GALVEZ V.
COURT OF APPEALS CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
GALVEZ V. CA G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994
FACTS:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of
frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi
Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.
On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an E x Parte
Motion to Withdraw Informations of the original informations. This motion was granted by Judge
Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the
court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners
for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners
before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners on
January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash.
In the meantime, prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration to Judge Villajuan that the reinstatement of the original informations be
granted. Judge Villajuan granted the MR.
On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari, petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this petition.
HELD:
No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not yet been
placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could be
arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof.
In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three informations
but the filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an
additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there would obviously have been no
cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural lapses
involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does
not impress us as a candid presentation of their real position.
Petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing of the
new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They would
want to ignore the fact that had the original informations been amended so as to charge the capital
offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that
the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off with amended informations than with
the subsequent ones. It really made no difference considering that where a capital offense is charged
and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either an amended or a
new information.
Contrary to petitioners’ submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial court of
authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held that—“The order of the court granting
the motion to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely
an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The
court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in
such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which
dismissed the complaint or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari.”
ANTONIO MARINAS v. ANDRES S. SIOCHI, GR Nos. L-25707 & 25753-25754, 1981-05-14
Facts:
The present controversy arose out of the issuance by the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, of a
Writ of Execution... for Ejectment
On December 13, 1965, petitioner Antonio Marinas, Deputy Sheriff of Rizal, with his co-
petitioners Antonio Montano and Gregorio
Rupisan, enforced said Writ of Execution by levying upon the personal properties and chattels of
private respondents Victoria Lasin Vda. de Atienza and Rosario L. Atienza, and... taking out said
properties from their (respondents') rented house
Pasig, Rizal
On the same... date, respondent Victoria Lasin Vda. de Atienza reported to the police authorities
of Pasig that her jewelry worth P590.00 had been taken by petitioners without issuing any receipt
On January 28, 1966, respondents re-entered the house they had been ejected
Respondent Rosario L. Atienza then discovered that several... pieces of her jewelry and other
personal items, with a total value of P1,018.00, were missing.
She reported the loss to the authorities on February 2, 1966, and her Statement was... taken
On February 7, 1966, two separate charges for Theft,... were filed against petitioners
Complaint for Grave Coercion... was also lodged against petitioners and three Does on the same
date.
The... three Complaints were filed by Lt. Jose S. Lontoc, Chief of the Criminal Investigation
Section of the Police Department of Pasig, Rizal, for and on behalf of the Chief of Police
On February 8, 1966, warrants for the arrest of petitioners were issued
Issues:
The issue of whether or not an accused is entitled to appear and present evidence in a preliminary
investigation
Ruling:
even though the offense be one falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the City Courts and
Courts of First Instance, the accused is not entitled as a matter of right to be heard in a...
preliminary investigation under section 10, Rule 112. The reason is because the case goes to trial
already after the arrest of the accused and his delivery to the Court
Principles:
it cannot issue warrants of arrest without first giving the accused a chance to be heard; and that
the Information... filed should carry a certification under oath that defendant was given a chance
to appear in person at said examination and investigation... the investigation shall be conducted
in his presence... and he shall have the right to be heard... he does not appear before the fiscal,
the investigation shall proceed without... him.
JINGGOY ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN - CASE DIGEST -
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SEN. JINGGOY ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015
G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015
(Due process: Counter-affidavits of co-respondents)
FACTS:
NBI and Atty. Baligod filed a Plunder Complaint with the Ombudsman against Sen. Jinggoy
Estrada (Estrada).
The following month, another Plunder complaint against Estrada was filed, this time, by the
Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Ombudsman. Estrada seasonably filed his counter-
affidavits in the two complaints.
Eighteen of Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints likewise filed their counter-
affidavits.
Subsequently, Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of CounterAffidavits of the
Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings.” The Ombudsman denied
the said request.
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s Order denying his Request,
Estrada then went to the SC via a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO
enjoining the Ombudsman and the NBI from conducting further proceedings.
During the pendency of Estrada’s petition before the SC, the Ombudsman furnished him copies
(most but not all) of his co-respondents’ counter-affidavits.
ISSUES:
(1)
Whether or not Estrada was denied due process when he was initially denied copies of his co-
respondents’ counter-affidavits;
(2)
Whether or not the requirements of due process under the Ang Tibay case are applicable to
preliminary investigation such as Estrada’s case.
RULING:
(1)
No. First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with
copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his
Request for the counter affidavits of his corespondents violates his constitutional right to due
process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory
requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a
respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of
the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the
counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. x x x x Although Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that a respondent “shall have access to
the evidence on record,” this provision should be construed in relation to Section 4(a) and (b) of
the same Rule, as well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, Section 4(a) states that “the
investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits
to substantiate the complaint.” The “supporting witnesses” are the witnesses of the complainant,
and do not refer to the co-respondents. Second, Section 4(b) states that “the investigating officer
shall issue an order attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and all other supporting documents,
directing the respondent” to submit his counter-affidavit. The affidavits referred to in Section
4(b) are the affidavits mentioned in Section 4(a). Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the
respondent are the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses. The provision in
the immediately succeeding Section 4(c) of the same Rule II that a respondent shall have “access
to the evidence on record” does not stand alone, but should be read in relation to the provisions
of Section 4(a and b) of the same Rule II requiring the investigating officer to furnish the
respondent with the “affidavits and other supporting documents” submitted by “the complainant
or supporting witnesses.” Thus, a respondent’s “access to evidence on record” in Section 4(c),
Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure refers to the affidavits and supporting
documents of “the complainant or supporting witnesses” in Section 4(a) of the same Rule II.
