SECTION BH UNIVERSITY OF CEBU ATTY.

ALIMANGOHAN

Instructions:

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Topic E (Property) = May 2, Monday, 7pm;
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# DOCTRINE:

Topic: FACTS:

Digested by: ISSUE:

RULING:

# DOCTRINE:

Topic: FACTS:

Digested by: ISSUE:

RULING:

E. Property
 #48 Laurel v. DOCTRINE:
Garcia, G.R.
No. 92013 (25 FACTS: The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in
July 1990) Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations
Agreement entered into with Japan, the other lots being:
Topic: ● The Nampeidai Property and is at present the site of the Philippine
Property Embassy Chancery;
● Kobe Commercial Property, categorized as a commercial lot now
Digested by: being used as a warehouse and parking lot for the consulate staff;
Cagampang, and
Emi Leah ● Kobe Residential Property, a residential lot which is now vacant.

The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the
Japanese government for national development projects are part of the
indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and
their suffering during World War II.

The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550

million would be payable in twenty (20) years. Rep. Act No. 1789, the
Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on procurement and
utilization of reparations and development loans. The procurements are
divided into those for use by the government sector and those for private
parties in projects as the then National Economic Council shall determine.
Those intended for the private sector shall be made available by sale to
Filipino citizens or to one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities in
national development projects.

The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under
the Second Year Schedule and listed under the heading "Government
Sector"; it consists of the land and building "for the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy". As intended, it became the site of the Philippine
Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi
building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to
provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped
since that time.

A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former

Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the
subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation —
which shall construct two (2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in
Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The
consideration of the construction would be the lease to the foreign
corporation of one (1) of the buildings to be constructed in Roppongi and the
two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The other building in Roppongi shall then be
used as the Philippine Embassy Chancery. At the end of the lease period, all
the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine
government. No change of ownership or title shall occur. The Philippine
government retains the title all throughout the lease period and thereafter.
However, the government has not acted favorably on this proposal which is
pending approval and ratification between the parties. Instead, President
Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine
government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through Administrative
Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.
The President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino
citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the
event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the
Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.

Petitioner Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047, apart from questioning the authority of
the government to alienate the Roppongi property assails the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 296 in making the property available for sale to
non-Filipino citizens and entities. He also questions the bidding procedures of
the Committee on the Utilization or Disposition of Philippine Government
Properties in Japan for being discriminatory against Filipino citizens and
Filipino-owned entities by denying them the right to be informed about the
bidding requirements.

In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi property and
the related lots were acquired as part of the reparations from the Japanese
government for diplomatic and consular use by the Philippine government.
Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one
of public dominion, and not of private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil
Code.

The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying
that the subject property is not governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of
Japan where the property is located. They rely upon the rule of lex situs
which is used in determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition,
transfer and devolution of the title to a property. They also invoke Opinion
No. 21, Series of 1988, dated January 27, 1988 of the Secretary of Justice
which used the lex situs in explaining the inapplicability of Philippine law
regarding a property situated in Japan.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Roppongi property is one of public dominion and thus,
cannot be alienated.
2. WON the conflict of law rule should apply.

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the Roppongi property is one of public dominion and thus,
cannot be alienated.

The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is

expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations
Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind
both the Philippine government and the Japanese government.

There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is

convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This,
the respondents have failed to do.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the

commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special
collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to
the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group.
The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the
citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot
 be the object of appropration.

The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of

Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and
intended for some public service.

Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property
been changed because the lot has been Idle for some years? Has it
become patrimonial?

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time
for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the
property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be
part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.

A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is

not relinquishment of the Roppongi property's original purpose. Even
the failure by the government to repair the building in Roppongi
is not abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a
shortage of government funds. The recent Administrative Orders
authorizing a study of the status and conditions of government
properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did
not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the
properties.

Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an "authority to

sell", does not have a provision in its text expressly authorizing
the sale of the four properties procured from Japan for the
government sector. The executive order does not declare that the
properties lost their public character. It merely intends to make the
properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of
a sale, lease or other disposition. It merely eliminates the
restriction under Rep. Act No. 1789 that reparations goods may be
sold only to Filipino citizens and one hundred (100%) percent
Filipino-owned entities.

Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong premise or

assumption that the Roppongi and the three other properties were
earlier converted into alienable real properties. As earlier stated, Rep.
Act No. 1789 differentiates the procurements for the government
sector and the private sector (Sections 2 and 12, Rep. Act No. 1789).
Only the private sector properties can be sold to end-users who must
be Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality
provision which was amended by Executive Order No. 296.

2. No, the conflict of law should not apply.

A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over
the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take
and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential
validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a
 conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land
ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic
law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law
should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists. The issues are
not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question
that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the
authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of
property belonging to the State. And the validity of the
procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by
Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light
on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does
not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through
reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell
them. In discussing who is capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary
merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who
can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on
acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and
entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in
belaboring whether or not this opinion is correct. Why should we
discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no showing
that it can be sold?

The subsequent approval by President Aquino of the recommendation

by the investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was
premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid change in the
public character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the approval
does not have the force and effect of law since the President already
lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already convened for
more than a year.

Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is
no longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the
respondents.

There is no law authorizing its conveyance.

Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides that,

“Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party shall be
submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same.” The
requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987.

It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government
on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence.
#49 Holy See
v. Rosario, FULL TEXT :
G.R. No. [Link]
101949
(December 1, DOCTRINE: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a
1994) private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of
the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the
Topic: activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged
Property regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be
tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an
Digested by: incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not
Aquino, Zaira undertaken for gain or profit

FACTS:

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting

of 6,000 square meters (Lot 5-A, TCT No. 390440) located in the Municipality
of Parañaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner Holy
See. Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by
TCT Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in the name of the
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon
Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers.
Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to a private respondent.

In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to

private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the
responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters.
Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot
5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).

Respondent filed a complaint for annulment of the sale of the three

parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner,
represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr.
Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana. Some of the allegations were: (1) the
Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D were already sold to Ramon Licup at the price of
P1,240.00 per square meters; and (2) the agreement to sell was made on
the condition that earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the
sellers, and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters who were then
occupying the same.

The petitioner however failed to evict the squatters, proposing instead

that private respondent undertake the eviction or that the earnest money be
returned to the latter. Private respondent counter-proposed that if it
would undertake the eviction of the squatters, the purchase price of the
lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square meter.
The petitioner returned the earnest money but still demanded the payment in
full price.

Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of
Sale between petitioner and the PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana on the
other; (2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; (3) specific performance
of the agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots; and (4)
damages.
 Petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the
complaint — petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit.

Private respondent contends that the doctrine of non-suability is not

anymore absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak
when, of its own free will, it entered into a commercial transaction for the sale
of a parcel of land located in the Philippines.

The trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner's

motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign
immunity by entering into the business contract in question. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Holy See is immune from suit in so far as its business
relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity.

RULING: Yes. The Holy See is immune from suit because the disposal of
the lot is clothed with a governmental character, that is , for the
construction of the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio.

In dealing with cases involving foreign government or foreign

sovereign, the usual test we consider is whether the activity is performed
in its official/ governmental function (jure imperii) or commercial (jure
gestionis) in nature. However, this is not the ultimate test in the absence
of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered
"commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis. Thus, we have to come
out with our own guidelines.

The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private

party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the
inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the
activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged
regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be
tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not
undertaken for gain or profit.

In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the
ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be
categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the
acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but
claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.

Lot 5-A was acquired by the petitioner as a donation from the

Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose,
but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the
Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or
personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of
its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22).

The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal

 thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not
sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same
because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner
to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have
occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to
leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the

complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.

NOTES:

● Absolute and Restrictive Theory : There are two conflicting

concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign
cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of
another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts
or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or
acts jure gestionis

● Pleading Sovereign Immunity in the Philippines: In Public

International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to
plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests
the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court
that said defendant is entitled to immunity. In the Philippines, the
practice is for the foreign government or the international organization
to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its
endorsement to the courts varies. In the case at bench, the The Court
allowed the DFA to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's
claim of sovereign immunity.

