Affective Polarization in the 2022 South Korean Presidential Election 273

Affective Polarization in the 2022 South Korean

Presidential Election:
Causes and Consequences*

Hyunki Shin**, Jae-won Yang***, Sung Deuk Hahm****

In this study, we analyzed the factors that intensified affective polarization among
voters during the 2022 South Korean presidential election. We also examined this
polarization's effect on their political attitudes, including their satisfaction with
democracy, perception of the fairness of elections, and trust in political institutions.
We found that the greater the perceived ideological differences between the two
parties―the People Power Party (PPP) and the Democratic Party (DP)―and the more
extreme the voter's ideology, the more affective polarization increased. We also found
that affective polarization intensified with increasing ideological extremity among all
age cohorts except those in their forties. Finally, in contrast to DP supporters, PPP
supporters' political attitudes became more negative as their affective polarization
increased because the opposing party, the DP, was the governing party. This suggests
that affective polarization may polarize support for democratic norms and trust in the
political institutions that underpin democracy, depending on one's partisan allegiances.

Key Words: affective polarization, presidential election, democratic norms

Ⅰ. Introduction

Many democracies, including South Korea and the United States, are experiencing
crises of political polarization. Stark divisions between political conservatives and

* This study was supported by the Research Fund, 2023 of The Catholic University of Korea
** Associate Professor, The Catholic University of Korea; E-mail: [email protected]
*** Professor, The Catholic University of Korea; E-mail: [email protected]
**** Professor, Graduate School of Political Studies, Kyonggi University; E-mail: [email protected]

KOREA OBSERVER, Vol. 55, No. 2, SUMMER 2024, pp.273-296

© 2024 by INSTITUTE OF KOREAN STUDIES.
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274 Hyunki Shin, Jae-won Yang, Sung Deuk Hahm

liberals in these countries suggest that politicians are not representing the voices of
all the public, sparking dissatisfaction with politics and systems of representation.
Despite this political polarization, many scholars who study the progress of
democratization in South Korea argue that the country has experienced a decline in
authoritarianism, transition toward democracy, and consolidation of democracy (Hahm
and Kim 1999; Hahm 2008; see O'Donnell & Schmitter 1991 for details). Hahm (2008)
argues that South Korea has achieved democratic consolidation on the grounds that
it regularly holds free, fair, and competitive elections, and there is no possibility of
a return to authoritarianism. In addition, there have been peaceful transitions of power
between conservatives and liberals (Hahm, Jung, and Kim, 2013).
For example, Yoon Suk-yeol, a conservative People Power Party (PPP) candidate,
was elected in the South Korean presidential election held in March 2022. Liberal
incumbent Moon Jae-in, who gained power in the 2017 presidential election after the
impeachment of conservative President Park Geun-hye, failed to regain immediate
presidential power. The conservative party, which had practically collapsed after the
impeachment, thus regained presidential power after five years.
Consequently, South Korea seems to have consolidated its democracy by achieving
its fourth horizontal transition of power since the transition to democracy in 1987: the
first was the election of liberal Kim Dae-jung in 1997, the second was the election
of conservative Lee Myung-bak in 2007, the third was the election of liberal Moon
Jae-in in 2017, and the fourth was the election of conservative Yoon Suk-yeol in 2022.
However, the exceptionally competitive presidential election of 2022 raised serious
concerns over its aftermath. The difference in votes between the two major candidates,
conservative Yoon Suk-yeol and liberal Lee Jae-myung, was only 0.73% (247,077
votes). This was the smallest margin since the country's democratization in 1987, as
48.56% of the electorate voted for Yoon Suk-yeol, and 47.83% voted for Lee Jae-myung.
It was also rated as the most "unlikable election" because it was full of suspicion and
negativity about the two major candidates and their families (Shin 2022). Both suffered
from scandals, from shamans to corruption to problematic wives.
This negative election atmosphere not only damaged public trust in democracy and
politics but also intensified affective polarization between citizens, which can pose an
existential threat to democracy. Affective polarization refers to the phenomenon in which
individuals' emotions toward their own political party become more positive, while their
feelings toward the opposing party become more negative (Iyengar et al. 2012, 2019).
The degree of affective polarization during an election can vary depending on
environmental factors, such as election campaigns and the political climate of a particular
 Affective Polarization in the 2022 South Korean Presidential Election 275

