without direct public
contribution. Although teams and ballparks provided public benefits by symbolizing the
city’s importance, hosting civic events and contributing to neighborhood development, civic
leaders did not consider sports facilities among government’s responsibilities. Given this lack
of public involvement, each ballpark was unique with its quality, aesthetics and location
determined by the tastes, intentions, interests and financial constraints of team owners.

Keynesian super stadiums as public amenities (1930–1980s)

Within the framework of Keynesian governance, sports facilities were redefined as public
goods. As part of the New Deal responding to the Great Depression, the Works Progress
Administration built or improved 3,300 stadiums and 5,600 athletic fields and established a
positive government role in the provision of recreation infrastructure, which included parks,
playgrounds, swimming pools, community centers and fair grounds (Wong, 1998; Bustad,
2014). Although none of these facilities were used for the Major League Baseball (MLB) and
only a few by minor league teams (see Kossuth, 2000), civic boosters after the Second World
War began promoting stadium development for professional teams to symbolize the city’s
importance, serve as a recreational amenity and/or anchor large-scale redevelopment
programs (see Table 3).
 2010 cost Public
Stadium
Stadium City Year (millions) % Location development
and urban
Municipal Stadium Cleveland 1932 188 100 Downtown
County Stadium Milwaukee 1953 70 100 Suburban governance
Memorial Stadium Baltimore 1953 84 100 Urban
neighborhood
Metropolitan Stadium Bloomington, 1956 103 100 Suburban
Minnesota
Candlestick Park San Francisco 1960 112 100 Urban periphery
RFK Stadium Washington 1961 219 100 Urban periphery
Dodger Stadium Los Angeles 1962 258 26 Urban periphery
Shea Stadium New York 1964 216 100 Urban periphery
Astrodome Houston 1965 329 100 Suburban
Atlanta Fulton County Atlanta 1965 160 100 Urban periphery
Stadium
Arlington Stadium Arlington, Texas 1965 16 100 Suburban
Oakland–Alameda County Oakland 1966 248 100 Urban periphery
Stadium
Anaheim Stadium Anaheim, California 1966 207 96 Suburban
Busch (II) Stadium St. Louis 1966 215 23 Downtown
Jack Murphy Stadium San Diego 1967 219 100 Urban periphery
Three rivers Stadium Pittsburgh 1970 335 100 Downtown
Riverfront Stadium Cincinnati 1970 341 100 Downtown
Veterans Stadium Philadelphia 1971 256 100 Urban periphery
Kauffman Stadium Kansas city 1973 163 76 Suburban
Kingdome Seattle 1976 235 100 Downtown
Metrodome Minneapolis 1982 156 90 Downtown Table 3.
Tropicana Field St. Petersburg 1990 230 91 Downtown Keynesian super
Source(s): Gershman (1993); Long (2013) stadiums