#50 Salvacion CASE LINK:

v. Central [Link]
Bank, G.R. No.
94723 (21 DOCTRINE:
August 1997)
FACTS:
Topic: Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner
Property Karen Salvacion, 12 years old, to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg
Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989
Digested by: and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day
Baclayon, on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the
Ruchi Makati Municipal Jail after policemen and people living nearby rescued
Karen.

Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli, for
Serious Illegal Detention and for 4 counts of Rape. On the same day,
petitioners filed with the RTC of Makati for damages with preliminary
attachment against Greg Bartelli. The Judge issued an Order granting the
application of petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment.

The Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China

Banking Corporation. China Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act
No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it. Deputy
Sheriff of Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply saying that the
garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure
is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a
court order which has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis.

China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits or
defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body, whatsoever.

Petitioners assailed Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 providing
that “Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.” should be
adjudged as unconstitutional on the grounds
● that it has taken away the right to have the bank deposit of defendant
Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in
petitioners’ favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed
by the Constitution;
● that the Monetary Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 has exceeded its delegated quasi-legislative power
when it took away the plaintiff’s substantive right to have the claim
sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of
preliminary attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised ROC,
and
● the plaintiff’s substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied by
way of the writ of execution out of the bank deposit of the judgment
debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which is beyond its power to do so.

Respondent Central Bank commented that the Monetary Board in issuing

Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power or authority
because the subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No.
6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that
grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency
deposits, but the law itself. Additionally, the Central Bank said that one
reason for exempting the foreign currency deposits from attachment,
garnishment or any other order process of any court, is to assure the
development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit
System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines.

ISSUE:

WON Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A.
6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency
 Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient.

RULING: NO

Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not

the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given
incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for
a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank
only for a short time.

Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He

deposited his dollars with respondent China Banking Corporation only for
safekeeping during his temporary stay in the Philippines.

In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if the Court ruled that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice
would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like
accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code
which provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail. "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de
otro." Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of
those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of
conscience.

Moreover, it would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central

Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for
wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the
innocent.

The provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.

#51 Orion DOCTRINE:

Savings Bank
v Shigekane FACTS: Respondent Suzuki, a Japanese national, met with Ms. Soneja to
Suzuki, GR inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer,
205487, 12 Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Kang, a Korean national and a
Nov 2014 Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.

Topic: At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot
Property No. 42 were for sale and assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the
parking slot were clean.
Digested by:
Cagampang, After payment of the price of the unit and parking slot, Kang then executed a
Emi Leah Deed of Absolute Sale. Suzuki took possession of the condominium unit and
parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior of the condominium
unit.

Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles
to the properties, which were then allegedly in possession of Perez (Orion’s
Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed
to deliver the documents. Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the
country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the properties with the
Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.

Before long, Suzuki learned that the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained
no annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This
notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President Perez,
certified that Kang had fully paid the purchase price of condo unit and the
parking slot. The title to the condominium unit had no existing encumbrance,
except for an annotation which provided that any conveyance or
encumbrance thereof shall be subject to approval by the Philippine
Retirement Authority (PRA), and a mortgage in favor of Orion for a loan
which was subsequently cancelled. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage
to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez.

To protect his interests, Suzuki thenexecuted an Affidavit of Adverse Claim

with the Registry of Deeds. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles
but Orion refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s
legal counsel as its reason.

RTC: ruled in favor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos.
18186 and 9118 to Suzuki. It found that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser
for value whose rights over the properties prevailed over Orion’s. The RTC
further noted that Suzuki exerted efforts to verify the status of the properties
but he did not find any existing encumbrance inthe titles. Although Orion
claims to have purchased the property by way of a Dacion en Pago, Suzuki
only learned about it two (2) months after he bought the properties because
Orion never bothered to register or annotate the Dacion en Pagoin CCT Nos.
18186 and 9116.

CA: partially granted Orion’s appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as it
upheld Suzuki’s right over the properties.

ISSUE: WON Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and
void. Under Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should be
made with the consent of both spouses.

RULING: No, Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property.

It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively

subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. The reason is
found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility. Immovables
are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over them
have their natural center of gravity there.

Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are
determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone
prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person to another, or
by which an interest therein can be gained or lost. This general principle
includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable
property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other
conveyances.
This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating
to immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an
instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is
incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his
domicile and by the law of the place where the instrument is actually made,
his capacity is undoubted.

On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed

principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The
foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the
judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know
only domestic or the law of the forum.

To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court which reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents

referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
inwhich the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 25. What attestation ofcopy must state. — Whenever a copy of

a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court.

Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall
be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature
of the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven
as a fact.

In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law
on the conjugal ownership ofproperty. It merely attached a "Certification from
the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law.
This certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of
the property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated bythe
seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.

Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach

or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not
 pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law
is the same as Philippine Law.

Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook
Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the
import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties
as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook
Jung.

We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that registration
of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the
possibility of it being conjugal or community property. In those cases,
however, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name
of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties.
Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in
favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.

#52 W Land
Holdings Inc v DOCTRINE
Starwoods
Hotel, GR Mere use of a mark on a website which can be accessed anywhere in the
222366, 4 Dec world will not automatically mean that the mark has been used in the ordinary
2017 course of trade of a particular country. Thus, the use of mark on the internet
must be shown to result into a within-State sale, or at the very least,
Topic: discernibly intended to target customers that reside in that country. This being
Property so, the use of the mark on an interactive website, for instance, may be said to
target local customers when they contain specific details regarding or
Digested by: pertaining to the target State, sufficiently showing an intent towards realizing
Dobrea, Errol a within-State commercial activity or interaction.

FACTS

Petitioner: W Land

Respondent: Starwood

Nature of action: Petition for cancellation of Starwood’s (trade) mark for

non-use.

Trademark involved: “W” mark

December 2005 - Starwood filed before the IPO an application for registration
of the trademark "W" for Classes 43 and 44 of the International Classification
of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks (Nice
Classification).

April 2006 - W Land applied for the registration of its own "W" mark for Class
36, which thereby prompted Starwood to oppose the same.
February 2007 - Starwood’s s application was granted and thus, the "W"
mark was registered in its name. BLA found merit in Starwood's opposition,
and ruled that W Land's "W" mark is confusingly similar with Starwood's
mark, which had an earlier filing date.

W Lands’ argument:

…claiming that Starwood has failed to use its mark in the Philippines
because it has no hotel or establishment in the Philippines rendering the
services covered by its registration; and that Starwood's "W" mark application
and registration barred its own "'W" mark application and registration for use
on real estate.

Starwood’s counter-argument:

Starwood denied having abandoned the subject mark on the ground of

non-use, asserting that it filed with the Director of Trademarks a notarized
Declaration of Actual Use (DAU) with evidence of use on December 2, 2008,
which was not rejected.

IPO BLA (Bureau of Legal Affairs) Ruling:

BLA ruled in W Land's favor, and accordingly ordered the cancellation of

Starwood's registration for the "W" mark. The BLA found that the DAU and
the attachments thereto submitted by Starwood did not prove actual use of
the "W" mark in the Philippines, considering that the "evidences of use"
attached to the DAU refer to hotel or establishments that are located abroad.

IPO DG (Director General) Ruling:

Grants the appeal. IPO DG found that Starwood's submission of its DAU and
attachments, coupled by the acceptance thereof by the IPO Bureau of
Trademarks, shows that the "W" mark still bears a "registered" status.
Therefore, there is a presumption that Starwood sufficiently complied with the
registration requirements for its mark.

CA Ruling:

CA affirmed the IPO DG ruling. At the onset, the CA observed that the hotel
business is peculiar in nature in that the offer, as well as the acceptance of
room reservations or bookings wherever in the world is an indispensable
element. As such, the actual existence or presence of a hotel in one place is
not necessary before it can be considered as doing business therein.
ISSUE

WON physical business presence in the Philippines is required for the use of
trademark.

