TITLE: Carpio v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.

964409, February 14, 1992

FACTS:
The case revolves around the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6975 (RA 6975), which
established the Philippine National Police (PNP) under a reorganized Department of the Interior
and Local Government. The act was approved on December 13, 1990, and published on
December 17, 1990. Petitioner J. Antonio M. Carpio, a citizen, taxpayer, and member of the
Philippine Bar, challenged the act’s constitutionality in a petition filed on December 20, 1990,
arguing that it contravened Article XVI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court
required the respondents to file a comment but did not issue a temporary restraining order,
allowing the Act to take effect on January 1, 1991.
Carpio contended that RA 6975 diminished the National Police Commission’s (NAPOLCOM)
control over the PNP by limiting its power to “administrative control,” thus leaving “control”
with the Department Secretary, under whom both NAPOLCOM and the PNP were placed.
### ISSUES:
1. Whether RA 6975 violates the constitutional mandate that the State shall establish a national
police force that is civilian in character to be administered and controlled by a national police
commission.
2. Whether the provision allowing local executives to choose police officers, and the creation of
the People’s Law Enforcement Boards (PLEB) undermines the NAPOLCOM’s control over the
PNP.
3. Whether Section 12 of RA 6975 constitutes an encroachment upon the President’s power of
control and commander-in-chief powers.
4. Whether the creation of a Special Oversight Committee intrudes upon the President’s
executive control.
### COURTS DECISION:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that RA 6975 does not infringe upon the
constitutional provision regarding the national police force’s administration and control. The
Court clarified the President’s control over executive departments, emphasizing that the act and
its provisions, including the administrative realignment under the Department of the Interior
and Local Government and the establishment of the PLEB, are consistent with and support the
constitutional intent of professionalizing and maintaining a civilian national police force. The
Court also found no unjust encroachment upon the President’s power of control or violation of
the commander-in-chief powers, stating that the creation of the Special Oversight Committee
does not impede the executive’s control, as it is an ad hoc body with a specific, transient
function.
### Doctrine:
The case upheld the President’s power of control over all executive departments and agencies,
affirming the doctrine of qualified political agency. It emphasized the constitutionality of an
administrative framework within which the civilian national police force operates under the
general control of the President, through the Department of the Interior and Local Government,
while being administered by the National Police Commission, thus adhering to the
constitutional mandate of establishing a civilian national police force.
### Class Notes:
– **Presidential Power of Control:** The President has control over all executive departments,
bureaus, and offices, meaning the power to alter or modify the actions of subordinate officials.
– **Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency:** Cabinet members are agents of the President, and
their actions, in the regular course of business, are presumptively the acts of the Executive
unless disapproved.
– **Civilian Nature of the PNP:** The administration and control of the national police force are
under the National Police Commission, with operational and administrative functions reflecting
its civilian character.
– **Legal Provisions for Appointment and Discipline:** The local executives’ participation in
selecting certain PNP officers and the establishment of the People’s Law Enforcement Board do
not detract from the NAPOLCOM’s control over the PNP.
### Historical Background:
The evolution of the Philippines’ police force—from its integration into the military during the
Commonwealth period to the creation of the Integrated National Police—highlighted the need
for a modern police organization distinct from the military. The 1987 Constitution and RA 6975
aimed to professionalize the police force by establishing it as a civilian entity under the
administration and control of the National Police Commission, thereby addressing past issues of
militarization and inefficiency in police service.
TITLE: IBP vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81
TOPIC: Military power (Sec. 18, Art. VI) - “Calling out” power
Principal Sum:
When the President calls out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, rebellion or
invasion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
The Court cannot overrule the President's discretion or substitute its own. The only criterion is
that "whenever it becomes necessary", the President may call out the armed forces. In the
exercise of the power, on-the-spot decisions may be necessary in emergency situations to avert
great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the
armed forces must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.
FACTS:
1. In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings
and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marine to
conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
2. Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (LOI 02/2000) which detailed the manner by which the joint
visibility patrols called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. The said task force was placed
under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
3. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and
to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional, arguing
that the deployment of marines in Metro Manila is violative of the Constitution because no
emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify, even only remotely, the
deployment of soldier law enforcement work; hence, said deployment in derogation of Article II,
Section 3 of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioner has legal standing;
2. Whether the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review; and
3. Whether the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the
PNP.
RULING:
The petition has no merit.
1. The petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing
to raise the issues in the petition.
2. The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. When questions of constitutional significance are
raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely:
(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
3. The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause, nor does it
infringe the civilian character of the police force. The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. It is noteworthy that
the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
TITLE: JAMAR KULAYAN, et al. v. GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu, et
al.G.R. No. 187298, 03 July 2012, EN BANC (Sereno, J.)
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another of cial, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be
justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
FACTS:
Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in
the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie
Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail
when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis
Management Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping
incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail
Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of
2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the
kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act
pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to
carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to
call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless
violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF)
to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including
arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al.
claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to
exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic
and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
ISSUE:
Can a governor exercise the calling-out powers of a President?
RULING:
NO. It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and
that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the
Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency
powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became
known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. Springing from the well-
entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion that there are certain acts
which, by their very nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of the State.
One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to which the
“calling-out” powers constitutes a portion. The power to declare a state of martial law is subject
to the Supreme Court’s authority to review the factual basis thereof. By constitutional fiat, the
calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed
upon the President alone. While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the
Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making
the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II,
Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the
ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not
require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as
Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine
military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the
armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. In the case of Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court had occasion to rule that the calling-out powers
belong solely to the President as commander-in-chief: When the President calls the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Regarding the country’s police force, Section
6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: “The State shall establish and maintain one
police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and
controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police
units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.” A local chief executive, such as the
provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the police, and may exercise
control only in day-to-day operations. Furthermore according to the framers, it is still the
President who is authorized to exercise supervision and control over the police, through the
National Police Commission. In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the
above provision it is clear that the framers never intended for local chief executives to
exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without
prejudice to their authority over police units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and
their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day situations, as
contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as a civilian agency of the government, the
police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the
President of the power of executive control. Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not
endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the
assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force.
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may
not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code. Respondents,
however, justify this stance by stating that nowhere in the seminal case of David v.
Arroyo, which dealt squarely with the issue of the declaration of a state of emergency,
does it limit the said authority to the President alone. Respondents contend that the ruling in
David expressly limits the authority to declare a national emergency, a condition which covers
the entire country, and does not include emergency situations in local government units. This
claim is belied by the clear intent of the framers that in all situations involving threats to
security, such as lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, even in localized areas, it is still
the President who possesses the sole authority to exercise calling-out powers.
Marynette R. Gamboa vs. P/Supt. Marlou C. Chan, et al.
Facts:
Marynette R. Gamboa, the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, filed a petition for a writ of habeas
data against Police Senior Superintendent Marlou C. Chan and Police Superintendent William O.
Fang. Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Ilocos Norte conducted
surveillance operations against her and her aides, classifying her as someone who maintains a
private armed group (PAG). This information was forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission, which
included her in its report on individuals maintaining PAGs. Gamboa claimed that this
surveillance and the subsequent inclusion in the report violated her right to privacy and sought
the deletion of the data.

