Letter From the Editors

Foreign policy is always evolving.

By Shannon Tiezzi and Catherine Putz

From India to Japan to the ever-growing territory of the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization, foreign policies across Asia are always
evolving. In this issue, we focus on the ways foreign policymakers are
reacting to – and shaping – intensified geopolitical competition.
When Narendra Modi took the oath of office for his third term as prime
minister, it cemented the continuation of a decade-long transformation of
Indian foreign policy. In our cover story, New Delhi-based correspondent
Siddharthya Roy explores how India’s role on the world stage has
changed under Modi – for better or worse. While India’s emphasis on
strategic autonomy and nonalignment is long-standing, Roy explains,
Modi has placed special emphasis on winning global recognition and
acclaim for India – and pushing back, at times forcefully, against critics.
While this has paid political dividends at home for Modi and his
government, Roy notes that India is already brushing up against the
limits of its capabilities.
Japan has long had a presence in the Pacific Island countries,
encompassing robust development aid and a longest-standing summit
framework, the Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM). But since the last
PALM summit in 2021, Japan has stepped up its engagement in the
security realm in particular. As Céline Pajon, head of Japan Research at
the French Institute of International Relations, explains, Japan’s security
outreach has gone from low-profile efforts mostly focused on
nontraditional security threats to providing defense equipment and the
full-scale involvement of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in training
regional counterparts. In the background, as always, is China’s own
increased security influence in the Pacific Island countries.
In early July, Belarus, a European country, will join the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization as a full member, completely bursting its
regional focus once and for all. As Eva Seiwert of the Mercator Institute
for China Studies (MERICS) notes, the SCO’s continued expansion – the
group added India and Pakistan in 2017 and Iran in 2023 – mirrors its
emergence as a tool for Moscow and Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions. The
SCO, once a Central Asia-focused regional security organization, stands at
a crossroads. Its rising international visibility, Seiwert writes, comes hand
in hand with a loss of regional relevance, which in turn opens the door
for other actors to address regional issues more efficiently.
We hope you enjoy these stories and the many more in the following
pages.

The Authors
Shannon Tiezzi is Editor-in-Chief of The Diplomat.
Catherine Putz is Managing Editor of The Diplomat.
Associated Press, Alex Brandon

Indian Foreign Policy Under

Narendra Modi: A Decade of
Transformation
Modi’s assertive foreign policy approach has redefined
India's image to that of a more proactive global player. But
can India live up to the hype?
By Siddharthya Roy

On June 8, 2024, Narendra Modi etched his name in the annals of Indian
history, surpassing all previous non-Congress prime ministers to become
the longest-serving leader in this category. This feat stands as a testament
to his grip on the Indian political landscape and his commanding
influence over the nation's domestic affairs.
However, as Modi assumes the role of India’s figurehead for the next five
years, the future trajectory of India’s foreign policy demands a thorough
and multifaceted examination that goes beyond the veneer of his political
longevity.
Modi’s victory also demands a careful analysis of how his domestic
politics, rhetoric, and success have affected – and will affect – his foreign
policy and India’s standing on the world stage.
Provincial to Premier
For one, Modi’s accomplishment of winning a third term – and,
immediately after that, being invited to the G-7 summit as an observer –
is a testament to his journey from a once-dismissed “provincial leader”
and “regional satrap” to a statesman with a commanding presence on the
international stage.
A decade ago, few could have predicted that the man whose brand of
Hindutva politics and strongman image drew scorn from domestic
opponents, Western governments, and global political pundits would one
day be hailed as a premier statesman. The 2002 Gujarat riots, which
occurred under Modi’s watch as chief minister, led to significant
international isolation, with the United States and other Western nations
denying him a visa. However, Modi’s resounding victory in the 2014
general elections compelled a swift reversal in U.S. policy, as Washington
pragmatically engaged with India's new leader.
Fast forward to the present, and the very countries and leaders who once
criticized Modi during his Gujarat days now acknowledge his
indispensable role in navigating complex global issues. Ironically, it was
Modi’s tenure as chief minister of Gujarat from 2001 to 2014, marked by
his strongman image, that laid the groundwork for his ascent, placing
him in the company of assertive leaders like Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Xi
Jinping, Sheikh Hasina, Vladimir Putin, and Mohammed bin Salman.
With India’s rapidly sinking position in democracy, press, religious
freedom, and other similar indices, it is only right that Modi is seen as
one in the pantheon of illiberal leaders in stark contrast to the liberal
democracies of the West. And this despite India never losing an
opportunity to call itself “the world’s largest democracy.”
Modi’s hallmark approach, which prioritizes economic development,
infrastructure projects, and foreign investment over social justice and
inclusivity, can be traced back to his time in Gujarat. In the face of the
backlash over the 2002 riots, Modi focused on initiatives like the “Vibrant
Gujarat” summits, a strategy that remains central to his political playbook
as prime minister.
Under Modi’s leadership, India has embarked on a robust economic
diplomacy campaign, signing a record number of bilateral agreements
and aggressively promoting domestic programs like “Make in India” and
“Digital India” on the global stage to attract foreign investment. While
Modi’s frequent foreign visits and speeches initially drew ridicule,
especially during his early tenure, when the late BJP veteran Sushma
Swaraj served as foreign minister, his persistent engagement with world
leaders has been instrumental in rebranding his international image.
In his United Nations General Assembly addresses, Modi has skillfully
emphasized India’s cultural heritage, economic potential, and strategic
importance, projecting the nation as a responsible global actor. Unlike his
predecessors, Modi has also actively engaged with the Indian diaspora,
recognizing their role as ambassadors of India’s interests abroad. His
speeches to large Indian communities in the United States, United
Kingdom, and Australia have deftly blended cultural pride with calls for
greater economic and political collaboration.
The second important aspect of Modi’s image is that of going beyond soft
power promotion in line with this strongman image.
Modi’s foreign policy approach has been markedly assertive. He has
taken decisive stances on critical issues, from surgical strikes against
Pakistan in 2016 to diplomatic offensives against China following border
clashes. This assertiveness has redefined India's image from a
traditionally non-aligned nation to a more proactive global player.
Modi’s revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with the
United States, Japan, and Australia, aimed at ensuring a free and open
Indo-Pacific, represents a clear strategic counter to China’s growing
regional influence and underscores India’s willingness to play a pivotal
role in regional security as a Western ally.
Through his deft foreign policy maneuvers and personal diplomacy,
Narendra Modi has successfully transitioned from a provincial leader to
a global statesman, reshaping India’s international engagement and
cementing its position on the world stage. His remarkable evolution
serves as a compelling case study of political evolution and adaptability
in the face of domestic and international challenges.
The Rise of India as a Mediator
The eruption of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 marked the first instance
of India possibly becoming a new face in global conflict mediation – a
role traditionally played by Western European nations.
India has steadfastly called for the warring parties to work for a peaceful
resolution through dialogue and diplomacy. It has stuck to this stance
while showing remarkable resilience to Western pressure.
Despite the harsh criticism, press and social media pressure, and even
direct lobbying from its closest Western ally, the United States, India
refused to condemn Russia’s invasion outright. On the other hand, India
sent clear signals to Russia by emphasizing the importance of respecting
all nations’ sovereignty and territorial integrity while advocating for a
cessation of hostilities and a return to the negotiating table.
This approach was particularly evident during the G-20 summit in Bali,
Indonesia, in November 2022, where Modi played a crucial role in
facilitating discussions between Russia and the West. Modi’s personal
rapport with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Western leaders
allowed him to bridge the divide and encourage a more constructive
dialogue.
Furthermore, India’s handling of the Russian oil imports issue has
showcased its diplomatic acumen and ability to balance competing
interests.
On the one hand, despite pressure from the United States and other
Western nations to reduce its reliance on Russian energy imports, India
has continued to purchase discounted Russian crude oil, arguing that its
primary responsibility is to ensure the energy security of its 1.4 billion
citizens. On the other hand, India sold the same oil to NATO countries and
helped them satiate their energy needs without breaking the sanctions
they had placed on Russia.
India has made certain the West realizes two things: one, new realities
don’t obliterate old ones. As close as India has gotten to the West and the
Quad, India has no intention to abandon Russia, its oldest and most
steadfast international ally.
Two, India is ready to go beyond passive non-alignment to active
neutrality. Modi isn’t going to shy away from using India’s growing
economic and geopolitical clout, which has also contributed to its
emergence as a key mediator.
As the world’s fifth-largest economy and a rising global power, India’s
influence on the international stage has been steadily increasing. Its
strategic partnerships with both Russia and the United States, as well as
its membership in key multilateral forums such as the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa) grouping, have positioned it as a vital link
between the East and the West.
India’s emergence as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine conflict has also
inspired a new narrative in global politics that challenges the traditional
Western-centric approach to conflict resolution. It has demonstrated that
developing nations with a strong commitment to multilateralism and a
pragmatic approach to international relations can play a vital role in
promoting peace and stability.
Responding to questions raised in the Indian Parliament soon after the
full scale invasion of Ukrainian territories by Russia had begun in
February 2022, Modi had conversations with both Putin and Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy individually, urging both to chose
negotiation over confrontation.
India’s minister of external affairs, Dr. S Jaishankar, stated on the record
that, “Prime Minister [Modi] spoke with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy
of Ukraine on 26 February and, again on 07 March. In these
conversations, Prime Minister expressed deep concern about the ongoing
conflict and resultant humanitarian crisis. Prime Minister reiterated his
call for immediate cessation of violence and noted that India has always
stood for peaceful resolution of issues and direct dialogue between the
two parties.”
While India refused to join any direct involvement in military affairs,
New Delhi sent 15 consignments of humanitarian assistance weighing
about 117 metric tons to Ukraine and sent financial aid to rebuild the
Kyiv Gymnasium of Oriental Language No. 1, which had been destroyed
by the Russian assault.
Most recently, Modi met Zelenskyy in person on the sidelines of the G-7
summit on June 14, 2024, replicating a similar meeting at the 2023 G-7
gathering. In a post on X (formerly Twitter) afterward, Modi called his
meeting with Zelenskyy “very productive,” saying “India is eager to
further cement bilateral relations with Ukraine.”
On the other hand, Jaishankar’s submissions to the Parliament say that
Modi “...also spoke with Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian
Federation on 24 February, 02 March, and 07 March.” Later, in September
2022, Modi met with Putin in person on the sidelines of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Uzbekistan.
Soon after the onset of the invasion, upon being briefed on the status of
negotiations between the Ukrainian and Russian sides, Modi proposed
that “...a direct conversation between President Putin and President
Zelenskyy may greatly assist the ongoing peace efforts.” He continues to
advocate for “dialogue and diplomacy,” telling Zelenskyy that is “the way
to peace.”
As the world becomes increasingly multipolar, India’s rise as a mediator
and Modi as the face of that mediation is likely to have far-reaching
implications for global governance and conflict resolution. Its success in
facilitating dialogue and finding common ground between opposing
parties has set a new precedent for diplomatic engagement and has
opened up new possibilities for a more inclusive and representative
international order.
Unchanged Independence, Changed Rhetoric
India has a strong history in the non-aligned movement during the Cold
War and had a clear stance on anti-colonial freedom movements before
that. India’s demand for the United Nations, particularly the U.N. Security
Council, to become more representative and include countries of the
Global South isn’t new, either. So Modi’s pursuit of an independent, India-
first approach to policy isn’t novel or a shift per se.
However, the strongest shift in India’s foreign policy under Modi is the
marked departure from the country’s traditional approach to
international relations as being distinct from domestic politics. The once
clear lines between domestic politics and foreign policy have become
increasingly blurred as the Modi government actively leverages
diplomatic achievements to bolster its political standing at home.
The BJP’s IT Cell has played a pivotal role in bridging the gap between
foreign and domestic policy, harnessing the power of social media to
shape public opinion on international issues. From trending hashtags like
#BoycottMaldives in response to Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu
clearly favoring ties with China over India to trending clips of
Jaishankar’s public utterances criticizing “Western hypocrisy,” the BJP
has effectively mobilized public sentiment in support of the government's
foreign policy decisions.
Not only have Modi and Jaishankar demonstrated an unabashed appetite
to turn global talking points into fodder for domestic consumption, but
they have nearly written this “hitting back” into India’s communication
and propaganda policies.
The recent exposé by the Washington Post, revealing the Research and
Analysis Wing (R&AW)’s efforts to counter Western criticism through a
network of analysts and writers, underscores the government’s proactive
approach to shaping the international narrative.
Moreover, India is no longer content with being the subject of criticism;
instead, it is actively challenging Western perspectives and asserting its
own voice on the global stage. This was exemplified by Jaishankar’s
strong response to the U.S. State Department’s 2021 report on religious
freedom, which he termed as “vote bank politics in international
relations.”
The Modi government’s assertive foreign policy stance has been further
highlighted by its response to recent events. The crackdown on protests,
such as the 2020 Jawaharlal Nehru University protests against fee hikes
and the 2021 farmers’ protests, drew international criticism, but the
government remained steadfast in its position.
The Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ announcement of a new
democracy index aimed at countering Western indices that often rank
India poorly showcases the government’s determination to challenge
established narratives.
The highlight of this projection of international strength through media,
however, is the flaunting of an assassination program targeting anti-
Indian extremist voices sheltering in the United States and Canada. While
the charges leveled by the U.S. and Canada saw routine and banal denials
from the establishment’s mandarins, IT Cell-led social media
unabashedly flaunted the allegations as victory stripes.
Beyond media posturing, in terms of real geopolitical alignments, Modi’s
government has marked a subtle but significant shift from the overtly
pro-U.S. policy of his predecessor, Manmohan Singh, to a more balanced
approach that includes a renewed emphasis on ties with Russia.
Despite India’s continued strategic partnership with the United States,
driven by shared concerns over China’s growing assertiveness, Modi’s
government has shown a willingness to challenge Washington when
necessary. Despite pressure from the United States and other Western
nations, India’s continued oil imports from Russia during the ongoing
Ukraine conflict underscore this new dynamic in Indo-U.S. relations.
Moreover, India’s decision to abstain from voting on U.N. resolutions
condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine has highlighted its commitment
to maintaining strategic autonomy in foreign policy.
However, Modi’s government has faced criticism for its perceived soft
stance on China, particularly in light of the ongoing border disputes
between the two countries. Despite Modi’s earlier promises to take a
tough line against Chinese aggression, the opposition has accused his
government of failing to adequately counter China’s military actions
along the disputed border.
The June 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which resulted in the deaths of 20
Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops, exposed the
limitations of India’s military capabilities and the challenges of directly
confronting China. The subsequent statements by Jaishankar and his
deputy, Meenakshi Lekhi, acknowledging India’s limitations in directly
confronting China, have further fueled this criticism, with the opposition
accusing the government of weakening India’s position vis-à-vis its
powerful neighbor.
What remains a high point for Modi, though, is that despite these
challenges, his government has made significant strides in expanding
India’s global footprint and enhancing its strategic partnerships.
The strengthening of the Quad with the United States, Japan, and
Australia has been a key foreign policy achievement aimed at countering
China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region. The first-ever Quad
Leaders’ Summit, held virtually in March 2021, underscored the growing
importance of this grouping and India’s central role in shaping the
regional security architecture.
India has also actively engaged with other regional and multilateral
forums, such as the SCO and the BRICS grouping, to advance its strategic
interests and shape the global discourse on issues ranging from terrorism
to climate change. The Modi government’s successful hosting of the 2021
BRICS Summit, which brought together the leaders of Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa, demonstrated India’s growing diplomatic
clout and its ability to navigate complex geopolitical dynamics.
India’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts, as seen in its
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, have further bolstered its image as a
responsible global power. The supply of vaccines and medical equipment
to countries in need, under the “Vaccine Maitri” initiative, has earned
India goodwill and strengthened its soft power in the international
community.
While all of the aforementioned successes have been widely reported in
the Indian media — especially the pro-government ones – the less than
shiny bits of news find little place.
For example, India had to host the 2023 SCO Summit virtually on account
of flaring tensions with fellow members China and Pakistan. The
awkward and difficult geopolitical dynamics remained far less reported
than the purported successes of the SCO Summit itself.
Hindutva as Hurdle
On the flip side, this blurring of lines between external and internal
propaganda and posturing has had a detrimental effect on India’s
standing in its neighborhood. The rise of Hindu nationalist rhetoric and
the Modi government’s emphasis on promoting Hindu culture has raised
concerns among India’s neighbors, particularly those with majority
Muslim populations.
In the Maldives, the run-up to the 2018 presidential election that brought
Ibrahim Mohamed Solih to power saw Maldivian Muslim groups
attacking and criticizing Modi’s relentless promotion of yoga as an
attempt to inject Hindu culture into the island nation. The Maldives, a
Muslim-majority country, has been wary of India’s growing influence and
has sought to maintain its Islamic identity. The perception of India as a
Hindu-centric state has further complicated bilateral relations, with the
Maldives increasingly turning toward China for economic and strategic
cooperation.
The recent election of Muizzu, who went to the polls on a shrill and
uncompromising anti-India, pro-China plank, is further evidence of the
Hindutva hurdle in India’s neighborhood policy.
Nepal, another key neighbor, has taken serious umbrage to the inclusion
of disputed territories in the new “Akhand Bharat” map displayed in the
Indian parliament building. The map, which depicts a unified India
encompassing Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Tibet, and
parts of Nepal, has been seen as an affront to Nepal’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
The border disputes between India and Nepal, particularly in the
Kalapani region, have further strained bilateral relations, with Nepal
accusing India of encroaching upon its territory. The Modi government’s
assertive stance on the border issue and its refusal to engage in
constructive dialogue have led to a growing anti-India sentiment in
Nepal, with calls for a more balanced and independent foreign policy.
In May 2020, Nepal’s Parliament approved a new political map that
includes the disputed territories of Kalapani, Lipulekh, and
Limpiyadhura, further escalating tensions with India.
Bangladesh has also seen an increasingly restive polity in recent years.
Despite the leadership of Sheikh Hasina, who has been a staunch
supporter of India, the rise of Hindu nationalist rhetoric and the
controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) have raised concerns in
Bangladesh about discrimination against Muslims in India and the
potential influx of undocumented Muslim migrants into the country.
The CAA, which fast-tracks citizenship for non-Muslim refugees from
neighboring countries into India, has been seen as a violation of the spirit
of secularism and has led to widespread protests in Bangladesh. The
growing anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh has also been fueled by the
Modi government’s perceived interference in the country’s domestic
politics and its support for the ruling Awami League party. In March
2021, violent protests erupted in Bangladesh over Modi’s visit to the
country, with demonstrators accusing him of stoking communal tensions
and promoting Hindu nationalism.
Propaganda as Policy
Modi’s use of Hindutva as dual-purpose propaganda content and the IT
Cell as an all-purpose propaganda weapon has, perhaps unwittingly,
spawned a dangerous feedback loop where propaganda has become
policy.
In light of the mixed success of the anti-Khalistan assassination program
and the arrest of R&AW assets in Europe, the NATO and Five Eyes
intelligence alliances have recently sent clear signals to India about its
place in the global pecking order. This has exposed the limits of India’s
strategic ambitions and its attempts to project itself as a global
superpower.
In other words, this has come as a rude awakening for Modi-led India,
which has been consuming – and become consumed by – its own
propaganda and delusions of grandeur.
The Five Eyes, in particular, have been reluctant to share sensitive
intelligence with India, citing concerns over the country’s close ties with
Russia and its handling of classified information. This comes as a
humiliating rebuke for India’s strategic establishment, which has long
sought to position the country as a key partner of the West in the Indo-
Pacific region.
The fact that the Five Eyes, which includes some of India’s closest
strategic partners such as the United States and Australia, are unwilling
to fully trust New Delhi with sensitive intelligence has laid bare the
hollowness of India’s claims to be a responsible and reliable global player.
It has also exposed the limitations of India’s attempts to balance its
relations with Russia and the West, a strategy that has come under
increasing strain in recent years.
Moreover, India’s exclusion from key strategic dialogues and initiatives
led by the NATO and Five Eyes countries has also highlighted the
country’s marginal role in shaping the global security architecture.
Despite Modi and Jaishankar’s much-vaunted “strategic autonomy” and
aspirations to be a “leading power,” India has been shown its place by the
very groupings it takes part in, including BRICS.
While the much-publicized rupee-ruble trade between India and Russia
collapsed quickly, Russia has continued expanding its ruble-yuan
exchanges. Similarly, in the rupee-riyal energy trade with Iran, only 45
percent of the transactions are actually settled using these currencies.
Fifty-five percent, or more than half the amount, is actually settled in
euros.
Among other factors, India has very little to export to these non-Western
nation-states. Moreover, India’s proximity to the West and near-absolute
reliance on SWIFT make its banks incapable of circumventing the
sanctions against Iran and Russia.
China, on the other hand, has been able to navigate these challenges with
greater success despite facing its own set of constraints and limitations.
China’s growing economic and military power has made it an
indispensable player in the global system, forcing even its most ardent
critics to engage with it on a range of issues.
China’s strategic partnerships with countries such as Russia and Iran
have given it a degree of leverage and autonomy that India can only
dream of. China’s ability to balance its relations with multiple powers
and shape the global agenda on climate change and global governance
has made it a formidable challenger to the Western-led order.
However, China’s assertiveness and its attempts to reshape the global
order in its own image have also sparked a growing backlash from the
West and its allies. The NATO and Five Eyes countries have increasingly
seen China as a strategic rival and have sought to counter its influence
through a range of measures, including economic sanctions, diplomatic
pressure, and military posturing.
But even as China faces these challenges, it has been able to maintain a
degree of strategic clarity and consistency that India has sorely lacked.
China’s propaganda machine may be just as relentless as India’s, but it is
backed up by a formidable economic and military apparatus that
commands respect and fear in equal measure.
In contrast, India’s propaganda has been exposed as a hollow sham, a
self-serving narrative that has little basis in reality. India's claims to be a
“Vishwaguru” (world teacher) and a “jagat janani” (mother of the world)
have been met with derision and scorn by the international community,
which sees through the country’s grandiose rhetoric and recognizes its
many weaknesses and contradictions.
The Modi government’s use of propaganda as a tool of foreign policy has
not only failed to enhance India’s global standing but has actually
undermined it. By peddling a vision of India that is at odds with reality,
the government has created a credibility gap that will be difficult to
bridge in the years ahead.
The Path Ahead
As Narendra Modi embarks on his third term as prime minister of India,
the challenges and opportunities in the realm of foreign policy are more
pronounced than ever. Despite the mixed results of his previous
strategies, there is a clear path forward that can help India enhance its
global standing and address the complexities of the international arena
more effectively.
First and foremost, Modi’s government needs to prioritize pragmatism
over propaganda. The blurring of lines between domestic political
narratives and foreign policy has led to significant credibility issues.
India should adopt a more realistic and transparent approach to
international relations. This means acknowledging its limitations and
working cooperatively with both Western and Eastern blocs without
overreliance on grandiose rhetoric.
India’s strategic autonomy should be reflected in its active participation
in multilateral forums. Strengthening ties within groups like the G-20,
BRICS, and the SCO can provide India with a platform to influence global
governance. Additionally, India should continue mediating in
international conflicts, leveraging its unique position as a bridge between
the East and the West.
While maintaining its historical ties with Russia, India’s foreign policy
should also focus on deepening partnerships with other key players like
the United States, European Union, Japan, and Australia. These
relationships, particularly within frameworks like the Quad, can help
counterbalance China’s growing influence. However, this should be done
without alienating other important partners or compromising India’s
strategic autonomy.
India’s neighborhood policy requires a sensitive and balanced approach.
The rise of Hindutva rhetoric has strained relationships with neighboring
countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Maldives. To mitigate these
tensions, Modi’s government should focus on building trust through
economic cooperation and cultural exchanges and address legitimate
concerns about sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Economic strength is the bedrock of any successful foreign policy. Modi’s
government should focus on enhancing India’s economic diplomacy by
fostering trade relationships, attracting foreign investment, and
participating in global supply chains. Initiatives like “Make in India” and
“Digital India” should be integrated into the broader foreign policy
framework to create mutually beneficial economic ties.
The recent setbacks in intelligence sharing with the NATO and Five Eyes
alliances highlight the need for India to improve its intelligence and
security cooperation. Building trust with these alliances will require
stringent measures to protect classified information and a more
transparent approach to India’s strategic objectives. Strengthening
domestic intelligence capabilities and fostering better coordination with
international partners can help India become a more reliable security
partner.
India’s rich cultural heritage, democratic values, and contributions to
global issues like climate change and public health provide a solid
foundation for soft power diplomacy. However, while it is crucial to
highlight these strengths, the narrative should avoid infantilizing India's
image on the global stage.
Additionally, Modi must resist the temptation to position himself as the
omnipresent mascot of every initiative and refrain from hyperbolic
claims about his superhuman capabilities. Such portrayals risk
undermining India’s credibility and invite ridicule rather than respect.
Instead, India’s soft power should be promoted through measured and
dignified cultural exchanges, educational collaborations, and
humanitarian efforts that reflect the nation's genuine strengths and
aspirations.
Lastly, a coherent and effective foreign policy requires internal political
cohesion and stability. With his mandate significantly reduced in 2024,
Modi needs to address domestic issues such as religious polarization,
economic inequality, and social justice. Doing so will be crucial in
providing a more stable domestic foundation for his international
engagements.
By contrast, letting these issues fester will directly undermine the moral
high ground he and his government have been seeking on the world
stage.

The Author
Siddharthya Roy is a New Delhi-based correspondent on South Asian affairs.
Japan Ministry of Defense

Japan’s Enhanced Security

Engagement With the Pacific
Islands
The expansion of security and defense cooperation stands
as the most spectacular change in Japan’s contribution to
the region in recent years.
By Céline Pajon

In July 2024, the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) will be held
in Tokyo. The PALM summits have been bringing together Japan and the
Pacific Island countries (PICs) on a triennial basis since 1997. On this
occasion, Japan might propose a security cooperation agreement to the
countries of the region. Indeed, the expansion of security and defense
cooperation stands as the most spectacular change in Japan’s
contribution to the region in recent years.
The Pacific territories hold significant wealth in fishery resources and
raw materials, including critical minerals. Their sea lanes are crucial for
Tokyo’s energy supplies, and their strategic geographical location is vital
amid China-U.S. rivalry. Additionally, these territories play a key role in
realizing Japan’s vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. These factors
underscore Japan's strong interests in the region and explain the rise in
strategic engagement.
As a major provider of Official Development Assistance (ODA), Tokyo has
developed innovative tools to help strengthen the maritime surveillance
capabilities of the PICs, and more broadly, their resilience to climatic and
geopolitical risks. From its low-profile beginning, focusing on non-
traditional challenges and led by civilian actors, security cooperation has
grown to be more visible, with the increased participation of Japan’s Self-
Defense Forces (SDF) and in cooperation with like-minded partners such
as United States and Australia. As a result, Tokyo has positioned itself as a
security provider in the Pacific Islands, developing a multifaceted and
integrated approach.
From Low-Profile Security Cooperation…
Tokyo began providing aid to the Pacific islands in the 1970s, when the
establishment of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) was under discussion
and Tokyo wanted to ensure access for its fishing vessels. Today Japan is
the region’s third-largest donor, behind Australia and New Zealand.
In 1997, nine years before China, and at a time when the United States
and other major donors were disengaging from the area, Tokyo set up a
triennial high-level forum to meet its Pacific partners. The PALM summit
initiated a multilateral political dialogue, initially bringing together 16
countries in the region, and accompanied the expansion of Japanese aid.
Japan’s security cooperation has therefore primarily involved
development aid and has focused on strengthening the maritime
surveillance and policing capacities of Micronesian states, which are
historically and geographically closer to Japan. It has been mostly
implemented by civilian actors: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Japan
Coast Guard (JCG), which trains their Micronesian counterparts; and also
a private actor, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF), which set up in
2009 an “International Committee for the Establishment of a Maritime
Safety System in Micronesia.” This mechanism has offered seminars on
the law of the sea and, since 2011, has provided small patrol boats to the
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Marshall Islands, and Palau.
By operating in this manner, Tokyo could meet the expectations of Pacific
states seeking assistance in monitoring their EEZs and combating illegal
fishing. At the same time, Japan could act with discretion to secure
approval from both Canberra and Washington, who were previously the
sole providers of patrol boats for the PICs.
Security cooperation has gradually evolved to include Japan’s Ministry of
Defense, which launched its own capacity-building program in 2012.
Initially, these activities were quite low profile and fell within the scope
of defense diplomacy and soft power. For example, since 2015, the
Ground Self-Defense Force has been training the Papua New Guinea
(PNG) Defense Forces’ military band.
In 2018, Pacific Island countries were incorporated into Japan's vision for
a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and the PALM summits took on a greater
strategic dimension. Since then, and in addition to sustainable
development, which has always been a top priority for Pacific Islanders,
the PALM summits’ final declaration has made references to the security
situation in East Asia, the preservation of the rule of law, freedom of
navigation, and the need to enforce United Nations’ sanctions against
North Korea.
The same year, the PICs were mentioned for the first time in Japan’s
annual Defense of Japan report and longer-term National Defense
Program Guidelines, which noted: “With island nations of the Pacific
Ocean, Japan will promote port and airport visits by SDF as well as
exchanges and cooperation that utilize capabilities and characteristics of
each service of SDF.”
In keeping with that goal, the 2021 edition of the SDF’s annual Indo-
Pacific deployment (IPD) saw the maritime destroyer JS Murasame make
stopovers in Papua New Guinea, Palau (where it delivered 75 judo
outfits), and Vanuatu (where it conducted a passing exercise).
...to Full-Fledged Security and Defense Engagement Amid China’s
Advances
The first Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD), held in
September 2021, sent a clear signal of Tokyo’s determination to step up its
game in this area. It brought together, in virtual format due to the
pandemic, defense officials and representatives from 13 Pacific Island
countries, as well as Australia, New Zealand, France, the United States,
and Canada, to promote port calls and exercises with the SDF in maritime
security and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations
(HADR). It was the first-ever multilateral defense ministerial hosted by
Japan and took more than five years to come to fruition.
The growing Chinese presence in the Pacific Islands region and its
deleterious side effects provided an important backdrop to this initiative.
Expensive loans were granted by Beijing within the framework of the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), sometimes resulting in heavy debts for
countries that could compromise sovereignty. Among the PICs, Chinese
loans account for 55 percent of Tonga’s total external debt and almost
half of Vanuatu’s debt.
The extent of China’s ambitions in the region was highlighted with two
trips by President Xi Jinping in 2014 and 2018. The region’s political
importance is linked to Taiwan, a core security interest for Beijing. Only
12 nations in the world still recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state, with
three located in the South Pacific (the Marshall Islands, Palau, and
Tuvalu). Beijing has persistently pressured Taipei’s allies, leading the
Solomon Islands and Kiribati to switch recognition to China in 2019;
Nauru followed suit in February 2024.
The revelation, in March 2022, of a confidential security agreement
between China and the Solomon Islands, which could possibly allow the
stationing of Chinese naval vessels, came as a shock to Australia and the
wider Western world. In June 2022, Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited
seven Pacific countries and presented a five-year cooperation plan,
including the domains of security, policy, and defense, which was
ultimately rejected by the countries of the Pacific Islands Forum. These
moves raised alarms and prompted reactions from the United States,
Australia, and other like-minded countries.
The expansion of Japan’s defense cooperation reflects the 2022 surge of
activities related to defense diplomacy with the Pacific that reacted to
China’s visible advance to the region. During the 2022 edition of the IPD,
the largest vessel in the Japanese fleet, the aircraft carrier Izumo, called
on Australia, Fiji, New Caledonia, Palau, PNG, the Solomon Islands, Tonga,
and Vanuatu. The strategic signal was clear: Japan is reinvesting in the
area, including at the military level, echoing China’s moves.
Beyond the China factor, the integration of the climate factor into Japan’s
security and defense strategy was a major development with direct
implications for its cooperation with the Pacific states. The first “Climate
Change Response Strategy” published in 2022 by the Japanese Ministry of
Defense identified the climate vulnerability of Pacific Island countries as
an aggravating factor in internal and interstate tensions, and a vector of
destabilization that could lead to an expansion of China’s influence in the
area. One of its priorities is therefore to build capacity and share
expertise with these countries in order to improve their resilience.
Japan could build upon its previous contribution in 2018 to fund the
Pacific Climate Change Center (PCCC), a regional research center located
in Samoa focusing on the impacts of climate change. Japan also
positioned itself as a HADR operation contributor: In February 2022,
Japan was the third fastest country to dispatch its armed forces to bring
humanitarian assistance to Tonga after a violent underwater volcano
caused a tsunami that immensely damaged the country. Japan is also
helping to build the capacity of PNG for the maintenance of heavy
engineering equipment, which plays an important role in disaster relief
operations.
An Integrated, Inter-Agency Approach
At the ninth PALM summit in 2021, Tokyo set up an “Inter-Ministerial
Committee for the Promotion of Cooperation with PICs” to strengthen
inter-agency coordination and the coherence of Japanese actions. In
particular, “the preservation of a free, open, sustainable and law-based
maritime order” was identified as a priority objective. The maritime
cooperation model Japan has applied to Southeast Asia since the 2000s is
being extended to the Pacific; new players and tools are being mobilized,
and practices are being integrated.
In 2023, one of the Japanese Coast Guard’s Mobile Cooperation Teams
(MCTs) was assigned to Pacific Island nations. By maintaining daily
contact with aid recipient countries, the MCTs strengthen their
understanding of local issues, and help train and equip these countries’
maritime police, thereby building trusting relationships.
In June 2023, the MCTs took part in the first cooperation action for the
benefit of Kiribati’s maritime law enforcement agencies, and engaged in
security-focused trainings in the Marshall Islands and FSM in early 2024.
The MCTs were originally set up in 2017 to train and equip Southeast
Asian coast guards to cope with Chinese expansion. Japan is thus clearly
linking the risks posed by China’s maritime expansion in the South China
Sea to the Pacific Islands theater and seeking to strengthen cooperation
between ASEAN and PICs, as highlighted by Defense Minister Kihara
Minoru at the second JPIDD in March 2024. He recalled that in August
2023, Japan involved PICs for the first time in its “Japan-ASEAN Ship
Rider Cooperation Program” aboard the JS Izumo, near Australian
waters.
Another innovative tool is Official Security Assistance (OSA) introduced
by the 2022 National Security Strategy. Piloted by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, this program is designed to strengthen the resilience of the armed
forces of friendly countries, while supporting Japan’s defense industry,
since it often involves the sale of military equipment on credit. The initial
priority recipient nations were the Philippines, Bangladesh, Malaysia,
and Fiji.
In the case of Fiji, Japan’s OSA works in tandem with Australia’s capacity-
building program: The Fiji navy received Japanese patrol boats and small
rescue boats (worth $2.7 million) for use in training exercises conducted
by the Australian army.
The initial OSA budget of $14 million will increase to $34 million by the
end of 2024, and the program will be extended to other countries,
including PNG.
Japan’s integrated approach requires closer coordination between the
various institutional players: the SDF and JCG are working together with
increasing frequency, as in the Marshall Islands in May 2024 by
equipping and training the local coast guards. Similarly, implementation
of OSA requires close coordination between the National Security
Secretariat, which sets strategic priorities; the Ministry of Defense, which
oversees the production and sale of military equipment; and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, which actually operates the aid program and
articulates it with ODA.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is also involved in
cybersecurity capacity building activities, a domain in which Japan has
played a pioneering role in Southeast Asia with the establishment in 2018
of the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Center in Thailand.
In February 2024, Japan led its first cybersecurity exercise with five
Pacific Island nations (Palau, the FSM, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, and
Kiribati, with Fiji and Tonga as observers) and in cooperation with the
United States and Australia, with whom it is also working on the region’s
digital connectivity. This effort goes hand in hand with Tokyo’s
participation to fund and set up undersea cables in the region.
Finally, the Japanese police, along with the SDF, is expanding and
diversifying its capacity-building activities in the area, including for local
police forces. The National Police Agency is participating to the JPIDD,
along with the SDF and the Japan Coast Guard. In January 2024, the
Solomon Islands Police Force received training to improve the
management of unexploded ordnance from the Pacific War, which still
causes casualties. In terms of police cooperation, the Japanese koban
system is considered as being a useful model for maintaining law and
order in the PICs.
An Integrated Approach, Coordinated With Partners
Coordination with like-minded partners, especially Australia, the region’s
leading provider of development and security assistance, is another
dimension of Japan’s integrated approach to the Pacific Islands.
The ultimate aim seems to be integrating the efforts of the various
partners through minilateral initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Maritime
Domain Awareness Partnership (IPMDA) set up by the Quad, bringing
together Japan, India, the United States, and Australia in 2022. The four
Quad foreign ministers also signed the guidelines for a “Quad
Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the Indo-
Pacific” in September 2022. The HADR partnership was implemented for
the first time in the wake of the catastrophic landslide in Papua New
Guinea in late May 2024.
Japan is a founding member of the Partners in the Blue Pacific, a U.S.
initiative also involving Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, and
the U.K. to take joint action in the PICs. One of the partnership’s first
regional initiatives was the Pacific Cyber Capacity Building and
Coordination Conference held in Fiji in October 2023.
Tokyo is also strengthening its cooperation with French forces in the
Pacific. Since 2014, the SDF have been a regular participant in the
multinational HADR exercises Croix du Sud and Marara led by France in
New Caledonia and French Polynesia, respectively. These French
territories have been included in the PALM summit since 2021. Japanese
participation in the first seminar of the Pacific Coast Guard Network
organized by France, the opening of a Japanese consular office in
Nouméa, New Caledonia, in January 2023, and the negotiation of a
Reciprocal Access Agreement for armed forces, announced in May 2024,
are elements that point to stronger ties in the area.
The Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue, which held its second edition
in March 2024 in Tokyo, reaffirms Japan’s integrated approach to security
cooperation. Japan has shown willingness to coordinate the JPIDD with
the PALM summit and the South Pacific Defense Ministers’ Meeting
(SPDMM). The SPDMM stands as the sole multilateral forum bringing
together defense ministers from the extended South Pacific – Australia,
Chile, Fiji, France, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga – to
discuss and better coordinate on climate change and its impacts,
maritime security, and the training of armed forces for HADR. Japan,
along with the United States and United Kingdom, has been an observer
country since 2022, and is now applying to become a full-fledged
member.
Finally, it should be noted that Japan’s security cooperation is also
channeled through multilateral organizations. In May 2023, for example,
Tokyo and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) signed
a funding agreement worth $6 million to counter maritime crime (illegal
fishing as well as drug trafficking) in nine PICs, through the upgrade of
maritime law enforcement infrastructure as well as the strengthening of
maritime law enforcement and criminal justice institutions. Under the
agreement, four inshore patrol crafts will be delivered to the maritime
police of Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu, and X-band radar stations
will be installed on land to improve maritime surveillance capability.
Conclusion
Despite the growing strength of Japanese security and defense
cooperation in the region, which is now truly multidimensional, several
limitations and challenges endure.
Tokyo’s ability to influence the Pacific Islands and in particular to
counterbalance China remains to be seen. The people of Oceania are
concerned by major geopolitical projects and are careful not to create
enemies. Only five out of the 12 Pacific nations (Fiji, the Marshall Islands,
the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and Papua New Guinea) have
openly endorsed the Free and Open Indo-Pacific slogan, which originated
with Japan. In contrast to ASEAN, the PICs have demonstrated no
intention of developing their own Indo-Pacific strategic framework or
integrating the concept into their individual national policies.
The PICs, in all of their official documents, describe climate change as the
existential threat to their security and wish to stay away from the
geopolitical competition between the United States and China. So while
the geostrategic competition with China provides the backdrop of Japan’s
growing security cooperation, Tokyo is careful not to frame its activities
in this way. Mindful of the sensibilities of PICs that are reluctant to take
sides, Tokyo underlines the centrality of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF),
building up the sovereignty and resilience of the Pacific countries, and
defending the rule of law. When working with the PICs, Japan usually
refers to a free, open, and stable “sea” rather than “Indo-Pacific” – a more
loaded term that has been rejected by China.
It should be also noted that some enduring irritants in the relations may
affect Japan’s expanded security cooperation with the Pacific Island
countries. In particular, the issue of nuclear waste, especially after the
2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster triggered by the Tohoku earthquake
and tsunami, remains sensitive. The PICs have consistently voiced their
concerns about Japan’s discharge into the ocean of wastewater from the
damaged Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, calling for greater
transparency and communication from the Japanese authorities. This
question will be on the agenda for the upcoming PALM 10 summit.
Finally, the resources that Tokyo can dedicate to the region are limited.
Japan’s security efforts must and will focus on the archipelagic state’s
immediate environment, where tensions are on the rise. Tokyo must
therefore work with its partners as much as possible, and develop long-
term bonds of trust with the PICs. The forthcoming arrival at the
Japanese National Defense Academy of officer cadets from Fiji, Tonga,
and Papua New Guinea should help to achieve this.

The Author
Céline Pajon is a research fellow and head of Japan Research at the French Institute of
International Relations (IFRI), where she is also the coordinator of the Program on Pacific Islands,
Center for Asian Studies. Céline is a senior researcher with the Japan Chair at Vrije Universiteit
Brussels (VUB) and an International Research Fellow with the Canon Institute for Global Studies
(CIGS) in Tokyo.

Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP, Vadim Savitsky

SCO Expansion: A Double-Edged
Sword
China and Russia have pushed the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization beyond its original mission, at the expense of
practical regional collaboration.
By Eva Seiwert

Belarus’ upcoming admission to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

(SCO) shows that the once purely regional grouping – originally
encompassing China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan – is steadily expanding its geographic and geopolitical reach.
After India and Pakistan in 2017 and Iran in 2023, Belarus will be the first
exclusively European country to join. What began as a purely Central
Asian forum focused on regional security cooperation will have become
an increasingly diverse 10-member club with broadening global
ambitions.
China and Russia’s Changing Interests in the SCO
The SCO’s shifting focus aligns most obviously with China and Russia’s
evolving interests in the organization. As founding members, they were
the driving forces in creating a platform for increased regional security
and economic cooperation, and 23 years later they are willing to sacrifice
that role to increase the SCO’s international weight. The group’s members
comprise roughly 25 percent of the world’s economic output and half of
its population, making it an ever more tempting tool for Moscow and
Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions.
While Russia’s interest in the Chinese-initiated organization was initially
lukewarm, Moscow began to take the SCO more seriously following its
annexation of Crimea in 2014 and ensuing Western sanctions. Since
starting its full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, Moscow has had to
seek partners outside of Europe even more intensively. The Kremlin now
sees the SCO as a useful forum for gathering support and countering
Western claims of its international isolation, and as a result has adopted
a “the more, the merrier” approach to membership.
China initially pushed for closer economic ties alongside security, cultural
and “humanitarian” collaboration among the members of the SCO. But
proposals such as a free-trade area and an SCO development bank were
rejected by Russia and other members. By the mid-2010s, Beijing was
using settings like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Central
Asia summit to promote closer economic cooperation with its neighbors
in the region. As recently as May this year, China announced a separate
mechanism for China-Central Asia emergency management cooperation,
despite this task falling directly into the SCO’s purview.
In parallel, since the 2010s, China has consolidated its position as a major
power in the international system, giving the SCO a symbolic value that
far outweighs its practical effectiveness. Beijing uses the forum to
showcase its ability to offer alternatives to existing U.S.-led institutions
and to present itself as the champion of the Global South. These two goals
make enlargement of the organization to include more countries beyond
Central Asia nothing but beneficial – even if this means further
undermining the SCO’s regional effectiveness.
Including India and Pakistan: Trading Effectiveness for International
Visibility
Russia and China’s shifting geopolitical ambitions provided the context
for the SCO’s first expansion. By embracing the South Asian heavyweights
India and Pakistan in 2017, the organization bet on increasing its
visibility on the world stage, while accepting the risk that decades of
India-Pakistan tensions could weaken its core security cooperation
mandate.
While the SCO had offered other states the opportunity to cooperate
loosely as observers since 2004 and as dialogue partners since 2009,
Beijing in particular had been reluctant to extend the circle of full
members in the organization’s early years. A major argument against
expansion had always been the need to first strengthen cohesion and find
a “common identity” among the six founding members before adding
new states and making the organization even more diverse.
Allowing India and Pakistan to join was also controversial given the SCO’s
focus on fighting what it calls the “three evils” of terrorism, extremism,
and separatism. Even some Chinese experts worried that both South
Asian countries’ habits of regularly blaming their neighbor for terrorist
acts within their own borders would make it increasingly difficult for
SCO members to reach a consensus on how to combat such threats.
Hopes that the SCO could help ease bilateral tensions were realistically
low from the beginning and fears about India-Pakistan tensions affecting
SCO activities have materialized to an extent – for instance, a dispute
with India over depictions on a map resulted in Pakistan staying away
from an SCO seminar in New Delhi in 2023. Although the SCO sees itself
as a forum for improving regional security, it insists that member states
keep their bilateral conflicts outside the organization. And even the
founding members have been reluctant to use the SCO as a platform to
resolve bilateral tensions, such as water disputes between Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan and border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Regardless of these obvious flaws, the first SCO expansion promised a
major upside. It would bring the organization more legitimacy, especially
by adding two major regional powers that were also nuclear states. On
top of that, accepting India as the first undeniably democratic member
country helped counter the common Western portrayal of the SCO as a
“dictators’ club.” The first round of expansion also incidentally saw the
organization become the largest regional organization worldwide, both
in terms of geographic reach and population represented.
Iran Joins in 2023: Expanding the SCO Into West Asia
Compared to the accession of India and Pakistan, inviting Iran to join the
regional security organization in July 2023 made more logical sense in
terms of organizational effectiveness. With Tehran as concerned as other
SCO members about drug trafficking and political instability in
Afghanistan, Iran is a natural choice to help prevent spillover from its
neighbor. The country has ample experience fighting the so-called three
evils domestically, which it can now share through the SCO’s Regional
Anti-Terrorist Structure. On top of this, Iran’s membership can help boost
SCO trade links, especially through the Indian-operated port of Chabahar
on the Gulf of Oman.
But by including Iran and thereby expanding into West Asia, the SCO
blurred its regional focus even more and damaged any international
legitimacy it had gained by admitting India. After gaining observer status
in 2005, Iran was the associate state most eager to make the SCO more
explicitly “anti-Western.” In 2011, Iran’s then-President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad campaigned for the SCO “to form a united front against the
West,” referring to Western countries as “enslavers, colonialists, [and]
invaders.” This was one reason why several SCO members long refused to
consider Iran’s 2008 application for full membership. But somewhere
along the way their priorities shifted – after 2017, even Beijing saw more
advantages than disadvantages in admitting the country.
The shift came at the same time Moscow and Beijing were individually
forging closer ties with Tehran. Both Russia and China joined Iran, the
United States, and Europe in signing the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action (JCPOA), under which Iran agreed to limits on its nuclear
program in exchange for relief from international sanctions. The deal
removed a key hurdle to Iran’s SCO membership, as it no longer violated
the organization’s rule that countries cannot join if they are under U.N.
sanctions. When then-U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew
from the JCPOA in 2018, China, Russia, and Iran saw this as confirmation
of the United States’ unreliability.
Shared antagonism toward the U.S. brought China, Russia, and Iran closer
together in the years that followed – and in late 2021 Beijing and Moscow
proved instrumental in initiating the process to admit Iran to the SCO.
More than anything, Iran’s accession in 2023 increased the geopolitical
weight of the organization and solidified the China-Russia-Iran
partnership. The addition of Tehran was a clear message to the United
States and its allies that the SCO no longer cared about whether the West
saw the organization as friend or foe.
Admission of Belarus Bursts the Regional Focus Once and for All
The accession of Belarus at the SCO summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on
July 3-4 seals the SCO’s transformation from a focused group of Central
Asian states intent on improving the regional security situation into a
geopolitical bloc at the center of a hardening global confrontation
between the U.S. and its allies on one hand and China, Russia, and the
partners they are collecting on the other. As the first entirely European
country to join, Belarus expands the SCO’s reach beyond Central, South,
and West Asia; adds an important ally of Russia and a “strategic partner”
of China; and reinforces the SCO’s strategy of building a counterbalance
to Western organizations and alliances.
Belarus was one of the first two countries to attain the affiliate status of
dialogue partner in 2009, and it was granted observer status in 2015. The
country is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russian-led
groupings of largely contiguous, post-Soviet countries. However, SCO
membership was initially regarded as a stretch – even Russia initially
argued that Minsk was too far from the SCO’s regional core. But its
change of heart speaks to Moscow’s evolving ambitions.
After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the SCO invited Belarus to apply
for full membership. In Russia’s and China’s increasingly heated rivalry
with the United States and its allies, SCO enlargement no longer seems to
serve the effectiveness of the organization as a regional forum, but rather
to assemble a bloc of countries favorable to Russia and China in their
campaign to establish a global order not dominated by the West.
At the same time, Minsk’s interests in the SCO may go beyond geostrategic
ambitions. For Belarus, trade with SCO countries is a welcome alternative
to economic ties to Europe, given EU sanctions against Belarus for
supporting Russian aggression against Ukraine. Belarus has enjoyed close
economic relations to several SCO countries for some time. It was one of
the first countries to join China’s BRI in 2014, a particularly useful move
for China given its proximity to the EU and membership in the Eurasian
Economic Union. But given its modest size and weak economy, Belarus
stands to gain much more economically from SCO membership than the
other members will gain from their new partner.
From the SCO’s point of view, Belarus adds nothing in practical terms to
the organization’s legitimacy, like India had, and does little to bolster
regional security and the fight against the “three evils,” capacities that
Iran has brought into the club. The admission of Russia’s closest ally is
largely symbolic, but in an important way: It fully commits the SCO to its
role as a multilateral representation of the “new international order”
championed by China and Russia.
The SCO at a Crossroads
The SCO’s next steps will be a measure of its future direction and role.
Will it now focus on consolidating relations among its existing members –
close partners of China and Russia who endorse the two countries’ vision
of a “multipolar world order,” but are also interested in reaping the fruits
of economic collaboration? Or will expansion become the new normal, as
the SCO gathers as many countries as possible to establish itself as the
voice of the Global South – albeit at the expense of practical security
cooperation?
At the moment, the SCO appears to be on its way to becoming an
international – rather than regional – organization that encompasses
many more states than its original regional focus envisaged. The
organization’s dialogue partners currently include, among others,
Bahrain, Cambodia, Egypt, Kuwait, the Maldives, Nepal, and Qatar – not
exactly Central Asian countries with similar security or economic
challenges. It remains to be seen whether these states will be able to
upgrade their status or only remain loosely tied to the SCO. If expansion
continues, the organization may shift from tangible regional security
cooperation to addressing more abstract global political and economic
issues.
But SCO decisions require the consensus of all members. This suggests
that the organization won’t rush to add more countries, especially ones
with which existing members have strained relations. For example, Iran
would likely have qualms about admitting Saudi Arabia or the United
Arab Emirates and veto their accession just like Tajikistan had for many
years opposed Iran’s full membership.
Although China and Russia are the SCO’s most powerful members,
smaller states have always influenced its development. Even as the SCO
contributes to the divide between the United States and its allies on one
side and China, Russia, and partners on the other, many Central Asian
states have no interest in being drawn into any one camp. Some
members such as Kazakhstan have refused to openly support Russia’s
war against Ukraine, and the country known for its “multi-vector foreign
policy” will be reluctant to turn the SCO into a designated “anti-Western”
club. Rather, several member countries continue to see the SCO as a
grouping aimed at helping to solve regional issues.
Enlargement has raised the SCO’s profile and put it in a bind –
international visibility comes hand in hand with a loss of regional
relevance. If it continues to strengthen its role as a geopolitical bloc
bringing together key Chinese and Russian political partners, the SCO will
most likely continue to weaken its efforts to forge practical cooperation
among neighboring states. This may encourage members to seek other
formats for tangible regional cooperation.
For example, SCO founding members Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan attended the first China-Central Asia summit in 2023,
with Turkmenistan also joining, and their leaders have attended five
Central Asia-only summits from 2018 to 2023. Turkmenistan, which holds
to what it deems a “positive neutrality” policy is not a member of the SCO,
and only occasionally attends its summits as a guest; but Ashgabat has
engaged fully with the Central Asia consultative leaders’ meetings since
2019, even hosting the 2021 meeting.
The SCO could benefit from building cohesion among current members
before expanding again.
Opportunities for the European Union
The SCO’s current transition phase presents an opportunity for the EU to
raise its engagement with Central Asia. Diplomatic and economic ties
have grown in recent years – the EU accounts for 42 percent of
cumulative foreign direct investment in the region – and Europe should
use this position to offer more reliable and attractive partnerships than
those offered through the SCO. While doing so, it shouldn’t expect Central
Asian countries to fully move away from their close political, security,
and economic partners Russia and China – and it should also continue
pressing Central Asian states to stop helping Moscow circumvent
European export restrictions, including by re-exporting dual-use goods to
Russia. At the same time, however, Brussels should take advantage of the
fact that both Europe and Central Asia are currently hoping to diversify
their international relations away from overreliance on Russia and
China.
Kazakhstan, the EU’s main Central Asian partner, for instance, wants to
diversify its oil export routes, which is clearly of interest to the EU.
Astana and Brussels have already signed a memorandum of
understanding about raw material, battery, and renewable hydrogen
partnerships, in line with Brussels’ strategy to diversify its supply of
critical raw materials such as lithium. Other areas for close cooperation
with countries in the region include water, energy, and responses to
climate change. On top of this, as Kazakh scholar Zhanibek Arynov has
noted, the EU could establish a European university in Central Asia to
connect with the young people of the region.
If we think, for example, of the vague and non-transparent “SCO
university” framework or the very apparent lack of initiatives on water
management within the SCO format, it becomes clear that the EU could
present itself as a (more) reliable partner to Central Asia, and offer more
attractive partnerships than through the SCO. Of course, all this will be
done on a much smaller scale, considering the SCO is a full-fledged
regional organization and the EU’s engagement with different Central
Asian countries remains limited. However, considering the countries’
interest in diversified relations, the EU could easily take some – initially
small – steps in the right direction.
As the SCO expands for the third time, it faces the challenge of
maintaining its regional effectiveness while increasing its international
influence. This presents strategic opportunities for the EU to engage more
deeply with Central Asia and provide an alternative to the SCO’s China-
Russia dominated framework increasingly presented as an alternative to
Western organizations.

The Author
Eva Seiwert is an analyst and project coordinator at the Mercator Institute for China Studies
(MERICS) in Berlin, Germany. Her research focuses on China’s foreign and security policy, with a
special interest in China-Russia relations, China-Central Asia relations, and China’s behavior in
international organizations.
Depositphotos

Sara Hsu
Under Xi, China’s economic approach “has been and is
likely to be state-led innovation and development.”
By Shannon Tiezzi

From July 15-18, the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party – the top governing body of China’s ruling party – will convene for
its much-anticipated “third plenum.” Since the beginning of the reform
and opening era, each Central Committee’s third plenum has long set the
policy direction for China’s economy. However, this iteration will happen
far behind the usual schedule. Traditionally, the third plenum convenes a
year after the CCP's National Party Congress, last held in October 2022.
Accordingly, the third plenum was expected in October or November of
2023. Instead, it was delayed until July 2024.
The nine-month gap between the expected timing and the actual
convening of the plenum sparked much speculation about debate and
disagreement regarding economic policy occurring within the black box
of the CCP. To help set the scene, The Diplomat’s Shannon Tiezzi
interviewed Sara Hsu, an associate professor at the University of
Tennessee, Knoxville, and an expert on China’s supply chains, fintech,
and economic development, about China’s economic trajectory since the
20th National Party Congress in the fall of 2022.
Hsu explained that China’s economy faces two equally daunting
challenges: internal structural issues and a hostile external environment.
“China’s ongoing government-backed economic policy is viewed by the
United States in particular as a threat to national security,” she said.
“...This is at least as much of a barrier to growth as China’s internal
issues.”
China’s government and the CCP insist that the economy is not facing
any serious struggles, while many external analysts are convinced
there are major structural deficits that need to be addressed
urgently. How would you evaluate the current health of China’s
economy?
Not only are there structural deficits in China’s economy that need to be
addressed, but there is an economic ideological clash with the West that
will prevent China’s government-led growth path from reaching success.
The structural deficits are related to China’s growth slowdown in the real
estate sector, aging population, excessive local government debt, and
youth unemployment. These issues have been discussed and in the
making for years. However, it is China’s overall economic strategy that
reflects a contrasting stance with the West.
A major issue is that just as China is promoting areas such as electric
vehicles, lithium batteries, and solar cells, the West sees China’s
government support for these industries as a threat and has increased
tariffs accordingly. China’s ongoing government-backed economic policy
is viewed by the United States in particular as a threat to national
security, as many of China’s recent policy measures have backed
innovative industries. This has led to major improvements in technology
as well as in overcapacity in some areas.
The U.S. is concerned that China will flood the U.S. market with
innovative products that may present a security risk. This is at least as
much of a barrier to growth as China’s internal issues.
China seems to be betting big on the “new three” export pillars –
electric vehicles, lithium batteries, and solar cells – to keep its
economy going strong. But the U.S. and especially Europe have been
increasingly vocal in their warnings about “overcapacity” in these
industries, suggesting China’s access to these markets might face
obstacles. How do you think China will respond to the tension
between its economic strategy and the conflicting goals of its trade
partners?
China may respond with tariffs of its own, although in recent years it has
refrained from imposing tariffs that are equally high. China has doubled
down on its economic strategy of state-led growth, which has been the
main focus for decades. As it was only in the run-up to the U.S.-China
trade war that the U.S. began to fear China's government-led strategy, the
American response to China's economic ideology is a more recent
development.
This is to say that I believe China will continue on its current trajectory
and continue to view the response of its trading partners as hostile.
Unfortunately, the conflicting perspectives will prevent China from
growing more significantly in the areas it hopes to promote.
Other than the “new three,” what are the current buzzwords that
help us make sense of China's economy policy direction?
“AI Plus” is another buzzword. The idea is to integrate AI into business in
order to promote innovation. The hope is that this will become another
source of economic growth. This is related to China’s desire to grow its
digital economy.
It is reminiscent of China’s “Internet Plus” strategy, which sought to
increase connectivity among industries and geographies. Both AI and the
internet are considered productivity boosters that can spur economic
growth.
Again, however, AI is another area of strategic competition with the U.S.,
and China's endeavors in AI are considered one of the biggest threats to
U.S. national security.
How has the relationship between China’s party-state and private
enterprises and markets changed under Xi Jinping?
China began to expand its private sector just before accession to the
WTO, but since Xi Jinping was ushered into office, the emphasis has been
on state enterprise first. Private enterprises have found their way
forward by associating with the government. Attempting to go it alone
has proven difficult, especially during crackdowns on private sector
industries such as technology and tutoring. Government favoritism of the
state sector has also reduced investment in the private sector due to
increased risk perception.
The third plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP, in 2013,
excited analysts over its talk of economic reform, especially an
expanded role for the market in China's economy. Over 10 years
later, how has Xi Jinping's government approached the policy
promises made at the 2013 third plenum?
Some of the policy promises have been fulfilled, while other areas, such
as an expanded role for the market, have not. China did promote mixed
ownership of SOEs [state-owned enterprises] to access private capital and
expanded the Silk Road to strengthen economic relationships with its
neighbors.
With that background in mind, how should analysts and observers
approach the outcomes of the upcoming third plenum of the 20th
Central Committee?
We can likely expect more of the same from the third plenum of the 20th
Central Committee, not major market-oriented reform. We will continue
to see an emphasis on new technologies and on development of
particular regions. The government is still concerned about stability, as it
should be, so continuing to stabilize the housing market and other areas
is essential. The approach has been and is likely to be state-led innovation
and development.
Will it be effective in promoting economic growth? Probably as effective
as it has been in recent years, which is not very much. It is not an
approach that is a strong complement to the changing views of China’s
Western trading partners and is even often in conflict with them.
The state-led approach will also not provide as strong a source of growth
as a private-led approach would. It has been shown across numerous
scholarly studies of China that private sector economic growth is faster
and more efficient. Unfortunately, promoting the private sector is
probably not in the works.
This is a shame, because China is struggling with many headwinds, such
as a real estate crisis, vestiges of the zero COVID policy, Western
economic opposition, and youth unemployment. The country needs
better sources of growth to fully get through the transformation to a
higher value added, higher income economy.
The Author
Shannon Tiezzi is Editor-in-Chief of The Diplomat.

Flickr, The International Institute for Strategic Studies

China’s Vision for a ‘Multipolar’

Security Order
Recent speeches by China’s defense and foreign ministers
provide new context on the Global Security Initiative.
By Shannon Tiezzi

Two speeches by two Chinese ministers in June helped flesh out China’s
vision for an alternative security order. The first was Defense Minister
Dong Jun’s address to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 2; the
second was Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s remarks at the at the BRICS
Foreign Ministers' Dialogue with Developing Countries (the BRICS Plus) in
Russia on June 11.
Dong, speaking at a security-centered forum, was expected to outline
China’s thoughts on a global security order, but Wang’s statements on the
topics at the BRICS Plus – nominally an economic-centered grouping –
were more surprising.
One takeaway from both speeches is the convergence of several of
Beijing’s favorite catchphrases – one of which is also beloved by Russia.
Both Dong and Wang, of course, mentioned the “Global Security
Initiative” proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, which as yet has
little to no actual substance.
In their explanations, both ministers also referenced some older slogans
that are more established and thus easier to parse: the “community with
a shared future” mantra that Xi popularized during his “new era,” and
the even older “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence,” which date
from Cold War-era China. We might consider the Five Principles, long a
mainstay of Chinese foreign policy, to be a blueprint for achieving a
“community with a shared future.” (The Five Principles are respect for
territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in
internal affairs; equality and cooperation for mutual benefit; and
peaceful coexistence.)
A third, and newer, phrase that was repeated in both speeches was
China’s spin on the post-Cold War concept of “indivisible security,” which
Russia used to justify its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
In China’s diplomatic parlance, the term is “common” or “universal
security,” but both convey the same point: military alliances or blocs that
build up security at the expense of another country are ultimately
counterproductive.
Dong and Wang put a new spin on the phrase by expanding the list of
preceding adjectives: “China champions a vision of common,
comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.” Wang expanded
on that vision by saying, “We must abide by the principle of indivisibility
of security, respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
countries, and take care of each other’s legitimate and reasonable
concerns.”
A lot is riding on the terms “legitimate” and “reasonable,” which are very
much in the eye of the beholder.
This has always been the issue with “indivisible security”: Most
governments show very little inclination to actually practice what has
been called “strategic empathy” and take their rivals’ security concerns at
face value. China itself is as guilty of this as any country.
Dong argued that “the security interests of all countries should be upheld
and their legitimate concerns addressed” – but later insisted that China’s
“core interests are sacred and inviolable.” Dong made it very clear, for
instance, that Beijing sees Manila’s complaints about Chinese aggression
in the South China Sea as “false narratives” meant to “mislead the
public,” not “legitimate concerns” that must be “addressed.”
With that in mind, China’s insistence on “common security” seems to be
an attempt to claim the moral high ground in its opposition to U.S.
security alliances.
This network of alliances is the status quo for the global security order.
Dong stressed the need for an alternative, “a framework of regional
security cooperation that is open, transparent and based on equality, one
that features equal participation, friendly exchanges and is free from
bloc confrontation.”
It’s hard to object to the sentiment, but again the devil is in the details.
What would that actually look like in practice?
First and foremost, Dong implicitly reiterated the “Asia for Asians”
framework that China has heavily promoted – essentially a bid to exclude
the United States from participating in Asia’s security architecture. Dong
repeatedly painted “people in the Asia-Pacific” with a broad brush,
claiming to speak for the entire region – which includes over half of
Earth’s population and is famously heterogenous.
This reductivist appeal to “unique Asian wisdom” serves Beijing’s
purpose of trying to shut out non-Asian powers – which would have the
effect of granting China, the Asia-Pacific’s largest and most powerful
state, default hegemony over the region.
“People in the Asia-Pacific are independent and self-reliant,” Dong
declared. “... [O]ur people are against any attempt to turn our countries
into vassal states or draw us into bloc confrontations.” Regional countries
should thus keep “their security firmly in their own hands.”
The governments of states that have actively sought increased defense
cooperation with the United States would probably disagree with Dong.
There is some irony to the fact that China’s vision for Asia-Pacific security
is highly exclusive – only Asian countries need apply – but Dong pledged
to advance China’s security involvement in other regions of the world.
Dong said China planned to build up its multilateral defense dialogues,
including the “the Xiangshan Forum, China-Africa Peace and Security
Forum, the Middle East Security Forum, and the China–Latin America
and the Caribbean States Defense Forum.”
It’s unclear to what extent these talk shops actually contribute to global
security, however. China’s security contributions in Africa are the most
developed, with a sizable peacekeeping presence, provision of arms and
training to soldiers and police forces, and regular participation in anti-
piracy patrols focused on Somalia (which, in turn, provided the rationale
for China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti). But these were all
outcomes of other platforms, from United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations to China’s bilateral efforts. The China-Africa Peace and
Security Forum itself has few practical achievements to showcase, much
less the newer platforms in the Middle East and Latin America.
More concretely, Dong said China intends to “deepen and expand” its
military cooperation with bilateral partners “on joint exercises and
training, equipment and technology, and logistic support.” With “new
cooperation partners, we are ready to start with areas such as military
culture, disaster relief and medical service, and advance our cooperation
with them step by step,” the minister said.
Dong described this as “open and substantive defense cooperation,” but
it’s essentially the same bilateral model of defense diplomacy pursued by
the United States – to which China has vociferously objected.
Underneath Chinese officials’ descriptions of China’s preferred new
security order, there is always a tension between ideal and reality. The
lofty rhetoric of dialogue triumphing over conflict has, sadly, proven to
be impractical time and time again. And while China has talked a big
game on conflict mediation, its track record is still sparse.
China says it wants an “equal and orderly multipolar world” without
“bloc confrontation.” The big question is whether that is even possible.
History suggests not.

The Author
Shannon Tiezzi is Editor-in-Chief of The Diplomat.
Associated Press, Andy Wong

Where Does China’s Economic

Policy Go From Here?
From bolstering tech ambitions to propping up the
property market, China’s leaders have no shortage of
urgent priorities to pursue.
By Nick Carraway

On April 30, China announced that it will host the third plenary session of
the 20th Central Committee in July. The main theme will be
“comprehensively deepening reform and advancing Chinese
modernization.”
This meeting of the top governing body of the Chinese Communist Party
is important, because it provides a plan and the big economic picture for
the duration of the Central Committee’s five-year term, which began in
fall 2022.
The third plenum traditionally has a focus on economic plans and gives
grand strategy for the next five years. This time, the third plenum had
been delayed for months, suggesting that Xi Jinping’s top leadership circle
had encountered difficulties in formulating a good economic plan amid
uncertainties.
Ahead of the third plenary session, top Communist Party leaders have
been touring the countries to understand the economic situation.
According to ThinkChina’s report, Premier Li Qiang, the second-ranked
leader, visited Xinjiang and Anhui and stressed the importance of the Belt
and Road Initiative. Zhao Leji, the third-ranked leader, went to Henan;
Wang Huning, chair of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference and another important Politburo Standing Committee (PSC)
member visited Guangxi. Vice Premier member Ding Xuexiang visited
Liaoning with a focus on technology; Li Xi, secretary of the Central
Commission for Discipline and Inspection, went to Jiangsu. Both Ding and
Li are also on the PSC.
Clearly, the Politburo has all hands on deck for the upcoming plenum.
Although on-site visitations are a convention ahead of plenary sessions,
central-local relations remains one potential item on the agenda.
Moving forward, we are likely going to see the promotion of “new quality
productive forces,” which is the latest buzzword to capture Xi’s goal to
upskill China’s economic production. The new term, coined in early 2024,
involves “high technology, high efficiency, and high quality.” According to
the official account, targeted sectors include the green transition,
innovation and operation model, intelligent and digital production.
China Energy Engineering Corporation Limited has been featured by
state media as an exemplar in “new quality productive forces.” The
company has invested nearly 13 billion yuan in R&D in the power grid,
new energy, and other innovative fields. The company also signed
contracts worth more than 500 billion yuan with BRI partners. Fulfilling
more BRI contracts to overcome overproduction problems is likely
continuing to be promoted in the third plenum.
Another emphasis is likely going to be the further integration and
development of the Yangtze Delta River region, including Shanghai,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui. In 2023, the region produced 30 trillion
yuan or 24.2 percent of China’s GDP. While Shanghai is known to be the
economic powerhouse and the biggest financial center in China, the three
provinces are home to eight other cities with GDPs exceeding a trillion
yuan, known as the “trillion club,” including Suzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing,
Ningbo, Wuxi, Hefei, Nantong, and Changzhou.
Anhui province is home to multiple large innovative companies,
including BOE Technology, Changxin Memory Technologies, and NIO,
which are industry leaders in semiconductors and electric vehicles.
Anhui is also home to the “quantum avenue” of China; Hefei Construction
Investment Group, Hefei Industry Investment Group, and Xingtai
Holdings together contributed greatly to an industrial cluster. Now
known as originator of the “Anhui model” in China, the province
produced five new companies every day in 2022, heavily clustered
around semiconductors, AI, smart home appliances, and electric vehicles.
China’s economic policymakers will likely also give some remarks on
revitalizing the real estate sector, given that the sharp decline of the
Chinese economy was triggered by the implosion of the sector
exemplified by Evergrande, China’s largest real estate developer.
The plenary session is also seen as an opportunity for Chinese leaders to
reestablish confidence among private capital. It is likely only a part of the
rhetoric will seem convincing, despite the booming advanced
manufacturing sector in China. The IMF observed that China’s economy
has taken longer than expected time to bounce back, and suggested
China’s priority should be to “further stimulate housing demand and help
restore market balance.”
The IMF estimates that Chinese GDP growth will fall to 3.3 percent by
2029 due to China’s aging population and low birthrate. But it also
adjusted China’s 2024 and 2025 GDP forecast to 5 percent and 4.5 percent,
up by 0.4 points compared to another estimate made in April.
The plenary might be a critical juncture for the nation’s economic and
strategic planning. There is much anticipation regarding how China will
navigate these challenges within the framework of its planned economy.

The Author
Nick Carraway is a Canada-based analyst researching China’s role in international relations.
Depositphotos

How China Gained a Foothold in

Eastern Taiwan
Led by “King” Fu Kun-chi, Hualien County has become a
nexus for political and economic connections with the PRC.
By Nien-Ju Tsai and Tara Lee

On May 23, the Bluebird Movement drew over 100,000 participants to a

rally outside Taiwan's Legislative Yuan. The demonstrators were
protesting against a series of disputed “parliamentary reform bills”
proposed – and eventually passed – by the Kuomintang (KMT) and the
Taiwan People's Party (TPP).
The protesters specifically targeted two figures: Huang Kuo-chang, the
TPP's caucus whip and a former key figure in the Sunflower Movement
who has since aligned with the KMT, and Fu Kun-chi, the KMT's caucus
whip. From the perspective of local policies shaping Taiwan’s
dependency on China, Fu is the more important figure.
Fu, a major political player in Hualien County on Taiwan’s east coast, has
been perceived as a significant proxy for the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) in Taiwan. He served two terms as a Hualien County legislator,
elected first as an independent, and then as a member of the KMT. Even
after being expelled from the KMT, he successfully ran for Hualien
County magistrate and held the position for eight consecutive years.
Although he was found guilty on charges of stock manipulation in 2008
and disqualified from holding civic office (a restriction eventually
overturned by the Supreme Court), his influence in Hualien remained
strong. During his imprisonment, which began in 2018 after a lengthy
appeals process ran its course, he supported his wife, Hsu Chen-wei, in
successfully running for county magistrate. She won re-election in 2022.
Together, Fu and Hsu have dominated Hualien's political landscape for
over 14 years, making them one of Taiwan's most enduring political
families of this century.
After his release from prison in 2019, Fu was reinstated in the KMT and
re-elected as a legislator in 2020. He became a core figure within the
party. This January, after the KMT regained its position as the largest
party in the Legislative Yuan, Fu took on the role of KMT’s caucus whip.
In April 2024, he led 16 other KMT legislators on a trip to China to meet
with Xi Jinping’s key advisors, including Wang Huning, the chairman of
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The trip
stirred controversy not only due to the cross-strait implications, but
because of its timing: Hualien experienced its most severe earthquake in
25 years this April, causing significant damage. By carrying on with the
trip, Fu was accused of prioritizing ties with Beijing over the
reconstruction and recovery efforts in Hualien.
Fu’s dominance in the central political landscape, coupled with his ties to
Beijing, have raised questions about China’s influence on Taiwan’s
eastern region.
Since 2000, the two counties in Taiwan's east, Hualien and Taitung, have
been loyal supporters of the KMT and the pan-Blue coalition. The local
Indigenous population, which makes up about 30 percent of residents,
has long been seen as an “iron vote” for the KMT and Pan-Blue
politicians.
In the 16th presidential election in January, KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih
gained only 33.5 percent of the national vote, but his vote share in
Hualien exceeded 50 percent. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
candidate (and current president) Lai Ching-te lost by over 25 percentage
 points in Hualien, the largest gap in vote
share for Lai in any voting district on
Taiwan proper (excluding the offshore
islands)
The loss was all the more striking as Hsiao
Bi-khim, Lai’s vice president, held the
legislative seat from Hualien from 2016-
2020. Hsiao was defeated by Fu in her bid
for a second term as Hualien legislator in
2020, furthering the DPP’s decline in
political influence in the eastern region.
In the current context, the KMT’s
dominance in Hualien equates to Fu’s
dominance. Not only do Fu and his wife
serve as Hualien’s regional legislator and
county magistrate, respectively, but the
local politicians they support occupy
various positions throughout the county,
making Fu the “King of Hualien.”
Fu has historically secured support through
advancing transportation infrastructure.
During his tenure as county magistrate, he
filled in a small creek in Hualien City,
known as “Gouzaiwei,” to build a 770-meter
A map highlighting Hualien long road. Instead of using locally sourced
County in Taiwan.
Hualien marble, he imported marble from
Wikimedia Commons, Taiwan China, with the total cost amounting to 450
Junior million Taiwanese dollars (NT$).
During construction, Fu faced accusations
of ignoring advice from urban planners and even seeking to benefit
specific companies. After the project’s completion, residents along the
road experienced issues such as water accumulation and uneven
surfaces, bolstering concerns that it was a typical white elephant project.
This approach to construction has become Fu’s signature style during his
campaigns. In 2020, with the slogan “Give Hualien people a safe road
home,” he championed the Freeway No. 6 east extension plan. This was
the election where Fu defeated the DPP’s Hsiao Bi-khim, winning his
fourth term as legislator.
The east extension plan of Freeway No. 6 is a highly challenging project.
With the backing of the KMT and the TPP, the plan was swiftly reviewed
in the Legislative Yuan. Fu has proposed other two bills that would
mandate the government to expand the high-speed rail system to the east
coast and build an expressway connecting Hualien and Taitung counties.
According to a government, the three projects will cost around NT$2
trillion (US$61.8 billion), equivalent to around 10 percent of Taiwan’s
2023 GDP and close to the central government’s entire 2024 general
budget (which is just over NT$2.8 trillion).
Fu has called for the bills to be passed before the legislative session ends
in mid-July, although other KMT legislators have pushed back, saying
there is no need to rush.
In the three bills, Fu specifically called for international companies to
participate through a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model. This has
raised concerns that it might serve as a backdoor for Chinese capital to
enter local projects through reinvestment. Chinese infrastructure
companies have often undertaken projects abroad under similar models.
There have been reports of the Fu family accumulating wealth by
reselling land to Chinese investors. In 2011, in a ceremony attended by
Hsu, the Rongliang Company invested in construction projects worth 47
billion yuan in Nanning, China; the next year, Rongliang inked a deal to
invest another 47 billion yuan in Dongguan, China. Hsu has served as the
chair of Rongliang, and in a 2017 tax evasion case prosecutors alleged
that Fu was the real owner of the company.
In that case, Fu was accused of pressuring a prominent Hualien hotel,
Promised Land Resort and Lagoon, to sell large parcels of land to
Rongliang at below the market rate. Rongliang then resold the land to
another developer, netting over NT$160 million overnight.
Fu denied the charges, calling them “political persecution.” He was
acquitted in 2020.
Further complicating the Promised Land Resort case, Taiwanese media
reported that Fu had attempted to resell the land to a Chinese state-
owned enterprise, Beijing Enterprises Group Company Limited, using
third-country investors as a cover. (It would have been illegal under
Taiwanese law for a Chinese firm to buy the land outright.) The Fu family
thus was accused not only of using its political influence to profit from
land development, but attempting to bring Chinese capital into Taiwan.
In general, the development of both tourism and transportation
infrastructure are attractive projects for the residents of the eastern
Taiwan region, where industry and living conditions are
underdeveloped. However, this has resulted in the infiltration of Chinese
capital into the local economy.
Since Taiwan opened up to Chinese tourists and investments in 2008,
Hualien has become one of the most popular destinations for Chinese
visitors. Hong Kong-based travel agencies have established one-stop
service chains in the area, monopolizing souvenir shops, hotels, tour bus
services, and dining establishments frequented by Chinese tourists.
Under this model, the spending of these Chinese tourists largely returned
to the hands of Chinese owners without being taxed.
Worse, these one-stop services funded by foreign capital also generated a
vicious price competition, severely damaging local businesses. The
continually declining quality of tourism has also led to a downturn in
domestic tourism in Hualien.
In August 2019, the Chinese government suspended the policy allowing
Chinese tourists to travel freely to Taiwan. However, with the decline of
domestic tourism in Taiwan due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the absence
of Chinese tourists has resulted in a significant loss of money for local
hotel and real estate businesses. In order to persuade Beijing to lift the
suspension on free travel to Taiwan, Hualien’s local businesses have been
persistently pressing the DPP government to adopt a softer stance toward
China.
These demands have effectively become political capital for Fu in his
negotiations with the PRC government. After visiting China in April, Fu
mentioned the possibility of revising restrictive measures like the Anti-
Infiltration Act and other factors unfavorable to cross-strait exchanges.
Fu’s vigorous push for the three transportation projects in Hualien and
Taitung can be seen as paving the way for a prosperous development of
cross-strait relations, benefiting his loyal supporters in Hualien – and
potentially Chinese businesspeople. These challenging transportation
projects would require large-scale engineering equipment, a strength of
the Chinese state-owned engineering groups that have set numerous
world records.
The rise in land values around the road projects presents a lucrative
opportunity for the Fu family, well-known for their expertise in land
brokerage. Moreover, land development opens opportunities for Chinese
capital to be integrated into local businesses, establishing more one-stop
services.
Finally, these government-funded projects would act as Fu’s goodwill
gesture to Beijing, aiming to reopen Hualien to a large influx of Chinese
tourists.
Hualien stands as a crucial gateway in eastern Taiwan, home to the
largest military port in the east, Hualien Port, and the Jiashan Air Force
Base. Just 140 kilometers from Japan’s Yonaguni Island, Hualien serves as
a crucial base for Taiwan's navy and air force, facilitating access to the
Pacific Ocean and maintaining vital connections with the U.S. military
base in Okinawa, Japan.
Allowing Chinese capital to monopolize Hualien’s economy will trigger a
series of domino effects, undermining Taiwan’s efforts to cooperate
militarily with allies like the United States and Japan. While Fu leverages
his China connections to boost his political status within the KMT, he is
set to continually sabotage Taiwan’s efforts to break free from Beijing’s
influence.

The Authors
Nien-Ju Tsai is a research assistant at the National Taitung Living Art Center
Tara Lee is an HR consultant at Doublethink Lab.

Depositphotos
Chinese Leadership’s In-House
Lecture Offers Valuable Insights
into China’s AI Strategy
In a lecture to China’s top legislative body, a leading
computer scientist outlined a national AI strategy focused
on developing the real economy and overcoming U.S. tech
restrictions.
By Lizzi C. Lee

On April 26, Professor Sun Ninghui, a preeminent expert in computer

system architecture and an academician at the Chinese Academy of
Engineering, delivered a pivotal lecture titled “The Development of
Artificial Intelligence and Intelligent Computing” to the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress. Despite limited coverage
from Chinese media, the full text of the speech, published online,
provided a rare and revealing look into Beijing’s AI ambitions.
Born in 1968 in Shanghai, Sun Ninghui has been a linchpin in China’s
technological landscape. His career includes directing the National
Intelligent Computer Research and Development Center and serving as
the dean of the School of Computer Science and Technology at the
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Sun's lecture was more than an academic exercise; it was a strategic
blueprint of China's AI ambitions and anxieties. He highlighted AI’s dual-
edged nature, pointing out its potential for remarkable technological
advancements while also spotlighting the security risks, particularly
regarding politically sensitive information. AI-generated deepfakes,
fraudulent news from tools like ChatGPT, and the proliferation of fake
news sites underscore AI’s potential to erode social trust. For Beijing,
these are not mere technical glitches but strategic vulnerabilities the
leadership is keen to neutralize.
Sun’s focus on AI’s ability to churn out politically sensitive or “incorrect”
information was striking. He stressed that the AI landscape is riddled
with factual inaccuracies, inherent biases, and ease of manipulation –
ripe for exploitation by adversaries. This concern is particularly acute for
China, driven by the government’s obsession with controlling politically
sensitive content. Beijing has rolled out stringent regulations to ensure AI
development stays within state-approved boundaries.
The tech rivalry with the United States was another focal point in Sun’s
lecture. With superior talent, foundational algorithms, and
computational power, the U.S. holds a commanding lead in AI. China’s
current role as a fast follower is a status quo that Beijing is desperate to
disrupt.
U.S.-imposed restrictions on high-performance computing products and
advanced semiconductor technologies are significant obstacles, argued
Sun. The ban on advanced chips like the A100 and H100 stymies China’s
AI progress, highlighting the strategic chokehold the United States
maintains over China’s tech aspirations. This impact is particularly harsh
for companies like Huawei and SMIC. Sun proposed that China innovate
indigenously and diversify supply chains to reduce dependency on U.S.
technology, echoing Beijing’s call to safeguard its high-tech future.
Sun’s critique of China’s underdeveloped domestic AI ecosystem was
particularly revealing. Compared to NVIDIA’s expansive CUDA ecosystem,
China’s AI development tools and talent pool are still embryonic,
underscoring the urgent need for a cohesive, integrated approach to
building a competitive AI ecosystem. The lack of synergy across AI tech
layers – from applications to hardware – poses a significant challenge
that Beijing is determined to overcome. To this end, China’s leaders must
commit to enriching the AI ecosystem through substantial investments
and strategic initiatives, Sun emphasized.
He outlined three strategic pathways for China’s AI development. The
first involves aligning with U.S.-led systems, a practical but restrictive
path given current geopolitical tensions. The second is building a closed,
proprietary system, suitable for specific sectors like the military or
judiciary but limited in scalability and global reach. The third and most
promising pathway, according to Sun, is embracing an open-source
model through global collaboration initiatives like RISC-V. By
championing a collaborative global ecosystem, China should dismantle
existing monopolies and lower entry barriers for domestic enterprises.
This third pathway aligns with Beijing’s vision of becoming a global tech
standard-setter and innovation leader.
Investing in new infrastructure is another cornerstone of China’s
proposed AI strategy. Emphasizing the importance of robust data and
computational infrastructure, Sun's vision includes establishing national
data hubs, developing foundational AI models, and integrating
computational resources nationwide. The goal is to transform data into a
strategic national asset, making AI services as accessible and affordable
as utilities like water and electricity. This strategy underscores Beijing’s
belief that a strong infrastructure backbone is essential for sustaining
growth, whether traditional or AI-driven.
A significant departure from the United States’ approach to AI is China’s
focus on the real economy, not just AI for AI’s sake. While the U.S.
predominantly drives AI innovation in virtual sectors like software and
internet services, China seeks to enhance its manufacturing prowess
through AI integration. Deploying AI in traditional industries such as
manufacturing and pharmaceuticals while fostering innovation in
emerging fields is imperative, Sun emphasized. This practical strategy
ensures AI not only drives economic growth but also fortifies China’s
industrial base, maintaining its global competitiveness.
Despite Sun’s confidence and grand vision, Beijing’s AI ambitions are not
without significant caveats. The government’s stringent control over
politically sensitive content might stifle innovation and limit the potential
for open scientific discourse. The heavy reliance on state-approved
values for AI development raises questions about the ethical implications
and potential misuse of AI technologies. Moreover, while the strategy to
circumvent U.S. restrictions through indigenous innovation has merit, it
remains to be seen whether China can achieve the necessary
technological breakthroughs amid ongoing global competition.
Sun’s lecture was more than an informative session for China’s
legislators. It should be seen as a strategic manifesto as Beijing is eager to
craft a comprehensive and forward-looking AI strategy. This rare glimpse
into the top leadership’s thinking offers a sharp, critical perspective on
how China plans to harness AI to maintain its competitive edge in the
high-stakes tech arena.