HELD

No.

The actual use of the mark representing the goods or services introduced
and transacted in commerce over a period of time creates that goodwill which
the law seeks to protect. For this reason, the IP Code, under Section 124.2,
requires the registrant or owner of a registered mark to declare "actual use of
the mark" (DAU) and present evidence of such use within the prescribed
period. Failing in which, the IPO DG may cause the motu propio removal
from the register of the mark's registration. Also, any person, believing that
"he or she will be damaged by the registration of a mark," which has not been
used within the Philippines, may file a petition for cancellation. Following the
basic rule that he who alleges must prove his case, the burden lies on the
petitioner to show damage and non-use.

The IP Code and the Trademark Regulations have not specifically defined
"use." However, it is understood that the "use" which the law requires to
maintain the registration of a mark must be genuine, and not merely token.
Based on foreign authorities, genuine use may be characterized as a bona
fide use which results or tends to result, in one way or another, into a
commercial interaction or transaction "in the ordinary course of trade."

The Trademark Regulations was amended by Office Order No. 056-13.

Particularly, Rule 205 now mentions certain items which "shall be accepted
as proof of actual use of the mark:"

RULE 205. Contents of the Declaration and Evidence of Actual Use.

—

xxx

(c) The following shall be accepted as proof of actual use of the

mark: (1) labels of the mark as these are used; (2) downloaded
pages from the website of the applicant or registrant clearly
showing that the goods are being sold or the services are being
rendered in the Philippines; (3) photographs (including digital
photographs printed on ordinary paper) of goods bearing the marks
as these are actually used or of the stamped or marked container of
goods and of the establishment/s where the services are being
rendered; (4) brochures or advertising materials showing the actual
use of the mark on the goods being sold or services being rendered in
the Philippines; (5) for online sale, receipts of sale of the goods or
services rendered or other similar evidence of use, showing that
the goods are placed on the market or the services are available
 in the Philippines or that the transaction took place in the
Philippines; (6) copies of contracts for services showing the use of
the mark. Computer printouts of the drawing or reproduction of marks
will not be accepted as evidence of use.

(d) The Director may, from time to time, issue a list of acceptable
evidence of use and those that will not be accepted by the Office.

Based on the amended Trademark Regulations, it is apparent that the IPO

has now given due regard to the advent of commerce on the internet.
Specifically, it now recognizes, among others, "downloaded pages from the
website of the applicant or registrant clearly showing that the goods are being
sold or the services are being rendered in the Philippines," as well as "for
online sale, receipts of sale of the goods or services rendered or other similar
evidence of use, showing that the goods are placed on the market or the
services are available in the Philippines or that the transaction took place in
the Philippines," as acceptable proof of actual use. Truly, the Court discerns
that these amendments are but an inevitable reflection of the realities of the
times. In Mirpuri v. CA, this Court noted that "[a]dvertising on the Net and
cybershopping are turning the Internet into a commercial marketplace:"

The Internet is a decentralized computer network linked together

through routers and communications protocols that enable anyone
connected to it to communicate with others likewise connected,
regardless of physical location. Users of the Internet have a wide
variety of communication methods available to them and a
tremendous wealth of information that they may access. The growing
popularity of the Net has been driven in large part by the World Wide
Web, i.e., a system that facilitates use of the Net by sorting through
the great mass of information available on it. Advertising on the Net
and cybershopping are turning the Internet into a commercial
marketplace.

xxx

Goodwill is no longer confined to the territory of actual market

penetration; it extends to zones where the marked article has
been fixed in the public mind through advertising. Whether in the
print, broadcast or electronic communications medium,
particularly on the Internet, advertising has paved the way for
growth and expansion of the product by creating and earning a
reputation that crosses over borders, virtually turning the whole
world into one vast marketplace.

It must be emphasized, however, that the mere exhibition of goods or

services over the internet, without more, is not enough to constitute actual
use. To reiterate, the "use" contemplated by law is genuine use - that is, a
bona fide kind of use tending towards a commercial transaction in the
ordinary course of trade. Since the internet creates a borderless marketplace,
it must be shown that the owner has actually transacted, or at the very least,
intentionally targeted customers of a particular jurisdiction in order to be
considered as having used the trade mark in the ordinary course of his trade
in that country. A showing of an actual commercial link to the country is
 therefore imperative.

Mere use of a mark on a website which can be accessed anywhere in the

world will not automatically mean that the mark has been used in the ordinary
course of trade of a particular country. Thus, the use of mark on the internet
must be shown to result into a within-State sale, or at the very least,
discernibly intended to target customers that reside in that country. This being
so, the use of the mark on an interactive website, for instance, may be
said to target local customers when they contain specific details
regarding or pertaining to the target State, sufficiently showing an
intent towards realizing a within-State commercial activity or
interaction.

Starwood's "W" mark is registered for Classes 43, i.e., for hotel, motel, resort
and motor inn services, hotel reservation services, restaurant, bar and
catering services, food and beverage preparation services, cafe and cafeteria
services, provision of conference, meeting and social function facilities, under
the Nice Classification.

Starwood submitted in 2008 its DAU with evidence of use which the IPO,
through its Director of Trademarks and later by the IPO DG in the January 10,
2014 Decision, had accepted and recognized as valid. The Court finds no
reason to disturb this recognition. According to jurisprudence, administrative
agencies, such as the IPO, by means of their special knowledge and
expertise over matters falling within their jurisdiction are in a better position to
pass judgment on this issue.

F. Personal Law, Nationality and Domicile

#53 Republic LINK: [Link]
Act No. 9225,
Retention and Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003 AN ACT MAKING THE
Reacquisition CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN
of Citizenship CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT. AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
Act (2003) COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Topic:
Personal Law, Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine
Nationality and Congress Assembled:
Domicile
Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention
Digested by: and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."
Eso,Jun
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the

contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have
re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance
to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws
and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate,

illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who
re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed
citizenship of the Philippines.

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and
other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted
authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce
their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice;
and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of
which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in
the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.

Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held

unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby
shall remain valid and effective.

Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and

regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15)
 days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of
general circulation

#54 Templeton DOCTRINE: The second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only
v. when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in property
Government, within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
59 Phil. 293
(1933) FACTS:

Topic: Allison D. Gibbs and his wife Eva Johnson Gibbs are both citizens of
Personal Law, California and domiciled therein since their marriage in July 1906. There was
Nationality and no antenuptial marriage contract between the parties and during the
Domicile existence their marriage the spouses acquired lands in the Philippine Islands,
as conjugal property.
Digested by:
Facundo, On November 28, 1929, Mrs. Gibbs died and that in accordance with
Ardiane the law of California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of
California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband,
belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration. In
intestate proceedings, Allison D. Gibbs, on September 22, 1930, filed an ex
parte petition.

The court granted said petition and entered a decree adjudicating the said
Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and absolute owner of said lands, applying
section 1401 of the Civil Code of California.

When this decree was presented to the Register of Deeds of Manila and
demanded for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title, it declined to
accept as binding said decree of court and refused to register the transfer of
title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the
corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid.

Thereupon, Allison filed in the saidc ourt a petition for an order

requiring the said register of deeds "to issue the corresponding
titles" to the petitioner without requiring previous payment of any
inheritance tax.

ISSUE:

WON Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death is the owner of
adescendible interest in the Philippine lands

RULING:

The second paragraph Article 10 of the Civil Code provides:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of

succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the
intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
 the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of
the property or the country in which it may be situated.

The second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary

succession has taken place in the Philippines and in accordance with the law
of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to
the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in other
words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the
deceased was vested with a descendible interest in property within the
jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.

This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our

Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation
of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is
situated.

Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested in
Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in
question must be determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae. It is
admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as
community property of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife.
Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that
of her husband. It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of
the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of
herhusband, in the Philippine lands covered by certificates of title Nos.
20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of their acquisition to the date of
her death.

