JUDICIAL REVIEW: NUISANCE OR ABSOLUTE NECESSITY
BY
PRAVEEN DALAL*
Introduction
The aim of this article is to understand and appreciate the role played by the Indian
judiciary in the establishment of an orderly and civilized society. The article further
attempts to trace and identify the true nature of judicial review as prevailing in India.
A theme of uneasiness, and even of guilt, colors the literature about the judicial review.
Many of those who have talked, lectured, and written about the Constitution have been
troubled by a sense that judicial review is “undemocratic”. They argue that the strength of
the courts has weakened other parts of the government[1]. This legal debate raises the
important and inevitable question that how far this statement holds true about judicial
review powers and capacities of the Indian Judiciary.
The Indian Constitution, like other written Constitutions, follows the concept of
“Separation of powers” between the three sovereign organs of the Constitution. The
doctrine of separation of powers stated in its rigid form means that each of the organ of the
Constitution, namely, executive, legislature and judiciary should operate in its own sphere
and there should be no overlapping between their functioning. The Indian Constitution has
not recognized the doctrine of separation of powers in its absolute form but the functions of
the different organs have been clearly differentiated and consequently it can very well be
said that our Constitution does not contemplate assumption, by one organ of the functions
that essentially belongs to another[2]. Though the Constitution has adopted the
parliamentary form of government, where the dividing line between the legislature and the
executive becomes thin, the theory of separation of powers is still valid[3].
Independence of Judiciary
Even though the Constitution of India does not accept strict separation of powers, it
provides for an independent judiciary with extensive jurisdiction over the acts of the
legislature and the executive[4]. Independent judiciary is the most essential attribute of rule
of law and is indispensable to sustain democracy. Independence and integrity of the
judiciary in a democratic system of government is of the highest importance and interest
not only to the judges but also to the people at large who seek judicial redress against
perceived legal injury or executive excess. Judicial review is the basic structure,
independent judiciary is the cardinal feature, and an assurance of faith enshrined in the
Constitution. The need for independent and impartial judiciary is the command of the
Constitution and call of the people. The subordinate judiciary is a complement to
constitutional courts as part of the constitutional scheme and plays a vital part in
dispensation of justice. Thus, subordinate courts are integral part of the judiciary under the
constitution[5].
In Ajay Gandhi v B.Singh[6] the Supreme Court extended the “theory of independence” to
Tribunals performing judicial functions. The court observed: “The functions of the Tribunal
being judicial in nature, the public have a major stake in its functioning, for effective and
orderly administration of justice. A Tribunal should, as far as possible, have a judicial
autonomy. The relevant provisions have conferred a statutory power upon the president to
constitute Benches. The appellate Tribunal is a National Tribunal. The President, subject to
delegation of powers senior Vice- President or the Vice-President, exercises the
administrative control over the members thereof. The benches are to be constituted only by
the President. No other authority is empowered to do so. Keeping in view the fact that the
independence of the Tribunal is essential for maintaining its independence, any power
which may be conferred upon the executive authority must proved to be in the interest of
imparting justice. We are of the view that this long-standing practice should be allowed to
prevail over the stand of the respondents herein. However, we are of the opinion that by
reason thereof, the President cannot be said to have an unguided, unfettered and unlimited
jurisdiction as the same may be flawed with great consequences”.
Scope and components of judicial review
Broadly speaking, judicial review in India comprises of three aspects: judicial review of
legislative action, judicial review of judicial decisions and judicial review of administrative
action. The judges of the superior courts have been entrusted with the task of upholding the
Constitution and to this end, have been conferred the power to interpret it. It is they who
have to ensure that the balance of power envisaged by the Constitution is maintained and
that the legislature and the executive do not, in the discharge of functions, transgress
constitutional limitations[7]. Thus, judicial review is a highly complex and developing
subject. It has its roots long back and its scope and extent varies from case to case. It is
considered to be the basic feature of the Constitution. The court in its exercise of its power
of judicial review would zealously guard the human rights, fundamental rights and the
citizens’ rights of life and liberty as also many non-statutory powers of governmental
bodies as regards their control over property and assets of various kinds, which could be
expended on building, hospitals, roads and the like, or overseas aid, or compensating
victims of crime[8].
