CHAPTER 4: CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES

Legislative intent can be ascertained from the language of the statute itself. When the language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied literally. Ambiguity is caused by the language
(words and phrases) of the statute itself.

When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish - Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguere debemos
It means that if a law is written in general terms and does not explicitly create exceptions or
distinctions, courts should apply it broadly without reading into it any unwritten exceptions or
distinctions. The courts are not to add limitations or qualifications that are not provided by the
legislature. Courts should administer the law not as they think it ought to be, but as they find it and
without regartd to consequences.

Republic of the Philippines Represented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center
(AFPFC) v. Daisy R. Yahon (G.R. No. 201043, June 16, 2014)

Facts: Daisy R. Yahon filed a petition for a protection order under R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act) against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon, a retired
Philippine Army personnel. Despite a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) issued in 2006, S/Sgt.
Yahon failed to comply, leading to the issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) in 2007,
directing him to provide P4,000 monthly spousal support and 50% of his retirement benefits. The AFP
Finance Center (AFPFC) sought to lift the TPO, claiming lack of jurisdiction, but the RTC and CA
rejected the motion, prompting the AFPFC to file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether retirement and pension benefits of government employees can be subject to
garnishment under RA 9262. (Note: Garnishment means a court order directing that money or
property of a third party be seized to satisfy a debt owed.)

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should
be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule that retirement benefits are exempt from
execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the
income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to
the woman. The Court emphasized that the term "employer" in Section 8(g) includes the military
institution, and where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. The Court held that
the directive to withhold a portion of S/Sgt. Yahon's retirement benefits was legal, as Section 8(g) of
R.A. No. 9262 applies to all employers, both private and government.

Juanito Pilar v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995)

Facts: On March 22, 1992, Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. However, he withdrew his certificate of
candidacy three days later, on March 25, 1992. Despite his withdrawal, the COMELEC imposed a
fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) on Pilar for failing to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures, as mandated by law. Pilar's motions for reconsideration were denied. Subsequently,
Pilar filed a petition for certiorari, arguing he cannot be held liable for failing to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his candidacy
three days after filing. He contended that the law applies only to candidates who actually entered the
political contest and either won or lost.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can be considered a candidate despite the withdrawal of his
certificate of candidacy.

Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and upheld COMELEC's decision to fine Pilar for
not filing his statement of contributions and expenditures. The Court ruled that Section 14 of R.A.
7166 applies to "every candidate," including those who withdrew. The mandatory filing ensures
transparency, as even withdrawn candidates may have received contributions. Pilar's withdrawal did
not exempt him from this requirement or the imposed fine.

People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Antonio C. Evangelista and Guildo S. Tugonon (G.R. No.
110898, February 20, 1996)

Facts: Grildo S. Tugonon was convicted of frustrated homicide by the RTC and sentenced to one year
of prision correccional with a P5,000 payment for medical expenses, considering incomplete self-
defense and voluntary surrender. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but
modified the sentence to 2 months of arresto mayor to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional.
Tugonon filed for probation, initially recommended for denial by the Provincial Probation Officer, but
the RTC granted it, prompting the prosecution to challenge the decision.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion by granting respondent’s
application for probation despite the fact that he had appealed from the judgment of his conviction of
the trial court.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion by granting
Tugonon’s probation. The Court set aside the RTC's order, citing the amended Probation Law under
P.D. No. 1990, which prohibits probation if the defendant has appealed the conviction. The law aims
to prevent appeals aimed at acquittal, followed by probation if the appeal fails. The Court clarified
that the appeal refers to the trial court's judgment, not the appellate court's decision, and emphasized
that probation must be sought at the first opportunity, not used to delay justice.

Exceptions in the statute

When the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling
reasons exist to justify it.

Cecilio de Villa vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 87416, April 8, 1991)

Facts: De Villa was charged under BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for a check given to private
respondents in Makati. He argued that the check was drawn from a foreign dollar account and thus not
covered by the law.

Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over a case involving a
check drawn against a dollar account with a foreign bank.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the
case, as the Bouncing Checks Law applies to checks in any currency, including foreign currencies.
The Court emphasized that where the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts. The petition
was dismissed for lack of merit, affirming the lower courts' decisions.

General and Specific Terms

In simple terms, general terms in a law are typically interpreted broadly unless the context or the law's
purpose suggests a narrower interpretation. However, these general terms may be limited by specific
terms or provisions that are related to them. Sometimes, specific terms in a law can be understood in a
broader sense if the overall reason for the law is general. Additionally, general terms may be restricted
by specific words that clarify the law's objective. This principle is particularly relevant when, except
for one general term, all other terms in a list fall under a specific category.

Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Pedro M. Gimenez as Auditor General (G.R. No. L-
14787, January 28, 1961)
Facts: Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc., which manufactures dental cream, imported materials like
irish moss extract and sodium benzoate and paid a 17% special excise tax on foreign exchange used
for these imports, as required by Republic Act No. 601. On March 14, 1956, the company applied for
a refund of P113,343.99 based on Section 2 of the Act, which provides for refunds on taxes for certain
imports. The Central Bank approved a partial refund of P23,958.13 but the auditor denied the rest,
arguing that stabilizers and flavors for toothpaste were not exempt. The Auditor General upheld this
decision, stating that the term "stabilizers and flavors" applied only to food products. Colgate-
Palmolive then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the foreign exchange used by the petitioner for importing dental cream
stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax under Section 2 of RA 601, entitling
it to a refund.

Ruling: Yes, the foreign exchange used by Colgate-Palmolive for importing dental cream stabilizers
and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax under RA 601, and the company is entitled to a
refund. The Supreme Court ruled that "stabilizers and flavors" in Section 2 of RA 601 includes non-
food items, as the law does not distinguish between those used in food and non-food products. The
Court noted that the principle of statutory construction, which states that general terms may be
restricted by specific words, applies only when all items in an enumeration belong to one specific
class, except for one general term. In this case, Section 2 lists both food and non-food items. Applying
the principle "Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos" (where the law does not
distinguish, neither do we distinguish), the Court reversed the decision and ordered a refund of
P23,958.13 as initially approved.

General Terms following Special Terms (Ejusdem Generis)

The rule of "ejusdem generis" means that when a law lists specific items and then uses a general term,
the general term is understood to include only things similar to the specific items. For example, if a
law mentions "cars, trucks, motorcycles, and other vehicles," the general term "other vehicles" would
be interpreted to include only those types of vehicles similar to cars, trucks, and motorcycles, not
something entirely different like boats or airplanes. This rule helps ensure that the general term is
consistent with the specific examples given.

Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Eutropio Migrino and Troadio Tecson (G.R. No. 89483,
August 30, 1990)

Facts: The PCGG, via the New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board, initiated an
investigation into Tecson’s alleged unlawful wealth accumulation beyond his lawful income. The
Board was set up to handle cases involving violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by
AFP personnel, whether retired or active. The Board asked Tecson to provide evidence regarding his
alleged unlawful wealth accumulation, but he failed to do so. Despite this, the Board recommended
prosecuting Tecson under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). Tecson moved to
dismiss the case, but the PCGG denied it. Tecson then sought a writ of preliminary injunction from
the Regional Trial Court, which halted the PCGG's investigation and prosecution. The PCGG
appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court's orders should be annulled. Tecson
contended that he was not covered by the Executive Orders governing PCGG jurisdiction, as his
alleged illegal acts were solely his own and not related to his being a crony, business associate, etc. or
subordinate.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent may be investigated and caused to be prosecuted by the
Board for violation of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, nullifying the June 26, 1989 order and
setting aside Civil Case No. 57092. The Court found that the respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction by issuing a writ of preliminary injunction against the PCGG. It barred the PCGG from
investigating or prosecuting Lt. Col. Tecson but allowed actions by the appropriate prosecuting
agency. The Court clarified that the PCGG’s jurisdiction is limited to investigating individuals closely
associated with former President Marcos who unlawfully accumulated wealth through that
association. It also noted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the PCGG, rendering its
injunction invalid, and reaffirmed that the State's right to recover ill-gotten wealth is not limited by
prescription under the 1987 Constitution.