The Author
Lizzi C. Lee is an affiliated researcher on the Chinese economy at the Asia Society Policy
Institute’s (ASPI) Center for China Analysis (CCA). She holds a Ph.D. degree in Economics from
MIT.
Depositphotos

Hong Kong and Tiananmen:

Erasing Memory in the Name of
National Security
Hong Kong’s vague and ambiguous concept of “national
security,” imported from the mainland, is being applied to
arts and culture.
By Eric Wear and Anouk Wear

On June 3, in the busy shopping district of Causeway Bay, performance

artist Sanmu Chan wrote the Chinese characters for “8964”（八九六四）
with his finger in the air. He then mimed pouring wine onto the ground,
to symbolize mourning those massacred in the military crackdown on
protesters in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989.
Hong Kong police officers watched the entire performance, then moved
in and took Chan away. This was the latest instance of zero tolerance for
remembrance of what the authorities called an “upcoming sensitive date”
– without naming the date or place referred to.
Other individuals have recently been arrested for sedition in Hong Kong
in respect to referencing the Tiananmen Square Massacre on social
media, accused of inciting hatred against the central and Hong Kong
authorities.
Despite being behind bars since 2021, the organizer of the annual
Tiananmen Massacre vigil Chow Hang-tung was re-arrested a week
ahead of the June 4 anniversary under the new Safeguarding National
Security Ordinance. The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has
called for her release and reparations.
Jimmy Lai, the founder of Apple Daily, also faces a charge for lighting a
candle at the 2021 Tiananmen Square Massacre vigil. He is currently on
trial for a number of national security charges related to his peaceful
pro-democracy activism. He faces up to life in prison.
Jens Galschiøt’s Tiananmen Massacre-themed artwork, the Pillar of
Shame, which stood on the Hong Kong University campus for over 20
years, was removed in the dark of night in December 2021, and is now
held by police as evidence in an unspecified case of subversion of state
power.
Government-aligned newspapers reported in August 2023 that Galschiøt
himself could be subject to a secret arrest warrant, with transfer of trial
to mainland China owing to the severity of the threat to national security.
Ahead of this year’s upcoming “sensitive date,” church leaders were
cautioned not to lead prayers.
Few places in the world police collective memory and art with this degree
of rigor. How has this occurred in Hong Kong, which until recently
ranked high for free expression?
During public consultation prior to the March 2024 passage of the
Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, under Article 23 of the Basic
Law, Hong Kong officials made great efforts to highlight that all countries
protect their national security.
The Article 23 legislation complements the 2020 National Security Law,
which Beijing imposed on Hong Kong and which has been used to arrest
hundreds of persons. The 2020 law was criticized by the U.N. Human
Rights Committee (among others), which recommended its repeal. Hong
Kong not only rebutted this but introduced new legislation to extend and
strengthen the government’s reach.
A significant aspect of these rounds of legislation has been the
introduction into Hong Kong law of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s “holistic”
concept of national security.
The concept defines national security as “the status in which the state’s
political regime, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the welfare of
the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other
major interests of the state are relatively free from danger and internal
or external threats,” as well as encompassing “the capability to maintain
a sustained status of security.” It derives from Xi’s call for
“comprehensive national security” (总体国家安全), introduced in 2014 and
added to the Communist Party Constitution in 2017.
Included among 16 dimensions of security, “cultural security” targets
ideological opposition and discourses that diverge from those of the
party.
This is an extremely vague and ambiguous concept of “national security,”
which can be applied to arts and culture without any of the safeguards
necessary to ensure that a state is in compliance with international
human rights standards.
Hong Kong Secretary for Security Chris Tang spoke of art as “soft
resistance” and called artistic expression a “common modus operandi of
those seeking to endanger national security.” Similarly, Chief Executive
John Lee asked everyone to tell a “good story” of Hong Kong and has
defended purging the city’s libraries of books containing “bad ideologies.”
Vague and ambiguous statements such as these encourage de-platforming
and freelance censorship in the private sector. Creative artists protect
themselves by self-censoring, steering away from politics and social
reflection.
Aside from its place in a comprehensive scheme of control, the Hong
Kong national security apparatus’ focus on arts and culture is a means of
signaling control and boundaries without undue disruption of Hong
Kong’s economic and professional life.
By snipping off any buds of reflective discourse or “wrong” memory,
society is channeled into narrowly productive ends. Those who can’t
come to terms with this will either flee or find themselves harassed or in
custody, as people in Hong Kong who seek to commemorate the
Tiananmen Square Massacre have experienced.
The broadening scope and arbitrary interpretation of cultural security by
the local and national government and their allies is a challenge for all
sides. While the “sensitive date” is certainly to be avoided, it is unclear
what other expressions or reflections on history may be interpreted as
seditious or subversive.
Individual officials reassure that sincere and constructive criticisms are
welcome, although this clearly is not the case. There is also no process for
clarification or appeal.
In a recent conversation with a Hong Kong artist, he lamented that there
are no red lines – Everything is red.
Finally, this sets an alarming precedent for like-minded regimes, which
will be inspired to use a broader concept of “national security” to police
the arts, culture, memory, and more. Condemnation and outcry toward
each instance of these human rights violations in Hong Kong is vital to
protect cultural rights in Hong Kong and around the world.

The Authors
Eric Wear is a former president of the Hong Kong section of the International Association of Art
Critics (AICA) and presently a member of the Freedom of Expression and Censorship Committee
at the international level of AICA. He now lives abroad.
Anouk Wear is a research and policy advisor at Hong Kong Watch. Her work focuses on the
Hong Kong government’s human rights violations and international legal obligations, including
violations of cultural rights. Anouk is Eric’s daughter.
Depositphotos

Japan Wants to Improve its

Foreign Worker Policy, But
Xenophobia Prevails
Even as Japan’s government seeks to attract more workers
from abroad, public sentiment is souring on foreign
tourists.
By Thisanka Siripala

Japan has decided to scrap its controversial technical intern program

after increasing incidents of unpaid wages, abuse, and exploitation of
vulnerable foreign workers from neighboring Asian countries. The
government has proposed an alternative training program, which seeks
to loosen the previous program’s rigid working rules. It’s an indicator
that Japan’s attitude to immigration is shifting as the country struggles to
address its severe labor shortage.
But, on an individual level, Japan’s hospitality toward foreigners has
reached a breaking point as it grapples with a post-pandemic surge in
tourism, challenging Japan’s own idea of being able to coexist with
foreigners.
Japan’s economic prospects depend on finding workers and lifting the
national birth rate, which continues to fall. It needs 6.74 million foreign
workers by 2040, which is almost four times more than its current
foreign labor force, according to the government’s 2022 economic growth
report. Japan is in desperate need of skilled foreign labor to bridge the
immediate labor shortfall in the agriculture, construction,
manufacturing, and healthcare sectors.
Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has traditionally adopted a
cautious stance around long-term immigration. The technical intern
program was seen as a way to allow unskilled workers to train in specific
sectors without a path to long-term employment or residency.
Originally, the technical trainee program was intended to make
international contributions to developing countries, but the reality is that
it has become a valuable source of labor. Since 1993, each year the
program has seen as many as 400,000 people from countries like China,
Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia try their hand at a new skill and
a new language in sectors facing a critical worker shortage.
The government’s plan to scrap the technical intern program comes as
Japan’s treatment of migrant workers garners international criticism.
Under the outgoing program, foreign nationals from developing
countries were accepted for up to five years to learn skills through on-
the-job training. But the program prohibited trainees from changing
companies, regardless of unpaid wages, illegal overtime, sexual
harassment, abuse of power, and dangerous work conditions. This led to
some 68,000 trainees running away from their workplaces between 2012
and 2022, according to Japan’s Immigration Services Agency.
Pregnancy was also prohibited under the technical trainee program.
There have been thousands of cases of workers hiding pregnancies and
abandoning newborns over the risk of losing their jobs. A survey in 2022
found that one in four female technical interns faced harassment and
pressure to quit their job over a pregnancy, according to the Immigration
Services Agency. The program was criticized for being a breeding ground
for exploitation and human trafficking by human rights groups assisting
technical trainees.
The U.S Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report has called out
the technical trainee program for shortcomings in countermeasures
against forced labor and human trafficking. The report recognized at
least four technical trainees as being victims of human trafficking while
under the program. It found that some employers had confiscated
workers' passports and controlled their movements to prevent trainees
from escaping.
Starting in 2027, a “training employment” program will replace the
technical trainee program. The newly launched program has been
commended as an improvement for foreign workers’ rights. It allows
workers to stay in Japan for training and employment for three years. If
their skills and Japanese language ability reach a certain level, they can
move on to a “specified technical skill” visa, which can be renewed
continuously at five year intervals. It also allows job transfers within the
same field and has expanded the categories of work to include retail,
hospitality, and hotel work. The new program fosters a path for long-term
work afterward.
In March the government approved plans to increase the number of
“specific technical skill” visas to 820,000 over five years. But the Japan-
Vietnam Tomoiki Support Organization says the new migrant worker
policy does not address the debt that migrants arrive with as a result of
exorbitant broker fees. The government says it is considering introducing
an upper limit for broker fees.
Legal experts have also criticized Japanese companies for having “almost
zero” awareness of human rights for foreign workers at a time when
companies in Europe face increased pressure to tackle human rights
violations and human trafficking risks associated with migrant labor.
Japan is now in competition with South Korea and Taiwan for skilled
migrant workers as Asia becomes the fastest aging continent. There is
also the setback of Japan’s currency plummeting to a 34-year low and its
reputation suffering from the scandal-ridden technical trainee program,
giving rise to a situation where Japan needs foreign workers more than
foreign workers need Japan.
As Japan looks to improve work conditions and work opportunities for
foreign workers, Japan’s image as a tourist friendly destination has taken
a hit. In May the number of foreign tourists in Japan topped a record 3
million, and many Japanese are tired of the influx.
One small town made international headlines by erecting a barrier to
block the view of Mount Fuji due to complaints of bad-mannered tourists
flocking to the town to take photos for social media. Some restaurants
have introduced higher menu prices for foreign tourists, with foreign
residents expected to show their Japanese government-issued
identification to get local prices. Geisha in Kyoto have made complaints
about frequent harassment for selfies and parts of Kyoto have banned
photography on the streets.
Japan is eager to revamp the country as a foreign-friendly labor market.
It’s getting ready to increase the number of foreign workers with
improved working conditions with an eye for long term residency. Yet at
the same time, strands of xenophobia continue to make life difficult for
foreigners in Japan.

The Author
Thisanka Siripala is an Australian-Sri Lankan cross platform journalist living in Tokyo.

Depositphotos

South Korea’s Legislature

Paralyzed, Yet Again
The ruling People Power Party and the opposition
Democratic Party scuffle for control over the National
Assembly’s standing committees.
By Eunwoo Lee

South Korea’s National Assembly has 18 standing committees. They are

important; every single piece of proposed legislation has to go through
one of them before it can be fielded to the National Assembly floor for a
vote.
In early June, a spat erupted between the ruling People Power Party (PPP)
and the opposition Democratic Party (DP) over selecting heads of these
committees. The DP, given their parliamentary majority of 175 out of 300
seats, notified the PPP that they would select the heads of 11 committees
from their rank. But the PPP insisted on putting their own members at
the helm of the House Steering Committee and the Legislative and
Judiciary Committee.
Control over these two committees is particularly important. The former
has oversight jurisdiction over the presidential office, and the latter over
the Justice Ministry and the Corruption Investigation Office. They have
power to summon and grill virtually anyone.
The authorities have steered clear of investigating First Lady Kim Keon-
hee for her acceptance of designer products in exchange for political
favors (one instance of which was caught on camera) and for her
participation in stock manipulation schemes (she is known to have been
involved, but the scope of her awareness of the illegality hasn’t been
determined).
Since the matter concerns both the presidential office, corruption, and
the judiciary, the PPP desperately wanted to lead the relevant National
Assembly committees and evade humiliating public hearings and more
investigations.
Besides, the Legislative and Judiciary Committee has the final say over
the wording and format of every piece of legislation, which can allow
whichever party controls it to tweak or deny content it doesn’t like.
Of course, the DP didn’t accede to the PPP’s demand. Nobody was willing
to budge on this point, halting the bipartisan negotiation. The DP decided
on their candidates for the 11 committees, tossing the rest for the PPP to
decide. The PPP boycotted all proceedings.
On June 10, the speaker of the National Assembly had no choice but to
call for parliamentary votes to elect the heads. (As per the National
Assembly Act, legislators have to elect committee heads no later than
three days after the first assembly since the general elections.)
As the PPP refused to choose committee heads for the remaining seven,
the votes proceeded just for the 11 committees that had DP nominees.
The PPP members didn’t attend the session, instead staging a sit-in
outside of the speaker’s office. The DP went ahead and elected the
committee heads, as a simple parliamentary majority is all that’s
required.
Then, comic scenes erupted. The DP-controlled standing committees held
their sessions, but the PPP members and ministers summoned for
interviews went AWOL. They swore to stay out of the DP-dominated
National Assembly, instead holding parallel, extrajudicial intra-party
committees mimicking the official ones. Choo Kyung-ho, the PPP minority
whip, pledged to hamper the DP-led legislation by “imploring presidential
vetos.”
All 108 PPP legislators filed a joint complaint to the Constitutional Court
to nullify the DP’s appointments, arguing that the DP trampled the
principle of parliamentary cooperation in such matters as electing the
speaker and committee members and reviewing legislation. Meanwhile,
the DP maintains that, given the government’s corruption and
incompetence, this is precisely what the majority of voters authorized
them to do through the general elections. The DP’s actions all conform to
the National Assembly Act.
President Yoon Suk-yeol’s Cabinet and the PPP members ignored the
standing committees’ call for attendance. Although the constitution
requires government officials to turn up and answer the committees’
questions regarding state affairs, there’s no clause detailing the
consequences for giving the committees the cold shoulder.
In response, the DP threatened to turn their hearings into audits and
investigations. If so, the committees would get to “summon” the Cabinet
and other legislators, or anyone for that matter, as “witnesses.” In this
case, not clocking in could result in up to three years of imprisonment.
The committees can also issue their witnesses a “warrant of
accompanying,” non-compliance of which leads to up to five years of
imprisonment.
The PPP is framing the whole fracas as the DP’s “parliamentary
dictatorship.” It is seriously considering giving up the rest of the
committees to the DP to reinforce this narrative. Yet such a decision
comes with two disadvantages.
First, the PPP can’t participate in and take credit for some laws in the
pipeline that enjoy bipartisan, as well as public, support. Currently,
pregnancy leave is one year for each newborn and capped at two years.
Both parties have been working on a bill to extend it to 18 months,
applicable to both parents, and to prolong paid leave. It has long been
anticipated as the first concrete step in a while to encouraging young
couples to have children. But if the PPP boycotts the Environmental and
Labor Committee, the DP will do the whole review and pass it on the floor
all by itself, taking sole credit for a policy widely welcomed by
newlyweds.
Another law in the making concerns setting up a legal framework and
regulation to construct a storage site for high-level radioactive waste.
South Korea has long struggled to find ways to permanently dispose of
spent fuel from its nuclear power plants. And because these power plants
and temporary storage facilities are in the country’s southeastern part,
conservatives’ home ground, the PPP has been working hard on this
legislation. Yet, if the PPP gives up fielding their own candidate for the
chairpersonship in the Committee for Trade, Industry, and Energy, the DP
will legislate alone, raking in all the public goodwill.
Second, the PPP’s concession of control over the committees the DP left
up for grabs may spell more trouble for the government. Some legislators
from the opposition parties have already expressed their willingness to
fill in for these committees and initiate official audits on the context
behind Yoon’s abrupt announcement of new offshore drilling for natural
gas. (There have been allegations of favoritism in the government’s
bidding process for contractors to analyze deep-sea data, and of collusion
between government agencies deliberately committing confirmation bias
in their reports to please the president.)
The same holds for the National Defense Committee. In case of the PPP’s
continued refusal to lead the committee, the committee will keep prying
into Yoon’s abuse of power last July, when a marine died because of the
top brass’ professional negligence, to cover for his people. The Corruption
Investigation Office is already working on the case, and the Legislation
and Judiciary Committee held a hearing on June 21, where the implicated
figures kept hemming and hawing or refused to answer some questions.
Having two committees grilling the involved parties could whip up more
intense public interest and fury since their hearings are all broadcast.
If worse comes to worst, out of spite, Yoon may really end up vetoing
every single piece of legislation that doesn’t carry the PPP seal, further
exacerbating South Korea’s legislative stalemate. So far, the National
Assembly has managed to pass only two meaningful laws, one banning
the consumption of dog meat and the other forming a special counsel to
investigate the Itaewon tragedy. All the others were scrapped due to
either the DP’s refusal or presidential veto.
Also, things can turn from pesky to nasty if the PPP members and
ministers end up getting arrested over this childish intransigence. This
entire series of dramatic standoffs and political posturing will only sour
the public sentiment and deepen the political divide.

The Author
Eunwoo Lee writes on politics, society and history of Europe and East Asia. He is also a non-
resident research fellow at the ROK Forum for Nuclear Strategy.

Depositphotos
Reality Check: South Korea and
China Face More Complex
Economic Dynamics
Domestic, bilateral, and global trends are combining to
reshape China-South Korea trade for the long term.
By Ray Wang

On May 27, Chinese Premier Li Qiang vowed a “new start” in a trilateral

summit with South Korean and Japanese leaders, where they reached a
general consensus on future cooperation in various areas. While this
“refresh” could be a positive sign for South Korea and China to improve
their economic ties, evolving bilateral dynamics, intensifying geopolitical
tension, an uncertain Chinese economy, and a more competitive
relationship in the global value chain pose serious challenges for two
countries’ economic relations.
Evolving Economic Ties
China has been South Korea’s most vital trade partner for the past
decade. This remains true despite the THAAD controversy in 2017, when
Seoul agreed to deploy the U.S. missile defense system, and Beijing
responded with economic coercion. The episode undermined China-
South Korea ties, and several sectors including automotive, retail,
tourism, and entertainment suffered, yet the two economies remain
highly integrated.
Recently, however, South Korea’s economic ties with China have waned.
Since the pandemic, this relationship has notably retracted. China’s share
of South Korea’s total exports has fallen from 25.9 percent in 2020 to 19.7
percent in 2023, according to the Korea Customs Service, while exports to
the U.S. increased from 14.5 percent to 18.3 percent during the same
period.
At one point in 2023, South Korea’s export share to the U.S. surpassed the
one to China, the first time in two decades (see Figure 1 below). In 2024,
South Korea’s export share to the United States (19.3 percent) even
surpassed China (18.8 percent) for the whole quarter.
Korean Export Share to Major Trade Partners, 2013-2024
Source: Korea Customs Service.

In addition, South Korean foreign direct investment (FDI) in China in

2023 also dropped significantly, down to about one-fifth of its 2022 level,
while the FDI in the U.S. surged by approximately 180 percent compared
to 2020. In 2023, South Korean investment in the United States was nearly
15 times larger than its investment in China (see Figure 2). This was also
the first time since 1992 that China was excluded from South Korea’s top
five destinations for outbound FDI.
Korean FDI in U.S. and China, 2012–2023
Source: CEIC

These shifts prompt three vital questions: What drives these changes?
Are they long-term structural shifts or a short-term blip? What does this
mean for the future of China-South Korea economic relations?
Key Driving Forces
In 2023, semiconductors accounted for 20.7 percent of South Korea’s total
exports, the highest among its industries. System semiconductors and
memory semiconductors constituted 33.8 percent and 29.2 percent,
respectively, of the total semiconductor exports.
One major factor contributing to South Korea’s declining exports to China
is the decreasing semiconductor exports in the past two years due to
cyclical market demand and China’s increasing self-sufficiency in
semiconductors (although the market has witnessed rebounds for the
past seven months). In 2023, South Korea’s semiconductor exports to
China hit their lowest level since 2016, and memory exports fell to their
lowest since 2019 (see Figure 3).
South Korean Semiconductor Exports to China, 2015-2023
Source: Korea Customs Service

Moreover, the 2017 THAAD controversy, China-U.S. trade war

commencing in 2018, and supply chain disruption during the pandemic
have reshaped the trade ties between South Korea and China. These
events have underscored the increasing geopolitical risk and the
vulnerabilities within the global supply chain, prompting Korean firms to
pursue greater diversification from China, shifting focus toward the U.S.,
ASEAN, and Europe since 2013, offsetting the reduced share of exports to
China (as shown in Figure 1).
China’s economic slowdown also contributed to South Korea’s decreasing
exports to the country as its domestic demand has been weak, stemming
from several factors such as limited government stimulus measures, a
real estate crisis, high youth unemployment rates, and low market
confidence.
This uncertain economic landscape has complicated the calculus for
South Korean companies and led them to adopt a more cautious
investment approach. In 2023, South Korea’s FDI into China plummeted
by 78 percent. This aligned with broader international sentiment toward
China, as previous data reported China’s record-low inflow FDI. On top of
that, China’s volatile economic policy during the pandemic, coupled with
perceived insufficient market support has further compounded the
uncertainties among South Korean investors.
China’s evolving regulatory environment with a greater emphasis on
national security has also raised concerns among South Korean investors.
Although Chinese President Xi Jinping has advocated for a “pro-business
China” to attract foreign investment and refine its global image, recent
legislations and actions toward foreign business have cast more doubt on
China’s business environment.
For South Korean firms, particularly high-tech FDI contributors in China
like Samsung and SK Hynix, the most concerning but predictable factor is
the sustaining tension on trade and technology between the two
superpowers. As the geopolitical risk in strategic sectors increases and is
expected to escalate, South Korean firms have re-evaluated and halted
their investment in China. Instead, major tech companies are investing in
the United States to reap the benefits of industrial incentives provided by
the CHIPS and Science Act and Inflation Reduction Act, as well as sidestep
geopolitical backlash.
This shift is evident in the growing investment in semiconductor and
clean energy and the significant decline in South Korean high-tech
investment in China. Specifically, South Korea’s semiconductor
investment in China witnessed a 99.8 percent year-on-year decrease in
2023.
China’s Move up the Global Value Chain
Another major factor is China’s rise in the global value chain, which has
shifted its economic relationship with South Korea from complementary
to competitive. According to McKinsey, China’s share in the global
manufacturing industry has increased from 19 percent in 2010 to 34
percent in 2023. China also recently claimed it has achieved 86 percent of
the goals of “Made in China 2025.”
This change has led to increased competition in semiconductors – the
most pivotal South Korean export and investment in China. Although
South Korean chipmakers still lead in high-end logic and memory chips,
China is gaining ground in the low-end market. Since 2015, China's share
of South Korea’s logic and memory chip exports has diminished. China
used to account for nearly 70 percent of South Korea’s integrated circuits
(ICs) exports and close to 80 percent of its memory exports in 2015.
However, these figures diminished to 57 percent and 73 percent in 2023,
the lowest since 2015 (see Figure 4), amid the dwindling exports of DRAM
and Flash memory over the past five years.

China's Share in South Korean IC and Memory Exports, 2015-2024

Source: Korea Customs Service

While South Korean firms remain dominant in cutting-edge memories

globally and ahead of Chinese memory makers, Chinese companies like
Yangtze Memory Technologies Co. (YMTC) and ChangXin Memory
Technologies (CXMT) are gradually improving their memory technologies
and production, albeit slowly, to compete for market share against
Korean firms in China
Emerging competitors like Semiconductor Manufacturing International
Corporation (SMIC), CXMT, and YMTC have continually expanded their
production and refining technologies despite increasing restrictions from
the United States. Coupled with the Chinese government’s push for
domestic firms to acquire more Chinese chips, these companies are
poised to gradually capture more market share in logic and memory
semiconductors, challenging South Korean firms.
Beyond the semiconductor industry, Chinese tech firms have intensified
competition with South Korean firms in the mobile phone, EVs, and
battery sectors. A 2023 report has suggested that the sales of 113 big
Korean companies have dropped by 13.1 percent since 2016.
Considering these developments, it is hardly surprising that South
Korean companies are becoming reluctant to invest in China, especially
those in high-tech sectors, due to concerns about market potential,
increasing competition, existing and potential U.S. restrictions, rising
operation costs, commonly cited intellectual property, and technology
leakage. There might also be concerns that high-tech FDI could
inadvertently strengthen China’s high-tech sector, enhancing its future
competitiveness.
A Structural Shift Rather Than a Short Blip
These changes indicate a structural shift rather than a short-term blip in
China-South Korea trade for two main reasons.
First, the competitive economic ties between China and South Korea are
set to intensify. China is expected to ascend further in the global value
chain, driven by a Chinese government that has increasingly emphasized
technology's role in the country’s national strategy and is likely to place it
as top priority after the Third Plenum in July.
Second, South Korean firms are expected to continue diversification
efforts to manage the increasing risks in geopolitics and supply chain in
years to come, especially amid the sustained China-U.S. tensions with the
risk of further escalation. Admittedly, one factor that remains unknown
and debatable in the equation of this relationship is the prospect of the
Chinese economy – a pivotal factor that impacts the two countries’
economic cooperation.
While this economic relationship has entered a more difficult phase, it
remains vital to both countries. For instance, a May survey revealed that
most Chinese and South Korean business leaders consider economic
cooperation necessary.
Policymakers in Beijing and Seoul clearly understand the importance of
managing this bilateral economic tie and have taken some initial steps
seeking to navigate the current dilemma. Two countries have recently
resumed the second phase of negotiation for the ROK-China FTA which
has been halted since 2015, and the Korea-China Investment Cooperation
Committee after its suspension in 2011. Beyond resuming existing
dialogue, two sides also established the “Korea-China 2+2 Diplomatic and
Security Dialogue” and the “Korea-China Export Control Dialogue.” Yet, it
remains unclear how effective these dialogues can be in improving
bilateral ties.
In the end, though it is unrealistic to expect China-South Korea economic
ties to be as vibrant as they were in the 2010s, the two economies are
likely to remain fairly integrated.

The Author
Ray Wang is a DC-based analyst and foreign affairs analyst formerly based in Taipei and Seoul.
His pieces have appeared in Nikkei Asia, The National Interest, The Diplomat, and The China Project,
among others. Wang is a Master of Science in Foreign Service candidate at Georgetown
University.

Presidential Executive Office of Russia

Why North Korea’s Military

Partnership With Russia Is Here to
Stay
For North Korea’s military-industrial complex, collaboration
with Russia creates a self-perpetuating cycle.
By Elena Guido and Eric Siyi Zhang

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has presented an unprecedented

strategic opportunity for North Korea, as it creates conditions for a
transactional relationship between the two. This relationship is
sustainable as long as the war in Ukraine continues.
The Hanoi summit in 2019 did not yield the results that North Korea had
hoped for – an easing of sanctions without renouncing its nuclear and
missile program. Pyongyang then turned to its dormant ally, Russia.
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022,
bilateral contacts between Moscow and Pyongyang have drastically
increased both at the top level and among Russian and North Korean
officials, expanding practical cooperation between the two. These meet-
ups set the stage for a troubling exchange: ammunition for food and
military know-how.
Shells are key to Russia’s war efforts, and its artillery-centered armed
forces require adequate and sustainable supplies of ammunition to
maintain its offensive. Pyongyang has become a key supplier of the
needed ammunition. Since 2023, North Korea has dispatched an
estimated total of 6,700 containers of ammunition by sea and by railway.
In return, Pyongyang has the opportunity to gain resources and achieve
important strategic advantages.
For North Korea’s military-industrial complex, this collaboration creates
a self-perpetuating cycle: with Russia providing hard currency and raw
materials, the North Korean arms industry can increase its capacity and
provide more ammunition for Russia. This is not only a blatant violation
of international sanctions, but it also has direct security implications
beyond Ukraine.
Kim has repeatedly expressed interest in developing North Korea’s space
program to improve intelligence gathering capabilities. Kim and Putin’s
meeting in September 2023 at the Vostochny Cosmodrome thus explicitly
discussed cooperation in space. North Korea likely received technical
assistance from Russia for the successful launch of the reconnaissance
satellite Malligyong 1 on November 21, 2023. North Korea has vowed to
place still more military satellites into orbit. The attempted launch of a
second satellite, Malligyong 1-1, while ultimately unsuccessful, is believed
to have incorporated Russian help on rocket fuel and rocket engine
technology
Meanwhile, North Korea evidently has a greater appetite for Russian
technology beyond space, particularly in intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
While Russia so far has refrained from supplying nuclear and missile
technologies, the risk of technological exchanges in those fields between
the two cannot be overlooked. This would make North Korea’s nuclear
threats more credible. It is also in line with its Juche philosophy,
emphasizing military strength and self-reliance. Stronger deterrence
against perceived U.S. aggression would entice Pyongyang to act more
confrontationally.
There are also strategic opportunities for Pyongyang beyond a
transactional quid-pro-quo in its partnership with Moscow. Russia can
reduce North Korea’s reliance on China, which has traditionally acted as
its economic lifeline. Less dependence on a single partner would grant
North Korea more autonomy in its foreign policy and economic decisions.
China has been uncomfortable with some of Pyongyang’s escalatory
activities. Actions such as missile launches, nuclear tests, and military
exercises automatically invite a stronger U.S. presence on the Korean
Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific. In contrast, Russia, driven by its
current needs for the war in Ukraine, has become increasingly
acquiescent of North Korean military ambitions.
A closer North Korea-Russia relationship also has significant implications
for the dynamics between the two Koreas. Recently, both countries
exchanged war threats and resumed hostile activities in the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that divides them, while Pyongyang has
increased the frequency of missile launches.
At the same time, the North Korean narrative around the South has also
been fundamentally redefined. Pyongyang no longer sees South Korea as
their compatriots, but rather as the “primary enemy.” It is not by chance
that this shift coincides with North Korea’s rapprochement with Russia. It
is an opportune moment for Pyongyang to engage in brinkmanship, as
Russia’s veto power makes further United Nations Security Council
sanctions increasingly unlikely. In the future, Pyongyang could use the
threat of escalations with South Korea as leverage to gain favorable
concessions.
As long as the war in Ukraine lasts, North Korea-Russia military
partnership is here to stay. While Russia gets ammunition for its war in
Ukraine; North Korea receives food, military technology, and diplomatic
support at the United Nations. More importantly, they are each other’s
only possible partner for such a quid pro quo right now.
The coalition between Pyongyang and Moscow will certainly also have
far-reaching strategic implications in Europe and Asia-Pacific. Several
factors might make China grow increasingly wary of the new
developments of the partnership between North Korea and Russia. Amid
an emerging military alliance between the two, South Korea might also
pivot to directly supplying Ukraine with weapons, which it has so far
refrained from doing so.

The Authors
Elena Guido is a researcher at the LeidenAsiaCentre, specializing in sanctions on DPRK and
DPRK-Russian relations. She has a background in Korean Studies and International Relations
from Leiden University.
Eric Siyi Zhang is a researcher at the LeidenAsiaCentre, focusing on China-Russia relations, the
governance of digital technologies, and cybersecurity. He specializes in big data research
methods in political science and international relations.
ROK Office of the President, Kang Min Seok

South Korea-Africa Summit: A

Disappointing Outcome?
While South Korea’s interests were clear, what was evident
from the summit was the lack of clarity on African
governments’ joint, specific position on engagement with
Seoul.
By Ovigwe Eguegu

On June 4-5, South Korea joined the trend of inviting leaders of African
governments for a summit intended to boost cooperation and diplomacy.
With the theme “The Future We Make Together: Shared Growth,
Sustainability, and Solidarity,” the inaugural Korea-Africa Summit was
attended by 25 African heads of state and government, and up to 48
African countries were represented by a top official. This summit built on
previous platforms, most notably the Korea-Africa Forum (KAF) and the
biennial Korea-Africa Forum on Economic Cooperation (KOAFEC), which
started in 2006.
However, given these existing platforms, some questioned the need for a
separate summit. Indeed, several African leaders were chastised for
attending the summit by citizens and opposition parties. Was it worth it?
In the lead up to the summit, the first deputy director of South Korea’s
national security office said, “South Korea’s [strategic] collaboration with
Africa is not an option but is a must, in that South Korea is striving to
become a global pivotal state.” The Yoon government clearly believes that
a Korea-Africa summit fits the profile of South Korea’s ambition to
become a “global pivotal state.”
The first day of the summit saw Mauritanian President Mohamed
Ghazouani, chairperson of the African Union, and South Korean
President Yoon Suk-yeol issue a joint statement outlining key areas of
cooperation. Per the Joint Declaration, Seoul pledged $14 billion in export
credits to Korean firms to enter African markets and made a further
pledge of $10 billion of Official Development Assistance to Africa by 2030.
From Seoul’s vantage point, the need for a summit and these pledges
were clear, and boiled down to two key overarching objectives: ensuring
access to critical minerals and seeking support over North Korea issues.
Diversify Sources and Increase Stockpiles of Critical Minerals
Being home to the likes of Samsung, LG, and other giants in the
semiconductor and EV battery industries, Seoul needs a stable and
predictable supply of key commodities. In February 2023, the South
Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy announced a strategy to
guarantee a steady and secure supply of critical minerals. The ministry
identified 33 crucial minerals; among these, 10 (including lithium, nickel,
cobalt, manganese, and graphite) were designated as “strategic” for
semiconductor and electric vehicle (EV) battery production.
Currently, South Korea meets around 95 percent of its mineral demand
through imports. African countries have long been major sources of the
commodities that go into South Korea’s supply chain. But until now, Seoul
had not seen the need to prioritize cooperation with Africa, because
China has been the middleman processing and refining these
commodities to industry grade. As a result, China is by far the country
South Korea is most directly dependent on.
Last year, China was one of the three primary suppliers for 25 of the 33
imported strategic minerals. South Korea imported 97.7 percent of its
natural graphite and 94.3 percent of its synthetic graphite from China as
of September 2023. South Korea also relies on China for significant
amounts of other critical minerals, including 84 percent of its lithium
oxide, 83.3 percent of cobalt oxide, 77.6 percent of manganese and cobalt
sulfate, and 69 percent of cobalt hydroxide imports.
However, this dependence is now seen as too risky due to intensifying
geopolitical tension, and competition among advance economies to
dominate the fourth industrial age. In this context, Seoul aims to secure
its supply chain to build industry resilience, and it sees maintaining
favorable relations with African countries as crucial.
Hence, on the sidelines of the summit Tanzania and Korea inked a $2.5
billion concessional loan deal over five years. It will allow South Korea
access to Tanzania’s ocean resources and minerals such as nickel,
lithium, and graphite. Ethiopia on the other hand secured a $1 billion
financing deal aimed at infrastructure, science and technology, and
urban development, to be made available over four years.
A South Korea-Africa critical minerals dialogue is scheduled to be
inaugurated later this year, where Seoul is likely to pursue further direct
deals.
The North Korea Question
The second priority for Seoul was gaining support amid tensions on the
Korean Peninsula and rising geopolitical anxiety more broadly.
Hence, the joint declaration also restated the need to implement all
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions aimed at the
“irreversible” denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula – a move
clearly aimed at defanging North Korea. Seoul intends to coordinate with
the three African non-permanent members of the UNSC to pressure
Pyongyang on security matters in the Korean Peninsula.
Pyongyang seems to have read the writing on the wall. Ahead of the
summit, the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK) said in a statement that relations with Africa will continue
developing.
In a speech during the summit, Seoul urged African countries to take
firmer steps in an international pressure campaign against North Korea.
“Along with our friends in Africa, South Korea will fully implement U.N.
Security Council resolutions and work to safeguard peace on the Korean
Peninsula and the international community,” Yoon said.
Pyongyang has long been a key player in providing African countries
with arms as well as military services like training and equipment
maintenance. Tanzania, for instance, has engaged North Korean
engineers to maintain its fighter planes. In 2017, a U.N. report accused
Tanzania of engaging a North Korean company in fixing and improving
its surface-to-air missile systems. So it came as no surprise that Seoul is
keen to deepen ties with Tanzania.
There is a consensus among experts that the Seoul summit, along with its
trade and investment opportunities, was intended to rally African
support against North Korea. Last year, Pyongyang seemed to be on the
backfoot on the diplomatic front following the closure of some of its
embassies across the world, including in Angola and Uganda. However,
Seoul has good reason to make a bilateral push.
Back in March, Russia vetoed the United Nations’ renewal of a panel of
U.N. experts monitoring North Korea’s compliance with international
sanctions. The panel of experts’ reports at times accused African
countries violating U.N. sanctions in their dealings with North Korea. No
U.N. oversight means plausible deniability for the African side moving
forward; this paves the way for North Korea to stage a comeback.
The Gap in African Positioning
While South Korea’s interests were clear, what was evident from the
summit was the lack of clarity on African governments’ joint, specific
position on engagement with Seoul. When African leaders were
questioned by journalists on what they wanted from the summit, there
was little of a unifying narrative.
This is not for a lack of potential unifying objectives that would also meet
domestic, bilateral objectives for specific African countries, in both the
areas highlighted above and beyond.
Take critical minerals. To capitalize on global competition for critical
minerals, producing countries with forward-thinking governments are
increasingly demanding better deals with an emphasis on value addition.
Indonesia is an excellent case in point with nickel. From the African side,
in fact, there already exists a blueprint for this – the African Mining
Vision, which prioritizes value addition, environmental protection, skills
transfer, and sustainable growth and development of countries with the
valued resources.
Already, countries are showing it is doable. Chinese investments into
lithium extraction in Zimbabwe and Nigeria both include some level of
refining. Botswana has long been a success story in diamond refining.
The Joint Declaration issued in Seoul stated, “We emphasize the
importance of Korea’s efforts to support Africa’s industrialization, and
the need to foster mutually beneficial trade and investment and
strengthen Korean-African business partnership.” To put that into
practice, the agreements South Korea reached with specific countries
should deliver on value addition. Right now, it is unclear whether they
do.
Furthermore, African countries could have followed South Korea’s (and
China’s) own path many years ago and sought stronger language around
the type of investment supported by export credits for Korean firms, or
even language around joint ventures or local content or employment
provisions that might enable job creation and technology transfer
through such investments. But none of this language was to be seen.
Similarly, while African governments proved willing to engage with Seoul
on the North Korea question, there appeared to be little sign of a quid-
pro-quo. Yet, again when it comes to the U.N. Security Council, Africa’s
priorities are clear: the Ezulwini Consensus, which demands African
representation on the United Nations’ top body. Even a nod toward this in
the declaration would have been helpful.
There are also other collective objectives African governments had,
which either were not advanced in time to make it into the declaration or
were rejected by South Korea. Take the 10 billion ODA commitment, for
instance. This could have been linked to an early commitment by Seoul to
contribute to the World Bank’s only concessional financing instrument –
IDA – which is due for replenishment. In fact, Seoul is scheduled to be
host the IDA’s final pledging and replenishment meeting from December
10-11.
A fallback to that would have been for South Korea to back a proposal
made by Kenya’s President William literally a few weeks ago when
hosting the IDA Africa Summit in Nairobi for the IDA to increase to $120
billon. While my firm, Development Reimagined, has published analysis
demonstrating that $120 billion is not particularly high in a historical or
needs-based context, the fact that no number was mentioned in the
declaration is a sign of low ambition from an African perspective.
Conclusion
Overall, while the inaugural Korea-Africa summit laid some groundwork
for a boost in capital commitment from South Korea toward
infrastructure, investment, and development projects in Africa, the
summit indicates that either African leaders need to shout louder about
their priorities, or countries like South Korea must put more effort into
listening to African demands. It is likely both are necessary.
Indeed, it is not the presence of African leaders at such meetings that
journalists or citizens should be concerned about. It is the outcomes they
achieve – which should not be limited to just domestic objectives. Most
capitals like Seoul now have a cohort of African ambassadors or high-
commissioners, and many have African Union representative offices.
With the proliferation of Africa-plus-one summits, it is time for African
capitals to organize and take these summits seriously, using the cohorts
and offices to plan ahead and coordinate ambitious positions.
Meanwhile, countries like South Korea should make more serious efforts
to co-create declarations, making them truly “joint,” while making side-
deals that emphasize their commitments to transformative, mutually
beneficial relationships.

The Author
Ovigwe Eguegu is a policy analyst at Development Reimagined. He focuses on geopolitics with
particular reference to Africa in a changing global order.

Associated Press
Can an Autocratic Modi Become a
Team Player?
Narendra Modi has emerged weaker from the recent
elections. He is not invincible. Will that change his style of
functioning?
By Sudha Ramachandran

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have
returned to power for a third straight term at the helm in New Delhi.
However, their performance in the recent general elections was below
expectations.
During the election campaign, Modi and the BJP boasted that the party
would win over 400 of the 543 seats contested in the general elections on
its own. But the BJP secured only 240 seats. While it is the single largest
party in Parliament, it is 32 seats short of a simple majority. In the 2019
general election, the BJP had enough seats (303) to form a government on
its own. This time around, the support of its partners in the National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) was necessary for the BJP to form a new
government.
Although this was Modi’s third straight win from the Varanasi
constituency, his performance was not impressive, as his victory margin
was a mere 152,513 votes compared to 479,505 in 2019. Modi’s
inauguration of a Ram Temple at Ayodhya, a key BJP campaign plank, fell
flat on its face. The party lost five of the nine seats from the Ayodhya
region.
Despite leading the BJP to a “historic” third term in government, the
results of India’s 18th general election are a humiliating comedown for
Modi. His stature in the eyes of voters, his party, and the NDA coalition is
much diminished. For the first time in decades, Modi does not seem
invincible.
The survival of his government depends on the continuing support of his
NDA partners. Running a successful coalition government requires
consultation, making concessions, and decision making by consensus. It
has prompted Modi’s detractors to claim that the prime minister would,
therefore, have to listen to NDA partners and heed their demands. Since
Muslims comprise an important support base of two key allies, the Janata
Dal (United) or JD(U) and the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), Modi would have
to moderate his aggressive anti-Muslim positions, perhaps even abandon
key items on the BJP’s Hindutva agenda, analysts said.
However, such expectations may be overly optimistic. Early signs do not
bode well.
Ahead of the swearing-in of the new Cabinet, there was much talk about
the TDP and the JD(U) demanding key portfolios in return for their
support. However, Modi did not give in to their demands. The most
powerful portfolios, including home, defense, finance, and external
affairs, remain in the hands of the BJP. It refused to field a non-BJP MP for
the speaker’s post either. Had it done so, it would have gone a long way to
allay the concerns of its allies and the opposition.
Modi, despite his diminished clout, is no pushover.
During his previous two prime ministerial terms, Modi used the central
investigative agencies to intimidate opposition politicians into joining the
BJP and silence media and other critics of his regime. TDP Chief N.
Chandrababu Naidu, for example, was jailed on corruption charges last
year. Modi could use this modus operandi again to keep Naidu and other
coalition allies in line. He could deploy this tactic to divide the opposition
INDIA bloc and draw opposition parties and factions to boost the strength
of the ruling coalition.
Analysts are also pointing out that Modi’s style is not conducive to
running a coalition government. In an article in Scroll, political analyst
Ramachandra Guha argued that unlike his predecessors, who were
“wired, both by experience and temperament, to effectively run a
government with support from other people and other parties, Modi is
not.”
Except in the 1990s, when as an activist of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh, the BJP’s ideological mentor, Modi would have taken orders while
engaging in mobilization and organization of campaigns, marches, and
rallies, he has never worked under anyone.
Both as Gujarat chief minister (2001-May 2014) and India’s prime
minister (2014 onward), Modi has functioned as the unchallenged
supremo of the BJP and the government. Indeed, unlike other BJP leaders,
who have consulted, even taken orders from the RSS, Modi has
maintained a distance from its leadership over the past two decades.
Modi’s tendency to centralize power and reluctance to consult in the past
suggest that the NDA allies will remain junior members of the coalition,
not equal partners of the BJP in government.
The recent general election has not only dealt a setback to the BJP and
Modi, but also provided a shot in the arm to the INDIA coalition in
general and the Congress party in particular. The opposition’s numbers in
Parliament have increased, as has their morale. Modi can expect to face a
more aggressive opposition both in parliament and outside.
Most importantly, Modi can expect challenges from within. His arrogant
and non-consultative style has arguably irked other BJP leaders.
Additionally, relations between Modi and RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat,
which have been strained for years, have worsened of late. In a speech
delivered from the RSS headquarters in Nagpur two days after election
results were announced, Bhagwat pulled up the Modi government, albeit
without naming the prime minister. “Manipur is still burning,” Bhagwat
said. “Who is going to pay attention to it? It is a duty to deal with it on
priority.”
Even if Modi does not heed his coalition partners or even the opposition,
he can be expected to heed the RSS leadership’s “advice” to a greater
extent than in the past. Over the past decade, the equation between Modi
and the RSS tilted in favor of the former.
Post-election, that may have changed.

