MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

40 A

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

AT THE PEACE PALACE

THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS

CASE CONCERNING: GENOCIDE AND TERRITORIAL

SOVEREIGNTY

THE REPUBLIC OF NOVOROSSIA

APPLICANT

v.

VOLGASLAVIA FEDERATION
RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................... 4

A] Statutes ........................................................................................................................ 4

B] Cases............................................................................................................................ 4

C] UN Documents and Regulations ................................................................................. 5

D] Journals and Eminent Jurists ....................................................................................... 5

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... 9

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION........................................................................................ 10

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................................................................................................... 11

STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................................................................................... 12

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS................................................................................................ 14

PLEADINGS ........................................................................................................................... 15

ISSUE 1: Whether the Volgaslavian Federation’s military intervention in Silvania, including

its recognition and support of separatist regions, constitutes a violation of The Republic of
Novorossia’s territorial sovereignty under international law. .............................................. 15

A] The Military Intervention Of The Volgaslavian Federation, On Humanitarian

Grounds, Is Illegal Under International Law. ................................................................... 15

C] Whether the principle of sovereignty violated under the guise of military

intervention and right to protect. ...................................................................................... 17

D] Whether Self-defence or the Article 51 under the UN Charter extends to unilateral

humanitarian intervention. ................................................................................................ 18

E] The recognition of the people's republic of silvania is illegal. .............................. 20

ISSUE 2: Whether the declaration of self-rule by the Silvanian Peoples’s Republic is legally
permissible under the principle of self-determination.......................................................... 23

A] The legal right to self-determination. .................................................................... 23

B] The legal right to Territorial integrity and Uti Possidetis Juris limits the right of
self-determination. ............................................................................................................ 24

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C] Principle of Self-Determination is intended to be used only in colonial situations.

25

D] The principle of self-determination must be invoked as a last resort. ................... 27

ISSUE 3: Whether the Volgaslavian Federation’s military intervention and subsequent

actions in Silvania constitute genocide against the Lunavian population. ........................... 29

A] Lunvian Population classification as ethnic group and their substantial destruction.

29

B] Special Intent of the Respondent and Tests of the act of Genocide. ..................... 30

C] Substantial evidences and Reports ........................................................................ 31

PRAYER FOR RELIEF .......................................................................................................... 33

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
A] Statutes

2004 declaration on the “essential elements of democracy”; the Seventh United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26
August to 6 September 1985 ................................................................................................ 25
Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter. "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Carter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII ............................................................................ 19
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into
force 23rd March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR ................................................................ 23
Montevideo Convention 1933 R3854/3D/21826 ..................................................................... 19
Theclauseinthe1970DeclarationonPrinciplesofInternationalLawConcerningFriendlyRelations
(repeated in the UN Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, 1993), Self-Determination, p.
120. See also R. Rosenstock, ‘The Declaration on Principles of International Law’, 65 AJIL,
1971, pp. 713, 732, and J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd edn,
Oxford, 2006, pp. 118 ff. The Canadian SupremeCourtintheQuebecSecession case discussed
the question without reaching a conclusion, (1998) 161 DLR(4th) 385, 437 ff.; 115 ILR, pp.
536, 582–7. It would appear that practice demonstrating the successful application of even
this modest proposition is lacking. ....................................................................................... 22
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (24th October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Art. 1(2)
states that the purposes of the organisation are, ‘to develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’......... 23

B] Cases

Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, ICJ Judgment para 190 ................... 25, 26
Case No. 75/92: see 13 NQHR, 1995, p. 478. 277 See articles 27–9 ...................................... 20
Corfu Channel, International Court of Justice, 1949 ............................................................... 14
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment, ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 523) ... 26
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09 (4 March 2009) para 203 ... 27
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Judgment, IT-98-33 (2 August 2001) para 595 ....................... 26

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Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Judgment, IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para 580 .................... 27
Reference re secession of Quebec ( 1998) 2 SCR 217 (134 .................................................... 19
Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217 [134] ................................................... 22
See e.g. the Ambatielos case, 23 ILR, p. 306; the Finnish Ships case, 3 RIAA, p. 1479; 7 AD,
p. 231, and the Interhandel case, ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 26–7; 27 ILR, pp. 475, 490......... 23
The Western Sahara case, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 31 and 32; 59 ILR, pp. 14, 49 ............. 19

C] UN Documents and Regulations

International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally

Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), UN Doc. A/56/83, 3 August 2001, at 43, Art. 25 ..................... 15
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 [1970], Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1971 p.16 [52........................................................................................................................ 22
Resolution 1514 (XV), the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, adopted in 1960 by eighty-nine votes to none, with nine abstentions ............ 19
See International Court of Justice, Nicaragua Merits, ICJ Reports, June 27, 1986, 94, para. 176
.............................................................................................................................................. 14
See International Court of Justice, Nicaragua Merits, ICJ Reports, June 27, 1986, 94, para. 176.
.............................................................................................................................................. 12
See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p.12 ......................................... 22
See, e.g., Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’, 10 EJIL (1999) 1, at
5 (‘as long as humanitarian crises do no transcend borders … and lead to armed attacks
against other states, recourse to Article 51 [self-defense] is not available’). ....................... 15
Tobar, Carlos R. 1907. Letter proposing the Tobar Doctrine. In Washington Treaties, 1907 and
1923 ...................................................................................................................................... 18

D] Journals and Eminent Jurists

(Schabas, W. A. (2009). Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes. Cambridge

University Press.) ................................................................................................................. 26
. 102 HC Deb., col. 977, Written Answer, 23 October 1986. See also 169 HC Deb., cols. 449–
50, Written Answer, 19 March 1990. As to French practice, see e.g. Journal Officiel, D´ ebats
Parl., AN, 1988, p. 2324 ....................................................................................................... 17

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92 ILR, p. 168. See also A. Pellet, ‘Note sur la Commission d’Arbitrage de la Conf´erence
Europ´ eenne pour la Paix en Yugoslavie’, AFDI, 1991, p.329, and Pellet, ‘Activit´ edela
Commissiond’ArbitragedelaConf´ erence Europ´ eenne pour la Paix enYugoslavie’, AFDI,
1992, p. 220 .......................................................................................................................... 20
A non-Charter-based exception to the prohibition of the use of force established through
supervening custom. See T. Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter:
Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice (2013), at 36.................................................... 14
Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On,” Ethics & International
Affairs 24, no. 2 (Summer 2010), pp. 143–69 ..................................................................... 14
Controversy over whether the Council is correctly identifying such threats is common—for
instance, with respect to the Libyan sanctions in the 1900s. See B. Martenczuk, “The Security
Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?”
European Journal of International Law 10, no. 3 (1999), pp. 517–47 ................................. 13
Controversy over whether the Council is correctly identifying such threats is common—for
instance, with respect to the Libyan sanctions in the 1990s. See B. Martenc zuk, “The
Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from
Lockerbie?” European Journal of International Law 10, no. 3 (1999), pp. 517–47. ........... 11
Danish Institute of International Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political
Aspects (1999), at 82; O’Meara, ‘Should International Law Recognize a Right of
Humanitarian Intervention?’, 66 International Comparative Law Quarterly (2017) 441, at
463 ........................................................................................................................................ 16
Fernando R. Tesón, “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,” in J. L. Holzgrefe and
Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 93. ..................................................... 13
For these debates, see, e.g., Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, The UN Security Council and the
Responsibility to Protect: Policy, Process, and Practice (Vienna: Favorita Papers 01/2000);
Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); and J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane,
eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003). .................................................................................... 11
Hurst Hannum, ‘The Right of Self-Determination in the Twenty-First Century’, (1998) 55
Wash & Lee L Rev 773 ........................................................................................................ 22
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report: Conflict, International
Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) ............................... 11