The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid

was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission
plainly falls within the language of Section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of
the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. It is unnecessary
in this proceeding to determine the "order of succession" or the "extent
of the successional rights" (Article 10, Civil Code, supra) which would
be regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of Californiawhich was in
effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.

#55 Alcanta v. DOCTRINE:

Secretary of There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a person actually
Interior, 61 resides. "Each case must depend on its particular facts or circumstances.
Phil. 459 Three rules are well established: first, that a man must have a residence or
(1935) domicile somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a
new one is acquired; and third, a man can have but one domicil at a time.
Topic:
Personal Law, FACTS:
Nationality and This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioners for a writ of
Domicile mandamus to compel the respondents "to register and inscribe the petitioners
as qualified electors at the electoral precinct at Balala, Culion, Palawan, in
Digested by: order that they can vote in the plebiscite to be held on May 14, 1935, on the
Falcone, Jon vital question of the acceptance or rejection of the Constitution for the
Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands."

The petitioners allege that they are qualified voters residing at Culion Leper
Colony, Culion, Palawan, having voted in previous elections in the Philippine
Islands. The petitioners requested, by telegram, the Interior Department to
authorize the Balala Electoral Board of Inspectors, Culion, Palawan, to
register the qualified voters of Culion Leper Colony but this request was
refused upon the ground that the petitioners were not bona fide residents of
Culion, Palawan.

The principal allegation of the respondents, by way of special defense, is

"that the herein petitioners are not qualified voters, because they shall not
have been residents of Culion for six months next preceding the day of
voting, for they have not acquired residence in Culion as they are confined
therein as lepers against their will, and they have no intention to permanently
reside there.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have acquitted a residence for voting purposes
in the municipality in which they desire to vote.

RULING:
Yes, the petitioners have acquitted a residence for voting purposes in the
municipality in which they desire to vote.

There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a person actually
resides. "Each case must depend on its particular facts or circumstances.
Three rules are well established: first, that a man must have a residence or
domicile somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a
new one is acquired; and third, a man can have but one domicil at a time.

There are a large number of people confined in the Culion Leper Colony.
They are not permitted to return to their former homes to vote. They are not
allowed to visit their former homes even though they have been separated
from near and dear relatives who are not afflicted as they are. Assuming that
the petitioners intend to return to their former homes if at some future time
they are cured, this intention does not necessarily defeat their residence
before they actually do return if they have been residents "of the Philippine
Islands for one year and of the municipality in which they offer to vote for six
months next preceding the day of voting." Surely a mere intention to return to
their former homes, a consummation every humane person desires for them,
not realized and which may never be realized should not prevent them, under
the circumstances, from acquiring a residence for voting purposes.

This court is of the opinion that, under our liberal law, such of the petitioners
as have been residents of the Philippine Islands for one year and residents
for six months in the municipality in which they desire to vote and have the
other qualifications prescribed for voters in section 431 of the Revised
Administrative Code and who have none of the disqualifications prescribed in
section 432 of the same Code were entitled to register and vote in the
plebiscite of May 14, 1935.
#56 Vellila v. DOCTRINE:
Posadas, 62
Phil. 624 FACTS: Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen, came to the Philippine Islands
(1935) in 1902 or 1903 and engaged actively in business in these Islands up to the
time of his death in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931. He had no
Topic: business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate consisting
Personal Law, principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the
Nationality and laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other intangibles and
Domicile personal property. He executed in the Philippine Islands a will where he
bequeathed all his property to his only sister, Ida M. Palmer, who then was
Digested by: and still is a citizen and resident of the State of New York, United States of
Fernandez, America. On February 24, 1931, a petition for appointment of special
Klmn administrator of the estate of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody was filed
by W. Maxwell with the Court of First Instance of Manila, the same being
designated as case No. 39113 of said court. Subsequently on April 10, 1931,
a petition was filed by Ida M. Palmer, asking for the probate of said will of the
deceased Arthur Graydon Moody, and the same was, after hearing, duly
probated by the court in a decree dated May 5, 1931. On July 14, 1931, Ida
M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only heiress of the deceased
Arthur Graydon Moody by virtue of an order issued by the court in said case
No. 39113
The property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted principally of
bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the
Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other personal properties, as are more
fully shown in the inventory of April 17, 1931, filed by the special
administrator with the court in said case No. 39113.
On July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for the estate of
the late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax return. On September 9,
1931, an income tax return for the fractional period from January 1, 1931 to
June 30, 1931 was also prepared by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the
estate of the said deceased Arthur Graydon Moody.

On December 3, 1931, the committee on claims and appraisals filed with the
court its report. On October 15, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer
answered the letter of the Collector of Internal Revenue
The estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the sum of
P50,000 on July 22, 1931, and the other sum of P40,019,75 on January 19,
1932, making a total of P90,019,75, of which P77,018.39 covers the
assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41 covers the
assessment for income tax against said estate.

On January 21, 1932, the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled the protest
made by Ida M. Palmer through her attorney.

ISSUE: Where was the legal domicile of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his
death?

RULING: The legal domicile of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death is the
Philippines.

Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place
of their usual residence." To effect the abandonment of one’s domicile, there
 must be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with
actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it
should be one’s fixed and permanent place of abode, one’s home.

In this case, There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that
he had adopted a new domicile while he was absent from Manila. Though he
was physically present for some months in Calcutta prior to the date of his
death there, the appellant does not claim that Moody had a domicile there
although it was precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and cabled that he
wished to sell his business in Manila and that he had no intention to live there
again. Much less plausible is the claim that he established a legal domicile in
Paris in February, 1929. There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had
any fixed abode that he intended to be his permanent home. There is no
evidence that he acquired any property in Paris or engaged in any settled
business on his own account there. There is no evidence of any affirmative
factors that prove the establishment of a legal domicile there. The negative
evidence that he told Cooley that he did not intend to return to Manila does
not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris. His short stay of three
months in Paris is entirely consistent with the view that he was a transient in
Paris for the purpose of receiving treatments at the Pasteur Institute. The
evidence in the record indicates clearly that Moody's continued absence from
his legal domicile in the Philippines was due to and reasonably accounted for
by the same motive that caused his surreptitious departure, namely, to evade
confinement in the Cullion Leper Colony for he doubtless knew that on his
return he would be immediately confined, because his affliction became
graver to us while he was absent than it was on the day of his precipitous
departure and he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where he was
well known, as he might do in foreign parts. The record before us leaves no
doubt in our minds that the "usual residence" of this unfortunate man, whom
appellant describes as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in Manila where he had
lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a century, rather than in any foreign
country he visited during his wanderings up to the date of his death in
Calcutta.

As M’s legal domicile at the time of his death was the Philippine Islands and
his estate had its situs here, the inheritance and income taxes here involved
were lawfully collected.

#57 Gallego v. DOCTRINE:

Vera, 73 Phil.
450 (1941) FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA
affirming the decision of the CFI-Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner’s
Topic: election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of
Personal Law, December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence
Nationality and [Link] is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was
Domicile employed as a school teacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some
municipalities in [Link] 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost.
Digested by: In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of
Garcia, Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the
Charisse previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in September 1940.
Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election
for assemblymen held in December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained
and paid for his residence certificate it was stated that he had resided in the
 said municipality for one and a half years.

Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in
Abuyog at the time he was elected mayor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and
acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

RULING:
NO. In the definition of “residence”in the election law, it states that in order to
acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile.

The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of

time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay
indefinitely because: (1) When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he
always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937;
(2) His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial
drawback caused by his loss in the election; (3) He did not take his wife and
children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and
did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government;
and (5) He visited his family thrice despite the great distance between Leyte
and Bukidnon.

The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence
qualification is to “exclude a stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an
elective office to serve that community.”

Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office
before, and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class
municipality.