The Author
Sudha Ramachandran is South Asia editor at The Diplomat.
Pakistan Foreign Ministry Press Service via Associated Press

Pakistan’s Ambitious Budget Made

With an Eye on IMF Deal
The main challenge lies in raising taxes in a country that
has long failed to widen its tax base.
By Umair Jamal

Pakistan’s newly elected government recently presented its federal

budget for 2024-2025, setting an ambitious tax revenue target of $46.66
billion – a nearly 40 percent jump from the past year. This bold move is
part of the government’s efforts to strike a new deal with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to address the country’s mounting
debt crisis. Pakistan is reportedly seeking a new IMF bailout of up to $8
billion, which Islamabad claims will be its last if it implements all the
envisioned economic reforms.
The budget document promises to bring the public debt-to-GDP ratio
under control, a critical concern for Pakistan and its lenders, including
the IMF and China.
With external debt reaching $125.7 billion in March 2023 and the debt-to-
GDP ratio standing at around 75 percent in 2022, the government
seemingly recognizes the urgent need to prioritize fiscal consolidation
and improvements in the balance of payments position.
A country’s debt-to-GDP ratio indicates how much its national debt is
compared to its GDP. Economies that have a low debt-to-GDP ratio
typically have enough revenue collected to repay loans without incurring
further debt.
Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb recently emphasized the
importance of this opportunity, urging the country not to waste it.
“Pakistan has another opportunity to improve itself and embark on the
path of economic development. I request everyone not to waste this
chance,” he said during his budget presentation speech in the Parliament.
The budget also aims to bring down the fiscal deficit for the new financial
year to 5.9 percent of GDP from an upwardly revised estimate of 7.4
percent during the outgoing year. This will be achieved through a
combination of measures, including restrictions on dollar-driven
imports, keeping bank borrowing rates at record-high levels, and the
privatization of some state-owned loss-making enterprises.
Moreover, the upcoming year’s growth target has been set at 3.6 percent,
with inflation projected at 12 percent. The government also plans to
generate additional revenue by selling its shares in various projects,
including mining ventures.
While the promises made in the budget document seem encouraging and
point toward a need in Pakistan to contain its debt and raise more funds
to increase its revenues, the question remains: Can Pakistan’s new budget
deliver on its ambitious targets? The success of this plan will be crucial in
securing the much-needed IMF deal and putting the country on a path to
economic stability and development.
The challenge for the new Pakistani government in raising taxes is that
the country has failed to significantly widen its tax base beyond direct
taxes repeatedly in the past. Only 10 million out of a population of over
230 million are registered taxpayers, and just 4.4 million filed annual tax
returns with the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR). The FBR’s weak system
is often exploited by businesses and individuals to evade taxes, and there
is little enforcement outside of major cities.
Moreover, there is little public awareness that tax filing is mandatory, as
the state has historically been lax in enforcement. This has reinforced
public attitudes that tax evasion is not a serious offense.
Furthermore, the current coalition government may be reluctant to
implement drastic reforms that could undermine its political base, even
as the country stands on the brink of default. The coalition government
led by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) is already facing
criticism from its allies. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), in particular,
has complained that the budget does not take into consideration their
concerns. It appears there are differences over how to implement a
reform agenda to address the economic crisis.
Stakeholders, including the IMF, will be wary of whether the government
is fully committed to implementing tough reforms, as the tax revenue
increases are expected to come largely from the middle class, who have
already been hit hard by inflation.
Meanwhile, reports suggest that powerful elites may continue to evade
taxes, further fueling public discontent. The government’s ambitious
budget plans may impress international observers, but the true test will
be whether it can overcome these deep-seated challenges to expand the
tax net meaningfully.
The government’s budget proposal raises significant concerns about its
ability to achieve the ambitious revenue collection targets and address
the growing pension liabilities. While the budget includes a substantial
increase in government employee salaries and a doubling of the federal
development budget, the lack of clear plans to tackle the pension crisis
and the uncertainty surrounding the government’s ability to meet the
nearly 50 percent growth in direct taxes are worrying.
The finance minister’s expectation that a Staff-Level Agreement with the
IMF will be sealed in July is a positive sign. However, the IMF’s lack of
response to the budget raises questions about its viability. Although some
may consider the IMF’s silence as an approval of the budget, it could also
indicate that it does not want to pressure the government publicly on the
issue.
What happens next will test the state’s seriousness in implementing
meaningful reforms and addressing the country's economic challenges.

The Author
Umair Jamal is a correspondent for The Diplomat, based in Lahore, Pakistan.
Special Arrangement

Low Voter Turnout, Apathy Mar

Bangladesh’s Local Elections
A number of factors, including perceived electoral
irregularities, a lack of genuine competition, and
disenchantment with local governance, has eroded public
trust in the electoral process.
By Saqlain Rizve

A few years ago, Tahsin Irteza, a 23-year-old university student, obtained

his National Identity Card from Bhandaria, an upazila (subdistrict) in
Pirojpur, Barisal division, where he was born and raised. He planned to
vote in the upcoming local elections in his area.
On May 29, the third phase of the country’s sixth Upazila Parishad
election, was scheduled to take place in 87 upazilas across Bangladesh,
including Bhandaria. Irteza found himself in a dilemma about whether to
vote or not. In the end, though, he and all the other voters of the upazila
did not even have the opportunity. The candidates for all three posts – the
chair and two vice-chair positions – were elected uncontested, as no rival
contenders emerged for their respective races.
“Firstly, we are all familiar with our country’s current voting system.
Initially, I was in a dilemma about whether I should vote or not, as it
wouldn’t make any difference,” Irteza told The Diplomat.
“Bangladesh has a population of more or less 170 million. Yet, in my area,
there were no contenders against the incumbents?” he said. “On the
contrary, we witness political engagement everywhere, from tea stalls to
every corner. Hence, it seems somewhat perplexing to us that there are
no candidates in a democratic country.”
According to Irteza, “The lack of transparency and fairness and low
turnout has resulted in widespread apathy and disinterest among voters.
Especially among young people, I believe there’s a lack of motivation to
participate in a process they perceive as rigged and unfair, resulting in
diminished enthusiasm and excitement about the upcoming election.”
The 6th Upazila Parishad Elections were held in four phases across
Bangladesh. Starting on May 8 and ending on June 5, four phases of the
election were completed among 442 upazilas. (Twenty-two upazilas have
yet to hold elections, as their voting was postponed due to Cyclone
Remal). Registered voters, totaling approximately 121.8 million, were
supposed to cast their votes for one chairperson and two vice
chairpersons in the local election.
However, according to the Election Commission (EC), the voter turnout
across all four phases averaged 35.8 percent: 36.1 percent in the first
phase, 37.7 percent in the second, 35 percent in the third, and just 34.3
percent in the fourth.
In the national election on January 7, the voter turnout was only around
40 percent, according to the EC. However, critics and the opposition say
the turnout was less even than the stated figure. The deserted
environment visible at most polling places made it easy to criticize the
turnout number given by the EC.
The scenario was different in 2009, when the government revived the
upazila parishad elections after a long gap.
A Brief History of the Upazila System
The system, introduced in 1982, represented a journey toward
decentralized governance when Gen. Hussain Muhammad Ershad took
the reins of power. Originally called “thanas,” these administrative units
were rechristened “upazilas” and functioned as subdistricts. The system
aimed to empower local communities by placing decision-making closer
to the people.
However, early challenges arose due to conflicts between upazila
chairpersons and national parliamentarians, leading to the system’s
abolition in 1992, the year after the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)
came to power.
“When they introduced the upazila government system, there was a
debate about power dynamics between the MP and the chairman of the
Upazila Parishad,” said Badiul Alam Majumdar, a renowned economist,
political analyst and local government and election expert. “Although
they both oversaw the same area, it became evident that MPs wielded
more influence. Over time, this power struggle escalated, with MPs subtly
asserting their dominance over the chairman’s responsibilities. They
started to fight silently [to determine] who will be more powerful locally.
“Eventually, the government decided to abolish this system for various
reasons… [the power struggle] was one of them,” Majumdar concluded.
As Muhammad Sayadur Rahman of the Department of Public
Administration at Jahangirnagar University explained further in a 2012
paper:

The inception of MPs following the 3rd parliamentary election in

1986 ignited tension between legislators and Upazila Parishad
Chairman. Regardless of their political allegiance, MPs sought a
stake in Upazila authority, as they lacked formal jurisdiction over
local administration. Eventually, the Ershad-led administration
enacted the Zilla Parishad Act in 1988, establishing District
governments and appointing MPs as chairpersons of the District
Parishads. However, following the end of military rule, the newly
established democratic government showed apathy towards the
Upazila Parishad.

During the caretaker government’s tenure from 2007 to 2009, there was a
significant focus on empowering local governments. In 2008, the
caretaker government reinstated the upazila system, establishing the
upazila parishad as an independent local governing body elected directly
by the populace, without granting MPs any advisory authority.
Subsequently, the Upazila Parishad Act was repealed entirely and
replaced with the Local Government (Upazila Parishad) Ordinance of
2008.
However, when the Awami League (AL) government assumed power in
2009, it chose not to endorse the Upazila Parishad Ordinance in
Parliament. Instead, it reinstated the repealed 1998 Upazila Parishad Act,
incorporating provisions for MPs to act as advisers. Despite
recommendations from lawmakers within the parliamentary standing
committee of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development, and
Cooperatives to extend this advisory role to MPs in city corporations and
municipalities, the government declined to implement these suggestions.
Despite being designated as mere advisers, the interference of MPs in the
functioning of upazila parishads has hindered their effectiveness since
the January 2009 elections. In response, upazila parishad chairs and vice
chairs are now mobilizing to advocate for the restoration of operational
autonomy for the local bodies.
The system was revived with modifications after decades. A pivotal
moment came in 2008 with the Upazila Parishad Ordinance, which
established the Local Government Commission to oversee elections and
promote efficiency. It also introduced reserved seats for women within
upazila parishads, ensuring a more inclusive approach. Today, upazila
parishad representatives, elected directly by the people, play a critical
role in driving local development initiatives and fostering grassroots
democracy.
Dwindling Voter Turnout
While the system has undergone some changes since its inception, the
core structure remains focused on empowering local communities and
encouraging participation in shaping their future. However, the historical
trends in voter turnout reveal a fluctuating pattern. The year 2009
witnessed a robust participation rate of 70.6 percent, demonstrating a
high level of civic engagement. By 2014, this enthusiasm waned slightly,
with the turnout decreasing to 61.2 percent.
In the meantime, after the national election of 2008, Bangladesh’s
political landscape changed significantly due to the AL government.
Armed with a two-thirds majority, the AL and its allies removed the
caretaker government provision from the constitution in 2011. Although
the AL claimed that this was prompted by a verdict from the highest
court, it is widely recognized that the removal of the provision was
intended to establish the ruling party’s dominance and remove
uncertainty regarding election results. Opposition parties, including the
BNP, protested the passage of this amendment.
As a result, in the national poll of 2014, the election was held under the
AL government, and in protest the main opposition and many other
parties chose not to participate in the election. Things went as the AL
planned. In the 2018 national election, the system was the same as there
was no caretaker government. That time, the BNP had to participate to
keep its party registration. Few considered the polls free or fair, however.
Year by year, Bangladesh slipped down in the world rankings of
democratic indices.
Come 2019, a more significant downturn unfolded in the upazila election,
particularly in the initial phase, where the turnout plummeted to 43.3
percent. This decline persisted across subsequent phases, culminating in
an overall average turnout of approximately 40 percent for the year.
Fast forward to 2024, and the trend continues, albeit with a further dip.
The four phases of this year’s upazila election, each of them lower than
any phase in an earlier year, indicate a sustained trend of decreasing
voter engagement. This downward trajectory raises questions about the
factors influencing voter participation and underscores the importance
of initiatives to revitalize civic involvement in the electoral process.
It appears that voter interest is decreasing as the election progresses.
Factors such as rain in some areas, the ongoing paddy harvesting season,
and the recent landfall of Cyclone Remal were cited by the officials as
reasons for the lower turnout in the last phases. But due to disasters or
other unexpected reasons, voting has been postponed in over 22 upazilas.
So those electorates are not being counted in voter turnout calculations.
And if the agricultural season is such a deterrent to voter turnout, why
not hold the polls at another time of the year?
Bangladesh’s Democratic Decline
The declining voter turnout in upazila elections is concerning, and
several key factors have contributed to this trend. For one thing, the
upazila parishad has become ineffective largely due to unconstitutional
interference by MPs and excessive control by administrative officials.
This interference undermines the autonomy and decision-making power
of local representatives, leading to public disenchantment. When citizens
perceive that their representatives lack the ability to effect change, they
lose interest in participating in elections.
But there is a deeper problem as well. Over time, citizens’ trust in the
electoral process has diminished due to past irregularities, vote rigging,
and questionable practices in local government elections. Instances of
polling centers being taken over, false votes being cast, and other
manipulations have left voters doubtful. The notorious votes during the
2018 general election and the rushed convictions of opposition leaders
before the 2024 general election have further fueled this mistrust.
Consequently, voters now question the significance of their votes,
suspecting that election outcomes are predetermined by those in power.
“Low voter turnout is symptomatic of a larger issue,” Majumdar said.
“The essence of casting a vote lies in the desire to elect the most suitable
candidate for the incumbent position. However, the prevailing sentiment
among the people of Bangladesh suggests a disillusionment wherein they
perceive their votes as inconsequential.
“This perception stems from a perceived bias among incumbent
individuals, the Election Commission, and administrative authorities.
Furthermore, the lack of participation from opposition parties
underscores the prevailing skepticism, as they anticipate predetermined
outcomes. Consequently, this disenchantment, coupled with concerns
over financial burdens and personal safety, serves as the primary reasons
behind the diminished participation in our local elections.” he continued.
The people of Bangladesh used to be crazy about elections because of the
festivities; however, this festive mood no longer exists in the country.
“Even despite the open field where anyone can stand in the upazila
election, however, there are still less candidates,” Majumdar said. “The
voting system in our country has been totally destroyed.”
Mohammad Rayhan Ahmed (a pseudonym), 35, from Sakhipur, a
subdistrict in Tangail district, recently returned from Saudi Arabia,
where he had worked as a migrant worker for the past seven years. Since
his student days, he has been a supporter of Abdul Kader Siddique, a
freedom fighter and former MP, and his party, the Krishak Sramik Janata
League. Ahmed even sent money from his earnings to the party office in
his local area.
“I was very excited as before about our upcoming upazila election on
June 5. However, there is no election vibe or excitement here like before.
Although one person from my supported party is contesting, some
leaders who do politics for the AL are also contesting this election,”
Ahmed told The Diplomat prior to the voting.
“One of them from the AL will surely win. Basically, AL leaders are
fighting against AL leaders in different signs. That’s why I may not vote,
and neither will my family members,” he said.
A Lack of Competition
The lack of participation by all political parties stands as one of the major
reasons behind the rising voter apathy. When major parties boycott
upazila elections, voter enthusiasm wanes. Additionally, the deteriorating
law and order situation in some areas discourages citizens from visiting
polling centers. This combination of political boycotts and security
concerns significantly dampens voter motivation. Addressing these issues
– rebuilding confidence in the electoral system, ensuring institutional
autonomy, and creating a fair and secure environment – is essential for
revitalizing voter participation in upazila elections.
Along with the BNP, some major political parties boycotted the local
elections in line with their political stance, while many smaller parties
are not participating due to a weak organizational base and the tenfold
increase in the mandatory security deposit set by the Election
Commission.
The BNP and its allied parties have officially decided to avoid the
elections, describing them as a “farcical election.” However, despite the
boycott by the BNP, many grassroots leaders of the party around the
country participated in the election. As a result, the BNP has expelled at
least 193 leaders for participating in the upazila elections — 80 in the first
phase, 61 in the second, and 52 in the third.
In addition to opposition parties, many members of the AL-led 14-party
alliance are also abstaining. While the Jatiya Party (JP), the main official
opposition in Parliament, and some partners of the ruling alliance are
participating, their involvement is minimal.
“Currently, there are approximately 100 candidates representing the JP
nationwide, a figure that, though notably low, has become somewhat
customary,” said Adv. Md. Rezaul Islam Bhuiyan, a presidium member of
the JP.
“I personally contested in the 12th National Election from Brahmanbaria-
2 in Chittagong division,” he added. “On the day of the election, up until
3:00 p.m, voter turnout was a mere 7 percent. This experience left us
disheartened and skeptical about the integrity of future elections,
particularly given the prevailing perception that the AL tends to
dominate most upazila parishad contests.”
Like Ahmed, Bhuiyan expressed concern that democracy in Bangladesh
now means choosing between candidates from a single party: “It’s
disconcerting to witness members of the AL competing against each
other under the guise of open competition.”
The Awami League’s Internal Woes
In January, the AL decided not to use party symbols in the elections, said
AL General Secretary and Road Transport and Bridges Minister Obaidul
Quader.
The AL has been grappling with issues of control among its grassroots
leaders. Despite being in power for three consecutive terms, the party has
struggled to maintain discipline, particularly at the local level. Party chief
and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has directed central leaders to take
strict action against those who have violated party rules. This move
comes as the AL prepares for its next national council, with the aim of
resolving these issues before the event.
Grassroots leaders have been accused of not adhering to the central
committee’s directives, leading to intra-party conflict and rivalry. The
central committee’s efforts to enforce discipline have been met with
resistance, with grassroots leaders often refusing to follow orders and
failing to resolve internal conflicts or complete local unit committees.
The party’s recent strategy to allow both independent candidates and
official nominees to contest elections aimed to increase voter turnout,
especially in the absence of the BNP. However, this led to significant
division at the grassroots level, with multiple candidates from the AL
competing against each other. The resulting factionalism weakened the
party’s unity and contributed to the spread of influence and incidents of
violence in the recent upazila elections.
Moreover, despite the AL central committee’s strict directive against the
participation of ministers’ and MPs’ relatives in the elections, it appears
that this instruction has not been fully adhered to. Reports indicate that
over 50 relatives of ministers and MPs pursued public posts in the four-
phase upazila elections. Notably, 10 out of 13 relative-candidates were
elected in the first phase of the upazila elections, with similar trends
expected in the remaining phases.
Hasina has emphasized that the term “family” in the context of the
upazila elections should include the ministers and MPs themselves, their
spouses, and children. Despite her clear stance, many relatives of
ministers or MPs have defied the party’s decision and contested anyway,
introducing a new dimension to the ruling party’s politics.
This situation has created a dilemma for several MP or ministers, as some
relatives have complied with Hasina’s order and withdrawn their
candidacies, while others have chosen to disregard the directives. The
outcome of this directive is poised to influence the future political
landscape, as those who fail to heed the party chief’s message risk facing
consequences.
Barrister Syed Sayedul Haque Suman, an MP for the Habiganj-4
constituency in Sylhet, also very famous to netizens, has been accused of
violating the electoral code of conduct during the Chunarughat Upazila
Parishad election. The allegations include campaigning for a chair
candidate, announcing donations, and promising cash to voters. A
complaint was filed by Md Abu Taher, another chair candidate, to the
assistant returning officer and Chunarughat Upazila Nirbahi Officer. In
his response to the Election Inquiry Committee, Suman denied breaching
the electoral code of conduct.
The declining voter turnout in the upazila parishad elections is a
concerning trend that reflects broader issues within Bangladesh’s
political landscape. A combination of factors, including perceived
electoral irregularities, lack of genuine competition, and disenchantment
with local governance, has eroded public trust in the electoral process.
The absence of major opposition parties, coupled with intra-party
conflicts within the ruling Awami League, has further compounded this
issue. As a result, voters are increasingly questioning the significance of
their participation in what they view as a flawed system.

The Author
Saqlain Rizve is a Bangladeshi journalist and photographer who covers politics and society from
Dhaka for The Diplomat.
Depositphotos

Providing Rural Justice Aided

Taliban’s Takeover of Afghanistan
Why would Afghans, who are very familiar with Taliban
brutality, be impressed with their justice system?
By Renard Sexton

As we approach three years since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan,

many aspects of governance have changed, most prominently the
precipitous decline of girls’ education and space for women in public life.
The justice system has also experienced a transformation, as the former
government’s Western-inspired system of prosecutors and judges was
swept aside in favor of swift judgments by Taliban justices interpreting
Shariah principles.
Although short on due process and unsparing in their punishments, the
Taliban’s courts have won some praise from citizens for their speed,
clearing huge backlogs of cases, and are regarded as relatively less
corrupt than the previous regime.
The perceived effectiveness of Taliban local courts stands in sharp
contrast with many aspects of their governance post-coup: economic
policy has failed to jumpstart a flagging economy, terrorism from the
Islamic State Khorasan Province is seen as a mismanaged and growing
security threat, and many basics of government functioning remain
vague at best.
The Taliban’s comfort with local level dispute resolution is in many ways
a return to earlier, simpler days for the movement. In the heart of the
insurgency, more than a decade ago, they could focus on the relatively
straightforward task of fighting the former Kabul government and its
allies, and imposing Shariah law in rural areas using a network of
motorbike-riding judges.
Our new research looks back at this period (from 2011-2014) at the end of
the U.S. “surge” to understand how the Taliban’s introduction of local
courts may have impacted the course of the war.
Comparing districts where Taliban courts operated during this period
with other districts that otherwise look very similar but did not have
courts, the areas with Taliban justice experienced significant reductions
in violent civil disputes (for example, fights between families over land).
This resulted in a major increase in citizens’ reported perceptions of
Taliban capacity to govern, and reduced confidence in the Kabul
government, as reported by citizens on a U.S.-government collected
survey (perhaps thus an understatement). Afghans who witnessed
Taliban justice in their district were much more likely to report that they
would bring their own disputes to the Taliban, rather than to government
courts, and reported lower likelihood of calling in tips to U.S. forces about
Taliban IEDs.
This demonstration of capacity and shift in public opinion appears to
have provided the Taliban with a boost on the battlefield as well. In areas
where courts were operating, the Taliban were able to execute nearly 70
percent more attacks against U.S. and government forces, including IEDs.
Rather than violence being a means of taking control to impose Islamic
jurisprudence, the Taliban used courts to win favor with the public,
which allowed for a more effective insurgent war.
Why would Afghans, who are very familiar with Taliban brutality, be
impressed with their justice system? For one, most people were not
themselves parties to active disputes, instead suffering collateral damage
from disputes ongoing in their village or town. Even if they did not agree
with the Taliban’s decision of who should win in a given case, they were
grateful that the matter was finally resolved. Importantly, this gave
citizens a stake in the Taliban remaining influential or indeed taking full
control – if the former Afghan government were to retake control, all
these land disputes would become unresolved again as the losers sought
reconsideration within the government courts.
Second, citizens felt that the Taliban’s system was more legitimately in
line with local values, underpinned by Islamic law, rather than a foreign-
imposed legal regime that sometimes contradicted their religious values.
As put by one disputant: “Unfortunately, I lost the trial. I am not upset at
the Taliban judges, they judge according to the Shariah, and I cannot
oppose the Shariah.”
At the time of the U.S. withdrawal, the reported intelligence consensus
was that the Kabul government would fall within 6-12 months. In
practice, the Taliban almost immediately took over control after U.S.
troops were no longer in place to prop up the regime. Canny observers of
Afghanistan and past rebellions noted that even a perfectly executed
campaign likely would not have prevented this: Like the Vietnam war,
this was a battle of attrition and resolve, and the Taliban, not foreign
occupiers, would always be willing to keep fighting longer.
But even if outside forces are destined to eventually lose interest, why did
the Taliban not face a stanch rebellion of disaffected Afghans opposed to
their rule and in favor of the political changes of the past two decades?
During the Taliban’s first stint in power in the 1990s, they faced persistent
insurrections from regional and ethnic armies who refused to submit to
their rule. Today, in contrast, the only consistent armed opposition the
Taliban faces is from the Islamic State, who are even more extreme
ideologically.
The Taliban’s relatively successful program of justice provision may have
played a role in making the public ambivalent to their eventual conquest
of Kabul. In survey experiments conducted in late 2020, as the U.S.
withdrawal strategy became clear, more than 60 percent of Afghans
supported peace and were indifferent to the Taliban being in control.
Islamic law was more popular than secular law, as was an “Islamic
Emirate” as compared to the existing “Islamic Republic.”
Taken together, we can understand the population of Afghanistan as
having taken a gamble on peace with the Taliban, one that was informed
in part by the experience of Taliban informal governance through rebel
courts. After decades of violence, and with just enough evidence that
governance would not completely disappear, people were willing to
accept a difficult peace as far superior to ongoing war.

The Author
Renard Sexton is assistant professor of Political Science at Emory University.
The research cited in this piece was co-authored with Austin Wright (Harris School of Public Policy at
The University of Chicago) and Donald Grasse (Cornell University).

Associated Press, Manish Swarup

How Different Will Modi 3.0 Be

From Previous Terms?
Modi will need to set aside some Hindu nationalist goals to
hold on to the support of his secular allies in government.
By Snigdhendu Bhattacharya
On June 9, Narendra Modi was sworn in as India’s prime minister for the
third consecutive term. He is widely perceived to have less authority this
time, as his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s tally in Parliament fell 32 seats
short of the majority mark.
As a result, Modi now heads a government heavily dependent on alliance
partners. The latter do not agree with several items on the BJP’s Hindu
nationalist agenda.
For example, his campaign in the recent general election was dominated
by his allegation that the opposition INDIA bloc would rob lower caste
and tribal Hindus of their reservation entitlements in education and jobs,
and give these to Muslims. His party pledged that it would prevent
Muslims from enjoying reservation benefits under the Other Backward
Classes (OBC) category.
However, Modi’s government now depends on the Telugu Desam Party
(TDP), which has 16 MPs and has formed the state government in Andhra
Pradesh. TDP General Secretary Nara Lokesh, the son of party chief and
Andhra Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu, has made it clear that his
party is committed to continuing the current 4 percent reservation for
Muslims under the OBC list. The TDP would ensure that no unilateral
decisions will be made on contentious issues like reservation, redrawing
of parliamentary constituency boundaries, and the Uniform Civil Code
(UCC), he said.
Unilateral decisions made on the back of the BJP’s brute majority in
Parliament were the hallmark of Modi’s rule of the past decade. From
demonetizing 86 percent of the country’s cash overnight in his declared
war against black money and criminalizing the Islamic divorce system of
triple talaq to stripping India’s Jammu and Kashmir state of special
constitutional status and statehood – all these major decisions were made
by the Modi administration without consulting NDA partners.
Had the BJP got a strong majority this time around, the party had plans to
enforce the UCC to remove the differences in personal laws of different
religious communities. Modi will find it difficult to implement this plan
unless he gets his partners on board.
Other items on the agenda of the Hindu nationalists are ending the
traditional collegium system of appointments in the judiciary, which
many fear would reduce the judiciary’s independence, and
implementation of the “One Nation, One Election” system whereby
parliamentary, state assembly, and local body elections will be held
simultaneously.
The Modi government has also been accused of unleashing different
federal investigation agencies on the opposition – either putting its
leaders behind bars or forcing them to join the BJP.
Political observers point out that India’s first BJP Prime Minister, Atal
Bihari Vajpayee, toned down the Hindu nationalist goals to keep the
coalition intact.
Hitherto, Modi has not needed to work with or appease allies. Whether as
the Gujarat chief minister or at the helm of the Indian government, he
has always enjoyed the backing of a strong BJP majority in the House,
which allowed him to exercise his authoritarian style of governance.
That has now changed.
“Modi will have to carry his allies along. Allies would want the
government and the coalition to follow policies that do not hurt their
constituencies,” Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, author of “Narendra Modi: The
Man, The Times,” told The Diplomat.
According to Mukhopadhyay, Modi has never displayed the skills needed
to work as part of a collective leadership. “He is used to dictating. He likes
to have the spotlight only on him. He now has to be humble, which he has
never been.”
Emerging Equations
With the BJP’s vote share in the southern states increasing, it may need to
put on the backburner its plans for a contentious delimitation of
parliamentary constituencies based on the current population.
The current parliamentary seat boundaries are based on the
constituency’s 1971 population. At present, there is a ban in force on
redrawing parliamentary boundaries, which ends in 2026, when the
government may either lift the ban or keep it in place.
The southern states are strongly opposed to lifting the ban, as they have
controlled their population numbers better than the northern states, and
will suffer should electoral boundaries be redrawn. Since the northern
states are more heavily populated, they will have more seats in
Parliament should electoral boundaries be redrawn.
In the recent general election, the BJP’s popularity in the north reduced
and the south has given it hope for expansion. BJP veterans who spoke to
The Diplomat said they expect the party to go for the status quo. Besides,
the TDP is from the south and is opposed to a fresh delimitation of
electoral boundaries.
According to Biswanath Chakraborty, a political scientist at Rabindra
Bharati University in Kolkata, the third Modi government will be
different from the past two avatars structurally and functionally.
Structurally, the government, which has been “a Modi government so far
will transform into an NDA government,” he told The Diplomat. “Instead
of I, Modi will have to highlight the collective leadership.”
“From a functional perspective, Modi would not be able to run the kind
of centralized administration he is used to,” Chakraborty said.
Chakraborty expects center-state relations to change. The Modi
government would not be able to make unilateral decisions or use central
investigating agencies the way it did in the past two terms. He also
anticipates a rise in militancy and terrorist activities in Kashmir and
Manipur. “A weak federal government has always encouraged forces
outside the democratic system,” he said.
Trust Deficit?
Over the past 10 years, the BJP and the Modi government have acted
systematically to weaken the opposition parties by engineering
defections.
However, their perceived role in engineering the division of two regional
parties, the Nationalist Congress Party and the Shiv Sena, dealt a major
blow to the NDA’s electoral performance in Maharashtra. This may
prompt the BJP to move more cautiously in the future while engineering
such defections.
The opposition, however, suspects that the BJP would wait for the right
time and opportunity to resume its poaching of opposition parties to
increase its parliamentary strength and reduce ally-dependency.
In response, opposition parties have decided to keep Modi under
pressure by saying that they will be waiting for the right time and
opportunity to fulfill “people’s desire of not to be ruled by the BJP.”
Modi has started his third innings cautiously, maintaining the status quo
in the distribution of ministerial portfolios. There is no change in
ministers heading key ministries like home, defense, external affairs,
finance, education, road transport, and railways. They will remain with
the BJP and headed by the same ministers as in Modi 2.0.
However, trouble looms. Two BJP allies in Maharashtra have publicly
expressed their displeasure at ministerial portfolio distribution. Besides,
its most important allies – the TDP and the Bihar-based Janata Dal
(United) or the JD(U) – bargained hard for the speaker’s post.
The speaker of the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament, has the
power to decide on the disqualification of a member, including for
defection. Opposition parties advised the TDP and JD(U) leadership to
secure the speaker’s post in their own interest. Opposition parties argued
that should these allies ever think of withdrawing support, the BJP would
try to engineer defections in these parties. Holding the speaker post will
protect the party from the BJP’s aggression.
In the end, however, the BJP prevailed, with its own Om Birla re-elected
as speaker.
The TDP and the JD(U) have frequently switched sides. This will keep the
BJP on its toes. How Modi deals with his insecurity and his allies’ lack of
trust in him will define Modi 3.0 to a great extent.

The Author
Snigdhendu Bhattacharya, the author of two non-fiction books on India’s ultra-Left and the
Hindu right, writes and comments on India’s politics, environment, human rights and culture.
Armed Forces of the Philippines via Associated Press

Explaining Vietnam and the

Philippines’ Divergent South China
Sea Strategies
Why has China taken such strong actions against the
Philippines, while seemingly turning a blind eye to major
land reclamations by Vietnam?
By Sebastian Strangio

On June 17, Chinese vessels forcefully blocked a Philippine resupply

mission to its isolated outpost at Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly
Islands. During the operation, Chinese personnel on board motorboats
repeatedly rammed and then boarded two Philippine Navy rigid-hulled
inflatable boats in order to prevent Filipino personnel from transferring
supplies, including firearms, to the BRP Sierra Madre, a warship that
Manila grounded on the shoal in 1999. In the ensuing melee, a number of
Filipino navy personnel were wounded, including one who reportedly
lost his right thumb. The Philippine military likened the action to “brazen
act of aggression” and “an act of piracy.”
The incident marked the culmination of 18 months of tensions around
the shoal, which has now emerged as the primary flashpoint in the South
China Sea.
While tensions have grown between China and the Philippines, Vietnam,
another nation that disputes China’s expansive claims in the South China
Sea, has been quietly reinforcing the features under its own control. In a
briefing published last month, the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative,
a part of the Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in
Washington, reported that Vietnam had “significantly accelerated” the
expansion of its outposts in the Spratly Islands over the past six months,
creating “almost as much new land as it had in the previous two years
combined.”
The conjuncture raises the question of why China has taken such strong
actions against the Philippines, while seemingly turning a blind eye to
major land reclamations by Vietnam. As Zack Cooper and Gregory Poling
wrote in a June 18 article for War on the Rocks, this is a question with
potentially far-reaching implications. They argued that “understanding
the logic behind China’s (lack of) response is especially critical because it
might help decipher Beijing’s response to future activities.”
In response, the authors adduced four factors to explain the divergence
in treatment. The first is simply that Chinese leaders may wish not to
provoke a second major standoff in the South China Sea – a judgment that
appears to fit with Beijing’s “divide and rule” approach to the maritime
conflicts. The second is that Vietnam had both the will and the ability to
push back against any Chinese escalation, which carried the implication
that Beijing had identified the Philippines in general, and its toehold on
Second Thomas Shoal in particular, as a point of weakness.
Third, Cooper and Poling argued that the difference can be explained by
the Philippines’ treaty alliance with the United States. Finally, they
argued that tensions between Beijing and Hanoi had been contained by
their “longstanding cooperative relationship.” While the first two points
are arguably relevant, these latter two points get closer to the nub of the
issue – and suggest that the periodic stand-offs between Vietnam and
China, while they carry the same potential to spark a wider conflict, are
governed by very different dynamics.
On the first point, it is clear that it is the U.S. alliance has played its role in
China’s growing pressure campaign, in particular, the Philippines’
decision to strengthen this alliance in response to growing Chinese
aggression in disputed waters. Over the past two years, President
Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has expanded U.S. access to Philippine military
facilities and inaugurated joint patrols with the U.S. and other partners.
On numerous occasions, U.S. officials have assured Manila that an armed
attack on any Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the
South China Sea will oblige it to come to the Philippines’ aid under the
two nations’ Mutual Defense Treaty.
The Vietnamese approach has been very different. As Khang Vu noted in
an article for The Diplomat in February, where the Philippines has
expanded its cooperation with the U.S. in response to Chinese pressure,
the Vietnamese government has stuck fast to its nonaligned foreign
policy. While Hanoi did upgrade its relations with Washington to the level
of a comprehensive strategic partnership in September, this was nestled
within diplomatic outreach to China that culminated in Xi Jinping’s visit
to Hanoi two months later. That visit, conducted against the red-yellow
backdrop of Chinese and Vietnamese flags, drove home the point that
Vietnam “puts its relationship with China above that with the U.S.”
Khang argued that there are good reasons for Vietnam to adopt such a
policy, rooted in the country’s geographic realities. Vietnam, he noted, “is
the only South China Sea claimant sharing a land border with China and
has been a victim of Chinese bullying by land in the past, in addition to
bullying at sea.” To offset this geographic handicap and the associated
security vulnerabilities, Vietnam has adopted a foreign policy rooted in
diversification, with a key note of constant assurance to China – as
embedded in the “Four Nos,” for instance – that Vietnam will never
become an ally of any hostile foreign power.
“Such confinement of maritime disputes also explains why China has not
criticized Vietnamese activities aimed at asserting its maritime claims as
harshly as it has criticized the Philippines,” Khang argued.
On the last factor mentioned by Cooper and Poling, this tendency is
facilitated and strengthened by the countless historical, political, and
cultural ties that bind the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) to its
counterpart in Beijing. These both create a degree of shared interest – a
joint opposition to U.S.-led “peaceful evolution” being at the top of the list
– and facilitate a degree of mutual understanding.
In Vietnam’s case, the real risk at present is less a Chinese attempt to
seize Vietnamese-held features in the Spratly Islands, than the possibility
that popular nationalist sentiment would arise to challenge the CPV over
its more accommodating – some would say cowardly – approach toward
Beijing.
In comparison, the Philippines exists at a greater remove, beyond the
Confucian-Leninist orbit inhabited by the two communist parties and
their leaders. Instead it has much more cultural and historical kinship
with the United States. (Not for nothing did Stanley Karnow once liken
the Filipino people to “some kind of lost American tribe that has
somehow become detached from the U.S. mainland and floated across the
Pacific.”) The extent to which Beijing and Manila have been talking past
each other during the ongoing stand-off over Second Thomas Shoal offers
ample evidence of this.
All of this makes it tempting to conclude that the Philippines’ decision to
double down on the U.S. alliance, albeit unsurprising given the country’s
own history of intimate relations with Washington, is something of a
double-edged sword. The possible deployment of the U.S. military is a
powerful potential deterrent to China. It also raises the stakes if China
commits an act that unequivocally triggers the collective defense
provisions of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.
At this point, the conflict over Second Thomas Shoal would cease to be a
maritime dispute between the Philippines and China, and would become
a test of U.S. resolve. For policymakers in Washington, especially those of
a more hawkish persuasion, the question of Philippine territorial
integrity would be superseded by the question of maintaining U.S.
primacy in the Western Pacific. In this conflict, the Philippines would find
itself on the frontlines.
It is unclear whether either Vietnam or the Philippines could realistically
hope to adopt the other’s approach, given the extent to which they are
shaped and conditioned by their own geographic, political, and cultural
circumstances. For Vietnam, the confrontational policy of the Marcos
administration, let alone a formal security alliance with the U.S., is a non-
starter.
Likewise, the Vietnamese approach is arguably ill-suited to the
Philippines. Former President Rodrigo Duterte attempted some version of
this, downplaying the maritime disputes in the interests of good relations
with China (and dollops of Chinese infrastructure funding). But while this
coincided with a period of relative quiescence in the South China Sea, it
did not stem Chinese incursions into areas claimed by the Philippines;
nor did it seemingly cure Chinese strategists of their tendency to view the
Philippines as a proxy for the United States.
All of this highlights just how difficult the Philippine position in the South
China Sea has now become. While Manila is not responsible for the
situation at Second Thomas Shoal, its move toward the U.S. has only
provoked a stronger Chinese reaction. But to back down now would be to
court capitulation, and show the leaders in Beijing that aggression can be
an effective strategy. As tensions between China and the U.S. increase,
Manila’s space for independent maneuvering is gradually narrowing.

The Author
Sebastian Strangio is Southeast Asia Editor at The Diplomat.

