CHAPTER THREE: WOMEN’S WAYS OF KNOWING:

A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE

In this chapter I aim to provide a review and critique of Women’s Ways of

Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice and Mind (Belenky et al., 1986).1 The
ideas that this book have given rise to are especially relevant to this thesis. I
first read this book within a few years of its initial publication. Its ideas had
resonance for me and gave me the tools to describe my own learning history.
Furthermore, I believe it shaped my emergent ‘living theory’ of what
developmental education required, in turn, influencing the design of the
MAPOD, in respect of an approach to learning based on a community of
learners. During my inquiry, I have read this book many times, developing with
each reading a deeper understanding of the text, helping me clarify over time
how I could improve my practice.

I begin with an introduction and overview of the study that forms the basis of
this book, and then develop a more fulsome account of the five epistemological
perspectives that shape the order of presentation of this book. In doing so, I
aim to help the reader who may be unfamiliar with this work to gain an
appreciation and understanding of how it has influenced my research. I develop
my account by explaining how these perspectives resonated for me, and by
providing a glimpse of how they helped me understand and know myself better
as a learner. In addition, I indicate where they have influenced my thinking and
living theory as a professional educator. By placing myself as knower within the
text, I hope to show how the reading of this book and its subsequent review
and critique was for me, not an activity of detached intellectual curiosity, used

1
Hereinafter in this chapter referred to as WWK.
to produce a traditional literature review, but rather a process of engagement
with ideas in which I as a knower was intimately connected and attached to that
which was also known to and communicated by others. The reading of this
book began a relationship with those ideas that the authors brought into the
public domain, leading to a personal and organisational learning trajectory of
transformation. Finally, I will address issues of critique, drawing out in
particular some of the key criticisms brought to light in the work of Goldberger
et al. (1996).

Introduction

Belenky et al. (1986) describe ways of knowing that women reported to them,
based on their individual life experiences. In the process, the authors identified
particular ways of knowing that women have cultivated and valued, ways of
knowing, they argue, that have been denigrated and neglected by the dominant
intellectual ethos of our time. These ways of knowing, claim the authors,
though gender related, are not gender specific, thus suggesting that whilst
these ways of knowing might be held in common by women, they are also
accessible to men. Their research involved intensive interviews with 135 women
from higher education and the wider social sphere.

In developing their theory of knowledge, Belenky et al. were concerned to

understand ‘how women know what they know’. They believed that what
women considered to be truth and reality affects the way in which they see the
world, including perceptions of self, and views of teaching and learning. The
book shows how women’s self concepts and ways of knowing are intertwined.
Epistemology is presented as an organising framework of the book.

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They describe five epistemological perspectives from which women view reality
and draw conclusions about truth, knowledge and authority. Moreover, they
show how women struggle to claim the power of their own minds.

The context of this study needs to be appreciated in respect of what had gone
before and the growing awareness that, in the majority of social science
research, there had been a distinct absence of women, not least because
academic research traditionally was conducted in universities, populated
predominantly by male students.

The starting point for the authors had been Perry’s work (1970) on intellectual
and ethical development.2 Perry identified stages of development in intellectual
and ethical thought. Significantly, this included a shift from dualism to
multiplicity – the ability to differentiate between right and wrong, giving way to
a multiplicity of perspectives. He also noted that students move beyond
dependence on authority towards a position where they hold their own opinion.
Beyond that, he recorded a stage of development which he called ‘full
relativism’, in which meaning and context are relative. At this stage, the student
appreciates that knowledge is constructed, not given; contextual, not absolute;
mutable, not fixed.

Significantly, the authors of WWK, in contrast to Perry (1970), reported

perspectives on ways of knowing, not stages of development and they reported
differences in the ways of knowing not present in Perry’s study. The authors
state that their wish is to share their findings, not prove anything.

That women speak in a different voice was not entirely a new concept. Gilligan
(1977) showed that women differed from men in their orientation. She showed

2
Conducted at Harvard, an ivy league university in the United States, populated by
male students.

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that women’s moral development was more likely to be marked and
differentiated by concerns about care, responsibilities and connectedness,
whereas rights, autonomy and separateness were characteristic of men’s
approach to moral thinking, decision-making and action. WWK thus serves to
extend the work of Perry and Gilligan, thus extending our knowledge of theories
of knowing.

Additionally, WWK was groundbreaking in that it studied women from diverse

backgrounds. As well as samples of women from the university population (the
traditional source of participants and informants in social science research), the
authors specifically included women from what they termed ‘the invisible
colleges’. By contrast, these women were outside the formal higher education
system and compared to students in higher education the women from the
‘invisible colleges’ had limited formal education. Generally, these women came
from poor and working class backgrounds. They tended to need social support
and instruction on parenting skills, which the ‘invisible colleges’ provided.
Significantly, therefore, there was diversity in terms of class differences,
education and life experience in the sample that informed this study. This
particular feature of the research design is not insignificant, because by
including women from such diverse backgrounds the authors were able to
identify ‘voice’ as the anchoring point of the study. It is testimony to the
collaborative approach of the authors, who found a way of working together
that addressed the different interests of their client groups and the research
questions they wished to pursue. The focus of the interviews was on women’s
experiences of life and learning:

“We were particularly interested in how maternal practice

might shape women’s thinking about human development
and the teaching relationship. We expected that by listening
to women talk about mothers and mothering, we might hear
themes that were especially distinctive in a women’s voice”
(Belenky et al., 1986:13).

