Middle East Technical University

IR 224: Research Methods in IR

The Story So Far…

Research and knowledge

For knowledge, we need research. The researcher interacts with what is out

there, the object of research, and develops some awareness. This awareness is

knowledge. The following are the forms of knowledge.

1. Knowledge of facts, or data: In research, there is usually little controversy

over data, although, as we are going to see under “theory” functioning as a

filter, some of the data may be wholly excluded from a specific research, or may

receive little emphasis. The researcher observes the object of research, and notes

the relevant data. As such, data are largely descriptive.

2. Analytic knowledge, or ideas: Research does not only observe reality, but also

seeks to assess or interpret it. This is knowledge closely centred on data, yet

more controversial. It is possible for different researchers to disagree in

evaluating the data and, consequently, have contrasting ideas. As we shall see

under “theory,” the specific theory used by the researcher will have a number of

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assumptions, and these assumptions will guide the overall assessment. When the

theory is different, so will be the assessment. That is why analytic knowledge is

more controversial.

3. Predictions: The data gathered and interpreted may at once generate some

awareness as to how things are likely to develop in future. Predictions as such

are informed guesses.

Limitations in research

Research is a highly complicated process, with some apparent limitations.

Limitations in research naturally mean limitation in knowledge generated

through research.

What exactly do we mean by limitations?

Limitations in research, and subsequently in knowledge, may take various

forms.

1. There may be no consensus in the scholarly community on the way research

is conducted. Some of the scholars may have reservations about the way

research is carried out by others. Ultimately, the scholars with reservations will

not trust the results of such research. This rarely happens in research in natural

sciences, such as physics and chemistry, but is pervasive in research in social or

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human sciences, including IR. “Doubts” about the way research is implemented

will prevent (a) the integration of research conducted by different researchers or

research teams, and (b) the accumulation of research findings, or knowledge, in

a specific research area.

2. The knowledge generated in research may be inconsistent. Different

researchers with different approaches will have different results. This will be

confusing for both (a) the research community, and (b) the policy circles, which

rely on research.

3. The knowledge generated may be of little use. There was some exceptional

consensus, though still relative, around Realisms under IR theory during the

Cold War years. Yet, Realisms failed to predict the end of the Cold War,

proving at least partly “flawed.” The same happened with the area studies under

IR and the Arab Spring under way from 2010 in places in North Africa and in

the Middle East. The developments took the area studies largely by surprise.

4. Finally, consider Turkey’s policy in the civil war in Syria from 2012. You

will find a wide variety of views seeking to make sense of this policy. The

views are barely compatible with each other, although they draw on the same

“facts.”

Two problematic levels: ontological, epistemological

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Crudely, research appears to have limitations on two separate planes:

1. It may not be possible to have a clear distinction between the researcher and

the object of research. Ordinarily we assume some “distance” between the

researcher and what the researcher observes. Accordingly, researcher monitors

the reality that is out there, developing an awareness of it. In fact, it may not be

possible for the researcher to have some such distance with reality. In our

discussions in class, we referred to this problem as the paradox of the gaze. The

gaze of the researcher (a) does not only depict the specific reality, but at once

(b) reconstitutes reality. That is because the researcher observes reality in terms

of what she or he already knows. That which is unfamiliar is linked by the

researcher to what is already familiar. This is what “knowing” is. In turn, this

means that the researcher perceives the reality in “manipulated” form. We

designated this problem as the ontological problem.

2. Second, limitations in research may have to do with problems in the craft of

research. How is research to be conducted? How are the data to be processed?

What are the relevant data? Such problems are not ontological, but

epistemological.

Modernists on the ontological limitations

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There seems to be little we can do to remedy the ontological problem.

“Modernist” thinking simply ignores the problem, arguing that the researcher is

a rational being, fully aware of this problem. Therefore, with sufficient care, it

should be possible for the researcher to “distance” himself or herself from the

object of research. Consequently, modernity turns a blind eye to the ontological

problem.

