Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila City

JUAN DELA CRUZ,

Defendant-Petitioner,

-versus-
CIVIL CASE NO. L-12345
For: Ejectment

JANE DOE,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

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MEMORANDUM

COME NOW PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, through the undersigned counsel, unto this

Honorable Supreme Court most respectfully submit and present this Memorandum in the
above-titled case and aver that:

THE PARTIES

1.P l a i n t i f f R e s p o n d e n t J a n e D o e i s o f l e g a l a ge , s i n gl e , a n d r e s i d i n g o n 1
0 1 0 G i n o o Boulevard, Pasay City, where she may be served with legal processes and notices issued
by thisHonorable Court;

2. Defendant-Petitioner Juana Dela Cruz is of legal age and residing on 123 Binibini
Street,Quezon City, and may be served with legal processes and other judicial notices thereto.

[Link] BACKGROUND

1. On February 11, 2008, herein Plaintiff-Respondent filed a Complaint for Ejectment dated
February 7, 2008 against Defendant-Petitioner;

2.O n D e c e m b e r 2 2 , 2 0 0 8 , a n A n s w e r d a t e d D e c e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0
0 8 w a s f i l e d b y t h e Defendant-Petitioner;

3. On February 3, 2009, a Decision was rendered by Branch 1 of Metropolitan

Trial Court of Pasay City in favor of the Plaintiff-Respondent;

4.O n A u g u s t 6 , 2 0 0 9 , a M o t i o n f o r R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f i l e d J u l y 5 , 2 0 0 9 b y
D e f e n d a n t - P e t i t i o n e r t h r o u g h l e g a l c o u n s e l w a s d e n i e d b y J u d g e Lo r e n z o
M e n z o n o f B r a n c h 1 0 o f t h e Regional Trial Court Pasay City;

[Link] September 14, 2009, a Petition for Review dated September 9, 2009 was
filed to theCourt of Appeals by Defendant-Petitioner;
 [Link] April 23, 2010, Plaintiff-Respondent through legal counsel filed a Comment
datedApril 19, 2010;

[Link] May 13, 2010, as per Verification and Report from the Judicial Records
Division(JRD) no Reply was filed by the Defendant-Petitioner;

8.O n M a y 2 1 , 2 0 1 0 , a R e s o l u t i o n w a s r e n d e r e d b y t h e C o u r t o f A
p p e a l s d e n y i n g Defendant-Petitioner’s Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO);

9.A c c o r d i n g l y, t h e H o n o r a b l e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o r d e r e d t h e p a r t i e s t o s u
b m i t t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e M e m o r a n d a f i f t e e n ( 1 5 ) d a ys f r o m n o t i c e , o t h e r w i s e r e g
a r d l e s s w h e t h e r o r n o t Memoranda were filed, the petition shall be submitted for decision;

Hence, the filing of the instant Memorandum.

[Link] BACKGROUND

10. Plaintiff-Respondent seeks that a parcel of land located at 123 Binibini Street, Pasay be
returned to her possession, but due to Defendant-Petitioner’s occupancy thereat, the
former cannot claim possession which left her with the option of residing at 1010 Ginoo
Boulevard, Pasay City. It is noteworthy to stress that Plaintiff-Respondent is the registered owner of
the land subject under TCT No. 12345 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. The property was sold
tot hem by the now deceased original owners, Spouses Marcelo and Marcela del Pilar;

[Link]-Petitioner, on the other hand, is an alleged lessee of the original owners of thel
and since September 1955. They had repeatedly assailed the verbal contract of lease for
more than 50 years;

[Link]-Respondent was not able to claim immediately the land for it was
previously subject to a pending legal proceeding and that there was still no urgent
necessity of using and occupying it. When the event came that Plaintiff-Respondent was able to
enforce her right over the land, Defendant-
Petitioner, despite earnest and peaceful efforts of the Plaintiff-Respondents t i l l r e f u s e d
t o va c a t e t h e l a n d . T h i s l e d h e r t o s e e k h e l p f r o m t h e B a r a n g a y o f f i c i a l s
f o r mediation and/or conciliation in accordance with law. However, the Defendant-
Petitioner still persistently occupied the land without heed to the serious and constant demand of
the Plaintiff-Respondent which rendered it unattainable to reach an agreement;

13. Due to the foregoing failure to claim the parcel of land attributed to the obstinate refusal
of the Defendant-Petitioner, Plaintiff-Respondent was compelled to hire the services
of a legal counsel to commence the enforcement of ejection under the wings of the courts of law.

[Link] OF THE CASE

A.) WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT AC

T E D CORRECTLY IN DECIDING THIS UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION ON
THEB A S I S O F T H E E V I D E N C E O F O W N E R S H I P A F T E R D E F E N D A N T H
A D RAISED IN DEFENSE THE LESSEE’S RIGHTS UNDER P.D. 1517, P.D.
2016,APD 1-12 – PASAY CITY;
B.)WHETHER OR NOT AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION BARS THE
BONA FIDE LESSEE’S RIGHT TO AVAIL THE PRIVILEGES AND BENEFITSPROVIDED
BY SECTION 6 OF P.D. 1517;

C.)WHETHER OR NOT IN DETERMINING THE COVERAGE OF AREAS

FOR PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT (APD), REFERENCE MUST BE HAD TO THEL
IST OF THE STREETS SUBJECT TO THE ZONAL DEVELOPMENT ANDNOT
TO THE AREAS INCLUDED IN THE DELINEATION BY METES ANDBOUNDS AS
INDICATED IN THE PROCLAMATION ITSELF.

