PHA Study
Process hazard analysis (PHA) studies that use the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study identify hazard
and operability scenarios by considering deviations from the design intent for nodes in a process that
typically are lines and vessels. Design intent is the set of required or desired process behaviors, as
intended by the process designers.
) سيناريوهات المخاطر وقابليةHAZOP( ) التي تستخدم دراسة المخاطر وقابلية التشغيلPHA( تحدد دراسات تحليل مخاطر العمليات
هدف التصميم هو مجموعة.التشغيل من خالل النظر في االنحرافات عن هدف التصميم للعقد في عملية تتكون عادًة من خطوط وأوعية
. على النحو المقصود من قبل مصممي العملية،سلوكيات العملية المطلوبة أو المرغوبة
The HAZOP method focuses on deviations from design intent because they represent potential
problems, for example, lack of flow in a transfer line or over pressuring a vessel, that may result in
hazard and operability scenarios. The HAZOP study team brainstorms causes of each deviation within
each node and identifies the sequence of events that results including safeguards that may fail and the
consequences.
نقص التدفق في خط النقل أو، على سبيل المثال، على االنحرافات عن هدف التصميم ألنها تمثل مشكالت محتملةHAZOP تركز طريقة
بالعصف الذهنيHAZOP يقوم فريق دراسة. مما قد يؤدي إلى سيناريوهات المخاطر وقابلية التشغيل،الضغط الزائد على الوعاء
.ألسباب كل انحراف داخل كل عقدة ويحدد تسلسل األحداث التي تنتج بما في ذلك الضمانات التي قد تفشل والعواقب
The different aspects of design intent for a node are represented by parameters such as flow and
pressure. Generally, numerous parameters are important for each node. Deviations from design intent
are generated by applying guide words to process parameters for each node:
يتم. تعد المعلمات المتعددة مهمة لكل عقدة، بشكل عام.يتم تمثيل الجوانب المختلفة لهدف التصميم للعقدة بمعلمات مثل التدفق والضغط
:إنشاء االنحرافات عن هدف التصميم من خالل تطبيق كلمات إرشادية على معلمات العملية لكل عقدة
Guideword + Parameter = Deviation
Usually, a standard set of guidewords is used (see table). For example, for an inlet line to a vessel, No +
Flow = No Flow, or for a vessel, High + Pressure = High Pressure. The generation of such deviations is
.the key aspect of HAZOP studies yet mistakes are commonly made by practitioners
No + Flow ، بالنسبة لخط مدخل إلى وعاء، على سبيل المثال.) يتم استخدام مجموعة قياسية من الكلمات اإلرشادية (انظر الجدول،عادة
إن توليد مثل هذه االنحرافات هو الجانب الرئيسي لدراسات.High + Pressure = High Pressure ، أو بالنسبة للسفينة،= No Flow
ومع ذلك فإن األخطاء عادة ما يرتكبها الممارسونHAZOP
The correct generation of deviations begins with an understanding of what is meant by each guideword.
Their meanings are provided in the table
.. وترد معانيها في الجدول.يبدأ التوليد الصحيح لالنحرافات بفهم المقصود بكل كلمة إرشادية
UIDEWORD MEANING COMMENTS
NO (NOT, Negation of No part of the intention is achieved but nothing else
NONE) design intent happens.
The intention occurs in a way that is quantitatively
MORE (MORE Quantitative
greater. Usually applies to quantities, properties and
OF) increase
activities.
LESS (LESS Quantitative The intention occurs in a way that is quantitatively
OF) decrease lesser.
AS WELL AS Qualitative All of the intention is achieved together with
(ALSO) increase something else.
Qualitative
PART OF Some of the intention is achieved but some is not.
decrease
The opposite of the intention happens. Often applies
REVERSE Logical opposite
to activities.
Complete No part of the intention is achieved and something
OTHER THAN
substitution quite different happens.
Deviations should not just be selected from a standard set in a rote manner because important deviations
likely will be missed. The generation of deviations should be part of the creative process of HAZOP
studies. The purpose of using guide words is to facilitate creative exploration of deviations from design
intent which helps to increase the chances of study completeness.
It is important to understand that any conceivable deviation from design intent can be generated by
applying one of the standard guidewords to a process parameter, which is the power of the HAZOP study
method. The challenge is to ensure that all important deviations are considered for each node by fully
defining the design intent and generating a complete set of deviations from it. The definition of design
intent was addressed in an earlier PTNote, Design Intent for HAZOP Studies.
In generating deviations, most practitioners do not have a problem in applying the guidewords No, More,
and Less to common parameters such as Flow and Pressure. They generate deviations that are obvious.
However, the combination of some guidewords and parameters may not produce an obvious deviation.
For example, while No Flow is an obvious deviation, As Well As Flow is not meaningful as it stands. Here,
practitioners must ask “What else can happen as flow is occurring?” One answer is a chemical reaction
(e.g. polymerization, a chemical reaction, is a concern for flowing monomers as it may cause pipe
blockages). Thus, “As Well As Flow” can rephrased as the more meaningful “Chemical Reaction”.
