People v.
So
247 SCRA 708 (1995)
Facts:
Elyboy and his lady friend, Teresita Domingo, were walking when they passed by the house of Elyboy's
cousins. When they passed by, Elyboy's cousin, Edgar, invited him to have a drink and meet his future
brother-in-law, Mario Tuquero to which the appellant agreed to stay and drink with them.
After consuming four cases of beer, Emy So, Elyboy's cousin, went inside the house to sleep.
While Emy was sleeping inside the house, she was awakened by the noise coming from the group outside
their house. It turned out that Elyboy got into an altercation with someone and started shouting loudly,
disturbing the neighbors.
Following this, Mario advised Elyboy to go home because his loud voice was disturbing the neighbors.
Elyboy ran towards home but later encountered Mario and Emy at the corner of the street. While Mario
and Emy were waiting for a taxi, Elyboy suddenly attacked Mario and stabbed him multiple [Link]
pleaded to stop but Elyboy ignored her and continued stabbing Mario.
Elyboy fled the scene but was eventually apprehended by the police.
Before the Regional Trial Court, accused-appellant Elyboy So was charged with murder for the death of
Mario Tuquero and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
1. Whether Elyboy acted in self-defense
2. Whether Elyboy was insane at the time of the incident
Ruling:
1. No, Elyboy did not acted in self-defense.
The Court held that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the appellant to
show that the killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. He must
prove the essential requisites of self-defense, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression, and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.
Based on the the number and nature of the wounds inflicted by the appellant on the victim, it
indicated a determined effort to kill, not self-defense.
2. No, Elyboy was not insane at the time of the incident.
It was held by the Court that his recall of the events that transpired before, during and after the
stabbing incident, as well as the nature and contents of his testimony, does not betray an aberrant
mind. His memory conveniently blanks out only as to the number of wounds he inflicted on the
victim.
Mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
The testimony of a physician that the appellant showed signs of psychosis or insanity in the past
does not prove that he was completely deprived of intelligence or discernment at the time of the
incident.
