NIETZSCHE ON WOMAN

Lawrence J. Hatab
Old Dominion University
Was Nietzsche a sexist, a “male chauvinist,”a misogynist? In the eyes
of many, Nietzsche is one philosopher for whom the question should
not even be asked, as if there were any question. Is not Nietzsche surely
one of the more striking examples o f a male philosopher perpetuating a
male-dominated culture by arguing for the inferiority of women? I don’t
think so. With some trepidation, I would like t o engage this delicate
matter, and take issue with the claim that Nietzsche’s views on women
reflect “all-too-human prejudices” which are therefore “philosophically
irrelevant,”’ and even attempt the impossible: argue for Nietzsche’s
“feminism”!
Was Nietzsche a sexist? If “sexism” means a belief in necessary and
essential differences between the sexes, the answer is a qualified yes. If it
means a belief in masculine superiority (i.e., “male chauvinism”), the
answer is definitely no; in fact, a good case can be made for feminine
superiority. If western culture reflects masculine domination, we will
see that Nietzsche presents a decidedly “non-western” view of the
masculine-feminine relation and the priorities disclosed in the nature of
that relation.
Like all facets of Nietzsche’s philosophy, his thoughts on woman
demand a careful reading, with an eye out for links to other aspects of
his thinking. We will begin with the longest single treatment of the issue
in Nietzsche’s writings, found in Part Seven of Beyond Good and Evil
(BGE), sections 231-239.2 Two important points in section 231 must be
noted at the outset: (1) He speaks of “woman as such” (Weib an sich),
not “women.”3 I take this t o be a n indication that Nietzsche is pursuing
something deeper than sexual differences. Hereafter, the term“woman”
is meant t o be synonymous with “the feminine” (Weiblichkeit), a prin-
ciple which is neither biological nor sociological but arche~ypal.~ (2)
Nietzsche identifies the thoughts to come as “my truths.” Some might
take this t o be a philosophical disclaimer, or relief for the serious reader,
i.e., that what follows is a rather idiosyncratic indulgence with no
importance beyond a subjective profile of the author. But although
Nietzsche was a playful writer, he was never without serious intention.
In my view, before we can judge Nietzsche‘s thoughts on woman we
must first attempt t o see how they fit his thought as a whole. Let us begin
by quoting a good portion of the sections in question:
Woman wants to become self-reliant-and for that reason she is beginning to enlighten

Lawrence J. Harab is Assistant Professor of Philosophy a1 Old Dominion University;

he is the author of Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence and a number of articles on
mysticism. and is presently working on a study of myth ondphilosophv.

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men about "woman as such": this is one of the worst developments of the general
uglification of Europe. For what must these clumsy attempts of women at scientific
self-exposure bringto light! . . . Woe when"theeterna1ly boring in woman"-she is rich in
that!-is permitted to venture forth! When she begins to unlearn thoroughly and on
principle her prudence and art-of grace, of play. of chasing away worries, or lightening
burdens and taking things lightly . . . .
. . . Is it not in the worst taste when woman sets about becoming scientific that way?So
far enlightenment of this sort was fortunately man's affair, man's lot . . , .
. . . But she does not want truth: what is truth to woman? From the beginning, nothing
has been more alien, repugnant, and hostile to woman than truth-her great art is the lie,
her highest concern is mere appearance and beauty. Let us men confess it: we honor and
love precisely this art and fhis instinct in woman-we who have a hard time and for our
relief like to associate with beings under whose hands, eyes, and tender follies our
seriousness, our gravity and profundity almost appear to us like folly.

We men wish that woman should not go on compromising herself through enlighten-
ment. , . . I think it is a real friend of women that councels them today: mulier faceat de
mu/iere! (Woman should be silent about woman). (232)
...
To go wrong on the fundamental problem of "man and woman", to deny the most
abysmal antagonism between them and the necessity of an eternally hostile tension. to
dream perhaps of equal rights, equal education, equal claims and obligations-that is a
f.vpico/sign of shallowness . . . . (238)
...
Wherever the isdustrial spirit has triumphed over the military and aristocratic spirit.
woman now aspires to the economic and legal self-reliance of a clerk: "woman as clerk"is
inscribed on the gate to the modern society that is taking shape now. As she thus takes
possession of new rights, aspires to become"master"and writes the"progress"of woman
upon her standards and banners, the opposite development is taking place with terrible
clarity: woman is refrogresing.
Since the French Revolution. woman's influence in Europe has decreased proportion-
ately a s her rights and claims have increased; and the "emancipation of woman." insofar
as that is demanded and promoted by women themselves (and not merely by shallow
males) is thus seen to be an odd symptom of the increasing weakening and dulling of the
most feminine instincts. There is sfupidily in this movement, an almost masculine stupid-
ity. . . .
. . . what is the meaning of all this if not a crumbling of feminine instincts. a
defeminization?
To be sure. there are enough imbecilic friends and corrupters of woman among the
scholarly asses of the male sex who advise woman to defeminize herself in this way and to
imitate all the stupidities with which"man"in Europe. European"manliness."is sick: they
would like to reduce woman to the level of"generaleducation,"probably even of reading
the newspapers and talking about politics . . . .
. . . Altogether one wants to make her more "cultivated" and, as is said, make the
weaker sex strong through culture-as if history did not teach us as impressively as
possible that making men "cu1tivated"and making them weak-weakening. splintering,
and sicklying over the force o f t h e will-have always kept pace, and that the most
powerful and influential women in the world (most recently Napolean's mother) owed
their power and ascendancy over men to the force of their will-and not to schoolmasters!
(239)