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International law and human rights by Dr. H.O. Aggarwal pg111 .......................................... 18
Lowe and Tzanakopoulos, supra note 9, at 473. Interestingly, the North Atlantic Assembly once
suggested that self-defence should apply to ‘defence of common interests and values,
including when the latter are threatened by humanitarian catastrophes, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes’. Ibid. The Arab League also issued a statement regarding Syria in
2013 that can be read to endorse Ohlin’s view, but the better reading of the statement, as
discussed below, is that it reflects the Arab League’s decision to give Syria’s membership in
the League to the rebel coalition .......................................................................................... 15
Michael Glennon, “The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 25 (2002), pp. 539–
58, at 539 .............................................................................................................................. 12
Oppenheim international law ................................................................................................... 17
Richard Stacey and Sujit Choudhry from the Center for Constitutional Transitions at NYU Law
.............................................................................................................................................. 23
See C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, 2008), at 88–92. Israel’s raid at
Entebbe is an example. See note 4 above............................................................................. 15
See e.g. A. Canc ¸ado Trindade, The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies
in International Law, Cambridge, 1983; C. Law, The Local Remedies Rule in International
Law, Geneva, 1961, and C. F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law, 2nd edn,
Cambridge, 2004. See also C. F. Amerasinghe, ‘The Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies
and the International Protection of Human Rights’, 17 Indian Yearbook of International
Affairs, 1974, p. 3. and below, chapter 14, p. 819................................................................ 23
See e.g. O. Asamoah, The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of
the United Nations, The Hague, 1966, pp. 177–85, and Shaw, Title, chapter 2................... 19
See e.g. R. Yakemtchouk, ‘Les Conflits de Territoires and de Fronti` eres dans les ´ Etats de
l’Ex-URSS’, AFDI, 1993, p. 401. See also, with regard to the application of uti possidetis to
the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, J. Malenovsky, ‘Probl` emes
Juridiques Li´ es ` a la Partition de la Tch´ ecoslovaquie’, ibid., p. 328. ............................. 20
See, e.g., ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’, supra note 29, at 247 a
embodied in article 25, the plea of necessity is not intended to cover conduct which is in
principle regulated by the primary obligations. This has a particular importance in relation
to the rules relating to the use of force in international relations’). ..................................... 16
See, e.g., G.K. Walker, Principles for Collective Humanitarian Intervention to Succor Other
Countries’ Imperiled Indigenous Nationals (2002), at 160 (‘collective humanitarian

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intervention under state of necessity, based on ILC State Responsibility principles that restate
customary and general principles norms, demonstrate that NATO acted within the bounds of
international law in conducting Allied Force’); Spiermann, ‘Humanitarian Intervention as a
Necessity and the Threat or Use of Jus Cogens’, 71 NJIL (2002) 523, at 543 (‘[a]t present
necessity is the one way that humanitarian intervention not sanctioned pursuant to the
Charter may find space in international law, however limited’). ......................................... 15
See, e.g., Rodley, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, in Weller, supra note 6, at 794 (‘[t]he
prohibition of the use of force is the most secure jus cogens norm’). James Green says this
view is endorsed by ‘an overwhelming majority of scholars’. Green, ‘Questioning the
Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force’, 32 Michigan Journal of
International Law (2011) 215, at 216. Green himself is more sceptical, though he does not
deny the possibility (at 217). ................................................................................................ 15
See, e.g., V. Lowe and A. Tzanakopoulos, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, in Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2011), at 473.................................................... 15
shaw chp 7 pg.372.................................................................................................................... 17
Swedish representative at the UN Security Council, cited in Gray, International Law and the
Use of Force, pp. 32-33. ....................................................................................................... 12
The Question of the Aaland Islands: Report of the Commission of Jurists, (1920) League of
Nations Official Journal Spec Supp 3 [27]........................................................................... 23
Wardwell, Sheldon (2012) "An Oral and Documentary History of the Darfur Genocide ....... 27

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AC Appeals Chamber
Art./Arts. Article(s)
Fn. Footnote number(s)
GC Geneva Convention
Ibid. Ibidem (in the same place)
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICC International Criminal Court
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IHL International Humanitarian Law
NIAC non-international armed conflict
OAG Organised Armed Group
p. Page
pp. Pages
TC Trial Chamber
UNHCR United Nations United Nation High Commission for Refugee
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
v. Versus
R2P Responsibility to protect
UHI Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention
UK United Kingdom
EU European Union
ARISWA Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ILC International Law Commission
US United States
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia
NGO Non-Governmental Organization

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Novorossia and the Volgaslavia Federation hereby submit the present dispute
to the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) pursuant to Article 40(1) of the Court’s Statute, in
accordance with the Statement of Agreed Facts for submission to the ICJ of the differences
concerning the Silvinia Province, submitted to the Court on the 26th day of April 2024. Both
States have accepted the jurisdiction of this Court and The Genocide Convention of 1948 by
being parties to them.

