Notes of Key Points:

 The war between the countries of Ukraine and Russia has caused an enormous impact in the
lives of countless Ukrainian soldiers and citizens. Furthermore, the intense and dangerous chaos
provoked by the breakdown in Russo-Ukrainian relations has escalated into a crisis that now
afflicts both European and global affairs.
 On November 21, 2013, the former Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych decided to postpone
the European Union-Association Agreement. Concerning to this, some people predicted that the
postponed EU would lead to a prolonged intercommunal conflict in Europe’s Borderland. The
Ukraine started a diplomatic demonstration of support to the Pro-European course by
thousands of people in the Maidan Square in Kyiv (capital of Ukraine) has developed into a
vicious confrontation separating families, communities and its nation.
 According to the UNHCR, since the disagreement between the two countries began, 500,000
citizens evacuated from their homes in the Ukraine and fled to another country to find a safe
place away from the intense war.
 On February 2015, over 5,000 people has been killed. While, 10,000 people are seriously injured
in the conflict in the Donbas (a region in Ukraine that connects the country of Ukraine and
Russia).
 The chaos is getting intense and militarized despite the official seaside imposed as a result of the
Minsk Accords in September 5, 2014.
 The article study is divided into four main sections:
1. People
2. Politics
3. Propaganda
4. Perspectives
 In the section of people, they look at social makeups of Ukraine which focuses on the ethnic,
linguistic diversity and the relation among the different ethnic groups. Here are the
counterclaims of the authors in People section:
 On the first chapter, David Marples said that he will focus on the ethnic, social composition of
Ukraine’s regions and the existing voting patterns. He argues that despite the fact that the
regional voting is the most characteristic feature of Ukrainian elections, there are still number of
additional factors that may affect the voting preferences of the people, which are the social
position of the voter and initiatives of the candidate. Regarding this, when Ukraine gained its
independence in 1991, they had several distinct regions and number of significant ethnic
minorities that are mostly Russians such as Autonomous Republic of Crimea Donetsk, Luhansk,
etc. On the contrary, the further western region of Transcarpathia has a significant Hungarian
population and numerous quite smaller nationalities had homes in Ukraine for many
generations, like Poles, Belarusians, and Jews. Moving on, in 2001 census, it is indicated the
consolidation and growth of the Ukrainian population. It is showed that there are 77.8%, up
from 72.7% in 1989 that are not completely assimilated and changed their self-identity.
However, the Russian population, correspondingly, declined from 22.1% to 17.3% according to
the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine in 2001. In 2006-2007, the research study conducted
by the Razumkov Center, revealed the following: 25.7% of Ukrainians considered themselves
that Russian is their first language and 52% of the population considered Ukrainian is their
 native language. Also, there are some recent studies suggests that there are 27.5 million people
who are actively use the Russian language at work and about 37 million or 80% of the
population are fluent on it. Ten years earlier, the figure had been 42 million (Aref’ev, 2013). The
Western Ukrainians played a prominent role in the 2013-2014 protests known as the
‘Euromaidan’ (Nuzhdin et al., 2013). The integral nationalism in 1930’s gave rise to the OUN with
a dictum of “Ukraine for Ukrainians”. Meanwhile, in the Eastern part of Ukraine was considered
as the heartland of industrial development in the Russian Empire and its traditions were
transferred to the Soviet Union during the crucial phase of its industrial development. In the
year between 1991 and 1999, the Communist Party of Ukraine remained the most powerful
force in the region. In 2010, it is represented as the peak of the Regions’ power. The party’s rise
appeared mercurial, but it was facilitated by disillusionment with Yushchenko’s presidency that
appeared initially to be about to set Ukraine on a new Western-oriented journey. In February
2014, the Ukraine removed legally the elected president and established a new regime
described as a ‘junta’. The Western agencies funded these events to remove Ukraine from all
Russian influence, because back then, the Ukraine is quite dependent from the country of Russia
in terms of providing them imports of oil and gas. On the second chapter, Nicolai Petro studies
the political and cultural differences of traditionally Russophone regions of southern and eastern
parts of the country. Petro claims that, in the Russophone areas, political conflict arises when
the legitimacy of Russian culture in Ukraine is challenged. Likewise, he explained how the
Ukraine have numerous Russian culture and native speakers (located on the Page 29 of the
article). After that, he shows the percentage of Russians and Russian speakers in regions that
supported V. Yanukovych. There are four distinct waves of Russian settlement in the east of the
Dnieper River which are Slobodskaya Ukraina, Novorossiya, Crimea, and Donbass.
 The Significance of the Past for the Present:

Those regions all rose to prominence as a direct result of the growth and expansion of the Russian
Empire.

