MOTION TO INTERVENE AND REOPEN CASE

_________________________________________________________________________

COMES NOW Movant, in propria persona/by and through counsel, stating in support of

this Motion to Intervene:

INTRODUCTION

The Constitution is NOT what judges say it is;

it is what THE CONSTITUTION says it is.

If a cop stops you on a darkened road and orders you to get out of the car and drop your

panties so he can rape you more easily, do you have to comply? Of course not! And if not,

why should anyone have to follow an illicit decree of a judge?

The Framers of our Constitution made no effort to define the “judicial Power” because

they didn’t have to. Lord Bacon observed that the office of the judge "is jus dicere, and not

jus dare; to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law." Francis Bacon, Essays LVI (Of

1
Judicature) (1620).1 The judicial power to determine law is a power only to determine what

the law is, not to invent it.” Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 901, vacated as moot,

234 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).2 As such, any judicial decree demonstrably at odds with the

Constitution is not law; pursuant to your oath, you are duty-bound to ignore it.

We did not fight a bloody revolution to exchange King George for King Don ... or King

Judge. As such, the rewriting of the Constitution under the false pretense of interpreting it is

“a flagrant perversion of the judicial power,” Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 331 (1932),

void on its face. In the words of Justice Holmes, it is ‘an unconstitutional assumption of

powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opin-

ion should make us hesitate to correct.” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938)

(emphasis added). "Courts are constituted by authority and they can not go beyond the power

delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their

1
Lord Coke maintained that "[i]t is the function of a judge not to make, but to declare the law, according to
the golden mete-wand of the law and not by the crooked cord of discretion." 1 E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws
of England 51 (1642). Blackstone adds that a judge is "sworn to determine, not according to his own judgments,
but according to the known laws.” 1 Wm. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *69 (1765).
Mindful that “the discretion of the judge is the first engine of tyranny," 4 C. Gibbon, The History of the Decline
and Fall of the Roman Empire 385 (1776-89) (Philips Samson, and Co. 1856), Hamilton argued that to "avoid
an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that [judges] should be bound by strict rules and prece-
dents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case before them." The Federalist No.
78, p. 442 (Alexander Hamilton). If a judicial decree “is manifestly absurd … it is not law.” 1 Blackstone,
Commentaries *69 (emphasis added). Jefferson envisioned the judge as “a mere machine,” expecting that the
law “be dispensed equally & impartially to every description of men.” Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to Edmund
Pendleton), Aug. 26, 1776. As in all but the most exotic cases, “the law” is established, the judge was expected
to be little more than an administrator, playing what Professor Llewellyn called “the game of matching cases.”
Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 49 (1960). There is no contrary authority.
2
Concurrences would fill a Brandeis brief. Alexander Hamilton elaborates:
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority,
contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No [judicial] act therefore
contrary to the constitution can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than
his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the
people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not author-
ise, but what they forbid.
The Federalist No. 78, p. 438 (Alexander Hamilton); Jefferson adds, “[o]ne single object … will entitle you to
the endless gratitude of society; that of restraining judges from usurping legislation.” Thomas Jefferson, Letter
(to Edward Livingston), Mar. 25, 1825, at 1. There is no contrary authority.

2
judgments and orders are regarded as nullities." Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,

254 U.S. 348, 353 (1920). Albeit in dissent, Justice Story adds that the Court was “not at

liberty to add one jot of power to the national government, beyond what the people have

granted by the constitution.” Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 22 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting).

There is no contrary authority.

Citing legislative history that should have been dispositive, Anderson v. Griswold, 543

P.3d 283, 322 (Colo. 2023) (quoting the Congressional Globe), the Colorado Supreme Court

held that Donald Trump “was disqualified from holding the office of President under Section

Three of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id. The controlling

question was whether the Amendment is self-executing; the answer was provided by Chief

Justice Marshall, in the first case we all studied in law school:

The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means,

or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when
the legislature shall please to alter it.

If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the consti-
tution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts,
on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

There is no support in precedent or logic for the proposition that a constitutional provision

must be activated by Congressional legislation to become effective. E.g., United States v.

Stanley (Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (“the Thirteenth amendment, as well as

the Fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation”), City of

Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (Fourteenth); South Carolina v. Katzenbach,

383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) (Fifteenth); cf., Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32

U.S. 243 (1833) (Bill of Rights originally not enforceable as against the States).