A careful reading of these passages, in the light of certain basic

assumptions in Nietzsche's thought, should lead t o the conclusion that
this is anything but "male chauvinism," i.e., the belief in the superiority
of masculine traits. If the "emancipation of women" means "equality,"
that is t o say, affirming and recommending the participation of women
3 34
in "man's world," it is clearly Nietzsche's view that this represents not a
step u p but in fact a regressive decline a n d loss of power. If feminine
traits could be characterized as: playfulness, adornment, instinctive-
ness, unpredictability, sensuality, nurturing (e.g., child rearing); a n d
masculine traits as: seriousness, rationality, orderliness, de-sensuali-
zation, productivity (e.g., a "career")-then Nietzsche seems t o be
saying that the repudiation of feminine traits in favor of masculine traits
is a n exchange of strength for weakness. In other words, not only is the
feminine not inferior t o the masculine. it may be superior to the mascu-
line. According t o Nietzsche, m a n is "sick."
If such a n interpretation is t o make sense. we must d r a w connections
with certain central Nietzschean themes: ( I ) The primacy of instinct.
Although Nietzsche never denies the value of reason, he rejects the
rationalistic devaluation of passion a n d instinct-not out of s o m e
shallow romanticism, but because he sees reason a n d instinct a s inex-
tricably linked. Reason is in the service of life instincts, the priority of
which must therefore always be recognized. ( 2 )The primac), qf H i l l .
Nietzsche never abandoned the Schopenhauerian view that knowledge
is subordinate t o will, that explanation, measure a n d order a r e epi-
phenomenal echoes of a n inexplicable force of sheer assertion-will. A s
in the first instance. knowledge is not without value, it simply does not
represent t h e core of h u m a n being. (3) Anti-egalitarianism. Nietzsche
opposed all forms ofequality. not o n social or political but philosophi-
cal grounds. All calls f o r equality, in Nietzsche's eyes. represented
variations of t h e central theme of western metaphysics: the attempt t o
transcend a world constituted by differences, a n d therefore, conflict. In
all facets of his thinking. Kietzsche tried to preserve the tension of
differences, because in his view the essence of reality ( a process of
becoming) is fueled by this tension. (4) The decadence qf' M'estern
culture. Nietzsche criticizes the spirit of western civilization because it
represents a n inversion of the priorities described above. T h e Platonic-
Christian foundation of the western mind determined the course of
culture a n d history t o be a continuing suppression of"nature" in favor
of "spirit." Now in view of the masculine a n d feminine traits sketched
earlier, if one were t o admit a c o m m o n assumption of "male chauvin-
ism"-that o u r culture is a masculine product-then it seems t o me that
accusing Nietzsche of misogyny or male chauvinism entirely misses the
point. There never has been a more severe critic of western culture t h a n
Nietzsche. Consequently, Nietzsche can be seen t o be one of the most
severe critics of the masculine principle.
We c a n pursue this matter from another angle by recalling the central
theme of The Birth of Tragedy (BT): the Dionysian-Apollonian distinc-
tion, a n d with it the issue of truth a n d appearance, that which is most
pertinent t o o u r topic. Assuming the reader is somewhat familiar with
BT, I will only sketch a bare outline of the fundamental issue in that
work.
335
 Nietzsche identifies what he considers to be the two archetypal forces
controlling the Greek spirit, forces embodied in the deities Dionysus
and Apollo. Dionysus personifies ecstatic self-transcendence and
Apollo personifies the principle of individuation; what is portrayed here
is a cosmic relation consisting of a unified, formless flux (becoming) and
individuated moments within that flux (being), both of which constitute
the world-process. For Nietzsche, the early Greeks knew both forces
well: the cultivation of form and meaning in the plastic and poetic arts,
and form-shattering annihilation in the ecstatic practises of the mystery
cults.
Nietzsche’s view of the world is one in which becoming has priority
over being. Consequently, he feels that Greek tragedy, which was
connected with Dionysian religion, represented the culmination of
Greek genius, and their deepest penetration into the nature of reality.
The tragedies could affirm individuation and form (the poetic reflection
of the hero) and yet recognize the priority of the annihilating power of
flux (the hero’s doom). In other words, the tragic world-view held form
(the Apollonian) to be “appearance” (a temporary ordering of a pri-
mordial chaos) which must consequently yield to a formless power (the
Dionysian) symbolized by the priority of destructive fate in the drama.
In the tragic age, the Greeks were able to create a world of beauty and
meaning and yet affirm the inevitable negativity of life, thereby affirm-
ing life as a whole.
With the advent of the scientific spirit (personified by Socrates) the
tragic attunement of Apollo and Dionysus was ruptured. The forces of
form and formlessness became separated into an antagonistic conflict,
where the principle of form was given priority. The Socratic search for
“truth” (i.e., an abiding form beyond appearance and change) repre-
sents the rejection of the artistic spirit (i.e., the view that form is a
creation out of an indeterminate chaos, not “truth”). In this way the
Apollonian principle is severed from the Dionysian, resulting in the
opposition between reason (form alone) and chaos (mystery and de-
struction), and the attempt to eliminate or at least devalue the latter.
According to Nietzsche, with this Platonic inversion of tragic priori-
ties, where now form takes precedence over formlessness and unchang-
ing form becomes the criterion for truth, western man begins to be
alienated from a world constituted by becoming. The ideals of western
(i.e., post-tragic) culture represent the predominance of Apollonian
tendencies and the subordination of Dionysian instincts, or even the
complete devaluation of the Dionysian (either in the other-worldly
form of Christianity, or the worldly form of scientific rationalism). In
any case, Nietzsche feels that the consequences are the weakening of
life-affirming instincts, and the loss of creativity and attunement to a
world of change.
Since, for Nietzsche, form is aprocess of creation out of formlessness,
and is therefore not “substance,” then the Platonic inversion presents