1. First is, the historical-cultural pattern of eastern Ukraine is bicultural. This Other Ukraine has
developed a self-sustaining regional identity where both Russian and Ukrainian interact freely,
and are interchangeable. It is interesting to note that, whereas in the Ukrainian constitution only
the Ukrainian language is considered official, in the constitution proposed for the rebellious
Donetsk People’s Republic, both Russian and Ukrainian are declared official languages
(Komsomolskaya pravda, 2014).

2. Second is, this territory is a border region, distinct from both Moscow (Capital of Russia) and
Kyiv(capital of Ukraine). This can be seen in the Other Ukraine’s version of Cossack mythology.
While Ukrainian nationalists see the Cossacks as underscoring Ukraine’s distinctiveness from
Russia, the Other Ukraine emphasizes a different aspect of this myth – the Cossack defense of
the Russian Empire and traditional Orthodox religion (Hillis, 2013).
3. Finally, there is the remarkably stable voting pattern displayed by the Other Ukraine since 1994.
Critics often attribute it to Soviet-era nostalgia, but it is better understood as a yearning for
Soviet-era cosmopolitanism, which is more reflective of their identity. It manifests itself in the
visceral rejection of the ethnic nationalism that is popular in regions of western Ukraine like
 Galicia, and in the affirmation of a Ukrainian identity that is inextricably linked to Russian
culture, if not to Russian politics.

In conclusion, there are no surprise that the country’s political divisions have followed these
historical patterns. Voting patterns in Donbass and Crimea stand out as being nearly the converse of
those in Galicia (Kucheriva Fund, 2014). By contrast, voters in Slobozhanshchina and the inland parts
of Novorossiya (Left Bank Ukraine) tend to be only marginally more pro-Russian, while the 27
Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives traditional areas of the Cossack
hetmanate (Right Bank Ukraine) are marginally more supportive of integral Ukrainian nationalism
(see Figure 2)

There is also a question asked in the article: If these historical patterns have been stable for so long,
why did fighting erupt only now? Because the peremptory removal of president Yanukovych
violated the delicate balance of interests forged between Galicia and Donbass. It was thus seen as a
direct threat to the core interest of Russophone Ukrainians. Moreover, there are a few problems
with this scenario:

1. Overt discrimination against Russian culture is likely to lead to resentment among Russophone
Ukrainians who, even with the loss of Crimea and possibly portions of Donbass, will constitute
no less than a third of the population.
2. Efforts to ban Russian cultural imports and curtail Russian cultural influence run into the
problem that the Russian language is still widely preferred in daily usage, especially in large
cities (Ukrainska pravda, 2014);
3. President Putin stated in November that he will not allow ‘all political opposition’ to the current
Ukrainian government to be eradicated (Govorit Moskva, 2014)

Moving on, President Putin’s have only two demands for Ukraine, stated in his interview on March
4, 2014, which are:

1. That the population in the East and the South should be safe.
2. That they will be part of the political process.

On the third chapter, Olga Onuch, present to her reader the analysis of how Russians and
Ukrainians view each other, the relations between the two countries, and the ongoing conflict. Her
research recommends that Ukrainians and Russians do not generally view each other in a hostile
manner (unfriendly and threatening). Each side believes there should be friendly relations between
the two countries nevertheless, she notes that each side views the current relations between the
two in a different way. In addition to this, she mentioned that since the fall of the Soviet Union in
1991, Ukrainians and Russians have been living peacefully in two separate and independent states
for nearly a quarter of a century. However, it is predicted by scientists that the two countries have
sour relationship. They show different figures to show the relationship of Russia and Ukraine. It was
followed by the claim of Denys Kiryukhin, in which he argues that there have been three main
narratives which have shaped the modern Ukrainian national discourse, that can be summarized by
following Patrick Colm Hogan, as reflective of heroism, sacrifice, and romanticism.