In U.O.I v K.M.Shankarappa[9] the Supreme Court held that the provision for revision by
Central Government of decisions of the Appellant Tribunal under Section 6(1) of the
Cinematograph Act, 1952 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court observed:
“The Government has chosen to establish a quasi-judicial body which has been given the
powers, inter alia, to decide the effect of the film on the public. Once a quasi-judicial body
like the Appellate Tribunal gives its decision, that decision would be final and binding so
far as the executive and the government is concerned. To permit the executive to review or
revise that decision would amount to interference with the exercise of judicial functions by
a quasi-judicial board. It would amount to subjecting the decision of a quasi-judicial body
to the scrutiny of the executive. Under the Indian Constitution, the executives have to obey
the judicial orders. Thus, Section 6(2) is a travesty of the rule of law, which is one of the
basic structures of the Constitution. The legislature may, in certain cases, nullify a judicial
or executive decision by enacting an appropriate legislation. However, without enacting an
appropriate legislation, the executive or the legislature cannot set at naught a judicial order.
The executive cannot sit in an appeal or review or revise a judicial order. At the highest, the
government may apply to the Tribunal itself for a review, if circumstances so warrant. But
the government would be bound by the ultimate decision of the Tribunal”.
In the landmark judgment of P.U.C.L v U.O.I[10] Justice Shah observed: “The legislature
in this country has no power to ask the instrumentalities of the State to disobey or disregard
the decisions given by the courts. The legislature may remove the defect, which is the cause
for invalidating the law by the court by appropriate legislation if it has power over the
subject matter and competent to do so under the Constitution. The primary duty of the
judiciary is to uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear or favour, without being
biased by political ideology or economic theory. Interpretation should be in consonance
with the constitutional provisions, which envisage a republic democracy. Survival of
democracy depends upon free and fair election. It is true that political parties fight
elections, yet elections would be farce if the voters were unaware of antecedents of
candidates contesting elections. Such election would be neither free nor fair”.
These bold words of Justice Shah reflect the status, which the Indian judiciary is holding in
the Indian Constitutional set up. The constitution makers have reposed great confidence and
trust in Indian judiciary by conferring on it such powers as have made it one of the most
powerful judiciary in the world. The Supreme Court has from time to time indulged in
genuine and needful judicial activism and judicial review. It gave birth to the famous and
most needed “Doctrine of basic Structure”. The need of the changing society encouraged it
to formulate and incorporate various theories, which originated outside India. One of such
theory, which has great practical and social significance in India, is the “Doctrine of
proportionality”. The said doctrine originated as far back as in the 19th century in Russia
and was later adopted by Germany, France and other European countries. By
proportionality, it is meant that the question whether while regulating the exercise of
fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures has been made by
the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the
purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the court will
see that the legislature and the administrative authority maintain a proper balance between
the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights,
liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose for which they were intended
to serve[11].
The court as far back as in 1952 in State of Madras v V.G.Row[12] observed: “ The test of
reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute
impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down
as applicable to all the cases. The nature of right alleged to have been infringed, the
underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to
be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at that
time, should all enter the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming
their own conceptions of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is
inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the judge participating in the
decision would play an important part, and limit to their interference with legislative
judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-
restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of
their way of thinking but for all, and the majority of the elected representatives of the
people have, in authorizing the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be
reasonable”.
Ever since 1952, the principle of proportionality has been applied vigorously to legislative
and administrative action in India. Thus, administrative action in India affecting the
fundamental rights has always been tested on the anvil of the proportionality in the last 50
years even though it has not been expressly stated that the principle that is applied is the
proportionality principle.
In Om Kumar v U.O.I[13], however, the Apex Court evolved the principle of primary and
secondary review. The doctrine of primary review was held to be applicable in relation to
the statutes, statutory rules, or any order, which has force of statute. The secondary review
was held to be applicable inter alia in relation to the action in a case where the executive is
guilty of acting arbitrarily. In such a case Article 14 of the Constitution of India would be
attracted[14]. In relation to other administrative actions, as for example punishment in a
departmental proceeding, the doctrine of proportionality was equated with Wednesbury’s
unreasonable[15].