period, i.e., the zeitgeist. The effect of the election campaigns in the 2022 South Korean
presidential election on affective polarization deserves particular attention. Affective
polarization was intensified by negative election campaigns, with hatred and hostility
incited between the supporters of opposing presidential candidates (Iyengar et al. 2012;
Sood & Iyengar 2016).
Affective polarization is widespread not only in countries that have undergone
democratic consolidation, such as South Korea, but also in advanced democracies, such
as the United States and Europe. Moreover, there is a growing concern that affective
polarization may undermine democratic norms and values and lead to democratic
backsliding (Kingzette et al. 2021; Orhan 2022). Based on empirical research, Orhan
(2022) found that increasing affective polarization is highly correlated with democratic
backsliding, which refers to the deterioration of qualities associated with democratic
governance, such as accountability, freedom, rights, and deliberation.
It has been argued that South Korea exhibits a tendency toward affective polarization,
as people are engaging in more pronounced negative rhetoric against political opponents
than in the past (Jang & Chang 2020; Jang & Shu 2019; Jung 2018). Some scholars
argue that democratic consolidation has yet to be achieved due to this crisis of affective
polarization among the citizens. In fact, South Korea made the transition to democracy
in 1987, almost four decades ago. Yet affective polarization is still quite common,
and such a pattern is not normally associated with mature democracy.
In South Korea, affective polarization among party supporters has become more
intense in recent years than in the past. In the 2022 presidential election, this polarization
was more intense than ever before. However, there is a debate about whether this
affective polarization is continuously deepening, as in the United States, and whether
it is serious enough to undermine democratic values and norms (Broockman et al. 2022).
In this context, we are interested in affective polarization among party supporters
in the context of the 2022 South Korean presidential election, which was marked by
scandals, mudslinging, and insinuations of corruption, criminality, nepotism, fraud, and
superstitious practices. The purpose of this study was to identify the factors that led
to this affective polarization among party supporters and its effects on their political
attitudes during the presidential election.
This study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews previous research on affective
polarization. Chapter 3 reviews previous research on how affective polarization can
be measured and then measures this polarization among supporters of both parties
involved in the 2022 presidential election. Chapter 4 analyzes what influenced affective
polarization during the election and how it affected the political attitudes of supporters
276 Hyunki Shin, Jae-won Yang, Sung Deuk Hahm

of both parties. Finally, in Chapter 5, we summarize our findings and discuss their
theoretical implications.

Ⅱ. Literature Review

A. Affective Polarization: Concepts, Causes, and Consequences

Political polarization is multi-dimensional. One dimension of political polarization

concerns "what" is polarized, and this category is divided into policy preferences,
ideological orientations, and partisan attachments. Another dimension regards "who" is
polarized, which is divided into the political elite and the general public (McCarty 2019).
Many scholars agree that ideological polarization in the U.S. has intensified among
political elites, but there is no consensus on whether this is the case among the general
public. Several scholars argue that as the ideological positions of the two parties,
Republicans and Democrats, have become more polarized, these differences have
manifested among the public. This reflects a general trend: when faced with more
polarized political parties, the public becomes more ideologically polarized in turn
(Abramowitz 2010; Abramowitz & Saunders 1998; Abramowitz & Webster 2016; Klein
2020).
Other scholars, however, argue that the fact that voters have only two realistic options
in elections is the reason for the ideological polarization of the public in the U.S. They
also argue that no empirical evidence supports the notion that the public is ideologically
polarized (Fiorina et al. 2005, 2008). In fact, the phenomenon observed at the public
level is less ideological polarization than partisan sorting, which refers to the
phenomenon of a larger percentage of conservative voters supporting the Republican
Party and a larger percentage of liberal voters supporting the Democratic Party than
in the past, despite no change in the distribution of the public's ideology (Fiorina 2017;
Levendusky 2009).
In response to this debate, Iyengar et al. (2012) offered a new proposal: polarization
at the public level is not ideological but rather affective. They argue that although
ideological moderates still constitute the majority of the mass public, strongly partisan
voters have intensified their antipathies and negative attitudes toward each other.
Strongly partisan citizens have also widened the differences in preferences between
supporting and opposing parties, eventually leading to affective polarization.
Previous research has explained affective polarization from three perspectives:
 Affective Polarization in the 2022 South Korean Presidential Election 277

partisan identity, ideological polarization, and partisan media. First, the partisan identity
explanation argues that partisan identity has become as important to individuals'
identities as race and religion. In the case of the United States, the analysis suggests
that partisan identity has been strengthened by overlapping with race and religion rather
than by the admixture of partisan identity with race and religion.
In South Korea, it has historically been difficult to form a stable partisan identity
due to frequent interparty coalitions and a high proportion of non-partisans under a
weak party system. However, in recent years, there has been a trend toward strengthening
partisan identity, as interparty coalitions have diminished compared to the past, and
a two-party system has been established (Lee 2022). Partisan identity divides the world
into an ingroup (one's own party) and an outgroup (the opposing party), which leads
to ingroup favoritism, or the tendency to support one's own partisan group and abhor
the outgroup.
This phenomenon of rising partisan identity is related to "social identity theory."
Tajfel and Turner (2004) used social identity theory to explain the psychological
mechanisms that cause affective polarization. They argued that people identify with
certain groups within society and behave differently depending on the social identity
formed. According to them, people want their "ingroup" to be evaluated more positively
than the "outgroup" to which they do not belong, and they expect their own values
to be implemented in society as a result (Sidanius et al. 1994). To satisfy these needs,
people show solid favoritism toward their ingroup while demonstrating antipathy and
even disgust toward the outgroup (Ashforth & Mael 1989). Affective polarization based
on partisan identity can be understood as a phenomenon that occurs when a political
affiliation becomes a cornerstone of one's social identity (Huddy & Yair 2021).
Second, the ideological polarization explanation argues that the widening ideological
distance between parties―that is, ideological polarization―has become a major cause
of increasing favoritism toward favored parties and hostility toward opposing parties
(Lelkes 2021; Levendusky 2018; Rogowski & Sutherland 2016). According to this
explanation, affective polarization is intensified when a voter strengthens their
commitment to their political ideology in a direction consistent with the supported party.
Along the same lines, some studies argue that the ideological polarization of political
elites drives affective polarization at the voter level (Lelkes 2021; Webster &
Abramowitz 2017).
According to them, the large ideological gap between political parties means that
rapid policy changes can occur as a result of elections, which can lead to large shifts
in voters' interests. Consequently, the ideological polarization of political parties
278 Hyunki Shin, Jae-won Yang, Sung Deuk Hahm

