Middle East Technical University

IR 224: Research Methods in IR

Post-positivism: Kuhn

Recall that in generating knowledge via research, positivism promises to take

into account only the facts about the object of research. The facts are the reality

as it is. Values that are simply projected on reality, and as such not necessarily

part of it, are left aside. Consequently, the systematic explanation of reality

(theory) is more or less a picture of what is out there, as opposed to merely

some “model” (some “understanding”) that renders the reality comprehensible

on the basis of the existing knowledge. The fact-value distinction and theory as

a picture of reality in turn secure objectivity in producing knowledge.

Objectivity makes knowledge wholly dependable. Finally, knowledge as such

enables progress: we know more and more and, controlling nature to an

increasingly greater degree with time, our lives get better and better.

In effect, positivism champions a highly restrictive notion of science. Research

that is not fully in keeping with the parameters outlined above is no science.

Whether the research is about natural phenomena or human action, to qualify as

“science,” it needs to remain within these benchmarks. Ignoring such criteria,

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the researcher may still produce knowledge. The knowledge manufactured may

prove to be useful too, serving some purpose. Yet, it will not be science.

Much of the study of international politics by this account is not science, and is

akin to, say, literary criticism, or speculative philosophy.

Positivism vs. post-positivism in IR

Some IR scholars, whose work would never really be admitted as “science”

under the tight positivist standards, have nevertheless been labelled as

positivistic by their opponents. The claim in this case is that the scholars in

question “utilise” at least some of the assumptions of positivism. They may not

even be aware that they actually do it.

Take Hans Morgenthau (d. 1980). The way he produced knowledge on inter-

state relations would barely qualify as “science” from a positivist viewpoint.

However, you will find that Morgenthau refers in his work, for instance, to

“laws” of international politics, importing the notion of “law” in natural

sciences, as in the Second Law of Thermodynamics (under heat, a closed

system inevitably decays). The concept of “law” assumes absolute objectivity,

free of values. It has thus been possible for some of his critics to point out such

“pretensions” in his work and claim that Morgenthau is positivistic in thinking.

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Is it really possible to achieve “genuine positivism” in IR research? Remember

that this is the gist of the debate between Hedley Bull and Morton Kaplan.

According to Kaplan, the parameters of positivism outlined above could very

well be applied to the study of human action, with some minor modifications

perhaps. Bull, on the other, considers positivism as entirely ill suited towards

making sense of human action.

In some areas under IR, chiefly peace and conflict studies, large volumes of

research have sought to remain within positivism in producing knowledge. To

be able to follow such research when published, you need to have some

knowledge of statistics and mathematics. Overall, however, IR research has

remained at best “positivistic,” as with Morgenthau above, reflecting no more

than mere influences of positivism, either in jargon or in partial thinking.

Interestingly perhaps, neither “positivist” nor “positivistic” scholars of IR have

admitted a link to positivism. This is partly because positivism in the study of

human action has come under steady assault throughout the last century, and the

term “positivist” has turned practically into an expletive, a curse. In the

language of its critics in social sciences, positivism equals a naïve optimism that

borders on simple-mindedness.

“Positivism” as a tag has not been used by its full or partial adherents in IR, but

it has been used by its strong opponents, with the prefix “post-” added before it.

A group of IR theories produced from 1980s are usually referred to as “post-

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positivist” in approach. Such theories of IR reject a clear distinction between the

researcher and the object of research, between fact and value. Accordingly, the

researcher cannot possibly achieve a “safe” distance from the object of research.

“I” give meaning to whatever is out there. At the same time, whatever is out

there has some impact on “me.” I am not separable form the world. I project

values on things inevitably. There are no facts as such. Facts without values are

empty. Correspondingly, post-positivist IR scholars consider theories as mere

“models” of understanding, rather than pictures of phenomena. They reject

absolute objectivity in producing knowledge. Naturally, they consider

“progress” as a highly dubious notion.

Thomas Kuhn

Much of the talk about post-positivism in social sciences, including post-

positivism in IR, draws on the work of one man who did not have anything to

do with social sciences. This man is Thomas Kuhn (d. 1996), a historian and

philosopher of science.