[Link]

A.)The court committed no error in deciding that an unlawful detainer action

been forced upon herein Defendant-Petitioner despite the assailed contention of the former
under P.D. 1517 and P.D. 2016.

B.)There is no bar in this instant case for an unlawful detainer to avail the benefits and
privileges provided by Section 6 P.D. 1517 provided it is applicable.

C.)The determination of the scope and limitation of Areas for Priority Development shall
be based on the list of specific areas prescribed by the proclamation.

[Link]

A.) It is necessary to emphasize that the Plaintiff-Respondent is the bona fide

owner of the parcel of land located at 123 Binibini Street, Pasay City under TCT No, 12345 of the
Register of Deeds of Pasay City. In the Philippines, the presentation of a valid certificate
of title of the real property is a conclusive evidence of ownership of the person whose name the
certificate of title is entitled to.

Under Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, or Act No. 496, it provides that “the original
certificates in the registration book, any copy thereof duly certified under the signature
of the clerk, or of the register of deeds of the province or city where the land is situated, and the seal
of the court, and also the owner’s duplicate certificate, shall be received as evidence in all the courts
of the Philippine Islands and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein except so far as
otherwise provided in this Act.”

Recognized jurisprudence also uphold the significance of a certificate of title in proving valid
o w n e r s h i p o f a l a n d . I n t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e c a s e o f Spouses Pascual v. Spouses
Coronel , t h e ponente cited two cases which highlight the significance of a valid certificate of title
in claimingownership over a land. It was held that “…in the recent case of Umpoc v.
Mercado, the Courtdeclared that the trial court did not err in giving more probative weight to the
TCT in the name of the decedent vis—vis the contested unregistered Deed of Sale. Later
in Arambulo v. Gungab, theCourt held that the registered owner is preferred to possess the
property subject of the unlawfuldetainer case. The age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens
Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.”

The ruling of Dizon v. Court of Appeals was also used as basis for this argument.
It was stated that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of ownership and the questionability of
thet i t l e i s i m m a t e r i a l i n a n e j e c t m e n t s u i t . F u t h e r m o r e , A r t i c l e 4 2 8 o f
t h e N e w C i v i l C o d e enumerates the rights of an owner. “The owner has the right
to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations other than those established
by law. T h e o w n e r h a s r i g h t o f a c t i o n against the holder and possessor of the thing in
order to recover it.”

It is indubitable that the certificate of title of 123 Binibini Street, Pasay City under TCT
No.12345 which is registered in the Register of Deeds of Pasay City entitles Petitioner-Respondent
the right to exercise the aforementioned rights, specifically, in this instant case, the
right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover the land.

The contention of the Defendant-Petitioner that the verbal lease agreement they
had madewith the now deceased original owners Marcelo and Marcela Del Pilar for over
50 years shallentitle them to the privileges under P.D. 1517 and P.D. 2016 (Annex “A” and “B”,
respectively)is untenable. It is expressly stated that Section 6 of P.D. 1517 grants lessees
the right of firstrefusal before they may be ejected from a land, but this is only feasible under
certain conditions.I t i s a n i n d i s p e n s a b l e q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h a t t h e l a n d i s i n c l u d e d i n
t h e l i s t o f A r e a s f o r P r i o r i t y Development (APD) before an owner can be granted of the right
of first refusal. The land subjecto f t h i s c a s e i s c l e a r l y n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e s p e c i f i c
a r e a s e n u m e r a t e d i n t h e l i s t o f A P D . T o reiterate the Court of Appeals decision in
CA-G.R. No. CV 12345: “Insofar as the property inlitigation, appellant Jane Doe is,
consequently, correct in objecting to appellee’s exercise of the right of first refusal granted under
Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1517. The fact that it is not included in the areas for priority
development specifically identified under Proclamation No.1967 indicates that appellee have no
cause of action for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and preliminary injunction against
appellants.”

B.)T h e P l a i n t i f f R e s p o n d e n t ’ s a r g u m e n t i n t h i s i s s u e i s i n t i m a t e l y c o n n e c
ted with the p r e c e d i n g a r g u m e n t . D e f e n d a n t -
P e t i t i o n e r v i g o r o u s l y a s s a i l s t h a t t h e r e i s n o b a r t o t h e availability of the
privileges and benefits conferred to bona fide lessee whenever there is anunlawful
detainer action. It is however true. But this is subject to circumstances that may qualifya lessee to the
privileges and benefits under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1516 such as the right of firstrefusal.
Unfortunately, the land possessed by the Defendant-Petitioner does not fall under
theambit of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1517. Therefore, the Defendant-Petitioner has no cause of actionin
this issue.