3
 According to the Senator who introduced the Fourteenth Amendment to that body, Sec-

tion Five was remedial in scope, “enabl[ing] Congress, in case the State shall enact laws in

conflict with the principles of the amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal con-

gressional enactment.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2768 (1868) (statement of Sen.

Jacob M. Howard (R-MI)). And that should have been the end of the case. Donald Trump

would have been prosecuted in the normal course of Court business, and the outcome of at

least one federal case would be known. But in “a stunning disfigurement of the Fourteenth

Amendment,” the Justices “impressed upon it an ahistorical misinterpretation that defies

both its plain text and its original meaning.” J. Michael Luttig and Laurence H. Tribe, Su-

preme Betrayal, The Atlantic, Mar. 14, 2024.

By that pellucid metric, even when viewed in isolation, Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100

(2024), is not law and scarcely even pretends to be. But in context, it is infinitely worse. In

knowingly acting in a manner intended to assist a thrice-indicted (and now, convicted) criminal

defendant “in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment,” 18 U.S.C. § 3,

the Justices have become accessories after-the-fact in his [alleged] crimes.

Under ordinary circumstances, Movant would not trouble the Court, having an admittedly

frayed faith that the system would correct itself. But this situation is so unprecedented and so

far beyond the pale that passivity is not an option. With the Court’s indulgence, Movant will

make the case (in admittedly gruesome detail) that defiance of Trump v. Anderson by our state

courts is imperative.3

3
At the nuts-and-bolts level, Movant is asking this Court to reconcile conflicting lines of precedent by follow-
ing the stronger ones. On the one hand, we have precedent supported by Bacon, Coke, Blackstone, the Feder-
alist, the plain text of the Constitution, and 200 years of precedent averring that judges can’t write law under
the guise of interpreting it, 200 years of precedent (including Marbury v. Madison) concluding that the Consti-
tution is self-executing, and 200 years of precedent declaring that legislatures said what they meant and meant
what they said. On the other, you have a series of legally groundless judicial decrees which literally aid and
abet federal felonies. Bottom line, the precedent says that these decrees are not precedent at all.

4
I. YOU ARE WATCHING AN AMERICAN COUP.

Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes was fond of saying that “when you have eliminated the impos-

sible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.” Arthur Conan Doyle, Sign

of the Four 111 (1890). And while no one will confuse Donald Trump for Professor Mori-

arty any time soon, there is no intellectually honest way to explain the United States Supreme

Court’s curious course of conduct. As such, we are forced to impute impure motives to the

Justices. One bad day is a Biden debate. Three bad days is Trump at a golf tournament.4

But read in pari materia, the cases referred to herein evidence a coup.

The King can do no wrong, in a land without a king. To even state “the Court’s” odious

conclusion in Trump v. United States, No. 23-939 (U.S. 2024), is to refute it. It cannot be

found in the plain text of the Constitution, its penumbrae, or its emanations. Antonin Scalia,

Historical Anomalies in Administrative Law, Y.B. Supreme Court Hist. Soc’y. 103 (1985).

Presidential immunity has no “grounding in constitutional text, history, or precedent,” Dobbs

v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215, 280 (2022), or the canons of com-

mon sense.

Similarly, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803), established that the Constitution

was self-executing. As such, to state “the Court’s” absurd conclusion in Trump v. Anderson,

601 U.S. 100 (2024), is to refute it. But this was more than a garden-variety case of judges

going rogue. This is all part of a darker criminal conspiracy.

Heritage Foundation President Kevin Roberts finally said the quiet part out loud: “We

are in the process of the second American Revolution, which will remain bloodless if the

4
If not for spectacularly bad lawyering, few would know how badly Trump sucks at golf. American Century
Championship – 2006 Results, https://americancenturychampionship.com/media-center/event-archive/ameri-
can-century-championship-2006-results/ (in three rounds, he barely broke 90). Why counsel asked shall remain
a mystery.

5
left allows it to be.”5 They have a fortune behind them—Elon Musk has pledged $45 mil-

lion a month to the cause.6 They control a house of Congress and own the Supreme Court.

Unlike America’s first failed right-wing coup,7 this has been a war long planned. Citizens

United v. Federal Election Com'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

“Of course we aren’t f*cking bluffing.”8

Movant will demonstrate herein that the Conspiring Judges9 acted with consciousness of

their guilt and were motivated in no small part by a desire for filthy lucre, and that the deci-

sions taken in furtherance of this conspiracy10 were not authorized by law. While this is not

the proper venue for a criminal prosecution, the citizenry reasonably expects our authorized

agents to stay in their lanes11 and as such, the decrees referenced herein are void as a matter

of law. Accordingly, Movant asks that Defendant Griswold be enjoined from listing De-

fendant Donald Trump on the ballot as a candidate for election, as the Colorado Supreme

Court has correctly determined that he is ineligible to serve as our President.