Take the term “paradigm” in IR theory. The term is to do with Kuhn’s view of

how natural sciences function, as we will see below. In IR, the term usually

refers to the overall “political realist” thinking in IR after World War II.

Realism is assumed to have formed some hegemony within the discipline,

guiding research, and excluding everything else that is outside its assumptions.

This thinking was unable, however, to account much of what happened in 1980s

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that would ultimately lead to the end of the Cold War. This was a failure.

Consequently, the discipline is through a “crisis” period nowadays, or a period

“between paradigms,” as reflected in the following rubric under IR theory: “the

inter-paradigm debate.”

Thomas Kuhn published his magnum opus, The Structure of Scientific

Revolutions, in 1962. In the second edition of the book, in 1970, he added a

“Postscript,” which sought to clarify the thoughts and the concepts in the

original book.

The book goes through the history of natural sciences and finds that the actual

history barely verifies the assumptions of positivism. Accordingly, unlike what

positivism assumed, (a) values of the time generally, and (b) values within a

specific scientific discipline at given points dictated much of science. This, as

we will see, is the gist of Kuhn’s concept of a paradigm. Under a paradigm,

theories were hardly “pictures” of phenomena, but “models” dictated by the

paradigm, that is, by values. Therefore, “objectivity” of the kind championed by

positivism never existed. The development of science certainly included drastic

changes, but these changes were neither cumulative nor linear; hence, it was

impossible to speak of “progress.”

As Kuhn published his work, to create a big storm that would last to this day, it

at once marked some irony. Social sciences had long been under the threat of

positivism; from the 19th century onwards, in fact. Prominent social scientists,

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such as Morton Kaplan, urged the use of positivist approach in the study of

human action. Against this backdrop, Kuhn’s book dared and questioned

positivism in natural sciences, the very template for the likes of Kaplan. Kuhn

simply claimed: this is not how natural sciences function.

That is, With Kuhn, the table had been turned against positivism. The new claim

was that, not only social sciences, but also natural sciences were “value-

relevant,” to use Max Weber’s term.

Science according to Kuhn

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn provides a description of

typical scientific research throughout the history of modern science.

Accordingly, there is (i) science in practice, and there is (ii) the formal

perception of this practice, with considerable gap between the two. This account

points almost to a “conspiracy.” Kuhn claims that institutional science has

systematically concealed:

• how research is typically conducted, and

• how scientific theories are formed.

Systematic concealment? How? Kuhn argues that every scientific field creates

an “official history,” which hides important details. The official history is

typically conveyed in textbooks. This is not unlike the fact, he intimates, that

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political histories are manufactured in some countries, especially after drastic

changes of power, to conceal the disturbing details of the past.

Kuhn’s aim in the book is then to provide an un-official, un-authorised history

of science. He sets out to describe how exactly, in actual practice, science

works.

Normal science

According to Kuhn, in any discipline of natural sciences (physics, chemistry,

biology, astronomy etc.), science is mostly normal science.

By “normal science,” Kuhn means: scientific research that is not original or

inventive. It is not original, because it is research fundamentally based on (and

manipulated by) a dominant model, which he calls a “paradigm.”

Paradigm

Kuhn uses the term “paradigm” in two senses, which are inseparable:

1. In its narrow sense, a paradigm is a hugely successful theory. This theory is

the dominant theory in the discipline. In IR, Realism was some such theory. It

long remained virtually unchallenged. It ruled the discipline. A paradigm in this

sense, includes two separate sets of elements:

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 a) The paradigm embodies the dominant ideas in the field. In relation to

Realism in IR as the paradigm of the discipline, consider the following

ideas, which were long dominant, and which came largely from Realism:

the international system is anarchical, anarchy means uncertainty, the

state is the only actor, conflict among states is inevitable, balance of

power is the only way to have security and order.

b) The paradigm also indicates the dominant avenues of research, often

by the example of the dominant theory: how research will be conducted

in practice. Again, in terms of Realism in IR, the Realist paradigm

greatly dictated the following to IR researchers: keep an eye on the

defence infrastructure of individual states and on diplomacy, which is

used to form alliances, and remember that the economic resources,

national power (population, type of government, national character) and

the geopolitical positions of states are significant in making assessments.