336
not only a philosophical mistake, but also an existential barrier imped-
ing the appropriate emergence of form-the aesthetic mode of creativ-
ity. Herein lies the background of Nietzsche’s critique of “truth” and
promotion of “appearance.” The continuing references to appearance
in Nietzsche’s writings point back to this central theme of BT form as
such is appearance; there is no “truth,” other than the annihilation of
form; “appearance,” that is to say, form which admits its “deceptive”
character, which yields to the formless, is a more appropriate model of
reality. Form is not “objective truth”; it is a creation. The world is an
“aesthetic phenomenon.”5
If we recall Nietzsche’s characterization of woman in the passages
quoted earlier, we can begin to see the references to “appearance,”“lie”
and the repudiation of truth in a new light. And if we could match the
Apollonian-Dionysian distinction with the masculine-feminine distinc-
tion, then Nietzsche’s objections to “emancipation”cou1d be translated
as follows: woman’s equality means (in Nietzsche’s eyes) the adoption of
masculine traits; defeminization announces the final victory of the
Apollonian over the Dionysian and completes the degeneration and
weakening of man. Could it be that “the woman question”represents,
for Nietzsche, a specific battle in which he fights for the preservation of
the Dionysian?
If we could conclusively equate the feminine with the Dionysian, then
in the context of Nietzsche’s critique of western culture we could argue
for the “primordiality” of the feminine. To that purpose, let us hear
more from BGE:
What inspires respect for woman, and often enough even fear, is her norure, which is
more “natural” than man’s, the genuine, cunning suppleness of a beast of prey, the tiger’s
claw under the glove, the naivetiof her egoism, her uneducability and inner wildness, the
incomprehensibility, scope, and movement of her desires and virtues-
What, in spite of all fear, elicits pity for this dangerous and beautiful cat “woman” is
that she appears to suffer more, to be more vulnerable, more in need of love, and more
condemned to disappointment than any other animal. Fear and pity: with these feelings
man has so far confronted woman, always with one foot in tragedy which tears to pieces as
it enchants. (239)
We are clearly reminded of the “nature vs. culture” tragic tension in
BT. In BGE, section 231, Nietzsche says: “Woman is essentially
unpeaceful, like a cat.” In one of his later writings, Nietzsche says that
woman “tears to pieces” when she loves, and calls women “maenads.*%
These are surely Dionysian references. In that same work he tells us that
he“knows women”because of his “Dionysian dowry,”and calls himself
in that context the “first psychologist of the eternally feminine.*7
These references suggest that Nietzsche considered the feminine and
the Dionysian to be closely linked if not synonymous. We can further
elucidate this association by briefly addressing the context of Dionysian
worship in ancient Greece.
The cult of Dionysus was the most successful “Titanic” counter-
weight to “Olympian” worship, in the sense that it represented elements