contributes to affective polarization at the voter level by making voters more partisan.
In particular, knowing a politician's ideology has a stronger effect on an individual's
affective polarization than knowing a politician's party; moreover, the more extreme
the politician's ideology, the more sensitive the individual is to that ideology (Lelkes
2021). And the more extreme the ideology, the stronger the tendency for affective
polarization to increase hostility toward the opposing party (Levendusky 2018). Thus,
it can be inferred that not only the perceived ideological gap between political parties
but also the ideological extremity of the individual influences affective polarization.
A third explanation for the cause of affective polarization is the increased prominence
of partisan media. This effect of partisan media is related to "motivated reasoning,"
or the way people process information. In motivated reasoning, people tend to evaluate
new information in a biased way that supports or justifies their existing beliefs or
perspectives. This can lead people to selectively accept information that is consistent
with their preexisting beliefs (confirmation bias), to believe that their preexisting beliefs
are more persuasive than new information (the prior attitude effect), or to ignore
information that does not support their preexisting beliefs or desired conclusions
(disconfirmation bias). Thus, preexisting beliefs about a particular political party stimulate
motivated reasoning, which increases affective polarization (Morris et al. 2003).
However, it is unclear whether the use of partisan media is the cause of affective
polarization or, contrarily, affectively polarized people use partisan media. Some
experiments (Druckman et al. 2022; Levendusky 2013) have shown that the direction
of causality runs from partisan media to affective polarization. The media increasingly
portray opposing party members as ideologically extreme and politically active, which
closely matches the stereotypes and prejudices people typically hold about their
outgroup. In other words, the media appear to increase affective polarization by shaping
or reinforcing people's prejudices and stereotypes about supporters of opposing parties
(Druckman et al. 2022).
On the other hand, researchers have also examined the positive and negative effects
of affective polarization. Affective polarization can have positive effects, such as
increasing voter turnout and political interest (Huddy et al. 2015; Kim & Lee 2021).
However, due to growing concerns about the negative effects of affective polarization,
much of the research to date has focused on these effects, which can be understood
at the collective and individual levels.
At the collective level, affective polarization threatens the sustainability of democracy
in several ways. First, it leads to a polarization of political trust in which the ruling
government is unconditionally supported, but the opposing government is unconditionally
 Affective Polarization in the 2022 South Korean Presidential Election 279

distrusted. Unconditional support for the ruling government makes it difficult to hold
the government accountable. Second, polarization of political trust based on partisanship
makes it difficult to reach a consensus on national policy and thus disrupts government
operations (Hetherington & Rudolph 2015). Third, affective polarization makes it
politically advantageous for politicians to respond only to the preferences of their
supporters rather than to the public as a whole, which can lead to extreme and divisive
political situations in which supporters of one side become the target beneficiaries of
policies that affect all sides (Iyengar et al. 2019; Klein 2020).
Meanwhile, at the individual level, affective polarization transforms individuals'
political attitudes. People who are more affectively polarized tend to downplay democratic
norms and exhibit less trust in political institutions (Graham & Svolik 2020; Kingzette
et al. 2021). Interestingly, as affective polarization increases, levels of trust in democratic
norms and political institutions vary by partisanship. People strongly support democratic
norms, such as constitutional protections for minorities, when their own party is in
power, but their support for democratic norms declines when the opposing party is
in power. This suggests that affective polarization can even polarize support for
democratic norms that should be shared (Kingzette et al. 2021).
Affective polarization can spill over beyond the political sphere and influence
behaviors and attitudes in everyday non-political life (Malka & Lelkes 2010). For
example, studies in the United States have found that partisan prejudice also affects
non-political domains, such as dating and spouse choice (Huber & Malhotra 2017;
Iyengar et al. 2012), lengths of conversations with family members (Chen & Rohla
2018), and relationships with friends and neighbors (Chopik & Motyl 2016; Huber &
Malhotra 2017).
Previous research in South Korea has found that affective polarization has a negative
effect on non-political daily interactions, such as those with co-workers, close neighbors,
friends, or spouses who represent the opposing side (Kim & Lee 2021; Lee 2022).
However, no studies in South Korea have empirically analyzed the effects of affective
polarization on political attitudes, such as trust in democratic norms and political
institutions. Therefore, this study aimed to empirically analyze whether people's trust
in democratic norms and political institutions is polarized by the political party they support.