In Delhi Development Authority v M/S UEE Electricals Engg.P.Ltd[16] the Supreme
Court dealt with the judicial review of administrative action in detail. The court observed:
“One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative
action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is “illegality”, the second
“irrationality”, and the third “procedural impropriety”. Courts are slow to interfere in
matters relating to administrative functions unless decision is tainted by any vulnerability
such as, lack of fairness in the procedure, illegality and irrationality. Whether action falls in
any of the categories has to be established. Mere assertion in this regard would not be
sufficient. The law is settled that in considering challenge to administrative decisions courts
will not interfere as if they are sitting in appeal over the decision. He who seeks to
invalidate or nullify any act or order must establish the charge of bad faith, an abuse or a
misuse by the authority of its powers. It cannot be overlooked that burden of establishing
mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are
often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands
proof of a high order of credibility”.
The administrative orders must also satisfy the rigorous tests of the “doctrine of legitimate
expectation”. The principle of legitimate expectation is at the root of the rule of law and
requires regularity, predictability and certainty in government’s dealings with the public.
For a legitimate expectation to arise, the decisions of the administrative authority must
affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either:
(i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision maker to enjoy and which he can
legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated to
him some rationale grounds for withdrawing it or where he has been given an opportunity
to comment; or
(ii) he has received assurance from the decision maker that they will not be withdrawn
without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they
should not be withdrawn.
The procedural part of it relates to a representation that a hearing or other appropriate
procedure will be afforded before the decision is made. The substantive part of the principle
is that if a representation is made than a benefit of substantive nature will be granted or if
the person is already in receipt of the benefit than it will be continued and not be
substantially varied, then the same could be enforced. An exception could be based on an
express promise or representation or by established past action or settled conduct. The
representation must be clear and unambiguous. It could be a representation to an individual
or to a class of persons”[17].
Another effective tool in the hands of judiciary, to test the validity of legislation, is to
invoke the principle of “reading down”. The rule of reading down a provision of the law is
now well established and recognized. It is a rule of harmonious construction in a different
name. It is resorted to smoothen the crudities or ironing the creases found in a statute to
make it workable. In the garb of reading down, however, it is not open to read words or
expressions not found in it and thus venture into a kind of judicial legislation. The rule of
reading down is to be used for the limited purpose of making a particular provision
workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute. It is to be used
keeping in view the scheme of the statute and to fulfill its purposes[18].
In B.R.Enterprises v State of U.P[19] the Supreme Court observed: “First attempt should
be made by the courts to uphold the charged provisions and not to invalidate it merely
because one of the possible interpretation leads to such a result, howsoever attractive it may
be. Thus, where there are two possible interpretations, one invalidating the law and the
other upholding, the latter should be adopted. For this, the courts have been endeavoring,
sometimes to give restrictive or expansive meaning keeping in view the nature of the
legislation. Cumulatively, it is to sub serve the object of the legislation. Old golden rule is
of respecting the wisdom of the legislature, that they are aware of the law and would never
have intended for an invalid legislation. This also keeps the courts within their track and
checks. Yet inspite of this, if the impugned legislation cannot be saved, the courts shall not
hesitate to strike it down. Here the courts have to play a cautious role of weeding out the
wild from the crop, of course, without infringing the Constitution. The principle of reading
down, however, will not be available where the plain and literal meaning from a bare
reading of any impugned of any impugned provision clearly shows that it confers arbitrary
or unbridled power”
It must be appreciated that a statute carries with it a presumption of
constitutionality. Such a presumption extends also in relation to a law, which has been
enacted for imposing reasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights. A further
presumption may also be drawn that the statutory authority would not exercise the power
arbitrarily[20]. Further, where a power is conferred upon a higher authority, a presumption
can be raised that he would be conscious of his duties and therefore will act
accordingly[21]. These presumptions have to be rebutted before an allegation of
unconstitutionality of a statute can be sustained.
Limits of Judicial Review
It is true that the courts have wide powers of judicial review of Constitutional and statutory
provisions. These powers, however, must be exercised with great caution and self-control.
The courts should not step out of the limits of their legitimate powers of judicial review.