The two major identity strategy:

1. First is, the Little Russian one, which had been long promoted by the government of the
Russian Empire. It enjoyed the support of some part of the intelligentsia of both central and
western Ukraine – the latter even formed religious and ideological movement of
‘Russophiles’ (‘Moskophiles’), which lost its influence after World War I. Thus, in the long
run, the propagation of the Little Russian identity proved to be ineffective – some
investigators, like Russian historian Aleksey Miller, relate it to the weakness of the
compulsory assimilation mechanisms that theRussian Empire had at its disposal in the 19th
century.
2. The second identity project can be referred to as the ‘Ukrainian proper’. Eventually it was
ethno-cultural identity that became prevalent in the Ukrainian national project, and national
politics conducted in the USSR played quite a role in its formation. Interestingly, for a long
time (up to the 20th century), ideologists of the national movement hesitated to set out the
project of an independent Ukrainian state.

The necessity of Ukraine’s independence was, for the first time, theoretically substantiated not
on nationalist but on Marxist grounds by social democrat Yulian Bachinski in his book Ukraina
Irredenta, published in 1895. Subsequently, Greta Uehling’s argues that, its fear and anxiety
which altered the ability of ordinary citizens to act, while assaults on freedom have become an
everyday form of social control.

On the beginning in February 2014, convoys of Russian tanks and military personnel carriers
rolled into the southern Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. The men who jumped out toted the
most modern of Russian weapons, took over the international airport in the capital city of
Simferopol and, after a stand-off, gained control of the port at Sevastopol, where the Black Sea
Fleet is stationed. They helped take over the Supreme Council of Crimea. Sergei Aksyonov,
widely referred to as ‘the Goblin’ from the ‘Salem’ criminal gang, was installed as Prime Minister
at this time. The Supreme Council then held a much-disputed referendum. On March 17, after
the official announcement of the referendum results, the Supreme Council of Crimea adopted a
resolution ‘On the Independence of Crimea.’ Information later leaked from Russian intelligence
services suggested that only about a third of the population, in contrast to 85% as officially
reported, had voted, but the process was in motion for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
(ARC) to become a part of the Russian Federation. A Treaty of Accession of the Republic of
Crimea was signed on March 18, 2014. Now, international maps are being re-labelled, new road
signs are being mounted, and new passports are being distributed. In short, there has been a
radical reconfiguration of quotidian life in Crimea. As of the last census (2001), the Ukrainian
peninsula of Crimea was home to some 2,376,000 people. At that time, the peninsula was 58
percent Russian, 24 percent Ukrainian, and 12 percent Crimean Tatar. On the statement of Ivan
Katchanovsky, he said that he analyses the history of Crimea and its turbulent present, the
periods before and after the secession, as well as the possible future developments in the area.
The major differences along ethnic lines concerning support for separatism in Crimea became
evident in the 1990s. Crimea was the only region of Ukraine with a majority ethnic Russian
population. The 2001 census recorded 58 per cent of the population of Crimea, including
Sevastopol, as ethnic Russian, and 24 per cent as ethnic Ukrainians. The Crimean Tatars
constituted 10 per cent of the population (calculated from Vseukrainskyi, 2014). The 1996 USIA/
SOCIS-Gallup survey showed that 59 per cent of ethnic Russians in Crimea supported their
 region joining Russia. A significant percentage of ethnic Ukrainians (41 per cent), and a much
lower percentage of the Crimean Tatars (8 per cent), expressed the same preference.
Conversely, 13 per cent of Russians and 29 per cent of Ukrainians in Crimea, and more than half
of the Crimean Tatars (54 per cent), favoured their region remaining a part of Ukraine (USIA,
1996). 2004 brought a pro-Western and nationalist president, Viktor Yushchenko, to power. nter
survey, conducted soon after the RussianGeorgian war following an attempt by the Georgian
government to seize the de-facto independent secessionist region of South Ossetia, 73 per cent
of the Crimeans, who made their minds on this issue, backed the secession of Crimea from
Ukraine with a goal of joining Russia (calculated from AR Krym, 2008). Moreover, top Russian
leaders, such as President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s and President Vladimir Putin prior to the
overthrow of the Yanukovych government in February 2014, did not support separatism in
Crimea. However, the Russian government declared that the NATO membership of Ukraine was
an unacceptable threat to security of Russia. President Putin stated during the NATO summit in
Romania in April 2008 that such a move could result in a break-up of Ukraine along regional
lines, and he reportedly claimed that Ukraine was an artificial country, which included
historically Russian regions along with other regions (Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 2008). Yanukovych fled
from eastern Ukraine to Crimea on 22 February. Lastly, Mikhail Pogrebinskiy, said that he
concentrates on the experience of Russians in Ukraine historically and after the 2013
Euromaidan revolution. He argues that the crisis has reinforced negative attitudes to, and
marginalization of Russians and the Russian speaking population of Ukraine.