#58 DOCTRINE:
Villhermosa v.
Commissioner FACTS:
of
Immigration, In the night of March 24, 1947, a party of sixty-nine Chinese landed
G.R. No. clandestinely on the shores of Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur, in an attempt to
L-1663 (21 evade our immigration laws. Leading them was Delfin Co, a young man, 18
March years old, born in Paniqui, Tarlac, of a Chinese father named Co Sut, alias Yu
1948) Kui, and Florentina Villahermosa his wife.

Topic: The voyage was undertaken; but unfortunately, the immigrants were
Personal Law, discovered and apprehended immediately after arrival, and on the 27th day of
Nationality and March, Delfin Co was examined by the Commissioner of Immigration.
Domicile
It appears that on April 29, 1947, Florentina Villahermosa, after knowing the
Digested by: apprehension of her son Delfin, filed in the civil registry of Tarlac under
Gorez, John Commonwealth Act No. 63 an oath of allegiance for the purpose of resuming
her Philippine citizenship which she had lost upon her marriage to Co Suy.
On the strength of such reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by Florentina, it
was contended before the immigration authorities that Delfin, being a minor,
followed the citizenship of his mother, and was a national not subject to
deportation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reacquisition of the Florentina Villahermosa of Philippine

citizenship followed with it the citizenship of Delfin being a minor.

RULING: (NO)

There are two reasons why Delfin Co must be returned to China. First, he is
not now a Filipino citizen; and second, granting that he is, at the time he
entered this country from China he was a Chinese subject to deportation, and
any subsequent change in his status cannot erase the taint of his unlawful,
surreptitious entry.

Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution enumerates those who are citizens

of the Philippines, as follows:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Delfin Co's claim to citizenship can only be predicated, if at all, on paragraph

4 of the above section. But, being a minor he has not had the opportunity to
elect Philippine citizenship, and therefore he is as yet an alien, his father
being a Chinese.

While his Chinese father lived, Delfin was not a Filipino. His mother was not a
Filipina; she was Chinese. After the death of such father, Villahermosa
continued to be a Chinese, until she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in
April, 1947. After that reacquisition Delfin could claim that his mother was a
Filipina within the meaning of paragraph 4, section 1 of Article IV of the
Constitution; but, according to that same Organic Act, he had to elect
Philippine citizenship upon attaining his majority. Until he becomes of age
and makes the election, he is the Chinese citizen that he was at the time of
 his father's demise

#59 In re: DOCTRINE:

Robert Cu,
G.R. No. FACTS:
L-3018 (18 The case is a review of the decision of the inferior courts in dismissing Robert
July 1951) Cu’s petition for naturalization on the finding that it was moot and academic
due to the fact that he was already a Filipino citizen by virtue of being borne
Topic: by a Filipino mother and electing Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of
Personal Law, majority.
Nationality and
Domicile Robert Cu was born in Bulacan in 1913 of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother, but whose marriage the petitioner could not prove as a fact. When he
Digested by: was about five months of age, his mother died. On reaching the age of five
Lanutan, Lauro years, his father brought him to China.

During the naturalization proceeding, as required by law that such petition be

supported by affidavits of two witnesses, both of which must be Filipino
citizens, petitioner presented Dr. Jose Ku Yeg Keng and Dr. Pastor Gomez.

Dr. Keng was disqualified as a witness since he was not a Filipino citizen and
the Government objected to Dr. Gomez’s testimony which the Court
sustained.

ISSUE: WON the trial of Robert Cu’s petition for naturalization should be
granted despite his failure to comply with the requirement of presenting
two Filipino witnesses

RULING:
No, Robert Cu’s petition for naturalization should not be granted.

In naturalization proceedings, the rule is that a petition for naturalization

should be supported by affidavits of two witnesses who must be Filipino
citizens.

In the case at bar, Dr. Keng was not a Filipino citizen. This means that Dr.
Gomez is the only qualified witness to Robert Cu’s petition for naturalization.
However, Dr. Gomez’s testimony had been objected by the Government.
Consequently, Robert Cu’s petition lacks the requirement of having two
Filipino witnesses.

Therefore, Robert Cu’s petition for naturalization should not be granted.

#60 Philippine DOCTRINE:
Trust v.
Bohanan, G.R. Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:
No. L-12105
(30 January Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will,
1960) dispose of all his or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable
with the payment of the testator’s debts.
Topic:
Personal Law, Par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, New
Nationality and Civil Code, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
Domicile succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
Digested by: whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property
Manlangit, Naz and the country in which it is found.

FACTS:

C. O. Bohanan, a citizen the United States and of the State of Nevada

executed a last will and testament in accordance with the laws of the state of
Nevada on April 23, 1944 in Manila. The testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan
were married on January 30, 1909. He secured a divorce which was granted
to him on May 20, 1922. Sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married
Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the
testator in 1944.

On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo,
presiding, admitted to probate the last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan.
The Philippine Trust Company was named as the executor of the will.

The executor filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in
accordance with the provisions of the will, the following adjudications:

(1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National
Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of
testator’s grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several
mining companies;

(2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator’s brother, F.L.
Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This
consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock similar to
those given to testator’s grandson;

(3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and
his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments;

(4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine

Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000.

Claiming having been deprived of the legitime, the respondents, the wife
Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children questioned the validity of the
testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner that:

● out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of

 P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and
one-half of all shares of stock of several mining companies and to his
brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy
of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.

ISSUE:

1. Is the wife entitled to a legitime? – NO

2. Are the testator’s children entitled to a legitime in accordance with the laws
of the forum? - NO

RULING:

1. No.

The laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to
dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of
his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925
provides:

Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by
last will, dispose of all his or her estate, real and personal, the same
being chargeable with the payment of the testator’s debts.

Moreover, in an order dated June 19, 1955 – the court found that there
existed no community property owned by the decedent and his former wife at
the time the decree of divorce was issued. This order was already final and
executory and she had not appealed therefrom. Also, the court below had
found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January
30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that
sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this
marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right
to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of
Nevada and since the court below had already found that there was no
conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter
can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator.

2. No.

In accordance with Par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2
Art. 16, New Civil Code, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to
the order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and
the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature
of the property and the country in which it is found.

It is therefore the Law of Nevada which will govern the disposition of the
properties of the testator but this foreign law must first be proved as our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws. However, the laws of
Nevada were not introduced in evidence by the executor’s at the hearing of
the project of partition. It is Magdalena C. Bohanan, upon her motion for
withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, who introduced in evidence the foreign
 law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. Said laws presented
by the counsel for the executor was admitted by the Court. Also the children
of the testator, did not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the
State of Nevada.

Under these circumstances, the Court held that the pertinent law of Nevada,
especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken
judicial notice by the court, without proof of such law having been offered at
the hearing of the project of partition.

The order of the court approving the project of partition was affirmed.

NOTES:

How are foreign laws proved?

Foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner
provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:

SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an

entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy tested by the officer having
the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. (Rule 123).

#61 Caraballo DOCTRINE:

v. Republic, ​A person is deemed a resident of a place in a country or state where he has
G.R. No. his abode and lives there permanently. It is a place chosen by him freely and
L-15080 (25 voluntarily, although he may later on change his mind and live elsewhere. A
April 1962) place in a country or state where he lives and stays permanently and to
which he intends to return after a temporary absence, no matter how long, is
Topic: his domicile.
Personal Law,
Nationality and FACTS:
Domicile

Digested by: 1. On September 26, 1958, in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
Opigal, Amil Ricardo R. Caraballo, an American citizen enlisted in the United States Air
Force as staff sergeant detailed in Clark Field, Angeles, Pampanga, for the
last 25 months, and receives allowances, pensions, allotment check and
insurances and was never been convicted to any crime. He and his wife
Graciela G. Caraballo have no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children, natural children by legal fiction or any other descendant; that with
his wife’s written consent, he desires to adopt as his child Norma Lee Caber,
a five- day old natural daughter of Mercedes J. Caber begotten by an
unknown father, who gave her consent to the adoption in a sworn statement.

2. The Court ordered the verified petition filed by Ricardo R. Caraballo to be

published and was published in the Daily Mirror once a week for three
consecutive weeks setting the petition for hearing on 18 October 1958.