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Drawing out the concept of ‘maternal thinking’ as described by Ruddick (1980,
cited in Belenky et al., 1986), the authors anticipated that wisdom (knowledge)
gained through maternal thinking and practice might illuminate educators and
practitioners in social services in their work regarding human development.

The five epistemological perspectives by which women know and view the
world, as identified by this study provide an organising framework for the book.
These are (1) silence, (2) subjective knowing, (3) received knowing, (4)
procedural knowing, including two different types of procedures, called
separate and connected knowing, and (5) constructed knowing. The book is
presented in two parts; the first focuses on ways of knowing, whilst the second
explores the context of development in families and schools. The final chapter
develops the idea of ‘connected teaching’, the theme of which is bringing the
maternal voice into the academy. The substance of each perspective can be
differentiated as follows:

Silence: in silence women experience themselves as mindless and voiceless,

and subject to the whims of authority.

Subjective knowing: from this perspective, truth and knowledge are conceived
as personal and private and subjectively known and or intuited.

Received knowing: this is where women see themselves as capable of receiving

and reproducing knowledge from external authorities. But these women do not
see themselves as being able to construct or create knowledge themselves.

Procedural knowing: procedural knowledge is present where women are

invested in learning. It describes methods for obtaining and communicating
knowledge. Two types of procedural knowledge are reported; ‘separate
knowing’ distinguished by evaluation and objectivity in judging an others

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point of view, and ‘connected knowing’, distinguished by acceptance and
appreciation of another’s’ point of view. These procedures build on ‘different
voice’ theory (Gilligan, 1982), highlighting how separation and attachment
influence ways in which men and women tend to think through and approach
issues.

Constructed knowing: from this position, women view all knowledge as

contextual. They experience themselves as creators of knowledge and place
value on both subjective and objective strategies for knowing.

Voice: a Metaphor for Growth and Development

The authors noticed how the metaphor of finding or gaining voice appeared to
reverberate throughout the interviews. Initially, they thought it was merely a
form of shorthand for a point of view, but as they progressed with the
interviews they began to appreciate it as a metaphor that applied to many
aspects of women’s experience and their development. Women spoke of voice
and silence as they described their lives, using variously such terms as
speaking up, speaking out, being silenced, really talking, really listening, feeling
deaf and dumb, having no words, saying what you mean and listening to be
heard. This range of comments fell within the five perspectives and was related
to feelings and beliefs regarding sense of mind, self worth and the extent to
which women felt isolated from or connected to others. The metaphor of voice
became the unifying theme that linked both the perspectives and the chapters
in the book. Furthermore, the idea of finding voice is symbolic of the journey
that women have had to make to ‘put the knower back into the known’ and to
reclaim the power of their minds and voices (Belenky et al., 1986:19).

The authors draw our attention to the differences between the visual and oral
traditions in respect of knowledge and knowing. The following quotation

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shows the subtlety and influence of using this analogy when compared with
the oral tradition in the shaping of the western mind:

“Visual metaphors such as, ‘the mind’s eye’ suggest a camera

passively recording a static reality and promote the illusion
that disengagement and objectification are central to the
construction of knowledge” (Belenky et al., 1986:18).

The authors further point out that visual metaphors suggest that you need to
stand or position yourself at a distance if you are to get a proper view. Contrast
this with the oral tradition where “the ear requires closeness of subject and
object” (ibid.) if one is to be heard and appreciated by the other. Put this way,
the metaphor of voice and its importance in WWK takes on a very particular and
enhanced significance, as will become clear when we examine the differences
between ‘separate’ and ‘connected’ knowing.

In academia, when we speak in terms of the visual metaphor, we tend to invoke

the qualities of illumination. For example, when we use theory to illuminate
practice, the practice becomes a ‘thing’ for which the theory provides
background objectification, and thus the minds eye is associated with intellect
and reason. By contrast, more auditory or kinesthetic analogies, such as
resonance, imply relationship and connectivity, within which subjectivity is an
active component. Subjectivity was considered antithetical to the academic and
scientific tradition until relatively recently. Though there has been some
movement in this, academics tend to remain suspicious of subjectivity.

Taking the path less travelled, the authors choose to pay particular attention to
the maternal voice and how it influences knowing.

“The stories of the women drew us back into a kind of

knowing that had too often been silenced by the institutions
in which we grew up and of which we were a part. In the end
we found that, in our attempt to bring forward the ordinary
voice, that voice had educated us” (Belenky et al., 1986:20).

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In hearing and naming the maternal voice, not generally associated in
institutions of higher education, WWK serves to facilitate the questioning of the
dominant repertoire of theories of knowledge in the academy, and offers
possibilities for its expansion.

A More Detailed Understanding of the Five Perspectives

Silence: For women whose voices were silenced, silence was synonymous with
oppression. Belenky et al. (1986), utilising a question from Gilligan’s (1982)
study, asked the women to describe their sense of self as they see themselves
now and in the past. For women who are ‘silent’ this was an impossible task, as
they claimed that they “relied on what others told them about themselves to get
any sense of self” (1986:31). In their interviews, they described their experience
as being silenced by voices of authority, and they reported that these
authorities were quick to tell them (with respect to their thinking) ‘you’ve got it
wrong’. In examples such as this, words were used as weapons, undermining or
belittling them. For some women, silence provided a degree of safety, as they
were fearful of speaking in the face of authority. Some described their
experience as being akin to feeling “deaf and dumb” (Belenky et al., 1986:34).
Authorities were described as “wordless authorities” (1986:27). By which, the
women explained that those in authority seldom made it clear what they wanted
or expected, moreover, such authority figures “expected you to know in
advance” (1986:28). These women were effectively terrorised in their silence,
defending themselves both psychologically and, in some cases, physically, by
being on guard and anticipating the whims of authority. This type of silence is
marked by violence. Silent women, the authors reported, often grew up in social
isolation from others, with their families cut off from the wider community. In
addition, discussion with other family members was often actively discouraged.