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Volgaslavian Federation’s military intervention in Silvania, including its
recognition and support of separatist regions, constitutes a violation of the Republic of
Novorossia’s territorial sovereignty under international law.
2. Whether the declaration of self-rule by the Silvanian People’s Republic is legally
permissible under the principle of self-determination.
3. Whether Volgaslavian Federation’s military intervention and subsequent actions in the
Silvania constitute genocide against the Lunavian population.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Geographical Outline:
The Applicant: the Republic of Novorossia (population of 45 million) and the Respondent:
Volgaslavian Federation (population 140 million) are part of eastern Europe as
neighbouring countries. Source of conflict is The Silvanian Province in eastern Novorossia
with its border with the Respondent containing vast deposit of coal and iron ore along with
heavy industries. The ethnic composition of Silvanian region is Volgaslavian (55%),
Novorossians (35%) and Lunavians (10%).
B. Historical Background:
The Lunavians in the Silvanian region enjoyed special privileges from the Applicant such
as referential access to higher education, overrepresentation in civil service positions,
economic advantages in government contracts and privatization, key positions in
Novorossia's security and intelligence agencies. The Lunavian language was granted co-
official status, and the Lunavian Business Association, founded in 1995, became a powerful
lobbying group. This fuelled resentment among other ethnic groups, particularly the
Volgaslavian majority in Silvania, who felt marginalized and discriminated against. The
Vinsk Peninsula in the Republic of Novorossia was another strategically important region
whose control determined the control of the Green Sea. It was made up of a substantial
ethnic Volgaslavian population (90%) leading to tension between ethnic Volgaslavians in
Vinsk and the Novorossians.
C. Annexation of Vinsk Peninsular:
In December 2020 President of Novorossia, attempted to create closer economic ties with
the Volgaslavian Federation that led massive protests known as the 'Starlight Revolution'
unleashing into violent clashes and numerous casualties across several cities in Novorossia
when the Novorossian government had a harsh response. By 22 February 2021 the unrest
further led to impeachment of the President and by March 2021 the new nationalist
government became openly hostile to Volgaslavian people, enforcing policies targeting
Volgaslavian language, culture, and religion, including closing schools and cultural centres,
and restricting public use of the Volgaslavian language. In response, the respondent's
military forces annexed the Vinsk Peninsula on June 30th, 2021, while a rushed referendum
claimed 97% support for joining the Volgaslavian Federation, the UN General Assembly
resolution declared the annexation invalid and affirmed Applicant’s territorial integrity with
the US, EU, and other nations imposing economic sanctions on the Respondent.

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D. Rise of Separatist Movement:

The annexation of the Vinsk Peninsula sparked separatist uprisings among Volgaslavian
populations in the Silvanian region who further on 27 April, 2022 declared Silvanian
People’s Republic as an independent state with the alleged support of the Respondent,
which they have denied. As the separatists gained significant control over Silvania region,
reports emerged of civilian casualties, infrastructure destruction, and targeted violence
against Lunavians. While, on the other hand in response to it, in Novorossian-controlled
regions, violence and discrimination against Volgaslavians surged, with restrictions on jobs,
public services labelling them as foreign agents" or "threats to national security.
E. Military Intervention and the Armed Conflict:
On 21 February 2024, the Volgaslavian President declared the recognition of the Silvanian
People's Republic as an independent state and further launched a "Special Military
Operation" on February 24, claiming the protection of Volgaslavian people residing in
Silvinia and demilitarization of Applicant. The international community condemned the
invasion, with the UN General Assembly passing a resolution on 2 March 2024 demanding
immediate Volgaslavian forces' withdrawal. As Volgaslavian forces and separatist militias
advanced, the UNHCR and several other reports displayed massive displacement of
Lunavian Population, their religious sites being destroyed, hundreds of thousands fleeing
to neighbouring countries, targeted violence, displacement, detention, and extrajudicial
killings of Lunavians, including the execution of 50 prominent leaders. The Volgaslavian
Federation's military intervention escalated a localized dispute in the Silvanian region into
a full-scale international armed conflict raising serious questions of respect for territorial
integrity in international law and the effectiveness of the international system in preventing
and responding to aggression. On April 26, 2024, the Republic of Novorossia filed an
application with the ICJ.

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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
A. The Applicant submits that, by invading Silvania with the armed forces of the Volgaslavian
Federation, the latter violates the Republic of Novorossia's territorial sovereignty as
established in international law. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter proscribes the use of force
except under two circumstances: when authorized so to do by the Security Council or when
it is excused as an act of individual or collective self-defense, neither of which
circumstances obtains in this case. The military intervention cannot be regarded as lawful
without Security Council authorization. There is no universal acceptance that unilateral
military intervention finds a basis in law, and this course of action warrants to be abused
by great powers to the destabilization of international order. The Applicant further
continues in that the Genocide Convention does not allow cross border military
intervention, and the doctrine of "Responsibility to Protect" enforces collective rather than
unilateral action. As a result, the military intervention of the Volgaslavian Federation
remains illegal while contravening the principles of sovereignty of the state.
B. The Applicant for the state of Novorossia humbly submits that the Silvanian People
Republic is not entitled to exercise their Right to Self-Determination. The right of
exercising the principle of self-determination by the Silvanian people republic will not be
considered lawful because, First, there is a legal right to territorial integrity and uti
possidetis juris which limits the right to self-determination, secondly the principle of self-
determination was only supposed to be used in colonial situations, lastly the principle of
self-determination must be invoked as a last resort.
C. The Applicant submits that Volgaslavian forces have committed genocide in Silvania
against ethnic groups in the region. Military actions by Volgaslavia in indiscriminate attacks
on civilian populations, and mass killings, displacements of people, and destroying
infrastructure, are all actions demonstrating following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. The Applicant
argues that these acts constitute the legal definition of genocide since they were perpetrated
with the intent to annihilate the targeted populationThe Volgaslavian Federation’s
recognition and support of separatist regions contributed significantly to the commission
of genocide. This support largely legitimized groups that were actively involved in these
heinous acts. Although the intent to kill specific groups was clear, the extent of the
destruction is also notable. Therefore, Volgaslavian Federation should be liable for
genocide.

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PLEADINGS
ISSUE 1: Whether the Volgaslavian Federation’s military intervention in Silvania,
including its recognition and support of separatist regions, constitutes a violation of The
Republic of Novorossia’s territorial sovereignty under international law.

A] The Military Intervention Of The Volgaslavian Federation, On Humanitarian

Grounds, Is Illegal Under International Law.

1.1 The Applicant for the State humbly submits that, "humanitarian intervention appears to
contradict the UN Charter," highlighting the inherent tension between intervention and
established international legal norms.1 Under the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which
unequivocally prohibits the use of force in international relations except in instances of
self-defence or Security Council authorization. This art. "outlaws the use of force by states"
and provides no suggestion that the motive behind the action matters at all.2 As a result,
humanitarian intervention is deemed illegal without the explicit approval of the Security
Council, as the Charter was designed to centralize the use of force under its authority to
maintain global peace.
1.2 The Applicant contends that while some instances, such as NATO's intervention in Kosovo
in 1999, were justified on humanitarian grounds, these actions were widely criticized as
"illegal but legitimate," underscoring the fact that they did not change the legal status of
humanitarian intervention.3 The Applicant for the state contends that this would exemplify
how political motivations often override legal considerations, but they do not establish a
new legal norm.
1.3 Moreover, the applicant for the state contends that humanitarian intervention is justified
under evolving state practice are refuted by the principle that state behavior alone does not
create law unless it is coupled with opinio juris the belief that the practice is legally