The parameters of judicial review of Constitutional provisions and statutory provisions are
totally different. InJ.P.Bansal v State of Rajasthan[22] the Supreme Court observed: “It is
true that this court in interpreting the Constitution enjoys a freedom which is not available
in interpreting a statute. It endangers continued public interest in the impartiality of the
judiciary, which is essential to the continuance of rule of law, if judges, under guise of
interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of
their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the court before
whom the matters come consider to be injurious to public interest. Where the words are
clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is
clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or to take upon itself the task of
amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the judge should not
proclaim that they are playing the role of lawmaker merely for an exhibition of judicial
valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates
adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. This can be
vouchsafed by an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as
trained reluctance to do so”.
If case the court forgets to appreciate this judicial wisdom, it would undermine the
constitutional mandate and will disturb the equilibrium between the three sovereign organs
of the Constitution. In State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) v Prem Raj[23] the Supreme Court
took a serious note of this disturbing exercise when the High Court commuted the sentence
by transgressing its limits. The court observed:
“The power of commutation exclusively vests with the appropriate government. The
appropriate government means the Central government in cases where the sentence or order
relates to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, and the state
government in other cases. Thus, the order of the high Court is set aside”.
Similarly, in Syed T.A. Haqshbandi v State of J&K[24] the Supreme Court observe:
“Judicial review is permissible only to the extent of finding whether the process in reaching
the decision has been observed correctly and not the decision itself, as such. Critical or
independent analysis or appraisal of the materials by the court exercising powers of judicial
review unlike the case of an appellate court would neither be permissible nor conducive to
the interests of either the officer concerned or the system and institutions. Grievances must
be sufficiently substantiated to have firm or concrete basis on properly established facts and
further proved to be well justified in law, for being countenanced by the court in exercise of
its powers of judicial review. Unless the exercise of power is shown to violate any other
provision of the Constitution of India or any of the statutory rules, the same cannot be
challenged by making it a justiciable issue before the court”.
The courts are further required not to interfere in policy matters and political questions
unless it is absolutely essential to do so. Even then also the courts can interfere on selective
grounds only. In P.U.C.L v U.O.I[25] the Supreme Court observed: “This court cannot go
into and examine the need of Prevention of Terrorism Act. It is a matter of policy. Once
legislation is passed, the government has an obligation to exercise all available options to
prevent terrorism within the bounds of the Constitution. Moreover, mere possibility of
abuse cannot be counted as a ground for denying the vesting of powers or for declaring a
statute unconstitutional”.
Similarly, in U.O.I. v International Trading Co[26] the Supreme Court observed: “Article
14 of the Constitution applies also to matters of government policy and if the policy or any
action of the government, even in contractual matters, fails to satisfy the test of
reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional. While the discretion to change the policy in
exercise of the executive power, when not trammeled by any statute or rule is wide enough,
what is imperative and implicit in terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy must be
made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any
other ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of every state
action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone, irrespective of the field of activity of
the state, is an accepted tenet. The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by
the state, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. Every
state action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by reason is
per se arbitrary”.
Similarly, where a political question is involved, the courts normally should not interfere. It
is also equally settled law that the court should not shrink its duty from performing its
functions merely because it has political thicket[27]. Thus, merely because the question has
a political complexion that by itself is no ground why the court should shrink from
performing its duty under the constitution if it raises an issue of constitutional
determination. Every constitutional question concerns the allocation and exercise of
governmental power and no constitutional question can, therefore, fail to be political. So
large as a question arises whether an authority under the Constitution has acted within the
limits of its power or exceeded it, it can certainly be decided by the court. Indeed it would
be its constitutional obligation to do so[28].
In B.R.Kapur v State of T.N[29] the Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the
court to interpret the Constitution. It must perform the duty regardless of the fact that the
answer to the question would have a political effect.
Concluding remarks
The role model for governance and decision taken thereon should manifest equity, fair play
and justice. The cardinal principle of governance in a civilized society based on rule of law
not only has to base on transparency but also must create an impression that the decision-
making was motivated on the consideration of probity. The government has to rise above
the nexus of vested interests and nepotism and eschew window-dressing. The act of
governance has to withstand the test of judiciousness and impartiality and avoid arbitrary or
capricious actions. Therefore, the principle of governance has to be tested on the touchstone
of justice, equity and fair play. Though on the face of it the decision may look legitimate
but as a matter of fact the reasons may not be based on values but to achieve popular
accolade that decision cannot be allowed to operate[30].