337
 of nature mysticism and ecstatic self-transcendence to balance the “sky”
imagery, moderation and de-naturalization personified in Olympian
religion. The respective notions of immortality speak to this point:
Olympian immortality meant freedom from death; Dionysian immor-
tality meant continual death and rebirth. In this way, Dionysian
mythology expressed the cyclic regeneration of nature, the destruction
and reconstruction of life forms. Consequently, Dionysian worship
embraced the “dark,” destructive side of life in order to receive the
blessings which stem from harmonizing the self with a necessary cosmic
force. The essence of Dionysian religion consisted in the realization that
although nature destroys the individual, the whole is indestructible;
therefore mystical self-transcendence grants religious transformation.
The Dionysian cult was originally a cult of women; only later were
men included. Furthermore, Dionysus was frequently characterized as
“androgynous,” that is to say, a male with a feminine manner (e.g., the
description of the god in The Bacchae). Much of the imaOery of Diony-
sian religion suggests it is derived from an archaic worship of the
feminine principle, e.g., the “Great Mother” theme common to many
cultures.8
The women who worshipped Dionysus were called “maenads,” i.e.,
those possessed by divine madness. The terrible practises of the cult,
such as dismembering live animals and devouring them raw, though
“mad” by ordinary standards, nevertheless were religiously significant.
They were examples of ritual participation in the destructive force of the
god. (Herein lies the religious element of Greek tragedy; the recognition
of the priority of destructive force, fate, is derived from the worship of
Dionysus.)
Although the wild exploits of the Dionysian women offered a stark
contrast to other, more moderate forces in Greek life, nevertheless it
must be remembered that Dionysian worship was thought to bring
peace and a blissful communion with the god. In fact, since the annihi-
lating force was necessary and inevitable (hence its divinization), then
failure t o revere it would only invite more terrible destruction (e.g., the
brutal consequences of Pentheus’ resistance in The B a c ~ h a e ) . ~
Dionysian religion presents the Greek version of a common rever-
ance given to the dark, destructive side of nature in many other cultures.
And almost invariably, such a power takes a feminine form. (For
example: mayii, and the feminine associations with the god Siva in
India, and the yin principle in China.) In general, one could accurately
summarize the cross-cultural features of the masculine-feminine duality
as follows: the masculine = light, knowledge, construction, conscious-
ness, form; thefeminine = darkness, mystery, destruction, unconscious-
ness, formlessness. So in this sense the Dionysian cult represented the
worship of the feminine principle.
With little trouble we could characterize western forms of spirituality
and intellectual development as the gradual ascendence of the mascu-

338
line over the feminine principle (beginning with the Olympian victory
over the Titans).”JNow Nietzsche’s critique ofthe West can quiteclearly
be translated into the terms of our theme: the Apollonian-Dionysian
duality presents a masculine-feminine duality; and Nietzsche’s objec-
tions to the predominance of the Apollonian becomes an objection to
the predominance of the masculine principle; and his respect for the
tragic spirit is inspired by its recognition and acceptance of a primordial
feminine principle.
In this way, Nietzsche promotes a decidedly “non-western” view of
the masculine-feminine relation, in that he seeks to elevate the negative
force to equal status with the positive force.” The “destructive”aspect
of the feminine, therefore, is not something to be regretted. In fact, it
destroys Apollonian “fixation” and thereby induces a “holistic” vision.
Western culture values knowledge over mystery, reason over instinct,
technology over nature. Nietzsche’s thoughts on woman present a
defense of, and in some ways a preference for certain sub-cultural
forces, the denial of which leads to alienation, weakness and sickness (or
perhaps the fate of Pentheus?). We are told at one point that a woman‘s
fight for equal rights is symptomatic of disease. Woman should resist
“rights,” because the state of nature, the “eternal war between the sexes,
gives her by far the first rank.”lZ If Nietzsche were a male chauvinist we
would have to demonstrate his preference for “man’s world,” and his
subordination of women to their “place” of subservience because of
their inferiority. But as we have seen, the superiority of the masculine
(intellect, order, the “business of the world”), is a reflection of an
Apollonian ideology. The “place” of the feminine, for Nietzsche,
reflects a Dionysian superiority. So ironically, in the context of our
analysis, it would not be difficult to interpret Nietzsche’s philosophy
literally as a “feminism”! 13
If we are to see this last point in its proper perspective we should
develop further the relation between the masculine-feminine distinction
and the truth-appearance distinction. We can do this by recalling those
passages on woman from BGE, this time in terms of the context within
which they are found. The passages conclude the section entitled “Our
Virtues,” which basically explores two important themes: (1) the creator
and the rejection of equality; (2) the value of “cruelty.”These themes are
related in the following way: Nietzsche proposes an aesthetic, “process”
view of the world, in which he espouses creativity (form brought forth
from formlessness through the creative process) in contrast to a “sub-
stance” view of the world, which reifies meaning into fixed, objective
“truth,” and which in order to overcome the variability of the world
must propose some common essence to “equalize” differences, thereby
resolving what to the conceptualizing intellect had been a “conflict.” It
is in this context that we can understand Nietzsche’s recommendation
for “cruelty.” Nietzsche tells us that high culture is the “spiritualization
of cruelty”(229) and that there is cruelty in all profound thinking (230).