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“The silent women lived cut off from others in a world full of rumor and
innuendo” (1986:25).

Conditions of social isolation, coupled with a lack of opportunity to play with

other children, or the chance to engage in dialogic relations with others, served
to arrest the development of silent women. Through dialogue ‘inner’ and ‘outer’
speech is developed. Whilst the former facilitates an awareness of one’s
thought process, in other words, an awareness of the development of mind, the
latter facilitates a development of voice. Whilst these are ‘home’ factors, the
school context was not necessarily any more supportive for silent women.
Belenky et al. (1986) point out that schools provide little for the development of
outer speech and inner speech, where the traditional role of the teacher is that
of the knowledge authority. Thus, the teaching methods serve to reinforce the
experience of silence. Furthermore, Belenky et al. argue that to concentrate on
developing the written form before the oral process has been developed is likely
to be tragic. They describe these silent women as “…lost in the sea of words
and numbers that flooded their schools” (1986:34). For them, school was an
unlikely place to find voice, “…it only confirmed their fears of feeling ‘deaf and
dumb’” (ibid.). And, in the words of one women, “in school you get detention
for talking to others” (ibid.). The term and perspective of silence became a
benchmark for the study.

“This position though rare, at least in our sample, is an

important anchoring point for our epistemological scheme,
representing an extreme in denial of self and in dependence
on external authority for direction” (Belenky et al.,
1986:24).

From my perspective

The descriptions of silence, as described in WWK, strongly resonated with my

childhood recollections and observations of my mother. I was born in Coventry

110
in the 1950s. My parents had emigrated from Scotland so that my father could
work in one of the car factories. My mother, the youngest of ten, struggled to
cope. Socially isolated, she had no-one to turn to, to help her in developing her
skills in cooking and parenting. Money was tight, we lived in relative poverty,
and due to the onset of illness in pregnancy my mother had lost her job. She
had epilepsy, and without a reference she was unable to find another job, not
that she could have coped with a job and a child at that time. To keep a roof
over our heads my father worked long hours, but he was unable to cope with
the domestic chaos that prevailed and, in turn, he took his frustration out on my
mother, subjecting her to regular beatings. Thus, domestic violence, social
isolation, the lack of opportunity to play, and the absence of dialogue with
others bounded my childhood experience within a wall of silence.

Like the silenced women that Belenky et al. describe, I had learned that survival
depended on obeying wordless authorities. I grew up knowing that I should not
wait to be told to do something; rather, I should anticipate what they wanted.
Being seen and not heard was required.

Subjective Knowing: The hallmark of subjective knowing is the emergence of

‘the inner voice’. This perspective marks a developmental shift from passivity
to action, in effect, from silence to a “protesting inner voice and infallible gut”
(Belenky et al., 1986:54), which facilitates a sense of self, agency and control.

Significantly, ‘truth’ now resides in the person, this transition enabling women
to become their own authorities. This is the key difference, when compared with
the perspective of received knowing. However, both perspectives still share the
tendency toward dualism, that being the belief in right and wrong answers.
Belenky et al. suggest that a shift toward this perspective is linked to the
experience and reaction women have to “failed male authority” (Belenky et al.,
1986:57).

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 “For women, the freedom from social convention and
definitions implied in the shift into subjectivism represents a
more greater autonomy and independence” (Belenky et al,.
1986:55).

Subjectivism is in essence the antithesis of rationalism and scientific thought;

therefore, this perspective is not without risk to the knower in a world
dominated by the scientific and rational tradition. Belenky et al. inform us that
some women are ‘shaky’ about the power of their own judgment.

The developmental process in this period of subjective knowing lays the

ground for experiential learning through reflection, as the women learn to ‘hear
themselves think’ and take heed of their observations and listening.

From my perspective

Though I remained confidant as I entered my teenage years that the right

answers were to be found through those in authority, particularly in education,
I began to experience doubt both in respect to parental authority, and that of
church, whose doctrine of blind faith defied both logic and plausibility. Being
brought up a Roman Catholic, attending a girls’ catholic school and taught
mainly by nuns,3 I gradually became more cynical about the wisdom of many of
my teachers. I could not see how such apparently intelligent people could be
fooled by the double standards portrayed by the clergy (who governed the
school).

In the mid-sixties, the role of women in society was changing, yet at the same
time the clergy, by Papal decree, was charged to preach from the pulpit on
women, their place in society and the doctrine of the church, which banned the

3
There were a number of lay teachers, though they were required to be practicing
Catholics.

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use of the pill. Though at the time I was too young for these matters to affect
me directly, they did affect the decisions of women of my mother’s generation,
many of whom, like my mother, neither wanted nor could cope with another
pregnancy. There were rumours about one of the parish priests having an affair
with a local woman. Many years later, another was to be charged and found
guilty of child sex abuse. The parish priest had no interested in the poor or
needy in the parish; he was only interested in building up the wealth of the
parish, and to this end he only had time for ‘his’ wealthy sponsors. I found this
deplorable, since the majority of parishioners were working-class, and selflessly
gave significant sums of money to the church every week. Though unable to
speak up or speak out against these failed authority figures, my inner voice was
beginning to inform my thinking.