B. Affective Polarization in South Korea

Several studies of political polarization in South Korea have begun by focusing

on the ideological polarization of political elites. Many studies have found that
280 Hyunki Shin, Jae-won Yang, Sung Deuk Hahm

ideological polarization among political elites began to emerge in the 2000s and has
been expanding since then (Ga 2014; Kang 2012; Lee & Lee 2015). However, there
is an ongoing debate about whether this ideological polarization is also manifested at
the voter level. Previous studies generally agree that there is no clear ideological
polarization at the voter level in South Korea, but they argue that there is affective
polarization, in which voters are more favorable toward the party they support and
more unfavorable toward the opposing party (Jang & Seo 2019; Kim & Lee 2021).
Many studies in South Korea have focused on discovering affective polarization
at the voter level and identifying its causes. Partisan identity, age, region, political
ideology, and policy preferences have been identified as causes of affective polarization
(Kim & Lee 2021, 2022; Kim et al. 2022). They also suggest that, as in the United
States, affective polarization affects non-political domains, such as friendships,
neighborhood relationships, and marriage (Jang & Jang 2020), but no studies have
empirically analyzed the political effects of affective polarization (Lee 2022).
In particular, several studies have analyzed the affective polarization that emerged
in the 2022 presidential election. These studies have found that people with strong
political ideologies were more affectively polarized in this election (Kim et al. 2022)
and that people with strong affective polarization show stronger support for their
candidate and a stronger desire to defeat the opposing candidates because of their dislike
for them (Ga 2023). These studies suggest that affective polarization intensified after
the 2022 South Korean presidential election because it was rated as the most "unlikable"
election in history, with more dislike and hostility displayed toward the opposing party's
presidential candidates than in any other election.
Given these claims of affective polarization in the 2022 presidential election, this
study poses the following research questions: What factors have contributed to affective
polarization at the individual level in South Korea, and what was the effect of affective
polarization on individuals' political attitudes in the 2022 presidential election?

Ⅲ. Data and Methods

A. Measuring Affective Polarization

Previous research has identified four ways of measuring affective polarization

(Druckman & Levendusky 2019). The most common method is a "feeling thermometer"
rating, which asks people to respond to how "cold" or "warm" they feel about their
 Affective Polarization in the 2022 South Korean Presidential Election 281

own political party and the opposing party. A second method is to rate the traits of
the party a person supports or opposes by asking them to rate the extent to which
they agree that the given party is intelligent, patriotic, honest, open-minded, and so
on. A third approach is to ask respondents to rate the extent to which they trust the
party to do the right thing (Levendusky 2013). Finally, a fourth approach is to ask
respondents to rate the extent to which they are comfortable interacting with supporters
of the opposing party, such as being friends, co-workers, or neighbors, or marrying them.
The fourth set of measures are known as social distance measures because they
gauge the level of intimacy individuals feel comfortable establishing with out-partisans.
While the first three measures relate to general attitudes toward political parties, the
social distance measures capture attitudes toward specific behavioral outcomes. Previous
research has shown that these four measures of affective polarization are highly
correlated and often used interchangeably or combined into a single index (Druckman
& Levendusky 2019). Following previous research, this study aims to measure affective
polarization using the method most frequently used in previous research: feeling
thermometer ratings.

B. Data Collection

We used a panel survey dataset collected by the Korean Election Studies Association
on three occasions before and after the 2022 South Korean presidential election. These
data were collected through web surveys twice before the election and once afterwards.
We used both pre-election (first wave) and post-election surveys (third wave) because
we were interested in changes in affective polarization during the presidential election.
The pre-election survey was conducted in November 2021, and the post-election survey
was conducted from March 12-15, 2022, immediately following the March 9 presidential
election.
For the pre-election survey, we randomly selected 1,800 respondents based on
population proportionality by gender, age, and region, but only 1,058 respondents
completed both surveys. We selected only supporters of the two main political parties,
the conservative People's Power Party (PPP) and the liberal Democratic Party (DP),
yielding 613 for the final analysis. According to the survey, 53.0% (325) of the
respondents supported the DP, and 46.9% (288) supported the PPP. Of the respondents,
52.3% were male and 47.6% female; 11.9% were in their twenties or younger, 15.3%
were in their thirties, 17.1% were in their forties, 19.4% were in their fifties, and 36.2%
were in their sixties or older.
282 Hyunki Shin, Jae-won Yang, Sung Deuk Hahm

C. Variables and Measurements

The dependent variable was affective polarization, as we set out to analyze the
changes in affective polarization among supporters of both parties around the 2022
presidential election as well as its causes and consequences.