Wikimedia Commons, mohigan

The Burning of Buthidaung:

Allegations, Denials, and Silence in
Myanmar’s Rakhine State
Reports of arson attacks and the mass displacement of
Rohingya civilians in western Myanmar are being used as
rhetorical weapons in the country’s civil war.
By Naw Theresa

On May 17, the Arakan Army (AA, now rebranded as the Arakha Army)
captured the town of Buthidaung in the northern part of Rakhine State in
Myanmar’s west. The next day, large parts of the town had reportedly
burned down.
While the events of May 17-18 are still being pieced together, they
immediately prompted allegations from Rohingya activists that AA
fighters were responsible for arson and the forced displacement. Citing
various eyewitness accounts, they claimed that thousands of Rohingya
previously living in Buthidaung had been left homeless.
Blaming the fires on regime air strikes, the AA has categorically denied
the allegations and doubled down with strong rebukes. Domestic media
platforms’ coverage has been non-committal at best while resistance
organizations and netizens have closed ranks to defend the group.
Although the military State Administration Council (SAC) has
intentionally used Buthidaung and the conscription of Rohingya as a way
of weaponizing communal tensions against the AA, the way the events
have played out, and the way in which anti-regime groups have reacted,
are not encouraging for the country’s ongoing struggles.
The Town
Located 90 kilometers northwest of the Rakhine State capital, Sittwe, and
20 kilometers east of Maungdaw on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border,
Buthidaung is the eponymous seat of one of the last remaining Rohingya
majority townships in northern Rakhine. A 2019 government report
stated that the entire township had around 206,000 residents, with 18,000
living in the town proper. It tallied 45,000 Buddhists and 160,000 Muslims
(also termed “Bangladeshi citizens”) and noted an “emigration” of over
102,000 persons from “the previous year.”
In March and April of this year, the SAC orchestrated protests in
Buthidaung, with Rohingya shown denouncing the conflict and the AA.
“Protesters” were coerced by junta forces who reportedly threatened to
burn down their homes. In mid-April, regime troops and Rohingya
conscripts allegedly started fires that destroyed hundreds of homes
belonging to ethnic Rakhines alongside the facilities of Doctors Without
Borders. Rohingya activists say that Buthidaung town had swollen with
as many as 200,000 displaced Rohingya by mid-May, with many huddled
into government buildings, the main hospital, and schools.
On May 2, the AA captured the military’s 15th Military Operations
Command (MOC) about five kilometers to the east of Buthidaung across
the Mayu River, the second MOC it had seized after overrunning the 9th
MOC in Kyauktaw in mid-February. A few days later, junta forces
dynamited the bridge over the Mayu and reportedly reinforced
Buthidaung with Rohingya conscripts. An Indian news outlet published
allegations that nearly 1,700 Buddhists and Hindus in the town were
being held “hostage” by “Islamic terror groups,” a claim dismissed by
Rohingya activists.
On May 17, the AA captured the town.
The Allegations
Rohingya activists and platforms allege that shortly after seizing the
town, AA fighters ordered all Rohingya to leave Buthidaung by the
morning of May 18. Most refugees reportedly responded that they could
not do so. According to eyewitness accounts compiled by activists,
satellite imagery analyses, and a tweet from the National Unity
Government (NUG)’s deputy human rights minister and Rohingya activist
Aung Kyaw Moe, fires in the Rohingya areas of Buthidaung began around
10 p.m. of May 17 and burned through the night. In addition, at least 35
villages, including those firmly under the AA’s control for weeks,
reportedly suffered significant fire damage, with the widespread pattern
said to point toward an on-the-ground arson campaign.
A survivor reported seeing dozens of dead bodies as he fled the town and
said that AA fighters were allegedly harassing and extorting fleeing
Rohingya. Around 4,000 Rohingya are reported to have fled to the
Bangladeshi border and thousands as well to Rohingya-majority
Maungdaw, which the AA is now attacking. Leading Rohingya activists
have decried the AA’s alleged actions in Buthidaung after May 17, while
Rohingya organizations have called for international pressure on the
group.
Furthermore, Rohingya sources have accused the AA of various cruelties
before the events of May 17-18. They say that the group shelled a school
and hospital in Buthidaung town where Rohingya were sheltering,
resulting in several deaths. The group is also alleged of being involved in
“extra-judicial killings, mass arrests, forced recruitment and the
displacement of Rohingya.” Earlier accusations include deliberately
targeting Rohingya villages as well as using them as launchpads and
human shields to draw regime fire.
Such allegations and concerns have grown as the AA has gained more
territory across northern Rakhine and its leadership has begun using
language that alarmed Rohingya activists.
The Denials
The AA has categorically and vehemently rejected all of the allegations
and has hit back with strong ripostes. It stated that it is liberating
Rakhine for all people and termed the accusations as baseless, countering
that false allegations were “betraying Rakhine State.” The group contends
that Buthidaung was burned by SAC air strikes and accused the regime
and its allies of spreading disinformation.
In one response, it said that its actions were “misinterpreted by some
Muslim diaspora groups as forced relocations and mass displacement”
and that Rohingya diaspora activists were trying to bring “particular
attention only to the Buthidaung incident.” It instead called for “balanced
attention and concentration to all the horrible civilian loss of lives and
property across Myanmar, including Arakan.”
The group has released photos and videos showcasing its troops assisting
Rohingya and interviews with refugees. The AA said that it is providing
humanitarian aid to around 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs)
from Buthidaung and Maungdaw, of which around 80 percent are said to
be Muslims, and later appealed for humanitarian aid for around 500,000
IDPs. Rakhine news platforms have repeated the AA’s line on inter-ethnic
harmony and showcased communities co-existing in the group’s
territories. They also called attention to the burned homes of non-
Rohingya in Buthidaung as well as to other towns bombed by the regime,
and have accused Rohingya militant groups of collaborating with the
regime.
As the Buthidaung allegations emerged, the AA’s popular leader Twan
Mrat Naing urged people “not to buy any distorted [and] misleading
craps [sic] during this challenging time” and told Rohingya activists to
“stop selfish grumpiness” and to abandon their “misbegotten scheme of
creating a separate Islamic safe zone.” In another rebuff, he wished that
people singing to the tune of international donors instead of the
“contextualized truth” would accept a fitting political future. His other
tweets have alarmed Rohingya activists, such as defending the use of the
term “Bengali” and patronizingly gloating over the surrender of forcibly
recruited Rohingya.
The AA in turn has accused Rohingya groups, including militant outfits,
of weaponizing the term “genocide” and issued a blistering response
when 195 anti-regime organizations cited the allegations and urged the
group to protect civilian populations. It countered that the allegations
were one-sided and accused the signatories of being useful idiots under
the human rights label, demanding the organizations to clarify their
positions. Some groups have since withdrawn and blamed themselves for
“not properly understanding the situation.”
Complicating the matter is that a number of major platforms appeared to
have used photos of regime-attributed incidents from other parts of
Rakhine in their articles on the Buthidaung incident. With the use fake
photos a perennial issue in Myanmar’s conflict, Rakhine pages and
politicians have accused the platforms as well as activists of deliberately
spreading disinformation. The military has set up fake Telegram
channels, which have aired supposed Rohingya grievances against the AA
and also circulated a fake NUG press release listing alleged AA abuses
against the Rohingya.
Furthermore, the fluid situation has contributed to discrepancies, such as
the number of Rohingya reported to have fled to the Bangladeshi border
originally reported at 45,000 and now revised to 4,000, fueling charges of
alarmist language and exaggeration from Rakhine organizations. Both
the AA and some commentators contend that Rohingya diaspora activists
have maintained a hardline attitude of distrust toward the group while
Rohingya communities on the ground are purportedly more supportive.
Silence and Support
Beyond the allegations and denials, an interesting dynamic has emerged
over how resistance groups and platforms have responded to the
allegations. Revolutionary groups, popular news pages, and netizens are
either skirting the issue or rushing to the AA’s defense while activists’
efforts to bring global attention to Buthidaung have been met with
harassment and accusations of being foreign pawns.
Initially, the NUG expressed alarm over the situation in Buthidaung and
said there were “allegations of large-scale forced displacement of
civilians, particularly Rohingya, the destruction of property, and the
burning of villages.” It soon backtracked on that particular sentence by
issuing a revised statement that squarely blamed the SAC for stirring
inter-communal conflict and destroying villages, and noting that
“Rakhine, Rohingya, and Hindu civilians are being forced to move and
their houses are being burnt.” The NUG’s Acting President Duwa Lashi La
later said that the AA and Rohingya communities were working together
to prevent the tensions from escalating.
Major and local news platforms known for their prompt and incisive
reportage on regime abuses either carried sterile reports of Buthidaung’s
capture or parroted the AA’s version of events. While the events in
Myawaddy on the Thai border saw a deluge of articles and analyses,
Buthidaung and the Rohingya activists’ allegations received muted
coverage among domestic sites, with the qualification that regime
internet restrictions hampered verification. Similarly, analysis and
commentary pages have been non-committal or silent over the
allegations, in sharp contrast to their prolific coverage of the conflict,
including regime atrocities against all communities in northern Rakhine.
Being one of the most potent and successful groups fighting the military,
the AA is seen as a standard bearer to be emulated by other resistance
groups and arguably occupies a higher rung on the resistance popularity
ladder than the NUG. As such, many anti-regime groups, commentators,
and netizens are loath to offend the AA and have rushed to its defense
over the allegations. Some resistance groups declared that they stood
firm with the AA, stating that “baseless conclusions” risked yielding
falsehoods. Even those attempting to point out the allegations do so while
reaffirming their respect and admiration for the group and its leader.
Meanwhile, members of the Rakhine diaspora protested against the
United Nations, alleging bias, and contend that fixating on the allegations
has only benefited the military regime.
On social media, many netizens have proclaimed that they stand with the
AA over the allegations. The AA’s supporters see such accusations more
as headwinds from the regime and “jealous groups” as the AA nears its
objectives. Articles that quoted Rohingya activists about Buthidaung or
other incidents were flooded with “haha” reactions and angry comments
accusing the platforms or activists of peddling disinformation, selling out
to foreign interests or being obsessed with the Rohingya. Meanwhile,
Rohingya netizens are swarming AA-affiliated social media profiles
demanding answers or outright accusing the AA of being “terrorists just
like the regime.”
Some pro-resistance netizens have partially accepted the credibility of
the allegations surrounding Buthidaung, and called for the incident to be
contextualized into the broader suffering of all the different communities
caught up in the civil war. Others have been outright dismissive, labeling
the allegations as a regime ploy while hurling vitriol at Rohingya
activists, asking why they supposedly kept quiet when the regime burned
other towns. They also say that it is regime trolls who are stirring online
animus between the communities – something that is definitely at play,
but this line is used all too frequently to deflect blame.
Resistance groups that signed the petition urging the AA to protect
civilians have been attacked as “parroting junta narratives,” being driven
by donor money, and acting as “human rights stooges” who are missing
the forest for the trees. Some have even been accused of “betraying the
revolution.”
Uncertain Future
The SAC cynically coerced Rohingya into the military to lay a trap for the
AA in Buthidaung aimed at triggering a scorched earth policy built upon
sectarian strife. That said, it was a trap that the AA knowingly walked
into and has made worse with its rhetoric. Commentators note that the
AA has backtracked on its commitments to the Rohingya community as
its position strengthens in Rakhine. The group recently asked the NUG to
limit its “interference” in certain matters concerning Rakhine, a likely
reference to the Rohingya issue. This raises questions about the AA’s
Rohingya policy, which it pledged to reveal upon receiving international
recognition.
The way the anti-regime media landscape has treated the issue is not
encouraging. It reflects a broader issue where many platforms and
commentators driven by revolutionary solidarity and opposition to the
SAC act as the stenographers and town criers of resistance organizations,
generally toning down or avoiding coverage that will cast such groups in
a negative light. Likewise, pro-resistance netizens’ quick reversion to
racist language, their fervent defense of the AA, and the hounding of
activists – all in the name of the revolution’s “bigger picture” – are
worrying behaviors.
Having ruled out negotiations, the AA is now pressing down on
Maungdaw and has vowed to advance onto Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, all of
which contain significant Muslim (Rohingya and Kaman) populations
confined to camps and preyed upon by the regime’s conscription effort.
Fresh allegations have emerged of mass killings, abductions, and forced
recruitment of Rohingya by AA personnel in both Buthidaung and
Maungdaw. One analysis noted that AA fighters have conducted acts
resembling collective punishment onto Rohingya communities in
retaliation for the latter’s involvement, voluntary or otherwise, with the
regime’s conscription drive.
The embattled SAC is ramping up atrocities against Rakhine
communities, which, combined with Rakhine anger at what they perceive
as myopic international fixation on the Rohingya, is only fueling more
communal malice. More recently, the AA accused regime troops, a
collaborationist Rakhine militia, and Rohingya conscripts of massacring
dozens of ethnic Rakhines in Byine Phyu village outside of Sittwe.
Resistance organizations quickly condemned the massacre and pledged
to help “pursue justice.” The junta rejected the claim as AA propaganda,
in turn alleging that the AA was using Byine Phyu to deflect allegations
surrounding Buthidaung.
As a side note, the Chin and smaller ethnic groups like the Mro have
made a number of allegations against the AA over the years, including
forced recruitment, forced labor, detentions, extortion, and the
confiscation of meager food supplies. Chin communities in AA-
administered Paletwa Township in Chin State are reportedly complaining
that the AA has treated local communities “worse” than regime troops.
One activist warned that Chin communities were tolerating the AA’s
abuses to a certain extent as fellow revolutionaries, but said that the AA
needed to own up to its actions. Adding more concern for Rakhine’s post-
junta future are the mixed pictures and frictions emerging out of the
territories in northern Shan State now administered by the AA’s allies.
Although the full details still remain unknown, the allegations
surrounding Buthidaung, Byine Phyu, and other incidents across Rakhine
State warrant thorough and impartial investigations in order to help
avert perpetual sectarian violence. Whatever emerges concerning
Buthidaung will not change the fundamental fact that the military is
responsible for the lion’s share of atrocities against different
communities across Myanmar as well as for sowing and exploiting
communal tensions. That said, the allegations and reactions should also
serve as a sobering reminder for outside observers to temper their
overly-optimistic prognostications of Myanmar’s future.

The Author
Naw Theresa is the pseudonym of a Myanmar-based independent analyst.
Associated Press, Heng Sinith

In Southeast Asia, the Authorities

Are the Biggest Gun Dealers in
Town
The region is home to a thriving and massively profitable
black market trade in small arms, many of them sourced
from official military stockpiles.
By Lindsey Kennedy and Nathan Paul Southern

It’s 1 a.m. in Poipet, a Cambodian town on the Thai border where the
economy runs on casinos, illegal online gambling, and the now-notorious
“pig-butchering” scams that use forced and trafficked labor to reel in
victims worldwide. The town’s clubs and karaoke bars are awash with
cocky Chinese gangsters splashing their cash on expensive liquor and
bags of meth, which is sold openly by bartenders hovering by the
bathrooms.
But at the outdoor tables of a tiny bar by the night market, overshadowed
by an under-construction compound that locals say will house yet more
Chinese-run scams, four Indonesian members of an online gambling
syndicate are keeping a lower profile. Their “boss” is an unassuming,
chain-smoking Indonesian man in his 30s with just a smattering of
tattoos. But as the empty bottles of Captain Morgan’s rum pile up, his
guard falls, and out comes the mafia-don swagger.
“The best thing about living here is that we can do whatever we want,” he
boasts. “We can get a ‘44 for 20,000 baht” – around $540. The boss is
referring to his high-powered 44-caliber revolvers, which he claims to
buy through a middleman who gets them straight from the Cambodian
police – something he said could never happen back home. In fact, until
they came to Cambodia, the group barely knew how to handle firearms;
they trained at a shooting range in Phnom Penh. Here, he explains,
lowering the flat palm of his free hand, the balance of power puts the
easily-bribed police “down here, then us, then the Chinese” – and his
guns are for “going to war” with these Chinese rivals.
But while the authorities are low priority, police and soldiers do become
targets. Three officers were injured trying to break up a drunken
shootout outside a Poipet casino in 2021, and in 2022, a drug dealer shot
dead two Poipet police. His weapon? A .44-caliber Magnum Revolver.
Selling weapons to potential enemies sounds like an absurd act of self-
sabotage, but all across Southeast Asia, state security apparatuses –
police, military, and government – are a primary source of weapons for
criminals and guerrilla fighters, within their own borders and beyond.
The civil war in Myanmar, the ongoing separatist insurgency in the south
of Thailand, and the rapid growth of organized crime groups running the
region’s multi-billion-dollar, human trafficking-driven online scam
industry all require a steady supply of firearms and munitions.
Capitalizing on this demand is a lucrative business, and armed forces
have ready access to legal supply. Throw in high-level corruption and
weak control of inventory, and this makes for a potentially catastrophic
mix.
“The presence of organized crime can act both as a driver for demand
and availability of illicit weapons, while also directly causing instability
and increased armed violence,” said Llewelyn Jones, the Asia-Pacific
regional director at MAG International, a humanitarian organization that
specializes in clearing landmines and unexploded ordnance, as well as
small arms initiatives to prevent weapons falling into the wrong hands.
States need to be able to record and trace all domestic and international
arms and ammunition shipments, he said, and to enforce legislation
when it comes to producing and licensing weapons. “It is widely
acknowledged globally that unsecured or poorly secured stockpiles of
small arms and ammunition are at risk of diversion to the illicit market,
with significant consequences for peace, security and stability,” Jones
added.
In Cambodia, measures like these seem a distant dream. A steady stream
of Telegram, Facebook, and WhatsApp exchanges seen by The Diplomat
detailed negotiations for black market firearms including AK-47s, AR-15s,
and Beretta and Glock pistols, alongside various accessories such as high-
capacity ammunition magazines and suppressors. Sources in the sector
said many of these could only have come from the armed forces.
In another Telegram group chat, police discussed how, just one week
after a delivery of assault rifles and pistols to the counterterrorism unit
in Phnom Penh in August 2023, one of these new semi-automatic rifles
turned up in a raid on a Chinese criminal gang in Sihanoukville. Yet
another video showed a recently seized AK-47, with the police strap still
attached to the gun.
“Mafia With Rifles”
Often, military and police units simply falsify the number of firearms
procured legitimately and then sell off the unregistered surplus through
personal networks or social media, explained “Z,” a Cambodian military
officer who asked that his identity be protected.
We met Z, as per his request, at a beachfront trans hostess bar in the
crime-ridden casino city of Sihanoukville, where heavily tattooed Chinese
and Taiwanese gangsters were shouting to hear each other above the
clamor of mini-dressed waitresses singing “Happy Birthday” to a small
child. Z was in civilian clothes, but brought his Glock pistol – as had at
least one other patron, who flashed it accidentally at the bar while
fumbling in his sling-bag for his wallet.
Shielded by the chaos, Z explained how his superiors required him to
assist in the sale of arms from his unit to criminal groups, and had also
arranged for him to act as private security for high-ranking Chinese and
Korean crime bosses. The role brought in extra income for Z and his unit
commanders, while providing these crime figures with a bodyguard who
can openly carry a weapon, which only serving members of the armed
forces are legally allowed to do. (The Cambodian government officially
banned the outsourcing of Royal Cambodian Armed Forces for private
security roles in 2019, but the rule is widely ignored).
A casino in Poipet, a town on the Cambodia-Thailand border, as seen on March 27, 2018.

Photo 123072901 © Tikhonova Vera | [Link]

Z also alleged that the cross-border arms trade between Cambodia and
Thailand is dominated by the elite Tea family, headed by Tea Banh, the
former long-time defense minister, and his brother, Tea Vinh, commander
of the navy. Tea Banh’s son Seiha was governor of Siem Reap before
taking over as defense minister in 2023. Tea Vinh’s son, Vichet, holds the
honorific title of Oknha and has a string of high-profile business interests
along the Cambodian coast, including yacht and ferry services in
Sihanoukville and Koh Kong. His other son, Sokha, is deputy commander
of the navy, and his daughter Leakhena is a navy colonel.
Past investigations suggest the Tea brothers used their political influence
to accumulate swathes of land along Cambodia’s coast, including
concessions cut out of supposedly protected forest, and allege ongoing
involvement in illegal logging going back decades. Tea Vinh was
sanctioned in 2021 by the U.S. government, which accuses him of
corruption and skimming funds from the Chinese-funded refurbishment
of the Ream Naval Base, close to Sihanoukville.
According to Z, guns and firearms parts are brought in through ports on
Cambodia’s south coast and either assembled in Cambodian factories or
sent directly overland into Thailand, and onward to Myanmar. This was
backed up in February this year, after our interview took place, when a
significant cache of weapons was seized off the coast of Thailand’s Trat
province, en route from Cambodia. Several M16 and AK-47 assault rifles
and over 1,500 rounds of ammunition were found in what Thai
authorities called weapons of war possibly heading for ethnic armed
groups in Myanmar.
While we could not independently verify Z’s claims that the Teas control
much of the Cambodia-Thailand small arms traffic, Thai media sources
have long accused the Cambodian Defense Ministry – headed first by Tea
Banh and now by his son – of direct involvement in cross-border arms
trafficking. In 2017, three Thai nationals (including an air force officer
and police lieutenant) were charged alongside a Cambodian immigration
officer, related by marriage both to Tea Banh and then-Koh Kong
governor Bun Leut, for transporting a cache of AK-47s, machine guns,
and other munitions by truck from Cambodia’s Koh Kong province into
Thailand, which Thai authorities believed were destined for Karen rebels
in Myanmar.
The following year, Thai police arrested another man smuggling an
assortment of Chinese-built, Type-95 assault rifles, M16s, and various
M16 components along this same route. The Defense Ministry, then
headed by Tea Banh, responded with the bizarre claim that these could
not have come from Cambodia as there were none in the country.
Cambodian shooting ranges at the time offered civilians the opportunity
to shoot M16s, and the prime minister’s own Bodyguard Unit carried
Type-95s.
Meanwhile, in southern Thailand, Muslim insurgents fighting for an
independent state also cite the Cambodian military as a major source of
small arms.
“Most of our weapons are AK-47s. If they are AKs then they are from
Cambodia,” said Ayu, the nom-de-guerre of a senior figure in the Pattani
United Liberation Organization, one of several groups fighting for
autonomy in Thailand’s Deep South.
Speaking to us at a hotpot restaurant in Patani, Ayu claimed to have a
“very good connection” with a regional army commander in Cambodia,
who helps him negotiate weapons sales. Ayu was unwilling to identify his
contact, but his claim about AK-47s rings true. In 2021, an immigration
officer in Cambodia’s northwestern province of Battambang was arrested
for attempting to smuggle, among other weapons, 50 AK-47s across the
land border into Thailand. However, according to Ayu, who claimed to
have built up a “network in the sea” with Cambodian officials, most
weapons destined for Thailand’s Deep South are smuggled across the sea
in fishing boats.
“The authorities in Cambodia – those guys are just really involved in the
business of trafficking,” echoed Boonsak Butnean, an ex-lieutenant
commander in the Royal Thai Marines, who served as platoon leader of
the Underwater Demolition Assault Unit, part of the Naval Special
Warfare Command. But the flow of small arms from Cambodia is only
one strand in a complex transnational network. “We have weapons
moving around Thailand from the south, and from Cambodia. These
weapons are moving to the west side, to Myanmar,” he said.
Another major problem in the south of Thailand is ammunition smuggled
over the southern border by Malay soldiers, said Maj. Gen. Narim
Busaman, a police commander for Pattani province. “Just looking at the
bullet, we know if it’s from Malaysia,” he explained at a meeting inside
the police HQ in Pattani. Much like their Cambodian counterparts, Narim
claimed that Malaysian army officials deliberately underreport the
number of bullets left at a camp and take the rest away to smuggle. “They
put bullets in their pockets to sell. It’s not really difficult,” he said.
But the Thai authorities are hardly blameless either, said Narim. While
Thais can legally own guns, the police and military have better guns, and
this access to high-grade weaponry leads to frequent, direct involvement
in organized crime. Local criminal groups mostly use shotguns, said
Narim – unless they have connections to police. “Publicly, many people
are police and army but privately they are mafia,” he added. “They are
mafia with rifles.”
Endemic Corruption
For Boonsak, trying to disrupt illicit trafficking networks like these almost
cost him his life.
“Bad guys are everywhere. We have army bad guys, police bad guys,
water police bad guys,” he said, adding that corrupt actors are even
embedded throughout the agencies designed to fight them.
As a lieutenant commander in the Thai navy, he was largely stationed on
the Mekong River, including in one of the world’s busiest transnational
trafficking zones: the Golden Triangle, where the borders of Thailand,
Myanmar, and Laos intersect. Corruption and bribe-seeking here are rife,
but Boonsak said that he refused to be bought. At first, he said, this was
simply an irritation for his colleagues in the police, who would try to
“trick” him into patrolling one area while they arranged an illegal
shipment in another. But when he began making major seizures, the
situation turned ugly.
“If my work is a success, that is bad for them,” he explained. “They
already arranged everything. They already paid all the way to Bangkok,
every guy along the way. So if one guy is arrested in one province, then
all the money is lost, and they will get nothing. That makes people
angry!“
The death threats began rolling in, said Boonsak. Then he discovered a
100,000 baht ($2,700) reward was on offer to anyone willing to kill him.
This was the final straw for Boonsak, who decided to quit the navy
altogether. The worst part, he said, was that “the bounty was placed by a
government officer. Not the guy you think is a bad guy, but the guy you
think is a good guy!”
Complicating the situation further in Thailand are its “Volunteer Defense
Forces”: armed civilian groups authorized by the government to defend
volatile border areas from insurgents and traffickers, especially on the
Malaysia border in the Deep South and the Myanmar border in Tak
province. On a night patrol with one volunteer defense force in Mae Sot,
across the river from Myawaddy in Myanmar, members of the group
explained that, despite no formal training, they had been tasked with
monitoring illegal crossings, smugglers, and any other spillover from the
conflict into Thai territory – essentially, picking up the slack where a
police presence or border security was lacking.
To do this, each volunteer was granted a license to buy multiple firearms,
and in Mae Sot, the group of 20 or so young men had leapt at the
opportunity, brandishing high-end assault rifles, some with expensive
modifications, and military-grade, bulletproof Kevlar vests. Once their
license was issued, they said, they could buy as many guns and as much
ammunition as they wanted, with no further checks. There is little to stop
these volunteers, or serving police and military, from selling on their
easily-acquired guns, especially over the border to Myanmar. Once out of
the country, there is scant chance these weapons will be traced back.
In 2021, Thai Customs officers seized 27 guns and 50,000 rounds of
ammunition from smugglers attempting to cross into Myanmar from Mae
Sai, on the northern border with Shan State. The majority were “welfare
guns” – firearms that can be bought by members of the government,
police, or military legally and at a discounted rate. Officials warn that the
scheme allows weapons to easily end up on the black market.
A group of Thai soldiers wearing masks stand in line for military training at an unknown location,
January 11, 2022.

Photo 238669814 © Patchamon Thainmanee | [Link]

In Mae Sot, two ethnic Burmese members of the volunteer group

admitted taking their Thai-issued weapons across the border to fight for
stretches with rebel groups and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs),
fighting junta forces in Myanmar’s civil war. Joining the resistance is one
thing, but as one volunteer guard, nicknamed Jay, explained, his role in
the militia involved laying makeshift anti-personnel landmines, a major
breach of the Mine Ban Convention, which Thailand signed in 1997.
What’s more, Jay explained, Thai generals in the area had, on occasion,
instructed him to drive truckloads of military weapons across the border
to supply the rebel groups – and while his own motivations were
ideological, he was keenly aware that theirs were purely financial.
Jay’s trips are just the tip of the iceberg. Accusations that the Thai military
is the core supplier of weapons used by EAOs in Myanmar have become
so widespread that Thailand’s army chief had to publicly deny that the
majority of weapons ending up in Myanmar originate from Thai military
stockpiles.
“Stolen Or Ripped Off”
Despite being on opposite sides of the decades-long, bloody civil war in
Thailand’s south, the insurgent Ayu claims some Thai security forces
have provided guns even to his group. “Yes, the Thai armed forces, the
military, have sold us weapons,” he said. At the same time, he said, there
are many ways to get guns from authorities – purchasing them, stealing
them, or just snatching them after a firefight. “Many guns we get we steal
from the body of an official after we attack them,” he said.
In fact, Maj. Gen. Narim Busaman believes that the real danger of armed
groups getting their hands on weapons doesn’t come from officials
handing them over willingly, but from robberies from official stores. It’s a
view shared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, which
highlighted the risks of countries holding on to weapons stockpiles in a
2020 report.
“Independently of the presence of conflict, holdings of firearms by
military and law enforcement agencies can constitute a risk of diversion
and can increase supply if the adequate measures are not in place to
ensure proper inventory management, storage, transportation and
disposal and to safeguard against leakage through theft or corruption,”
said Llewelyn Jones.
“It is normal for us to find M16 weapons,” said the major general. “Many
weapons were stolen or ripped off an officer who [the insurgents] shot.”
A similar situation took place in Vietnam in 2023, when a crowd of people
from marginalized ethnic minority groups attacked two police buildings
in the Central Highlands province of Dak Lak, resulting in the deaths of
nine people. Vietnamese authorities claim the goal was, in part, to steal
weapons and ammunition from police stations. More than 90 people
were put on trial earlier this year for the attack, and 23 guns, 1,199
bullets, plus grenades and other explosive devices, were seized.
This vulnerability of weapons stores to attack and theft makes it even
more concerning that local factories producing guns and ammunition
have cropped up in Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and Myanmar. Many
operate in legal gray areas, without proper oversight or adherence to
international standards, and with no accounting or transparency
measures to ensure weapons aren’t being siphoned off for sale on the
black market, or traded with countries in breach of embargoes.
“International law does not prohibit countries from starting their own
domestic arms manufacturing capabilities. But it does impose obligations
on how those arms are used, particularly when exported abroad,” said
Dr. Tomas Hamilton, an expert in arms expert regulation with Guernica
37 Chambers, a specialist group of international criminal and human
rights lawyers. “Those rules would also be particularly relevant when
states are producing weapons domestically, which are then legitimately
exported to a foreign military or security force, but then unlawfully
directed into other hands.”
In Myanmar, rebels fighting against the junta since 2021 have had to
improvise. Gun activists and enthusiasts, often based in the United States,
share knowledge on how to create 3D printed guns, and some EAOs have
run with it. The entirely 3D printed FGC-9, 9mm semi-automatic pistol,
which can be modified into a carbine style rifle, has already seen
extensive use in Myanmar’s civil war. It’s a useful fix – for now. Later, this
proliferation of weapons may prove hard to manage or control.
“Comparatively to other regions in which we operate, MAG has had less
direct access to stockpiles in Southeast Asia. Often, we conduct technical
assessments jointly with national security sector actors and make
recommendations on specific areas of improvement, but this is
something we have not yet done in this region,” said Jones. “An increase
in the number of weapons and munitions facilities inevitably leads to
associated risk.”
Poorly managed stockpiles and makeshift factories can result in tragic
consequences. In April of this year, 20 soldiers were killed in a series of
explosions in Cambodia’s Kampong Speu province – the first blast so
intense it damaged houses and part of a factory over a kilometer away.
The Cambodian government described this as an ammunition explosion
at a military base, and put the accident down to an exceptionally bad
heatwave, combined with faulty munitions. The base was described a
collection of storage facilities combined with a “work facility” – although
it is unclear if munitions were simply stored there, or if any parts were
assembled on site.
But disasters like these are a high risk in countries hell-bent on keeping
weapons production and trading hidden from outside eyes. Back in
Sihanoukville last year, Z warned that firearms parts were already being
smuggled into the country through ports in Sihanoukville and nearby
Ream, and assembled into functional weapons in secretive, small-scale
factories. One of these makeshift munitions factories was, he said, hidden
in a warehouse behind the naval training academy, which we tracked
down directly next to the Ream Naval Base, which is closely connected to
the Teas. Meanwhile, a purported tourism development slightly further
along the coast was, he said, a front for a weapon parts depot used to
supply the factory.
Both locations, according to Z and others in the area, belonged to the Tea
family. When we attempted to visit the depot, which was billed as a
resort, security blocked our access to the site, claiming the new road was
still underway. However, satellite images of newly constructed buildings
on the site appeared to show warehouses resembling the suspected Ream
factory, rather than a hotel. The munitions factory is since said to have
been packed up and moved to Kampong Speu.
Cambodia doesn’t seem likely to scale back its central role as a regional
arms trader any time soon.
“Imports from Cambodia are more than what we get from killing
officials,” said Ayu, the hard-bitten insurgent, through a cloud of cigarette
smoke. “They are always ready to send us weapons – and other people in
this area need weapons too.”

The Authors
Lindsey Kennedy is an investigative journalist and filmmaker, and the director of the research
consultancy TePonui Media. Her work primarily explores trafficking, human rights violations, and
environmental crime.
Nathan Paul Southern is an investigative reporter and non-traditional security specialist with a
focus on transnational organized crime, security, trafficking and the intersection between
criminality and governance.
Associated Press, Manman Dejeto

Duterte’s Ironic Free Speech

Advocacy in the Philippines
The war of words between the Duterte and Marcos clans
has made the former president an unlikely – and
unconvincing – champion of free expression.
By Mong Palatino

Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has warned against the

deterioration of freedom of expression under the government of
Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr.
After a planned rally was canceled in Tacloban City on May 25, Duterte
issued a public statement blaming “the forces of darkness that threaten
not only our rights to express our grievances but the very existence of
our nation.”
He accused his successor of sabotaging the rally, whose speakers included
not only himself but his close allies as well. “As part of the Marcos
administration’s policy of stifling peaceful dissent, they are doing
everything to prevent this rally from happening,” Duterte added.
The former president claimed that dissent was tolerated during his term.
“I was city mayor for 22 years and president for six years but I never,
never ever prevented anyone from exercising his or her right to
peacefully assemble,” he said.
Duterte minced no words in describing the state of the nation. “Freedom
of expression is very important and even more so now when there is no
transparency, accountability, peace and security in our country. It is a sad
day for Philippine democracy,” he said.
Tacloban is the bailiwick of the Romualdez clan, whose matriarch is
Imelda Marcos, the mother of the incumbent president and former first
lady during the Martial Law dictatorship.
Duterte insinuated that local Romualdez officials had a hand in the
cancellation of the activity. The city government has denied this and
pointed out that a typhoon disrupted many events, including the planned
rally.
Perhaps Duterte and his camp had already noticed a disturbing pattern.
On May 7, the venue of Duterte’s rally in Dumaguete City was moved
twice after permits were revoked at the last minute. On April 28,
Duterte’s rally in Bustos, Bulacan was abruptly canceled.
Davao City Mayor Sebastian “Baste” Duterte, son of the former president,
expressed disgust over the cancellation of the assembly in Bulacan.
“This will not silence us but rather this will inspire us even more to
continue to fight for transparency, accountability, and against any form of
oppression by this current administration. We shall continue to protect
the constitution,” the mayor wrote on his Facebook page.
Since January, the Dutertes have been attending monthly “prayer rallies”
aimed at mobilizing public opposition to the charter change proposal put
forward by Marcos’ allies. The elder Duterte said that the constitutional
amendment bill is a ploy to extend Marcos’ term, which ends in 2028.
These “prayer rallies” have become controversial because of the presence
of politicians and prospective candidates in the 2025 midterm election,
and also because of Duterte’s tirades against Marcos, whom he has
repeatedly accused of being a drug addict. At one point, Duterte’s son
even called for the president to resign.
Despite this “word war,” the Dutertes and Marcoses are still allies in the
ruling coalition. Duterte’s daughter is the country’s vice president and is
concurrently education secretary in the Marcos Cabinet.
Duterte’s critical remarks against the leadership of Marcos could signal
the worsening rift between the two influential political dynasties. The
tension might turn into an open split that could divide the ranks of the
ruling party ahead of the midterm polls next year.
Duterte may have a valid basis for decrying the state of freedom or
unfreedom in the country, but he lacks the credibility to be a champion of
free speech. During his presidency, he consistently attacked the press for
its critical coverage of the government’s brutal “war on drugs.” He
supported the closure of the country’s largest media broadcaster while
enabling the rise of social media influencers who peddled disinformation
against state critics. He demonized activists, red-tagged civil society
groups, and criminalized the work of human rights defenders. In early
May, the Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling that identified red-
tagging as a threat to a person’s life, security, and liberty.
Marcos could claim that his government is merely continuing the policies
of his predecessor. But that does not excuse the human rights abuses and
restrictions imposed on the local population. Media watchdogs have
recorded around 135 incidents of attacks and threats against journalists
under the Marcos presidency.
In other words, both Duterte and Marcos are guilty of weaponizing laws
that eroded the country’s civic space. It is therefore absurd for Duterte to
complain about state harassment when he is in many ways responsible
for normalizing repression in the bureaucracy.
As an Inquirer editorial correctly pointed out, Duterte’s statement about
government intolerance is “empty rhetoric by a person who craves the
attention he once enjoyed.”
“He is the last person in the Philippines who can claim fealty or
allegiance to the right of the people to free expression within the bounds
of the law,” the editorial added.
Indeed, there are worrying signs today about the continuing hardships
faced by the media in fulfilling their duty and the legal barriers that
undermine the work of people’s organizations. But when opposition
forces push back against tyranny, they demand accountability not just
from Marcos but also from Duterte as well.
The Author
Mong Palatino is a regular commentator for The Diplomat. He previously served for two terms in
the House of Representatives in the Philippines representing the youth sector.

Photo 28909910 © Xing Wang | [Link]

How the ‘Politics of Gratitude’

Inflames Cambodia-Vietnam
Relations
Some Vietnamese nationalists view Phnom Penh’s decision
to press ahead with a controversial canal project as a sign
of ingratitude.
By Huynh Tam Sang and Mai Vu Thao My
On May 20, Vietnam’s Ambassador to Cambodia Nguyen Huu Tang was
summoned by Cambodian Foreign Minister Sok Chenda Sophea, to
discuss a rash of online criticisms of Hun Sen, the former prime minister
and president of the Senate. The meeting followed Hun Sen’s earlier
complaints about the “shocked” comments of Vietnamese TikTok users,
who berated him for his resolve to move forward with the country’s
controversial Funan Techo Canal project. At the cringeworthy meeting,
Sok Chenda Sophea asked his Vietnamese counterpart to track down and
punish the plotters behind the derogatory comments about Hun Sen.
The summons was used by Cambodia to convey a plain message: that
compromise on online name-calling is not an option. “If the Vietnamese
side decides to cooperate well with us,” Touch Sokhak, spokesperson of
Cambodia’s Ministry of Interior, said, “it will demonstrate the Vietnamese
side also wants to find out who the perpetrators are, where they come
from, and what their intentions and goals really were.” This seems to
suggest that Phnom Penh will view any idleness on Hanoi’s part as either
malicious or deliberate.
The diplomatic summons in response to as trivial an issue as offensive
online comments was perplexing, but it could be read as a subtle reprisal
for Hanoi’s publicly expressed concerns about the Funan Techo Canal
project, in particular, its request for the “equitable sharing” of
information about the project and careful evaluation of its potential
ecological impacts. Phnom Penh has consistently called the project its
“domestic matter” and has announced plans to begin construction in
August.
The predictable impact has been to strain diplomatic relations between
the two neighbors. Hun Sen recently asserted that “Cambodia is not
inferior to Vietnam” and that “Cambodia knows how to protect its
interests; Vietnam does not need to interfere.” His son, Prime Minister
Hun Manet, has used this framing to question the “unfair treatment of
Cambodia by foreign entities” that are seeking to “interrogate” his
government.
This is not the first time the two countries have faced such tensions in
their relationship. In a Facebook post, Hun Sen recalled being tarnished
by Vietnamese social media users in 2016-2017 regarding his statements
over the South China Sea issue. In June 2016, Hun Sen insisted that he
would “not support” the international arbitration case initiated by the
Philippines against China’s claims over the disputed sea.
Despite Phnom Penh’s request, Hanoi has done little to curb the online
criticisms of Cambodia’s government. Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry did not
issue an official statement until three days after the summons. Even then,
it simply stated that both countries have taken “practical and effective
measures” to raise public awareness of their relationship but failed to
provide details of any concrete measures to address the issue, thus
threatening to increase the frictions between the two governments.
Underlying the current diplomatic stand-off is a complex and fraught
historical relationship. Vietnamese official discourse has generally
framed its ties with Cambodia in terms of the politics of gratitude.
Remembering Vietnam’s sacrifices during the overthrow of the Khmer
Rouge in early 1979, which led to the installation of the current party in
power, has been a common theme in state discourse and media reporting.
Rhetoric suggesting that “Cambodia is grateful to Vietnam” is most
pervasive on the annual anniversary of the topping of the Khmer Rouge
on January 7. Gratitude is intrinsically tied to a sense of “indebtedness,”
perpetuating a cycle where reciprocal acts are expected from the
Cambodians.
Accordingly, Cambodia is frequently accused of being “ungrateful” when
it goes against Vietnam’s wishes. Many Vietnamese see Cambodia’s
dogged pursuit of the Funan Techo Canal as an expression of its
ingratitude toward Vietnam, and claim that Cambodia is “biting the hand
that feeds it.” Extreme nationalists have even gone so far as to call for
“punishments” against Cambodia for its “betrayal.” The rise of social
media only increases the likelihood that such divisive narratives may
infiltrate Cambodian society and exacerbate nationalistic tensions.
From the moment the infrastructure project was announced, the
Vietnamese public’s views of Cambodia have been fraught with
skepticism. This has been fueled by extensive speculation, including by
the Vietnam-based Oriental Research Development Institute, about the
canal’s potential military use by China. This argument rests entirely on
the views of unnamed “military experts” cited in the piece, but it has both
worried the Vietnamese public and exasperated Cambodian officials and
media outlets. A Cambodian researcher even wrote that Vietnam was
seeking to counterbalance Chinese influence in Cambodia by courting
Washington’s attention amid the China-U.S. rivalry.
None of this is good for the Vietnam-Cambodia relationship, and
historical resentments could resurface if this conundrum is not properly
navigated. Many Cambodians view Vietnam as a “traditional enemy” that
has long plotted to “absorb” Cambodia. The notion of Vietnamese
“expansionism” remains alive in Cambodian historical memory and
political culture, as does the claim that Hanoi has a “secret agenda” in
Phnom Penh. Hence, Hanoi’s lack of action to address Vietnamese
netizens’ criticisms of Hun Sen could be seen by Cambodians as a
calculated effort to get Cambodia to bend to its will. There was a
precedent where some Cambodians believed Hanoi held back on border
demarcation in response to Phnom Penh withholding its diplomatic
support for Vietnam’s stand on the South China Sea issue.
By responding too forcefully to the canal project, Vietnam also risks a
self-fulfilling prophecy by pushing Cambodia into China’s arms. Just four
days after summoning the Vietnamese ambassador, Sok Chenda Sophea
visited China, where his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi reaffirmed
Beijing’s support for the “transportation, logistics, and irrigation systems”
of the “strategically important Funan Techo Canal” while pledging to
deepen the bilateral “comprehensive strategic cooperation.”
Vietnam now has few good options, as Hun Manet, unlike his father, no
longer feels burdened with historical gratitude for the liberation of
Phnom Penh in 1979. Instead, the new prime minister is seemingly
committed to diluting Vietnam’s influence in Cambodia. On May 30, Hun
Manet announced the construction of the canal would begin in August, as
procrastination would cause “a lot of speculation.” He added, “We will
not let the naysayers tell us this is not possible.”
In this way, he is seeking to leverage Cambodian nationalism to bolster
the new government’s legitimacy. In times of intense anti-Vietnamese
sentiments, Cambodian leaders tend to adopt a harder line on Vietnam.
When the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) lost public support at the 2013
election, the Hun Sen government urged Hanoi to stop its
“encroachment” on Cambodian land and play along with the opposition
party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party, which blasted the CPP for
bowing to Vietnam’s influence.
With hypernationalism sweeping Vietnamese social media, Hanoi runs
the danger of alienating its “traditional friendship” with Phnom Penh if
its public diplomacy remains vague. When the two neighbors are at odds
over competing interests, the only way to reach mutual consensus is for
them to be sincere and committed in their behaviors.
But things are looking gloomy. Vietnamese citizenry are mostly unaware
that Cambodia is a “high priority” for Vietnamese foreign policymakers,
leading to confusion and even misconduct, particularly when bilateral
ties are strained. Moreover, while a Department of Vietnamese Studies
was established at the Royal University of Phnom Penh in 2022, a similar
Department of Cambodian Studies is yet to be established at any
Vietnamese university. What is more worrisome is the lack of essential
initiatives to educate young Vietnamese about cultural and historical ties
that shape the bilateral relationship.
This “Cambodia vacuum” in Vietnam’s discourse and academia needs
fixing since effective public diplomacy relies on educating the public
about the country’s foreign policy goals in a clear and concise manner.
Instead of simply leaning on the bland slogan “good neighbors,
traditional friendship, comprehensive, long-lasting, sustainable
cooperation,” Hanoi should mitigate unwarranted pique among the
populace through a well-thought-out strategy that prioritizes intimate ties
with Phnom Penh. This requires Vietnamese and Cambodian officials,
businesses, and citizens to engage in meaningful dialogues that
encompass language, culture, and academia, if they are to improve
mutual understanding and sympathy.
The views expressed here are of the authors and do not reflect the official
stance of their affiliated institutions.