Post-moderns on the ontological limitation

Those who call themselves “post-modern” do not agree. They argue that, no

matter how careful the researcher is, it is just not possible for the researcher to

abstract himself or herself from the observed reality. Because the researcher is

part of the same reality. It is like a person “in” a building trying to see the whole

building, which is impossible. What you see will only be reflective of the

“angle” that you have. Therefore, in the end, we have to accept that the

researcher not only “passively” observes, but also actively shapes the reality

under observation.

The mainstream practice: ontological limitations are largely ignored

In practice, the academic thinking on research devotes little time to this

problem. The problem is either wholly ignored or receives little attention. In IR

theory, this problem is treated as significant only under post-structuralism,

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Critical Theory, and some forms of constructivism and the feminist approaches.

All of these theories of IR are outside the mainstream.

The result: the mainstream is concerned merely about the craft of research

The result is that the overall academic thinking on research is devoted greatly to

the craft of research, that is, the epistemological problem.

The craft of research has three interwoven levels

The craft of research as such has distinct, but inseparable levels. It may be

possible to simplify these levels as follows.

1. Data gathering and processing.

2. Theory.

3. Epistemological perspective.

A. Data gathering and processing

There are many techniques used in research to collect data and interpret them.

This level in research involves various skills and highly technical procedures.

The techniques that are used most in social sciences, including IR, are as

follows.

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Case study: There is a research topic, such as ethnic separatism. The researcher

picks a handful of “cases” of ethnic separatism from different parts of the world.

The cases are meant to reflect the likely diversity in the world in terms of ethnic

separatism. Next, the researcher carries out an “in-depth” study of each case

individually, highlighting the salient aspects of each. Then the researcher has a

“cross-case” analysis, comparing the cases, to see what is common across the

cases. Finally the researcher makes generalisations about ethnic separatism,

such as: “lack of basic communal rights for an ethnic group in an established

state fuels separatism.”

Formal models: The researcher develops or uses a model that is essentially

formal (logical or mathematical). The aim is to understand a problem, such as a

possible NATO involvement in the civil war in Syria, on the basis of the model.

The best-known example is “game theory.” There are various games, such as

Prisoner’s Dilemma, or Chicken Game. The game helps the researcher to

understand the pattern (if there is one) and make predictions. Game theory is

used in IR especially in understanding the making of state policies when there is

little or no cooperation among states.

Quantitative analysis: This is the technique in social sciences that is closest to

the research in natural sciences. The researcher does not “pick” cases. The cases

are nor few, but many. They are “randomly” selected and processed, usually by

means of computer software and by statistical analysis. In generating

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knowledge, the researcher is more interested in “correlations” (coincidences),

rather than “causations” (cause-effect).

Qualitative analysis: This technique is known also as the traditional or classical

analysis. It is the oldest and the most prevalent technique in social science

research. The researcher “mines” sources (usually books, articles, historical

chronicles, formal documents, news reports etc.) and establishes the relevant

data. Next, the researcher conducts interpretation on the basis of the “context,”

namely the set of circumstances that surround a particular event or situation.

There may be many types of context, such as historical, political, philosophical,

legal, and textual.

The IR debate on method

The well-known debate in IR theory, often referred to as “the Second Great

Debate,” was about data gathering and processing techniques in the study of

international politics.

Traditionalism

The “traditional” approach represented by Hedley Bull advocated in the debate

the “qualitative analysis” outlined above. This technique, argued Bull, is the

only one suited for international studies. Central to research in IR, accordingly,

was “human action.” Behind human action was some “purpose.” This fact

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radically distinguished the study of IR from the study of natural phenomena.

The researcher had to strive towards the grasp of the purpose and the values and

culture behind the object of research. In so doing, the researcher would have to

(a) draw on history, politics, philosophy, and law, (b) use ordinary evidence,

and (c) make assessment through common sense, personal judgement, and

intuition. Because the tools used for assessments were imperfect, the research

findings could never be conclusive. The knowledge generated was tentative at

best.