3. As at the hearing nobody appeared to object to the petition for adoption,

petitioner’s counsel prayed for an order of default, which was entered against
all interested parties, except the Solicitor General or Provincial Fiscal who,
according to the Court, must appear in adoption cases.

4. On October 27, 1958, the Provincial and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of

Pampanga moved for the dismissal of the petition for adoption on the ground
that it states no cause of action and that the petitioner, being a non-resident
alien, is not qualified to adopt.

5. On October 28, 1958, the Court granted the petitioner ten days within
which to file an answer to the motion to dismiss and submit a memorandum
of authorities. The petitioner filed an answer or objection to the motion to
dismiss and was denied.

6. On December 12, 1958, the petitioner moved that the case be set for
hearing. On 15 December 1958 the Court set the petition for hearing on 22
December 1958 at 9:00 o’clock in the morning.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the petitioner is qualified to adopt under the Philippine

law.
2. Whether or not the petitioner is a non-resident alien.

RULING:

1. NO, under the Philippine law the petitioner is not qualified to adopt.
The Government contends that he is not, invoking the provisions of
article 335 of the Civil Code. The article provides:

The following Cannot adopt —

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural

children, or natural children by legal fiction;
(2) The guardian, with respect to the ward, before the final approval
on his account;
(3) A married person, without the consent of the other spouse;
(4) Non-resident aliens;
(5) Resident aliens with whose government the Republic of the
Philippines has broken diplomatic relations;
(6) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude, when the penalty imposed was six months’ imprisonment or
more.

The petitioner, an American citizen who now lives in Clark Field,

municipality of Angeles, province of Pampanga, Republic of the
Philippines, because of his assignment as staff sergeant in the United
States Air Force — his stay in the Philippines then being temporary —
is a non-resident alien who, pursuant to clause 4 of the above quoted
article of the Civil Code, is disqualified to adopt a child in the
Philippines.

2. YES, the petitioner is a non-resident alien.

 A person is deemed a resident of a place in a country or state where
he has his abode and lives there permanently. It is a place chosen by
him freely and voluntarily, although he may later on change his mind
and live elsewhere. A place in a country or state where he lives and
stays permanently and to which he intends to return after a temporary
absence, no matter how long, is his domicile.

A sojourner such as a tourist though actually present at a place of his

free choice cannot be deemed a resident of that place. A foreigner
who has a business or interest therein or property located in a country
or state and goes and stays in that country or state to look after his
business or property or to check up the manner or way his business
or property is being conducted or run by his manager but does not
intend to remain in the country indefinitely cannot be deemed a
resident of such country.

Actual or physical presence or stay of a person in a place, not of his

free and voluntary choice and without intent to remain there
indefinitely, does not make him a resident of the place. Looking after
the welfare of a minor to be adopted the law has surrounded him with
safeguards to achieve and insure such welfare. It cannot be gainsaid
that an adopted minor may be removed from the country by the
adopter, who is not a resident of the Philippines, and placed beyond
the reach and protection of the country of his birth.

#62 Aznar v. DOCTRINE:

Christensen-G
arcia, supra

Topic: FACTS:
Personal Law, Edward Christensen died testate. His will provides that Php 3,600 be given to
Nationality and Helen Christensen, and the rest of the estate be given to his daughter Lucy
Domicile Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.
Digested by:
Quiñones, Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen,
Erika insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child She was declared by the US as an acknowledged natural child of
Edward in an earlier case.

Edward’s citizenship, which he acquired in California when he resided in

Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines.
Furthermore, the deceased appears to have considered himself a citizen of
California based on the fact that, when he executed his will, he declared that
he was a citizen of that State. Thus, he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. However, at the time
of his death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.

CONTENTIONS: The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution
should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of
two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In
amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern
the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are
involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in
California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the
domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also
alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged
natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the
time of her birth.

ISSUE:
Whether Philippine or California succession law should apply

RULING:
PHILIPPINE LAW applies. Since the domicile of the deceased Edward, a
citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will
depriving his acknowledged natural child, Helen, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, NOT by the internal law of California.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 NCC:
Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the

order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property
may be found.

The application of this article requires the determination of the meaning of the
term “national law”.

The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee

that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his
property by will in the form and manner he desires.

But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of
California:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the
law of his domicile.

It is argued on the executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a

citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof given in the In Re
Kaufman case should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the
State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance
therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the
validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to
the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws
rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on
succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced
jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In
re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946
should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California
but in other jurisdictions.

The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination
of matters with a foreign element involved is in accord with the general
principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above
explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions.

It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and Lucy) behalf that the clause “if there is
no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946
of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision
in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This
contention can not be sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law

mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or
return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws
rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case,
when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should
not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football,
tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which
the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the
 state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the
application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children
while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of

testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having
its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the
state. The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above
quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American
law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

#63 Lao Chay DOCTRINE:

v. Galang,
G.R. No. CITIZEN; NATURALIZATION; WIFE OF NATURALIZED ALIEN DOES NOT
L-19977 (30 AUTOMATICALLY FOLLOW CITIZENSHIP OF HUSBAND. — An alien
October 1964) woman who is married to a citizen of the Philippines acquires the citizenship
of her husband only if she has the qualifications and none of the
Topic: disqualifications provided in the Revised Naturalization Law (Com. Act No.
Personal Law, 473, as amended.)
Nationality and
Domicile FACTS:

Digested by: Ng Siu Luan and her three children, who are all of minor age, came to the
Remoreras, Philippines on January 19, 1960 as temporary visitors, having been allowed
Sandy to stay in this country until January 26, 1961. Instead of departing on that
date, however, appellees asked the Bureau of Immigration for the
cancellation of their alien certificates of registration as well as that of their
children on the basis of Lao Chay's admission to Philippine citizenship on
December 12, 1960.

Appellant Commissioner of Immigration granted the petition as far as Lao

Chay and the three children were concerned, but denied the same with
respect to Ng Siu Luan on the ground that she is not qualified to acquire
Philippine citizenship of her husband under the provision of paragraph 1,
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as she lacks the requirements
provided for under paragraph 2 of the same Act." He therefore asked her to
leave the country on January 26, 1961. The Immigration Commissioner
denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration, although he gave Ng Luan a
five-day extension within which to arrange for her departure.

To stop the threatened deportation of Ng Siu Luan, appellees filed a petition

for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of First Instance of Manila and
secured from it a writ of preliminary injunction.

RTC: The court granted the petition and held that the law does not require
that an alien wife should have the same qualifications as those required of
applicants for naturalization, it being enough that she is not otherwise
 disqualified. From this decision, the Commissioner of Immigration appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether the wife of a Chinese who obtained papers of Philippine citizenship,

automatically follows the citizenship of her husband if not otherwise
disqualified under the Naturalization Law?

RULING:

NO. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No.

473, as amended) provides in part as follows:

"Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now
or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."

It is now settled that under this provision, an alien woman, who is married to
a citizen of the Philippines acquires the citizenship of her husband only if she
has all the qualifications prescribed in Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications provided in Section 4 of the law. 1 Since Ng Siu Luan
admittedly does not possess the qualifications for naturalization, her marriage
to Lao Chay cannot be deemed as automatically vesting in her Filipino
citizenship.

Anent appellees' claim that a difference in the citizenship of husband and wife
is subversive of family solidarity, this Court has already said that the duty of
consorts to live together is irrelevant to the issue which concerns only the
right of a sovereign state to determine what aliens can remain within its
territory and under what conditions they can stay therein.

#64 Zita Ngo DOCTRINE: A foreign woman cannot be considered a Filipino simply by
Burca v. marriage to a Filipino man.
Republic, G.R.
No. L-24252 The following rule applies with respect to the naturalization of a foreign
(30 January married to a Filipino man:
1967) (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this
country must apply therefor by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she
Topic: possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the
Personal Law, disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law;
Nationality and (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner
Domicile has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition
and
Digested by: (3) Any action by any other office agency, board or official, administrative or
Tudtud, Kiara otherwise — other than the judgment of a competent court of justice —
certifying or declaring that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen is also a Filipino
citizen, is hereby declared null and void.