339
In other words, since all affirmation is at the same time a denial (an
overcoming), the “essence” of thought as a whole is process, not fixed
substances. The annihilation of form inherent in process constitutes the
emergence of form. Therefore, any formulation cannot claim to be
“truth” (fixed and objective), but is more accurately “appearance”(i.e.,
creative perspective in a process which cannot be fixed in any form). In
this way, Nietzsche inverts the Platonic-western priorities by denying
truth and affirming appearance.14 The traditional notion of truth must
be discarded (herein lies the essential meaning of the “death of God”
theme); that is to say, the notions of unchanging form, universal con-
cepts and scientific explanations must yield to something more primor-
dial (as Apollo yielded to Dionysus in tragedy). The result is the
aesthetic recognition of the role of negativity in the constitution of
form.
It is in this context that the passages on woman are placed, indeed
they conclude the section. Despite Nietzsche’s aphoristic style, he was a
careful writer. The “woman question” is not a digression or a sidelight.
In fact, the Preface to BGE begins with the sentence: “Supposing truth
is a woman-what then?” Put another way: “What if truth were
appearance?”
We should now have a deepened appreciation for Nietzsche’s referen-
ces to certain feminine characteristics such as playfulness, ornamenta-
tion, instinctiveness and unpredictability. If we contrast these with
certain masculine (Apollonian) values such as seriousness, unmasking
through explanation, order and stability, it is evident that the feminine
seems to be more appropriate to the primordial aesthetic nature of the
world. 15
Nietzsche proclaims in The Gay Science: “Woman is so artistic”
(361). And the first set of passages from BGE expressed Nietzsche’s
belief that man must continually learn from woman. Feminine natural-
ness, frivolity and love of surfaces teaches man the “folly” of his pur-
suits, makes light of serious things, and in so doing discloses the
meaning of appearance.16 Here we have a contemporary remnant of the
Dionysian suspension of “culture” and the salvific effect of loosening
the bonds of knowledge. We can now better understand Nietzsche’s
alarm over the prospect of abandoning the feminine. One could say he
feared the loss of the “Dionysian conne~tion.”’~
We have seen that in the context of Nietzsche’s philosophy the
“woman question” is much deeper than a social, sexual or biological
matter. I hope I have demonstrated the shortsightedness of the judg-
ment that Nietzsche’s thoughts on woman are philosophically
irrelevant.
At this point I would like to link these deeper aspems of the
masculine-feminine distinction with the male-female question, and con-
sequently speak to certain issues in contemporary feminism. 1 must
admit my limitations in these matters; but in considering Nietzsche’s