5
Maggie Astor, Heritage Foundation Head Refers to ‘Second American Revolution’, N.Y. Times, July 3, 2024.
6
Sara Dorn, Elon Musk Will Give About $45 Million A Month To Support Trump, Report Says, Forbes, Jul.
15, 2024.
7
When the Bankers Plotted to Overthrow FDR, NPR, Feb. 12, 2012 (“the Wall Street Putsch,” in the 1930s).
8
Asawin Suebsaeng and Adam Rawnsley, Trump’s Not ‘Bluffing’: Inside the MAGA Efforts To Make a
Second Term Even More Extreme, Rolling Stone, Jul. 21, 2024 (“That’s the message one close Trump adviser
and former administration official—who requested anonymity to speak candidly—wants to get across to the
press and public, when asked about Donald Trump’s 2024 campaign vows of ‘retribution,’ unprecedented
force, and militaristic action.”).
9
The (alleged) co-conspirators are Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and
Barrett, and District Court Judge Aileen Cannon. “Conspiring Justices” does not include Ms. Cannon.
10
To show a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3 (accessory after the fact), the People must prove: (1) the commission
of an underlying offense against the United States; (2) the defendant's knowledge of that offense; and (3) as-
sistance by the defendant in order to prevent the apprehension, trial, or punishment of the offender. United
States v. Triplett, 922 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1991).
11
“All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound
to obey it.” United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).

6
II. JUDICATURE 101

We have now sunk to a depth at which the restatement of the

obvious is the first duty of intelligent men.
~George Orwell12

“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance

thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United

States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. “Governments are

instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.” Decla-

ration of Independence, para. 2 (U.S. 1776). As Lincoln declared, "no man is good enough

to govern another man, without the other’s consent,” Abraham Lincoln, Speech (on the Kan-

sas-Nebraska Act, Springfield, IL), Oct. 16, 1854, and the Framers’ Constitution marks the

outer limit of our consent.

Thereunder, “We the People of the United States”13 write our own laws, pursuant to the

processes specified therein. We make the big calls, leaving the day-to-day process of law-

making to legislators. We hire a President to run this leviathan and judges, to resolve dis-

putes. And we expect our judges to stay in their lanes.14 To that end, we vested “The judicial

12
George Orwell, The Taming of Power (book review), New Adelphi, Vol. 15-16 (Jan. 1939), at 205.
13 U.S. Const., preamble (emphasis in original). Under this paradigm, “government” is a simple contract. Sov-

ereignty—the jura summa imperii—was retained by the people, holding it as tenants-in-common. Governments
are our authorized agents, with powers enumerated in constitutions. Our national Constitution (and its prede-
cessor) is a treaty between thirteen co-sovereigns, expressly delegating a portion of their delegated sovereignty.
See e.g., N.H. Const. part 1, art. 7. The people retain the right to revolution, Declaration of Independence, para.
2 (U.S. 1776), N.H. Const. part 1, art. 10, which is unenumerated and protected by the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments. The “right” to keep and bear arms and organize into militias is not a right, so much as it is a remedy.
14
James Madison elaborates:
The preservation of a free Government requires not merely, that the metes and bounds which separate
each department of power may be invariably maintained; but more especially, that neither of them be
suffered to over-leap the great Barrier which defends the rights of the people. The Rulers who are guilty
of such an encroachment, exceed the commission from which they derive their authority, and are Tyrants.
The People who submit to it are governed by laws made neither by themselves, nor by an authority derived
from them, and are slaves.
James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance (address to the Virginia General Assembly), Jun. 20, 1785,
reprinted in 2 J. Madison, The Writings of James Madison (1783-1787) at 122-23 (emphasis added).

7
Power of the United States … in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con-

gress may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. We entrusted

them with power to declare the law, and nothing more.15

“There are right and wrong answers to legal questions," Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45

U. Kan. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1996), and clear rules of the road. “The object of construction, applied

to a constitution, is to give effect to the intent of its framers … and when the text of a con-

stitutional provision is not ambiguous, the courts … are not at liberty to search for its mean-

ing beyond the instrument.” Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889). Legislators

are presumed to have said what they meant and meant what they said, Connecticut Nat’l.

Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (Thomas, J; collecting 200 years’ worth of

cases), and “[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language

must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE

Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 109 (1980).16 The first step in interpretation of a provision “is

to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard

to the particular dispute in the case." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)

(Thomas, J.).

15
“In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You
must first enable the government to controul the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself.”
The Federalist No. 51, p. 320 (I. Kramnick ed. 1987) (James Madison). Their solution was to allocate power
“between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and sep-
arate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will
controul each other; at the same time that each will be controuled by itself. Id.
16
Legislative history can be valuable for resolution of ambiguities in technical areas of the law, see, Train v.
Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1 (1976), but it is better used to confirm drafter intent.
E.g., United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95-96 (1820) (per Marshall, C. J.) ("Where there is no ambiguity
in the words, there is no room for construction. The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a
court in departing from the plain meaning of words . . . in search of an intention which the words themselves
did not suggest"); Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011) (“Those of us who make use of
legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text. We will
not take the opposite tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.”). See
generally, Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends, Cong. Research Service, Mar. 10, 2023, at
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45153.

8
 “It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect;

and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.” Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803). Moreover, “where a technical word is used [in the Consti-

tution], all the incidents belonging to it necessarily attended it." 3 J. Elliot, Debates on the

Federal Constitution 531 (1836) (Madison). Considered in pari materia, these rules provide

a coherent framework for resolving virtually every constitutional dispute. The Constitution

was a treaty between thirteen co-sovereigns; the pre-existing common law, textual and sub-

stantive canons, and common language defined all terms.

Residual ambiguities are to be resolved by resort to “the saving grace of common sense."

Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955). The office of a judge is “to make such con-

struction [of a law] as shall suppress the mischief, advance the remedy, and to suppress sub-

tle invention and evasions for continuance of the mischief ... according to the true intent of

the makers of the act." Heydon's Case [1584] 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch.). Pacta sunt servanda.

As the Constitution would not precipitate an absurd and unjust result where any plausible

alternative is available, see e.g., United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S.

534, 542-43 (1940); Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 394 (1940), we expect judicial

decisions to make sense. As a final check, the competent judge is obliged to answer the

question famously posited by Scalia: "Would the States conceivably have entered into the

Union if the Constitution itself contained the Court’s holding?" Arizona v. United States,

No. 11-182, Jun. 25, 2012 (Scalia, J., bench statement at 6). Even at trial court level, stare

decisis is more of a corset than a straightjacket.17

17
Originalists don’t have a problem with Justice Taney’s opinion Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (prop-
erty has no right of access to the courts), as fixing society’s ills is above a judge’s pay grade; the Constitution
needed fixing. Undoing the politically driven Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), decision in Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was safely within its remit, as to have a clear and

9
 While getting there can be an adventure at times, according to Madison, there is one and

only one correct way to interpret the Constitution:

I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in which the Constitution was
accepted and ratified by the nation. In that sense alone is it the legitimate Constitu-
tion. And if that not be the guide in expounding it, there can be no security for a con-
sistent and stable, more than for a faithful exercise of its powers.18

James Madison, Writings of James Madison: 1819-1836 191 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (emphasis

added); accord, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to Wilson Nicholas), Sept. 7, 1803 at 2; An-

tonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, First Things 17 (May, 2002).

We citizens call this “originalism.” You Judges seem to call it “a damned nuisance.”

III. DOG BITES MAN: A BRIEF HISTORY OF JUDICIAL MALFEASANCE.

At the risk of stating the obvious, judges don’t always color inside the lines. As Justice

Scalia writes, “Judicial decisions, like the Constitution itself, are nothing more than ‘parch-

ment barriers.’ Both depend on a judicial culture that understands its constitutionally as-

signed role ... [and] the modesty to persist when it produces results that go against the judges'

policy preferences.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1176 (2011) (Scalia,

J., dissenting). “The Court's temptation is in the quite opposite and more natural direction—

towards systematically eliminating checks upon its own power; and it succumbs.” Planned

Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 981 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In two

brief passages, Scalia summarized two centuries of judicial misconduct. “Lawless judicial

conduct—the administration, in disregard of the law, of a personal brand of justice in which

undeniable right without a remedy is “a monstrous absurdity in a well organized government,” Kendall v.
United States, 37 U.S. 524, 623 (1838)), and if there be an admitted wrong, the courts will look far to supply a
remedy.” DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 176-77 (1901).
18
James Madison, Writings of James Madison: 1819-1836 191 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (emphasis added); accord,
e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to Wilson Nicholas), Sept. 7, 1803 at 2; Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours,
First Things 17 (May, 2002).

