The geopolitics of water:

How the Brahmaputra River

could shape India–China
security competition

NEELY HABY

AUGUST 2024

Strategic Insight
About the author
Neely Haby produced this research while a visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International
Security and Cooperation. She is currently an analyst at US Indo-Pacific Command and received her
Masters degree in International Affairs from the George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service
at Texas A&M University. Opinions expressed in this article are her own and do not reflect the positions or
policies of the US Department of Defense.

Acknowledgements
Thank you to internal reviewers at ASPI and also to external reviewers for their feedback on previous drafts
of this report. Thanks to Brian Eyler, Mahima Sikand, and Arzan Tarapore, and to Nathan Ruser at ASPI for
the satellite imagery work and analysis he has contributed to this report.

About ASPI
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think
tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence,
security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic
issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally.
ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our Annual Report, online at www.aspi.org.au and in the
acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the
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ASPI’s publications—including this paper—are not intended in any way to express or reflect the views of
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Cover image: Brahmaputra River, iStockphoto/UlyssePixel.

The geopolitics of water:
How the Brahmaputra River
could shape India–China
security competition

NEELY HABY

AUGUST 2024
CLIMATE &
SECURITY
 POLICY CENTRE Strategic Insight
Important disclaimer
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First published August 2024

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Contents
Executive summary 4
Political control through water infrastructure 5
Strategic flooding 6
Population manipulation through water restriction 8
The People’s Republic of China doesn’t give water for free 8
Recommendations9
Conclusion11
Notes11
Acronyms and abbreviations 12
Executive summary
The Tibetan Plateau is the largest source of freshwater in with the river at relatively lower altitude after it. Such a
the Indo-Pacific region, supporting a staggering 1.35 billion project would be able to power a 50-gigawatt hydropower
people, a fifth of the world’s population.1 Of the five major station (that could provide 300 billion kilowatt hours of
rivers flowing from the plateau, China has established electricity a year). It would be the largest hydropower
a system of hydroelectric dams on the two largest: the project in history—about three times the size of the Three
Mekong River flowing through Southeast Asia, and the Gorges Dam (Figure 1).8
Brahmaputra River flowing through India and Bangladesh.
The scale and location of the proposed Great Bend
Beijing’s reach for lofty climate initiatives as the biggest
Dam will substantially increase China’s influence in the
energy consumer on the planet has made it the largest
border region and expand its capacity to store and
hydropower producer in the world, giving it extensive
withhold or release water in India. Hydro-hegemony isn’t
influence and power over lower riparian nations – that is,
a foreign concept to India, which in many cases benefits
those downstream on rivers – through water control.2
from holding a favourable position upstream from its
China’s climate pledge is to peak in carbon emissions neighbours. However, as the lower riparian nation on the
before 2030. Its ‘14th Five Year Plan for a Modern Energy Brahmaputra, New Delhi is unable to shape water politics
System’ details its strategy in energy from 2021 to 2025, as it has on other parts of its border, most notably with
a timeframe it describes as a critical period for ensuring Pakistan on the Indus River.
China’s energy security.3 Energy shortages experienced by
This report assesses the geopolitical impact of a possible
the country over the past three years have encouraged a
dam at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra. In particular,
balanced approach to its low-carbon transition, detailed
it examines the dam as a potential source of coercive
in the plan as a coordinated, ‘supplies guaranteed’,
leverage China may gain over India. A dam there would
large-scale expansion of renewables.4 The plan runs
create four likely strategic effects: it would very likely
parallel to the building of hundreds of new coal-fired
consolidate Beijing’s political control over its distant
power plants to insure the country against recurring
borderlands; it would create the potential for massive
blackouts.5 China is pushing to match thermal energy
flooding as a tool of violence; it may affect human
expansion with a rapid enlargement of renewables to
settlement and economic patterns on the Indian side of
maintain its eco-friendly façade.
the border, downstream; and it would give Beijing water
The Brahmaputra River, nicknamed the ‘highest river in the and data that it could withhold from India as bargaining
world’, exists as a hydropower goldmine because water leverage in unrelated negotiations.
flow and the steepness of elevation drop determine the
To mitigate those challenges and risks, the report
amount of available energy in moving water.6 The greatest
provides three policy recommendations for the Indian
point of hydropower potential on the Brahmaputra is the
Government and its partners in Australia and the US. First,
Great Bend, which is a point on the river in China where the
it recommends the establishment of an open-source,
water takes a sharp turn, dropping 3,000 metres through a
publicly available data repository, based on satellite
gorge before gushing cross-border into Arunachal Pradesh,
sensing, to disseminate information about the physical
India.
impacts of the Great Bend Dam. Second, it recommends
The Chinese Government has for years toyed with the idea that like-minded governments use international legal
of a massive dam at the Great Bend, and, in 2020, in the arguments to pressure Beijing to abide by global norms
midst of a military crisis on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and conventions. Third, it recommends that the Quad—the
it announced its latest plan for a massive hydropower informal group comprising Australia, India, Japan and the
plant on the Brahmaputra.7 A possible hydropower project US—use its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
would involve a tunnel that cuts through terrain, linking (HADR) guidelines to begin to share information and build
the river at relatively higher altitude before the Great Bend, capacity for dam-related contingencies.