This is the first and the narrow sense of the term “paradigm.”

2. In its broader sense, the term “paradigm” refers to the values of the time

generally: the entire cultural, social, political, epistemological “matrix” that

serves as the context of research. Again, to go back to Realism as the paradigm

of research in IR, the Cold War could be argued to have been the context of

research. The Cold War period in inter-state relations presented a “matrix” of

values. A matrix is a network. As such, it is formed by “unwritten” rules. The

rules are unwritten, but well known. They tell the scientists in the discipline

what to do and what not to do, what is allowed and what is not allowed. In IR,

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for instance, the available themes were clearly indicated under the Realist

paradigm, as commanded by the context of the Cold War. It could not even

occur to the researcher to step outside those themes. Take the theme of “gender”

in the study of international politics (a recent theme that emerged towards the

end of the Realist paradigm). A researcher under the Realist paradigm was not

likely to have some interest in gender. If they did, they would likely to have

been branded immediately as “crazy,” and therefore “not fit” to conduct genuine

research. That is, researchers strictly outside of the paradigm would be

“eliminated” forthwith. Such researchers would have no chance to survive.

Defying the paradigm in such fashion (stepping outside the paradigm) would

not be likely, however. Because, according to Kuhn, starting from the

undergraduate education, scientific education is simply brain washing. Students

who are not fully committed to the paradigm do not survive, but fail. They

could not possibly go as far as to do postgraduate work. In the end, such people

would not succeed in becoming academics.

Normal science under a paradigm

That is, a scientific discipline is at once authoritarian, “disciplining” those who

are within the discipline. Research is always “paradigmatic.” Nothing outside

the ruling paradigm is likely to be possible. This means:

• research is always guided by one dominant model, and

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 • research is limited by a disciplinary matrix, which establishes “do”s and

“do-not”s for the researchers.

Under the paradigm, researchers do nothing more than puzzle-solving. Puzzle-

solving may in fact involve a lot of work, time and energy. Yet, it is not really

creative or original work. It is a highly controlled process. The way the puzzle

has been presented (the “picture” to be pieced together in a jigsaw puzzle, for

instance) will determine the every move of the puzzle-solver. The puzzle-solver

is hardly “free.” The “picture” is already there. The scientist simply puts the

pieces of the picture together.

Normal science under the paradigm is also like a chess game. A lot of brain is

involved in chess, but in the end the activities of the players are highly limited,

rather than open-ended: there are chess pieces on a checker board with limited

number of squares, and there are rules as to how the pieces will move.

Ultimately, the player is barely “free.”

More interestingly perhaps, Kuhn thinks that normal science is similar also to

systematic theology. That is, normal science is like studying the rules and

practices of a religion: rules are rigid, you are supposed to have faith in them.

Questioning the basic assumptions of the religion is out of the question. It

would be heresy. There are religious institutions and a religious history, which

you are supposed to know and simply venerate.

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Scientific community

The “scientific community” in any discipline, namely the researchers within a

study area, are therefore a controlled bunch. They are not free. They have been

brainwashed form undergraduate education onwards; they have authoritative

models, which they cannot possibly question; and they have rigid rules.

This depiction of the scientific community by Kuhn does not at all agree with

our popular perception of scientists. Our popular image is that scientists are

sceptical, adventurous, open-minded, curious, creative, etc.

Anomalies

The dominant theory (the paradigm in the first sense) receives the respect of all

within the discipline. There is full faith in it. Yet, in time, scientists will start

observing “anomalies.” An anomaly is that which is not normal. It is an element

of surprise. It is what looks rather strange. It is something that is hard to explain

within the paradigm.

As the scientists are strongly committed to the paradigm; paradoxically, they are

also extremely alert to anomalies. That is, strong commitment at once means a

special ability to spot anomalies.

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When anomalies appear, they are ignored to start with, according to Kuhn. They

are explained away through (i) unfamiliar surroundings (we don’t really know

enough about the whole thing, let us wait and see), (ii) lack of tools and

resources to conduct further research, or (iii) lack of competence (we are not

smart or skilled enough to solve the problem).