1
For these debates, see, e.g., Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, The UN Security Council and the Responsibility to
Protect: Policy, Process, and Practice (Vienna: Favorita Papers 01/2000); Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers:
Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); and J. L.
Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
2
Controversy over whether the Council is correctly identifying such threats is common—for instance, with respect
to the Libyan sanctions in the 1990s. See B. Martenc zuk, “The Security Council, the International Court and
Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?” European Journal of International Law 10, no. 3 (1999), pp.
517–47.
3
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons
Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

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required. Despite some violations of Article 2(4), there is no widespread legal acceptance
that these interventions are lawful. It is imperative to understand that, "the legality of
humanitarian intervention is essentially indeterminate," meaning that "the legality of
humanitarian intervention is fundamentally contingent upon one's theory of how law works
and changes"4. Therefore, while the Volgaslavian Federation may have acted unilaterally
under the guise of humanitarianism, these actions remain illegal under current international
law.
1.4 The Applicant humbly submits that if the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is
allowed there’s a potential for its abuse. As the Swedish government noted in response to
Israel’s Entebbe incident, permitting exceptions for humanitarian reasons would be "bound
to be abused, especially by the big and strong, and to pose a threat, especially to the small
and weak.5 This reflects concerns that powerful states in this case being the Volgaslavian
Federation; might exploit humanitarian justifications to interfere in the affairs of weaker
nations, further destabilizing the international order. Thus, maintaining the prohibition on
unilateral interventions is crucial for preventing such abuses.
B] Whether The Grounds Of Military Intervention If Illegal But Legitimate In This Case
Of Alleged Genocide.
1.5 The Applicant contends that the Genocide Convention of 1948, which some interpret as a
mandate for intervention, does not authorize the use of force across borders. While the
Convention obligates states to prevent and punish genocide, it does not provide a legal basis
for military intervention without Security Council approval.6 Similarly, Article 103 of the
UN Charter asserts its supremacy over any other treaties, reinforcing that "in the event of a
conflict between the obligations of the Members of the UN under the present Charter and
their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the
present Charter shall prevail". Consequently, the Applicants for the state argue that
humanitarian intervention lacks a legal foundation needed to override the Charter’s clear
and binding restrictions.

4
Michael Glennon, “The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 25 (2002), pp. 539–58, at 539.
5
Swedish representative at the UN Security Council, cited in Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, pp.
32-33.
6
See International Court of Justice, Nicaragua Merits, ICJ Reports, June 27, 1986, 94, para. 176.

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C] Whether The Principle Of Sovereignty Violated Under The Guise Of Military

Intervention And Right To Protect.

1.6 The Applicant for the state asserts that sovereignty, as enshrined in the UN Charter, is a
fundamental pillar of international law and is crucial for maintaining international peace
and stability. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter emphasizes the inviolability of state
sovereignty, prohibiting "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state".7 This provision reflects the international community’s
commitment to preserving the sovereignty of all states, regardless of size or power, and
prevents external interference in domestic affairs.
1.7 The concept of sovereignty is also closely tied to the principles of legal equality and non-
intervention, which ensure that states are protected from unilateral actions by more
powerful nations. The Charter centralizes the use of force within the Security Council,
making it the sole body responsible for authorizing collective military action. This system
was established to prevent individual states from using force unilaterally, upholding
international order and respect for sovereignty.
1.8 While proponents of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) argue that sovereignty is
conditional upon a state's ability to protect its citizens, suggesting that gross human rights
abuses can lead to the forfeiture of sovereign rights.8 However, the Applicant states that
this interpretation does not have a solid legal foundation. While R2P emphasizes the
international community’s responsibility to prevent atrocities, it explicitly requires Security
Council approval for the use of force, thus preserving the Charter’s framework.9
Sovereignty remains intact even in cases where states fail to protect their citizens, as any
breach of sovereignty must be handled collectively, not unilaterally. Whereas, in this case
the Volgaslavian Federation have acted on its own accord without the prior approval of the
Novorossian government or the UN.

7
Controversy over whether the Council is correctly identifying such threats is common—for instance, with respect
to the Libyan sanctions in the 1900s. See B. Martenczuk, “The Security Council, the International Court and
Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?” European Journal of International Law 10, no. 3 (1999), pp.
517–47
8
Fernando R. Tesón, “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,” in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane,
eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), p. 93.
9
Fernando R. Tesón, “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,” in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O.
Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), p. 93

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1.9 Furthermore, the principle of self-defense, as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter,

allows for the use of force only in response to an armed attack. This provision does not
extend to preemptive or humanitarian interventions unless authorized by the Security
Council.10 Therefore, even when internal crises occur, sovereignty is not forfeited, and
unilateral interventions remain illegal under international law.
1.10 The protection of sovereignty is not only a matter of principle but also a safeguard for
maintaining legal and political stability. The International Court of Justice’s ruling in the
Corfu Channel case reaffirmed that violations of sovereignty, even when framed as non-
invasive or limited actions, are unlawful without the consent of the state concerned.11 This
highlights that sovereignty cannot be circumvented without undermining the very
foundations of international law.
1.11 Additionally, the UN Charter’s recognition of jus cogens norms—peremptory norms
that no state can violate further strengthens the protection of sovereignty. The prohibition
on the unilateral use of force is one such norm, and any law conflicting with it must give
way to this higher principle.12 This reinforces the illegality of military intervention even on
artificial concepts like unilateral humanitarian intervention wwhen conducted without
Security Council authorization, as it directly contravenes the established norms of
international law.

D] Whether Self-Defence Or The Article 51 Under The UN Charter Extends To

Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention.

1.12 Since the definition of self-defence involves a use of force, UHI is prohibited by Article
2(4) unless it falls within a recognized exception. It does not. By definition, UHI is not
authorized by the Security Council or conducted with the consent of the territorial state.13
Moreover, a state engaging in UHI cannot invoke the right of self-defence, because Article
51 requires an armed attack on the state using defensive force.14 In terms of the latter,
therefore, UHI must be distinguished from the use of force to protect nationals abroad,

10
See International Court of Justice, Nicaragua Merits, ICJ Reports, June 27, 1986, 94, para. 176
11
Corfu Channel, International Court of Justice, 1949.
12
Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On,” Ethics & International Affairs 24, no. 2
(Summer 2010), pp. 143–69.
13
A non-Charter-based exception to the prohibition of the use of force established through supervening custom.
See T. Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice (2013),
at 36.
14
See, e.g., V. Lowe and A. Tzanakopoulos, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law (2011), at 473.