(1) Dependent variable

The respondents were asked how favorably they would rate both parties, the
conservative PPP and the liberal DP, on a scale from 0 ("very unfavorable") to 10
("very favorable") in the pre- and post-election surveys. The scores were rescaled to
a range between 0 and 100. Following previous research (Druckman & Levendusky,
2019; Kim & Lee, 2021; Lee, 2022; Sood & Iyengar, 2016), affective polarization
was measured by the absolute value of the difference between the feeling temperature
of the opposing party ("outgroup party") and the temperature of the supporting party
("ingroup party"). The pre-election affective polarization measured in this way was 52.5,
and the post-election polarization was 53.9; the two are not different at a statistically
significant level (t = -1.50, p = 0.13).

(2) Independent variable

We set up three independent variables based on the three explanations of affective
polarization mentioned above: partisan identity, ideological polarization, and partisan
media. First, since partisan identity, which is the core of one's social identity, is directly
related to affective polarization (Kim & Lee 2021), partisan identity should be set up
as an independent variable. However, the survey did not have a question that directly
measured partisan identity, so we used strength of party identification ("partisan
strength") instead. It was measured on a five-point Likert scale by asking, "How long
have you supported your party without changing your party?"
Second, based on previous research suggesting that ideological polarization
reinforces affective polarization (Lelkes 2021; Levendusky 2018; Rogowski &
Sutherland 2016), we included the ideological distance between the two parties as an
independent variable. Since this study only included supporters of these two parties,
we measured the ideological distance between the parties by asking respondents to rate
the parties' ideological positions on an 11-point scale (0 = liberal to 10 = conservative)
and determining the absolute value of the difference between the ideological scores
of the DP and the PPP.
 Affective Polarization in the 2022 South Korean Presidential Election 283

We also measured the respondents' ideological extremity based on previous research

suggesting that ideological extremity is related to affective polarization. The respondents'
ideological extremity was measured by the absolute value of the difference between
their own ideological score on an 11-point scale and the median (5 points). Thus, the
greater the absolute value, the more extreme the voter's political ideology.
The third independent variable measured the respondents' media exposure during
the presidential campaign. We used a 4-point scale (1 = "hardly ever" to 4 = "very
often") to measure how often the respondents encountered news about corruption or
immoral behavior involving the two presidential candidates (Yoon Seuk-yol of the PPP
and Lee Jae-myung of the DP) and their families.
We also included two variables that can affect affective polarization. The first was
the candidate the respondent supported in the presidential election. Based on previous
findings that presidential campaigns make partisan competition more salient and that
feelings and support for presidential candidates influence affective polarization
(McLaughlin & Thompson 2020; Singh & Thornton 2024), we included the candidate
the respondent voted for in the 2022 presidential election as an independent variable.
In this study's sample, 52.6% voted for Lee Jae-myung of the DP, 45.7% for Yoon
Seok-yeol of the PPP, 0.8% for Shim Sang-jung of the Justice Party, and 0.8% for
other candidates.
The second variable was political interest, which is an important factor in shaping
one's level of political sophistication. People with high levels of political sophistication
are likelier to engage in motivated reasoning that reinforces affective polarization (Flynn
et al. 2017; Morris et al. 2003). Political interest was measured on a four-point Likert
scale by asking, "How much are you usually interested in politics?"

(3) Control variable

Socio-demographic characteristics, including gender, age cohort, education,
household income, household wealth, and birthplace, were included as control variables.
For gender, male was represented as 1 and female as 0. Instead of age, age cohort
was included because generational conflicts were significantly highlighted in the 2022
presidential election. Age cohorts were divided into five groups: twenties or younger,
thirties, forties, fifties, and sixties or older. Education and household income were
measured on a 14-point scale and a 10-point scale, respectively.
In addition, household wealth and birthplace were added because economic inequality
based on assets and regional conflicts are important divisions that have deepened
284 Hyunki Shin, Jae-won Yang, Sung Deuk Hahm

political conflicts in South Korea. Household wealth was measured on a 10-point scale,
and birthplace was divided into eight regions.

Ⅳ. Empirical Results

A. Affective Polarization Before and After the 2022 Presidential Election

We examined how the respondents' affective polarization changed before and after
the 2022 presidential election. For all respondents, the pre-election affective polarization
was 52.5, and the post-election affective polarization was 53.9, which was not a
statistically significant difference (t = -1.50, p = 0.13). In other words, there was no
significant change in affective polarization among all respondents during the presidential
election. However, when we broke these data down by partisanship, the story was
different. Figure 1 represents our findings on pre- and post-election affective polarization
along partisan lines.

Figure 1. Affective Polarization before and after the 2022 Presidential Election

As shown in Figure 1, the affective polarization of the DP supporters did not change
significantly, as it was 53.84 before the election and 53.75 after the election. While
 Affective Polarization in the 2022 South Korean Presidential Election 285

there was a statistically significant decrease on the feeling thermometer toward the PPP
(out-party), from 16.8 to 14.7 (t = 2.26, p < 0.05), a similarly large decrease on the
feeling thermometer toward the DP indicated no change in overall affective polarization.
The decrease on the feeling thermometer toward the DP among DP supporters after
the election was likely due to disappointment following the election loss.
On the other hand, PPP supporters' affective polarization increased from 51.1 before
the election to 54.2 after the election, and this difference is statistically significant (t =
-2.31, p < 0.05). For PPP supporters, the decrease on the feeling thermometer toward
the DP from 19.7 to 15.8, which is statistically significant (t = 3.84, p < 0.01), was
likely responsible for the increase in overall affective polarization after the election.
Although there were differences in the changes in overall affective polarization
around the presidential election depending on the respondents' party allegiance, it was
common for supporters of both parties to show a decrease on the feeling thermometer
toward the out-party after the election.