The result is that anomalies are swept under the carpet.

Crisis period

Those anomalies accumulate. There comes a time when it becomes impossible

to ignore the anomalies. When this happens, normal science goes into a period

of crisis.

Crisis periods are rare. But when there is crisis, the scientific community

becomes different all of a sudden. Scientists start displaying new characteristics.

They start taking chances. They question the paradigm (the dominant theory).

All in all, they become rather adventurous.

Theoretical pluralism

It is no longer normal science. Normal science period is left behind. There is no

paradigm.

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As a result, scientists have become creative.

Not surprisingly, various new theories emerge. The new theories seek to explain

the anomalies under the former paradigm.

Theories compete. This is basically the search for a new paradigm. In the end,

one of the competing theories becomes the new dominant theory, the new

paradigm.

How does that theory defeat the other theories and become the new paradigm?

According to Kuhn, theory choice is totally arbitrary. There are no objective

criteria in picking the new dominant theory (compare this with Popper on

“better theory”).

One of the theories becomes the new paradigm, argues Kuhn, only through

arbitrary agreement between the scientists. The scientists agree among

themselves by taking into account:

• the future promises of the new theory (how will the new theory affect

the discipline, is it good for my career?)

• and aesthetic considerations (whether or not the theory is more

aesthetically pleasing than the rest).

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Revolution

When scientists agree on a new dominant theory, which is the next paradigm,

Kuhn calls this a “revolution.” It is not a linear, progressive development, but a

revolution, because the switch from the old paradigm to the new is entirely

arbitrary.

Recall that the term paradigm has two senses: the dominant theory and the

context. There has been a change, according to Kuhn, because the context has

changed. The new theory is not necessarily the better theory, but it is certainly

more suited to the new context.

Textbooks

Next, textbooks within the discipline are re-written. A new official history

emerges. The new official history paints the latest paradigm as a mere

improvement, as an “addition” to the existing knowledge, rather than a

revolution.

That is, textbooks depict a linear development, a progress.

The truth, according to Kuhn, is that the change is a “jump,” not a linear

development: it is a revolution.

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In re-writing the textbooks, scientists hide this fact.

To this end, textbooks assume a cumulative notion of science: each new theory

is better than the one before, adding to the existing knowledge. In chronicling

the history of the discipline, textbooks are also selective: they ignore disturbing

details.

More importantly, textbooks write history backwards: the dominant theory (the

new paradigm) is in effect the starting point. The developments before that

theory are described as small steps that eventually lead to it. In truth, textbook

writing is not “from the past to the present,” but “from the present to the past.”

The past is simply “instrumentalised” to vindicate the present—as in political

histories following political revolutions.

IR and textbooks

In this regard, consider the treatment of Niccolò Machiavelli (d. 1527) in IR

textbooks that were written under the Realist paradigm. Machiavelli is often

considered in these books as a forerunner of Realism: “the strong do what they

can, and the weak suffer what they must.”

That is simply because Realism is the starting point for these textbooks. It is the

main thing, the ultimate end, of which gradual initiation is to be projected back

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on history. Accordingly, Realism existed way back, although in primitive forms,

to be perfected only later, in the 20th century.

That is, the 20th century Realist thinking, the paradigm in the first sense, is a

culmination of history, progressing in a linear fashion, rather than a revolution

(or a coup d’état perhaps) that was enabled greatly by the Cold War, the

paradigm in the second sense.

In the process, disturbing details about Machiavelli (such as his curious

“idealism” as a deeper current) are carefully concealed.

Or consider Jean Bodin (d. 1596). He was “rationalist” enough to detect in the

state practice the principle of sovereignty: the state was a magna persona, a

supreme person, through the magic principle that, unlike other persons, a state

recognised no higher authority.

Textbooks will usually hide the fact that the same Bodin also wrote a manual

for fighting witchcraft, De la démonomanie des sorciers (1580). That is, Bodin

believed in witches, a fact that was hardly compatible with his rationalism.

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