FACTS: Zita Ngo was a Chinese national, whose parents are both Chinese
 nationals. However, she was born in Surigao, Ph. She holds a Certificate of
Residence 46333 and Alien Certificate of Registration A-
148054. She married Florencio Burca, a native-born Filipino, on May 14,
1961.

Zita Ngo filed a petition to declare herself as "as possessing all qualifications
and none of the qualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act
473 for the purpose of cancelling her Alien Registry with the Bureau of
Immigration".

ISSUE: WON Zita Ngo shall be considered a Filipino.

RULING: No, Zita Ngo cannot be considered a Filipino.

A foreign woman cannot be considered a Filipino simply by marriage to a

Filipino man.

The following rule applies with respect to the naturalization of a foreign

married to a Filipino man:
(1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this
country must apply therefor by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she
possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the
disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law;
(2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner
has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition
and
(3) Any action by any other office agency, board or official, administrative or
otherwise — other than the judgment of a competent court of justice —
certifying or declaring that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen is also a Filipino
citizen, is hereby declared null and void.

Note that there is no law or rule which authorizes a declaration of Filipino

citizenship. Citizenship is not an appropriate subject for declaratory judgment
proceedings. And in one case, we held that citizenship of an alien woman
married to a Filipino must be determined in an "appropriate proceeding".

In this case, the petition for citizenship was filed. However, such is insufficient
for two reasons: (1) failed to mention that she also resided in the Philippines;
and (2) no testimony from two witnesses which will corroborate that she
bears all the qualifications to become a Filipino national and none of the
disqualifications.

#65 Mo Ya Yim DOCTRINE:

Yao v. CIR,
G.R. No. FACTS:
L-21289, 41
SCRA 292 On 13 March 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung, a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
(1971) Hongkong, was permitted to come into the Philippines for a period of one
month until 13 April 1961 through a non-immigrant visa. On the date of her
Topic: arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,
Personal Law, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Nationality and Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
Domicile country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
 Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After
Digested by: repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines
Aquino, Zaira up to 13 February 1962.

On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao

alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her
bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of
her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary
injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her
arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or
Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or
Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name
except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or
sisters-in-law. The Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen
upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

RULING: Yes.

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman

marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under
Section 4 of the same law.

Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently

naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment
he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from
any of the disqualifications under said Section 4

Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization

proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16.

Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who

dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should
follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that

the Legislature intended to treat them differently.

As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand

today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding
to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own
citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called
upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but
such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage
or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth
is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.

Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a

 judicial or administrative case.

Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides

therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand.

Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from
and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo
Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

#66 Llorente v. CASE LINK:

CA, GR [Link]
124371, 23
Nov 2000 DOCTRINE:
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Topic:
Personal Law, "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
Nationality and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
Domicile living abroad.
Digested by: "Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
Baclayon,
country where it is situated.
Ruchi
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved

FACTS:

In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In
1937, he and Paula Llorente got married in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo
became an American citizen.

In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered

that Paula was already living illicitly with Ceferino Llorente, a brother of
Lorenzo and the two even have a son.

Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her monetary
support. Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula agreed in writing that Lorenzo shall
not criminally charge Paula if the she will agree to waive all monetary support
from Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the US.
In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in California. Paula
was represented by an American counsel. The divorce was granted and in
1952, the divorce became final.

Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno.

They had three children.

In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his
estate to Alicia and their children and left nothing for Paula. In 1983, Lorenzo
went to the court for the will’s probate and to have Alicia as the administratrix
of his property. In 1985, before the probate proceeding can be terminated,
Lorenzo died. Later, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over
Lorenzo’s estate.

RTC: divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and
inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with
Alicia Fortunato at Manila is likewise void. Hence, Paula Titular Llorente,
meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo
Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary
compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate
and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and
also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.

The CA affirmed the trial court decision.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Lorenzo’s divorce abroad should be recognized in the
Philippines.

RULING:

1. YES. The Civil Code clearly provides:

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.

"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved.

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did
not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to
the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the
law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

The Court noted that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was
not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit
equally unproven statement that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary
theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of
Lorenzo’s will.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the
Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, the Court recognized the divorce obtained by the

respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated
that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must
be reversed. The Court held that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H.
Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to
the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

"ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution."

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and
children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. The Court do not
wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by
our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity."

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo
are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and
proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact,
the will was duly probated.

The Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the
 deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California
in and for the County of San Diego.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and
determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law
with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch
to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of
Court.

#67 Macalintal DOCTRINE:

v COMELEC,
GR 157013, 10 FACTS:
July 2003
ISSUE:
Topic:
Personal Law, RULING:
Nationality and
Domicile

Digested by:
Ceballos, Pia

#68 Saludo v. DOCTRINE:

American There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to
Express, G.R. indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes
No. 159507 (19 a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
April 2006) returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in
another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
Topic: intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for
Personal Law, one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
Nationality and residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not
Domicile by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention
of remaining will constitute domicile.
Digested by:
Dobrea, Errol
FACTS:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American
Express International, Inc. for alleged wrongful dishonor of his AMEX credit
card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The dishonor of
these AMEX credit cards was allegedly unjustified as they resulted from
respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his
failure to pay its balance.

In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the

complaint. Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of
action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred that the
complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid
because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that
respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover,
notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not
 allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax
certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City.

ISSUE:
Whether venue was improperly laid because not one of the parties, including
Saludo, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the
complaint?

RULING:
No. The Court explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on
venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the
place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the
defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.

There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to

indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in
another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for
one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not
by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention
of remaining will constitute domicile.

It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of

election law is more stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile."
Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." When parsed, therefore,
the term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the
particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place
where a party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purposes of election law."

#69 Lavadia v DOCTRINE: Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the
Luna nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property
GR171914, 23 between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an
July 2014 incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial
approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who
Topic: contracts a subsequent marriage.
Personal Law,
Nationality and FACTS:
Domicile Petitioner: Soledad Lavadia (Wife in the 2nd marriage after divorce)
Digested by:
Eso, Jun Defendant: Eugenia Luna (Wife in the 1st marriage) & Gregorio Luna (son)
representing the heirs of Atty. Luna

Atty. Luna married his first wife, Eugenia Zaballero-Luna, in San Miguel,
Bulacan. The two begot seven children. However, after almost 20 years of
marriage, Atty. Luna and Eugenia eventually agreed to live apart from each
other in February 1966.

They agreed to a separation of property which was manifested in a written

agreement.

On January 12, 1977, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage
with Eugenia from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the CFI in Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic. On that same day, he also contracted
another marriage, this time with a woman named Soledad.

Atty. Luna was able to establish his own law firm in the following years.
However, he died in 1997. After the death of Atty. Luna, his share in the law
firm including the 25/100 pro indiviso share in the condominium unit and law
books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence
and Federal Supreme Court Reports) found therein were taken over by
Gregorio Luna, his son from the first marriage. Gregorio also leased out the
25/100 portion of the condo unit to Atty. Dela Cruz.

Soledad (wife 2nd marriage) then filed a complaint against the heirs of Luna
stating that she should own the property since the same were acquired
during the second marriage. In line with the issues regarding property rights,
the heirs of Atty. Luna challenged the validity of the second marriage.

RTC – (1) Soledad has no right as owner over the condominium unit.

(2) However, Soledad is declared to be the owner of the books.

CA – (1) Eugenia, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of Atty. Luna until the
latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by Atty.
Luna in the Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with
Eugenia because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized
in our jurisdiction.

(2) Soledad has no right as owner of the condominium and books.

(3) The heirs of the first marriage are to be declared owner.

Hence this petition. SC concurred with the ruling of the CA.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted
up to the time of his death? Yes

2. Whether or not the agreement for separation and property settlement of

the first marriage was void? Yes

RULING:
1. (T) Yes, Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of
his death.