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which many states and in this case the Volgaslavian Federation might believe qualifies as
self-defence.15
1.13 The Applicant states that, even if the Volgaslavian Federation contends that UHI is a
prohibited use of force, it could still be justified on the basis of necessity,16 one of the
‘circumstances precluding wrongfulness’ in the Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).17 The Applicant reiterates that the State of
Belgium made precisely that argument in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s (NATO) intervention in Kosovo but international community 18 rejected the
idea that necessity can justify an otherwise-prohibited use of force,19 and the ICJ believes
that their position is the stronger one. Most importantly, Article 2(4) is widely recognized
as a jus cogens norm20 a ‘conspicuous’ one, according to the International Law
Commission.21 Article 26 of the ARSIWA specifically provides that no circumstance can
‘preclude’ the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in conformity with an
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law’. A state thus
cannot plead necessity with regard to a prohibited use of force.
1.14 The Applicant humbly submits that even if Article 2(4) was not jus cogens, Article 25
of the ARSIWA would still preclude a state from arguing that necessity permits UHI. Article
25(1) provides that a state cannot invoke necessity ‘as a ground for precluding the

15
See C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, 2008), at 88–92. Israel’s raid at Entebbe is an
example. See note 4 above.
16
Lowe and Tzanakopoulos, supra note 9, at 473. Interestingly, the North Atlantic Assembly once suggested that
self-defence should apply to ‘defence of common interests and values, including when the latter are threatened by
humanitarian catastrophes, crimes against humanity, and war crimes’. Ibid. The Arab League also issued a
statement regarding Syria in 2013 that can be read to endorse Ohlin’s view, but the better reading of the statement,
as discussed below, is that it reflects the Arab League’s decision to give Syria’s membership in the League to the
rebel coalition.
17
International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
(ARSIWA), UN Doc. A/56/83, 3 August 2001, at 43, Art. 25.
18
See, e.g., Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’, 10 EJIL (1999) 1, at 5 (‘as long as
humanitarian crises do no transcend borders … and lead to armed attacks against other states, recourse to Article
51 [self-defense] is not available’).
19
See, e.g., G.K. Walker, Principles for Collective Humanitarian Intervention to Succor Other Countries’
Imperiled Indigenous Nationals (2002), at 160 (‘collective humanitarian intervention under state of necessity,
based on ILC State Responsibility principles that restate customary and general principles norms, demonstrate
that NATO acted within the bounds of international law in conducting Allied Force’); Spiermann, ‘Humanitarian
Intervention as a Necessity and the Threat or Use of Jus Cogens’, 71 NJIL (2002) 523, at 543 (‘[a]t present
necessity is the one way that humanitarian intervention not sanctioned pursuant to the Charter may find space in
international law, however limited’).
20
See, e.g., Rodley, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, in Weller, supra note 6, at 794 (‘[t]he prohibition of the use of
force is the most secure jus cogens norm’). James Green says this view is endorsed by ‘an overwhelming majority
of scholars’. Green, ‘Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force’, 32 Michigan
Journal of International Law (2011) 215, at 216. Green himself is more sceptical, though he does not deny the
possibility (at 217).
21
id 21

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wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State’

unless the act ‘is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave
and imminent peril’ and ‘does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States
towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole’. By
definition, atrocities against foreign nationals do not pose a ‘grave and imminent peril’ to
an ‘essential interest’ of the intervening state. And even if abstract considerations of
humanity could qualify as such an essential interest, it is clear that UHI ‘seriously impairs’
the territorial state’s essential interest in maintaining its sovereignty and territorial integrity
and in this case undermines the State’s interest and policies. 22
1.15 The Applicant contends that idea that UHI can be justified on the basis of necessity also
runs afoul of Article 25(2) of the ARSIWA, which provides that, ‘in any case, necessity
may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if the international
obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity’. Article 2(4) involves
precisely such an obligation because the UN Charter’s ‘closed system’ of rules prohibits a
state from claiming a non-Charter-based rationale for the use of force.23 Article 25(2) thus
precludes a state from invoking the necessity of UHI to justify a violation of Article 2(4).24
1.16 In conclusion, the Applicant for the state humbly submitted that the Republic of
Novorossia’s territorial sovereignty has been violated by the Volgaslavian Federation’s
military intervention in Silvinian Region including its recognition as an independent state
is in violation of international law. The use of force in Silvinian Region is prohibited by the
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The Applicant for the state respectfully asserts that military
intervention through a pretext of humanitarian crisis is still insufficient to override the
existing legal framework to avoid a flagrant breach of the international peace and security
i.e. Article 1 of the UN Charter.

E] The Recognition Of The People's Republic Of Silvania Is Illegal.

The recognition of the Silvanians Peoples Republic is illegal in nature simply because the
recognition of the Peoples Republic of Silvania is a political act. However, it has time and
again been iterated what must constitute a valid recognition for a state. As expressed by the

22
Danish Institute of International Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects (1999), at 82;
O’Meara, ‘Should International Law Recognize a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?’, 66 International
Comparative Law Quarterly (2017) 441, at 463.
23
Ruys, supra note 4, at 162.
24
See, e.g., ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’, supra note 29, at 247 a embodied in article
25, the plea of necessity is not intended to cover conduct which is in principle regulated by the primary obligations.
This has a particular importance in relation to the rules relating to the use of force in international relations’).

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UK The normal criteria which the government must apply for recognition as a state are that
it should have, and seem likely to continue to have, a clearly defined territory with a
population,a government who are capable to exercise effective control of that territory, and
independence in their external relations. Other factors, including some United Nations
resolutions, may also be relevant.25 similar requirements of statehood have also been
enlisted in the Montevideo Convention,1933.26 However the Peoples republic of Silvania
fails to live upto the standards of required for statehood as they lack an government itself
excersizing effective control as well as no independence in terms of external relations as
Silvania is a territory in the Republic of Novorussia. Moreover no UN resolutions have
been passed so as to affirm the recognition of the Peoples Republic of Silvania, therefore it
can be concluded that the requirements as per international law are not met in order to grant
the Peoples Republic of Silvania any sort of recognition whether de facto.27 or de jure.28
1.17 Moreover, as per the declaration adopted on 16th December 1991 titled ‘Guidelines on
the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union’ in which a
common position on the process of recognition of the new states was adopted. It was noted
in particular that recognition required:– (a) respect for the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the
Charter of Paris29, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights;(b)
guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with
the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE30;– (c) respect for the
inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common
agreement; It is clear from the above law that the Peoples Republic of Silvania is in
violation of the laws laid in clauses (b) and (c) due to their discriminatory and genocide
like violence against Lunavians as well as the inviolability of frontiers through violent
means by destruction of government buildings in the provinces of Silvania help prove that
under international law the recognition of such a state is null and void.