Scientific approach

In IR debate on method, Morton Kaplan represented the so-called “scientific

approach.” This approach is best illustrated above, under data gathering and

processing techniques, by the “quantitative analysis.” As the tag “scientific”

implies, this approach sought to advocate for the study of international politics a

method that was akin to the method in natural sciences, if not wholly identical

with it. Kaplan argued that IR had failed to produce a body of accumulated

knowledge so far, not to mention “laws” similar to those concerning natural

phenomena, because IR used the greatly out-dated traditional approach. Instead

of ordinary evidence, the researcher had to use (a) logical or mathematical

abstraction. The data handled had to come purely from (b) observable

phenomena. To eliminate bias on the part of the research, the data picked had to

be (c) random. The research results could be sufficiently precise and as such (d)

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subject to verification or at least falsification. Following this method, it would

be possible to be conclusive or certain in research findings.

B. Theory

As stated above, the craft of research has distinct, though inseparable, levels: 1.

Data gathering and processing. 2. Theory. 3. Epistemological perspective.

The data in research are in effect “filtered” through the use of theory. The study

of international politics has many specific theories. Each theory has its own

assumptions about the relevant data and about the way the data are to be

interpreted. Depending on the theory, therefore, both (a) the emphasis put on the

data and (b) the way the data are to be analysed will inevitably vary. In this

sense, theory is none other than a “vision.” (The word “vision” is at the heart of

the concept of theory. Theory comes from the Greek “theoria,” which is literally

vision or sight.)

Do we have to use theory in research?

This actually is a trick question. In research, theory is not an “option” to take or

leave. In each and every case, the researcher will have a theory. If the researcher

is not trained in theory, she or he will still have a theory: a primitive, rough

theory.

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That is because it is not possible epistemologically (a) to see reality, and (b)

evaluate it in the absence of a theory. If the researcher does not have a

sophisticated, fully developed theory, inevitably he or she will have some

undeclared theory, of which he or she will not be aware. Even the man on the

street, who may think, for instance, that behind the Covid-19 virus are Jews, has

a “theory.” It is a comprehensive theory about evil, about basic facts, and the

main actors.

When you are conducting research (it makes no difference as to whether you are

an IR scholar or the man on the street), you need to have a template for “facts.”

You should be able to “recognise” facts when you see them. This template is

provided by theory.

As you start the research, soon you will find that there are simply too many

facts to consider. You will have to decide what to include in year research and

what to exclude. Theory will tell you how to do that.

You will need a starting point in your assessment of the facts. Theory will give

you a clue.

Finally, you need to link facts to each other. For this, you must have some

assumptions. These assumptions will also come from theory.

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Theory as such is a “vision” enabled by a number of “assumptions.” Often it is

possible to reduce all those assumptions to one fundamental idea. Consider IR

theories. Realisms are based on the overarching reality of power (the relative

power) among states, which means conflict. Liberalisms draw on the principles

of mutual benefit among contestants, and reject conflict as inevitable.

Constructivisms tend to view reality as a function of ideas. Marxisms are

interested chiefly in the global distribution of wealth, with little interest in states

as such, which are mere “fronts.” The maxim is “follow the capital.” For

feminisms, patriarchy could be the chief underlying principle in the overall

functioning of social and political phenomena.

Formulated in such succinct terms, these theories are not different in some sense

from the theory of the man on the street: “Jews are behind all human evil.”

Where they differ in vision is that the latter is of course blatantly primitive. The

theory holder is not even aware that he is using a theory, not to mention that this

theory lacks auxiliary (supporting) hypotheses to ensure empirical durability

and strength.

Theory is then a simplifying device, a filter. It is not a mere “option.” There is

no such thing as building on facts “directly.” There are no direct facts. Facts

become “facts” through theory. In short, no theory = no research = no

knowledge.

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C. Epistemological perspectives

Behind data gathering and processing in research is in fact a theory. Theory tells

you what is relevant and what is not. It is through theory that the researcher has

data.

But what exactly are data? What data are, depends in some sense on the

epistemological perspective in research.