340
position I a m convinced there is much he can contribute t o the current
debate.
Let us begin by considering what in Nietzsche’s eyes is the most
important distinction in human nature: not that between male and
female or even masculine and feminine, but the creator and the “herd,”
that is t o say, the distinction between those who enact the creative
process and those who simply receive their world as “given.” How can
we characterize the creator? In the light of Nietzsche’s archetypes 1
would say the creator presents a n equal mix of Apollonian and Diony-
sian features; since the creator as such brings forth form from formless-
ness (not-yet-form) and clears away old forms t o make way for the new,
he is attuned t o both the constructive and destructive aspects of the
whole (form-as-process) represented by the Apollonian-Dionysian fra-
ternity. In this way, moreover, the creator presents a n equal mix of
masculine and feminine qualities. If the masculine-feminine distinction
can be summarized as the duality of consciousness and the uncon-
scious,’* we can more clearly see the creative process as a masculine-
feminine correlation. Although at times Nietzsche seems t o emphasize
the unconscious (“All perfect acts are uncon~cious”~9), nevertheless the
creative process as whole must involve the gathering in consciousness of
unconscious forces (i.e., the tragic synthesis). The creator is therefore to
be distinguished from either ordinary types who dwell in the conscious
world alone, or purely destructive types for whom chaos is a n end in
itself.
In characterizing the creator as a n equal mix of masculine and
feminine qualities, we offer no conclusion about the gender of the
creator. At this point I will try t o organize what I think could be a
Nietzschean position in this matter.
The masculine-feminine distinction is not equivalent t o the male-
female distinction. The former duality is much deeper than gender. I
think it is clear that the creator is archetypally “androgynous.”2o The
ordinary male could be said t o represent a predominance of the mascu-
line (Apollonian) and the ordinary female a predominance of the femi-
nine (Dionysian). Nietzsche’s remarks on woman in BGE might have
been limited t o ordinary types. But even if this were so, we would have
t o draw the connection with the matter of the creator, which, after all,
was the context for the sections on woman.
For Nietzsche, the creator is a special case of human nature. But if we
recall the “pyramid” analogy in The Antichrist ( 5 7 ) we should
remember that the creator is not a n isolated case. The peaks of culture
are supported by a broad base. Ordinary men “support” the creator,
and therefore can even be said t o be a “foundation”for the creator. How
so? If the creator is a mix of masculine and feminine traits, it might have
been Nietzsche’s view that (true t o his “process philosophy”) the tension
between the masculine and the feminine, the “eternal war of the sexes”
must be maintained as the condition which generates the creator, as a

34 1
mix. If the masculine-feminine tension were blurred o r suspended,
perhaps there would emerge n o creator out of this tension. In other
words, if the creator embodies a dialectic of opposites, then the oppo-
sites must be maintained as opposites in the larger order.
Nietzsche’s objections to “equality” have their roots in his aim to
preserve the conditions of creativity. O n the one hand he objects t o
reducing the creator t o the conventional values of the ordinary type.
And o n the other hand, he seems to object to a “unisexua1”democrati-
zation of the basal conditions for the emergence of the creator-type-
that is to say, the well-defined masculine-feminine tension between
ordinary males and females.2’
If it is true that the masculine-feminine tension generates the creator,
then it is clear why Nietzsche attacks “woman’s equality” in the context
of his critique of the West. T o abandon the feminine principle in a n
already masculine-dominated culture would only complete the alien-
ated closure of the human spirit and obviate its creative potential.
Nietzsche might ask: How much of the modern feminist spirit is merely
a continuation of masculine dominance in its objections t o the feminine
(i.e., non-Apollonian) roles of many females? In other words, how
much of modern feminism is more accurately a “masculinism’?
I d o nor think that Nietzsche’s views imply confining all females to
certain roles. He consistently opposes any form of “All S is P.” I think
Nietzsche would simply object t o the “democratic”view that allfemales
are, o r could become the same, either in terms of feminine or masculine
roles. He would object t o the idea that women who follow a feminine
stereotype (e.g., “serving”a man) are “oppressed,” o r that women who
might choose a feminine role are “duped” or coerced by cultural condi-
tioning. He would oppose such ideas because of the implicit theory that
all human beings, whether male or female, are capable of o r meant for a
common form of life-in this case masculine roles (“productivity,”
“responsibility”) o r even a masculine-feminine mix (creativity).
1 a m convinced Nietzsche would not equate “male” with “masculine,”
and “female” with “feminine.” The fact that Nietzsche fears woman
could lose the feminine implies it is not confined to gender. A female can
certainly pursue a predominantly masculine role (e.g., a “career”). Can
a female embody the masculine-feminine mix of the creator-type? I a m
inclined to think so, especially since the only person Nietzsche ever
deemed worthy of continuing his work was a female, Lou Salomc. What
would Nietzsche oppose in contemporary feminism? Not a woman
“liberating” herself, pursuing either a masculine role o r a masculine-
feminine mix, but rather seeing liberation not as a n individual matter
but as a “women’s movement.”(What Nietzsche seemed to resist most
in BGE was a n “enlightened” woman’s pronouncements on “woman as
such.”) Such a movement would imply yet another form of democrati-
zation, which for Nietzsche is always a n expression of metaphysical
absolutism (e.g., human nature possesses a common essence upon