Super stadiums could validate a city’s “major league” status by hosting major league teams
(Riess, 1989). Although civic leaders had recognized the symbolic value of sports in the late
19th century, the attraction and retention of an MLB team became a matter of public concern
in the 1950s. Milwaukee, Baltimore and Kansas City burnished their status by building
municipal stadiums and attracting MLB teams (Gendzel, 1995). Cities in the South and West
used teams to validate their emerging status. Los Angeles offered 300 acres of valuable public
land to attract the Dodgers from Brooklyn (Sullivan, 1987). The Astrodome signified
Houston’s ambitions and high-tech future (Gast, 2014). Toward rebranding the city as the
center of the “New South,” Atlanta attracted the Braves to move from Milwaukee in 1966
(Gendzel, 1995).
As the Braves’ relocation after just 13 seasons upset Milwaukee residents by stripping
away the city’s major league status, several cities throughout the Northeast and Midwest
justified stadium construction to symbolize their continued relevance (Lipsitz, 1984; Lisle,
2017; Gendzel, 1995). Downtown super stadiums ensured that Cincinnati, Pittsburgh and St.
Louis would retain their teams in the late 1960s. Klobuchar (1986) argued that Minneapolis’
construction of the Metrodome was intended to symbolize the primacy of downtown against
suburbs such as Bloomington, where the Twins had played in their first two decades.
As civic leaders recognized stadiums as an important civic amenities that could host
diverse events, build community cohesion and be a site of memory, the perceived public value
of super stadiums impacted their location by justifying the use of public resources and legal
authority (Danielson, 1997; Riess, 1989). Planners selected sites based on access, generally in
IJSMS suburbs or on the urban periphery with highway access and large parking lots (Riess, 1989).
The 50-acre site of Bloomington’s Metropolitan Stadium was ten miles from the downtowns
of Minneapolis and St. Paul, was located near two highways and offered ample parking
(Gershman, 1993). While assembling such large or infrastructure-dense sites may have been
beyond the ability of early 20th century team owners, planners could use public land or
acquire private property through direct purchase, condemnation or eminent domain.
The public sector’s desire to maximize use and minimize cost helped determine design.
Round and ovular stadiums could accommodate diverse uses but were not ideal for viewing
baseball or football, as, for example, Cleveland Municipal Stadium, opened in 1932, initially
included a running track that set spectators back further from the field (Goldberger, 2019).
The problems of cotenancy became more pronounced in the super stadiums of the 1960s,
which had too many seats for baseball and not enough for football (Gershman, 1993). With
modernist architecture minimizing ornamentation, stadiums tended toward being generic, as
player Richie Hebner observed, “when I go up to bat, I cannot tell whether I’m in Cincinnati,
Philly, Pittsburgh or St. Louis. They all look alike” (as qtd. in Ritter, 1992, p. 4).
Stadiums were also included within urban renewal projects as their size helped justify
large-scale slum removal. In Cincinnati, Riverfront Stadium would improve the Ohio River
waterfront by removing warehouses, factories and the infamous “Bottoms” neighborhood
(Byczkowski and Wilkinson, 2002). In St. Louis, a “blight” designation enabled the seizure
and razing of many properties on the Busch Stadium site, which would become one of four
anchors for downtown redevelopment (Lipsitz, 1984). While civic leaders in St. Louis
strategically used its stadium, most cities did little to encourage ancillary development, as, for
example neither Cincinnati, Seattle nor Minneapolis identified economic development
objectives within their stadium plans (Byczkowski and Wilkinson, 2002; Klobuchar, 1986).
Between 1930 and 1985, 16 cities built stadiums used by MLB teams with only Los
Angeles requiring a substantial financial commitment from team owners (Long, 2013). As
teams enjoyed increased revenues, many cities could claim “major league status” and
provided residents with a convenient space for mass recreation. However, the focus on
symbolic and practical purposes reduced their economic impacts, as stadiums were isolated
from surrounding communities due to the emphasis on parking and highway accessibility.
This even applied to downtown stadiums, where parking lots and highways were barriers
dissuading visitors from venturing beyond stadium grounds to explore the city. As a result,
ancillary development was rare with few bars, restaurants, entertainment and retail
establishments opening nearby (Goldberger, 2019) [2].

Neoliberal postmodern stadium as development anchors (1990–2010s)