4| THE GEOPOLITICS OF WATER: HOW THE BRAHMAPUTRA RIVER COULD SHAPE INDIA–CHINA SECURITY COMPETITION
Figure 1: 3D satellite modelling showing the ‘Great Bend’ and where China is proposing to cut through the mountain to create a tunnel for
its proposed hydropower plant. The possible diversionary route outlined on this map is based on topographical analysis undertaken by
Nathan Ruser and is illustrative of an option only

Source: Nathan Ruser, ASPI.

Political control through water infrastructure

Although hydroelectricity can be transported thousands Region and India’s Arunachal Pradesh state in the eastern
of miles away from its origin, the impact it has on sector of the Line of Actual Control.’13 Populating disputed
servicing the immediate region in which a hydropower territory with civilians and infrastructure gives Beijing a
plant is built begins with construction.9 The installation better negotiating position in border talks to refuse the
of hydroelectric systems builds communities by bringing removal of ‘local’ populations.14 China is working to silently,
electricity, highways, energy and commerce.10 China and irreversibly, legitimise its control of its borderlands,
repeatedly uses village building to consolidate the central including territory disputed with India.
government’s control over the country’s periphery, moving
China’s establishment of dams along the Brahmaputra
interior Chinese populations to the country’s frontiers.11
further demonstrates its attempt to consolidate its
Hydroelectric infrastructure is an indicator of Chinese
control over contested border areas. Chinese strategy
efforts to build and support larger Chinese communities in
has long used salami-slicing in multiple regions, making
territory disputed with India.
incremental changes that have altered the status quo,
The strategic value for Beijing in establishing infrastructure most notably in the maritime domain in the South China
and communities in its borderlands extends beyond the Sea.15 In 2016, an Indian official expressed concern over
consolidation of domestic political control.12 It could the Chinese Lalho hydroelectric project at Shigatse on
also be used to substantiate China’s claims in disputed the Brahmaputra, in part because it would facilitate and
territory. The annual report released by the Pentagon on support further Chinese infrastructure closer to the LAC.16
China’s military power in 2021 stated that ‘Sometime in With a dam at the Great Bend, China would be extending
2020, the PRC built a large 100-home civilian village inside major energy infrastructure closer to Indian territory than
disputed territory between the PRC’s Tibet Autonomous ever before.17

AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE |5

Strategic flooding
Strategic flooding has been used as a tactic in wartime increasing floods caused by the melting of Himalayan
to divert troops, destroy critical infrastructure and glaciers (Figure 2), and as Beijing publicly pledges its goals
devastate populations for decades.18 The destruction of to reduce emission rates with renewables.21
the Kakhovka Dam in Ukraine, for example, unleashed a
From June through September, monsoons bring heavy
flash flood on communities downstream in Ukraine during
rainfall to India, causing flooding and landslides that
the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war. The US and the European
destroy property and farmland.22 However, a recent
Parliament held Russia responsible for the destruction,
and many experts concurred that the destruction change in rainfall patterns makes water flow less
appeared to be an act of Russian sabotage. The impacts predictable, increasing the risk to Indians who live in
trickled from military implications to humanitarian disaster the river basin area.23 In June 2023, a few days of rain
as the floodwater washed away homes, roads and crop caused an entire highway in northeastern India to wash
fields and contaminated drinking water.19 away, restricting aid from reaching thousands who
were stranded.24
In peacetime, strategies by upper riparian nations to alter
the flow of transboundary rivers are less obvious for two To prevent humanitarian disaster, India and China
reasons. First, the impacts on dams downstream are signed their first water data-sharing agreement on the
often confused with the effects of climate change; second, Brahmaputra in 2002.25 China committed to share data
damming projects traditionally have a positive reputation on water levels during the monsoon season, so India
for helping to achieve renewable-energy goals.20 Both could better prepare for floods and reduce the risk to
work to China’s advantage as northeastern India faces civilian populations.
Figure 2: Multitemporal radar imagery of the Brahmaputra ‘Great Bend’ showing (indicated by colour) areas of melting glaciers over the
2018–2024 period