B. Factors Influencing Affective Polarization

We conducted an ordinary least square regression to determine which factors

influenced affective polarization in the 2022 presidential election. We used an
autoregressive model in which pre-election affective polarization was used to predict
post-election affective polarization, with post-election scores regressed on pre-election
scores to control for the influence of prior levels of the variable (Maxwell et al. 2011).
According to Model 1 in Table 1, the variable that influenced post-election affective
polarization was the ideological distance between the two parties; that is, the greater
the perceived ideological distance between the two parties, the greater the respondents'
post-election affective polarization. Another finding pertaining to ideology is that the
more extreme the respondent's ideology, the more affectively polarized they were. This
is consistent with previous findings that ideological extremity influences affective
polarization (Lelkes 2021; Levendusky 2018).
On the other hand, partisan identity variables, such as partisan strength and
supporting party, which have been cited in previous studies as possible causes of
affective polarization, did not have an effect. Media exposure, defined as exposure to
negative news coverage of the presidential candidates and their families during the
election, also had no effect on post-election affective polarization. Researchers have
debated whether partisan identity or ideological polarization is the cause of affective
polarization, but in this study, at least, ideological polarization appeared to be the cause
286 Hyunki Shin, Jae-won Yang, Sung Deuk Hahm

of affective polarization.

Table 1. Factors Influencing Post-election Affective Polarization in the 2022 Presidential Election
Model 1 Model 2
β Standard Error β Standard Error
Partisan strength 0.97 0.89 0.93 0.89
PPP supporter -3.04 5.03 -2.77 5.02
Ideological distance 2.12*** 0.33 2.16*** 0.33
Ideological extremity 3.00*** 0.64 -0.32 1.39
Media exposure 0.07 1.36 -0.14 1.36
Candidate supported (ref. = the rest)
Lee Jae-myung 9.89 8.94 9.09 8.99
Yoon Suk-yeol 14.13 8.73 13.22 8.80
Shim Sang-jung 20.96 11.88 20.81 11.96
Political interest 3.95*** 1.43 3.95*** 1.42
Pre-election affective polarization 0.48*** 0.03 0.49*** 0.03
Male -0.12 1.57 -0.15 1.56
Age (ref. = 40s)
20s and under 5.64 2.93 -5.04 5.26
30s 1.18 2.77 -6.10 4.68
50s 6.17** 2.55 -2.93 4.54
Over 60s 6.36*** 2.38 0.11 3.98
Age * Ideological extremity
20s and under * Ideological extremity 5.48** 2.21
30s * Ideological extremity 3.77** 1.87
50s * Ideological extremity 4.50** 1.79
Over 60s * Ideological extremity 3.27** 1.63
Education -0.07 0.38 -0.09 0.38
Household income 0.50 0.41 0.57 0.41
Household wealth -0.59 0.38 -0.63 0.38
Birthplace (ref. = Seoul) Coefficients are dropped
Constant -17.19 11.45 -9.75 11.79
N 593 593
Adj R-squared 0.56 0.56
F value 30.63*** 26.93***
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05

Other factors that affected affective polarization included political interest,

pre-election affective polarization, and age cohort: the stronger the political interest
 Affective Polarization in the 2022 South Korean Presidential Election 287

and the higher the level of pre-election affective polarization, the stronger the affective
polarization. In addition, affective polarization was higher among those in their 50s
and 60s than among those in their 40s.
In Model 2, we represented the interaction between ideological extremity and age
cohort to analyze whether there was an interaction effect between these two variables.
Model 2 shows that, while the effects of the variables that were statistically significant
in Model 1 were maintained, the interaction effect between ideological extremity and
age cohort was statistically significant, meaning that affective polarization increased
with ideological extremity in all age cohorts except the forties. The highest marginal
effect was 5.15 for those in their twenties, followed by 4.17 for those in their fifties,
3.44 for those in their thirties, and 2.94 for those in their 60s and older. These marginal
effects are all statistically significant. By contrast, ideological extremity did not increase
affective polarization among those in their forties.