Rule of ejusdem generis merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is
uncertain.

The People of the Philippines v. Hon. Vicente B. Echavez, Jr., et al. (G.R. Nos. L-47757-61,
January 28, 1980)

Facts: The case revolved around the application of Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes
squatting. On October 25, 1977, Fiscal Ello filed separate informations against sixteen individuals,
including the five respondents, charging them with squatting on a grazing land. The accused allegedly
entered the land with "stealth and strategy." Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves
dismissed the informations on December 9, 1977, arguing that the decree did not apply to agricultural
lands and that the entry should have been effected with "force, intimidation, or threat," not "stealth
and strategy." The fiscal amended the informations to align with the decree's language, but the lower
court denied the motion, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applied
to agricultural lands.

Ruling: The Supreme Court's decision was based on the interpretation of Presidential Decree No. 772
and its preamble. The decree was intended to address squatting in urban communities, particularly
illegal constructions by well-to-do individuals. The preamble emphasized the problem of squatting in
urban areas and the need to remove illegal constructions for public health, safety, and peace and order.
The Court noted that the decree's language and intent were focused on urban squatting issues, not
agricultural lands. Additionally, the Court referenced Republic Act No. 947, which specifically
addresses squatting on public agricultural lands, including grazing lands, and provides penalties for
such actions. The rule of ejusdem generis, which limits the scope of general terms to the same kind or
species as the specific terms preceding them, was deemed inapplicable because the legislative intent
of the decree was clear. The decree was not meant to cover agricultural lands, and the trial court
correctly dismissed the informations based on this interpretation.

Alta Vista Gold and Country Club v. The City of Cebu, Hon. Mayor Osmeña and City
Treasurer Teresita Camarillo (G.R. No. 180235, January 20, 2016)

Facts: Alta Vista, a non-stock and non-profit corporation operating a golf course in Cebu City,
challenged the imposition of an amusement tax on golf courses by the City of Cebu. The tax was
based on Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended by City Tax Ordinance Nos.
LXXXII and LXXXIV. The petitioner was assessed a deficiency business tax, including an
amusement tax amounting to P2,612,961.24 for the year 1998. Despite repeated attempts by the City
to collect the tax, Alta Vista refused to pay, arguing that the imposition was illegal under the Local
Government Code. The City Treasurer denied the petitioner's protest, leading to the issuance of a
Closure Order by the Mayor. Alta Vista then filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
injunction, prohibition, mandamus, and declaration of nullity of the tax ordinance and closure order.
The RTC dismissed the petition, prompting Alta Vista to elevate the case to the Supreme Court on
pure questions of law.

Issue: Whether or not the City of Cebu or any local government can validly impose amusement tax to
the act of playing golf.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Section 187 of the Local Government Code, which mandates a
procedure for questioning the validity of tax ordinances, is generally mandatory but recognized
exceptions for cases involving pure questions of law. The Court found that the case at hand involved
purely legal questions, making it an exception to the rule. On the substantive issue, the Court applied
the principle of ejusdem generis, concluding that golf courses do not fall under the category of "places
of amusement" as defined by the Local Government Code. The Court emphasized that amusement tax
can only be imposed on places where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing a
show or performance, which does not include golf courses. The imposition of the tax was therefore
beyond the authority of the City of Cebu, making the ordinance and subsequent tax assessment
invalid. The Court also highlighted the principle of uniformity in taxation, noting that singling out
golf courses for amusement tax purposes was unjust and contrary to the Local Government Code.

Express Mention and Implied Exclusion – Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
If a law specifically mentions certain things or situations, it is generally understood that other things
or situations not mentioned are excluded. In simpler terms:
 Express Mention: If a law clearly lists specific items or cases, those listed items are covered
by the law.
 Implied Exclusion: If something is not listed or mentioned in the law, it is usually not covered
by that law.
So, if a law says, "This rule applies to cats and dogs," it implies that the rule does not apply to animals
like birds or fish, even though they are not specifically mentioned.

Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte, Rep. by its Municipal Mayor, Caroline Arzadon-
Garvida v. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte, Rep. by its Municipal Mayor, Salvador Pillos,
and the Honorable Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 169435, February 27, 2008)

Facts: The petitioner, Municipality of Nueva Era, represented by its Municipal Mayor Caroline
Arzadon-Garvida, contested the claim of the respondent, Municipality of Marcos, represented by its
Municipal Mayor Salvador Pillos, over a portion of Nueva Era's territory. Nueva Era was created by
Executive Order No. 66 on September 30, 1916, while Marcos was established on June 22, 1963,
through Republic Act No. 3753. The dispute arose when Marcos, after almost 30 years, claimed a
portion of Nueva Era's territory based on the description of its eastern boundary in R.A. No. 3753.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos Norte initially ruled in favor of Nueva Era, dismissing
Marcos' claim. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City affirmed the SP's decision. However,
the Court of Appeals (CA) partly reversed the RTC's decision, extending Marcos' eastern boundary to
the Ilocos Norte-Kalinga-Apayao boundary, thereby allocating a portion of Nueva Era's territory to
Marcos.

Issue: Whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva
Era.

Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, thereby ruling in favor of Nueva Era and maintaining its territorial
integrity. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the petition
for review on appeal filed by Marcos under Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7902, vests the CA with appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts. The Court further
reasoned that the law creating Marcos, R.A. No. 3753, explicitly enumerated the barangays of Dingras
as the source of Marcos' territory, and no part of Nueva Era was mentioned. Applying the rule of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Court concluded that the omission of Nueva Era's barangays
was intentional. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent was to create Marcos out of the
territory of Dingras only, and any interpretation extending Marcos' boundary to include a portion of
Nueva Era would lead to absurdity and contradict the legislative purpose. The Court also noted that at
the time of Marcos' creation, a plebiscite was not required by law, and thus, the creation of Marcos
without a plebiscite was valid. The Supreme Court reinstated the RTC's decision, which upheld the
SP's ruling that the disputed area remained part of Nueva Era.

Associated Words – Noscitur a sociis

The meaning of a word or phrase in a law can be understood better by looking at the words or phrases
that are used with it. In simpler terms:
 When you want to understand what a particular word or phrase means in a law, look at the
other words or phrases listed around it.
 The meaning of a word is often shaped by the words it is associated with.
For example, if a law refers to "books, magazines, and other reading materials," the phrase "reading
materials" is understood to include things similar to books and magazines, not unrelated items like
kitchen appliances.

Dra. Brigida S. Buenaseda, et al. v. Secretary Juan Flavier, et al. (G.R. No. 106719, September 21,
1993)

Facts: In a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, the petitioner seeks to nullify the
Ombudsman’s order dated January 7, 1992, directing the preventive suspension of Dra. Brigida S.
Buenaseda, Chief Hospital III, and others. The order was in connection with an administrative
complaint (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) filed by private respondents for violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Respondents argue that the Ombudsman’s power of preventive suspension
under Section 24(5) of RA No. 6770 is supported by Section 13(8) of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, allowing the Ombudsman to exercise additional powers as provided by law. Conversely,
the Solicitor General and petitioners claim that the Ombudsman can only recommend preventive
suspension to the heads of departments and agencies, citing Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution,
which limits the Ombudsman’s authority to directing appropriate actions and recommending
suspension.

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman has the authority to suspend government officials and employees
outside the Office of the Ombudsman during the investigation of administrative complaints against
them.

Ruling: The Solicitor General’s argument is misleading as it overlooks that the Ombudsman’s
suspension of the petitioners was preventive, not punitive. The Constitution’s grant of power to the
Ombudsman to "recommend the suspension" of public officials (Sec. 13(3)) refers to punitive
suspension as a penalty, similar to removal, demotion, or fine. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis,
"suspension" here should be interpreted in line with these penalties. Section 24 of RA No. 6770,
which allows the Ombudsman to preventively suspend officials facing administrative charges, is
procedural, not penal. Preventive suspension aids in the investigation, particularly to prevent
tampering with evidence or witness intimidation. The Ombudsman must have the discretion to impose
such suspension when necessary for an effective investigation. RA No. 6770 aims to empower the
Ombudsman to fulfill his constitutional mandate efficiently. Thus, its procedural provisions should be
interpreted to support, not hinder, the Ombudsman’s functions.