Third, Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “the
respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he
may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense.” A respondent’s right to examine
refers only to “the evidence submitted by the complainant.” Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or under Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure,
there is no requirement whatsoever that the affidavits executed by the co-respondents should be
furnished to a respondent.
(2)
No. Simply put, the Ang Tibay guidelines for administrative cases do not apply to preliminary
investigations in criminal cases. An application of the Ang Tibay guidelines to preliminary
investigations will have absurd and disastrous consequences. x x x x The quantum of evidence
needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a preliminary
investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie case that
would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,” while the
establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence
which would justify a conviction’.” x x x x To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required in
determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial
evidence of guilt.
G.R. No. 190569 April 25, 2012
P/INSP. ARIEL S. ARTILLERO, Petitioner,
vs.
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Overall Deputy Ombudsman, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman; BERNABE D.
DUSABAN, Provincial Prosecutor, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo; EDITO AGUILLON, Brgy.
Capt., Brgy. Lanjagan, Ajuy, Iloilo, Respondents.
Facts:
This case pertains to the criminal charge filed by Private Inspector Ariel S. Artillero (petitioner) against Barangay
Captain EditoAguillon (Aguillon) for violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1866 1 as amended by Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 8249.
According to petitioner, althoughAguillon was able to present his Firearm License Card, he was not able to present a
Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence (PTCFOR).
In a Resolutiondated 10 September 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo City recommended the
dismissal of the case for insufficiency of [Link] claims that he never received a copy of this Resolution.
Thereafter,Provincial Prosecutorforwarded to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman the Resolution recommending
the approval thereof.
The Office of the Ombudsman, approved the recommendation of Provincial ProsecutorDusaban to dismiss the case.
It ruled that the evidence on record proved that Aguillon did not commit the crime of illegal possession of firearm
since he has a license for his rifle.
On 22 June 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the 17 February 2009 Resolution, but it was
denied. Thus, he filed the present Petition for Certiorari via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner was denied his right to due process when he was not given a copy of Aguillon’s
Counter-affidavit, the Asst. Prosecutor’s 10 September 2008 Resolution, and the 17 February 2009
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman.
2. Whether or not the public respondents’ actof dismissing the criminal Complaint against Aguillon, based
solely on insufficiency of evidence, was contrary to the provisions of P.D. 1866 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR)?
Held:
No. A complainant in a preliminary investigation does not have a vested right to file a Reply—this right should be
granted to him by law. There is no provision in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court that gives the Complainant or
requires the prosecutor to observe the right to file a Reply to the accused’s counter-affidavit.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. "What the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard." We have said that where a
party has been given a chance to be heard with respect to the latter’s motion for reconsideration there is sufficient
compliance with the requirements of due process.
At this point, this Court finds it important to stress that even though the filing of the MR cured whatever procedural
defect may have been present in this case, this does not change the fact that Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban had the
duty to send petitioner a copy of Aguillon’s Counter-affidavit. Section 3(c), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, grants a complainant this right, and the Provincial Prosecutor has the duty to observe the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in the cases presented before it. That the requirements of due
process are deemed complied with in the present case because of the filing of an MR by Complainant was simply a
fortunate turn of events for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
It is true therefore, that, as petitioner claims, a barangay captain is not one of those authorized to carry firearms
outside their residences unless armed with the appropriate PTCFOR (Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Resident).
However, we find merit in respondents’ contention that the authority of Aguillon to carry his firearm outside his
residence was not based on the IRR or the guidelines of P.D. 1866 but, rather, was rooted in the authority given to
him by Local Government Code (LGC).
In People v. Monton, Section 88(3) of Batas PambansaBilang 337(B.P. 337), the LGC of 1983, which reads:In the
performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay shall be entitled to possess and carry the
necessary firearms within his territorial jurisdiction subject to existing rules and regulations on the possession and
carrying of firearms.
The Court hereby rules that respondent Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
finding that there was no probable cause to hold respondent Aguillon for trial.
Even the IRR of P.D. 1866 was modified by Section 389 (b) of the LGC as the latter provision already existed when
Congress enacted the LGC.
GERLIE M. UY v. JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, AM No. MTJ-07-1666, 2012-09-05
Facts:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint[1] for "gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge,
grave misconduct and others," filed by Public
Attorneys Gerlie[2] M. Uy (Uy) and Ma. Consolacion T. Bascug (Bascug) of the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO), La Carlotta District, against Presiding Judge Erwin[3] B. Javellana
(Javellana) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), La
Castellana, Negros Occidental.
Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
n Crim. Case No. 02-056, entitled People v. Lopez, et al., for Malicious Mischief, Judge
Javellana did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary investigation in
accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment and
pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant and her witnesses had no personal...
knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for
dismissal of said case.
Issues:
gross ignorance of the law and procedures
Ruling:
In People v. Lopez, et al., Judge Javellana conducted a preliminary investigation even when it
was not required or justified.
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary
investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where
the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)... day without
regard to the fine. As has been previously established herein, the maximum penalty imposable
for malicious mischief in People v. Lopez, et al. is just six (6) months.
Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary
investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. We stress that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of... cases,
and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.[37] Judge
Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid
down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby... lengthening or delaying the
resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule.
WHEREFORE, Judge Erwin B. Javellana is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and
gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for a period
of three (3) months and one (1) day with a STERN WARNING that the... repetition of the same
or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