For me, the turning point in my quest for self came following a long period of
illness in my fourteenth and fifteen years, when my educational future was
placed in doubt, and when the options being presented to me were typing skills,
a quiet little job in an office, and a good marriage prospect. I could no longer
see my life in terms of the values of the community in which I lived, or indeed,
imagine fulfilling their expectations of me. I began to plan my escape and, with
the help of my doctor, I determined to make education my ally.4

Received Knowers: This perspective involves listening to the voices of others

as a means of knowing what to know. Thus, within this perspective listening,
receiving or taking in what authorities have to say is equated with being a
learner.

“While received knowers can be very open to take in what

others have to offer, they have little confidence in their
ability to speak. Believing that truth comes from others,
they still their own voices to hear the voices of others”
(Belenky et al., 1986:37).

4
I continue this story in Part Two of this thesis.

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From this perspective, the notion that ‘truth’ is received and is somehow ‘out
there’ and experienced as external, is the predominant view of women who have
this perspective. The idea that ‘truth’ is constructed is out with the perspective
of these women. One of the features of this perspective is that it is difficult to
believe that authorities themselves might disagree or hold competing views. I
recall vividly a particular occasion with the first MAPOD cohort, when one of
the students, frustrated by the different views expressed by the tutor team,
shouted: “Why can’t you lot get your act together”, reflecting her expectation
that authorities should be clear about ‘the truth’.

Received knowers are listeners and tend toward conformist thinking. Belenky et
al. suggest that the socialisation of women in society to ‘be seen and not
heard’ conditions them to “cultivate their capacities for listening while
encouraging men to speak” (1986:45). It is further argued that when women
speak they are judged not in comparison to men but by this taken for granted
‘standard’ of behaviour. This view is supported by Cline and Spender (1987).5

Though there have been changes to society’s norms in the west, facilitating
opportunities for more equal relationships between men and women,
particularly with regard to educational opportunity, change on the home front
by comparison, for many working mothers, has been in my experience been
minimal, whilst in the boardroom very little has changed. Received knowers are
potentially very vulnerable. According to Belenky et al.:

“Received knowers are especially at the mercy of authorities

judgments. If someone in a powerful position tells such a
woman that she is wrong or bad or crazy, she believes it”
(Belenky et al., 1986:49).

5
In their aptly named book, Reflecting Men at Twice their Natural Size.

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On the other hand, if the authority demonstrates belief in the woman, it is likely
to cause the woman to believe in herself.

From my perspective

As a child I experienced myself as dumb and without a voice though I did not
experience myself as deaf. Rather, I depended on authorities for guidance and
believed that if I listened well to those in authority I would learn. But like the
women in Belenky et al.’s study, I was vulnerable to the judgments of
authorities, and their view of me shaped my own view of myself. I went to my
first primary school until I was approximately eight years old, where most of the
teachers I encountered gave me some encouragement to positively see myself
as a learner and a potentially useful citizen. But in my next school the message
changed. The school was pioneering discovery methods of learning, where the
children were being sent out to complete tasks and projects and learn for
themselves, but with little or no guidance. I was used to being instructed and
found myself at sea in this new regime. The school authorities demanded due
deference from pupils, which translated as ‘carry out instructions as given by
authority figures and don’t ask questions’. Consequently, I found myself in a
double bind. I did not thrive in this environment. I was not considered suitable
grammar school material and I duly failed the eleven plus examination, leaving
to attend a local secondary modern school. Despite this experience of perceived
failure as a learner, I persevered, believing that I just had to listen harder and
pay more attention if I was to become a successful learner.

Procedural knowing: Procedural knowledge is generally thought of as ‘the

voice of reason’. Belenky et al. tell us how the voice of reason stifles the inner
voice. One example given is the procedures taught for analysing a painting.
They describe five criteria on which one’s evaluation and judgment of a paining
is made, namely:

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 • the composition;
• the texture;
• the colour;
• the lighting;
• how the artist expresses his/her feelings.

The self is noticeably absent from this procedure.

“The inner voice turns critical; it tells them their ideas may
be stupid, and because their ideas must measure up to certain
objective standards they speak in measured tones. Often
they do not speak at all. But this is not a passive silence; on
the other side of this silence, reason is stirring” (Belenky et
al., 1986:95).

In academia, there are conventions supporting this type of reasoning. In

particular, argument and adversarial discourse. Gilligan (1982) and Lyons (1983,
in Belenky et al., 1986:102) described two different self-concepts. One a
‘separate self’, that is autonomous, which gives its name to ‘separate knowing’,
and the other, in which one is ‘connected’ to others in relationship, and thus
named ‘connected knowing’.

Separate Knowing: Doubting is at the heart of separate knowing. Citing Elbow,

who coined the phrase ‘the doubting game’, we are told that this involves
“putting something on trial to see if it is wanting or not” (1973, in Belenky et al.,
1986:104). In short, this procedure requires us to look for what is wrong and/or
missing, taking the contrary position, or playing devils advocate. It is a
procedure commonly applied in academia toward teaching learning and
assessment.

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From my perspective

This was the game I would learn as an undergraduate and further refine as
postgraduate and new academic. Paradoxically, in finding voice in the academy,
the doubting game can leave students feeling that they rather than their ideas
are being put on trial. Belenky et al. suggest that students may become pawns
in the doubting game.