342
which distinctions are accidentally imposed).
Nietzsche’s doctrine of rank will not allow the idea of a common
human nature. But this need not imply that the hierarchy is forever
fixed. Women can become creators, Females and males can switch
“roles.” (Some homosexual relationships illustrate a frequent “reloca-
tion” of masculine and feminine qualities; this would suggest that the
distinction itselfis natural but its location varies.) Whatever movement
is accomplished, Nietzsche would plead against universalizing it. Any
idea can succumb to dogmatism. Even the proposition “Everyone is a
creator” is a dogmatic statement Nietzsche would reject.**
1 think Nietzsche would warn modern feminists that within the
legitimate pursuits of certain individuals there is the veiled possibility of
a final and completed form of masculine (Apollonian) dominance over
the feminine (Dionysian). Nietzsche would simply want to insure that
the masculine-feminine distinction (and tension) is preserved in some
form. I think he would ask: How much of contemporary feminism is a n
implicit preference for masculine traits? Do women simply want a n
equal share of masculine alienation? Is there not the danger of a power-
ful and necessary instinctive element becoming extinct? Has everyone
come t o fear the feminine?
Nietzsche could support, and may have even himself proposed a
“feminism” with the following characteristics:
( 1) A recognition of the archetypal masculine-feminine distinction,
where each has equal importance (perhaps the feminine could even have
priority), where the feminine is protected from extinction or domina-
tion by the masculine.
(2) The proposal of a “new model” of human nature, in the form of a n
androgynous mix of masculine and feminine traits-cthe creator-type.
(3) The qualification that androgyny is not for everyone. Nietzsche
would want to retain the proportionate polarities in ordinary males and
females, whose “war” prepares the generation of the exception. (Serious
readers of Nietzsche should recognize that his “elitism” has nothing t o
d o with social or political dominance.)
1 think we should heed Nietzsche’s warnings about “politicizing”
individual destinies (even ifentrenched cultural barriers t o individual
freedom incite a politically focused attack as a first step), or universaliz-
ing the exception. Any “movement,” as such, can only perpetuate in
another form the very condition which aroused its opposition in the first
place-the suppression of differences. Even a liberation movement can
be oppressive. Will we come full circle some day, where a woman will
feel guilty if she prefers “homemaking” to a “responsible career’? Is
“Total Woman” a sign of inauthenticity? By whose standard?
In closing, although 1 have tried t o show the legitimate importance of
Nietzsche’s thoughts on woman, it has not been my intention t o argue

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for the validity of his view of human nature. I a m not at ail sure about
such matters. I am sure that most contemporary feminists would object
to Nietzsche’s elitist exclusion of many persons from the ideal of andro-
gyny. But in my view, at present there is no conclusive evidence that
androgyny is the natural state of all persons, or that what Nietzschecalls
the creator-type lies dormant in every individual. I must say that the
burden of proof does not lie with Nietzsche.
NOTES

I Walter Kaufmann. Nierzsche: Philosopher, Psychologisr. Anrichrisr. (Vintage Books.

1968). p. 84.
The translation is by Walter Kaufmann in Basic Wrirings o/ Nierzsche. ( M o d e r n
Library. 1968).
T h e same distinction is drawn in Thus Spoke Zararhusrra. I. “ O n Little Old a n d
Young Women.”
See Erich Neumann, The Origins and HisrorI, o/Consciousness. (Princeton Univer-
sity Press. 1969). p. xxii.
BT. First Preface. 5 . “Appearance“ in Nietische’s thought should never be taken to
mean something negative(e.g..“he only appearsto be wise”). but highly positive (e.g.. the
actor appears o n stage)- in other words. a n emergence through the creative process. I
discuss this point in Nieri~cheand Erernal Recurrence: The Redemprion of Time and
Becoming. (University Press of America. 1978). pp. 63-67.
&ce Homo. “Why I Write Such Good Books.“ 5 . translated by Kaufmann in Basic
Wrirings qf Nierxche. op. < , I /
’ lhid.
” F o r example. the Dionysian practise of boilinggoat pieces in milk expresses this idea
of returning to the Mother. See C. Kercnyi. L)roni.sos.( Princeton University Press. 1976).
p. 256.
T h e pathological consequences of repressing anti-social impulses is certainly a central
concern of psychoanalysis.
lo See Joseph Campbell, The Masks vf God. Volume 111. Occidenral Mjthology. (New
York: Viking Press. 1964). chapter I .
‘ I Those who analyse the feminine archetype often overlook the fact that in many

cultures the feminine principle not on1y”nurtures”but destroysas well. But only a culture.
like ours. which emphasizes the constructive. masculine principle would disdain the
feminine. The female personification of terrible natural forces in other cultures is not a n
expression of a “woman hating” spirit. bur rather a gesture of honor a n d worship
(deification). Such a cultural view affirms construction a n d destruction as co-equal
aspects of the overall world-process. In this archetypal light. American women w h o
protested the exclusive use of feminine names for hurricanes concealed a continuation of
the western preference for the masculine. We view the association of women with
hurricanesasan insult. In India. such feminine associations pay homage t o a great power.
In this context. the call for “hi-sexual” hurricanes seems silly.
I * Ecce Homo. “Why I Write Such Good Books.” 5 .