By 1990s, sports facilities began to be incorporated into UEDs and broader consumption-
oriented development efforts targeting suburbanites, tourists and business travelers (Chapin,
2004; Rosensweig, 2005; Harvey, 1989). Civic leaders believed that stadiums could catalyze
urban redevelopment through attracting more than two million people annually and accruing
urban marketing benefits from broadcasts to local, national and global audiences
(Rosentraub, 1997). Such intentions impacted both facility design and location. First,
postmodern stadiums were designed as imageable buildings that would showcase cities
through being architecturally unique and appropriate to the surrounding area (Goldberger,
2019; Smith, 2001). Second, stadiums would provide an important source of potential
consumers for bars, restaurants, retail stores and other commercial establishments within
UEDs (Friedman et al., 2012).
Civic leaders believed that teams and sports facilities were powerful tools for urban
promotion that could differentiate cities and provide a competitive advantage within a
crowded travel marketplace (Friedman and Silk, 2005). Unlike the festival marketplaces and
convention centers anchoring early UEDs whose effectiveness was diminished by Stadium
competition and fading novelty, stadiums could not easily be replicated, monopoly leagues development
controlled the supply of teams and each game was a unique event (Euchner, 1999; Judd and
Fainstein, 1999; Friedman et al., 2012). Additionally, game broadcasts would display the city’s
and urban
virtues as broadcasters discussed their activities, as images from UEDs featured prominently governance
within commercial bumps, and as flattering views of downtown and surrounding landscapes
provided backgrounds for game play (Smith, 2001). With their high visibility, cities use
stadium architecture to reinforce these messages by incorporating local esthetic designs,
cultural landmarks and natural features (see Table 4).
While marketing impacts can be difficult to isolate, stadiums offered UEDs a large number
of potential consumers. In Cleveland, Progressive Field and the Rocket Mortgage Field House
attract five million people annually into the Gateway Sports and Entertainment Complex
(Rosensweig, 2005). In Denver, civic planners envisioned Lower Downtown (LoDo) becoming
a vibrant district with retail, restaurants and housing with Coors Field at its center (Buckman
and Mack, 2012). Detroit hoped that Comerica Park along with the Ford Field football stadium
could provide vibrancy to a planned entertainment district of “sports bars, microbreweries
and music cafes” surrounding the renovated Fox Theater (Bachelor, 1998). In Baltimore, the
construction two stadiums at Camden Yards was “part of an essential second stage of
downtown festival development” (Rosensweig, 2005, p. 1) through functioning as “a special
activity generator” (Hannigan, 1998, p. 56).

2010 cost Public

Stadium City Year (millions) % Location

Guaranteed Rate Field Chicago 1991 332 83 Urban

neighborhood*
Oriole Park at Camden Baltimore 1992 183 91 Downtown
Yards
Progressive Field Cleveland 1994 274 48 Downtown
Globe Life Park Arlington, 1994 231 92 Suburban*
Texas
Coors Field Denver 1995 303 73 Downtown
Turner Field Atlanta 1997 343 0 Urban periphery*
Chase Field Phoenix 1998 503 72 Downtown
T-Mobile Park Seattle 1999 718 76 Downtown*
Oracle Park San Francisco 2000 439 5 Downtown
Minute maid Park Houston 2000 358 68 Downtown
Comerica Park Detroit 2000 419 43 Downtown
Miller Park Milwaukee 2001 525 74 Suburban*
PNC Park Pittsburgh 2001 363 72 Downtown
Great American Ball Park Cincinnati 2003 358 89 Downtown*
Citizens Bank Park Philadelphia 2004 565 70 Urban periphery*
Nationals Park Washington 2008 545 84 Downtown
Citi Field New York 2009 581 24 Urban periphery*
Yankee (II) Stadium New York 2009 1,327 22 Urban
neighborhood*
Target Field Minneapolis 2010 435 60 Downtown
Marlins Park Miami 2012 494 70 Urban
neighborhood* Table 4.
Note(s): *Built in the parking lot of previous stadium Neoliberal postmodern
Source(s): Long (2013) stadiums
IJSMS Beyond UEDs, stadiums have been used to influence broader development initiatives.
Subsidies for Nationals Park in Washington, DC were intended to help its rapidly developing
Near Southeast neighborhood to become a community with diverse residential,
entertainment, commercial and recreational uses rather than be dominated by the single-
use office buildings that were common in other parts of the city (Friedman and Andrews,
2011). While the Near Southeast has become this type of community, Nationals Park’s impact
is questionable as development lagged in the Ballpark District and only occurred after a
critical mass of resident workers and visitors were coming into the neighborhood for other
purposes.
Between 1990 and 2010, eight of 20 baseball stadiums were located within UEDs or with
particular development goals in mind, with the public bearing 60% of their average $230 m
cost (Long, 2013). Overall, their record for encouraging economic activity is mixed as
development was generally left to the workings of private capital and market conditions
(Chapin, 2004). Cleveland’s Gateway Project and Denver’s LoDo have been identified as
success stories, while Detroit and Phoenix are perceived as cautionary tales as they failed to
reinvigorate their surrounding neighborhoods (Bachelor, 1998; Buckman and Mack, 2012;
Rosensweig, 2005). Rosentraub (2010) attributes outcomes to planning as, “simply put, too
many cities did more ‘hoping’ than they did planning a strategy or establishing partnerships
with private capital to achieve success” (p. 7).