Epistemology

Epistemology, formed by the compounds episteme (knowledge) and logos, is a

section of philosophy. It rehearses answers to questions such as: “What does it

mean to ‘know’ something?” “How do we know what we know?” “What is the

basis of sound knowledge?” “What are the limitations of knowledge, if any?”

Some of the concepts central to research, chiefly truth and objectivity, have a

good deal to do with the possible answers to such questions.

The researcher, we noted, seeks to develop an awareness of what is out there?

This awareness is knowledge. But what exactly is out there? Reality.

What is reality?

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Fact vs. value

Consider a piece of chalk as reality. I can define it through some of its

properties that are in some sense “intrinsic” to it, such as its shape, weight,

colour, and molecular structure.

I can also define it as “useful.” Its use, however, is not intrinsic to it. It depends

on a number of “extrinsic” circumstances. Where there is no tradition of

education in a class with a blackboard, the piece of chalk will cease to be useful.

Or, when we are in a class with the modern board, on which you can only write

with a spirited marker, again, the piece of chalk will have no use.

This simply means that “usefulness” is not necessarily part of the chalk.

Whereas its size, weight, colour, molecular structure are part of it; for no matter

“where” the chalk is, these attributes are going to describe the chalk.

The attributes deemed to be part of the reality in each and every case are “facts”

about it. The attributes that depend on the circumstances, on the other hand, are

“values.”

The way people walk on the pavements in Kızılay during the rush hour, often

bumping into each other, can be described vividly. As such, it will be a “fact.”

Yet describing it as rude and inconsiderate is simly “value.” It is not necessarily

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rude, that is. Whether it is rude depends entirely on social conventions. It would

be rude in London perhaps, but not necessarily so in Ankara.

Imagine someone in pyjamas out on the street. This could be a “fact.” That

wearing pyjamas out on the street is not normal is a “value.”

Values as such are (a) fluid, they may change with time, (b) local, not universal,

and (c) constructed, meaning: they are based on habits, social norms, standards,

and conventions.

Three epistemological perspectives

There are three main epistemological perspectives in the study of social and

political phenomena, and they centre largely on this distinction between fact and

value.

1. Normativism: The mainstream normativism distinguishes between natural and

social sciences, and finds a fact-value divide fully justified for natural sciences.

Understandably, natural sciences focus on facts, leaving out values. This is how

natural sciences attain objectivity and formulate universal laws. Whereas social

sciences, which deal with “human action,” cannot possibly leave out values.

Human actions are meaningful only in value settings. For this reason, social

sciences cannot be objective. Normativism in the periphery does admit the

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significance of values in social and political research, but has issues with a total

repudiation of objectivity.

2. Positivism: Positivism does not distinguish between natural and social

“sciences.” Social and political research that may fail the standards required for

“science” should be treated as art, rather than science. According to the

mainstream, a fact-value distinction is inevitable for science. Values should

have no room in research, unless it is possible somehow to “observe” them, in

turn to be transformed into logical or mathematical abstractions. Research

results should be verifiable, meaning: they should be “truth-testable” or

measurable on the basis of observation. If they are not verifiable, they are

simply meaningless. A second view under positivism invokes “falsifiability,”

rather than verifiability, and has significant qualms about the concept of

certainty to which the mainstream aspires.

3. Post-positivism: This perspective, as the designation implies, is a critique of

positivism, arguing that not only social sciences but also natural sciences are

value relevant. In various versions, which may conflict in places, post-

positivism rejects a fact-value distinction altogether. More, the notion of

progress in knowledge is repudiated, or strongly qualified, not only for social

sciences, but also for natural sciences. Post-positivism highlights the

institutional structure of science and the significant constraints on the scientific

practice that come with it.

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Normativism

At the heart of normativism is the term “norm,” which comes from the Latin

norma (a carpenter’s tool used for measurements), which may in turn be linked

in etymology to the Greek nomos, the code.

Norms as such are codes, standards, conventions, values, habits, and custom; in

short, values. As noted above, values are constructed (do not have a physical

reality), localized, and keep changing.