The Constitution of India envisages separation of power between the three organs of the
Constitution so that the working of the constitution may not be hampered or jeopardized.
This thin and fine line of distinction should never be ignored and transgressed upon by any
of the organ of the Constitution, including the judiciary. This rigid perception and practice
can be given a go by in cases of “abdication of duties” by one of the organ of the
Constitution. Thus, the judiciary can interfere if there is an abdication of duties by the
legislature or the executive. For instance, if the legislature delegates its essential and
constitutional functions to the executives, it would amount to “excessive delegation” and
hence abdication of the legislative functions by the legislature. In such cases, the theory of
separation of powers would not come in the way of judiciary while exercising the power of
judicial review.
This is more so, when the Constitution makers have conferred the important sovereign
function of interpretation of the constitution and various statutes upon the judiciary. The
Constitutional courts can even scrutinize the working of the lower courts besides analyzing
legislative and executive actions. The superior courts, like High Courts and the Supreme
Court, can issue various writs to control the functioning of lower judiciary. Besides, the
High Court has supervisory jurisdiction over the lower courts. However, the High court
cannot issue a writ against another High court. Similarly, the decision of the High Court or
the Supreme Court cannot be questioned by way of a writ proceeding. Thus, a final decision
of the Supreme Court cannot be questioned under Article 32 of the constitution of India,
except by way of review petition. The Supreme Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra v Ashok
Hurra[31] has judicially created an exception to this rule in the form of a “curative
petition”. Thus, a curative petition can be filed before the Supreme Court under Article 32
in appropriate cases. The Supreme Court only in exceptional cases would exercise this
power. This fantastic judicial innovation is based on the premises that no person should
suffer due to the mistake of the court. Similarly, an order passed by the court without
jurisdiction is a nullity and any action taken pursuant thereto would also be nullity. A party
cannot be made to suffer adversely either directly or indirectly by reason of an order passed
by any court of law, which is not binding, on him[32].
The power to entertain a curative petition is not specifically conferred by the Constitution
but can be exercised by the apex court under its inherent powers. This means that the
Constitution is organic and living in nature. It is also well settled that the interpretation of
the Constitution of India or statutes would change from time to time. Being a living organ,
it is ongoing and with passage of time, law must change. New rights may have to be found
out within the constitutional scheme. It is established that fundamental rights themselves
have no fixed content; most of them are empty vessels into which each generation must
pour its contents in the light of its experience. The attempt of the court should be to expand
the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights by process of judicial interpretation. There
cannot be any distinction between the fundamental rights mentioned in Chapter III of the
Constitution and the declaration of such rights on the basis of the judgments rendered by
the Supreme Court[33]. Thus, horizons of constitutional law are expanding. In State of
Maharashtra v Dr Praful . B. Desai[34]the Supreme Court observed: “It is presumed that
the Parliament intends the court to apply to an ongoing Act a construction that continuously
updates its wordings to allow for changes since the Act was initially framed. While it
remains law, it has to be treated as always speaking. This means that in its application on
any day, the language of the Act though necessarily embedded in its own time, is
nevertheless to be construed in accordance with the need to treat it as a current law”.
At this stage the words of Justice Bhagwati in the case of National Textiles Workers Union
v P.R.Ramakrishnan[35] need to be set out. They are: “We cannot allow the dead hand of
the past to stifle the growth of the living present. Law cannot stand still; it must change
with the changing social concepts and values. If the bark that protects the tree fails to grow
and expand along with the tree, it will either choke the tree or if it is a living tree it will
shed that bark and grow a living bark for itself. Similarly, if the law fails to respond to the
needs of changing society, then either it will stifle the growth of the society and choke its
progress or if the society is vigorous enough, it will cast away the law, which stands in the
way of its growth. Law must therefore constantly be on the move adapting itself to the fast-
changing society and not lag behind”.
It is further trite that the law although may be constitutional when enacted but with passage
of time the same may be held to be unconstitutional in view of the changed situation[36].