A new era of urban governance and stadium development

While neoliberal urban governance promised broad prosperity, the results have been mixed
with gentrification transforming parts of the city and dislocating long-term residents while
other parts of the city received minor impacts (Friedman et al., 2004). In the move from an
“active state” to an “enabling state,” urban planners and civic leaders have reduced market
barriers as they offered economic and political incentives for development projects (Da Cruz
et al., 2019). This shift has resulted in the privatization of previously public services and
responsibilities, constrained public accountability, limited possibilities within strategic
planning and increased the complexity of governing cities. In response to the retreat of
government, the nonprofit and philanthropy sector has grown to provide essential public
goods and to address major social issues. Da Cruz et al. (2019) suggest that an emerging form
of networked urban governance has “[expanded] the number and diversity of actors involved
in an increasingly nonlinear policymaking process that challenges hierarchical integration”
(p. 6). This new policy environment features multiple stakeholders working on numerous
complex and contradictory public problems across multiple geographic and jurisdictional
scales.
Faced with these challenges, urban governance practices attempt to coordinate policy
among an assemblage of interdependent actors guided by diverging and sometimes
conflicting perceptions and strategies. Rather than centralized and hierarchical relations of
governance structures, network governance requires constructive engagement with a host of
public, private and societal actors based on principles of decentralism, pluralism and
associative relationships (Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes, 1997). As Klijn and Koppenjan (2016) posit,
governments have “shifted from a government approach—implying that they use their
formal hierarchical position to unilaterally impose solutions—to governance, in which their
focus is on the process through which outcomes are achieved” (p. 6). Thus, there is a growing
awareness that governance involves the management of relationships with a select,
persistent and structured set of mutually dependent actors and firms, which develop more or
less stable patterns of social relations as they participate within the policy process (Klijn and
Koppenjan, 2016). However, since relationships are at the core of network governance,
projects and policies may not be subject to regular government oversight and control, could
lack general accountability and potentially undermine democratic governance structures.
 Network governance impacts urban space as private actors and semipublic institutions Stadium
promote their self-interests within policy formulation and urban planning. Public officials, development
private developers and quasipublic redevelopment authorities have reconceptualized the
relationship between public and private space with open-air squares, gardens, plazas and
and urban
parks that look public but are privately controlled (Mitchell, 2003; Zukin, 1997). These governance
relationships are further evident within the proliferation of sprawling corporate campuses
that reshape communities to meet the preferences of multinational corporations. These new
“company towns” are reimagined as fully-integrated work–life communities that mix private
amenities of housing, retail, restaurants and entertainment with parks, recreation spaces and
bicycle lanes that previously were public resources. Further, the state and local governments
that use public incentives to facilitate this development have ceded control over these spaces
to corporations with the belief that incremental employment, tax revenue and economic gains
will offset public costs. Although network governance structures seemingly suggest a more
inclusive policy process, assumptions regarding job growth and economic impact obfuscate
the antidemocratic reality of these urban development plans and pose serious questions
regarding public oversight, accountability and transparency.