“In accepting authorities’ standards, separate knowers make

themselves vulnerable to their criticism. The authorities
have a right to find fault with the reasoning of separate
knowers; and since there is nothing personal in their
criticism, the separate knowers must accept it with
equanimity” (Belenky et al., 1986:107).

That this is the dominant way of knowing in academia is not insignificant. As a

tutor, I have felt obliged to teach my students how to play the doubting game. I
wanted them to know how to construct a good enough argument and to know
that they should back up their claims with evidence. Not least, because I know
that they would likely be judged by that standard by other authorities. Separate
knowing is a public language expressed in public performance and based on
reason and critical thinking, in contrast to subjective knowing which is a private
language based on intuition. But I have learned that, for some students, even
teaching them how to play this game can hinder their development, as they
experience and/or perceive this procedure to be destructive. For students who
have yet to find their voice, and who are vulnerable to criticism, the location of
criticism as personal and not in the context of their ideas is often how they hear
feedback, which can undermine their development and, in some cases, lead to
feelings of failure. This experience as a tutor is borne out by the findings of
Belenky et al. who report that “on the whole, women found the experience of
being doubted debilitating rather than energizing” (1986:227).

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In developing their argument, the authors describe it as “the doubting model as
peculiarly inappropriate for women” and further state that they are “not
convinced” that it is any more “appropriate for men” (Belenky et al., 1986:228).
At times this traditional approach to academic judgment on MAPOD became a
source of tension between staff and students, raising questions concerning
what constitutes academic rigour and ‘valid knowing’. It has been a significant
question for my own practice, and one that has influenced my research.

The language of separate knowing is a public one based on reason. Belenky et

al. remind us that we are governed not by men but by laws. This type of
procedural knowledge extracts the self from the known. It relies on objectivity
and pure reason. It is an adversarial form and has significant power
implications. On this very issue, Belenky et al. state:

“This is not the common ground of genuine colleagues. The

teacher has not, in the words of radical educator Paulo
Freire, become a genuine ‘partner of the students’, a ‘student
among students’ (1971,p.62). The teachers still weald the
power: They write the rules of the game and rate the
players’ performances. But teachers and students can now
speak a common language, and they can at least play at
being colleagues” (1986:107).

Despite shifts in power relations on MAPOD toward greater equity between

students and tutors through practices such as peer assessment, partnership as
described by Belenky et al. remained problematic. It is one of the living
contradictions experienced in my practice as a tutor and is a paradox that sat
uncomfortably at times with the broader efforts of tutors and the programme to
facilitate a different way of being in educative relations with students, that
being a more collegiate relationship, and one responsive to students’ needs.

Separate knowing is engrained as the dominant mode of discourse in business

and society. It is characterised by debate and the notion of the better argument.

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Schweickart (1996) suggests that we are not easily able to conceive of a way
that is different and yet, still valid.

Connected knowing: Connected knowers develop procedures for gaining

access to other people’s experiential knowledge through resonance and
empathy. It involves acceptances and precludes evaluative judgment. It is the
opposite of the ‘doubting game’; it is ‘the believing game’ (Elbow, 1973, in
Belenky et al., 1986:113). It involves “seeing the other not in their own terms
but in the other’s terms”.6 Schweickart cites the definition offered by Clinchy
(1989) of the ‘believing game’, stating:

“[it is where you] suspend your disbelief, put your own views
aside, and try to see the logic in the idea. Ultimately, you
need not agree with it, but while you are entertaining it, as
Elbow says, ‘say yes to it’: you must empathise with it, feel
with it and think with the person who created it” (Clinchy,
1989, cited in Schweickart, 1996:310).

Connected knowing is marked by “really listening”. It involves the “capacity to

attend to another person and to feel related to that person in spite of what may
be enormous differences” (Belenky et al., 1986:143).

Contrasting the Two Procedures

In separate knowing, evaluation serves to place the object at a distance and the
self above it, creating mastery over it, whereas connected knowing requires
intimacy and equity with the person and their ideas. Knowledge as judgment
and knowledge as understanding would seem to differentiate these two
procedures.

6
The work of Elbow (1973), a composition theorist is cited by Belenky et al
(1986:104). They state that he had run a programme at one of the participatory
colleges in their study, on innovative writing for new students. Though his ideas of
believing and doubting originate in the context of composition writing, Belenky et al.
use them as an explanatory framework to explore the way in which a reader and
specifically an academic authority might approach a text.

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 “Connected knowers begin with an interest in the facts of
other people’s lives, but they gradually shift the focus t o
other people’s ways of thinking. As in all procedural
knowing, it is the form rather than the content of knowing
that is central. Separate knowers learn through explicit
formal instruction how to adopt a different lens -how, for
example, how to think like a sociologist. Connected knowers
learn through empathy. Both learn to get out from behind
their own eyes and use a different lens, in one case the lens
of a discipline, in the other the lens of another person
(Belenky et al., 1986:115).

Though connected knowers avoid making judgments, this should not be taken
as a sign of passivity or lack of agency. The attitude of trust and the
assumption that the person has something good to say would, according to
Belenky et al., suggest forbearance, if not an intentional form of passivity,
reflecting a relationship in tune with the other.

Connected Teaching

Linked to connected knowing is connected teaching. It is concerned with

bringing the feminine principle into the educational learning relationship. “It is
time for the voice of the mother to be heard in education” (Noddings, in
Belenky et al., 1986:214). This is a clear reference to the maternal voice, the
caring voice of the mother. Belenky et al. invoke the metaphor of ‘teacher as
midwife’. This is where the teacher helps the student draw out and give birth to
their own ideas. Where the women in their study reported occasions for
developmental/cognitive growth, it was where a midwife model of teaching and
learning had been employed (Belenky et al., 1986:227). The authors further
describe connected teachers as “believers [who] trust their students’ thinking
and encourage them to expand it” (Belenky et al., 1986:227).