 The Politics, focuses on the political processes in Ukraine, Russia, and the world that have
preceded the crisis, as well as the developments that have contributed arguably caused the
current conflict. On the first chapter of the selection, Andrew Wilson assesses the state of
Ukrainian politics since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of
Ukraine as an independent entity. He elucidates the processes of post-Soviet elite formation,
the rules and pathologies of the system, and the role of civil society in the 2013 revolution.
Ukrainian politics will remain a struggle between old- and new-style politics, he concludes,
although it remains to be seen how much of the old informal politics has changed. It is followed
by a piece titled ‘The Origins of Peace, Non-Violence and Conflict in Ukraine’ by Taras Kuzio that
examines why, after two decades of peace, a violent conflict broke out on Ukrainian territory.
He highlights four main factors that have contributed to the crisis: First is, the rise of
authoritarian and neo-Soviet political forces. Second is, the pattern of western-supported
popular protests. Third and fourth is, NATO and EU enlargement as nationalism and revisionism
of Russian foreign policy. On the statement of Marlene Laruelle, she discusses how the Ukraine
crisis has affected the different Russian nationalist movements, explaining the popular
narratives of Eurasianism and the Russkiy Mir, then outlining the contradictions between the
two paradigms. She claims that the Ukraine crisis has fragmented the ‘national-democrat’ scene
and has strengthened aspirations for the recreation of Soviet power - Russia’s imperial mission -
and the Eurasian Union project. On the final chapters, Peter Rutland and Edward W. Walker,
look at the geopolitical roots of the crisis and the international developments since the collapse
of the Soviet Union that have led to the current conflict. Rutland argues that it was Ukraine’s
geopolitical position, and the interventions of competing outside powers pursuing their own
 self-interest, which led to the continuing civil war in Ukraine. Walker, on the other hand,
concludes that it was the post-Cold War security architecture and the enlargement of NATO that
have played the main role in creating the conditions for and exacerbating the crisis.
 The Propaganda seeks to analyze the different types and sources of propaganda that have been
in play during the crisis - both state and media generated. It explains the processes behind the
formation of different interpretations of the events and presents what the contributors believe
to be the dominant views and opinions of the public in Russia, Ukraine, and the West. In this
section, Mark Galeotti reviews the tactics used by Russia in the Ukraine crisis, such as the ‘hybrid
war,’ the roles the ‘little green men,’ the Spetsnaz and the intelligence community have played
in operations in both Crimea and the Donbas. While Russia has so far won the ‘military war’ to
create Novorossiya and the ‘intelligence war’ to support combat operations, Galeotti argues it
has not achieved its desired aims and thus is losing the ‘political war.’ Following this, Paul
Chaisty and Stephen Whitefield, in their chapter titled ‘Putin’s Nationalism Problem,’ examine
the new official narratives of Vladimir Putin’s leadership, the problems associated with them,
and how the Ukraine crisis has influenced the support for Putin’s rule. They maintain that
although the Ukraine crisis has contributed to the increase of support, the Kremlin will most
likely fail to satisfy the aspirations of such a diverse group of moderate patriots and radical
nationalists. The following chapter, by Elena Chebankova, seeks to understand the roots of
Putin’s popularity by analysing the political, structural, and discursive spheres of Russian political
life. The secret of Putin’s success, she argues, is his ability to recreate a narrative of the Russian
structure in the new form and, in the context of the Ukraine crisis, embrace the long-established
search for self-rediscovery of Russian society. The fourth analysis, by Stephen Hutchings and
Joanna Szostek, concentrates on the main media and political narratives in Russia during the
Ukraine crisis. They contend that the Russian media response to the crisis cannot be attributed
to ‘cynical eclecticism’ alone, in the sense of exploiting whichever currents serve the needs.
While they agree that such an instrumental approach has been present, the efforts to present
dominant narratives in a form of a coherent worldview have also been apparent. In the next
chapter, Marta Dyczok explores how the conflict has been portrayed by the main western media
outlets and presents the dominant competing narratives. She concludes that while it is difficult
to determine what impact international reporting on the crisis has had on public opinion
worldwide, information has been used as a weapon, and thus the rules of objective reporting
have worked against the goal of providing accurate coverage. Finally, Mikhail Molchanov
focuses on the representation of Russia, Russians, and the crisis in the Ukrainian political and
media discourse and the historical process of ‘othering.’ He maintains that in order to heal the
ethno-regional split in Ukraine, the authorities in Kiev need to change their attitude towards
Russia and the Russians. Perspectives This final section concentrates on the possible future
developments related to the various aspects of the conflict. In the first chapter, Richard
Connolly focuses on the economic side of the crisis and seeks to answer the question of how the
economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the West may affect the country’s place in the global
economy. He argues that by using the narrative of an external threat, the Russian leadership
seeks to justify centralization of political economy, which involves the suppression of economic
competition, state control over strategic sectors of the economy (in particular finance, energy
and defense), and the deterioration of the business environment in Russia. The second article,
by Paul D’Anieri, focuses on the dominant views on the motivations of Russia’s actions in
 Ukraine, the sources of Putin’s legitimacy, and how the current crisis has threatened it. He
concludes that for Russia to feel secure with regards to Ukraine, Ukraine needs to be
geopolitically neutralized, and if neutralization is not a viable strategy, then renewed stability
would depend either on the West accepting Russian control Ukraine or on Russia – the loss of
Ukraine. Subsequently, Edwin Bacon makes a case for narrative analysis as the most adequate
tool to predict developments in international politics, and explains its importance in the
development of future scenarios for Russia and the world following the Ukraine crisis. He claims
that in relation to Russia, the scenario of authoritarian stability and global power alongside
economic decline and consumer dissatisfaction is possibly a pertinent one.