(R) The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was
solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the
time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the
nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the
effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine
laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having
remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated
their marriage.

From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947
until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been
recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either
or both of the spouses are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of
defective marital unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable
marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have
been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of
the marriage.

(A) It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the
first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably with the nationality
rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not
dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to
the time of his death on July 12, 1997.

2. (T) The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void for
lack of court approval.

(R) The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not
per sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval
of the Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190
and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage

settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage
shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.

Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property,
and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been
sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been
declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.

(A) The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors
of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership shall be
notified of any petition for judicial approval or the voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the
creditors and other third persons. After dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions
of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501
shall be applicable.

Additional Note:

What law governed the property relations of the second marriage

between Atty. Luna and Soledad?

Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void; properties
acquired during their marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous

are void. Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or
incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or

subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means
of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A bigamous marriage is
considered void ab initio.

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void
ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the
bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership,
conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof

to confirm such fact. To establish co ownership, therefore, it became
imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the
acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient
and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor.
#70 Poe v DOCTRINE: Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is
COMELEC, supported by some treaties, adhering to the customary rule to presume
GR 221697, 8 foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is
March 2016 found.

Topic: FACTS:
Personal Law,
Nationality and Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned
Domicile as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on Sept. 3, 1968. After
passing the parental care and custody over petitioner by Edgardo Militar to
Digested by: Emiliano Militar and his wife, she has been reported and registered as a
Facundo, foundling and issued a Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, thus
Ardiane was given the name, Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.

When the petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity spouses Ronal Allan
Kelley (aka Fernando Poe, Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces)
filed a petition foe her adoption. The trial court granted their petition and
ordered that her name be changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.

Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan City at the age of 18 in 1986; in

1988, she applied and was issued Philippine Passport by the DFA; in 1993
and 1998, she renewed her passport.

She left for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her studies after
enrolling and pursuing a degree in Development Studies at the University of
the Philippines. She graduated in 1991 from Boston College where she
earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.

She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the

Philippines and the U.S., in San Juan City and decided to flew back to the
U.S. after their wedding. She gave birth to her eldest child while in the U.S.;
and her two daughters in the Philippines.

She became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. She came back to the
Philippines to support her father’s candidacy for president in the May 2004
elections and gave birth to her youngest daughter. They then returned to the
U.S. in 2004 but after few months, she rushed back to the Philippines to
attend to her ailing father. After her father’s death, the petitioner and her
husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 2005
and immediately secured a TIN, then her children followed suit; acquired
property where she and her children resided.

In 2006, She took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to RA No. 9225 or the Citizenship retention and Re-acquisition Act
of 2003; she filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together
with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children which
was granted. She registered as a voter; secured Philippine passport;
appointed and took her oath as Chairperson of the MTRCB after executing
an affidavit of Renunciation of American citizenship before the Vice Consul of
the USA and was issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the USA in
2011.

In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
 Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months”
to the question “Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.”
Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator
on 16 May 2013.

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May
2016 Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May
2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May
2005. The petitioner attached to her COC an “Affidavit Affirming Renunciation
of U.S.A. Citizenship” subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in
Quezon City on 14 October 2015.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on
the ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a
natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents
or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she was in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her
COC.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that
Poe is qualified as a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however,
abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.

ISSUE:

WON Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino

citizen

RULING:

Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a

natural-born Filipino.

It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is

no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings as they are
already impliedly so recognized.

There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language

permitting discrimination against foundlings as the three Constitutions
guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.

Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is supported by some

treaties, adhering to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born
of the country in which the foundling is found.

#71 DOCTRINE:
Simundac-Kep Based on the Nationality Principle, which is followed in this jurisdiction, and
pel v Keppel, pursuant to which laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
GR No. condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
202039, 14 Philippines, even though living abroad.
Aug 2019
The courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws. To have evidentiary
Topic: weight in a judicial proceeding, the foreign laws should be alleged and proved
Personal Law, like any other material fact.
Nationality and
Domicile FACTS:
Petitioner: Angelita Simundac Keppel - Filipina Nurse working in a Hospital in
Digested by: Germany; eventually became a German Citizen
Falcone, Jon
Respondent: George Keppel - German nurse and co employee pg Angelita

Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed by Angelita against Georg

Angelita left the Philippines to work in Germany as a nurse. In the hospital

where Angelita worked, she met Reynaldo Macaraig, also a nurse and fellow
Filipino who had become a naturalized German citizen. They fell in love and
got married in Germany. Angelita and Reynaldo's union produced a son.

After a few years of marriage, Angelita became attracted to Georg. Like

Angelita, Georg was married to a Filipina nurse, with whom he had two
children. Eventually, the attraction between Angelita and Georg developed
into an intimate affair. Not long after that, Reynaldo discovered Angelita's
infidelity and they separated.

February 1986, Angelita became a naturalized German citizen. Angelita and

her son left Germany to go home to the Philippines, where they planned to
start over. While in the Philippines, Angelita continued communicating with
Georg through letters and telephone calls. Subsequently, Georg's wife
divorced him, and so Georg felt free to come to the Philippines to meet
Angelita's family in September 1987.

Angelita returned to Germany and obtained the divorce decree. Thereafter,

Angelita and Georg got married in Germany. The following year, Angelita
gave birth in Germany to a daughter, whom they named Liselotte.

In 1991, Angelita and Georg entered into an agreement for the complete
separation of their properties. At that time, Georg resigned from his job. To
make matters worse, Georg was diagnosed with early multiple sclerosis and
could not work. Since Angelita's income was barely enough to support them
all, they decided to return and settle permanently in the Philippines in 1992.

Angelita earned a considerable income from her business ventures, which

she shared with Georg. However, Angelita stopped giving Georg money in
1994 when she discovered that Georg was having extramarital affairs.

Angelita filed the instant petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of
Georg's alleged psychological incapacity. Georg opposed the petition,
insisting that the court should only issue a decree of legal separation with the
consequent division of their properties and determination of Liselotte's
custody. Angelita countered that there were no properties to divide between
them because all the real properties that she acquired in the Philippines
belong solely to her as a consequence of the agreement for complete
separation of property that they previously executed in Germany in 1991.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the validity of the marriage of Angelita and George should be
sustained

RULING:
Yes, Under the Nationality Principle, the petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of
the Family Code unless there is a German law that allows her to do so.

Based on the Nationality Principle, which is followed in this jurisdiction, and

pursuant to which laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.

The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as

follows:first, Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce, and hence,
the courts cannot grant the same; second, consistent with Articles 15 and 17
of the Civil Code, the marital bond between two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad; third, an absolute
divorce obtained abroad by a couple who are both aliens may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws;
and fourth, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former
is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry

A fundamental and obvious defect of Angelita's petition for annulment of

marriage is that it seeks a relief improper under Philippine law in light of both
Georg and Angelita being German citizens, not Filipinos, at the time of the
filing thereof.

Firstly, what governs the marriage of the parties is German, not Philippine,
law, and this rendered it incumbent upon Angelita to allege and prove the
applicable German law. We reiterate that our courts do not take judicial notice
of foreign laws; hence, the existence and contents of such laws are regarded
as questions of fact, and, as such, must be alleged and proved like any other
disputed fact.

Proof of the relevant German law may consist of any of the following, namely:
(1) official publications of the law; or (2) copy attested to by the officer having
legal custody of the foreign law. If the official record is not kept in the
Philippines, the copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. Angelita did not comply with the
requirements for pleading and proof of the relevant German law.

And, secondly, Angelita overlooked that German and Philippine laws on

annulment of marriage might not be the same. In other words, the remedy of
annulment of the marriage due to psychological incapacity afforded by Article
36 of the Family Code might not be available for her. In the absence of a
showing of her right to this remedy in accordance with German law, therefore,
the petition should be dismissed.

Philippine law finds no application herein as far as the family rights and
obligations of the parties who are foreign nationals are concerned.