These changed circumstances may also create a vacuum in the legal system, which has to
be suitably filled up by the legislature. If the legislature fails to meet the need of the hour,
the courts may interfere and fill-in the vacuum by giving proper directions. These directions
would be binding and enforceable in law until suitable legislation is enacted to occupy the
field[37]. Thus, directions given by the court will operate only till the law is made by the
legislature and in that sense temporary in nature. Once legislation is made, the court has to
make an independent assessment of it. In embarking on this exercise, the points of
disclosure indicated by this court, even if they be tentative or ad hoc in nature, should be
given due weight and substantial departure there from cannot be countenanced[38]. The
courts may also rely upon International treaties and conventions for the effective
enforcement of the municipal laws provided they are not in derogation with municipal laws.
The above discussion unerringly points towards the permissibility and democratic
nature of the judicial review in India. The judicial review in India is absolutely
essential and not undemocratic because the judiciary while interpreting the
constitution or other statutes is expressing the will of the people of India as a whole
who have reposed absolute faith and confidence in the Indian judiciary. If the
judiciary interprets the Constitution in its true spirit and the same goes against the
ideology and notions of the ruling political party, then we must not forget that the
Constitution of India reflects the will of the people of India at large as against the will
of the people who are represented for the time being by the ruling party. If we can
appreciate this reality, then all arguments against the democratic nature of the
judicial review would vanish. The judicial review would be undemocratic only if the
judiciary ignores the concept of separation of powers and indulges in “unnecessary
and undeserving judicial activism”. The judiciary must not forget its role of being an
interpreter and should not undertake and venture into the task of lawmaking, unless
the situation demands so. The judiciary must also not ignore the self-imposed
restrictions, which have now acquired a status of “prudent judicial norm and
behaviour”. If the Indian judiciary takes these two “precautions”, then it has the
privilege of being the “most democratic judicial institution of the world, representing
the biggest democracy of the world”.
© Praveen Dalal. All rights reserved with the author.
* Advocate, Delhi High Court
LL.B, Diploma in Internet, Cyberlaw & Other Related Laws (ILI), Pursuing LL.M from
Law Faculty, Delhi University. Contact at: [email protected]/ [email protected]
[1] Eugene V. Rostow: The democratic character of the judicial review ((1952) 66
Harv .L.R 193,)
[2] Ram Jawaya v State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549, at 556.
[3] P. Kannadasan v State of T.N (1996) 5 SCC 670.
[4] Chandra Mohan v State of U.P, AIR 1967 SC1987, at 1993.
[5] KartarSingh v State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, at 736 to 738.
[6] 2004 (1) SCALE 84.
[7] L.Chandra Kumar v U.O.I, (1997) 3SCC 261.
[8] U.O.I v S.B.Vohra (2004) 2 SCC 150.
[9] (2001) 1 SCC 582.
[10] 2003 (3) SCALE 263.
[11] Teri Oat Estates (p) Ltd v U.T. Chandigarh (2004) 2 SCC 130.
[12] AIR 1952 SC 196.
[13] (2001) 2 SCC 386.
[14] E.P. Royappa v State Of T.N, (1974) 4 SCC 3.
[15] Thefamous case Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn (KB
at .229:ALL ER p. 682) commonly known as “The Wednesbury’s case” is treated as the
landmark so far as laying down various basic principles relating to judicial review of the
administrative or statutory direction.
[16] 2004 (3) SCALE 565.
[17] J.P.Bansal v State of Rajasthan, 2003(3) SCALE 154.
[18] C.G.E.S v Calcutta Municipal Corporation, 2003(6) SCALE 802.
[19] (1999) 9 SCC 700.
[20] P.U.C.L v U.O.I, (2004) 2 SCC 476.
[21] Balram Kumawat v U.O.I, (2003) 7 SCC 628.
[22] 2003(3) SCALE 154.
[23] (2003) 7 SCC 121.
[24] (2003) 9 SCC 592.
[25] 2003 (10) SCALE 967.
[26] (2003) 5 SCC 437.
[27] P.U.C.L v U.O.I, AIR 2003 SC 2363.
[28] State of Rajasthan v U.O.I, (1973) 3 SCC 592.
[29] (2001) 7 SCC 231.
[30] Onkarlal Bajaj v U.O.I, AIR 2003 SC 2562.
[31] (2002) 4 SCC 388.
[32] Dwarka Prasad v B.D.Aggarwal, (2003) 6 SCC230.
[33] P.U.C.L v U.O.I, (2003) (3) SCALE 263.
[34] (2003) 4 SCC 601.