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From my perspective

As a tutor, I have had to work much harder to develop this kind of knowing in
my teaching and learning relationships, grappling with and learning how to
really listen, and be accepting of student accounts. The challenge this has
presented has given rise to an area of inquiry within my research, which I offer
as storied account of working with students, in Part Two of this thesis.

Constructed knowing: This is a perspective that integrates ways of knowing,

creating a voice in which women embrace the pieces of themselves, in search of
their own unique voice.

“It is in the process of sorting out the pieces of the self and
of searching for a unique and authentic voice that women
come to the basic insights of constructivist thought: All
knowledge is constructed, and the knower is a n
intimate part of the known” (Belenky et al., 1986:137)
emphasis original.

To be able to see knowledge as constructed expands our possibilities for

thinking about things. Constructed knowers appreciate the relevance and
uniqueness of context to knowledge. Constructed knowing greatly expands the
power of the mind. Building on Polyanyi’s (1958) contribution to our
understanding of the role of ‘personal knowledge’ in scientific thinking,
Belenky et al. suggest that constructed knowing excites a passion for knowing:
“the passionate participation of the knower in the act of the known” (1986:141).

From my perspective

This thesis involves such passion as described above, in that a self-study

places my ‘I’ at the centre of my inquiry, as I engage reflexively with the
construction of my own living theory, and its reconstruction, as I come to know
myself as a living contradiction, and as I passionately engage with improving

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my practice in my teaching and learning relationships. Commenting on this
quality of knowing. Belenky et al. state:

“What we are calling passionate knowing is the elaborated

form connected knowing takes after women learn to use the
self as an instrument of understanding” (Belenky et al.,
1986:141).

The capacity to ‘really listen’ goes hand in hand with the capacity to ‘really
talk’. It involves constructed discourse, such as exploration, talking and
listening, asking questions, argumentation, hypothesising and the sharing of
ideas. It is a reciprocal process where listening and taking on board the ideas of
another no longer has the oppressive elements, as experienced by the received
knower. “In ‘real talk’ domination is absent, reciprocity and cooperation are
prominent” (Belenky et al., 1986:145-146).

‘Really talking’ is likened to the ‘ideal speech’ situation of Jurgen Habermas

and is based on each person being able to speak their truth unencumbered by
power plays from the other. Habermas emphasises both understanding and
achieving consensus concerning validity of claims, assessed by truth,
truthfulness and normative rightness. Habermas relies on the process of
intersubjective understanding as the litmus test for assessing validity claims, or
a warrant to the argument. Intersubjectivity is taken as primordial by Habermas
for the co-ordination of action.

Criticisms of Women’s Ways of Knowing

Perspectives or stage theory?

WWK has not been without its critics. Despite the authors’ assertions that the
five epistemological perspectives identified in the study are not presented as a
developmental stage theory, they have faced criticism on this front.

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 “Despite the explicit disclaimers, the rhetoric of the book,
reinforced by its organisation and the invocation of other
developmental psychologists, continually evokes notions of
progress from simpler to more complex, less to more
adequate ways of knowing or epistemological perspectives”
(Ruddick, 1996:252).

This seems fair criticism, since the journey from silence to voice as described by
the five perspectives does give the illusion of progress, and as Ruddick points
out this journey mirrors the educational process of development utilised in the
United States. Indeed, the progress marked by constructed knowing in
education is rewarded and seen as a mark of epistemological and intellectual
success.

Valuing Diversity or Concealing its Complexity?

WWK made a distinctive contribution to its field, because it drew on the

experience of women both at universities (the traditional location for
participants in social science studies) and ‘invisible colleges’ of America, thus
including women who had not had a formal education, and who were from
poorer working class backgrounds and usually excluded from such studies. We
are told that the study included a number of women from diverse ethnic
minority backgrounds. However, criticism has been made in respect of its
limited application to non-white American and Anglo Saxon cultures. Who are
these women from ethnic minority backgrounds? The merging of the data into a
melting pot of women’s responses conceals rather than reveals the uniqueness
of their experience. Consequently, we do not get an appreciation of the richness
or complexity of the diversity that women from ethnic minority communities
bring to the study. Referring to the way in which the authors of WWK describe
how they worked with the interview data, Maher and Tetreault make the point
that “few of these individual ‘whole stories’ are heard” (1996:155). Indeed, they
argue that what is missing is a perspective of the societal and structural

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influences of race and class, culture and other factors that serve to shape and
influence the growth and development of self. This concealment of
positionality, that is, the location of identity within a network of relationships,
including cultural, political and economic, obscures the very differences that a
study of inclusionality ought to achieve.

Silence: a Negative or Positive Experience?

Not unconnected to the view on diversity and positionality is the criticism of

WWK for its rendering of silence as an inadequacy. Though there is no doubt
that the women cited were silenced due to powerful voices in authority that left
them feeling deaf and dumb, criticism suggests that silence may be a virtue in
some cultural contexts and not a lack as implied by this study.

One such alternative has come from Patricinio Schweickart (1996). A Filipino,
Schweickart begins her essay with reflections on the meaning and tradition of
silence in her own culture, in which silence is valued. In particular, Schweickart
presents a positive relationship between silence as a way of knowing and
wisdom, and asserts that “thoughtful silence is a highly valued form of agency”
(1996:306).