Use of negative words – Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while those in the
affirmative are mere directory.

Manolo P. Fule v. The Honorable Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-79094, June 22, 1988)

Facts: The petitioner was convicted of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks
Law) by the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, based on a stipulation of facts agreed upon by the
prosecution and defense during a pre-trial conference. This stipulation was not signed by the
petitioner or his counsel. Despite this, the petitioner waived his right to present evidence and
submitted a memorandum affirming the stipulation. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the
stipulation and affirmed the conviction.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of the petitioner for violating BP 22 is valid, given that the
stipulation of facts was not signed by the petitioner or his counsel, but was later confirmed thorugh a
memorandum.

Ruling: The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1, 1985, require
that pre-trial agreements must be signed by the accused and their counsel to be admissible as evidence
(Rule 118, Sec. 4). This rule is mandatory, and the use of the word "shall" underscores its binding
nature. Penal statutes must be applied strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the
accused.

Since the Stipulation of Facts in this case was not signed by the accused or his counsel, it is
inadmissible. Although the accused's lawyer confirmed the stipulation in a memorandum, this does
not cure the omission. Without independent evidence, the guilt of the accused cannot be established
beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
Regional Trial Court for further reception of evidence.

Use of “may” and “shall” – The use of word “may” in the statute generally connotes a permissible
thing while the word “shall” is imperative. “May” generally indicates discretion or permission,
meaning that a particular action is optional or allowed but not required. It gives someone the chioce to
act/refrain from acting. “Shall” is imperative and means that an action is mandatory or required. It
imposes a duty or obligation that must be fulfilled.

Purita Bersabal v. Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador (G.R. No. L-35910, July 21, 1978)

Facts: For failure of the petitioner to file her memorandum on time as required by the Court of First
Instance of Caloocan City pursuant to the RA 6031, her appeal was dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance can dismiss an appeal for failure to submit a
memorandum on time, or if it is required to decide the case based on the evidence and records despite
the delay.

Ruling: Section 45 of RA 296, as amended by RA 6031, mandates that Courts of First Instance must
decide appealed cases based on the evidence and records transmitted from lower courts, with the
option for parties to submit memoranda or request oral argument. The submission of memoranda is
optional, and failure to submit does not empower the court to dismiss the appeal. Instead, the court is
required to decide the case based on available evidence. The use of "may" in the statute is permissive,
while "shall" is mandatory, indicating that the court must make a decision regardless of whether
memoranda are submitted. Similarly, in Article 213 of the Family Code, the term "shall" is used in a
mandatory sense, prohibiting the separation of a child under seven from the mother unless compelling
reasons are determined by the court. The respondent judge’s order was set aside, with instructions to
decide the case on its merits.

The use of the word “may”clearly shows it is directory in nature and not mandatory.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Merceditas de Sahagun, Manuela T. Waquiz and Raidis J. Bassig
(G.R. No. 167982, August 13, 2008)

Facts: The respondents were officials of the Intramuros Administration. In 1992, they awarded
contracts to Brand Asia, Ltd. for video production and marketing services without public bidding. An
anonymous complaint in 1995 led to the dismissal of the Intramuros Administrator, and a 1996
complaint resulted in criminal and administrative charges against the officials. The Ombudsman found
them guilty of grave misconduct and dismissed them, but the Court of Appeals overturned the
decision, citing the one-year filing limit under R.A. 6770 and ruling that the Ombudsman had
recommendatory, not punitive, powers.
Issue: Whether or not Section 20 (5) of RA 6770 prohibits administrative investigations in cases filed
more than one year after commission.