Network integrated stadium as development guarantor (2010s–present)

Recognizing the problems with a purely market-based approach for using stadiums to
generate economic development, a new model of integrated stadium development (ISD) has
emerged during the past 20 years (see Table 5). These projects have three elements: a plan
incorporating both stadium and ancillary development; multi-use development mixing
entertainment, residential, retail, commercial and/or recreational elements and a commitment
by team owners to act as a lead developer. Rather than “hoping” for markets to respond to the
stadium’s presence, ISDs strategically employ collaborative planning between cities and
team owners to ensure ancillary development and help meet visitor expectations
(Rosentraub, 2010). Second, ISDs seek to create communities with residents, workers and
commercial businesses sustaining economic activity on a year-round basis. Third, as team
owners invest hundreds of millions of dollars in the stadium neighborhood, ISDs ensure the
development sought by local governments actually occurs (Long, 2013).
Within this model, Rosentraub (2010) distinguishes between “subsidies” and “strategic
investments.” Stadiums of the two previous eras were heavily subsidized as cities provided
public resources, borne many operating expenses and allowed team owners to receive most
stadium revenues. Although stadiums produced some public benefits, teams received the
majority of economic benefits without making a significant financial commitment to the
project or surrounding city. In contrast, strategic investment requires beneficiaries to
contribute to development projects around stadium as cities leverage public resources toward
producing incremental tax revenues that are supposed to offset public costs, revitalize