Although we have here a unique definition of feminism, one which would not seem t o
suit the goals of today’s feminist. nevertheless it is clear that Nietzsche would join the fight
against “women‘s inferiority.” At o n e point in his writings. Nietzsche gives a fascinating
explanation for the so-called “failings” of women, fascinating because it sounds so much
like contemporary feminism:

. . . Someone took a youth to a sage and said: “Look. he is being corrupted by women.”
The sageshook his head a n d smiled, “ I t is men,”said he, “that corrupt women; a n d all the
failings of women should be atoned by a n d improved in men. F o r it is m a n who creates for
himself the image of woman, and woman forms herself according to this image.”

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 . . . someone else shouted out of the crowd: "women need to be educated better!"-
"Men need t o be educated better," said the sage. . . ."- The Gay Srience, 68. Translated
by Walter Kaufmann. (Vintage Books, 1974).

14 I t is important to clarify the often ambiguous references to"truth"and "appearance"

in Nietzsche's writings. At times he s p e a k s j o r truth, at times ogoinst truth. I think the
solution to this ambiguity is the following distinction: for Nietzsche. becoming truth;
being = appearance. Since the tradition had always seen being as truth and becoming as
appearance, Nietzsche must criticize the traditional notion of truth (constancy) so that a
more primordial truth (flux) can take its place. In this way, traditional truth becomes
appearance. which us appearance is appropriate t o the "truth" of a primordial chaos.
15 At this point we could clearly understand Nietzsche's objections to a frequent

assumption of today's thinking about human nature and sexual roles-that masculine
and feminine traits are precisely that-roles, that is to say, (culturally fashioned)"masks"
which hide the person's true nature. which is sexually neutral. For Nietzsche. there is
nothing under the mask. All forms of"nature"are"masks"ofa formless flux. Therefore.
the adoption of a mask does not hide, but rather ronsrirures"human nature."
16 The reference to gravity (Schwere)in EGE232 should recall the"spirit ofgravity"(die

Geisr der Srhwere) that Zarathustra had t o overcome in Part I11 of Thus Spoke
Zarathustro.
1' I f Dionysian "cruelty" is interpreted as the "dismemberment" of the Apollonian
principle. then the connection between playfulness and danger which often comes up in
Nietzsche's treatment of woman might make more sense. The playfulness of the feminine
is a"danger"for masculine seriousness. lnstinctiveness and naturalness are a"danger"for
masculine order. Many references t o this effect occur in Thus Spoke Zorarhusrro. I , "On
Little Old and Young Women." And I believe that attention to the qualities of danger,
play, and man's "fear" of woman described in this section could possibly redeem the
Statement which concludes the segment, a statement often quoted and thought t o typify
Nietzsche's misogyny: "You are going t o women? Do not forget the whip!"Two remarks
are in order: ( I ) The statement is given not by Zarathustra, but by an old woman; (2) In the
context of the section it is not clear for whom the whip is intended! The reference is to
"the" whip, not "your" whip. And the whip may serve as an image expressing Dionysian
(feminine) "cruelty." in the sense described earlier.
I might add: this piece was written in the winter of 1883. Less t h a n a yearearlier, in May,
1882. Nietzsche posed for a photograph with Paul R& and Lou Salomc. The pose had
Nietzsche and R & pulling a cart with Lou sitting o n top. whip in hand. Apparently,
Nietzsche greatly enjoyed this episode. See Rudolph Binion. Frou Lou: Nietzsche's
Waj,ward Disciple, (Princeton University Press. 1968). p. 55.
I N See Erich Neumann. The Origins a n d History of Consciousness. op. cit.. p. 42.
I YThe Willto Power. 289. Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J . Hollingdale. (New
York: Random House. 1967).
2o For further clues t o the complementarity of the masculine and feminine principles, see
EGE 248. where Nietnche describes two types of genius, one which wants t o beget,
fertilize and dominate(e.g., the Romans), another which wants pregnancyand the task of
forming, maturing and perfecting (e.g., the Greeks).
? I The image of woman giving birth to the Ubermensrh(creator) in Zarathusrro, 1,"On
Little Old and Young Women." might be better interpreted on this level.
.'? Nietzsche never argues for the elimination ofconvention and ordinariness. In fact. the
"crowd" is needed t o maintain the tension of the creative process (the fight ogoinst
convention). See Zarathustra. 11, "On the Rabble.'' The Goy Science. 76, and The
Antichrist. 57.

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