Ruling: The rule is well-established that administrative offenses do not prescribe, as they relate to the
character of public officers. The goal is not punishment, but the improvement of public service and
maintaining public trust. Respondents argue that Section 20(5) of RA 6770, which bars investigations
if a complaint is filed more than one year after the act, applies to their case. However, in Melchor v.
Gironella and Filipino v. Macabuhay, the Court ruled that this provision does not imply prescription
but grants discretion to the Ombudsman to decide whether to investigate after one year. The word
"may" in Section 20(5) is permissive, not mandatory, meaning the Ombudsman has discretion to
investigate even beyond the one-year limit. The Court rejected the interpretation that "may not"
imposes a mandatory prohibition. The rule has been further clarified by Administrative Order No. 17,
reinforcing that the Ombudsman has the discretion to dismiss or proceed with cases beyond the one-
year period.

Use of the word “must” – The word “must” in a statute like “shall” is not always imperative and may
be consistent with an exercise of discretion. When a law uses the word "must," it often implies that
something is required or mandatory. However, in some cases, even though "must" sounds strict, it
might allow for some flexibility or judgment. This means that, depending on the context of the law,
authorities or courts could still have the power to decide whether or not to strictly follow the rule.

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
117188, August 7, 1997)

Facts: The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (LGVHAI) was formed on February 8,
1983, but failed to file its by-laws. In July 1989, Atty. Joaquin A. Bautista informed LGVHAI's
president, Victorio V. Soliven, that it had been automatically dissolved due to non-filing and
inactivity. This led to the registration of a competing South Association.

LGVHAI filed a complaint with the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), claiming its
registration was revoked without due process. After a favorable ruling for LGVHAI, the South
Association appealed but had its case dismissed by the HIGC Appeals Board. The South Association
then took the case to the Court of Appeals, questioning whether LGVHAI's failure to file by-laws
resulted in automatic dissolution and if two associations could exist in one subdivision. The Court of
Appeals upheld the HIGC's decision, focusing on the implications of non-compliance with Section 46
of the Corporation Code regarding by-law filing.

Issue: Whether or not LGVHAI’s failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46
of the Corporation Code resulted in the automatic dissolution of LGVHAI and whether or not two
homeowners’ associations may be authorized by the HIGC in one “sprawling subdivision.”

Ruling: The controversy centers on Section 46 of the Corporation Code, which requires corporations
to adopt by-laws within one month of receiving their certificate of incorporation from the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). The section states that a majority vote is needed for by-law
adoption, and they must be filed with the SEC.

However, the petitioner argues that the term "must" in this context does not necessarily impose a strict
obligation. While "must" typically indicates a mandatory requirement, it can also be interpreted as
allowing for discretion based on the overall context of the law. The provision allows for by-laws to be
adopted before incorporation, suggesting that failing to file them within the prescribed time does not
automatically dissolve the corporation. By-laws are essential for corporate governance but are
subordinate to the articles of incorporation and the Corporation Code.
The ruling concludes that by-laws are not essential for a corporation's existence or valid operation,
and thus, the failure to file them on time does not invalidate the corporation's acts. The petition was
denied.

The use of the term “and” and the word “or” - The word "and" connects words or phrases,
indicating addition, while "or" signifies an alternative choice among options. In legal contexts, "and"
denotes a union, and "or" can clarify previous statements.

In Romulo, Mabanta, Sayoc and Delos Angeles v. Home Development Mutual Fund, it was
established that "and" and "or" can be used interchangeably. The term "and/or" means either "and" or
"or," allowing for flexibility in interpretation. For example, "butter and/or eggs" includes both items
or either one. Thus, the legislature intends for "and/or" to enable this interchangeability.

The word “only” means exclusive.

Roos Industrial Construction, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No. 172409,
February 4, 2008)

Facts: Jose Martillos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against his employer.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor, awarding P224,647.17. The employer appealed to the NLRC but
failed to post the required appeal bond on time, requesting an extension due to holiday delays. The
NLRC dismissed the appeal, citing the bond as mandatory for jurisdiction. After multiple motions
were denied, a writ of execution was issued. The employer then appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which upheld the NLRC's decision. The employer further petitioned the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the motion for extension of time to file cash or surety bond before the NLRC
toll the reglementary period to appeal.