Source: Nathan Ruser, ASPI.

6| THE GEOPOLITICS OF WATER: HOW THE BRAHMAPUTRA RIVER COULD SHAPE INDIA–CHINA SECURITY COMPETITION
However, in 2017 and again in 2020 during border The Bogibeel Bridge cuts three hours off of the travel time
clashes between Chinese and Indian troops on the LAC, from Delhi in central India to Dibrugarh in Upper Assam,
Beijing temporarily ceased its sharing of water data with reducing the travel distance by hundreds of kilometres.29
New Delhi.26 Since then, sharing has been sporadic,
The bridge is designed to support the transport of armed
increasing distrust and stoking Indian fear.27 Further, the
forces, including heavy equipment such as main battle
memorandum of understanding expired in 2023. Although
both countries are working to renew the agreement, the tanks.30 The key to India’s defence on its border with China,
primary issue remains: the document isn’t legally binding.28 Bogibeel Bridge is just one example of a strategic asset
that remains vulnerable to raging floodwaters. If it were
This fear is rational for India. Dams in upper riparian
washed away, or completely submerged, India’s defence
nations are a source of significant threat if those states
release water at the wrong time. Hydroelectric systems could be severely compromised.
constructed on the Brahmaputra allow China to calculate In addition to physical access, crucial lines of
water releases to compound floods in the region. From a
communication can also be severed by floods. In 2022,
humanitarian perspective, releasing water at the wrong
floods in India knocked down cellphone towers and power
time could mean losses of lives and more homelessness in
regions such as Assam and Arunachal Pradesh (Figure 3). lines, cutting off communications to millions of people
in the northeast and making evacuations extremely
From a national-security perspective, floods could
difficult.31 The Indian Army has openly discussed its
threaten Indian access to the LAC. The Indian Government
struggle to conduct rescue operations as floods disrupt
is investing large sums of capital to build bridges, roads
and railways to its border with China. In 2018, Prime telephone connections.32 India’s defence of the LAC,
Minister Modi inaugurated the sixth, and longest, road and and locals who live in and around the river basin, remain
rail bridge across the Brahmaputra in northeastern India. critically vulnerable to floods.

Figure 3: A radar satellite image of the Brahmaputra floodplain in northern India

Source: Nathan Ruser, ASPI.

AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE |7

Population manipulation through water
restriction
Outside of monsoon season, northeast India battles volatility, in the form of drastic flood–drought cycles, is
changing rainfall patterns resulting in the drying up of reducing crop production.41 Villagers in Assam report that
mountain springs that feed into the Brahmaputra River.33 they’re even having difficulty growing rice, a staple crop,
Similarly, over the past year, China has dealt with droughts forcing many in the region to migrate to cities to feed and
that create shortfalls in hydroelectric generation.34 To support their families.42
mitigate blackouts across large cities, Beijing adapted its
China’s large-scale damming of major rivers has already
hydroelectric systems to store and recycle water during
caused massive environmental and human dislocation.
unpredictable wet and dry seasons. Pumped-storage Its build-up of hydropower dams on the Mekong, for
hydropower is listed as a priority for China’s National example, has permanently affected agricultural viability
Energy Administration, and the technology is used and habitation patterns around the Mekong Delta. Since
extensively by China’s most prominent state-owned dam 2010, Vietnam has regularly suffered devastating droughts,
construction company, Power China.35 That increases the effects of which are compounded by greater intrusion
China’s capacity to withhold water in reservoirs to manage of ocean saltwater. As a result, freshwater availability and
the even production of hydroelectricity at the cost of agricultural production have plummeted, and, critically,
those downstream. people have migrated away from traditional farming lands
An estimated 42 million Indians reside in the Brahmaputra in search of urban livelihoods.43
River basin, where a majority of the indigenous population As the Mekong example shows, China’s aggressive
depends on the river’s water for their livelihoods.36 Up to hydropower construction intrinsically has significant
30% of the Brahmaputra’s flow originates on the Chinese downstream ecological and demographic effects; in the
side of the border; any withholding of water in upstream Brahmaputra basin, too, the construction of another
reservoirs can alter typical river flow patterns, or flow massive dam at the Great Bend would exacerbate those
regimes.37 Retention, especially during dry seasons, effects in lower riparian states, India and Bangladesh.
can prevent water from reaching a stream; conversely, The precise contours of those effects are unpredictable,
inundation can create water-channel erosion.38 Increased but their foreseeable results—including the dislocation
variance in flow results in a series of ecological impacts of vulnerable communities near the border—are likely
that translate directly into human-security threats.39 to create political challenges and complications for the
The drying up of wetlands reduces fisheries, leaving government of India in its already politically fraught
locals without a dependable source of protein.40 Climate northeastern states.

The People’s Republic of China doesn’t give

water for free
In India’s perception, China’s lack of a river basin to fund a billion-dollar project in Bangladesh to restore
commission, the obscurity of construction of hydroelectric and manage a major tributary of the Brahmaputra, the
dams and the on-and-off sharing of water data typify Teesta River.45
Beijing’s lack of communication and cooperation on most
bilateral security issues.44 However, communication and Water issues serve as another political lever for China to use
cooperation don’t appear to be lacking between China and in managing its relations with India. By raising issues on the
Bangladesh on the same matter. In fact, China has offered Brahmaputra, Beijing can force concessions by the Indian

8| THE GEOPOLITICS OF WATER: HOW THE BRAHMAPUTRA RIVER COULD SHAPE INDIA–CHINA SECURITY COMPETITION
Government, most likely targeting the LAC. Conversation Even more, China is leveraging food and water insecurity
is currency when it comes to the Chinese Government. in the region as an opening to provide relief efforts and
Dialogue on responsible water management between aid that vulnerable South Asian countries can’t refuse48—a
these two disputing countries will come at a cost to India. vicious cycle that inherently reduces the sovereignty of
China doesn’t give such opportunities for free. some of India’s closest neighbours. China can be the
problem and solve the problem, intertwining its affairs
More broadly, Chinese actions on the Brahmaputra can with those on its periphery to amplify its influence.
influence how other nations in the region view India.
Lastly, as China tips the scale of power in the border
China’s efforts in Bangladesh only irritate the failed Teesta
region further off balance, even the perception that the
Water Agreement between New Delhi and Dhaka.46
People’s Republic of China can weaponise water on the
The agreement to formalise the sharing of river water
LAC holds political and strategic value. Introducing plans
and resources fell short because of domestic political
for the Great Bend Dam, spotlighting its extraordinary
opposition, from the Indian state of West Bengal.47 Those power-generating capacity, contributes to this narrative of
actions tarnish India’s reputation as a responsible upper intimidation. To account for the risk, India must factor in
riparian nation and increase Chinese influence in the this Chinese capability whether it’s leveraged or not. That
region. In this context, China has offered to step in and deep distrust increases the potential for miscalculation
finance Bangladesh’s own unilateral efforts to better and misunderstanding, simultaneously increasing the risk
manage the Teesta. of conflict.49