Similarly, “As Well As Composition” can be rephrased to produce the more meaningful “Contamination”.
The logic in this case is that in addition to whatever materials are intended to be present in a node,
additional, unintended materials are present, i.e. contaminants, hence the deviation, “Contamination”. It is
also possible to combine Other Than with Flow to generate “Chemical Reaction”. In this case, a chemical
reaction occurs instead of flow rather than in addition to it.
By way of counterexample, More Flow would not be an appropriate way to generate Chemical Reaction
because the guideword “More” implies a quantitative increase, not a qualitative change. Note that Flow
and some other parameters have multiple characteristics which can be important. Thus, Flow may be
Flow Rate or Flow Quantity depending on the circumstances in the process.
Some practitioners confuse deviations with causes. For example, in a procedural PHA study, a
maintenance step may involve replacing a check valve. Consider the application of the guideword
“Reverse” to this action. What deviation might be generated by applying Reverse to Replace Check
Valve. A clear contender would be “Backwards Installation of the Check Valve”. Novice practitioners may
suggest “Improper Maintenance” as an appropriate deviation in this situation but that is the cause of the
backwards installation of the check valve, not a deviation.
Some practitioners confuse deviations with consequences. For example, in a procedural PHA study, a
maintenance step may involve replacing a gasket. Consider the application of the guideword “Other Than”
to this action. What deviation might be generated by applying “Other Than” to “Replace Gasket”? One
important characteristic of a gasket is its specification. Thus, Incorrect Gasket Specification would be a
meaningful deviation in this case. Novice practitioners may suggest “Leak” as an appropriate deviation in
this situation is but that would be a consequence of an incorrect gasket being installed, not a deviation.
Some practitioners confuse deviations with other deviations. For example, in the case of the check valve
replacement, the practitioner may be thinking in terms of the consequences of reverse installation and
believe that the result would be to obstruct flow. They then theorize that the appropriate deviation is No
Flow. As we have seen, this is incorrect. Deviations are departures from the aspect of design intent
expressed by the parameter, not the consequences of a deviation. The correct treatment of this situation
in a HAZOP study would be to identify reverse installation of a check valve in a line as a cause of No Flow
in the node containing the check valve.
Another example of the incorrect application of Reverse to Replace Check Valve would be to assign the
deviation “Backflow” to this combination. However, backflow is a deviation in its own right, typically
generated by applying Reverse to Flow.
A key test in deciding which combination of guideword and parameter makes sense for a deviation is to
identify the attribute or aspect of the process that is addressed by the deviation. The parameter should
then be clear and the appropriate guide word can be confirmed by reviewing their meanings. For
example, if Missing Component is being considered as a deviation, on reflection, it should be obvious that
the attribute of the process that is involved is composition. If a component is missing, some of the
intention is achieved but some is not. Thus, Part Of is the clear choice as the most appropriate
guideword.
Similarly, in considering the application of “Part Of” to “Composition”, a practitioner may suggest
“Incorrect ratio of materials” as the deviation. Certainly, composition is related to the ratio of materials.
However, the actual parameter in this case is the ratio of materials, not composition. Thus, it should be
clear that this deviation is best viewed as resulting from the combination of “Other Than” with “Ratio of
Materials”. It is also possible that “More” or “Less” could be applied if the concern is with adjusting the
ratio of materials upwards or downwards, and even “Reverse” if the concern is with reversing the ratio of
two materials.
In generating deviations, it is important to understand that not all guidewords generate meaningful
deviations for all parameters, for example, No Temperature is not meaningful. Also, the same deviation
can be generated by applying different guidewords to different parameters, for example, As Well As Flow
and Other Than Flow to generate Chemical Reaction. Furthermore, multiple deviations may exist for the
same guide word / parameter combination, for example, As Well As Flow can generate both Chemical
Reaction and Foaming.
Deviations should be generated logically and consistently in HAZOP studies to alleviate confusion and
they should be generated completely to reduce the chances of missing scenarios and producing an
incomplete study.
Further information on HAZOP studies is provided in:
Analytical Methods in Process Safety Management and System Safety Engineering – Process Hazards
Analysis, in Handbook of Loss Prevention Engineering, Wiley-VCH, 2013.
You may contact Primatech for further information by clicking here.
To comment on this PT Note, click here.
Copyright © 2018, Primatech Inc. All rights reserved.
The main difference between active and passive safety features is that the active safety systems use
various sensors to prevent any accident, whereas passive safety features activate to protect passengers
in case of an accident.??????
An active system prevents accidents from happening. A passive system minimizes the effects of
an accident. Both systems have proven records of success. That makes it important to have
both systems working properly.
Passive safeguards involve equipment that does not require physical actuation in order to perform the
intended function, e.g. a dike wall around a storage tank. Active safeguards involve equipment that does
requires physical actuation in order to function, e.g. a deluge system. Generally, passive safeguards are
more reliable than active safeguards because there are no activation mechanisms to fail
The main difference between active and passive safety features is that the active safety systems use
various sensors to prevent any accident, whereas passive safety features activate to protect passengers
in case of an accident.