Though the criticism that Schweickart offers recognises the potential for
difference, it does not in my opinion diminish the particular perspective on
silence that the authors of WWK found. Adding further clarity to this
perspective, in the light of such differences, Belenky (1996) adds a ‘d’ to the
word silence. Not wishing to disrupt but clarify this perspective as an anchor
for their epistemological framework, Belenky argues that what specifically
distinguished these women whose stories informed this perspective was that
they were silenced (Belenky, 1996:427). In her notes on page 427, Belenky
points out that in studies of non Western cultures as those reported by

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Goldberger,7 silence is linked to powerful accounts of “connecting with and
apprehending the world” independent of language and ways of being that for
those of us who are what she calls ‘word people’, dependent on language, find
difficult to understand. Defending the original perspectives of silence and
received knowing, Belenky (1996) argues that retention of these epistemological
perspectives in their original form is important to projects concerned with
emancipation, in other words, where the aim is to overcome the stifling of the
human condition caused by silence, and where the goal is to facilitate human
liberation and the facilitation of voice.

The journey from silence to voice involves awareness of how one’s voice has
been stifled, and a critique of the oppressor, thus enabling one to distinguish
and construct a voice of one’s own, and a sense of self and mind. A similar
position is taken by Freire, who says:

“In order for the oppressed to be able to wage the struggle

for their liberation, they must perceive the reality of their
oppression, not as a close world from which there is no exit,
but as a limiting situation which they can transform. This
perception is necessary, but not a sufficient condition by
itself for liberation; it must become the motivating force for
liberating action… The oppressed can overcome the
contradiction in which they are caught only when this
perception enlists them in the struggle to free themselves”
(1972:25).

Personally, I find Belenky’s (1996) clarification to add a ‘d’ to silence,

immensely helpful. I have both experienced the perspective of silence as a child
growing up in a chaotic world that mirrors the descriptions offered by Belenky
et al. (1986), and as described earlier, and I have experienced being silenced as a
mature professional woman in the face of overwhelming voices of authority.
This is despite otherwise being considered by colleagues to have a strong
sense of personal agency. I thus want to suggest that the experience of silence

7
And of course by Schweickart in the same book, Knowledge, Difference and Power,
Goldberger et al. (1996).

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is not only an anchor point, as described by the authors of WWK for their
findings, but in addition, I perceive silence like a virus, ever contagious in an
authoritarian and androcentric social order. Not wishing to understate my view
on this issue, I cite Richard Shaull:8

“At first sight Paulo Freire’s method of teaching illiterates

in Latin America seems to belong to a different world from
that in which we find ourselves. Certainly it would be absurd
to claim that it be copied here. But there are certain parallels
in the two situations which should not be overlooked. Our
advanced technological society is rapidly making objects of
most of us and subtly programming us into conformity t o
the logic of its system. To the degree that this happens, we
are also being submerged in a new ‘culture of silence’”
(Shaull, in Freire, 1972:foreword).

I think Shaull makes the case that silence remains a real and present danger for
all of us in the modern world.

‘Ideal Speech’ and ‘Really Talking’: a Different Perspective

Whilst appreciating Habermas’ effort to put intersubjectivity in the forefront of

cognitive and moral theories, Schweickart critiques what she calls her
‘counterintuitive’ response to his reduction of ‘understanding’ to ‘agreement’,
(1996).

“In my view Habermas offers a stripped down version of

communication, one that has been emptied of substance in
order to render it theoretically manageable. One theoretical
consequence of the exclusion of ‘feminised’ substance is a
theory that misrepresents the structure of intersubjectivity
and communication. Women’s Ways of Knowing
recuperates the substance that has been dumped out (or
‘muted’) by Habermas” (Schweickart, 1996:309).

Schweickart’s argument is an important one for feminist standpoint theorists,

because it highlights how the force of the better argument and the debate takes

8
Who wrote the foreword for Freire’s (1972) Pedagogy of the Oppressed.

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prime position in normative discourse. Feminist standpoint theory suggests
that connected knowing need not be seen as subservient, rather it needs to be
seen as different and valuable in it own right. Feminist standpoint theory aims
to convince us that we can adopt an appreciative stance.

Standpoint Theory: an Advantage or Disadvantage?

From the point of view of the authors of WWK, the intention to specifically draw
on the experience of women stood in contrast to the male voices heard in the
Perry (1970) study and the predominantly masculine perspective of social
science studies in general. However, one anticipated criticism of a feminist
standpoint approach to theory is that in the same way as those studies it
criticises for excluding the feminine perspective, in turn it employs the exclusion
of the male perspective.

It has been suggested to me by male students that the very title of Women’s
Ways of Knowing creates an assumption that any perspective relevant to them
will be absent from the text. Whilst I believe that the specific intention to
represent the experience of women, traditionally excluded from such studies
was right and is a cause for celebration, I do empathise with the view expressed
by those male students. More significantly, the danger with feminist standpoint
theories, if they are seen to be exclusive, perpetuates the gender specific rather
than gender related myth that the authors tried to explicitly avoid. Ruddick
(1996) in defence of WWK, points out that the authors speak of particular
women, not woman in general. Furthermore, she asserts that identities are not
fixed.