The Authors
Huynh Tam Sang is a lecturer of the faculty of international relations and research fellow of the
Center for International Studies at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam
National University, Ho Chi Minh City.
Mai Vu Thao My is a research assistant at HCM-USSH and a core member of the university’s “IR
Young Scholars” (IRYS) research club.
ID 274433142 © Chaoss | [Link]

Details and a Lack Thereof: The

China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan
Railway
A recent agreement sketches out the framework for the
long-discussed railway to proceed, but many of the
financing details remain unclear.
By Catherine Putz

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov may have jumped the gun when he
announced in early May that construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-
Uzbekistan (CKU) railway would begin in October. But recent
developments do markedly advance the project. On June 6, in a virtual
ceremony hosted by China, Japarov, President Xi Jinping of China, and
President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan signed a trilateral
intergovernmental agreement on the CKU railway that, for the first, time
hints at a framework to realize the route.
But for all the fanfare, and despite the publicized details, much remains
uncertain about the financing and impact of the project.
The Details We Have
The announcement of the agreement was heavy on optimism and light
on details. Per a Chinese Foreign Ministry readout, the signing “will
provide a solid legal basis for the construction of the project, marking the
transition of the railway project from a vision to reality, and
demonstrating to the international community the firm determination of
the three countries to promote cooperation and seek development
together.” The CKU railway is positioned, in the Chinese readout, as “a
strategic project” and “a landmark project of Belt and Road cooperation.”
A few days later, the Kyrgyz parliament published the agreement and on
June 18, Azamat Sakiev, the head of Kyrgyz Railways, spent two hours
answering questions from lawmakers. While there’s no contesting the
agreement is concrete progress, there seems to be much yet in need of
settling before tracks can be laid.
The agreement, which the Kyrgyz parliament approved in three
simultaneous readings at once on June 19, contains 13 sections, which are
characterized as confirming the “intentions of cooperation and
determine measures to support” construction of the project. Importantly,
the document notes the railway will run on the “Kashgar-Torugart-
Makmal-Jalalabad-Andijan” route.
The route charts north from Kashgar and crosses from China’s Kizilsu
Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture in Xinjiang through the Torugart Pass,
which cuts through the Tian Shan mountains at 3,752 meters (12,310
feet). The railway will then head northwest to Makmal – home to what
was at one point in time the largest gold mine in the Soviet Union. From
there, the railway will cut southwest toward the Kyrgyz city of Jala-Abad
and then west toward Andijan in Uzbekistan. Much of this route is
extraordinarily remote; the Torugart Pass is one of only two border
crossings between Kyrgyzstan and China.
China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the
Kyrgyz and Uzbek transport ministries are responsible for coordinating
the agreement’s implementation. But the real work – in the areas of
commerce, technology, financing, engineering construction, operation,
and so on – falls to the three national railways.
While China is responsible for construction on Chinese territory and
Uzbekistan for modernization of its own railways, when it comes to
Kyrgyzstan – where the bulk of the work will take place – a Joint Project
Company will be established. China will hold a controlling 51 percent
stake in the company, and Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan 24.5 percent each.
Kyrgyzstan is specifically responsible for “the timely implementation of
work to assess social and environmental impact, protect cultural
monuments, ensure safety, as well as for work on land acquisition,
demolition of facilities, and resettlement of land plots required for this
project, at its own expense.”
Furthermore, Article 9 of the agreement obligates Kyrgyzstan to provide
support and “convenient conditions” in land for construction, building
materials, electricity and water supplies, as well as visa exemptions for
Chinese and Uzbek personnel. The Kyrgyz side also agreed to release
“construction machinery, equipment, mechanisms, vehicles, construction
and other materials necessary” from customs duties and tax payments.
The Chinese side also has dibs on the execution of engineer, procurement
and construction work – Krygyz and Uzbek entities may participate in
“partial subcontracting work.”
The agreement signed on June 6 has a term of five years, with an
automatic renewal unless one of the parties in forms the others of its
intent to exit.
The Details We Want
Importantly, the agreement signed contains no figures for the cost of
construction or expected revenues. It does not specify the scale or pace of
construction, either, or lay out how Kyrgyzstan will go about acquiring
the land and managing expected public protests on account of
environmental concerns.
In his testimony, Kyrgyz Railways head Sakiev provided additional
details, though journalists noted that some of the numbers don’t quite
add up. Sakiev said construction would cost $4.7 billion; other estimates,
such as from chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Akylbek Japarov have
been as high as $8 billion.
Sakiev said that the Chinese government had pledged a $2.35 billion low-
interest loan and Uzbek media reported that the remaining amount
would be financed by the three parties in accordance to their share –
floating $573 million as the bill for both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. But
Sakiev said that Kyrgyzstan would have to cover $700 million, and when
an MP mentioned that Kyrgyzstan would be on the hook for closer to $1
billion during the hearing Sakiev did not challenge it.
Kyrgyz officials have said that the country expects to earn up to $200
million annually from the transit of goods alone.
The agreement does not specifically lay out the financing plan, meaning it
remains one of the topics to be settled between the three governments.
Another point of opacity is exactly how many tunnels and bridges will
need to be constructed in Kyrgyzstan to realize the railway. Kyrgyzstan’s
official news agency Kabar reported that 81 bridges and 41 tunnels would
have to be built; another Kyrgyz new service, Tzarbek reported that the
project would need 95 bridges and 48 tunnels. A feasibility study was
completed last summer, but the results were not released publicly.
The Risks Ahead
The two major hurdles that the CKU railway has long faced are the
financing question discussed above and the geopolitical situation.
Ostensibly, the CKU railway would provide China a route that ultimately
connects to Europe without Russia’s involvement. As such, Russia has
long opposed the railway. But Russia’s clout has diminished since its full-
scale invasion of Ukraine; Moscow needs the support of Central Asian
states – and China – far more than they need Russia’s support. The project
also has yielded little critique from the West, as regional connectivity
remains a top agenda item for Europe and the United States in Central
Asia.
The risks ahead derive from these two challenges. When it comes to the
geopolitical situation, the future is unwritten. Kyrgyzstan is notoriously
unstable politically, with three revolutions in about 30 years. While it is
entirely plausible that any Kyrgyz government would support this
project, Sinophobia in Kyrgyzstan – particularly related to mining and
road projects, environmental concerns, the presence of Chinese workers,
and the exclusion of Kyrgyz companies – are all nationalistic flashpoints
in the making. The Japarov government recently flaunted that it had
nearly doubled revenue, but if the Kyrgyz people don’t start seeing the
effects of that influx, Bishkek could rumble.
The financing remains unclear, and the terms appear to prioritize China
and Chinese companies. The construction of so many bridges and
tunnels, in addition to being significant feats of engineering in of
themselves, are also ripe opportunities for inflation of costs, the cutting
of corners, and corruption.
In 2018, Bishkek’s main power plant broke down in the middle of a cold
snap, less than six months after a Chinese-managed modernization
project was completed. Although the breakdown caused a political
firestorm in Kyrgyzstan – including the jailing of two former prime
ministers – China’s role in the corruption related to the project was little
remarked upon by the Kyrgyz government. In February 2024, the plant
experienced a massive pre-dawn explosion.
While there is a huge difference between a power plant and a railway,
there is little difference in how corruption in the procurement processes
necessary for all infrastructure projects operates. Given the provisions of
the CKU railway agreement, and a 2022 Kyrgyz law that paved the way
for state-controlled companies – like Kyrgz Railways – to purchase goods
and services without a public tender process, the opportunities for
corruption are manifold.
In the case of the power plant, documents shared after the 2018
breakdown listed pliers being bought for more than $600. A top official at
the plant who had been fired immediately after the breakdown shared
the documents and commented to the media that when he and others
raised concerns about the high costs, he was told to stick to technical
details and leave the financing alone.
Given Kyrgyzstan’s autocratic turn since 2020, we can expect more of the
same attitude.

The Author
Catherine Putz is Managing Editor of The Diplomat.
Kyrgyz Presidential Administration

Keeping Kyrgyz Journalism Afloat

While the Island of Democracy
Sinks
“One way or another, our journalists will do what matters.”
By Aigerim Toleukhanova and Sher Khashimov

On the chilly morning of January 15, 2024, Mahinur Niyazova, then

editor-in-chief of one of Kyrgyzstan’s most popular independent media
outlets, [Link], was on her way to attend a parliament hearing about
proposed new media regulations when she received a call from her
editor Anton Lymar. The country’s notorious security services were at
[Link]’s Bishkek office with a search warrant.
“I immediately called our lawyers to come to the office. Then I called my
colleagues but no one picked up and I figured their phones have been
seized,” recalled Niyazova on a phone call from Berlin in early May. “I hid
my phone away before entering our office.”
What Niyazova saw upon arrival was a sight that has been growing all
too frequent in Kyrgyzstan, once considered an island of democracy in an
authoritarian Central Asia – seized laptops and phones, the media outlet’s
internal documents packed in boxes, and a team of hostile security
service agents sealing the premises. Niyazova, Lymar, and the owner of
[Link], Asel Otorbaeva, were taken in for questioning, presumably over an
article on the war in Ukraine that allegedly incited the citizens of
Kyrgyzstan to go fight against Russia. The journalists were released that
evening but were asked not to leave the country and were called in for
another round of questioning on January 17.
“They kept our office sealed for three months. We tried to work remotely.
And then on March 17 I learned on social media that [Link] [had] changed
hands,” said Niyazova.
Otorbaeva, whom Niyazova considered a friend, passed over control of
the news agency to Almasbek Turdumamatov, a former National Bank
bureaucrat and a press secretary to Kyrgyzstan’s former President
Kurmanbek Bakiyev.
“Looking back, I think the January events were a hostile takeover and
[Link] now is in the hands of someone closely affiliated with the
government,” Niyazova told The Diplomat.
Despite Otorbaeva denying this interpretation of the events, Niyazova
resigned from [Link] a few days later.
January 2024 proved to be the latest salvo in the ongoing fight against
press freedom in Kyrgyzstan. The day after the raid on the [Link] office,
the authorities arrested 11 current and former journalists from Temirov
Live, one of the country’s leading investigative outlets, which has
repeatedly uncovered gross corruption on the part of government
officials, on charges of inciting mass unrest. Although some of those
detained in January have been released to house arrest, four remain in
Detention Center 1 in the center of Bishkek as the group awaits trial; if
convicted, they face years in prison.
Since its independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has been the freest of Central
Asia’s former Soviet republics. Unlike its regional neighbors, the country
has had a string of genuinely democratic elections – as well as three
revolutions – and boasts a robust civil society. Kyrgyzstan shares some
commonalities with the media systems of other Central Asian countries:
the authorities’ informal circulation of guidance to the press; the inability
of independent media to receive services from the state and state-
controlled media infrastructures; denying “disloyal” media access to
advertising and information; the abuse of state monopolies and
subsidies; little market support for self-sustaining media organizations;
and government control over licensing, airwaves, and internet service
providers. But Kyrgyzstan has also stood out for its more vibrant and
innovative independent media space and a real hunger for investigative
reporting.
“I think we’ve always had a strong civil society that had kept the
government more responsive and accountable to its people, which in
turn has led to more press freedom in the country,” explained Bolot
Temirov, the founder of Temirov Live.
Temirov, who started as a journalist in 2006 almost by accident, joined
[Link] in 2018, one of several similar outlets across Central Asia
focused on fact-checking and countering mis- and disinformation in the
region. But because of how much misinformation traditionally comes
from government officials themselves, Temirov has witnessed the line
between mere fact-checking and investigating government officials
directly grow thinner over time. “2017-18 was the beginning of the
investigative journalism boom in Kyrgyzstan,” he said.
In 2018, a new foundation was created in the name of Ulanbek Egizbayev,
a Radio Azattyk journalist who died that year, the goal of which was to
support corruption investigations and annually award the best
investigative journalism. That period saw Kloop, one of Kyrgyzstan’s most
popular independent media outlets, join forces with the Organized Crime
and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and Radio Azattyk for a far-
reaching investigation into widespread corruption in Kyrgyzstan’s
customs service in December 2019.
Politklinika, an investigative media outlet launched in 2013 in the Kyrgyz
language, a rare occurrence when most media outlets aiming for
nationwide readership typically start with a Russian-language edition,
investigated corruption in the government tender system and personal
property declarations of the government officials.
In 2019, Radio Azattyk’s Ydyrys Isakov uncovered how Osh’s sports clubs
engaged in racketeering and intimidation at the request and under the
protection of local government officials.
Temirov launched his investigative YouTube channel, Temirov Live, in
2020 and helped [Link] further investigate the corruption of
Raimbek Matraimov, the former deputy head of Kyrgyzstan’s customs.
This flourishing of the investigative journalism scene pushed Kyrgyzstan,
which since 1991 has stayed ahead of its Central Asian neighbors on press
freedom, to 82nd place out of 180 in Reporters Without Borders’ 2020
global press freedom ranking, ahead of all former Soviet republics except
for the Baltic states, Georgia, and Armenia.
Then in October 2020 Sadyr Japarov, a former member of parliament and
a populist firebrand who was serving a prison sentence for kidnapping a
local official, was released by a crowd of supporters who were protesting
the results of an allegedly rigged parliamentary election and the
government’s management of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the ensuing
chaos, Japarov maneuvered himself first into the prime ministership and
then almost immediately into an acting presidency following the October
15 resignation of President Sooronbay Jeenbekov.
A few months later, in January 2021, Japarov won the presidential
election and secured himself in power. Since then, he appointed his close
ally, Kamychbek Tashiev, to run the country’s notorious security service –
the State Committee for National Security (GKNB or SCNS) – and crack
down on any threats to their power.
“The first attempts to pressure our journalists started in 2019 when we
published our investigation into Raimbek Matraimov,” said Anna
Kapushenko, Kloop’s editor-in-chief. “The real pressure started when
Japarov and Tashiev came to power. They started using the same tools as
the Russian government – derogatory public statements, judicial
harassment, troll factories.”
“I was beaten up by three strangers in January of 2020 and the
[Link] website underwent a DDoS attack a month before. But it has
gotten worse since [Japarov] has come to power,” agreed Temirov.
Dilbar Alimova, the editor-in-chief of Politklinika, also recounted
someone breaking into their office and stealing work laptops and hard
drives in the spring of 2020.
Since Japarov pushed himself to the top in October 2020, independent
journalists in Kyrgyzstan have experienced a significant rise in online
harassment and troll activity, both from temporary fake accounts and
those permanently affiliated with certain politicians as protection against
targeted criticism. Kloop published several investigations into troll
factories and their ties to government officials. Under Temirov,
[Link] also investigated the rise of online harassment of journalists
and other dissident voices in the country. “[These trolls] say that I ‘sold
out to the West,’ that I am the ‘enemy of the Kyrgyz people,’” Temirov told
the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) at the time.
“It took [Japarov and Tashiev] just six months to ramp up the pressure on
journalists,” confirmed Niyazova, formerly with [Link]. In Kyrgyzstan,
with its weak economy and high poverty rate, independent media outlets
usually can’t rely on subscription revenue from their readers and have to
depend on ad revenue and grants. With Japarov’s rise to power, the
country’s government has started putting pressure on businesses and
state corporations not to buy ads in media outlets seen as hostile to the
government narrative.
“Because of Japarov, the Manas Airport, Megacom, the Kumtor
corporation all have stopped buying ads in [Link]. Living off of ad revenue
became impossible and we had to reorient ourselves towards grant
funding from foreign donors,” said Niyazova.
In the summer of 2021, Japarov made his first legislative moves aimed at
curtailing critical voices. That July, he signed a law that requires NGOs to
file onerous financial reports to remain in good standing with tax
authorities. The law was introduced amid growing anti-Western
sentiment among politicians and religious groups, who increasingly
accused independent journalists and human rights activists of spreading
“Western ideology” and “LGBT propaganda.” Civil society leaders saw the
new controls as a response to media investigations into high-level
corruption and rightfully feared these controls would be used to cripple
the work of independent activists.
A month later, Japarov signed into law the controversial “false
information” bill in violation of parliamentary procedure. The bill gave
the government more power to take down online information it deems
false and forced owners of websites and social media accounts to disclose
their personal data and e-mail addresses. The intended use of the law
became clear in October 2022, when the government blocked Radio
Azattyk’s website because of a news story about the border conflict with
Tajikistan, which government officials deemed “against the national
interests of Kyrgyzstan.”
State financial police soon ordered a block on Radio Azattyk’s bank
accounts under the article of the criminal code on countering terrorism
and money laundering. The state-owned television and radio channels
also suspended the broadcasting of Radio Azattyk’s programs, and seven
of its reporters were stripped of their parliamentary accreditation. In
January 2023, the government ordered the liquidation of Radio Azattyk, a
decision that was annulled by an appeals court in July 2023 after the
outlet agreed to remove the materials targeted by prosecutors.
“Radio Azattyk is the biggest independent media in the region; they were
supposed to be the main point of opposition against the government. If
even they with their vast resources couldn’t fight off the authorities, who
can?” lamented Kloop’s Kapushenko. “The Radio Azattyk case broke the
journalists across the country emotionally.”
A handful of the journalists The Diplomat spoke to for this piece alleged
that Radio Azattyk was forced to settle with the government behind the
scenes in an attempt to stay in the country, a move that is expected to
weaken its future reporting; Radio Azattyk did not respond to a request
for comment.
For so long Central Asia’s standout country for independent journalism
and media innovation, Kyrgyzstan fell 50 places in Reporters Without
Borders’ 2021 global press freedom ranking.
“With all these new restrictions, the independent media is barely
breathing now. The false information law, for example, essentially targets
specifically the media,” said Nurbek Sydykov of the Media Policy
Institute, a longstanding NGO defending free expression and media
freedom in Kyrgyzstan. “The Constitution clearly prohibits any laws that
restrict press freedom and freedom of speech so we figured it couldn’t get
any worse because it would require amending the Constitution itself.”
But the attacks on press freedom have grown only more brazen ever
since.
“[Law enforcement] came for me on late Saturday evening in the hopes
that other journalists won’t learn quickly [about the arrest] and our
lawyers won’t show up on time,” Temirov recounted of the infamous
evening of January 22, 2022, when his outlet’s office in Bishkek was
sacked, his equipment and documents seized, and he was arrested on
false drug charges.
At the time, Temirov Live had just released an investigation uncovering
the Tashiev family’s apparent influence over the operations of a state-
controlled fuel refinery. Speaking to the press during the Temirov trial,
Japarov said there was no pressure on the media in Kyrgyzstan, only on
journalists who “try to evade responsibility for their crimes.”
The president further commented that such journalists conduct pseudo-
investigations, spread false information, discredit individuals, and
mislead the public, sending an unambiguous message about Temirov’s
fate. By the end of the year, he was convicted of using forged documents
to obtain a Kyrgyz passport – an absurd charge given that no one disputes
he was born in Soviet Kyrgyzstan and thus entitled to Kyrgyz citizenship.
But Temirov was stripped of his citizenship anyway and deported to
Russia. He can’t return to Kyrgyzstan for five years and today continues
his investigative work from an undisclosed location in Europe.
“Every two years in January something special happens either to me or to
my team,” he chuckled over a call with The Diplomat.
In August 2023, under the pretense of creating a safe information
environment for children, Japarov signed a law that gave his government
even more power to take down undesirable information. That same
summer, state prosecutors moved to shut down Kloop because Kloop
Media, its NGO publisher, was not properly registered as a media
organization. A court approved the shut-down in February.
In May 2023, Japarov introduced a draft law on mass media, arguing that
the current law, passed in 1992, was out of date. The bill suggested re-
registration of all media outlets in the country under ambiguous and
broad requirements with plenty of room for misinterpretation and
abuse. In its analysis, the Media Policy Institute concluded that one of the
goals of the proposed law is the liquidation of media outlets considered
undesirable by the authorities. This past March Japarov withdrew the bill
for further revisions; the seventh version of the bill is expected to be
reintroduced again.
“The [proposed media registration] requirements were very unclear,”
Niyazova, who is part of the working group advising the parliament on
the media law reform, explained. “For example, an outlet must list out its
geographic reach. But you can’t list the entire world and if someone reads
you in a country you didn’t list it could serve as grounds for liquidation.
Or the government wants each outlet to submit their detailed standard
operating procedures, thus interfering with editorial independence.”
Finally, on April 2, 2024, Japarov took arguably the most destructive shot
against the country’s dissenting voices by signing the foreign agents law,
heavily inspired by similar regulations in Russia. The law mandates that
NGOs receiving foreign funding be labeled “foreign representatives” and
be subject to costly reporting and auditing requirements.
Kyrgyzstan has some 29,000 NGOs. Although it’s unclear how many of
them are actually active, many have played a critical role in attracting
and distributing foreign aid. In fact, the government has effectively
outsourced considerable public service provision to NGOs. Many civil
society actors have started closing down in the wake of the law.
Furthermore, the law will also hurt the country’s independent media,
which – given the funding difficulties media around the world face and
the crippled advertisement market in Kyrgyzstan – have long relied on
foreign funding to keep reporting.
“I think the law allows government officials to dip their hands in foreign
funding and to have more tools to crush dissent. It also helps Japarov to
show his loyalty to Russia, an important consideration in the current
geopolitical environment,” explained Kapushenko.
When asked what she made of these developments under Japarov, she
said, “I think the [Link] sale and the recent arrests of journalists are part
of a long game aimed at shutting down anyone who can hurt the Japarov
regime. The opposition is divided, organized crime groups vying for
power have been diminished, big businesses have been raided, and civil
society is slowly bleeding out. These are all the players who could stand
up to the government. Now it is the media’s turn and the journalists’
arrests are meant to show how far this government is willing to go.”
“These recent arrests and illegal searches and the new laws are
negatively impacting the work of the media. There’s growing self-
censorship and the journalists are constantly living in fear now,”
lamented Sydykov of the Media Policy Institute.
But while some are not sure how to stay in journalism amid the
government’s growing hostility – Niyazova, for one, doesn’t want to quit
but can’t see herself working in Kyrgyzstan anymore – others are
resolved to continue their fight, too.
“If before we could brag about the strongest investigative journalism
tradition in the region, today it is growing weaker, [the government] is
trying to break us. But I don’t think they will succeed,” said Politklinika’s
Alimova. “Many journalists continue their work from abroad. One way or
another, our journalists will do what matters.”
“I won’t deny that it is scary. But today journalism is the only way to find
any sort of justice and fairness in Kyrgyzstan,” said Temirov, whose wife
is among the Temirov Live journalists in detention in Kyrgyzstan. His
outlet, together with Kloop and OCCRP, just published a damning
investigation into how state projects are handed to Japarov’s proxies
while the public spending system is growing more and more opaque.
“Until there are [no more] people like us who stand up to the system, who
refuse to give up and to break, there’s hope for a robust civil society and
for a responsive government. Without people like that there is no future.”
The Authors
Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a freelance journalist from Kyrgyzstan who has written about social
issues for The Guardian, Reuters, Al Jazeera, and other outlets.
Sher Khashimov is a Tajikistan-born freelance journalist who examines social issues, digital
politics, and press freedom in Central Asia.

Catherine Putz

Imams in Uzbekistan Asked to

Stay off Social Media
Uzbek imams and religious bloggers occupy an influential
space online in Uzbekistan.
By Niginakhon Saida
On May 27, imams working at mosques in Uzbekistan were reportedly
warned against going on social media platforms and engaging with any
content. The assistant chief imam of Tashkent city, Ergash Rustamov, sent
an audio message on Telegram to regional chief imams, instructing them
to monitor the social media activities of the imams under their purview.
“Our next task is not to go on social networks. We will strictly control it. It
also applies to those who are/have been on Hajj (pilgrimage)... Also, we
must not ‘like’ any topic on social networks,” read the message.
Uzbek imams and other religious bloggers occupy a relatively large space
on the internet, boasting millions of followers. Between 2017 and 2021,
imams in official roles launched 58 websites, 166 Telegram channels, 200
Facebook pages, and 21 YouTube channels carving out a significant
digital footprint. These numbers have grown since then. Apart from that,
sermons or discussions of religious teachers (ustoz, sheikh, domla, and
other locally titled religious figures) are video and audio recorded by
their students and followers to be posted on social media platforms.
Occasionally, however, their teachings cause debate among the public,
and those debates could have been the reason for the warning.
Most controversial social media incidents involving Uzbek imams are not
related to terrorism, extremism, or radicalism, as some might assume;
instead, they primarily focus on social, economic, and cultural matters. In
May 2023, for example, the chief imam of Toshlaq district in Fergana and
imam of a local mosque, Shukurullo Egamberdiev, known as “Shukurullo
domla,” was dismissed from his chief imam position. The dismissal
reportedly happened after a contentious discussion about labor migrants.
Another imam, Ishoqjon Begmatov, who worked at a mosque in
Tashkent, was removed from his position in August 2023. The Muslim
Board of Uzbekistan conducted a review of Begmatov's public statements
following a controversial remark regarding taxes and the cashback
system, in which customers can register receipts and receive a rebate of 1
percent of the purchase, which stirred public debate. In a video in which
he answered a question about the cashback system, Begmatov criticized
the mandatory nature of cashback regulations for merchants, expressing
the view that such requirements were a form of oppression for both
businesspeople and consumers.
Both imams acknowledged their errors and expressed regret,
presumably at the request of the Board.
RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, Radio Ozodlik, noted other cases over the last
couple of years where imams’ statements were met with public
discontent.
Sometimes it is due to a failure to communicate religious understanding
to a secular public. In 2017, for example, the chief imam of Mirzo Yusuf
mosque in Tashkent, Rakhmatullokh Sayfutdinov, criticized male
gynecologists, insinuating that male doctors examining the private parts
of women is not acceptable in Islam unless there is a dire need.
“Brothers, today one of the issues that we need to correct is to stop
sending our boys to study in obstetrics and gynecology. Let’s stop this
shame,” he said in a Friday sermon. This sparked a heated public debate.
Later, in an interview with Ozodlik, Sayfutdinov clarified his remarks,
explaining his words were misunderstood. “In this statement, I called for
girls to be taught gynecology and obstetrics. It was a call to create jobs for
women,” the imam reportedly said in a phone call.
This is not the first time the activities of imams have been restricted. In
April, Ozodlik reported that imams were asked to submit their travel
passports to the Board. Rustamov explained that passports were being
collected for registration purposes only.
“We are returning the passports after registering them. We are entering
the passport data into the database and returning them,” he said to
Ozodlik.
However, this explanation raised doubts, because the committee could
have more easily asked for passport details or copies. The timing of the
request, following the Crocus City Hall attack in Russia, further fueled
suspicion that the authorities wanted to make sure imams could not
leave the country at that time.
Whether or not the warning against social media use was sent to the
imams at the request of the Uzbek government remains unknown. If it
was, Tashkent is missing a critical point – there is far more value for the
country and for the government in imams making public appearances
and speaking freely on social media than costs, even with occasional
troubles over sensitive statements.
Uzbekistan’s religious figures, especially those who hold formal positions
at mosques or other institutions, mostly discuss socioeconomic issues on
their platforms. Very rarely do they talk about politics and they almost
never challenge the leadership. Occasionally they might criticize some
regulations, such as when female students were not allowed to wear
headscarves at universities or schools, but they seldom venture beyond
their scope, and their criticism targets universities or schools rather than
government institutions. Many imams, if not all of them, call on the
public to pursue peace and issue warnings against terrorism, extremism
and radicalism.
During the 2022 protests in the Republic of Karakalpakstan, popular
imams, including the mufti, were among the first to call on people to stay
home and speak against unrest. Similarly, they often explain to the youth,
many of whom are eager to go to protect Palestine or fight jihad in other
countries, why those are not options for Muslims in Uzbekistan. Religious
bloggers such as Abror Muhktor Aliy often criticize any suggestion of
joining Islamic military groups abroad.
Imams also constantly call for moderation. Last year, Grand Mufti of
Uzbekistan Nuriddin Kholiqnazarov yet again called people to follow
Islam moderately, explaining that the Hanafi school followed by a
majority of Muslims in Uzbekistan does not require women to cover their
faces or hands or wear full black outfits.
“[B]oth the companions of our Prophet (peace be upon Him) and the
ulema of our school in many of their instructions recommended that the
beard should be no longer than one kabza (the width of the palm) and
should be kept in order,” said the mufti in a speech that was later posted
to the Telegram channel of the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan.
Most importantly, imams remain one of the few influential groups that
constantly call on people to love the country and to respect the
government. There are over 37 million people in Uzbekistan and
approximately 90 percent of them identify as Muslim. While many are
cultural Muslims, who observe a secular lifestyle, there are equally as
many devout Muslims, who listen to imams and take their words to heart.
Imams play an important role in fostering patriotism, especially among
the youth in Uzbekistan. Limiting their public appearance to live sermons
at mosques only will not serve the country in the long run.

The Author
Niginakhon Saida is a scholar whose research interests focus on gender, Islam, and politics in
Central Asia.
Depositphotos

Could Iran Be a Gateway for

Central Asia?
Connecting with Iran may be tempting for Central Asian
countries like Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but increased
relations with Tehran may ultimately be counterproductive.
By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project may finally get

underway, with the Kyrgyz, Chinese, and Uzbek leaders signing a
trilateral intergovernmental agreement in early June. Shortly before that,
at the 8th annual Trans-Caspian Forum, organized by the Caspian Policy
Center on May 21, Kyrgyz Ambassador to the U.S. Bakyt Amanbaev added
that the project will connect with Pakistan to reach the Arabian Sea and
“holds special significance for all of us [because it will have] enormous
economic and social importance for the entire region.”
While Amanbaev mentioned Pakistan, Iran has been discussed as a
potential point for sea access as well. Kyrgyz officials visited Iran’s port of
Bander Abbas in 2021, prompting speculation that Bishkek wanted to
reach the ocean by linking to it. In 2023, Kyrgyz Railway Company Deputy
Director Dastan Usubakunov also noted, “We will get access to the
Persian Gulf and Pacific Ocean [via] Bandar Abbas Port.”
At a recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting, Iran’s
ambassador to Tajikistan said that Iran can be Central Asia’s gateway to
international markets. Ambassador Alireza Haghighian noted that given
its location, Iran can help Central Asia obtain access to the Persian Gulf
and, from there, to the broader world.
The statement is not new; Tehran has previously discussed increasing
transportation infrastructure connectivity with Central Asian countries.
For example, Tehran proposed linking to the China-Kyrgyzstan-
Uzbekistan railway in 2022 and addressed the possibility of a transit
corridor with Tashkent and Ashgabat in October 2023.
While Iran has generally close relations with Tajikistan, Tehran is also
keen to approach other Central Asian states, particularly Kyrgyzstan. In
2023, Iranian imports of non-oil products from Kyrgyzstan increased.
News reports have mentioned Bishkek’s interest in improving its
connections with Iran.
As I have previously discussed for The Diplomat, the CKU railway project
will bring Kyrgyzstan further into China’s orbit, with debt and growing
dependency on Beijing significant concerns. Given Kyrgyzstan’s already
damaged international image due to the repressive actions of Japarov’s
government, a Bishkek-Tehran partnership may entail negative
consequences for Kyrgyzstan.
Iran is likely also trying to promote connectivity projects to improve
relations with Uzbekistan, as “despite the solid groundwork for
integration, Uzbek-Iranian relations still have a distinct smell of
confrontation,” argued Dr. Vladimir Mesamed from Hebrew University.
In a February meeting between the two governments in Tashkent,
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri proclaimed that “the depth
of the long-standing relations between the two countries was formed in a
popular context, and for this reason, it cannot be broken.” Bilateral trade
reached around $500 million in 2023.
Central Asian governments should be wary of Iran’s offer to act as a
gateway for Central Asia. A self-evident reason is that Iran continues to
be regarded as a pariah state and malign actor by the United States,
Europe, and several other governments. The recent drone attacks against
Israel and the incidents involving the Iranian Navy seizing oil tankers
have further exacerbated tensions with Washington. Thus, the image of
Central Asian governments would be tarnished by increasing
connectivity with Iran.
This warning is particularly relevant for Kyrgyzstan, as U.S. Senator Bob
Menendez has already warned the Kyrgyz leadership about helping
Russia avoid sanctions, and Kyrgyz-based companies have been
sanctioned for their links with Russia. It is hypothetically possible that
the West could threaten Bishkek with sanctions if, besides links with
Moscow, they also increase ties with Tehran.
Tehran’s interest in linking to the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan corridor
must be put into the bigger geopolitical context. With a limited number of
regional allies (including Syria, another international pariah), Iran seeks
partners and allies elsewhere, such as Central Asia. The country achieved
a victory in 2023 when it became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). Membership in the SCO will facilitate the training of
Iranian military personnel with Central Asian armed forces in the future.
Gaining alliances in Central Asia would help Iran avoid international
isolation and legitimize itself globally.
Much has been written about Iran’s strategy toward Central Asia, with
some analysts arguing that as Russia is focused on Ukraine, “Iran is
moving to fill a gap left by Russia [and] the Russian invasion also is
forcing Central Asian states into an economic reckoning.” Certainly,
history and geography play a role, and Iran has cultural and historical
ties with Central Asia. Still, Tehran has limited offerings for Central Asia;
Tehran cannot match the Russian market vis-a-vis Central Asia dollar to
dollar.
The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project is not new; over the
years, there have been multiple false starts. Hence, it remains to be seen
if Japarov’s optimism that the project will soon get underway is well-
placed. Of the three countries involved in the project, Bishkek appears to
be the most eager to start it (during the Trans-Caspian Policy Forum, the
Kyrgyz ambassador was the only diplomat who mentioned the railway
project in his remarks). This situation is unsurprising as, given its
geographic location, Kyrgyzstan relies heavily on new transport corridors
to access the wider world.
However, the railway project will be expensive. It will rely heavily on
Chinese investment and Bishkek’s ability to procure financial assistance
from other sources, including, perhaps, international credit institutions.
Given the country’s economic situation and deteriorating international
image, obtaining international financial aid may be difficult.
As an already expensive and complex international railway corridor may
finally begin construction, Central Asian governments (particularly
Kyrgyzstan) should not forget the importance of geopolitics and the
current state of global disorder. Connecting with Iran may be tempting,
but increased relations with Tehran may ultimately be
counterproductive.

The Author
Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in
Washington, D.C. He is an analyst who monitors defense & security, geopolitical, and trade issues
across the Western Hemisphere, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia.

OSCE
How Central Asia Approaches
Repatriation and Reintegration
From Middle East War Zones
Central Asian nations have seized the initiative, emerging
as worldwide pioneers in tackling the challenge of
repatriating and reintegrating citizens who traveled to Iraq
and Syria.
By Alouddin Komilov

A June 2023 report by UNICEF estimated that around 40,000 members

from more than 80 nations journeyed to Syria and Iraq to support the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (IS) and other extremist
organizations between 2011 and 2016. While some may have joined
willingly, others, including relatives of foreign terrorist fighters, may
have been deceived or pressured into participation. Following the defeat
of the Islamic State in 2019, numerous men, women, and children remain
in camps and detention centers in northeastern Syria and Iraq, facing
complex challenges in terms of humanitarian aid, security, and human
rights.
To address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters to global peace
and security, the United Nations Security Council, through resolutions
2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017), urged member states to create and execute
specific and comprehensive plans for the prosecution, rehabilitation, and
reintegration of returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters and
their families in compliance with international law. This was further
emphasized in the Eighth Review of the U.N. Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy (UNGCTS) (A/RES/77/298), where the General Assembly
acknowledged the significance of enhancing international cooperation,
promoting information sharing, and establishing risk assessments and
counter-terrorism strategies that consider age and gender aspects.
Central Asian nations have seized the initiative to tackle this challenge,
emerging as worldwide pioneers in repatriating and reintegrating their
citizens. By March 2024, over 2,100 individuals had been repatriated to
the region through humanitarian missions orchestrated by Central Asian
countries. Notably, Kazakhstan welcomed back 754 of its people,
Kyrgyzstan 511, Tajikistan 334, and Uzbekistan 531.
Upon their return, repatriated individuals, primarily women and
children, have undergone a rehabilitation process followed by tailored
initiatives to support their peaceful reintegration into families and
communities. Each country has established its own program and
gathered expertise in this area, the sharing of which on a regional scale
would be beneficial for all stakeholders. Given the ongoing repatriation
efforts of Central Asian states, it is crucial to enhance coordination
among regional experts to simplify procedures, particularly in intricate
criminal cases.
In light of these circumstances, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev
proposed creating a Regional Expert Council comprising leading
specialists from Central Asian nations under the guidance of the U.N.
Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT). The primary objective of this
Regional Expert Council is to enhance regional and national initiatives
for the rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals returning from
conflict zones and formulate strategies to combat terrorism. This
proposal was put forth during the high-level international conference
"Regional Cooperation of the Countries of Central Asia within the
Framework of the Joint Action Plan for the Implementation of the U.N.
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy" held on March 3-4, 2022, in Tashkent.
To translate these initiatives into action, Tashkent convened the
inaugural meeting of the Regional Expert Council for Central Asia on the
rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees on May 15-16, 2024.
Uzbekistan was among the first nations to take proactive steps to
repatriate its citizens from conflict zones. It recognized the importance of
addressing the challenges faced by these individuals, mostly women and
children, upon their return. Through the five phases of Operation Mehr,
531 individuals, including 381 children, from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan
were successfully repatriated to Uzbekistan.
At the UNOCT's Third High-Level Conference of Heads of Counter-
Terrorism Agencies of Member States (HLC) in June 2023, two Uzbek
nationals, a mother and daughter returnee, repatriated from the Al-Hol
camp in northeastern Syria provided moving testimonies of their
experiences. The initiative, applauded by U.N. Secretary General Antonio
Guterres, served as a powerful sign of support for his call to member
states to expedite repatriation for those from conflict zones in Syria and
Iraq.
Upon repatriation, the Uzbek government ensured that these individuals
received comprehensive support to reintegrate into society successfully.
This encompassed access to educational, medical, and social programs
vital for their rehabilitation and integration. Moreover, the government
offered practical assistance to foster self-sufficiency and economic
stability. Some returnees received complimentary housing and low-
interest loans, crucial for securing their livelihoods. Others were
equipped to establish personal businesses, such as small bakeries and
sewing operations, further supporting their journey to rebuild their lives.
Social aid was also extended to facilitate a seamless return to their
communities.
The Inauguration of the Regional Expert Council
The inaugural meeting of the Regional Expert Council, supported by
UNOCT, represents a significant step forward in enforcing global and
regional anti-terrorism measures. The event was a direct outcome of the
U.N. resolution “Enhancing regional and international partnerships to
promote peace, security, and sustainable growth in the Central Asian
region,” which was approved in June 2018 after being proposed by
Tashkent. It also builds on discussions initiated during the high-level
symposium “Central Asia – a shared past and a collective future” held in
Samarkand in November 2017.
The gathering convened a diverse array of attendees, including deputy
foreign affairs ministers from Central Asia, high-ranking dignitaries
representing international bodies like the U.N., OSCE, and UNRCCA, and
specialists focused on the rehabilitation and reintegration of repatriates.
The main focus of the discussions revolved around Uzbekistan's updated
strategy for countering terrorism, highlighting the significance of
preventive, spiritual, and educational initiatives along with
administrative and legal measures. This strategy, as outlined in
Uzbekistan's National Strategy for Combating Extremism and Terrorism
for 2021-2026, adopts a comprehensive approach that includes social,
legal, and material support for victims of terrorism, including repatriates.
The occasion also held a regional workshop intending to exchange
insights and best practices in rehabilitation and reintegration among
various Central Asian nations. The workshop primarily concentrated on
fostering collaboration between national governments and civil society
organizations, rehabilitation and reintegration schemes with a focus on
specific genders and age groups, access to essential services, the role of
local communities and religious leaders, bolstering regional and national
initiatives, and establishing an informal regional network.
The meeting echoed the Joint Action Plan to Implement the U.N. Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia and strived to craft a holistic,
focused rehabilitation initiative and secure enduring civil society
engagement in the reintegration journey. By employing a collaborative
and multi-dimensional strategy, the gathering aimed to strengthen the
region's capability to tackle the intricate hurdles arising from the reentry
of individuals from conflict zones.
Through various resolutions and assessments, the United Nations has
stressed the need for comprehensive approaches involving the
prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration of these individuals in
compliance with international law. Central Asian nations, particularly
Uzbekistan, have stood out for their efforts in repatriating and
reintegrating their citizens, paying particular attention to women and
children, who constitute a notable portion of the returnees.
Uzbekistan's proactive stance has resulted in the development of tailored
rehabilitation schemes and substantial aid to support reintegration
efforts, including education, healthcare, and economic opportunities.
The inaugural gathering of the Regional Expert Council represented a
crucial stride in implementing global and regional counterterrorism
frameworks. It illustrates a comprehensive strategy that addresses the
immediate needs of returnees and integrates preventive measures
against extremism. By fostering a collaborative atmosphere, these
initiatives strengthen regional security, contribute to the global fight
against terrorism, and ensure the humane treatment and successful
reintegration of conflict-affected individuals. This all-encompassing
approach serves as a model for regional and international counter-
terrorism endeavors.

The Author
Alouddin Komilov is the chief research fellow at the Center for Progressive Reforms in
Uzbekistan.
Depositphotos

Australia’s Liberals Go Nuclear

With its proposal to develop nuclear power, the Liberal
Party has focused Australia’s collective mind more clearly
on its energy future. But the complications may prove far
too toxic.
By Grant Wyeth

Energy remains a central issue in Australian politics. The country is a

huge exporter of fossil fuels, but also has the requisite conditions to be a
major renewables power. Yet part of the problem of any energy transition
in Australia is that the regions that are economically reliant on the coal
industry in particular are not regions where renewable energy sources
are likely to be developed. The energy transition for these regions has the
potential to decimate their economic viability.
The opposition Liberal Party believes it has a solution to this dilemma,
but one that is deeply contentious and expensive. The party’s plan –
should it be elected in next year’s federal election – is to build seven
nuclear power stations on sites where coal-fired power stations are
forecasted to be decommissioned. The plan is to have two of these
nuclear power stations operational by 2035-2037.
The proposal is a bold new intervention in Australian politics, and one
that cuts across a number of spheres, not just domestic energy
consumption, but also its foreign policy. While the Liberal Party is
currently framing the proposal as one tied to Australia’s energy security,
and as a way to meet Australia’s emissions targets, the impetus for the
nuclear power plants is the AUKUS agreement for the U.S. and U.K. to
supply Australia with eight new nuclear-powered submarines.
One of the hurdles of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines is that
Australia doesn’t have the nuclear capabilities to service them. Australia
currently only has one small nuclear reactor, which is mostly used for
research purposes rather than power generation. Its establishment in
2007 provided Australia with some nuclear knowledge, but nowhere near
the scale required to operate its future fleet of nuclear-powered
submarines without the assistance of technicians from the U.S. and U.K.
Developing significant domestic nuclear capabilities would help
overcome this problem, although ramping up the number of technicians
required within the country within a decade remains a huge task.
While increasing Australia’s nuclear capabilities would assist in
maintaining sovereignty over its future nuclear-powered submarines, it
also comes with significant diplomatic problems. Due to their experience
as testing grounds for both U.S. and French nuclear weapons, Australia’s
neighbors in the Pacific are rightly deeply suspicious of all things nuclear.
Pacific Island capitals would view this proposal as substituting one threat
(fossil fuels) for another (nuclear power).
Although the development of nuclear power generation doesn’t
automatically lead to acquiring nuclear weapons, it would significantly
increase Australia’s capabilities to do so. In a more destabilized regional
environment in the Indo-Pacific, and with a less-reliable Washington, the
conditions make nuclear weapons not outside the realm of consideration
in Canberra.
However, prior to any regional diplomatic problems that may arise there
are also the domestic political concerns. Twenty-five years ago the federal
government implemented a ban on nuclear energy as part of the
country’s environmental laws. Additionally both New South Wales and
Queensland have bans on nuclear energy, which would be
constitutionally difficult for the federal government to overturn.
Attempting to create an overarching national framework for nuclear
energy could be challenged in the country’s High Court were the Liberals
able to get the proposal through both houses of Parliament.
Of course, all this relies on the Liberal Party – and its ally the National
Party – actually winning the next election. Several of the Liberal Party’s
traditional wealthy, highly educated urban seats that they lost at the last
federal election are unlikely to be convinced that nuclear energy should
be part of Australia’s future. These seats are now highly committed to
renewables as not only the best environmental form of energy
generation, but also the most cost effective. Without these seats, finding a
majority in the House of Representatives will be difficult for the party.
And neither of Australia’s major parties will be able to command a
majority in the Senate for the foreseeable future.
However, what the Liberal Party has done is focus Australia’s collective
mind more clearly on its energy future. If coal and gas will eventually be
phased out, but renewables cannot currently provide sufficient baseload
power, then a reliable alternative needs to be found. Nuclear power’s
emissions-free generation offers an energy prospect that can seem
compelling. But the complications it brings may prove far too toxic to
become a reality.