Issues:
1. Whether the surveillance conducted by the PNP and the inclusion of Gamboa in the Zeñarosa
Commission's report violated her right to privacy.
2. Whether Gamboa is entitled to the privilege of the writ of habeas data.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied Gamboa's petition for the writ of habeas data. The Court held that
the surveillance conducted by the PNP was part of its duty to maintain peace and order and was
not shown to be unlawful or conducted with malice. The inclusion of Gamboa in the Zeñarosa
Commission's report was based on verified information and was within the scope of the
Commission's mandate to investigate and report on the existence of PAGs. The Court found no
violation of Gamboa's right to privacy and ruled that she was not entitled to the privilege of the
writ of habeas data.
Significance:
This case highlights the balance between an individual's right to privacy and the state's duty to
maintain public order and safety. It underscores the importance of lawful and justified
surveillance by law enforcement agencies and the limitations of the writ of habeas data in cases
where the surveillance is conducted within the bounds of the law.
People of the Philippines vs. Angelita Reyes y Ginove and Josephine Santa Maria y Sanchez
Facts:
On September 22, 2006, P/Insp. Alberto Gatus of the Galas Police Station-Anti-Illegal Drugs Unit
received a tip from a confidential informant about the illegal drug activities of an alias "Babang"
at No. 13 Manungal Street, Barangay Tatalon, Quezon City. The following day, a buy-bust
operation was conducted. PO2 Talosig, acting as the poseur-buyer, was introduced to Angelita
Reyes by the informant. Reyes asked how much shabu he wanted to buy, and when he replied
₱200, Josephine Santa Maria, who was with Reyes, asked for the money. After receiving the
marked money, Reyes handed over a plastic sachet containing shabu. This was the pre-arranged
signal for the police team to arrest Reyes and Santa Maria. The marked money was recovered
from Santa Maria, and the shabu was seized from Reyes. Both were charged with violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).