10
the judge becomes a law unto himself—is as threatening to the concept of government under

law as is the loss of judicial independence.” In re Ross, 428 A.2d 858, 861 (Me. 1981).19

(And truth be told, Scalia was no exemplar of virtue on this score.20)

1. "Just Who Do We Think We Are?"21

Damn good question, Chief Justice Roberts. It was so gracious of you to answer.

It’s not like the Justices don’t understand their job description, or the constitutional limits

on their power. Writing for the Court, Roberts admits: “Members of this Court are vested

with the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative

19
Concurrences read like a Brandeis brief. Judge Laurence Silberman of the D.C. Court of Appeals confessed
that he was “in despair” about the United States Supreme Court, noting that every one of the Justices “is guilty,
to one degree or another, of violating the two most basic rules of restrained judicial behavior: ruling only on
questions presented by the case at hand, and interpreting precedents honestly.” Benjamin Wittes, “Without
Precedent,” 296-2 Atlantic Monthly 39 (Sept. 2005). Judge Bork describes the Court as a “band of outlaws.”
Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, 67 First Things 21, 24 (Nov. 1996). Justice Kagan writes that they
“forget that they are judges and that their Court is a court,” Elena Kagan, The Development and Erosion of the
American Exclusionary Rule: A Study in Judicial Method (unpublished Master’s thesis; Apr. 20, 1983).
The academy is no kinder. Professor Karl Llewellyn writes that judges routinely
manhandl[e] ... the facts of the pending case, or of the precedent, so as to make it falsely appear that the
case in hand falls under a rule which in fact it does not fit, or especially that it falls outside of a rule which
would lead in the instant case to a conclusion the court cannot stomach.
Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 133 (1960); accord, Richard A. Posner, How
Judges Think 144 (Harv. U. Press 2008). Alan Dershowitz adds. “[S]ome justices actually cheat. … Trust no
one in power, including—especially—judges. … You will be amazed at how often you will find judges “fi-
nessing” the facts and the law.” Alan Dershowitz, Letters To a Young Lawyer 11 (Basic Books 2001).
20
As always, see Randy Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of Faint-Hearted Originalism, 75 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 7, 13 (2006), Scalia refutes Scalia. For instance, under our system, Congress writes laws and as a rule,
bases them on facts. In response to extensive fact-finding during lengthy hearings, Congress reauthorized
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act four times, with the latest being in 2006. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks,
and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-246, 120
Stat. 577 (July 27, 2006) (“R/A Act”). Importantly, it found that “[t]he evidence clearly shows the continued
need for Federal oversight in jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 since 1982,” that the
partisan Republican wing of the Court significantly weakened the VRA’s protections in Reno v. Bossier Parish
School Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000) and Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), and that remediation was in
order. R/A Act, Sec. 2(b)(4)-(5).
In support of the R/A Act, Congress amassed a staggering legislative record of over 15,000 pages. Shelby
County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2636 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The majority didn’t
even read the record—at a page a minute, it would have taken 250 hours—and yet, they decided, sua sponte,
that Congress got the facts wrong???
21
Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, 576 U.S. __ (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3).

11
to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation's elected leaders, who

can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them.” Nat. Fedn. of Indep. Business

v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012). In an acidic dissent lamenting the

official recognition of same-sex marriage,22 he added: “Under the Constitution, judges have

power to say what the law is, not what it should be. The people who ratified the Constitution

authorized courts to exercise ‘neither force nor will but merely judgment.’" Obergefell v.

Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting; citation omit-

ted). Scalia piles on: “This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of

nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of

the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the

Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.” Id., 135 S.Ct. at 2627 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting).

Barrett admits that “partisan politics are not a good reason for overturning precedent.