C.)T h e t h i r d i s s u e q u e s t i o n s t h e c o ve r a g e o f t h e A P D p r e s c r i b e d b y t h e
p r o c l a m a t i o n , whether or not it refers to the list of streets subject to the Zonal
Development or to the areas included in the delineation of the metes and bounds indicated.

Reiteration is therefore necessary to lay emphasis on the decision of the Court of

Appealsthat in the List of Areas for Priority Development (APD’s), labeled as the South Sector of
PasayCity, the area for priority development was defined as Tramo Lines along Barangays San
Isidro,San Roque, and Santa Clara. It was thereafter specifically enumerated the list of
covered sub-
areas (please refer to Annex “C” for diagram) which are the followin
g : 1 ) F . V i c t o r , 2 ) Ventanilla Street, c) Juan Luna Street, d) D. Jorge Street, e) Viscarra
Street, f) Conchita Street, g)Dolores Street, h) Leonardo Street, i) Alvarez Street, j) Basilio Street, k)
Rodriguez Street, and i)Villa Barbara.

“There is consequently no gainsaying the fact that with its Binibini Street location,
the property in litigation is not included among the sites identified as Areas f
o r P r i o r i t y D e v e l o p m e n t i n P a s a y C i t y. ” T h e m e r e f a c t t h a t t h e l i s t d o e s
n o t i n c l u d e B i n i b i n i S t r e e t necessarily implies that it is deemed excluded from it.
 Citing Solanada Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, it made a profound analysis of Section 6
of P.D. 1517 (as found in Annex “A” of this Memorandum) based on statutory construction:“
We agree. A close reading of Proclamation No. 1967 reveals that, before a preemptive
right can be exercised, the disputed land should be situated in an area declared to be both an APD and a
ULRZ.
An urban tenant's right of first refusal is set forth in Section 6, PD 1517, as follows:

S e c . 6 . L a n d T e n a n c y i n U r b a n L a n d R e f o r m A r e a s . W i t h i n t h e U r b a n Zones,
legitimate tenants who have resided on the land for ten years or more[,] who have built their homes
on the land[,] and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last
ten years shall not bed is possessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first
refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at reasonable prices, under terms and
conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee created
by Section 8 of this Decree. Proclamation No. 1967 further delimited the areas or zones wherein this
preemptive right could be availed of .

WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 1893 was issued on 11 September 1979, pursuantto Section
4 of P.D. No. 1517, declaring the entire Metropolitan Manila area asUrban Land Reform
Zone.

WHEREAS, It is now necessary and appropriate to identify specific sites covered by urban
land reform in Metropolitan Manila for purposes of making specific theapplicability of P.D. Nos.
1517, 1640 and 1642 and of LOI No. 935.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President

o f t h e Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and existing laws,
and in relation to Proclamation No. 1893 declaring the entire
MetropolitanM a n i l a a r e a a s a n U r b a n L a n d R e f o r m Z o n e , a n d L O I 9 3 5 , h e
r e b y a m e n d Proclamation No. 1893 by declaring 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas
for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones as described in the attached annex.

“ T h e p r o v i s i o n s o f P . D . N o s . 1 5 1 7 , 1 6 4 0 a n d 1 6 4 2 a n d o f LO I N o . 9 3 5 s h a l l
apply only to the above[-]mentioned Areas of Priority Development and Urban Land
Reform Zones.

xxx xxx xxx”

The aforecited whereas clauses express a clear intent to limit the operation of PD1 5 1 7
to specific area s declared t o be located in both an APD and a U LRZ.
The conjunctive
and i n t h e l a s t s e n t e n c e o f t h e q u o t e d p r o v i s i o n c o n f i r m s t
his intention.
And i n s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n i m p l i e s c o n j u n c t i o n , j o i n d e r o r u n i o n . As
understood from the common and usual meaning of the conjunction
and, the provisions o f P D 1 5 1 7 a p p l y o n l y t o a r e a s d e c l a r e d t o b e l o c a t e d w i t h i n
b o t h a n A P D a n d a ULRZ.”

With the foregoing recognized jurisprudence said, the Defendant-Petitioner’s

action would necessarily lead to futility for no cause of action.

PRAYER
 WHEREFORE,p r e m i s e c o n s i d e r e d , i t r e s p e c t f u l l y p r a ye d f o r t h a t t h i s H o n
o r a b l e Supreme Court that Defendant-Petitioner’s prayer for writ of injunction be DENIED for
havingno cause of action and the petition DISMISSED for being clearly unmeritorious.

Other just and equitable relief under the foregoing are likewise being prayed for.

Respectfully submitted.

Makati City for Manila City, Philippines. April 12, 2024.

LAW OFFICES
Counsel for Plaintiff-Respondent
New Building,Makati Avenue, Makati City

ATTY.
IBP Lifetime No. 67891;
5/10/2005PTR No. 44568; 1/10/2011
Roll of Attorney No. 2005-001023
MCLE Compliance No. III – 000899