2010 cost Add’l

Stadium City Year (millions) Public % devel Location

Petco Park San Diego 2004 596 72 450 Downtown

Busch (III) St. Louis 2006 401 67 370** Downtown*
Stadium
Truist Park Atlanta 2017 555 68 400 Suburban
Globe Life Field Arlington, 2020 934 45 250 Suburban*
Texas
Note(s): *Built in the parking lot of previous stadium Table 5.
**$120 m in public subsidies for Ballpark Village Integrated stadium
Source(s): Long (2013), Goldberger (2019) developments
IJSMS neighborhoods and produce better jobs. Economist Roger Noll has noticed this shift over the
past decade as subsidies have become more indirect through tax incremental financing, land
grants and tax abatements (see Demause, 2018).
San Diego’s Petco Park, which opened in 2004, is the first ISD in the US. In 1998, San Diego
voters approved a $296 m public contribution toward the stadium in return for Padres owner
John Moores agreeing to invest $450 m to build three hotels and 1.5 million square feet of
commercial space (Erie et al., 2010; Rosentraub, 2010). Moores’ investments were intended to
help transform the stadium’s East Village neighborhood from an unattractive but functional
downtown area in to a destination neighborhood that could entice middle and upper-class
residents to move back into the city (Chapin, 2002).
Despite Petco Park’s example, only one of the other 14 baseball stadiums to open between
1999 and 2016 qualifies as an ISD. In its 2003 stadium agreement, the St. Louis Cardinals agreed
to invest $380 m to develop a baseball museum, residential, commercial and retail spaces across
the street from their new stadium (Prost and Stern, 2000). ISDs are also becoming common in
agreements for football stadiums and sports arenas and include the Staples Center in Los
Angeles, Nationwide Arena in Columbus, OH, Brooklyn’s Barclay Center, the Los Angeles
Rams’ City of Champions Stadium and Detroit’s Little Caesar’s Arena (Rosentraub, 2010).
The promise of integrated stadium development. This growing track record suggests a new
era of development is emerging that will result in the widespread replacement of postmodern
stadiums by ISDs. This has already occurred in Atlanta, where Turner Field (opened in 1997)
was replaced by Truist Park and Arlington, Texas, where Globe Life Park (opened in 1994)
was replaced by Globe Life Field. Both new stadiums have been attached to team-led, mixed
use projects (Battery Atlanta and Texas Live!) to guarantee the ancillary development that
had not happened around previous facilities. Mixed use development also features
prominently within stadium proposals in Oakland and Tampa.
Although new construction would seemingly be the most amenable to ISDs, the large
parking lots of stadiums built in previous eras can potentially accommodate development.
The owners of the San Francisco Giants are leading the $1.6 bn Mission Rock project that will
transform 28 acres of Oracle Park’s parking lots into 1,500 housing units, 1.5 million square
feet of commercial space and eight acres of public parkland (Dineen, 2017). A number of other
cities and teams have begun such retrofit projects. In Cincinnati, The Banks’ mixed-use
development, which could include as much as 3.6 million square feet of retail, residential and
commercial space at build out, connects Great America Ball Park and Paul Brown Stadium. In
Green Bay, the NFL’s Packers are developing the 34-acre “Titletown” project adjacent to
Lambeau Field. In Philadelphia, Comcast Spectacor and owners of the NHL Philadelphia
Flyers have developed Xfinity Live! within the South Philadelphia Sports Complex.
Along with Petco Field and Busch Stadium, Truist Park and Globe Life Field have
received $1.55 bn in strategic investments toward their combined $2.57 bn construction cost.
However, the public commitments for these baseball stadiums need to be understood within
the broader context of the development projects they anchor and into which team owners and
their development partners already have invested $1.5 bn with more planned. Though it is
still relatively early in this era, experiences of baseball stadiums in San Diego, St. Louis and
Atlanta show both the promises and risks of ISDs.
Importantly, ISDs better align the financial interests of team owners with the economic
development priorities of the city. While postmodern stadiums and surrounding UEDs would
compete for visitor spending, integrated stadiums seemingly reduce this problem. As developer,
operator and/or landlord of adjacent properties, team owners can realize new revenues from
economic activity in the stadium neighborhood, which increases franchise profitability and asset
value or can be invested in team quality (which could increase consumer demand). For local
governments, ISDs seemingly guarantee that ancillary development will occur, thus justifying a
new round of public financing against the disappointing results from previous attempts.
 Initial results of ISDs are promising. Since opening in 2004, Petco Park has helped attract Stadium
more than $2.87 bn in private investment that has produced 1,200 hotel rooms, 3,600 development
residential units, 550,000 square feet of commercial space and 19,200 jobs (Cantor and
Rosentraub, 2012). St. Louis’ Ballpark Village has 150,000 square feet of retail, dining and
and urban
entertainment and features 150 live events throughout the year. As Truist Park opened, the governance
Braves increased their revenues from $262 m in 2016 to $442 m in 2018, which includes $38 m
from real estate activities in Battery Atlanta (Tucker, 2019).
The challenges of integrated stadium development. Yet, these experiences raise several
issues regarding development commitments, the public’s financial exposure and moral
hazard, public oversight, the privatization of public spaces, access and exclusion and
intraurban competition. First, firm commitments and timelines need to be incorporated into
initial contracts. San Diego required Moores to begin redevelopment activities in the East
Village before the city broke ground on Petco Park. However, St. Louis did not include this
requirement in its agreement with the Cardinals. As a result, eight years passed between the
stadium’s opening in 2006 and the completion of the first phase of Ballpark Village, which
included only the retail, dining and entertainment amenities providing the greatest benefit to
the team. Construction of office space, residential buildings and hotels began in 2017 and
were due for completion in 2020. While $360 m represents a substantial investment in
downtown St. Louis, where investment has lagged since the 1960s, the failure to include
explicit performance requirements means that 14 years (40% of the Cardinals’ 35-years lease)
passed between the stadium’s opening and the completion of Ballpark Village’s most
impactful elements for the public. The slow pace of the Cardinals’ investment also may have
delayed, if not prevented, other projects from moving forward. Similar problems have arisen
in the District Detroit project around Little Caesar’s Arena. Although Red Wings’ owner
Christopher Ilitch has promised as much as $2 bn in additional investment to transform 50
blocks in Midtown Detroit, development of housing and hotels has been slow to materialize
with critics suggesting the Ilitches “are only truly committed to delivering on the pieces tied
directly to their existing businesses” (Pinho and Shea, 2019).
Second, questions surround the extent of the public’s financial exposure. Many PPPs have
been structured to provide the benefits of development to private actors, while the public
bears the costs for projects that fail (Harvey, 2001). As Braves revenues increased by 68%
over two years, in 2017, Cobb County spent nearly $30 m from its general fund and water fund
to build infrastructure for Truist Park, while “revenues directly generated by the project did
not come close to covering the county’s expenses” (Lutz, 2018, para. 37). These expenses were
a strain on county finances, which, despite record tax assessments in 2017, necessitated
significant reductions for public parks, nonprofits and public libraries due to a $55 m deficit in
its 2018 budget (Lutz, 2017). With the nondemocratic nature of the project’s approval process
which avoided a public vote, long-time stadium critic Neil DeMause (2016) has questioned
whether Truist Park is the “worst stadium deal ever.”
Further adding to the public’s risks is the fact that most team owners have little experience
in developing commercial real estate, a field notorious for its bevy of high profile and
expensive failures. These financial risks are exacerbated by moral hazard as civic leaders
may lack the financial restraint and political courage to allow one of these projects to fail, and
it is unknown the degree to which developers and lenders have received explicit and implicit
public guarantees. This can be seen in Columbus, Ohio where the city purchased Nationwide
Arena in 2011. As the building was privately financed after four referendum defeats, the NHL
Columbus Blue Jackets claimed they could not operate profitably under their lease and
threatened to relocate without public support, which resulted in the city buying the Arena for
$42.5 m and giving the team favorable lease terms (Ebersole, 2013).
Third, there are broader political and social concerns. Erie et al. (2010) criticized San
Diego’s agreement for ceding public control of redevelopment to private enterprises,
IJSMS insufficient oversight and utilizing substantial public resources for primarily private gain. In
particular, they identify various renegotiations that shifted costs and risks onto the public
and reduced potential public benefits, while allowing developers to capture the bulk of the
benefits after Moores threatened to slow his investment activity (Erie et al., 2010).
Beyond cities making themselves vulnerable to threats from team owners, ISDs “re-envision
the city as a privately controlled series of spaces that mimic the traditional public space of the
city” (Goldberger, 2019, p. 319). Although a romanticized view of baseball history suggests fans
from all economic classes comingled in ballparks, the reality is that stadium access has always
been highly stratified and have become more so as new technologies and stadium designs allow
teams to provide markedly different experiences to patrons based on ticket price. The Team
Marketing Report’s (2015) estimate of the average cost of game attendance for a family of four
($211 for tickets, parking, food and souvenirs) exceeds the average American household’s
monthly entertainment budget of $207 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). This consumption
orientation extends into the ISD with codes of conduct essentially requiring visitors engage in
some form of economic behavior to legitimate their presence.
Class-based exclusion within ISDs can be further complicated by cultural and racial
politics. In Atlanta, the Braves moved from the historically black neighborhood of
Summerhill to a suburban site 12 miles away from downtown. As Bookman (2013) noted,
Battery Atlanta lacks access via public transportation as Cobb County residents resisted the
extension of MARTA in the 1980s “out of the belief that by doing so they would keep the
city’s black majority at a safe distance” (para. 11). With public transportation considered
essential to ease Truist Park’s anticipated traffic problems, the head of the Cobb Taxpayers
Association worried that the stadium would be a “Trojan horse” for MARTA and the
racialized “crime” it would presumably bring (Bookman, 2013).
Finally, as the Braves are the first MLB team since 1972 to move into a stadium further
outside of the urban core than its predecessor, ISDs may revitalize intra urban competition for
teams between suburbs and downtowns. As research showed sports venues failed to generate
ancillary development, few suburban governments bid against center cities for teams during
the entrepreneurial period with rising facility costs difficult to manage within their
comparatively smaller capital budgets and lower debt limits. With ISDs promising hundreds
of millions in additional investments toward total development commitments approaching
one billion dollars, these projects are seemingly more viable despite much higher costs and
risks. With ISDs offering teams new revenues and possibly rendering postmodern stadiums
economically obsolete, team owners are more likely to demand mixed-use development rights
from a wider pool of possible governmental bidders both within and outside their markets.
However, without careful planning and negotiations, as Cobb County’s experience with
Truist Park and Battery Atlanta demonstrates, the public’s benefits may be illusory.