Recommendations
As a lower riparian state, India has some structural media, researchers and other civil-society groups with
disadvantages that expose it to the geopolitical and high-quality data that’s otherwise difficult to access. For
humanitarian risks highlighted above. Despite those India, the information will put it in a better position to
disadvantages, India can use two of its relative strengths— navigate negotiations on the border and engineer water
technology and foreign partners—to offset China’s coercive management to protect military assets and downstream
leverage if China goes ahead with plans to build the Great communities. For Bangladesh, it will help to identify the
Bend Dam. root of its water problems, giving Dhaka a more informed
perspective when engaging with China on water projects.
1. India’s partners should establish an open-source and
In this instance, India and Bangladesh are put in a position
publicly available satellite-based data repository.
to speak truth to power to replace lost leverage in being the
Technology can serve as a catalyst for responsible lower riparian nations.
water management by initially replacing the need The model for this program is the ongoing project in
for bilateral cooperation for access to water data. To Southeast Asia on the Mekong River: the Mekong Dam
do that, a civil-society group or consortium could Monitor.50 The monitor is an open-source platform built out
establish an open-source satellite-based data collection by Stimson and Eyes on Earth Inc., and funded by the US
program to expose China’s infrastructure building and State Department, US foundations and individual donors,
water manipulation on the Brahmaputra River. If the that uses remote sensing, satellite imagery and GIS analysis
data repository were to be established by a reputable to provide near-real-time reporting and data downloads
civil-society group or groups, it could more credibly on water levels in reservoirs along the Mekong. The data
claim to be a politically neutral service, not subject to the is then fed into an easily accessible online application and
policy settings of India or any other interested party. Such translated into local languages for downstream countries
a data service would help both India and Bangladesh to receive early warning prior to sudden releases of water
understand the extent to which they’re being affected by China. Furthermore, it establishes a baseline for water
by Chinese actions upstream; and it would also provide levels annually, so that slight increases in water restrictions

AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE |9

don’t go unnoticed. This is a way to combat the ‘new of the discourse before China can frame the issue to
normal’ often established and accepted by countries that its advantage.54
have no way of analysing long-term water data.
The purpose of such an initiative isn’t to place blame and
Water data from this proposed ‘Brahmaputra Dam stoke tension, but to establish authority on behalf of India
Monitor’ would remain open-source information available and Bangladesh that can push China towards engaging in a
to all parties vulnerable to flow variation, including those solution; that is, a river basin commission or water-sharing
who live in the river basin in China. This would also treaty. At this point, technology can only go as far as
leave access open to Beijing, to discuss ways to mitigate revealing the reality of damming; placed in the spotlight,
these issues. Beijing is left to choose to be a responsible participant.
2. Explain the effects of Chinese river damming and 3. Engage the Quad’s HADR framework on the
better leverage international law in coordination humanitarian effects of river damming.
with partners.
To counter the prospect of China using a future Great
China often succeeds in its use of grey-zone tactics Bend Dam for purposes of strategic coercion, India could
because they’re hidden from public view. Conversely, it’s enlist its like-minded partners, including in the Quad
most effectively challenged when its coercion is exposed (the informal minilateral grouping that brings together
and the effects of its actions are explained.51 In that way,
Australia, India, Japan and the US). In 2022, the Quad
New Delhi and Dhaka, together—and in coordination
established a HADR framework that requires members to
with partners—can expand the narrative on the realities
meet biannually and conduct regular tabletop exercises
of Chinese upstream river damming. Bangladesh’s role is
to increase interoperability in case of disaster.55 The Quad
essential in this initiative, as it’s expected for India to be
could add work specific to water security and dam-related
critical of any Chinese activity near the border. China’s
disaster preparation to its HADR toolkit. That work would
efforts to control the narrative by concealing activity,
primarily take the form of information exchanges, capacity
especially when humanitarian considerations are pushed
building and tabletop exercises among the Quad members
to the side, are crucial to its ability to avoid bad publicity.
for dam-related contingencies such as flooding. Such
Knowledge of upstream manipulation can bring awareness
preparatory work would be inherently useful—it would
to local communities, policymakers in India, policymakers
contribute to the Quad’s avowed mission of providing
in the US, and the international community.
international public goods to the region, especially to
Partners, including especially the US, can support safeguard vulnerable human populations, but it would also
this narrative by placing pressure on China to enact send a political signal of international interest in mitigating
downstream risk-mitigation efforts required by the risks associated with China’s hydropower construction.
international law.52 As per customary law based on the
1968 Helsinki Rules and the 1997 UN Convention on In an extreme case—if a Chinese dam were to cause a
the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International disaster downstream—Quad partners would then be
Watercourses, the upper riparian nation is required to better prepared to respond with HADR operations. Such a
provide prior notice of intention of intervention and scenario could occur, for example, in the Mekong basin or
full detailed technical information, have due regard the Brahmaputra basin. While the Quad’s HADR guidelines
for the concerns of the lower riparian states, advance were initially developed to assist non-Quad countries
consultations, and accept the principle of avoidance in the region, they don’t exclude the possibility of being
of ‘substantial harm’ or ‘significant injury’ to the lower applied in grave contingencies within Quad members.
riparian area.53 The US and other partners could use Quad assistance in such a scenario would also leave open
international legal arguments suggesting that China the possibility of India coordinating with international
must act with greater cooperation and transparency to partners, including the US, close to the LAC—which
safeguard India and Bangladesh. Combating Chinese may help to deter China from considering the use of
legal warfare demands early action, to set the parameters strategic flooding.