According to normativism, in social and political research, the research needs to

take into account not only (a) the facts, but also (b) the values. To be more

exact, normativism assumes that in social sciences facts are not separable from

values. If you try to separate the values from the facts with which they are

associated, then the facts will cease to be meaningful.

If the facts are some “hardware,” so to speak, the values should be understood

as the “software,” without which the facts will stop functioning.

Normativism: Max Weber

Considered to be one of the founders of modern sociology, Weber (d. 1920) is

significant not only in social theory, but in social sciences generally. His

seminal work on the nature of the modern state, on bureaucracy, capitalism and

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the Protestant ethic, among other contributions, has made him a key figure

across disciplines.

His work on the origin of capitalism is perhaps a good illustration of his view of

the facts as inseparable from values. Capitalism, as a mode of production,

cannot be understood, he argues, unless we take into account the values

associated with the Protestant ethic. This ethic, which emerged concomitantly

with capitalism, teaches a much more vigorous sense of individual discipline,

considering idleness and time wasting as foremost sins. Enjoyment in life must

be limited, and time is infinitely valuable. Work is viewed as a form of worship

towards God. The chief duty in life, indeed, is methodical work, which means

minimum waste of the sources and maximum investment of the gains.

In practice, this work ethic may mean: constant work, lowering expenses, more

and more investment, and greater and greater accumulation. The upshot of all

this is for an individual to accumulate beyond the needs of personal

consumption. This notion of unlimited accumulation, Weber argues, practically

fired capitalism. It is not surprising that the early centres of capitalist

development in Europe were overwhelmingly Protestant.

Before Weber, the likely relationship between capitalism and Protestantism had

been detected by others. Friedrich Engels, for instance, had argued that the

Protestantism could be a reflection of the work ethic that was dictated by

capitalism with the early changes in the mode of production. This earlier view

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considers the “values” in question as a mere extension of the facts at a more

profound, material level, though. Weber, on the other hand, bestows on the

values a “constitutive” function: they are not merely dictated by the material

circumstances, but they also effect or impact the material conditions.

Weber on method

1. Weber radically distinguishes between natural and social sciences. Natural

sciences are objective, descriptive, universal, seeking law-like regularities.

Social sciences, on the other hand, are cultural, local, interpretative, engaging

unique events, that is, mere “singularities” of human action. Social sciences

require case-by case study, rather than a “generalising” scientific approach.

They are value-relevant and studying values means moving beyond mere

observation.

2. Causal laws may not be fully applicable to social phenomena. The cause of

human action is much more difficult to be identified, often vague. (Think of the

possible causes of war, as discussed in IR.) Sometimes the cause may be

inseparable from the effect. (Do we have uncertainty in the international system

[i] because of anarchy, or [ii] because we “read” uncertainty into the formal

anarchy?) Further, in the area of human action, the same cause may not always

have the same effect. (Suicide bombers are not “horrified” at the prospect, as

most of us would, but “pleased” to blow themselves up. We do not understand

this and often assume that they are under the influence of some drugs.)

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3. The method for social sciences, according to Weber, should be interpretive,

open-ended, pluralistic (no single interpretation), and inevitably inconclusive.

This hardly means a state of anything goes, however. There is a “science” of

interpretation, which often goes with the rubric of “hermeneutics.” This science

is based on a form of profound, penetrating, insightful “understanding.” The

German term for understanding, Verstehen, is generally a shorthand for this act

of value-based interpretation.

4. In “understanding,” the researcher treats the object of research as (a) a mind

objectified. That is, behind the object of research is some “purpose.” In effect,

therefore, this understanding is (b) one mind engaging another mind. It is an

encounter between the mind of the researcher, with the attendant values, and the

mind behind the object of research. In the encounter, the researcher seeks to

grasp (c) the reciprocal relations between the part (the object of research) and

the whole (the system of values at work). That is, the part emanates from, or is

part of, the whole. Yet, at once, the part is not purely passive, and may impact

the whole, transforming the larger system of values.

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