Conclusion
As this paper has demonstrated, the nature of stadium construction over the past century has
changed with the nature of public governance. As stadiums have been utilized by civic
leaders for a range of public purposes, their nominal costs and public risks have escalated
with each generation of stadium development as proponents have adjusted their approaches
to meet the expectations of each era. Thus, assessing modes of stadium development
primarily in terms of the question of “who pays?” misses important differences in terms of
political contexts and the broader policy environment. This, however, is not a semantical
distinction without a difference as public purpose is the foundational justification for any
public project and should be the primary driver of policy decisions.
An approach to stadium development that centers on public purpose should provide for
better policy outcomes for the multitude of actors within the city’s governance network. Such
focus on public purpose requires assessment of the basic assumptions on which subsidization
policies are based. Fixating on the question of whether a certain project makes financial sense Stadium
marginalizes other questions, particularly those asking how to maximize the public good among development
the broadest population. As stadiums primarily benefit team owners, players, a city’s corporate
community and the middle to upper class spectators who generally live in suburban areas and
and urban
can afford consuming at the venues in the surrounding UED or ISD, a public purpose governance
perspective raises questions regarding whom the city serves and the allocation of public
resources to different groups. A public purpose centered-approach places the analysis of
subsidization policies into a much broader dialog with the essential questions surrounding social
justice, access, crime and punishment, segregation, mobility and other critical public issues.
In conclusion, this paper offers a reframing of the way in which researchers understand
the history of sports facility development and analyze of public policies regarding sports
facility development through an approach combining public purpose with the mode of urban
governance. This broader perspective provides greater insight into the efficacy of public
policy through examining the outcomes and broad range of impacts that major league sports
facilities can have upon their cities and the contexts in which those decisions are made.
However, this approach has only partial applicability to an analysis of the public policy
process through which stadium subsidies are approved, which would need further
consideration of political dynamics, specific policy inputs and implementation (Houlihan,
2012). Additionally, this approach seeks to evaluate policy outcomes as they relate to political
contexts rather than assessing process-oriented implementation issues (Chen, 2018). In
demonstrating the ways in which different modes of governance impact subsidization
decisions, this paper suggests that future research evaluating public policies surrounding
stadium development should start by examining the political context and policy goals. This
will provide a better approach to evaluate the efficacy and impacts of subsidization policies
and better inform policymakers as public stadium development plans reemerge in new forms.

