G.R. No.
L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
TOPIC: Commencement of Civil Personality
ISSUE: Whether or not a conceived child has already the right for pecuniary damages on account of
personal injury or death
FACTS:
Here, private respondent Oscar Lazo is the husband of Nita Villanueva who became pregnant three times
out of her relationship with Lazo and had herself aborted by the defendant, Antonio Geluz, in all those
three instances of her pregnancy. The third and last abortion was of a two-month old foetus, while the
plaintiff, Lazo was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial
board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. This constitutes Lazo’s basis in filing this
action and award of damages.
RULING: No, a conceived child does not have yet the right for pecuniary damages on account of
personal injury or death. According to the court, The Court of Appeals and the trial court committed a
reversible error in awarding damages base on the provision of Article 2203 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does
not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. And since an action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy
to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of
the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact,
even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-
natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or
juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional
personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because
that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following
article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's
womb.
Moreover, this is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the
rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either
help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the
illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code
Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230).
But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an
award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his
wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of
his parental hopes and affections
. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment,
since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the
circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated
DOCTRINE: A conceived child does not have yet the right for pecuniary damages on account of
personal injury or death; the parents of an unborn foetus may only recover moral damages for the illegal
arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and
anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations, as well as to
exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them provided that they have not consented or
acquiesced to the abortion.