But neither are they a good reason for deciding a case of first impression.” Amy C. Barrett,

Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1711, 1729 (2012-2013)

(“Barrett”). Barrett “tend[s] to agree with those who say that a [judge’s] duty is to the Con-

stitution and that it is thus more legitimate for her to enforce her best understanding of the

Constitution rather than a precedent she thinks clearly in conflict with it,” Barrett at

22
To an originalist, this is a puzzling position. The right to contract is an essential corollary of the right to own
property, as you must be able to acquire and dispose of it to actually own it. In a secular society, marriage is a
mere contract, with default terms drafted by the State. Rights are retained by the individual unless ceded to
the State; all that a State can do is abridge rights and then, only in accordance with the authority granted to it.
As the right to marry is fundamental, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the State must show a compelling
interest in preventing two persons from entering that marriage contract. As the State cannot show that it is in
any way harmed when Fred and Ted decide to wed, it has no colorable authority to prevent them from doing
so. This must be so, if ours is a constitutional Republic with limited government powers. Judges are certainly
free to question the ultimate wisdom of same-sex marriage on their own dime, but they are stuck with the
constitution we have and the rules they are authorizes to apply to interpret it.

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1728 (emphasis added), implicit in the originalist thought she expounded on at length in her

confirmation hearing. When anyone comes for his gunny-gun-guns, Alito declares that when

“the statutory text is clear … we must follow it.” Garland v. Cargill, 602 U. S. 406, 429

(2024) (Alito, J., concurring). And in a Tenth Circuit concurrence, Gorsuch pointedly ob-

served:

Ours is the job of interpreting the Constitution. And that document isn't some inkblot
on which litigants may project their hopes and dreams for a new and perfected tort law,
but a carefully drafted text judges are charged with applying according to its original
public meaning. If a party wishes to claim a constitutional right, it is incumbent on
him to tell us where it lies, not to assume or stipulate with the other side that it must
be in there someplace.

Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645, 661 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J, concur-

ring; emphasis added).

However, the most full-throated defense of originalism and concomitant judicial restraint

comes from Clarence Thomas. In a recent concurrence, Thomas offers a blanket confession:

“We should restore our stare decisis jurisprudence to ensure that we exercise "mer[e] judg-

ment," [as opposed to will], which can be achieved through adherence to the correct, original

meaning of the laws we are charged with applying. In my view, anything less invites arbi-

trariness into judging.” Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678, 139 S.Ct. 1960, 1981 (2019)

(Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).

Thomas’ soliloquy is a master class in judicature. Therein, he averred that “the Court's

typical formulation of the stare decisis standard does not comport with our judicial duty

under Article III because it elevates demonstrably erroneous decisions—meaning decisions

outside the realm of permissible interpretation—over the text of the Constitution and other

duly enacted federal law.” Id. “[W]e are not entitled to interpret the Constitution to align it

with our personal sensibilities.” Id. at 1980. “By applying demonstrably erroneous

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precedent instead of the relevant law's text…the Court exercises "force" and "will," two at-

tributes the People did not give it.” Id. at 1981 (citing The Federalist No. 78). “It is always

"tempting for judges to confuse our own preferences with the requirements of the law," Id.

(citation omitted), and that is never permissible. He continues:

A proper understanding of stare decisis in our constitutional structure requires a

proper understanding of the nature of the "judicial Power" vested in the federal courts.
That "Power" is—as Chief Justice Marshall put it—the power "to say what the law is"
in the context of a particular "case" or "controversy" before the court. Phrased differ-
ently, the "judicial Power" "is fundamentally the power to decide cases in accordance
with law." It refers to the duty to exercise "judicial discretion" as distinct from "arbitrary
discretion."

Id. at 1982 (citations omitted).

“Judicial discretion is not the power to "alter" the law; it is the duty to correctly "expound"

it.” Id. (citation omitted). As he observed, “there are right and wrong answers to legal ques-

tions," Id. at 1984 (citation omitted), and it is the task of the judge to ascertain and apply the

right ones, because judicial opinions are not the supreme Law of the Land. U.S. Const. art.

VI, cl. 2. Thomas provides the rule that this Court is to follow when confronted by bloody

juridical abortions: “When faced with a demonstrably erroneous precedent, my rule is sim-

ple: We should not follow it.” Gamble, 587 U.S. 678, 139 S.Ct. at 1984. “This view of stare

decisis follows directly from the Constitution's supremacy over other sources of law—in-

cluding our own precedents … [as it] necessarily limits ‘the power of a court to give legal

effect to prior judicial decisions’ that articulate demonstrably erroneous interpretations of

the Constitution because those prior decisions cannot take precedence over the Constitution

itself.” Id. at 1984-85 (citations omitted). This translates into conclusive evidence of scien-

ter. In Biblical terms, the Justices knew the good they ought to do and didn’t do it; “it is sin

for them.” Jas. 4:17 (NIV). And seen in proper context, it is also a federal felony.

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