Issues:
1. Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the chain of custody of the seized drugs was properly established.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Angelita Reyes and Josephine Santa Maria for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The Court held that the prosecution successfully established the
elements of illegal sale of shabu, including the identities of the buyer, seller, and the object of
the sale. The Court also found that the chain of custody of the seized drugs was properly
maintained, as the police officers followed the required procedures for handling and
documenting the evidence. The integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs were
preserved, leading to the conviction of the accused.

Significance:
This case underscores the importance of adhering to proper procedures in drug-related
operations to ensure the integrity of evidence. It also highlights the judiciary's role in upholding
convictions when the prosecution meets the burden of proof and follows legal protocols.
Mario Veridiano y Sapi vs. People of the Philippines
Facts:
On January 15, 2008, Mario Veridiano y Sapi was apprehended by police officers at a checkpoint
in Nagcarlan, Laguna, based on a tip from a concerned citizen. The police conducted a
warrantless search and found a tea bag containing 2.72 grams of dried marijuana leaves in
Veridiano's possession. He was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under
Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). Veridiano pleaded not
guilty, arguing that his arrest and the subsequent search were unlawful and violated his
constitutional rights.

Issues:
1. Whether the warrantless arrest of Veridiano was valid.
2. Whether the warrantless search conducted on Veridiano was lawful.
3. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain Veridiano’s conviction for illegal possession
of dangerous drugs.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Veridiano, granting his petition. The Court held that the
warrantless arrest did not meet the standards for a valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit
arrest. Consequently, the search incidental to the illegal arrest was also invalid, making the
marijuana seized inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree" under Article III, Sections 2 and
3(2) of the Philippine Constitution. The Court also rejected the argument that Veridiano
consented to the search, noting that his silence did not equate to voluntary acquiescence. Due
to the lack of admissible evidence, the Court acquitted Veridiano and ordered his immediate
release unless held for another lawful cause
Significance:
This case reinforces the doctrine that for a warrantless arrest to be lawful, there must be an
overt act indicating that a person has committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. It also clarifies the parameters for lawful warrantless searches and the necessity of
unequivocal and intelligent consent for such searches. The decision underscores the importance
of protecting constitutional rights against unlawful arrests and searches.
Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales vs. People of the Philippines
Facts:
On July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan and PO3 Bienvy Calag II observed Alvin Comerciante
and Erick Dasilla engaging in suspicious activities in Mandaluyong City, including the exchange of
plastic sachets suspected to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). Based on these
observations, the police conducted a warrantless arrest and seized the sachets. Comerciante
was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). While Dasilla was acquitted after
filing a demurrer to evidence, Comerciante was convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction.
Issues:
1. Whether the warrantless arrest and subsequent seizure of the drugs from Comerciante were
lawful.
2. Whether the evidence obtained from the warrantless arrest should be admissible or deemed
as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Comerciante, finding that:
1. The warrantless arrest did not satisfy the conditions for a lawful arrest under the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. The arresting officers did not witness Comerciante committing a
crime nor had immediate knowledge that a crime had just been committed.
2. The "stop and frisk" rule, which allows for a search for weapons or contraband before arrest,
could not justify the search in Comerciante's case due to the lack of a genuine reason indicating
criminal activity.
3. Given the illegal warrantless arrest, the seized sachets containing shabu were inadmissible as
"fruit of the poisonous tree," leading to Comerciante's acquittal.
Significance:
This case reiterates essential principles related to warrantless arrests and searches, particularly:
1. The necessity of a lawful arrest before a search can be made, emphasizing that evidence
obtained from an unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible.
2. The specific conditions under which a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful.
3. The "stop and frisk" rule and its legitimate application based on reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.
Honesto Ogayon y Diaz vs. People of the Philippines
Facts:
On October 2, 2003, at around 5:20 a.m., police officers from the Albay Provincial Police Office
executed a search warrant at the residence of Honesto Ogayon in Barangay Iraya, Guinobatan,
Albay. The search, conducted with the assistance of local officials, led to the discovery of drug
paraphernalia and two sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). Ogayon was
charged with illegal possession of drug paraphernalia and dangerous drugs under Sections 11
and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
Ogayon pleaded not guilty and challenged the validity of the search warrant and the legality of
the search.
Issues:
1. Whether Ogayon waived his right to question the legality of the search warrant by not
objecting to it in a timely manner.
2. Whether the search conducted under a defective search warrant was highly irregular,
rendering the seized items inadmissible.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Ogayon, finding that:
1. Waiver of Right to Question Search Warrant: The Court held that Ogayon did not waive his
right to question the search warrant. The protection of fundamental rights takes precedence
over procedural missteps, and the seriousness of constitutional rights demands vigilance.
2. Validity of the Search Warrant and Evidence Seized: The Court found the search warrant
defective due to the lack of evidence showing that the issuing judge conducted the necessary
personal examination of the complainant and witnesses, as mandated by the Constitution.
Consequently, the search was declared null and void, and the seized items were deemed
inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court reversed Ogayon's conviction due to the invalidation of the search warrant