25
1. 102 HC Deb., col. 977, Written Answer, 23 October 1986. See also 169 HC Deb., cols. 449–50, Written
Answer, 19 March 1990. As to French practice, see e.g. Journal Officiel, D´ ebats Parl., AN, 1988, p. 2324.
26
Montevideo Convention 1933 R3854/3D/21826
27
Oppenheim international law
28
Oppenheim international law
29
shaw chp 7 pg.372
30
Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter. "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII"

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1.18 The Volgaslavian Federations recognition of The Peoples Republic of Silvania is purely
political in nature and has failed to take into the legal consequences of such an act of
recognition. The act of granting de jure recognition expressly to a state which does not
fulfill the requirements of a state is illegal in nature and hence the prosecutors are of the
opinion that such a recognition be held invalid as it is bad in law. It is clear from the facts
that the breakaway republics are ultimately beholden to the Volgaslavian Federation, due
to which such recognition is an abuse of customary international law. Both the UN Charter
and customary international law prohibit states from interfering in the internal affairs of
other states.31 This is currently cited as one reason why the Volgaslavian Federations
recognition of Peoples Republic of Silvania is illegal as recognition while generally lawful
may constitute unlawful interference where it is premature. Premature recognition is when
a state recognising an entity it knows lacks all the criteria of statehood. This premature
recognition of Peoples Republic of Silvania is interference in the internal affairs of the
Republic of Novorossia and is hence against the UN charter.
1.19 The prosecutors are vehement supporters of the Tobar Doctrine.32 which refuses to
recognize revolutionary governments on the ground that such government has come into
existence after application of force.9. The act of burning down government buildings
constitutes acts of violence and hence such a state cannot be granted recognition.

31
Tobar, Carlos R. 1907. Letter proposing the Tobar Doctrine. In Washington Treaties, 1907 and 1923.
32
International law and human rights by Dr. H.O. Aggarwal pg111

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ISSUE 2: Whether the declaration of self-rule by the Silvanian Peoples’s Republic is

legally permissible under the principle of self-determination.

A] The Legal Right To Self-Determination.

2.1 The Applicant for the State of the Republic of Novorossia humbly submits that the legal
right to self-determination is found in various texts relating to international law, however
to understand the legal right of self-determination the Respondent asserts that the stand
which the law has taken on such a heavily disputed right. The practice since 1945 has made
it trite in todays’ world by observing that , ”all peoples have the right to self-determination;
by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development”.33 However, Inadequacy of political, social,
economic or educational preparedness was not to serve as a protest for delaying
independence, while attempts aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity
and territorial integrity of a country were deemed incompatible with the UN Charter.34 The
Colonial Declaration set the terms for the self-determination debate in its emphasis upon
the colonial context and its opposition to secession, and has been regarded by some as
constituting a binding interpretation of the Charter.35 the International Court has
specifically referred to the Colonial Declaration as an ‘important stage’ in the development
of international law regarding territories and as the ‘basis for the process of
decolonization’.36 Furthermore it was also held when the issue of self-determination came
before the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference Re Secession of Quebec in 1998 in the
form of three questions posed. The second contention is that whether there existed in
international law a right to self-determination which would give Quebec the right
unilaterally to secede.37 The Court declared that the principle of self-determination ‘has
acquired a status beyond “convention” and is considered a general principle of international
law’
2.2 Hence, it shall be concluded by the law laid down that the right of self-determination which
has although evolved into customary international law, is not an absolute right and can only
be granted in certain situations. The Principle of self-determination is subject to the tests of

33
Resolution 1514 (XV), the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
adopted in 1960 by eighty-nine votes to none, with nine abstentions.
34
shaw- legal right of self-determination pg 253
35
See e.g. O. Asamoah, The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations,
The Hague, 1966, pp. 177–85, and Shaw, Title, chapter 2.
36
The Western Sahara case, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 31 and 32; 59 ILR, pp. 14, 49
37
Reference re secession of Quebec ( 1998) 2 SCR 217 (134)

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the principle of Territorial Integrity as well as the intent of establishing such a principle
beyond colonial text.

B] The Legal Right To Territorial Integrity And Uti Possidetis Juris Limits The Right Of
Self-Determination.

2.3 The Applicant for the state humbly submits how the right of self-determination is limited
by the principle of territorial integrity and uti possidetis juris, it is important to understand
these two concepts in terms of self-determination. The principle of territorial integrity
protects the territorial framework of independent states and is part of the overall concept of
the sovereignty of states. In terms of the concept of the freezing of territorial boundaries as
at the moment of independence (save by mutual consent), the norm is referred to as uti
possidetis juris.38 This posits that boundaries established and existing at the moment of
independence cannot be altered unless the relevant parties consent to change. 39 The
Applicant contents that the principle of uti possidetis juris has developed into a general
concept of contemporary customary international law and is unaffected by the emergence
of the right of peoples to self-determination.40 The application of this principle beyond the
purely colonial context was underlined particularly with regard to the former USSR41 and
the former Yugoslavia. In the latter case, the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission established
by the European Community and accepted by the states of the former Yugoslavia made
several relevant comments. In Opinion No. 2, the Arbitration Commission declared that
‘whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination must not involve changes to
existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the states
concerned agree otherwise’.42 This hence proves that the claims furthered by the
Volgaslavian Federation as well as the Silvanian Peoples republic cannot be entertained on
the pretext of self – determination as it will lead to an inherent violation of the principle of
territorial integrity of the Republic of Novorossia.

38
shaw chapter 10, p. 525.
39
see shaw p.290
40
3 ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 565; 80 ILR, p. 469
41
See e.g. R. Yakemtchouk, ‘Les Conflits de Territoires and de Fronti` eres dans les ´ Etats de l’Ex-URSS’, AFDI,
1993, p. 401. See also, with regard to the application of uti possidetis to the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic, J. Malenovsky, ‘Probl` emes Juridiques Li´ es ` a la Partition de la Tch´ ecoslovaquie’, ibid., p.
328.
42
92 ILR, p. 168. See also A. Pellet, ‘Note sur la Commission d’Arbitrage de la Conf´erence Europ´ eenne pour
la Paix en Yugoslavie’, AFDI, 1991, p.329, and Pellet, ‘Activit´ edela Commissiond’ArbitragedelaConf´ erence
Europ´ eenne pour la Paix enYugoslavie’, AFDI, 1992, p. 220.

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2.4 The principle of Self-Determination, therefore, applies beyond the colonial context, within
the territorial framework of independent states. It cannot be utilized as a legal tool for the
dismantling of sovereign states43 in Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire,44 where the
Commission declared that Katanga was obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination
that was compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire. This sets the
precedence for the fact that the principle of self-determination may only be exercised within
the framework of the territorial integrity of a state. Moreover, it is also held by Shaw that
self-determination cannot be used to further larger territorial claims in defiance of
internationally accepted boundaries of sovereign states,45 thereby making the Silvanian
Peoples’ Republic’s territorial claim illegal in nature. The practical implications of the right
to self-determination also must be understood as they pose a serious threat to national
security. As held by the UN, “if every ethnic, religious, or linguistic group claimed
statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security, and economic
well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve.46

C] Principle Of Self-Determination Is Intended To Be Used Only In Colonial Situations.