 The perspective, it concentrates on the possible future developments related to the various
aspects of the conflict. In the first chapter, Richard Connolly focuses on the economic side of the
crisis and seeks to answer the question of how the economic sanctions imposed on Russia by
the West may affect the country’s place in the global economy. He argues that by using the
narrative of an external threat, the Russian leadership seeks to justify centralization of political
economy, which involves the suppression of economic competition, state control over strategic
sectors of the economy (in particular finance, energy and defense), and the deterioration of the
business environment in Russia. The second article, by Paul D’Anieri, focuses on the dominant
views on the motivations of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, the sources of Putin’s legitimacy, and
how the current crisis has threatened it. He concludes that for Russia to feel secure with regards
to Ukraine, Ukraine needs to be geopolitically neutralized, and if it is not a viable strategy, then
renewed stability would depend either on the West accepting Russian control of Ukraine or on
Russia – the loss of Ukraine. Subsequently, Edwin Bacon makes a case for narrative analysis as
the most adequate tool to predict developments in international politics, and explains its
importance in the development of future scenarios for Russia and the world following the
Ukraine crisis. He claims that in relation to Russia, the scenario of authoritarian stability and
global power alongside economic decline and consumer dissatisfaction is possibly a pertinent
one. The penultimate chapter, by Alexander Osipov, focuses on the analysis of the state of
diversity policies in Ukraine and its neighbors, including the Russian Federation, and the possible
future developments in this area. He claims that diversity policy in Ukraine and Russia – but also
in Moldova and Belarus – has similar features and focuses on recreating a narrative of multi-
ethnicity, but with an ethnic or cultural core, and thus a hierarchy of ethnicities and languages.
Finally, Richard Sakwa, in the concluding chapter of the volume, comes back to the systemic root
causes of the conflict and argues that the confrontation in Europe’s borderland is a result of
three separate crises: the turbulence in the system of European security, the internal conflict in
Ukraine, and the crisis of the Russian developmental model.