The Author
Grant Wyeth is a Melbourne-based political analyst specializing in Australia and the Pacific, India
and Canada.
Depositphotos

Re-Thinking New Zealand’s

Independent Foreign Policy
To evaluate whether Wellington’s shift toward tighter
defense cooperation is truly abandoning a long-held
tradition, first we must ask what an “independent foreign
policy” really means.
By Guy C. Charlton and Xiang Gao

In the eyes of many politicians and analysts Aotearoa New Zealand’s

“independent” foreign policy is being undermined. Critics argue that
closer security arrangements with Australia and NATO as well as the
possibility that New Zealand will join Pillar II of AUKUS would reverse
the country’s ability to chart a pragmatic self-determining approach in its
foreign policy.
Recently, former Prime Minster Helen Clark and former National Party
leader Don Brash put aside their historical animosity to argue that a
decision to join AUKUS would “abandon our independent foreign policy
in favor of unqualified support for America’s ‘China containment policy.’”
They accused New Zealand’s current government of deciding to “throw in
our lot with America’s attempt to slow China’s economic rise and keep it
tightly hemmed in by American forces.” Various members of the
opposition Labor Party have similarly argued against a New Zealand
presence in AUKUS, describing the pact as an attempt to “wedge” China
and a trade threat.
For these commentators, such actions are a regrettable (and dangerous)
ideological reflex by the current conservative National government to
return New Zealand to its traditional stifling security relationships,
whose policies are singularly premised on the containment of Chinese
power in the Pacific. As Clark noted during her April 2024 visit to
Wellington, under an “independent foreign policy” it is the government’s
job to navigate relationships with both China and the United States, “and
not act in ways which support polarization and support a view that one
side is driving tensions.” The policies, baggage, and implications of
increased defense cooperation are seen as ill-suited to New Zealand’s
present economic and security situation as a small Pacific state.
Given the politics and rhetoric revolving around Pillar II of AUKUS, along
with the current government’s seeming inability to adequately articulate
its position, it is unlikely that there would be a clear-eyed analysis of
deeper security cooperation. Instead the question of whether such re-
alignment is desirable or not often descends into a peroration on the
“tradition” of lining-up with historical allies or ethical superiority of New
Zealand’s non-discriminatory trade policy, its anti-nuclear policy, and the
South Pacific focus that has been the grundnorms of an “independent”
foreign policy since the David Lange government in the 1980s.
Nevertheless, what exactly is New Zealand’s “independent” foreign policy
and how do the elements of the policy fit the international context?
New Zealand’s initial forays into international affairs started with the
signing the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 under the auspices of the British
Empire. It was a founding member of the League of Nations. Under the
League, New Zealand was assigned a mandate for the former German
colony of (western) Samoa, which it ruled until Samoan independence in
1962. At this time, New Zealand’s foreign policy hewed closely to the
British Empire, and then the United States after World War II. Its Western
orientation was evident in its involvement in the Malayan Emergency,
the Vietnam War and the Five-Power multilateral Defense Agreements
(Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom),
the ANZUS pact and GATT.
However, the pro-Western orientation was tempered by a strong
commitment to the United Nations, collective security, and liberal
internationalism, which policymakers felt was protective of smaller
states and trade. Prime Minister Peter Fraser, one of the few world
leaders who participated in the 1945 San Francisco Conference that
established the United Nations, argued passionately against the
Permanent Member veto in the U.N. Security Council.
Over the course of the 1960s, changes in domestic attitudes toward race
and immigration, Maori activism, recognition of the New
Zealand/Aotearoa exceptionalism under the Treaty of Waitangi, as well as
the growing disillusionment with the U.S.-led Vietnam War gave rise to
new normative and policy perspectives. These rejected bipolar Cold War
mentalities that underpinned much of post-World War II Western
security policy. Changing security perceptions were paralleled by
economic challenges that resulted from the British accession to the
European Economic Community with its consequent loss of markets for
New Zealand agricultural products and the increased non-viability of
New Zealand’s post-war controlled economy.
The Lange government’s decision to embrace neoliberal economic
policies and a non-ambiguous nuclear-free policy established an
additional basis for policy innovation. The non-nuclear policy, which was
entrenched by U.S. bullying, the continued French nuclear testing at the
Moruroa Atoll, and the bombing of the Greenpeace ship the Rainbow
Warrior in Auckland, led to the dissolution of ANZUS.
At the same time, New Zealand gained an awareness of the wider range
of security, economic, and environmental challenges. As a small trading
nation, policymakers sought to expand trading opportunities and a rules-
based international trading and investment regime. New Zealand has
worked hard to lower trade and investment barriers with China as an
important aspect of deepening its economic relations with Asia generally.
It was the first country to agree to China becoming a member of the WTO,
it was the first state to recognize that China has a market economy (the
United States and most European states have not); and it was the first
developed country to enter into a comprehensive free trade agreement
(FTA) with China. New Zealand supported the deepening and expansion
of the World Trade Organization and sought to create a Pacific-wide
trading regime through the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
The independent foreign policy has several elements. First, as a small
power New Zealand supports and works within international
organizations such as the WTO and the United Nations. While there is a
ready recognition that there are many states which fail to uphold the
international rules-based economic and security order, the continued
commitment to a rules-based order is considered crucial to prosperity
and security.
Related to this is the idea that New Zealand, as a liberal free-trading
nation, is committed to the fundamental importance of transparent,
open, and non-discriminatory trade and investment relationships. Put
another way, New Zealand will not condition trade and investment
relationships based on normative or geostrategic considerations unless
such considerations are adopted by the international community. These
policies are reflected in New Zealand FTAs.
Second, New Zealand rejects the presence and use of any type of nuclear
power or nuclear weapons. The nuclear-free commitment underscores
the clear threat that nuclear power and weapons pose for humanity as
well as demonstrates the efficacy of normative considerations for non-
proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and the re-imaging of security
arrangements, especially in the Asia-Pacific.
Third, New Zealand continues to foster a close economic and security
relationship with Australia, but will participate with other states such as
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States in military and
intelligence activities, such as the Five Eyes Intelligence Agreement.
And fourth, New Zealand perceives itself as an engaged honest player
among the Pacific Island states, and has sought to assist these states as
they address climate change, environmental degradation, less than
adequate governance and consequences of great power confrontation.
The policy successes – including the rise of the global nuclear-free
movement, the Rarotonga Treaty, the integration of the Chinese economy
into the global economy, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and the enhancement of
Indigenous and human rights – are significant. For many people the ideas
have become part of the New Zealand/Aotearoa national identity. Yet the
need to re-evaluate security relationships with Australia and other
Western states signifies an appropriate response to changes in the
international environment. Liberal internationalism and democracy are
clearly under threat. It is important that New Zealand support and join
those states who continue to support liberal internationalism and a rules-
based order.
Trade and investment have become more politicized and the notion of
“value-neutral” non-discriminatory trade and investment is more
difficult to carry on in practice. As such, the issue of trade and investment
asymmetries and dependencies has again become an important foreign
and economic policy consideration.
Moreover, it appears that China is seeking to remake the international
order and the balance of power in its Asia-Pacific neighborhood. Since
the ascension of President Xi Jinping, China has re-emphasized
authoritarian rule and embraced a more insurgent nationalism. At the
rhetorical and normative level, the Chinese government has rejected the
validity and efficacy of liberal values, human rights, and Western models
of internationalism. This rejection is underscored by Beijing’s attempts to
influence electoral politics across the region, its support for the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, and its increased willingness to use force and/or the
threats of force in Taiwan and the South China Sea. New Zealand cannot
avoid the changing international context by focusing only on its trade
and investment relationships in the Pacific.
It can be argued that regional polarization is the product of both U.S. and
Chinese misperceptions and does not concern New Zealand. Moreover, a
move toward a closer relationship with Australia and the United States
along with joining Pillar II of AUKUS not only misidentifies the threat to
New Zealand’s national interest (China) but also increases polarization
and the risk of conflict and threatens trade with China. Yet such a policy
position is not advanced by clinging to the moniker “independent” or by
embracing the idea that closer security relationships will undermine the
self-determining nature of New Zealand or make it less democratic.
As discussed above, New Zealand has always pursued a Western-
oriented, liberal-based foreign policy. Its foreign policy has always been
couched within the liberal-based order, security relationships with
Western states, and appreciation of the position of small trading states
within that order. It was forged with dissatisfaction with ideology,
nuclear-proliferation, and the inability of Western states (particularly the
United States) to see the real problems and issues in the Pacific and the
developing world but was never in opposition to the liberal international
order or Western security cooperation in itself.
The international context and New Zealand’s normative and material
objectives today, and in the future, are what policymakers need to
consider when considering Pillar II of AUKUS. In any event, the emphatic
commitment to those foreign policy elements discussed above, without
which New Zealand would not have an “independent” foreign policy,
substitutes tropes and discourse for real policy and reflects an ideological
predisposition instead of clear analysis.
New Zealand foreign policy has always been a laboratory for small states
to have an impact on global affairs. It has included realpolitik
considerations as well as other material and normative elements that
have often been hard to reconcile. It also includes a specific commitment
to small state independence and liberal values (both in security and
economic relationships), which neither preclude additional security
commitments nor mandate a policy premised on avoiding polarizing
competition. Rather the issue is whether the international environment
requires a deeper re-alignment of foreign policy objectives and
[Link] analysis has been undertaken by both Finland and
Sweden when they chose to join NATO, despite their deep historical
commitment to neutrality and foreign policy “independence.” Such an
analysis is not facilitated by a misplaced commitment to an idealized
notion of an “independent” foreign policy that has been present in New
Zealand policy discourse.

The Authors
Dr. Guy C. Charlton is an associate professor of Law at the University of New England, Australia.
Dr. Xiang Gao is head of the Political Studies Discipline at the University of New England,
Australia.
Facebook, Richard Marles MP

Solomon Islands’ New

Government: A Chance to Reset
Australia’s Pacific Diplomacy
The island nation is far from alone in adopting a “look
north” policy. It’s time for Canberra to take a long, hard
look at why.
By Corey Lee Bell

The meeting between Solomon Islands’ new Prime Minister Jeremiah

Manale and Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles in Honiara
on May 21 suggested that the change in leadership in the island nation
may have given the two governments an opportunity to reset their
relationship.
Bilateral ties suffered during the tenure of Manale’s predecessor,
Manasseh Sogavare, a regular critic of Australia whose decision in early
2022 to enter a comprehensive security deal with China raised anxieties
in Canberra.
Manale, who co-signed the security pact in his capacity as Sogovare’s
foreign minister, is known to share the pro-Beijing-bent of his
predecessor. However, the newly elected leader, who previously worked
with Australian officials engaged in the Regional Assistance Mission to
the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), is generally regarded by Australian insiders
and analysts as a less combative figure and someone that Canberra can
work with.
On this front, Marles' trip to Solomon Islands seemed to show that
Canberra’s ties with the new administration are off to a positive start,
with Manale affirming the “depth and strength” of the bilateral
relationship and telling Marles that “I want to see our relationship grow
to new heights during my tenure as prime minister.”
Moving forward, at the front and center of efforts to rebuild ties are
likely to be the areas of security cooperation, development aid, and
budgetary assistance – each of which were addressed during the visit.
The former in particular has been the focus of considerable attention
since the China-Solomon Islands security pact. Marles reinforced that the
decision to visit Honiara so soon after the election of the new prime
minister was prompted by Canberra’s commitment “to be the Solomons’
go-to security partner.”
But raising the bar on Australia’s aid efforts is likely to be no less pivotal
for putting ties on a firmer footing. During Marles’ visit Manale indicated
that he was especially keen to “fast-track” projects with partners that
would “help Solomon Islands move forward faster to achieve its
economic, social and security objectives.” He also indicated that “budget
support” will help “further cement our relations.”
On this front there can be no doubt as to the generosity of Australia’s
assistance packages to date – a fact that Manale acknowledged. Since the
withdrawal of RAMSI in 2017, Australia has provided over AU$800
million in aid in key areas including security, health, education,
agriculture, and governance.
Yet while this aid is having an impact, it has been less than stellar.
The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) report
for 2022-2023 ranked the performance of Australia’s development
program in the Solomon Islands as only “adequate” in effectiveness
across a majority of categories, including health and education. None
achieved a “very good” rating. 2023’s Final Investment Monitoring Report
for the Solomon Islands Governance Program delivered a “less than
adequate” rating.
Yet these modest ratings likely exceed what for some are visceral
appraisals of Australian aid programs’ performance. Australia is, of
course, not fully responsible for outcomes that are contingent on
governance and policy decisions in another sovereign nation. Yet the cold
reality is that despite decades of assistance to the tune of several billion
dollars, Solomon Islands remains one of the most poverty-stricken
nations in the most aid-reliant region on the planet. This is borne out not
only by anecdotal observations but also by statistics, with Solomon
Islands’ per capita GDP well below that of Papua New Guinea, less than
half of those of Tonga and Samoa, and a bit over a third of the GDPs of
Tuvalu and Fiji.
All this gave a leg up to Sogavare, who has long insisted that Australian
assistance has fueled dependency as opposed to moving the nation
toward economic self-determination. This judgment fed into his hallmark
“look north” campaign policy, which promoted reducing reliance on
Australian aid by expanding trade and investment links with China. His
party’s substantial seat losses in the last election, while no doubt the
result of a number of factors and not just foreign policy, means that the
broader popularity of this view is questionable. But it should trouble
Canberra, nonetheless, that this has now become a recurring theme in
the Melanesian sphere.
The “look north” policy is actually the namesake of a number of policies
taken up over the last few decades in Melanesia, the first being that
adopted by Papua New Guinea (PNG) in the early 1990s. This occurred as
PNG’s economy and relationship with Australia’s Paul Keating-led
government suffered concurrent crises. PNG’s leader at the time, Paias
Wingti, according to a DFAT official, appeared at the time to feel that
Australia was “holding PNG back economically” – perhaps an accusation
that Canberra was fueling aid dependency. He was also apparently
“happy to see Australian influence diluted, especially in the economy.”
In the next decade a “look north” policy was adopted by another
government whose relationship with Australia was in crisis: Fiji. This
occurred after the Australian government pushed a hard line in response
to a coup that toppled Fiji’s government in late 2006, including a
reduction in state aid and security cooperation. Yet, according to some
experts, underlying Fiji’s new policy was a broader aspiration for tapping
into global markets to expand the nation’s agency and economic
determination. This intersected with China’s push into the Pacific through
its Belt and Road Initiative, and was a precursor to Fiji entering tighter,
and prolonged, security cooperation with China.
Canberra would of course counter claims that it is intentionally holding
nations in the region back – or under its sway – through its aid regime.
Yet underlying this recurring perception problem among Melanesian
elites is that while individual programs have delivered untold benefits to
local communities, the big picture of Australia’s aid performance in the
Pacific is not flattering.
The reality is that the Melanesian sphere, which with a few exceptions
has been the primary focus of Australia’s Pacific aid, is generally poorer,
on a per capita basis, than its Polynesian and Micronesian peers – which
are more influenced by New Zealand and the United States, respectively,
with Fiji the only exception. Mountains of health aid also failed to
prevent a substantial widening of the gap between life expectancy in
Pacific Island countries and the global average. On top of this, several
nations that are recipients of Australian assistance in and just outside the
Melanesian sphere have some of the worst infant mortality rates outside
of Africa.
Each of these issues is of significant concern in its own right. Yet together
they may have also played a key role in past failures in an area that is of
primary concern to Canberra: regional stability. Infant mortality, GDP per
capita, and life expectancy have each been identified by researchers as
predictors of political instability.
In view of this, it is notable that when Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and
Solomon Islands separately adopted “look north” policies or penned
comprehensive security deals with China, it was in each case only several
years after major social and political disturbances. In PNG, “look north”
emerged during the ongoing Bougainville conflict and amid years of
growing instability and lawlessness following a painful economic
transition from an agrarian to a resources-based capitalist economy. In
Fiji’s case, it was adopted in the wake of the latest of a series of coups.
And in Solomon Islands, the security deal with China came after years of
internal strife, suppressed with some success thanks to the Australian-led
RAMSI, yet which reemerged after Honiara agreed to shift diplomatic
recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China.
Poor performance in relation to the economic and health-related
predictors of social instability also appear to correlate with Pacific Island
countries’ decisions to draw closer to Beijing. When the Solomon Islands
and Kiribati switched diplomatic allegiances from Taipei to Beijing in
2019, both of the Pacific Island nations languished near the bottom of the
region’s league table in terms of GDP per capita. Kiribati, alongside Papua
New Guinea, was also a poor performer in global comparisons in life
expectancy, and both nations, along with Timor-Leste, have the highest
infant mortality rates in the region. Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea
are also among the region’s poorest nations on a per capita basis.
Notably the latter two have also recently shifted in China’s direction on
security. Timor-Leste, which Singapore’s foreign minister last year said
was “virtually a failing state,” saw its Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao last
year agree to sign a joint China-Timor-Leste pact that upgraded the two
nations’ relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” and
enhanced military cooperation. Soon after, Timor-Leste’s President José
Ramos-Horta revealed that he had taken the initiative to ask Beijing’s
help to develop police and military infrastructure.
Earlier in May it was revealed that Australian diplomats scrambled to
head off a policing deal between China and Papua New Guinea, several
months after widespread riots broke out in PNG’s capital, Port Moresby.
To the extent that denying China a security foothold in the region is a
core aim of Australia’s regional aid diplomacy, these factors arguably
support a different take on what should be the priorities of Canberra’s
assistance programs. Instead of investing in aid to influence the foreign
policies of nations that in more recent times have patently placed a
premium on their own agency, Australian aid should perhaps foremost
target the causes of instability that could lead Pacific Island countries to
barter their sovereignty for security. Put another way, Australia should
seek to study and identify factors like those mentioned above that tend to
make Pacific Islands unstable, and devise an outcome-focused approach
that prioritizes improvements in those areas.
There are practical reasons for doing so. The first is that while Canberra
exacts some diplomatic capital through “outbidding” China on the aid
front, this is not a winning strategy for the long term. Unless Australia
can enlist investment in the region from more powerful allies, most of
which have less strategic skin in the game, economic asymmetries mean
that Canberra has little chance of out-competing Beijing’s aid diplomacy
should the latter pull out all stops to increase its influence.
And while Canberra also currently wins out in experience and
capabilities on the aid front, Beijing has been exploring ways to up its
game, especially in the area of health diplomacy, where it is encouraging
research and building up smaller programs, such as earlier engagements
between Solomon Islands health officials and the Guizhou Medical
University. Again, asymmetries of resources and personnel make the long
term prospects of Australia out competing China on this front a risky bet.

Second, while adaptability and responsiveness are always essential

virtues in development assistance planning, devising aid programs
around a sharper organizing concept could make programs more
focused, coherent, and directed at tangible, outcome-based metrics.
But last and most important, by focusing on strengthening the stability
and by extension the agency of Pacific Island nations, such a strategy is
likely to bring Australia and Pacific Island leaders’ aims and interests into
better alignment. That, in turn, will pave the way for less skepticism and
closer engagement to achieve outcomes that serve both Pacific Island
nations’ and Canberra’s collective security interests. Building trust in this
way may also bolster Australia’s aspirations to remain the region’s
“security partner of choice.”
Such an approach may encounter resistance in Canberra, which is still
committed, through its Stronger Pacific Family policy, to “winning” in its
“strategic competition” with Beijing in the region. Yet there are few signs
that this is an agenda that Pacific Island countries are enthusiastically
behind. Better targeting aid to help Pacific Island nations feel more
secure about their future, by investing in mitigating potential causes of
crises and not just bolstering capacities to respond to them, could better
position these countries to resist intrusive security deals that could
compromise their sovereignty and threaten Australia’s security interests.
Doing so means investing trust in the premium Pacific Island countries
place, in the absence of existential security concerns, on retaining the
“friends to all” policy they see as being pivotal to maximizing their
agency. If the history of “look north” policies are anything to go by, it is at
least better to be seen as a facilitator of agency than a perceived
impediment to it.

The Author
Dr. Corey Lee Bell is a researcher at the University of Technology Sydney’s Australia-China
Relations Institute.
Depositphotos

Despite the Diplomatic Thaw,

Australians Still Deeply Mistrust
China
While political relations have improved, Australian public
opinion on China remains generally negative.
By Elena Collinson

Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Australia from June 15-18 highlighted

the continuing efforts by both Beijing and Canberra to maintain a
working relationship. But while political tensions have thawed since the
trough in relations between 2016 and early 2022, Australian public
opinion on China remains generally negative.
The results of the newly-released UTS:ACRI/BIDA Poll 2024 by the
Australia-China Relations Institute and the Centre for Business
Intelligence & Data Analytics at the University of Technology Sydney
reveal just how deep Australians’ mistrust of China continues to be.
Now in its fourth year, the poll surveyed 2,015 Australian adults across all
states and territories on their views on various aspects of the Australia-
China relationship, including overall views on the bilateral relationship,
political communication, security, the triangular Australia-U.S.-China
relationship, trade and investment, society, university and research,
relations with Southeast Asian nations and Pacific Island nations, and
global and regional cooperation.
Seventy-one percent of Australians say that China is a security threat to
Australia. This is not surprising: Australia’s recent experience with
China’s campaign of economic coercion and “wolf warrior” diplomacy
can hardly be expected to be forgotten, even as Beijing’s punitive tariffs
on Australian exports are gradually released and dialogue has resumed
at the leadership level.
A growing number of Australians believe that either the United States or
China will force the country to choose between close relations with
Washington or Beijing, but they are relatively evenly split on which of the
great powers will force the issue, with 52 percent stating that such a
choice will be forced by China and 47 percent nominating the U.S.
Another Trump presidency is deemed likely to render that dilemma more
acute, with just over two-thirds of Australians (67 percent) saying that the
Australian government’s balancing of its relationships with China and the
U.S. will be made more difficult if Donald Trump returns to the White
House early next year.
That half of those polled believe a conflict with China is a “serious
possibility” in the next three years serves as testament to how deeply
rooted the national anxiety about China is.
Such a sentiment is unlikely to dissipate as countries like Australia, and
others, continue to wrestle with the nature of China’s military power and
its strategic intentions. There is a perception, though, that China’s
regional influence is slipping. Fifty-five percent of Australians say that
China has more influence than the United States in Australia’s regional
neighborhood, which, while still relatively high, reflects a steady
decrease in agreement with this view over the last four years, down from
a high of 65 percent in 2021.
Although one-third of Australians (33 percent) believe the bilateral
relationship may improve somewhat over coming years, more generally
Australians continue to adopt a guarded stance toward relations with
Beijing. They are still content to reap the benefits of the economic
relationship and cultivate business ties – though even faith in these
dimensions is diminishing. Nearly three-quarters of those polled see
Australia as too economically reliant on China and the nexus between the
relationship and underlying Australian economic prosperity shows mild
signs of strain. This year, 54 percent of Australians said that without close
economic engagement with China, Australia would not be as prosperous
as it currently is, down nine points from a high of 63 percent in 2021.
Australians are also unsupportive of the Australian government’s
decision to allow Chinese-owned company Landbridge’s lease of the Port
of Darwin to continue. Only 26 percent of Australians said that the
Australian government was right not to cancel or vary the 99-year lease,
and just over six in 10 Australians (62 percent) said the Australian
government should force Landbridge to sell the port back to the
government.
Overall, Australians remain strongly wary of and concerned by Chinese
leader Xi Jinping’s more assertive foreign policy, particularly in the areas
of foreign interference, espionage, and the use of social media and
communications platforms such as TikTok and WeChat. About two-thirds
of Australians identified espionage and foreign interference by China as a
major problem, and six in 10 Australians (59 percent) support a
nationwide ban on TikTok and WeChat. A majority (68 percent) continue
to want sanctions on Chinese officials and entities involved in human
rights violations.
Half of those polled support higher defense spending, even if that means
budget cuts in other portfolios. Support for AUKUS – the alliance linking
Australia, the U.S., and the United Kingdom – is inching up even as the
Australia-China relationship is viewed as a net positive for regional
stability and as support for a containment strategy slips.
And the number of those who believe Canberra should remain neutral in
any military contingency over Taiwan in which the U.S. is militarily
engaged fell to 43 percent, down six points from 49 percent last year.
Washington policymakers will be keenly watching that number now and
into the future.
The poll does not necessarily award high marks to the governing Labor
Party for its policy of “stabilization” of relations with China, though it
does register relatively strong support for the two countries discussing
their differences via traditional diplomacy, not by picking up the
megaphone.
The gap that opened up in 2023 between support for the Australian Labor
Party and support for the Liberal/National coalition as the best placed to
handle Australia’s China policy seems to be closing this year. Forty
percent of Australians nominated the Australian Labor Party as the
political party best placed to handle Australia’s China policy, down from
49 percent in 2023. Thirty-four percent said the Liberal/National coalition
is best placed to handle Australia’s China policy, up from 29 percent last
year. This perhaps indicates that the public wants a stronger government
response, at least in some instances.
The public may well be registering that when it comes to the Albanese
government’s formula for the relationship – “cooperate where we can,
disagree where we must” – it is hearing much more the former than the
latter from its political leaders.

The Author
Elena Collinson is a senior researcher at the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University
of Technology Sydney.

Associated Press, Alex Brandon

Asian Values in the Moral Debate
for AI Governance
As the G-7 seeks to set global standards, including on tech
issues, it should be mindful of the diversity of the moral
compass in the Indo-Pacific.
By Shihoko Goto

Should AI answer to a higher, moral authority?

With the first papal presence at a G-7 summit meeting this year, the
debate about man vs machine has only intensified. During the summit in
Italy in June, Pope Francis warned that uncontrolled development and
reliance on artificial intelligence would be destructive to civilization
itself.
“We would condemn humanity to a future without hope if we took away
people’s ability to make decisions about themselves and their lives, by
dooming them to depend on the choices of machines,” he stated before
the leaders of the world’s richest nations. “We need to ensure and
safeguard a space for proper human control over the choices made by
artificial intelligence programs: Human dignity itself depends on it.”
In light of Pope Francis’ high-profile participation, it’s worth noting that
Japan remains not only the sole non-Western country of the G-7, but also
the only nation in the group that does not have a cultural foundation
based on Christianity, let alone Catholicism. To be sure, the six other
member countries are also secular democracies that espouse the freedom
of religious belief. Yet in the United States, Canada, France, Britain,
Germany, and Italy, Christmas remains a national holiday, and Judeo-
Christian values continue to provide the guiding principles of their
justice systems and the ethics that bind their societies together.
In the Indo-Pacific, including in Japan, however, December 25 is just
another day on the calendar, and Christianity remains a minority
religion, even though it has played a not insignificant part in shaping the
norms of societies across the region. For instance, an outsized number of
educational institutions, especially in secondary and tertiary levels for
women, continue to be influenced by the legacy of missionaries in the
field. Still, when it comes to social values, it is Confucianist principles that
resonate more strongly and bind those in East Asia. Indeed, a more
authoritative religious figure to offer moral clarity for the subregion
could potentially be the Dalai Lama, rather than the Pope.
But the Indo-Pacific is diverse not only in its stages of economic
development, but in its religious beliefs and indeed values. So as the G-7
seeks to enhance its legitimacy and influence as a gathering of countries
focused on cross-border issues, it should be mindful of the diversity of
the moral compass as it reaches out to the Global South.
In South and Southeast Asia, Christianity is a minority religion and
looked to with trepidation, if not outright hostility. Concern from Muslim
majority countries, including Indonesia, over the past year has been
particularly striking as religious favoritism by Western powers show no
signs of waning.
It is therefore imperative to acknowledge the differences in values that
stem from divergent religions and ideologies, even when advancing rules
for technology governance. At the latest summit meeting in Borgo
Egnazia, countries including Algeria, Kenya, and Mauritania were invited
to join the world’s richest nations. To be sure, the United States remains
at the forefront of developing AI and U.S.-based companies including
Open AI as well as Google and Meta are the driving force of shaping
advanced technology. Still, as global competition for AI development
intensifies on the one hand, and use of the technology expands
worldwide, the values that underpin what humanity ultimately wants
from advanced technology are not universal.
Just as there is an ever-increasing overlap between national security
concerns and economic interests, questions regarding morality and the
human spirit are becoming increasingly intertwined with the governance
of AI. Developing technologies that ultimately have a goal of enhancing
efficiencies are not a natural partner to philosophical and indeed
religious debate. But as the advancement of AI leads to more concerns
about what is right and wrong, there is a growing need to acknowledge
and include the divergent ideologies that provide the ethical foundations
governing societies.
By addressing the moral quandary posed by AI, Pope Francis has brought
the moral challenges that are posed by advanced technology. The ethics
of AI and what humanity expects from technology will be a growing
challenge for the world, and the voices to bring those moral qualms to
the forefront should not be limited to a single religious figure or indeed a
religious group.
The Author
Shihoko Goto is director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the Wilson Center.

Depositphotos

Asia on Edge: What MAGA Think

Tanks Reveal About a Trump 2.0
Presidency
It seems unlikely Trump 2.0 would upend security
structures in the region. In trade and commerce, however,
Trump’s potential return has Asian officials and observers
hugely worried.
By Aneek Das and Felix Heiduk
The United States is in the middle of campaign season for an election
whose outcome could very well significantly alter Washington’s
diplomatic, security, and economic orientation vis-à-vis Asia. The specter
of a second presidency for Donald Trump, especially, has U.S. allies and
“like-minded” partners in Asia worried. His “America First” approach is
well-established, and media reports have warned that a second
administration might well be one of “Trump unhinged.”
Ideas and policy proposals circulated by think tanks in the United States
that are aligned with Trump and his “Make America Great Again”
(MAGA) slogan can give us a preview into a second Trump term. Drawing
on such materials, we argue that it is a potential escalation of a trade war
with China, rather than military brinkmanship, that will most likely have
the biggest impact not only on China-U.S. relations but on the entire
region.
Defense and Security
In the field of security and defense, Trump’s potential return to the White
House would most certainly pose a challenge for U.S. allies and “like-
minded” partners, which in the past have relied on the U.S. for balancing
or hedging against a growing Chinese assertiveness in the region.
First, a reinvigoration of Trump’s “America First” doctrine, coupled with
a transactional view on alliances and partnerships, could prompt at least
a gradual scaling back of U.S. military presence in cases where U.S. allies
or partners are deemed to “free ride” on U.S. security guarantees. Trump
is expected to pressure Japan and South Korea to increase their financial
contributions for the stationing of U.S. troops, particularly targeting
South Korea, which he has accused of enjoying a “free ride.”
Trump himself, in a recent interview, considered the complete
withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. He has said as much and
also halted joint military exercises with South Korea in the past. A similar,
perhaps more assertive, stance might be adopted again if he returns to
power. At least partially in response to this (as well as to a general rise in
regional tensions) Tokyo and Seoul have begun to raise their defense
spending substantively.
However, NATO allies in Europe, rather than U.S. allies in Asia, will most
likely bear the brunt of a Trump 2.0 security and defense policy. Trump
believes that European allies in particular have made the U.S. carry most
of the costs for Europe’s defense over the past decades.
While Trump has refused to answer whether the United States will come
to Taiwan’s aid in case of an invasion launched by Beijing, MAGA-aligned
think tank experts propose that Taiwan should continue to receive
considerable diplomatic and military support from Washington to deter
China. Taiwan will also almost certainly remain a major regional
geopolitical flashpoint as well as a bone of contention in China-U.S.
relations for years to come. Likewise, Trump’s stance on the South China
Sea and commitment to the alliance with the Philippines is expected to
remain firm.
The possibility of re-engaging with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un
through summits remains uncertain due to the failure of the previous
Hanoi summit. Instead, it is suggested that under a second Trump
administration, Washington needs to openly challenge the evolving North
Korea-Russia-China partnership.
Trump will also very likely maintain the general adversarial stance vis-à-
vis China that shaped his first term in office as well as that of the current
U.S. administration under Biden. After all, the overall strategic aim of
retaining Washington’s pre-eminent position in the region through the
pursuit of military primacy has broad bipartisan support in the United
States.
With regard to the U.S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, Trump’s
security policies are expected to align closely with Biden’s, particularly
regarding support for minilateral initiatives aimed at balancing or
deterring China such as AUKUS and the Quad. However, there might be
an increase in bilateral or regional military exercises among allies like
Japan and Australia, who are wary of Trump’s unpredictable decision-
making.
Enhanced security cooperation with India is also likely, given Trump’s
rapport with Prime Minister Narendra Modi – who just began his third
term in office – and India’s strategic role in countering China. This
includes suggestions to waive the Countering America’s Adversaries
Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions imposed on India over its
purchases of Russian arms to allow India greater access to the U.S.
defense industry market.
At the same time, however, it is unlikely that a Trump 2.0. administration
will be able (and willing) to alter the relative decline in U.S. military
power in Asia that the region has witnessed over the last decades. The
United States has only gradually increased its military presence in the
region since the end of the Cold War.
Trump might increase the number of U.S. missile interceptors and
nuclear-capable ballistic missiles deployed in the region to counter the
dual threats of Chinese aggression toward Taiwan and North Korea’s
nuclear capabilities. Trump might also implement, at least partially, his
idea to deploy more U.S. naval ships in the Indo-Pacific to counter China’s
growing military presence in the region. None of this, however, will alter
the relative decline of U.S. military power. Neither is it likely that Trump
would be able or willing to revise what the Lowy Institute’s Sam
Roggeveen called the “absolute decline in American resolve.”
Trade
While the changes in U.S. foreign policy put forward by MAGA-aligned
think tanks would certainly pose challenges for Asian allies and partners,
the ideas floated do not have the potential to significantly alter the
structures or practices of security cooperation in Asia. In the field of trade
and commerce, however, Trump’s potential return has Asian officials and
observers hugely worried.
Almost all Asian states have over the last two decades derived increasing
trade and investment from China to the extent that regional supply and
value chains have become increasingly China-centric. The ideas floated
regarding a 10 percent across-the-board tariff on U.S. imports, with even
higher rates on goods from China, have set alarm bells ringing.
While the Biden administration recently imposed a set of new tariffs on
Chinese-made electric vehicles and related components, MAGA-aligned
think tanks as well as Trump himself have suggested his administration
would increase tariffs on China further. They seek to tackle what they
perceive as Beijing’s “strategy for global dominance” with even more
tariffs, an assertive trade policy, and a further decoupling of American
supply chains from China.
Seeing the United States as locked in a zero sum game with China, MAGA
think tankers suggest it should be U.S. policy to ultimately harm China’s
economy. Rather than managing competition with China, Washington
under a new Trump administration should win the competition instead.
As Washington intensifies efforts to reduce its trade with China through
hiking tariffs, Chinese exports to, and imports from, the rest of Asia
would likely increase as a result. And exports from other Asian states,
who often rely on Chinese imports for many of their exports, to the
United States will likely increase further. For example, exports to the U.S.
from countries like Vietnam or Indonesia have surged as a result of
Trump’s first “trade war” with China, leading to growing trade
imbalances.
However, reducing trade surpluses with the United States – with China
and the EU especially, but also other states – is a designated core interest
of Trump. A Trump administration would very likely put Asian countries
with trade surpluses like Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, or Indonesia
under the spotlight.
MAGA-aligned think tanks have also proposed the introduction of a “U.S.
Reciprocal Trade Act.” This would allow a future Trump administration
to impose tariffs on countries that refuse to lower theirs. This approach
would adversely affect U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea, but also
other countries like India would be impacted. Trump has specifically
criticized India’s high tariff rates, referring to it as the “tariff king.” It has
also been suggested that the U.S. Congress should review China’s
permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status, which gives China
preferential trade treatment via, for example, lower tariffs or the absence
of import quotas.
The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), launched by the Biden
administration, is widely regarded as a positive initiative by the think
tank community. However, there are calls for modifying the IPEF to focus
more on trade issues and reduce the emphasis on non-trade topics such
as climate change. Meanwhile, Trump himself has threatened to
withdraw the U.S. from the IPEF, echoing his previous decision to exit the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) during his first term in office.
The IPEF, unveiled in May 2022 by President Joe Biden, has been viewed
as the lynchpin of a broadening of stronger economic U.S. engagement in
the region, with the intention of providing Asian states with an
alternative to China’s growing economic dominance. The proposed
collapse of IPEF could have far-reaching consequences for the regional
economic order.
Initially launched to enhance economic integration, supply chain
resilience, and sustainable development, IPEF is seen as a critical tool for
countering China’s growing influence. U.S. partners had high
expectations for the framework to deliver tangible benefits, such as
robust supply chains, collaborative decarbonization efforts, and fair
economic practices. However, the possibility of a U.S. withdrawal raises
not only serious questions about American reliability but also increased
economic overdependence on China by Asian states – a scenario many
Asian policymakers seek to avoid.
MAGA-aligned think tanks also propose further economic decoupling
from China as well as increased “friend-shoring” of U.S. trade and
investment. This would amount to changes in the regional supply chains
as goods would be re-routed to or assembled in other states, which in
turn could lead to increased exports from India and Southeast Asia to the
United States. Vietnam, with its already significant trade surplus with the
U.S., could be heavily affected, particularly in its electronics sector.
However, it would very likely also tie those economies more closely to
China, because that’s where much of the capital, supply chains, and
funding of new infrastructure will come from.
It has also been suggested to use USAID assistance strategically to counter
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), providing aid only to countries
loyal to Trump or the U.S. government. This transactional approach to
foreign aid could further strain bilateral relationships with developing
countries in Asia and undermine the broader U.S. strategic positioning. If
Trump pressures Asian countries to economically align with the U.S.,
their strong economic ties with China might push them closer to Beijing,
thereby further bolstering China’s influence.
Conclusion
In conclusion, if the proposed policies and instruments outlined above
were to be applied by a Trump 2.0 administration this could significantly
alter the strategic landscape in Asia. Close examination of the ideas
floated by MAGA-aligned think tanks suggests that changes pertaining to
the region’s strategic landscape will be visible in various policy areas
with trade and commerce particularly affected. It is in this field where
MAGA-aligned think tanks have floated the most drastic proposals.
This is because instead of managing the competition with China, various
think tanks suggest that Washington’s general strategy should shift to
outright winning the competition. In the process, China’s economy is to
be hollowed out through tariffs, decoupling of supply chains, and other
measures. The proposal made by Trump himself to withdraw from IPEF
and the potential introduction of a U.S. Reciprocal Trade Act could
further negatively impact regional supply chains and economic stability.
The obvious limitations of our analysis stem from the unpredictability of
Trump’s decision-making style and the potentially diverse, heterogeneous
reactions in Asia if the aforementioned policies and instruments were to
be applied. Nonetheless, even if some of the proposals outlined above
never transition from the “chattering class” into policy, they do
contribute to a further shift in the public debate by further normalizing
economic nationalism, launching a trade war with China and
entrenching zero-sum great power confrontation as the prime strategic
frame of reference of U.S. foreign policy.
The Authors
Aneek Das is an Erasmus + Research Intern at the German Institute for International and
Security Affairs. He is a Master’s student in World Politics and International Relations at the
University of Pavia.
Felix Heiduk is the head of the Asia Research Division at the German Institute for International
and Security Affairs.

The White House, Adam Schultz

Should the US Initiate a New

Round of Backroom Diplomacy
With China?
The political conditions in the U.S. aren’t quite right – and
China doesn’t seem receptive to such outreach, rendering
it an unnecessary option for the time being.
By Jiachen Shi

Backroom diplomacy has long been a key element in China-U.S. relations.