2.5 The first international legal case to be heard regarding self-determination was the Aaland
Islands case of 1920. The archipelago brought the case to the Council of the League of
Nations to enquire whether the citizens of Aaland could assert their self-determination and
return from Finland to the Kingdom of Sweden47 all groups, as such, to separate themselves
from the State of which they form a part by the simple expression of a wish’. 48 secession.
The Charter of the United Nations came into force in 1945, in which Article 1 includes
reference to self-determination.49 This meant, for the first time, self-determination was

43
Theclauseinthe1970DeclarationonPrinciplesofInternationalLawConcerningFriendlyRelations (repeated in the
UN Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, 1993), Self-Determination, p. 120. See also R. Rosenstock, ‘The
Declaration on Principles of International Law’, 65 AJIL, 1971, pp. 713, 732, and J. Crawford, The Creation of
States in International Law, 2nd edn, Oxford, 2006, pp. 118 ff. The Canadian SupremeCourtintheQuebecSecession
case discussed the question without reaching a conclusion, (1998) 161 DLR(4th) 385, 437 ff.; 115 ILR, pp. 536,
582–7. It would appear that practice demonstrating the successful application of even this modest proposition is
lacking.
44
Case No. 75/92: see 13 NQHR, 1995, p. 478. 277 See articles 27–9.
45
Shaw pg 524
46
GA RES A/47/277
47
The Question of the Aaland Islands: Report of the Commission of Jurists, (1920) League of Nations Official
Journal Spec Supp 3 [3]
48
Ibid at 5
49
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (24th October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Art. 1(2) states that the
purposes of the organisation are, ‘to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’.

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recognised in an official international legal document, affirming that it was an existing

right. However, the lack of definition and detail as to what self-determination entails
provided in the Charter left little ability for the right to be applied, particularly in relation
to secession. But, the 1966 International Covenants transformed that, by providing a
substantive definition about what is encompassed in the right to self-determination; ‘All
people have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.50
This therefore incorporated self-determination as a human right, however this incorporation
was not intended to provide a right to individuals, but rather to people.51 The main purpose
of granting this right was to provide a meaningful vehicle for decolonization. Between 1945
and 1970, a total number of 55 states had become independent through the application of
self-determination, displaying the value of the principle in this context. This intended use
was also clearly displayed in the Namibia case, in which the ICJ held that the right to self-
determination had become applicable to non-self-governing territories, making South
Africa’s presence in Namibia illegal under international law.52 Decolonization had therefore
been the prime purpose of the advancement of a right to self-determination amounting to
secession Yet, as countries increasingly utilized the principle and became post-colonial
states, the international community became increasingly wary of the ramifications of self-
determination amounting to secession being considered a right in a post-colonial world.
Due to which self-determination began to be referred to once more not as a right but simply
as a principle, implying its limited applicability outside of colonial situations. 53 This was
only furthered by the development of the customary principle of uti possideits which has
been expressed above. Hence, we can conclude that the intention of applying the principle
of self-determination was explicitly in colonial situations, the current matter at hand does
not constitute a colonial situation and hence the right to self-determination must be denied.

50
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23rd March
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR)
51
Hurst Hannum, ‘The Right of Self-Determination in the Twenty-First Century’, (1998) 55 Wash & Lee L Rev
773
52
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 [1970], Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971 p.16 [52]
53
See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p.12

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D] The Principle Of Self-Determination Must Be Invoked As A Last Resort.

2.6 It is trite law that the principal of self-determination can only be exercised as a last resort.
As held in the Aalands case.54 ‘the separation of a minority from the state can only be
considered an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort where a state lacks either the
will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees. It was also held in the
Quebec case in the supreme court that, ‘when a “people” is blocked from the meaningful
exercise of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise
it by secession.”55 Putting emphasis on the word “ last resort”, the applicant for the state
would like to iterate that the criteria of last resort was not met by the Silvanian Peoples
Republic due to which the exercise of the principle of self-determination (external self-
determination) to secede cannot be granted and is against international law.
2.7 It is respectfully asserted to the Hon’ble ICJ that as per international law the independence
of the domestic judiciary is guaranteed, every civilized nation must have a judiciary which
is independent in nature.56 The essential function of the judiciary in a constitutional
democracy is to be the ultimate guarantor of human rights in a democratic system.57
Moreover, it is imperative to respect the principle of the exhaustion of domestic or local
remedies58 the rule flowing from the above principle is a method of permitting states to
solve their own internal problems in accordance with their own constitutional procedures
before accepted international mechanisms can being invoked, and is well established in
general international law.59
2.8 In the present case, if there was any infringement of the human rights of the citizens, the
judiciary, an independent body from the legislative should have been approached, However
the fact sheet is silent regarding the same. The principle of self-determination to secede
from the parent state cannot be granted based on a conjecture that the People’s Republic of
Silvania, who are essentially Novorossian citizens exercised the aforesaid principle as a last

54
The Question of the Aaland Islands: Report of the Commission of Jurists, (1920) League of Nations Official
Journal Spec Supp 3 [27]
55
Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217 [134]
56
2004 declaration on the “essential elements of democracy”; the Seventh United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985
57
Richard Stacey and Sujit Choudhry from the Center for Constitutional Transitions at NYU Law
58
See e.g. A. Canc ¸ado Trindade, The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International
Law, Cambridge, 1983; C. Law, The Local Remedies Rule in International Law, Geneva, 1961, and C. F.
Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law, 2nd edn, Cambridge, 2004. See also C. F. Amerasinghe, ‘The
Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies and the International Protection of Human Rights’, 17 Indian Yearbook of
International Affairs, 1974, p. 3. and below, chapter 14, p. 819.
59
4 See e.g. the Ambatielos case, 23 ILR, p. 306; the Finnish Ships case, 3 RIAA, p. 1479; 7 AD, p. 231, and the
Interhandel case, ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 26–7; 27 ILR, pp. 475, 490.

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resort when the fact sheet is silent to that effect. Hence, the applicant respectfully submits
that the ambiguity regarding the matter should not allow the principle of self-determination
to be exercised so as to allow a part of the Republic of Novorossia to secede without the
consent of the parent state.

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ISSUE 3: Whether the Volgaslavian Federation’s military intervention and subsequent

actions in Silvania constitute genocide against the Lunavian population.

A] Lunvian Population Classification As Ethnic Group And Their Substantial

Destruction.