Significantly, the perspective of connected knowing revealed in the study is

relevant to both men and women if we are to cultivate a different way of being
in relationship with others, specifically in education and industry. Ruddick

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points out that both “Women and Men are limited by a system that makes it
difficult to think in a ‘voice’ that is both ‘different’ and credible” (1996:266,
emphasis original). Indeed, in drawing out her argument for maternal leadership,
Belenky cites Ruddick, who says:

“it is a struggle for women to make their own viewpoint

heard, even to each other and to themselves. She says
maternal thinking is a ‘revolutionary discourse’ that has
been silenced. ‘As a central discourse’, she says, ‘(it could)
transform dominant, so-called normal ways of thinking’
(Ruddick, 1989:p.269)” (Belenky, 1996:416).

Why then has society never recognised maternal thinking as an asset? Belenky
(1996) suggests that mothers are ignored precisely because they are seen as
irrelevant to public life. She develops her argument to suggest that because the
role of motherhood is seen as natural, in other words, in essence, a gift of
nature, the mother is seen to be exerting no ‘agency’ and thus her caring work
is counted as contributing nothing. ‘Agency’ implies activeness and self-
directedness. Thus, Belenky is suggesting that in the perceived absence of
‘agency’ we might understand how it is that the role of motherhood is assumed
to be natural. That this myth needs to be tackled and shattered is important, if
the discipline of maternal thinking is to be appreciated as a discipline and
quality that is gender related and not gender specific, in other words, confined
to women, and if it is to serve the thinking, understanding and behavioural
changes that this different way of knowing can facilitate leadership roles.

Belenky provides an explanation of why this myth has become embedded in

society. She points to economic accounting systems used world wide for
assessing a nations wealth. “Whereas Women’s traditional work is classified as
‘reproductive’ waging war is classified as ‘productive’” (1996:416). Belenky
explains that accounting systems were invented to help nations work out how
they would pay for their wars, arguing that even today in many countries
military expenditure can be allocated in accounting terms as though it were

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contributing to the wealth of a nation “in spite of the fact that military spending
allocates resources to unproductive and destructive endeavors” (1996:416).

Conclusions

Despite the criticisms, WWK has provided an expanded theory of knowledge,

which has identified ways of knowing that are associated with the feminine
principal, hitherto not recognised in earlier epistemic or developmental studies.
It has contributed to our understanding of knowledge as a socially constructed
phenomenon and one in which the maternal voice plays a significant part. This
is important in a society that values reason and which has largely failed to
recognise and place value on what we can learn from a different procedure, yet
equally disciplined way of thinking. Its epistemological framework with its
distinct anchor point of silence draws our attention the relationships and
conditions that cause oppression, and helps us understand the development
processes involved in moving from silence to voice. Notwithstanding criticism,
it would seem that WWK has touched the lives and minds of many women and I
am one of the many. It is a force for a liberating pedagogy.

At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that WWK shaped my emergent

living theory in respect of influencing the MAPOD design as a community of
learners. Like the ‘public homeplaces’ that Belenky (1996) describes,9 MAPOD
was founded with the idea that a community of learners would provide a safe
haven in which learners, battered by the experience of inhumane workplace
organisations, might find a space where they could recuperate in the company
of peers and, in the process, develop a critical stance toward the social and
political organisational arrangements that give rise to inhumane practice. At the

9
“Public homeplaces: nurturing the development of people, families and communities”
by Mary Field Belenky, was one of the essays inspired by WWK, ten years after the
initial study. See Belenky (1996).

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time of launching MAPOD, in the mid-1990s, many of my students were Human
Resource professionals, who were managing in difficult and changing
circumstances, dealing with the onslaught of mergers, acquisitions and
redundancy programmes. These professionals were often absorbed with the
work of ‘emotional labour’ (Fineman, 1993), which drained many of them of
energy and assaulted their integrity. The values of care and respect amongst
equals and relationships based on mutuality and reciprocity, as reported by
Belenky (1996:395), were similarly espoused in the MAPOD recruitment process
and reinforced on the programme, in the expectation that participants were
responsible not only for their own learning but that of others. Learning how to
facilitate a good company of learners became an important strand of my practice
inquiry, not least as I would have to learn how to live up to the values and
process that I espoused. Given my conditioning in the academy to be an
effective procedural knower, I had much to discover in my inquiry about my
way of thinking and coming to terms with myself as a living contradiction. The
ideas in this book helped me do that.

Just as the authors of WWK returned to the work of Gilligan (1982) to develop
their different voice theory, I too revisited her work so that I might better
understand the storied accounts she gave to illustrate the differences in the
rights and responsibilities orientation of participants in her studies on moral
decision making. Moreover, it helped me to better understand how separation
and attachment in the lives on men and women give rise to how ‘truth’ is carried
by different modes of language and thought. Gilligan suggests that:

“To understand how the tension between responsibilities and

rights sustains the dialectic of human development is to see
the integrity of two disparate modes of experience that are
in the end connected. While an ethic of justice proceeds
from the premise of equality - that everyone should be
treated the same - an ethic of care rests on the premise of
non-violence - that no one should be hurt. In the
representation of maturity, both perspectives converge in
the realisation that just as inequality adversely affects both

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 parties in an unequal relationship, so too violence is
destructive for everyone involved” (1982:174).

In my own case, developing my understanding of these different truths has

helped me grapple with and work through tensions between responsibilities and
rights in my teaching and learning relationships, and in the course of this
inquiry.

In this chapter, I have provided a review and critique of WWK. I have indicated
how the ideas borne from this study resonated with my experience and how
those ideas have influenced my thinking, professional practice and inquiry.

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