and the inadmissibility of the evidence seized. Ogayon was acquitted due to the absence of
substantial evidence.
Significance:
This case underscores the importance of adhering to constitutional requirements for issuing
search warrants and the protection of individuals' rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. It highlights the judiciary's role in ensuring that procedural rules do not undermine
fundamental constitutional guarantees.
People of the Philippines vs. Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a.k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari
Facts:
On January 10, 2014, police officers received an anonymous tip about an individual transporting
marijuana from Kalinga to Isabela. Acting on this tip, the police set up a checkpoint. Later, they
received a text message further describing the suspect. A passenger jeepney fitting the
description was stopped at the checkpoint, and Jerry Sapla was identified as the suspect. Upon
searching a sack in front of him, the officers found four bricks of marijuana, leading to his arrest.
Sapla was charged with violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). He argued that the marijuana was planted and that the
warrantless search was illegal.
Issues:
1. Whether the warrantless search and seizure conducted on Sapla was valid.
2. Whether the evidence obtained from the warrantless search is admissible.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Sapla, setting aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court held that the warrantless search and seizure were invalid due to the absence of
probable cause. The anonymous tip alone did not justify the intrusive search without a warrant.
Consequently, the marijuana bricks seized during the unlawful search were inadmissible as
evidence. The Court emphasized that constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures must be upheld, even in the fight against illegal drugs. As a result, Sapla was acquitted
due to the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without the
inadmissible evidence
Significance:
This case underscores the importance of protecting constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures. It highlights that evidence obtained from an unlawful search cannot be
used in court, reinforcing the principle that the ends do not justify the means in law
enforcement.
Larry Sabuco Manibog vs. People of the Philippines
Facts:
On March 17, 2010, Police Chief Inspector Randolph Beniat received a tip from a police asset
that Larry Sabuco Manibog was standing outside the Municipal Tourism Office in Dingras, Ilocos
Norte, with a gun tucked in his waistband. Acting on this information, the police approached
Manibog and conducted a "stop and frisk" search, which led to the discovery of a .38 caliber
revolver. Manibog was arrested and charged with illegal possession of a firearm. He argued that
the warrantless search and seizure were unlawful and that the evidence obtained should be
inadmissible.
Issues:
1. Whether the warrantless search conducted on Manibog was lawful.
2. Whether the firearm seized during the warrantless search is admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless search conducted on Manibog was unlawful. The
Court emphasized that for a "stop and frisk" search to be valid, there must be a genuine reason
to believe that the person is armed and dangerous. In this case, the police acted solely on an
unverified tip without any overt act from Manibog that would justify the search. Consequently,
the firearm seized during the unlawful search was deemed inadmissible as evidence. The Court
acquitted Manibog due to the lack of admissible evidence to support his conviction
Significance:
This case reinforces the strict requirements for lawful warrantless searches and the protection
of individuals' constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. It underscores
the necessity of a genuine and reasonable basis for "stop and frisk" searches to ensure that
evidence obtained is admissible in court.
People of the Philippines vs. Jeffrey Hirang y Rodriguez
Facts:
Jeffrey Hirang y Rodriguez, also known as Jojit and Jojie, was charged with qualified trafficking in
persons under Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a) and (c), and Section 3(a), (b), and (c) of
Republic Act No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003). On June 27, 2007, in Taguig City,
Hirang allegedly recruited, transported, and provided four minor girls, aged 14 to 17, for
prostitution. He promised them good times and financial rewards, exploiting their
vulnerabilities. An entrapment operation led by the International Justice Mission (IJM) and the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) corroborated the victims' accounts, resulting in Hirang's
arrest and subsequent trial.
Issues:
1. Whether the prosecution successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt Hirang’s guilt for the
crime charged.
2. Whether Hirang should be acquitted based on the alleged violation of his rights under R.A.
No. 7438 during arrest.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed Hirang’s conviction. The Court held that the prosecution effectively
demonstrated the elements of trafficking as defined by R.A. No. 9208, including recruitment,
transportation, and exploitation of minors for prostitution. The entrapment operation was
deemed legitimate, distinguishing it from unlawful instigation. The Court also found that any
procedural defects during Hirang’s arrest were rectified by his voluntary participation in the trial
and his plea, negating grounds for acquittal based on procedural missteps.
Significance:
This case reiterates the principles surrounding the prosecution of trafficking in persons,
emphasizing the legality of entrapment operations versus instigation and the sufficiency of
corroborative testimonies alongside victim accounts in establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Miranda v. Arizona
Facts:
Ernesto Miranda was arrested in Phoenix, Arizona, and taken into custody for questioning
regarding a kidnapping and rape. During a two-hour interrogation, Miranda confessed to the
crimes without being informed of his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination or his
Sixth Amendment right to an attorney. His signed confession was used as evidence at trial,
leading to his conviction. Miranda appealed, arguing that his confession was obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights.
Issues:
1. Whether the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination extends to the police
interrogation of a suspect.
2. Whether the police are required to inform a suspect of their rights to remain silent and to
have an attorney present during questioning.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Miranda, holding that the Fifth Amendment requires law
enforcement officials to advise suspects of their rights before questioning them. The Court
established the "Miranda rights," which include:

1. The right to remain silent.

2. The warning that anything said can be used against the suspect in court.
3. The right to have an attorney present during questioning.
4. The right to have an attorney appointed if the suspect cannot afford one.
The Court held that any statements made by a suspect during a custodial interrogation are
inadmissible in court unless the suspect has been informed of these rights and has voluntarily
waived them.
Significance:
This landmark decision established the requirement for police to inform suspects of their
constitutional rights, fundamentally changing law enforcement practices in the United States.
The "Miranda rights" are now a standard procedure to ensure that suspects are aware of their
rights and that any confessions or statements made during interrogations are voluntary and
informed.

People of the Philippines vs. Larry Mahinay y Amparado

Facts:
Larry Mahinay began working as a houseboy for Maria Isip on November 20, 1993. On June 25,
1995, after joining a drinking spree, Mahinay asked Isip for permission to go out. Witnesses saw
the victim, 12-year-old Ma. Victoria Chan, playing inside Isip’s unfinished house that afternoon.
Later, Mahinay appeared uneasy and drunk when attempting to purchase food from a nearby
store. By evening, the victim was missing. The following day, her body was discovered in a septic
tank within the compound, bearing signs of rape and fatal injuries. Mahinay was arrested on
July 7, 1995, and charged with rape with homicide. Despite pleading not guilty, the trial court
convicted Mahinay, sentencing him to death and ordering him to pay damages to the victim’s
heirs. The case was automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court due to the death penalty.
Issues:
1. Whether the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to convict Mahinay beyond a
reasonable doubt.
2. Whether Mahinay’s extrajudicial confession was admissible and voluntarily made.
3. The appropriateness of the death penalty under the circumstances of the crime.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed Mahinay’s conviction, emphasizing the sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence that pointed to his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found Mahinay’s
confession, obtained with legal assistance, to be voluntarily made and therefore admissible in
court. The Court upheld the death penalty, highlighting the severity of the crime of rape with
homicide under the circumstances provided by law
Significance:
This case underscores the principle that conviction can be based on circumstantial evidence if it
is consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis. It
also highlights the importance of ensuring that extrajudicial confessions are made voluntarily
and with legal assistance. The decision reflects the stringent approach of the law in deterring
heinous crimes and upholding justice for the victims.