C. Political Effects of Affective Polarization

When dividing the effects of affective polarization at the individual level into political
and non-political types, previous studies in South Korea have either rarely analyzed
the political effects of affective polarization or reported that it has no effects (Kim &
Lee 2021; Lee 2022). In particular, regarding the political effects, concerns have been
raised that increasing affective polarization is associated with lower levels of trust in
democratic norms and political institutions (Graham & Svolik 2020; Kingzette et al.
2021), but few studies have empirically tested these speculations (Broockman et al.
2022; Kingzette et al. 2021).
In this study, we investigated how affective polarization impacts individuals' political
attitudes, including their satisfaction with democracy, perception of electoral fairness,
and trust in political institutions. The three types of political attitudes were measured
in the following ways. First, satisfaction with democracy was measured on an 11-point
Likert scale by asking, "How satisfied are you with democracy in South Korea?" Second,
election fairness was measured on a four-point Likert scale by asking, "How much
do you agree with the statement that this election was fair and free?" Finally, there
are two types of political trust: trust in the political institutions of the state (including
the cabinet, parliament, and political parties) and trust in the neutral institutions of
the state (including the courts, police, and civil service) (Newton et al. 2018; Warren
2018). Therefore, we chose the central government and parliament as political
institutions, and the courts and prosecution were taken as neutral institutions. Trust
288 Hyunki Shin, Jae-won Yang, Sung Deuk Hahm

in these four institutions was measured using a four-point Likert scale, and all three
types of political attitudes were rescaled as values ranging from 0-100.
To assess whether affective polarization affects individuals' political attitudes, we
regressed each political attitude on an indicator of PPP support, post-election affective
polarization, and determined the interaction of the two to capture heterogeneous effects
by party, as advised by previous research (Broockman et al. 2022; Kingzette et al.
2021). A number of control variables used in the model are presented in Table 1:
partisan strength, ideological distance, media exposure, candidate supported, ideological
extremity, and political interest. We also include all socio-demographic variables except
birthplace.
Table 2 presents the effect of affective polarization on individuals' political attitudes.
It shows that post-election affective polarization has had an effect on trust in courts
and prosecution: affectively polarized DP supporters had significantly lower trust in
courts and prosecution. Most importantly, the interaction between post-election affective
polarization and PPP supporters was statistically significant and negative, suggesting
that affectively polarized PPP supporters move in the opposite direction to DP supporters
in their political attitudes. With the exception of trust in the courts, where there was
no significant interaction effect, satisfaction with democracy, perception of election
fairness, and trust in the central government, parliament, and prosecution moved in
opposite directions for DP supporters and PPP supporters.
PPP supporters were less satisfied with democracy and believed more strongly that
the election was unfair as their affective polarization increased. In terms of trust in
political institutions, PPP supporters were less trusting of the central government and
parliament as affective polarization increased. Satisfaction with democracy, belief in
the fairness of elections, and trust in political institutions are common underpinnings
of political systems across partisan lines (Garzia et al. 2023; Graham & Svolik 2020;
Kingzette et al. 2021). We found that, when the party they supported became the
governing party, they expressed satisfaction and trust in that common ground, but when
the party they opposed became the governing party, they expressed dissatisfaction and
distrust. This polarization of political attitudes is clearly illustrated in Figure 2.
This polarization was even more evident when looking at trust in the prosecution.
In contrast to trust in the central government, PPP supporters' trust in the prosecution
did not change significantly as affective polarization increased, while DP supporters'
trust in the prosecution decreased significantly as affective polarization increased. In
the case of the prosecution, it is believed that affectively polarized DP supporters were
less trusting because Yoon Seok-yeol, the PPP's presidential candidate, served as a
 Affective Polarization in the 2022 South Korean Presidential Election 289

prosecutor general and was at odds with the DP's governing administration.

Table 2. Effects of Affective Polarization on Political Attitudes

Satisfaction Perception Political Trust

with of Election Central
Democracy Fairness Government Parliament Court Prosecution

Affective polarization 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.00 -0.24*** -0.26***

PPP supporter -5.04 -4.81 -9.03 -1.72 -1.72 12.31
PPP supporter * Affective
-0.15** -0.45*** -0.18*** -0.14** 0.13 0.21***
polarization
Partisan strength 0.83 2.27 1.49 0.05 0.76 -0.14
Ideological distance -0.06 -1.02 -0.18 -0.64 0.31 0.79
Ideological extremity -0.57 1.04 0.68 0.97 -0.52 -0.73
Media exposure 0.43 -4.57** -2.57 -3.80** -1.01 -3.87**
Candidate supported (ref. = the
rest)
Lee Jae-myung -13.17 -11.49 -2.23 3.05 20.99 14.55
Yoon Suk-yeol -9.38 -15.34 0.73 5.05 28.59** 19.27
Shim Sang-jung -12.14 2.44 3.16 1.58 37.32** 19.99
Political Interest 0.45 -0.40 1.07 1.30 -3.52 -4.44**
Male -1.16 2.20 0.92 -5.97*** -2.19 -4.06**
Age (ref. = 40s)
20s and under -0.89 -5.09 -1.62 0.84 6.06 10.27***
30s 0.32 -1.45 -2.88 -0.76 -0.73 1.59
50s 1.23 0.82 0.27 -3.76 -1.65 0.24
Over 60s 2.87 9.55*** 3.25 -0.36 3.40 4.93
Education -1.04** 0.23 -0.19 -0.42 0.12 0.35
Household income 0.27 -1.01 -0.68 -0.12 0.33 1.01**
Household wealth 0.56 0.51 0.19 -0.12 -0.19 -0.05
Constant 75.60*** 75.76*** 58.26*** 49.26*** 34.36** 29.43***
N 593 593 593 593 593 593
Adj R-squared 0.05 0.32 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.35
F value 2.45*** 15.37*** 6.54*** 3.18*** 4.44*** 17.44***
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05
290 Hyunki Shin, Jae-won Yang, Sung Deuk Hahm

Figure 2. The Party-conditioned Relationship between Affective Polarization and Political Attitudes

In sum, the effects of affective polarization on individuals' political attitudes,

including satisfaction with democracy, perception of electoral fairness, and trust in
political institutions, are differentially affected by individuals' partisanship. People are
more trusting and satisfied when the party they support is in power, but assume the
opposite attitude when it is not.