Ruling: The Court reaffirms that an appeal from a Labor Arbiter's decision involving a monetary
award is only perfected when a cash or surety bond is posted within ten days. This bond requirement
is not procedural but jurisdictional, meaning failure to comply results in the decision becoming final
and executory. In this case, the employer filed the appeal bond late, so the NLRC did not have
jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Although there are exceptions for justifiable delays, the law
mandates strict compliance with the bond requirement for appeals.

Computation of time - When the law mentions years, months, days, or nights, it refers to 365-day
years, 30-day months, 24-hour days, and nights from sunset to sunrise. If months are named, they
follow their actual number of days. In computing periods, the first day is excluded, and the last day is
included (Art. 13, New Civil Code). For determining prescription of crimes under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code, a "month" is considered a 30-day period, not a calendar month.

A “week” means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it
begins.

Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 98382, May 17, 1993)

Facts: The private respondent mortgaged two lots to the petitioner bank to secure loans. After failing
to pay, the bank foreclosed on the properties and became the highest bidder at the auction. A final
deed of sale was registered in the bank's favor, and the lots were later sold to a third party. However,
the bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publishing the auction notice "once a week for
three consecutive weeks." The notices were published on March 28, 1969 (Friday), April 11, 1969
(Friday), and April 12, 1969 (Saturday), which were not consecutive weeks as required by law.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner bank complied with the requirement of weekly publication of
notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
Ruling: Article 13 does not define "week." In Concepcion v. Zandueta, a week is interpreted as seven
consecutive days. In this case, the first week of publication should have been from March 28 to April
3, 1969, and the second week from April 4 to April 10, 1969. The April 11 publication occurred on the
first day of the third week, failing to meet the legal requirement. The inclusion of March 28 as the
start date follows the computation method in Bonnevie v. Court of Appeals. Thus, the court ruled that
the auction lacked proper publication, rendering it void. Petition dismissed.

Function of the proviso – A proviso is a part of a law that limits or clarifies the main rule. It can do
one of three things: (1) make an exception to the main rule, (2) narrow down the scope of the rule, or
(3) prevent misunderstanding about how far the rule applies. The word "provided" is typically used to
introduce a proviso.

Law: "All employees are entitled to a paid annual leave of 15 days. Provided, that employees who
have been with the company for less than six months are only entitled to 5 days of paid leave."

In this case, the proviso ("Provided, that...") qualifies the main rule by making an exception for
employees who have been with the company for less than six months, limiting their entitlement to
only 5 days of paid leave instead of 15.

ALU-TUCP v. National Labor Relations Commission and National Steel Corporation (G.R. No.
109902, August 2, 1994)

Facts: On July 5, 1990, petitioners filed complaints with the NLRC seeking regularization and
monetary benefits. The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioners were "regular project employees" and
entitled to regular employee salaries as per the collective bargaining agreement. Both parties
appealed. Petitioners claimed they were regular employees, while the private respondent argued they
were project employees hired for a specific project, NSC’s Five-Year Expansion Program.

The NLRC affirmed that petitioners were project employees, as their work was tied to a specific
undertaking not directly related to the company’s main business. However, it revoked the award of
regular employee benefits, citing no legal basis. The relevant law, Article 280 of the Labor Code,
defines regular and project-based employment, with regularity depending on the nature and duration
of the work.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are correctly classified as "project employees" or "regular
employees." This distinction matters because project employees' services end with the completion of
the project, while regular employees can only be terminated through recognized modes under the
Labor Code.

Ruling: Petitioners argue that their over six years of service with NSC should classify them as regular
employees, but this claim is legally unfounded. Their status as project employees remains unchanged,
even after more than one year. The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code applies to
casual employees, not project employees. The Court in Mercado, Sr. v. National Labor Relations
Commission clarified that the proviso in Article 280 only pertains to casual employees, confirming
that petitioners do not qualify for regular employee status. Thus, the petition is dismissed.