People of the Philippines vs. Jerry Pepino y Rueras and Preciosa Gomez y Campos
Facts:
On June 28, 1997, Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez, along with an unidentified accomplice,
entered Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat, Parañaque City, pretending to be customers. Pepino
brandished a gun and, under the guise of a holdup, handcuffed Edward Tan, the owner, and
forced him into a metallic green Toyota Corolla. Edward was taken to an apartment in Quezon
City, where he was chained and shackled. The kidnappers demanded a ransom of ₱40 million
from Edward's father, which was later negotiated down to ₱700,000 by Edward's wife, Jocelyn
Tan. After the ransom was paid, Edward was released at the UP Diliman Campus. Edward later
identified Pepino and Gomez from a police lineup. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted
Pepino and Gomez of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced them to death. The case was
automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court due to the death penalty.
Issues:
1. Whether the arrest of Gomez was legal despite being warrantless.
2. Whether the identification process that led to Gomez’s conviction was free from
suggestiveness and undue influence.
3. Whether the circumstances surrounding the identification of Gomez and Pepino established
their participation in the kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. Whether the imposition of the death penalty on Gomez was appropriate, considering
subsequent legal developments on the death penalty in the Philippines.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that:
1. Illegal Arrest: Gomez’s failure to contest the legality of her arrest prior to arraignment
constituted a waiver of any objection, curing any defect related to her arrest.
2. Identification Process: The identification of Gomez by Edward was found credible and reliable
despite her contention that it was tainted by suggestiveness and improper police lineup
procedures.
3. Participation in the Kidnapping: The Court affirmed Gomez’s participation in the kidnapping
and her conspiracy with Pepino based on credible identification and evidence presented.
4. Death Penalty: Given the prohibition on the death penalty enacted through Republic Act No.
9346 after the incident, the Court modified Gomez’s sentence to reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole.
Significance:
This case reinforces principles surrounding warrantless arrests, the waiver of objections to
irregular arrest procedures upon arraignment, and the evaluation of out-of-court identification
processes. It also highlights the impact of legal developments on the imposition of the death
penalty.
People of the Philippines vs. Rene Almanzor y Roxas
Facts:
On March 11, 1994, at around 5:45 a.m., Sally Roxas, a 17-year-old service crew member at
Jollibee Greenbelt, was walking along Makati Avenue when Rene Almanzor, posing as a
Marikina policeman, stopped her. Almanzor showed her an ID and, under the pretense of giving
her a ride to work, forced her into his car at gunpoint. He drove her to a secluded area in
Makati, where he raped her. Sally reported the incident, and Almanzor was arrested and
charged with forcible abduction with rape. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found him guilty and
sentenced him to death. The case was automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Issues:
[Link] the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Almanzor committed forcible
abduction with rape.
2. Whether the death penalty was appropriate for the crime committed.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Rene Almanzor for forcible abduction with rape.
The Court held that the prosecution's evidence, primarily based on the credible and consistent
testimony of the victim, Sally Roxas, was sufficient to establish Almanzor's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court found that the elements of forcible abduction with rape were
clearly proven: Almanzor abducted Sally with lewd designs and subsequently raped her through
force and intimidation.
Regarding the penalty, the Supreme Court upheld the imposition of the death penalty, as the
crime of forcible abduction with rape was punishable by death under the applicable laws at the
time of the commission of the offense. However, due to the subsequent abolition of the death
penalty in the Philippines through Republic Act No. 9346, the Court modified the sentence to
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Significance:
This case underscores the importance of credible witness testimony in securing convictions for
serious crimes such as forcible abduction with rape. It also highlights the impact of legislative
changes on the imposition of the death penalty, reflecting the evolving legal landscape in the
Philippines.

People of the Philippines vs. Belarmino Divina alias "Bejar" and Mecrito Baga y Hiyog
Facts:
On June 17, 1988, in Barangay Malungcay Daku, Dauin, Negros Oriental, Belarmino Divina and
Mecrito Baga, conspiring together, attacked Concepcion Baillo and Jaime Baillo. Concepcion was
shot and killed, while Jaime sustained multiple gunshot wounds but survived due to timely
medical intervention
Issues:
1. Whether the accused are guilty of murder and frustrated murder.
2. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in disapproving Divina's property
bond.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Belarmino Divina and Mecrito Baga for murder
and frustrated murder. The Court found that the prosecution had sufficiently proven the
elements of the crimes, including evident premeditation and treachery.
Legal Principles:
• Murder: Defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, requiring intent to kill, evident
premeditation, and treachery.
• Frustrated Murder: Occurs when the offender performs all acts of execution which would
produce the crime of murder, but the crime is not consummated due to causes independent of
the perpetrator's will.
Disposition:
The appeal was denied, and the decision of the lower court was upheld