Ⅴ. Conclusion and Discussion

This study analyzes how the affective polarization of supporters of two parties, the
 Affective Polarization in the 2022 South Korean Presidential Election 291

DP and the PPP, changed from before the 2022 South Korean presidential election
to afterwards, what drove this affective polarization, and how it affected the supporters'
political attitudes. Given that the 2022 presidential election was one of the most unlikable
presidential elections in history, with high levels of hostility on both sides toward the
opposing party's candidates, it is of particular importance to see how the affective
polarization of supporters of both parties changed over the course of the election.
In this study, we measured affective polarization using the most common method
in the literature, the feeling thermometer rating method, which measures affective
polarization as the difference between the attributed position on the feeling thermometer
of the supported party and that of the opposing party. While there was no significant
difference between pre-election and post-election affective polarization for all
respondents, differences were discovered along partisan lines: DP supporters' affective
polarization did not change significantly, but PPP supporters' affective polarization
increased significantly after the election (pre-election: 51.1 → post-election: 54.2).
However, regardless of which party was supported, we found that favoritism toward
the opposition party decreased after the election.
In analyzing the causes of this shift in affective polarization after the 2022
presidential election, we found that the greater the perceived ideological differences
between the two parties and the more extreme the respondent's ideology, the greater
the affective polarization after the election. While ideological polarization, partisan
identity, and partisan media have been identified as causes of affective polarization
in previous research, in this study, which limited its analysis to the 2022 presidential
election, only ideology-related variables caused affective polarization.
Whether the absence of effects of partisan identity or partisan media in this study
is due to the specificity of the 2022 presidential election needs to be further explored,
as there may be other explanations. We found that the more strongly people perceive
the ideological differences between their party and the opposition, the more affectively
polarized they become. However, this finding presents an ironic problem. People who
recognize the ideological differences between the two parties and are able to compare
their ideological positions are what political scientists call "good citizens." The irony
is that good citizens are more likely to be affectively polarized.
Age cohort was also found to influence affective polarization in the setting of this
presidential election. When we analyzed the interaction between age cohort and
ideological extremity, we found that increasing ideological extremity was associated
with increasing affective polarization for all age cohorts except those in their forties.
Previous studies in South Korea have reported that affective polarization affects
292 Hyunki Shin, Jae-won Yang, Sung Deuk Hahm

non-political everyday life, such as relationships with coworkers, friends, and romantic
partners, but have not provided clear empirical results regarding how it affects political
principles, such as individuals' democratic norms and trust in political institutions. In
contrast, this study shows that respondents' political attitudes, such as satisfaction with
democracy, perception of electoral fairness, and trust in political institutions, vary
depending on whether the party they support is the governing party.
That is, when the party an individual supports becomes the governing party, they
express satisfaction with democratic norms and trust in political institutions, but when
the party they oppose becomes the governing party, they express dissatisfaction and
distrust. Thus, the key contribution of this study is its empirical demonstration that
affective polarization polarizes democratic norms and trust in political institutions along
partisan lines.
In South Korea, there is a debate about whether affective polarization exists at the
level of the general public. This study shows that there were differences in affective
polarization by party support during the 2022 presidential election, but it is unclear
whether this is a temporary or long-term phenomenon. Another limitation is that, unlike
previous studies, we did not find the effects of partisan identity and partisan media
to be drivers of affective polarization.
While the effects of the ideological polarization of both parties and ideological
extremity were identified as causes of affective polarization, this study does not reveal
whether this is due to specific features of the 2022 election or other causes. A further
limitation of this study is that, while it analyzes the causes and consequences of affective
polarization during the election, it does not propose a solution to affective polarization.
While the findings of this study suggest that both parties need to compete for the
ideological center to weaken affective polarization, and that individuals need to work
on reducing their ideological extremity, it does not discuss the solution to affective
polarization in depth. This should be further explored in future research.
Nevertheless, our analysis is noteworthy for examining the factors that influenced
affective polarization in the 2022 South Korean presidential election and its political
effects. Our empirical findings also shed further light on the global resurgence of
affective polarization, implying that self-serving politicians can exploit it for their own
political interests. As we observed in Bolsonaro's victory in Brazil in 2018 and Trump's
victory in the U.S. in 2016, affective polarization can have serious ramifications,
particularly in times of political turmoil.
 Affective Polarization in the 2022 South Korean Presidential Election 293

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