Notes
1. Baseball stadiums were chosen due to their long history, high usage, distinctive designs and unique
connections to place. As in any periodization, this paper recognizes some facilities do not conform to
its parameters.
2. Although civic leaders recognized the failure of stadiums to spinoff ancillary development, 12 of 26
baseball stadiums built since 1990 have been built near predecessors with no significant difference
regarding their integration into the broader development plans. Unsurprisingly, these facilities have
produced little ancillary development.

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About the authors

Michael T. Friedman is a Lecturer in the Department of Kinesiology at the University of Maryland,
College Park. His research focuses on the relationship between public policy, urban design, and
professional sports. He has published research on stadiums in the Sociology of Sport Journal,
International Review for the Sociology of Sport, and the International Journal of Sport Management and
Marketing. Michael T. Friedman is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: [email protected]
Adam S. Beissel is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sport Leadership and Management
at Miami University, Oxford, OH, USA. Adam’s scholarship and teaching interrogates the cultural and
political economies of global sport. His primary research interests include: the Economics of Sport Mega-
Events; Global Politics of International Sport; Sport Stadiums and Urban Development; Social and
Economic (in)justice in College Sport; Sports Labor Markets and Global Athletic Migration. Adam S.
Beissel is currently working on a research project examining the political economy of the 2026 FIFA
Men’s World Cup joint hosted by the United States, Mexico, and Canada.

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