3.1 The Applicant on the behalf of the Republic of Novorossia humbly submits that the
Volgoslavian Federation’s Military Intervention and subsequent actions in the Silvanian
region constitutes Genocide against the Lunavian Population. Article II of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines the Genocide meaning
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group. The Lunavian people are classified as
an “ethnic group” as they fall well within the ambit of the same as has vehemently been
explained by the court in BiH.60 which has been subjected to mass killings and exodus.
These killings can be inferred from the fact sheet which can reasonably be deduced to be
attributed to the specific intent of the Volgaslavian federation to bring about ruin to the
Lunavian community.
3.2 Applicant for the Republic of Novorussia would like to briefly guide the court through the
atrocities faced by the Lunavian community as per the fact sheet that expressly states that
at least 50 prominent leaders of Lunavian Population were executed. Point 10 of the fact
sheet has shown the Respondent’s targeted violence against Lunavian communities.
Lunavian Population faced widespread discrimination; their cultural institutions and places
of worship were systematically destroyed or repurposed, effectively erasing their presence
in areas under separatist control as has been reported. In order to commit the act of
genocide, substantial destruction of the group is not necessary, it should follow the pattern
of eliminating an ethnic group essentially as held in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro, ICJ Judgment, 2007: "It is not necessary to intend to achieve the complete
annihilation of a group. However, the destruction must concern a substantial part of the
group. The intent must be to destroy at least a substantial part of the group that is

60
4 Ibid. at ¶ 513.

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numerically significant or representative of the entire group." 61 In the aforesaid case the
Volgaslavian federation may have not brought about complete annihilation of the Lunavian
community, However the intent to hurt a particular ethnic group has been established with
the reports documented of arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killings of the Lunavian People
in particular.
3.3 William Schabas, a leading expert in genocide studies, further contends in terms of
Substantial destruction as explained above could also include the elimination of leadership,
a significant portion of the group’s population, or its reproductive capacity." Thereby
describing the situation in silvania currently, which helps prove that there was substantial
destruction and in turn proves that there was a genocidal intent.62

B] Special Intent Of The Respondent And Tests Of The Act Of Genocide.

3.4 Targeted Violence Against a Specific Ethnic Group: It is humbly submitted that the
systematic targeting of the Lunavian minority, as mentioned in point 14 of the fact sheet,
suggests intent to destroy this group. The report of targeted violence and extrajudicial
killings of Lunavian leaders and intellectuals aligns indicates intention of genocide, where
intellectuals and leaders of a community are specifically targeted to weaken the fabric of
the ethnic group as stated in point 16 of the fact sheet. In the Judgement of Rwanda.63 The
Chamber finds that the physical acts constituting the killings of Tutsi, coupled with the
widespread and systematic attacks against them, demonstrate the intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such, thereby fulfilling the
requirement for genocide under Article 2 of the Statute of the Tribunal." This judgment
outlines how the targeting of Tutsi leaders and intellectuals was part of a broader campaign
to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group and hence was classified as genocide. Thereby falling well
within the ambit of case at hand.
3.5 Forced Displacement: The forced displacement of Lunavian Population is signifying the
genocidal intent of the Respondent. While displacement on its own may not always equate
to genocide, in this case, it is combined with other actions, such as violence and killings,
that contends the interpretation of an intent to destroy the group. This is akin to the events
during the Bosnian Genocide,64 where forced displacement of Bosnian Muslims, coupled

61
Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, ICJ Judgment para 190
62
(Schabas, W. A. (2009). Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes. Cambridge University Press.)
63
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment, ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 523)
64
Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, ICJ Judgment para 190

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with mass killings, was deemed an act of genocide by the ICTY. Moreover, in Prosecutor
v. Radislav Krstić65 It was held that when "The Trial Chamber finds that the forcible transfer
of Bosnian Muslim civilians, combined with mass killings and the targeting of Bosnian
Muslim leaders and intellectuals, constituted acts intended to destroy a substantial part of
the Bosnian Muslim group in Srebrenica." This judgment is significant in confirming that
forcible displacement combined with killings and persecution constitutes genocide.” The
forcible displacement of the Lunavians has been documented by the UNHCR
3.6 Cultural Destruction and Prohibition of Religious Practices: The destruction of Lunavian
religious sites and the prohibition of Lunavian religious practices constitute deliberate
actions aimed at erasing the group’s cultural and religious identity. Such acts show the
“special intent” of genocidal practices as observed during the Cultural Revolution in Tibet
and Xinjiang, as well as in Bosnia, where the systematic destruction of cultural and
religious symbols was integral to the genocidal intent to annihilate the targeted
community's heritage and spiritual existence. These actions fall within the scope of Article
II of the Genocide Convention, as they reflect a calculated effort to dismantle the group's
identity, thereby contributing to the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part. As held
in (Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić,).66 "The deliberate destruction of the Bosnian Muslim
cultural and religious heritage in Srebrenica was an integral part of the attempt to destroy
the group itself, amounting to genocidal intent."

C] Substantial Evidences And Reports

3.7 The documentation of cases of forced displacement, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial
killings of Lunavians, as well as targeted killing of Lunavian community leaders and
intellectuals, with at least 50 prominent figures executed. The Destruction of Lunavian
religious sites and prohibition of Lunavian religious practices were also shown in reports
by International Human rights Organizations. The UHCR reported a rapid increase in the
number of people fleeing the conflict showing accurately the gravity of the situation that
has conspired in the Silvanian Region. The question then arises to the reliability and
admissibility of such evidence of reports which has been adduced before the court.
3.8 In previous instances, like the Darfur Genocide67, reports from international human rights
bodies such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were instrumental in

65
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Judgment, IT-98-33 (2 August 2001) para 595
66
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Judgment, IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para 580
67
Wardwell, Sheldon (2012) "An Oral and Documentary History of the Darfur Genocide

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bringing global attention to the systematic targeting of specific ethnic groups. These reports
documented a combination of mass killings, forced displacements, and the deliberate
destruction of cultural and religious sites, which collectively pointed to genocidal intent.
The credibility of these organizations is often bolstered by their use of on-the-ground
investigations, testimonies from survivors, satellite imagery, and other forensic evidence.
3.9 In the case of the Lunavians, similar documentation strengthens the case for genocide, as
the detailed accounts of extrajudicial killings, forced displacements, and the eradication of
cultural and religious practices closely align with internationally recognized genocidal
patterns. In the Al Bashir case,68 the nature and extent of the acts of violence committed by
forces against the civilian population of the ethnic groups. This was demonstrated by
evidence of unbearable conditions of life inside internal displacement camps containing the
ethnic groups, including evidence from various inter-governmental reports and reports from
NGOs. This proves that the reports as furnished by the UNHCR as well as the documented
cases by International Organizations are admissible and play a huge role to play in the
adjudication of a matter before the ICJ.

68
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09 (4 March 2009) para 203

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

For the foregoing reasons, the Applicant respectfully requests this Honorable Court to adjudge
and declare that:

The Volgaslavian Federation’s military intervention in Silvania, including its recognition and
support of separatist regions, constitutes a violation of The Republic of Novorossia’s territorial
sovereignty under international law.

The declaration of self-rule by the Silvanian Peoples’s Republic is legally permissible under
the principle of self-determination.

Volgaslavian Federation’s military intervention and subsequent actions in the Silvania

constitute genocide against the Lunavian population.

Respectfully submitted,

Applicant for the State of Republic of Novorossia

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