10 | THE GEOPOLITICS OF WATER: HOW THE BRAHMAPUTRA RIVER COULD SHAPE INDIA–CHINA SECURITY COMPETITION
Conclusion
China has its own reasons for rapidly expanding its some of India’s best assets in countering the potential
hydropower infrastructure on the Brahmaputra and coercive leverage China may gain wouldn’t require
considering a massive new dam at the Great Bend, significant resources. India’s most effective options rest in
but such infrastructure will also give it added coercive taking advantage of relatively affordable and accessible
leverage against India. For its part, India is already deeply technology, and by harnessing the power of collective and
concerned by China’s growing military and dual-use coordinated action with like-minded partner states and
infrastructure near the LAC, so new Chinese activity at the civil-society institutions. Those options would not only
Great Bend will only reinforce India’s prior biases on the help to offset China’s new leverage but would also help
need to pour resources and attention into defending itself New Delhi to avoid the trap of pouring scarce national
on its northern border. However, as this report has shown, resources into defending itself from Chinese coercion.

Notes
1 Eleanor Albert, ‘Water clouds on the Tibetan Plateau’, Council on Foreign 11 Robert Barnett, ‘China is building entire villages in another country’s
Relations, 9 May 2016, online. territory’, Foreign Policy, 7 May 2021, online.
2 ‘An energy sector roadmap to carbon neutrality in China’, IEA 50, 12 China Power Team, ‘How is China expanding its infrastructure to project
International Energy Agency, September 2021, online; China Power Team, power along its western borders?’, Center for Strategic and International
‘How is China’s energy footprint changing?’, China Power, Center for Studies, 16 March 2022, online.
Strategic and International Studies, 16 February 2016, online; Madhumitha 13 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and security developments
Jadganmohan, ‘Largest hydropower producing countries in 2022’, Statista,
involving the People’s Republic of China, 2021, Department of Defense,
31 January 2024, online; Brian Eyler, Regan Kwan, Courtney Weatherby,
US Government, 2021, online.
‘How China turned off the tap on Mekong water’, Stimson, 13 April 2022,
14 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ‘Did China create new facts on the ground
online.
along the LAC with India?’, The Diplomat, 12 November 2021, online;
3 ‘14th Five Year Plan: Modern Energy System Planning (2021–2025)’, Climate
Nathan Ruser, Baani Grewal, ‘The latest flashpoint on the India–China
Change Laws of the World, March 2022, online; Jiang Yifan, Gao Baiyu, Sam
border: zooming into the Tawang border skirmishes’, ASPI, Canberra, no
Geall, ‘China’s five year plan for energy: one eye on security today, one on a
date, online; Nathan Ruser, Baani Grewal, ‘A 3D deep dive into the India–
low-carbon future’, China Dialogue, 23 June 2022, online.
China border’, ASPI, Canberra, no date, online.
4 John Kemp, ‘Reset by drought, China turned to coal to keep lights on’,
Reuters, 21 July 2023, online. 15 Robert Haddick, ‘Salami slicing in the South China Sea’, Foreign Policy,
3 August 2012, online.
5 Lauri Myllyvirta, Qi Qin, Xing Zhang, Flora Champenois, ‘China’s new coal
power spree continues as more provinces jump on the bandwagon’, Center 16 Ibu Sanjeeb Garg, ‘Why India should be worried about China’s Lalho dam’,
for Research on Clean Air and Energy, 29 August 2023, online. Mint, 18 October 2016, online.
6 Catherine, ‘Top six rivers rising from the Tibetan Plateau’, Great Tibet 17 Mark Giordano, Anya Wahal, The water wars myth: India, China and the
Tour, 20 October 2023, online; Energy Administration and Information, Brahmaputra, US Institute of Peace, 8 December 2022, online.
‘Hydropower explained’, US Government, 20 April 2023, online. 18 Stanley W Dziuban, ‘Implications of artificial flooding in military
7 Shan Jie, Lin Xiaoyi, ‘China to build historic Yarlung Zangbo River operations’, Society of American Military Engineers, 1950, online.
hydropower project in Tibet’, Global Times, 29 November 2020, online; 重磅 19 US Mission to the United Nations, ‘Remarks at a UN Security Council
丨雅鲁藏布江下游水电开发决策敲定，规模近6000万千瓦，相当于“再造 meeting on the situation in Ukraine resulting from the destruction of the
3个三峡”[Breaking news: The decision on the development of hydropower Kakhovka Dam’, 6 June 2023, online; ‘Parliament calls on NATO to invite
in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo River has been finalised, with Ukraine to join the alliance—news’, European Parliament, 15 June 2023,
a scale of nearly 60 million kilowatts, equivalent to ‘rebuilding three Three online; James Glanz, Marc Santora, Pablo Robles, Haley Willis, Lauren
Gorges’], The Paper, 28 November 2020, online; Shan Jie, Cao Siqi, ‘Yarlung Leatherby, Christoph Koettl, Dmitriy Khavin, ‘Why the evidence suggests
Zangbo River hydropower project nailed with the passing of 14th Five-Year
Russa blew up the Kakhovka Dam’, New York Times, 16 June 2023, online.
Plan, but won’t be completed soon’, Global Times, 13 March 2021, online.
20 Judy Shin, ‘The Mekong River unrest: the battle for water’, Earth.Org,
8 The tunnel could reportedly carry 2,000 cubic metres of water a second,
15 May 2020, online; Peter Bosshard, ‘China’s dam-building will cause more
with a drop in altitude of 2,800 metres. Yang Yong, ‘World’s largest
problems than it solves’, The Guardian, 4 March 2011, online.
hydropower project planned for Tibetan Plateau’, Dialogue Earth, 5 March
2014, online; Mark Doman, Katia Shatoba, Alex Palmer, ‘A mega dam on the 21 ‘China country rating’, Climate Action Tracker, 22 November 2023, online.
Great Bend of China’, ABC News, 29 August 2022, online. 22 TM Krishnamurti, ‘Indian monsoon’, Britannica, 26 February 2024, online.
9 ‘Hydropower 101: Transmission, from dam to doorstep’, Peninsula Light 23 Akshit Sangomla, ‘Climate crisis in north east India: what is behind water
Co., 1 July 2020, online. scarcity in the region’, Down to Earth, 9 September 2021, online.
10 Water Science School, ‘Hydroelectric power: advantages of production 24 Arunachal24 Team, ‘Floods wreck havoc in Arunachal, Assam and Sikkim:
and usage’, US Geological Survey, 6 June 2018, online. road washed away, tourists stranded’, Arunachal24, 16 June 2023, online.

AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE | 11

25 Kiran Sharma, Sanskrita Bharadwaj, Faisal Mahmud, ‘Bangladesh, 42 Sharma et al., ‘Bangladesh, Brahmaputra serve as proxy for
Brahmaputra serve as proxy for Sino-Indian conflict’, Nikkei Asia, 26 July Sino-Indian conflict’.
2023, online. 43 Nguyen Minh Quang, James Borton, ‘Ecocide on the Mekong: downstream
26 Joel Wuthnow, ‘Did China use water as a weapon in the Doklam standoff?’, impacts of Chinese dams and the growing response from citizen science in
War on the Rocks, 4 October 2017, online. the lower Mekong Delta’, Asian Perspective, Fall 2020, 44(4):749–766.
27 ‘Why India is worried about China’s dam projects on the Brahmaputra 44 Nilanthi Samaranayake, Satu P Limaye, Joel Wuthnow, Raging waters,
River’, The Economic Times, 5 October 2016, online. Marine Corps Press University, 2018, online; Brahma Chellaney, ‘China can’t
just keep building the world’s biggest dam in secret’, Nikkei Asia, 14 July
28 Neeraj Singh Manhas, ‘A fragile lifeline: India and China must collaborate
2023, online; Ameya Pratap Singh, Urvi Tembey, ‘India–China relations and
on water’, The Interpreter, 21 November 2023, online.
the geopolitics of water’, Nikkei Asia, 23 July 2020, online.
29 Anish Mondal, ‘Bogibeel Bridge on Brahmaputra river: India’s longest
45 Syful Islam, ‘China open to role in Bangladesh river project under India’s
rail-cum-road bridge is 100% welded bridge’, Financial Express, 1 May 2023,
nose’, Nikkei Asia, 14 November 2022, online.
online; Encardio Rite, ‘Case study: Bogibeel Bridge: Asia’s second longest
46 Syful Islam, ‘Bangladesh PM’s India trip leaves farmers thirsty for water
rail–road bridge’, Medium, 2 February 2021, online.
deal’, Nikkei Asia, 8 September 2022, online.
30 Rite, ‘Case study: Bogibeel Bridge: Asia’s second longest rail–road bridge’.
47 Anuttama Banerji, ‘India must settle the Teesta River dispute with
31 Karan Deep Singh, Saif Hasnat, ‘Ruinous flooding in India and Bangladesh Bangladesh for lasting gains’, The Diplomat, 9 April 2021, online.
kills at least 116’, New York Times, 20 June 2022, online. 48 Anuttama Banerji, ‘Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief: new
32 ‘Sikkim flash floods highlights: death toll rises to 18, nearly 100 people frontier for China–India contestation?’, The Diplomat, 19 December 2023,
remain missing’, Mint, 6 October 2023, online. online.
33 Sangomla, ‘Climate crisis in north east India: what is behind water scarcity 49 Vijay Gokhale, Shivshankar Menon, Tanvi Madan, ‘Podcast: A big-picture
in the region’. look at the India–China relationship’, Brookings, 20 September 2023,
34 John Kemp, ‘Drought-depleted hydropower drives China to turn to coal’, online.
Reuters, 18 June 2023, online. 50 Mekong Dam Monitor, online.
35 ‘Regional profile: East Asia and Pacific’, International Hydropower 51 This is the rationale behind the successful Sea Light program designed
Association, 2022, online. to expose Chinese coercion in the South China Sea. See Raissa Robles,
36 Satu Limaye, ‘The middle riparian quandaries: India and the Brahmaputra ‘Philippines to maintain “assertive transparency” over South China Sea
River Basin’, Center for Naval Analysis, online. row against Beijing’s “bullying behaviour”’, South China Morning Post,
14 February 2024, online.
37 The actual amount of flow originating in China is a matter of some
52 Vaishali Basu Sharman, ‘Amid boiling LAC, China’s construction of “world’s
uncertainty and dispute; 30% is probably an overstatement because it
largest” dam on India’s Brahmaputra River could add fuel to fire’, The
includes tributaries in the Brahmaputra river system, but it remains the
Eurasian Times, 17 July 2023, online.
figure used by the United Nations. See Giordano & Wahal, The water wars
53 ‘The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers’,
myth: India, China and the Brahmaputra.
International Law Association, August 1966, online; Official Records of the
38 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), ‘Flow alteration’, US Government,
General Assembly, ‘Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of
29 February 2024, online. International Watercourses’, United Nations, 21 May 1997, online.
39 EPA, ‘Flow alteration’. 54 Peter Mattis, ‘China’s “three warfares” in perspective’, War on the Rocks,
40 Sharma et al., ‘Bangladesh, Brahmaputra serve as proxy for 30 January 2018, online.
Sino-Indian conflict’. 55 State Department, ‘Guidelines for Quad partnership on humanitarian
41 Akshit Sangomla, ‘India’s climate story: floods to drought and back again’, assistance and disaster relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific’, US Government,
Down to Earth, 5 September 2018, online. 23 September 2022, online.

Acronyms and abbreviations

GIS geographic information system
HADR humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
LAC Line of Actual Control

12 | THE GEOPOLITICS OF WATER: HOW THE BRAHMAPUTRA RIVER COULD SHAPE INDIA–CHINA SECURITY COMPETITION
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