Since U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to
China in 1971, the United States has employed this discreet approach to
ease tensions between the two nations several times. Compared to formal
diplomacy, backroom diplomacy often yields unexpected positive
outcomes as its high level of secrecy fosters an environment conducive to
more efficient and flexible negotiations, particularly in times of
heightened tension when formal channels may be less effective.
U.S. leaders often prefer to keep discussions with China secret, notably
when policies face criticism from Congress, the media, and public
opinion. However, not all diplomacy occurs behind closed doors. Formal
diplomacy is necessary for great powers like the United States and China
to demonstrate their capability to shape negotiations and outcomes.
Diplomacy is perhaps the most misunderstood instrument employed to
manage foreign relations, as it unfolds out of sight and out of mind, yet in
democracies like the United States, formal diplomacy also embodies
policy transparency. As advocated by former President Barack Obama,
practicing openness in diplomacy helps showcase legitimacy to partners
and the public and ensure government accountability.
Hence, astute U.S. leaders recognize that backroom diplomacy should be
used judiciously. Successful backroom diplomacy hinges on finesse,
politesse, and perhaps most importantly, timing. For U.S. presidents to
initiate backroom diplomacy with China, two key conditions must be met:
they must have a strong political determination to improve China-U.S.
relations, and there must be substantial domestic pressure opposing such
improvements.
One of the most prominent examples of backroom diplomacy is then-
President Richard Nixon’s effort to reopen relations with China. Once an
ardent anti-communist senator, Nixon evolved into a grand strategist
prioritizing geopolitics upon taking office. Recognizing that China could
be leveraged against the Soviet Union and that both Moscow and Beijing
could pressure North Vietnam, he took steps toward China-U.S.
normalization. First, he relaxed the trade and travel restrictions that had
been imposed on China in 1950, and then he resumed Sino-American
talks in Warsaw in December 1969 after a two-year suspension.
In the meantime, despite a growing congressional trend toward being
more receptive to China policy reform in the late 1960s, resistance to
opening up to China still prevailed in the United States. For example,
when Representative Paul Findley proposed the “East-West Trade
Relations Act of 1969” to use trade as a means to normalize relations with
China, it was never passed.
Confronted with significant domestic pressure, Nixon understood that his
efforts to normalize China-U.S. relations could backfire if not carefully
managed. Unlike his predecessors, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B.
Johnson, whose attempts to shift China policy were thwarted by domestic
opposition, Nixon tenaciously pursued his geopolitical ambition via
backroom diplomacy. Ultimately, his approach proved successful both
domestically and internationally.
Other U.S. presidents who have employed backroom diplomacy with
China include Jimmy Carter and George H. W. Bush. Like Nixon, they
demonstrated strong political determination to improve China-U.S.
relations despite facing significant domestic pressure. Now, as the
bilateral relationship reaches another critical juncture, the question
arises: should the current U.S. president, Joe Biden, initiate a fresh round
of backroom diplomacy?
The crux still rests on the two aforementioned conditions. First, does
Biden possess the strong political determination to improve the Sino-
American relationship? Yes and no.
In the short term, the Biden administration is actively navigating the
United States’ China policy from “decoupling” to “de-risking.” This
strategic shift is not solely driven by the necessity for a stronger
economic rapport with the world’s second-largest powerhouse to stabilize
the U.S. economy. It also reflects a desire for a more collaborative China
in the Indo-Pacific, aimed at dampening tensions surrounding the
Ukraine-Russia war and the Taiwan Strait.
In the longer term, Biden’s stance on fundamentally reshaping China-U.S.
relations remains ambiguous. Not only has his administration retained
Trump-era China tariffs and enacted China-countering bills such as the
CHIPS and Science Act, it also strengthened U.S. alliances in the Indo-
Pacific in response to China’s increasing assertiveness. In contrast with
the overt “all-encompassing decoupling” policy toward China in the final
year of the Trump administration, the Biden administration has
employed a more flexible and nuanced approach to China, described by
Secretary of State Antony Blinken as being “competitive when it should
be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be.”
Second, does Biden face significant domestic pressure against improving
the Sino-American relationship? Not necessarily. While anti-China
sentiment may appear pervasive, partisan divisions over China are
becoming increasingly evident, both within the general public and
among political elites. Despite claims that Congress has generated around
400 anti-China bills in recent years, the majority of these are merely
“performative legislation” with little impact.
Moreover, despite the purported bipartisan tough stance on China, the
Biden administration’s efforts to ease tensions with China find greater
acceptance among Democrats. Unlike Nixon, Carter, and the senior Bush,
Biden encounters less ideological resistance against China as he seeks to
improve bilateral ties. In an era of deep economic interdependence
between the two countries, Biden’s China policy might even attract
support from Republicans.
In addition to the two aforementioned conditions, another crucial factor
is the anticipated response from Chinese leaders. U.S. leaders are more
likely to initiate backroom diplomacy when they anticipate at least
receptive, if not entirely positive, reactions from their Chinese
counterparts, no matter how small those responses are.
When Nixon was laying the groundwork for opening back channels to
China through the U.S. ambassador to Poland, Walter Stoessel, Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai responded cautiously by approving the release of two
Americans who had been detained in China for months after their yacht
had strayed into Chinese territorial waters near Hong Kong. Recognizing
this signal from across the Pacific Ocean, Kissinger swiftly moved
forward with Nixon to the next step. Similar receptive responses could
also be found when Carter and the senior Bush sought backroom
dialogues with China.
The unfortunate reality is that both countries are currently gripped by
nationalistic sentiments. The United States emphasizes its global
leadership in defending democracy against authoritarianism, while
China challenges the global order with its “China Model.” Controversial
issues such as Taiwan and human rights have become unavoidable topics
in nearly every recent bilateral talk, with neither side willing to yield
ground. As the areas of irreconcilability widen, the likelihood of
American leaders expecting receptive responses from their Chinese
counterparts sharply declines, rendering backroom diplomacy an
unnecessary option for the time being.
As the 2024 U.S. presidential election approaches, both Democrats and
Republicans are expected to double down on their use of the “China
Card” to avoid appearing weak on China issues and score political points.
With limited incentives to change the status quo, perhaps a major
breakthrough in the current bilateral relationship will only emerge after
the election, whether through formal or backroom diplomacy.

The Author
Jiachen Shi is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at Tulane University.

Wikimedia Commons, Ishikawa Toraji

Invading Taiwan: Lessons From

History
Given rising concerns about a Taiwan emergency, it’s worth
revisiting the last full-scale invasion of the island in 1895.
By Takahashi Kosuke
Chinese military aircraft have repeatedly entered Taiwan’s air defense
identification zone, and China has conducted several large military
exercises around Taiwan in the past two years. Most recently, on May 23
and 24, the Chinese military and coast guard held a large-scale military
exercise, code-named Joint Sword-2024A, around Taiwan’s main island
and the Taiwanese outlying islands of Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu, and
Dongyin in the Taiwan Strait.
With the drills, China stepped up military pressure against Taiwan’s new
president, Lai Ching-te, whom Beijing considers a “Taiwan
independence” separatist. Lai was inaugurated on May 20.
Xi Jinping, who became president of China in March 2013, has set
“reunification” with Taiwan as a policy goal. Xi has publicly talked about
the possibility of an armed reunification, rather than a peaceful
settlement, on several occasions. There is widespread speculation that the
Xi administration will employ force to unify Taiwan with China by 2027,
the 100th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army’s founding.
Taiwan has never been invaded by a large-scale foreign military force in
modern times.
However, one month after Taiwan was ceded to Japan in the Treaty of
Shimonoseki, which was signed between the Qing Dynasty and the
Empire of Japan in April 1895 to end the First Sino-Japanese War,
remnants of the Qing Dynasty and some local Taiwanese residents staged
an armed uprising in opposition to the cession. The Meiji government of
Japan dispatched its army, navy, and air force to carry out a pacification
operation.
This incident is called “Taiwan Heitei” in Japanese, meaning the Taiwan
Pacification Campaign of 1895. Meanwhile, it is called the Yiwei War in
Chinese (1895 was the year of Yiwei in the Chinese 60-year astrological
cycle).
From a military perspective, there are precious lessons that we can infer
from this historical incident in preparation for China’s invasion of
Taiwan.
The remnants of the Qing Dynasty in Taiwan sought Taiwanese
independence and declared the establishment of the “Democratic State of
Formosa” in May 1895. The Taiwanese military force consisted of about
33,000, but the exact number of military volunteers in Taiwan is
unknown. The official war history published by the Imperial Japanese
Army General Staff Office in 1907 suggested that there may have been
tens of thousands of militia troops.
The problems began with their weapons. Firearms were not widely
distributed among the volunteer soldiers. Even including hunting rifles,
only about 30-40 percent had firearms, and the rest fought with swords,
and metal or bamboo spears.
By contrast, the Japanese military dispatched about 50,000 army soldiers
and 26,000 military porters (laborers) to Taiwan. In the battle, the
number of Japanese soldiers killed or wounded, including those who died
of disease, reached 5,320, and the number of military laborers killed
reached 7,000. On the other hand, the Taiwanese side suffered a total of
14,000 deaths, including volunteer soldiers and residents, according to
Japanese historians.
The second problem is Taiwan’s topography. About three-quarters of
Taiwan’s land area is mountainous and hilly, with the remaining quarter
being flat land. The flat land stretches to the west facing the Taiwan
Strait.
The plains on the west side were suitable for the landing and movement
of troops. After occupying Taipei in June 1895, the Japanese army
occupied Hsinchu in early August, Changhua at the end of August, Chiayi
in early October, and Tainan in late October. This line connecting Taipei,
Hsinchu, Changhua, Chiayi, and Tainan is the main artery of Taiwan.
Currently the Taiwan High Speed ​Rail, which uses Japanese Shinkansen
technology, runs along this route.
At the time, Taiwan had many factories and munitions depots in the
northern part of the western plains. The Japanese army occupied the
plains from the north, so Taiwan, which was already poorly equipped,
faced a shortage of weapons and ammunition from a very early stage.
The anti-Japanese forces were compelled to move to the mountainous
regions to the east and continue their resistance.
Also, at that time, Taiwan only had land forces, so Japanese naval
shipping was not attacked. If Taiwan had laid mines in the shallow
waters to the west, the Japanese military would have suffered great
damage. It would have also had a psychological effect.
The shallow waters of the Taiwan Strait make it ideal for laying mines.
On the other hand, the eastern and southern sides of Taiwan’s main
island reach depths of 2,000 meters not far from the coast. The undersea
terrain is rugged and deep ocean water flows in. Deep ocean water is cold
and has a low salinity, which affects the speed of sound waves, making it
easier for submarines to avoid enemy sonic detection.
If Chinese submarines control the waters east of Taiwan, it will pose a
danger to the shipping routes connecting Taiwan with Guam and Hawai‘i.
Thus, in the event of a Taiwan emergency, the struggle for control of the
sea – and under the sea – to the east of Taiwan will intensify. If Taiwan
takes control of this sea area, it can also be used as a base for launching
anti-ship missiles from submarines into the Taiwan Strait. In this case, it
will be necessary to communicate the location of enemy ships to
submarines, and the U.S. military may support Taiwan by providing this
sort of information.

The Author
Takahashi Kosuke is Tokyo Correspondent for The Diplomat.

Sina Weibo
China’s 6th Generation and
Upcoming Combat Aircraft: 2024
Update
A look at where the PLA’s cutting-edge aircraft programs –
from the J-XD to J-20 upgrades and the mysterious H-20
stealth bomber – stand.
By Rick Joe

In previous articles, I have documented the progression of combat

aircraft in China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as well as conveyed
projections and estimates of near-term outcomes. Various established
aircraft have reached milestones in recent years, and some future
expected projects are likely to make their presence felt in coming years
into the second half of the decade.
However, PLA secrecy remains unique among the major military forces
of the world, and this has only intensified in the last half decade as
geopolitical tensions have escalated. In this article, I will aim to
summarize known indicators and make estimates for various upcoming
projects.
J-XD: Naming the Next-Generation Fighter
The PLA’s sixth-generation manned fighter, or next-generation manned
fighter, is considered to be an established program of record that is under
active development and expected to emerge in some form during this
decade. However, before discussion of this project can commence, a
stand-in title for it is necessary, as there is no current consensus name
from the Chinese language PLA watching community. I will use “J-XD” to
refer to this project, until such a time that a consensus name emerges to
replace it.
J-XD is a concise name which can be seen as a pinyin acronym. “XD” can
represent either “xī n dài” (新代 meaning new generation), or “xià dài” (下
代 next generation), both of which are reasonable titles. J-XD also avoids
using a numbered system that may introduce confusion as to whether the
aircraft is “sixth-generation” or “fifth-generation,” given the Chinese
military nomenclature seems to use both the domestic Chinese
generation system and the Western generation system at times.
Utilizing a name that includes “NGAD” (Next Generation Air Dominance,
the U.S. Air Force’s name for their sixth-generation project) is somewhat
inappropriate given the use of English words in an acronym for a Chinese
project. Furthermore, J-XD has the additional benefit of paying homage to
the stand-in name for J-20 (known in the 2000s as “J-XX”).
Current indicators for the J-XD remain largely unchanged from the last
few years. It is generally accepted that various demonstrator test beds
(potentially subscale) have been flown, and a more stealthy, tailless flying
wing/flying arrowhead airframe is considered one of the likely
configurations it may adopt.
The J-XD is virtually guaranteed to incorporate new generation
subsystems and technologies in propulsion, sensors, computing and
networking, and is likely to operate alongside future unmanned combat
aerial vehicles (UCAVs) or collaborative combat aircraft (CCAs). A
selection of papers exploring airframe testing, engine development, and
aerospace engineering efforts that have relevance to J-XD development
are also accessible with the right search terms. Meanwhile, generic next-
generation fighter representations have been shown both by state
aircraft manufacturers and at defense expos.
Unsurprisingly, more granular rumors or estimates regarding the
subsystems, weapons, and characteristics of the J-XD remain elusive even
among the PLA watching community; however, it is widely accepted that
the J-XD ranks among the most important upcoming projects for the PLA.
In context of this, U.S. Air Force senior officers have reasonably alluded to
viewing Chinese sixth-generation efforts as an underway competitor.
Current Fifth-Generation Efforts
However, before the J-XD emerges, there are still a number of active and
vigorous fifth-generation fighter types in active development and
production for the PLA. The fates of these fighters will also relate to the
outcome and trajectory of the J-XD, in terms of the procurement scale and
timeline of each respective type.
The J-20 family is the primary PLA fifth-generation fighter family, and has
seen increases in both production scale and technological upgrades in
recent years. However nomenclature once again needs to be discussed.
At present, “J-20” is the name of the baseline variant in production
powered by WS-10 engines (and by Al-31 engines in the first batch); this
fighter is externally identified by its non-beaked nose as well as the lack
of a dorsal hump behind the canopy.
“J-20A” is the name of the improved variant in development (and possibly
early production) that is intended to be powered by more capable WS-15
engines (but may enter initial production with WS-10 engines). Multiple
prototypes of the J-20A exist and can be identified by a slightly beaked
nose and a dorsal hump behind the canopy.
Unfortunately, some “general knowledge” websites such as Wikipedia list
the J-20 and J-20A as “J-20A” and “J-20B,” respectively, which are not
appropriate consensus names for the respective variants. This serves to
create confusion.
Estimates from think tanks and professional military institutes, suggest
that around 200 J-20s have been produced as of the end of 2023 or early
2024. In context of rumors from the Chinese language PLA watching
community, these estimates appear somewhat out of date. Indeed,
estimates from the PLA watching community estimate that the 200-
airframe milestone was reached some time in late 2022 or early 2023.
Furthermore, it is thought that at some point in 2022 to 2023, the annual
production rate of J-20s from Chengdu had grown to approach three
digits (i.e.: 100 airframes a year). This would give China the ability to
annually equip three frontline PLA Air Force brigades, which also tracks
with the number of new J-20 units being converted in recent years.
At the time of writing in mid-2024, I cautiously estimate that the J-20 fleet
size may approach 300 airframes. It must be noted that future J-20
production rates may change (either increase or decrease) as the
program proceeds. PLA secrecy and the difficult nature of attaining
consistent high-quality satellite imagery means any “concrete” estimate
of the J-20 fleet size is likely to be meaningfully behind from facts on the
ground at any given time, though may serve as a useful “minimum floor”
estimate.
The new J-20A variant remains in development, though unverified
rumors suggest it may be on the cusp of early production. Major elements
to confirm for the J-20A include whether initial production batches are
powered by WS-10 or WS-15 engines (with the J-20A prototype serial 2052
powered by WS-15s flying in mid-2023), as well as how production of the
J-20A and J-20 will cross with one another.
J-20A advancements must also be watched, as the variant is not merely a
J-20 with more powerful engines, but is rumored and expected to include
an overhaul of software, avionics and sensor suites (even more so than
inter-batch advancements for existing J-20s), material and structural
advancements with corresponding signature reduction benefits, as well
as significant power and thermal management advances. All of these
enhancement will enhance future growth potential and a wider variety
of upgrades and payloads. Among global peers, perhaps the most
intuitive comparison for the J-20A is the TR3 variant and Block 4 upgrade
for the F-35 family.
Of note, the twin seat “J-20S” (also known as the “J-20AS” or “J-20B”) is
currently thought to be a technology demonstrator related to the J-20A
variant to enhance and accelerate developmental efforts. However, the
emergence of a production variant of the twin seat “J-20S” cannot be
excluded in the future.
The J-35/XY and FC-31 derived family of fighters are the other major
Chinese fifth-generation program. The carrier-borne J-35/XY has been
flying in the form of prototypes since 2021, and mockups have been
visible aboard both the catapult equipped CV-18 Fujian (which recently
began its sea trials), as well as the CV-16 Liaoning, which may precede
flight testing aboard the respective carriers. The presence of a J-35
mockup aboard the Liaoning is significant, as it indicates the fighter is
compatible with the PLA Navy’s ski jump carriers (the Liaoning and CV-
17 Shandong), which can significantly bolster the capability and future
relevance of both ships.
Presently, the J-35 is expected to proceed with carrier flight testing in the
near-term future, with initial production possibly to commence within
the next couple of years at the earliest. There may also be indicators that
a “J-31” developed from the FC-31 demonstrator intended for PLA use (or
potentially for an export customer) may have also recently flown;
however, this is yet to be confirmed. It is unclear how a notional “J-31”
may fit in context of PLA procurement of J-20 family aircraft that is
occurring at relatively large scale, not to mention the future J-XD and
expectant UCAVs/CCAs.
H-20’s Status Unclear
Compared to fighter efforts like the J-XD, J-20 and J-35, the status of the
much rumored and anticipated H-20 stealth bomber has become much
less clear in recent years. While there remain occasional official remarks
alluding to the development of the H-20, there have been some uncertain
rumors in recent months that the H-20 as a project may not be pursued in
the previous consensus form of a stealthy flying wing bomber.
This would not be entirely unprecedented, as the evolving strategic
environment in the last half decade may have caused revisions of various
projects and their respective priority, causing the public understanding
of the project to be in limbo. We have seen a similar degree of secrecy for
the future of China’s carrier procurement beyond Fujian. Somewhat
more unprecedented for the H-20, however, is the relatively high-profile
nature in which its existence was acknowledged as early as the late
2010s, creating a greater degree of concrete expectation for it than other
past projects.
At this stage, the status and prediction of H-20 remains unclear. It may
well still be an active project, or alternatively it may have undergone
substantial revisions and emerge later than previously expected in an
wholly different form, or even have elements of its role be delegated to
other systems such as UCAVs/CCAs for the near term. Interestingly, there
have been some rumors that the J-XD is considered a project of higher
priority than the H-20. But in the absence of context or detail, it is difficult
to substantiate this.
The PLA’s Unmanned Future
The PLA’s pursuit of high-end UCAVs is fairly established, with the
stealthy flying wing GJ-11 being the most well-known type. Its program
status (both in stage of development as well as production) is unknown,
but potentially a small number of airframes exist in advanced testing.
What is known is that a carrier-based stealthy flying wing UCAV (possibly
derived from GJ-11) is expected to emerge, with a mockup having been
observed aboard the PLA Navy carrier mockup in Wuhan, and a possible
new airframe variant having emerged within the last year. A number of
other flying wing UAV platforms are also known to exist, and with likely
multiple more in more secretive development without public knowledge.
Various air-to-air oriented CCA concepts have also been shown at Chinese
defense expos such as the Zhuhai airshow; however, these remain largely
in line with various CCA projects around the world, and it is likely that
more sophisticated models for PLA use are in more secretive
development. The lower profile and more compact nature of many UCAVs
and CCAs, as well as greater inherent PLA secrecy, makes it likely that a
number of different UCAV and CCA concepts are in development and
testing, and their emergence to the public sphere is likely only going to
occur in late stages of development or even introduction into service.
Similar to other efforts by international air forces, PLA UCAVs and CCAs
are very likely to be integral capabilities with the future J-XD fighter, as
well as be compatible with existing fifth-generation fighters like the J-20
and J-35, and potentially 4.5-generation fighters such as the J-16 and J-10C
with requisite upgrades.
The future trajectory and shape of PLA high end UCAV and CCA
procurement remains one of the major unknowns of tracking future PLA
combat aircraft.
Uncharted Waters
At this point in time, the long arc of Chinese combat aircraft (and in
particular, manned fighter aircraft) development has brought China into
the same category as leading edge aerospace powers, even when
considering a few remaining industry domains where China has yet to
catch up or scale (such as advanced turbofans). The overall level of
advancement somewhat complicates projections of upcoming PLA
combat aircraft projects, due to lack of existing comparable platforms
that can guide public speculation.
The J-XD and associated future PLA UCAV and CCA projects will emerge
alongside other global projects in highly uncharted waters, and may
prove to be more fascinating than past PLA aerospace tracking efforts,
and indeed more novel than past global military aerospace tracking since
the Cold War.

The Author
Rick Joe is a longtime follower of Chinese military developments, with a focus on air and naval
platforms.
Wikimedia Commons, Llez

Germany’s Defense Engagement

in the Indo-Pacific Is a Balancing
Act
Like the 2021 edition, Germany’s 2024 Indo-Pacific
Deployment will signal Berlin’s commitment to the region –
and the limits of its presence.
By Christina Keßler

On May 7, the German Navy kicked off its second Indo-Pacific

deployment. Two ships, the frigate Baden-Württemberg and the combat
supply ship Frankfurt am Main, set sail for a world tour.
The deployment is another step Germany is taking to increase its
engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, showcasing its commitments to its
regional partners, including India, Malaysia, South Korea, and Japan. At
the same time, Germany is trying to preserve good relations with its
important trading partner, China. This poses a difficult balancing act for
the country.
Over recent years, tensions in the Indo-Pacific have been increasing,
especially in the maritime domain. Competing territorial claims between
China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia – notably in the
South China Sea – risk escalating, and threaten peace and stability.
The rising tensions motivated the German Navy to conduct its first Indo-
Pacific deployment in 2021. The frigate Bayern set sail for the Indo-
Pacific, the first time in almost two decades that a German warship
cruised the region. Port calls included Pakistan, Australia, Guam, Japan,
South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, and India.
Partners welcomed the 2021 tour, but it also became apparent that
Germany’s defense engagement in the region has limits. Throughout the
tour, Germany attempted a diplomatic balancing act. It tried to signal to
partners its willingness to be more engaged in the Indo-Pacific, while
simultaneously signaling to Beijing that its mission was not about
confronting China.
The Bayern requested to stop in Shanghai, a signal from the German
Navy that the mission should not be understood as directed against
China. This led to some irritation from observers in Japan and Australia.
However, the requested port call was rejected by Chinese officials.
Apart from this, the Bayern was careful not to do anything that could
lead to tensions with China. While the frigate traversed the South China
Sea, it stayed on international shipping routes and did not conduct any
military drills (exercises or rehearsals of prescribed movements).
According to international law, warships have the right to “innocent
passage” through the territorial seas of other countries. At high sea
(waters that do not fall under the jurisdiction of any one country),
however, ships are allowed to hold military drills. One could therefore
argue that the voyage of the Bayern recognized Chinese territorial claims
in the South China Sea.
Geographically it might be far, but the Indo-Pacific is deeply intertwined
with the German economy. Germany is the world’s third-largest export
nation and the Indo-Pacific is a global trade hub, home to nine of the
world’s ten largest ports. Waterways like the South China Sea and the
Strait of Malacca are vital to the global economy. China is Germany’s most
important trading partner, and positive ties between the two countries
are crucial for German industry.
Due to its economic entanglement with the region, Germany has a strong
interest in a stable Indo-Pacific where freedom of navigation is upheld. In
recent years, German policymakers have become more attentive toward
the region. In 2020, the country released its policy guidelines for the Indo-
Pacific, which defined Germany’s interests there. A lot of these interests
relate to Germany’s economic interests, such as maintaining open
markets and free trade as well as open shipping rules. The guidelines also
talk about global challenges, such as changing geopolitical dynamics,
climate change, digital transformation, and access to fact-based
information.
Next to contributing to peace and stability in the region, Germany wants
to diversify and deepen its relations across the Indo-Pacific. In 2023
Germany released its first-ever National Security Strategy, which
reiterated that the Indo-Pacific “remains of special significance to
Germany and Europe.”
At the same time, the tone of the German government toward China has
become tougher, as indicated by Germany’s 2023 China Strategy. The
document acknowledges that China has changed immensely under Xi
Jinping and now challenges German interests. For example, Beijing has
put principles of international law into question, such as by ignoring the
ruling of an international tribunal regarding the South China Sea, which
rejected most of China’s territorial claims. China has also engaged in
economic coercion against Germany’s partners, including EU member
states like Lithuania.
But when it comes to concrete policies, the strategy remains vague.
Germany does not want to cut its relations with China, especially on the
business side of things. At the same time, Berlin tries to strengthen
relations with other countries in the region in order to diversify its
economic dependencies.
A conflict in the Indo-Pacific would severely damage the German
economy. It also would put Germany in a difficult position, as the United
States and other partners present in the region would likely expect some
kind of support from Berlin. In order to support stability in the region,
Germany is increasing its presence with a second deployment.
From this May until December, two ships are sailing to the Indo-Pacific
and will participate in several military exercises – including the U.S.-led
“RIMPAC 2024,” the world’s biggest maritime exercise. For a few months,
the ships will also be joined by German Air Force planes. Together with
air forces from both Europe and the Indo-Pacific, the German Air Force
will participate in a series of joint exercises called “Pacific Skies 24.”
Planned ports of call on the tour include Japan, South Korea, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, and India.
With this deployment, Germany wants to signal to its Indo-Pacific
partners that it has not forgotten them, despite its focus being on
supporting Ukraine against the Russian invasion. This is especially
important considering some regional partners, like Japan, have also
shown significant amounts of support for Ukraine.
The first Indo-Pacific deployment was welcomed by partners, and the
current deployment will likewise reinforce Germany’s relations with
countries in the region. Potentially, the tour could strengthen not just
diplomatic but also economic relations between Germany and its
partners, thereby contributing to the country’s objective of diversifying
economic ties to the region.
Another stated objective of the journey is to secure sea and trade routes.
The exact planning of the tour is not yet set. The ships plan to cross
through the South China Sea, and transit through the Taiwan Strait is also
being considered. However, whether such a passage happens will be
decided shortly beforehand, depending on political considerations and
the state of the China-Germany relationship. China might interpret a
Taiwan Strait transit as a provocation.
In this year’s Indo-Pacific deployment, Germany wants to show its
partners there that it will continue to be present in the region. However,
observers should not expect anything too dramatic from this journey, like
the German Navy actively challenging Chinese territorial claims.
Germany will continue trying to protect its relationship with China. It is
unlikely that the Baden-Württemberg or the Frankfurt am Main will
traverse contested waters on their tour, be it the South China Sea or
anywhere else. While the two ships will keep the option of going through
the Taiwan Strait open for now, observers should not be surprised if this
transit does not happen.
With this second deployment, Germany will continue with its challenging
Indo-Pacific balancing act.

The Author
Christina Keßler is currently the Clara Marina O’Donnell fellow at the Centre for European
Reform as well as the Europe fellow at the Rising Experts Program at Young Professionals in
Foreign Policy (YPFP). She holds an MA in European Political and Governance Studies from the
College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium as well as an MSc in Global Governance and Diplomacy
from the University of Oxford.
Depositphotos

Mongolia’s Precarious Energy

Security
Mongolia’s energy security needs to be viewed holistically,
as a function of its economy, environment, and geopolitical
situation.
By Telmen Altanshagai

Mongolia sits in a unique position where its energy situation is deeply

intertwined with both its economy, which is mostly driven by raw
material exports, and its geographic location between two major
countries. However, there is a lack of acknowledgement of the reality of
the energy situation accounting for geopolitical factors within the
Mongolian government, or at least within its ministries.
According to Mongolia’s Ministry of Energy, the current state policy on
energy is deeply concentrated on the production, expansion, and
sustainability of electricity production. The absence of other critical
components – like agriculture, mining, heavy industry, transportation,
development, and security factors – in energy policy misinforms the
public and undermines the country’s national security and interests. A
precise assessment of the energy security situation should not be limited
to the issue of domestic electricity and heat production, but also include
greater economic and foreign policy considerations as a whole.
The Mongolian government should immediately develop comprehensive
long-term energy security policies in accordance with the prevailing
geopolitical realities. The necessary steps would include transforming the
electricity sector from coal-fired to renewable energy, shifting away from
a reliance on coal exports to becoming a renewable energy exporter, and
attracting foreign infrastructure financing.
Energy as the Base of the Economy
Mongolian economic policy, energy policy, and national security policy
are deeply intertwined. A failure to recognize the impact of mineral
resources such as coal and copper on Mongolia’s energy policy is deeply
flawed and potentially dangerous. According to data from the Mongolian
National Statistics Office, last year 86 percent of the country’s exports
were raw materials, including coal, copper concentrate, and gold. More
than half of Mongolia’s exports were coal.
It is no secret that the country needs to shift from an export-based
economy, which is heavily dependent on the global market, to a
diversified economy. Mongolia’s government itself readily acknowledges
this.
In another alarming datapoint, just one trading partner, China, accounts
for 80 percent of Mongolian exports. The vulnerability of the current
economic picture puts Mongolian national, economic, and energy
security alike at immediate risk.
In the long run, Mongolian economic and foreign policy must recognize
the fact that the sale of coal is not sustainable. The international
community is eager to move from fossil fuels as the climate emergency
becomes ever-more dire. Therefore, Mongolia’s current and future
administrations must tailor their policies toward value-added processing
– something the country has been struggling to achieve – or even the
potential replacement of coal as a revenue source.
Notably, Mongolia can tackle both its energy and economic security
concerns with one approach. Mongolia has the potential to sustain its
domestic electricity demand through renewable energy sources such as
solar, wind, and hydro. It should also view exports of renewable energy
into neighboring countries as an alternative source of economic security.
Energy as Electricity
Mongolia’s electricity and heating production is overwhelmingly based
on coal-fired thermal power plants, according to the Ministry of Energy.
As of 2018, the Energy Regulatory Commission reported that close to 93
percent of Mongolia’s power plants were coal-fired, while only 7 percent
generated renewable energy.
Furthermore, Mongolia produces just 80 percent of the total electricity
needed domestically and imports the other 20 percent from Russia. There
has been an ongoing government effort to meet growing demand by
extending the capacity of existing power plants, building new ones in
rural regions, and investing in the technology and infrastructure of
renewable energy, including solar and wind projects, as reported in the
government action plan for 2016–2020 formulated by the Ministry of
Energy. However, while transmission network extensions to reach
isolated parts of the country have been on the agenda for the past few
years, these efforts only included coal-fired power plants.
In terms of energy policy, Mongolia’s main priority should be to target
supply close to 100 percent of domestic demand when it comes to
electricity and heating production – even if this power is generated by
fossil fuels.
There are growing efforts by the international community to capture
carbon emissions or remove them, which need to be studied and
implemented immediately, including by shifting toward renewable
energy sources. In the long run, however, it is only realistic to assume
coal-fired plants are not a sustainable solution given the climate
emergency. As a result, ambitious efforts to pursue renewable energy will
be the future.
Energy as Petroleum Products
Perhaps one of the greatest information gaps for average Mongolians or
even policymakers is the tendency to look at critical petroleum products
such as diesel and gas in isolation, excluding the energy factor, which is
deeply tied to national security.
Mongolian industrial and other consumers are 95 percent dependent on
imported petroleum products, despite the country having crude oil
deposits. Indeed, petroleum products make up the biggest share of
imports in terms of value. Data from the Mongolian National Statistics
Office indicated that diesel and petrol ranked first and third, respectively,
on the list of commodities Mongolia imported in 2022, together
accounting for 35 percent of all imports.
Around 90 percent of all imported petroleum products come from Russia,
which creates a geopolitical dependency. The general public has seen
disruptions of Russian oil supplies from time to time and shares a
common feeling of uneasiness about the fact that Mongolia’s economy is
dependent on foreign actors’ discretion. Despite Mongolia having 43
million tons of proven crude oil reserves and production, the lack of in-
country refineries has forced it to export its oil to China since 1998.
According to the Mineral Resources and Petroleum Authority of Mongolia
and other news agencies, the construction of Mongolia’s own refinery
and oil pipelines are underway, funded by a soft loan from the Indian
government. They are expected to be operational in 2027.
The current plan is to be able to produce up to 20 percent of domestic
petroleum product consumption and have six months of country reserve
to boost Mongolia’s resilience to disruptions or price spikes. If the plan
proceeds on schedule, the Mongolian government will gain significant
leverage in foreign policy. However, the size of the oil reserve is relatively
small, and the fact that 8 million tons out of 43 have already been
extracted suggests that the potential leverage from this infrastructure
development will be temporary and short-term.
In the long term, the government of Mongolia should join the rest of the
world in electrifying its transportation sector, supported by domestic
renewable energy production.
Government Commitments and Vision 2050
Mongolia’s latest long-term development policy known as “Vision 2050”
sets the tone for future government policy in energy security but again
lacks the necessary national security element. There are a number of
significant goals, such as “becoming self-sufficient in electricity
production,” “increasing export-oriented sources and becoming an
energy exporter," and “developing an independent integrated energy
system,” but the strategy ultimately failed to inform or reiterate why
those goals are fundamental to Mongolia’s national security and
dependency.
In 2021, in the midst of COVID-19 and the greater economic impact of the
pandemic, the Mongolian Parliament announced a “New Recovery
Policy” as a part of Vision 2050. In addition to the number of action plans
to increase the existing capacities of thermal power plants and a proposal
to build a hydropower plant in the recovery plan, a couple of debatable
proposals were mentioned: a natural gas pipeline from Russia to China
via Mongolia, and a potential Northeast Asian integrated power grid.
The potential new gas pipeline, Power of Siberia 2, has been under
discussion for years, if not decades, although progress was frozen
temporarily during the pandemic. According to a recent Reuters report,
the Russian deputy prime minister announced that construction may
begin in Mongolia starting in 2024 on a pipeline to carry 50 billion cubic
meters of gas a year.
According to the Intelligence Department of Mongolia’s study on the
potential pipeline, the talks had been unproductive among stakeholder
groups up until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which changed the
geopolitical landscape immensely. It is interesting and almost
counterintuitive that the Mongolian government has been pushing the
idea of becoming a transit nation, thereby emphasizing further
cooperation between neighbors, while also longing to assert geopolitical
independence. In this context, the most controversial comment made by
the Intelligence Department study was that transit countries can pose
certain “risks” to supplier countries, citing the examples of Ukraine and
Belarus.
In terms of geopolitics, embracing the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline can be
seen as having two possible outcomes, depending on one’s perspective:
Either it is political suicide by allowing expansionist Russia to export its
gas using Mongolian land, or it is the ultimate ticket for security to avoid
hostility from both Russia and China by connecting critical energy
sectors.
I am skeptical about the argument made by the Intelligence Department
about the “risk” situation. I would argue that it is the complete opposite:
Mongolia would face increasing risk from Russia. Embedding a Russian
pipeline in the territory of Mongolia only would deepen Russia’s interest
in interfering with Mongolian domestic affairs, undermining Mongolian
sovereignty. Furthermore, the key considerations – such as who would
own, finance, and construct the pipeline – are still unclear.
The most important question of the deal is, what is in it for Mongolia? If
the Mongolian government manages to cut a favorable deal by
negotiating a “bid check” as a transmission country and a concession to
respect territorial integrity at all times, the situation could be a win for
Mongolia, allowing it to finance much-needed projects from education to
infrastructure. Otherwise, it is seen as a blunt invitation for Russians to
interfere in Mongolian domestic affairs in the name of the pipeline.
Another intriguing possibility is the potential for Mongolia to become a
renewable energy exporter using an integrated Northeast Asian power
grid linking Mongolia, Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea. This would
be the preferable choice if the Mongolian government decided to pursue
the development of the project seriously. Not only would this project
open a new line of revenue for Mongolia, but it would also be a critical
foreign policy tool to strengthen Mongolia’s position in global politics.
According to a study conducted by the Asian Development Bank,
researchers found “ample renewable resources for both domestic use
and potential export” in Mongolia but concluded that “system flexibility
remains an impediment” and “future analysis is needed prior to
investment.”
An interconnected transmission line could ease the tensions in Northeast
Asia and foster trust in an already heightened region. Participation by
high-income, energy-insecure countries like Japan and South Korea could
be a significant part of financing the infrastructure and knowledge; at the
same time, manufacturing giants like China could potentially provide
resources such as solar panels and batteries.
If the Russian gas pipeline were to cross Mongolia as a transit country,
the integrated power grid would provide crucial security and bargaining
leverage for Mongolia as a complement.
Policy Recommendations
Mongolian policymakers, ministries, and the general public must
understand that the energy security issue is not limited to electricity
production and consumption; rather, almost every sector in Mongolia,
from the economy to agriculture, is deeply intertwined with the energy
situation, which makes it a national security priority. Hence, a
comprehensive long-term energy security policy based on a precise
assessment of the geopolitical realities of today’s Mongolia must be
proposed and implemented.
Those policies include transforming Mongolia’s electricity sector from
coal-fired to renewables-based, while also shifting Mongolia’s exports
from coal to renewable energy. To achieve both goals, Mongolia must
attract more foreign infrastructure financing.
Serious attempts to revolutionize Mongolia’s electricity sector from fossil
fuel-based to renewable must be the long-term goal in the coming
decades. The government of Mongolia must invest in transmission lines
as well as storage for renewable energy production that could supply
domestic consumers.
On a related note, Mongolia must move away from a coal-based economy
and intensify its effort to produce more renewable energy. The
government of Mongolia must recognize that the revenue from coal
exports to China is not only sustainable but also not reliable. The large
proportion of exports tied up in a single resource (coal) and a single
recipient (China) leave Mongolia’s economy dependent on market factors
beyond its control. Projects like the Northeast Asian Integrated Power
Grid open the door for a new era where Mongolia exports renewable
energy to the rest of the world.
Financing major renewable energy projects will be costly, and the
returns will not be immediate. However, there are many ways to navigate
those challenges by attracting foreign investment from “third neighbors,”
including Japan, India, or South Korea. Along the way, development
banks like the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank, by effectively advertising Mongolia,
could potentially offer renewables to the rest of the world.
To achieve that, strengthening Mongolia’s economic and political stability
has become a prerequisite, and building a predictable legal environment
for foreign investment has become a must. Here again, Mongolia’s energy
security cannot be separated from broader concerns.

The Author
Telmen Altanshagai is a graduate student at the School of International Service, American
University in Washington D.C. completing her master’s degree in Global Governance, Politics,
and Security. Ms. Altanshagai has an interest in the geopolitics of energy, the development
economy in the Global South, especially in Mongolia and Central Asian republics, diplomacy, and
governance.
Wikimedia Commons, Adityaoberai

From Free Access to Free Market:

The Rise of Private Indian
Universities
Like pre-college education before, high school education in
India is witnessing a massive shift to the private sector.
By Krzysztof Iwanek

The number of private Indian universities is not rising – it has soared to

the sky. The 1980s saw the establishment of only one such institution, and
so did the 1990s. By comparison, the last 22 years (2000-2022) witnessed
the inauguration of 428 private universities in India.
The number is expected to climb even higher with the further
liberalization of government rules on private institutions of higher
learning. For instance, in 2023, it was announced that foreign universities
will be allowed to open campuses on Indian soil. But the growth of India’s
higher education market is much more about the rising demand than the
liberalized rules of supply.
Even a quick glance at the reality of these new universities shows that
much of their growth represents a trend of Indian higher education
sailing out to the waters of the free market. It seems that science subjects,
such as engineering, dominate the curriculum options, though
humanities are not completely missing. Some of these new institutions
arose in rural areas outside Delhi, rather than within the city, probably
due to Delhi’s impossible real estate prices (it takes immense capital to
build in India’s capital). These universities, however, also mostly boast
posh campuses spreading over swaths of what was recently agricultural
land. Everything about them screams: “We are the new money.”
It is equally apparent that these new private universities often spring up
as investments of large companies. For instance, the GD Goenka
University was established by a family of industrialists, the Goenkas;
BML Munjal University was created by another such family, the Munjals
(mostly known for motorcycle manufacturing); the Jagan Nath University
is named after a businessman dealing with oil processing – and the list
goes on. In other words, many of these new institutions represent a new
field of investment by India’s most powerful companies; they are an
addition to a wide portfolio of dominant industrialists.
But while the numbers quoted in the first paragraph may be stunning,
the reasons behind this revolution are not so rosy. It seems that what is
now happening with Indian universities is a repetition of what already
happened with primary and middle schools. Over the past few decades,
India witnessed a remarkable shift from public to private education
because a great many government schools fail to deliver.
India’s elites have long been enrolling their progeny in private
institutions. Gradually, the process began to encompass the middle
classes, and even the lower-middle classes, as private players began to
establish budget private schools that charge comparatively low fees. With
this, hundreds of thousands of new private and middle schools
mushroomed in India especially since the liberalization of the country’s
economy in 1990s.
The data for 2021-2022 academic year suggest that there are still more
government-managed schools in India than private ones (68.7 percent to
31.3 percent, respectively) out of a total number of 1.5 million schools.
However, the percentage of private schools is gradually growing while
that of public ones is decreasing.
Second, the proportion alone does not reveal the socioeconomic reality.
With a bit of generalization, it may be said that it is the children of poor
people who attend government schools (apart from a small number of
high-quality public schools), while those who can afford it have shifted to
private institutions. In rural areas, government schools face less
competition (though even there one finds cheap private education
institutions), while in large cities, they are completely overshadowed by
their private equivalents. In places like Delhi, there are already more
private schools than public ones. This is not because the state wants it,
but because it has been unable to reform and expand the network of
public schools.
Now, the same process of the richer layers of society moving from the
public to the private sector seems to be occurring in the realm of higher
education. Again, Indian elites did so long ago, and now the process is
expanding down the rungs of the economic ladder. These hundreds of
new universities – with their sprawling campuses based outside major
cities, where it is next to impossible to reach without a car, and their
flashy websites only in English – seem to be catering to the country’s new,
growing middle classes. But over time, we may well see the rise of a host
of cheaper universities aimed at attracting the lower-middle classes.
And it is not only about a shift from public to private, but one from India
to overseas. When Russia’s brutal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine began,
there was a need to evacuate over 18,000 Indians from the attacked
country. Most of them were students – and most of these were medical
students. One of the main reasons why so many of them were studying in
Ukraine is that there aren’t enough slots at India’s own universities to
study medicine – combined with the fact that studying in Ukraine was
cheaper than in the EU or even Russia (and quite likely cheaper than
studying at elite universities back in India).
The whole process will thus likely yield both positive and negative
results. Indian higher education will strive toward higher quality and
there will be more places to study to choose from – though at first, these
will be accessible only for richer Indians, who already have more options
than everyone else. Many Indian public universities may be stagnant in
comparison to what is happening in the private sector, but at least they
admit more students from the poorer sections (through the reservation
system). The world “university,” after all, comes from the Latin
universitas, meaning “whole,” and such an institution should ideally
strive not only to present the whole of knowledge, but also be open to all.
Now, it would seem, from the ideal of free access, the pendulum will
swing toward the free market.
Yet, undeniably, this tremendous growth of India’s higher education
system currently represents a massive opportunity for investors – both
Indian and foreign ones – but also for universities in other countries that
wish to attract Indian students. This may as well be a new golden mine
for institutions in places like Europe, where schools and universities are
being threatened by demographic decline.

The Author
Krzysztof Iwanek writes for The Diplomat’s Pulse section. He is a South Asia expert and was the
chair of the Asia Research Centre at the War Studies University in Warsaw.

IMDB

Art Imitates Life in Indonesian

Horror Film – But is Anyone
Entertained?
The hit film “Vina: Sebelum 7 Hari” drew its inspiration from
the rape and murder of a 16-year-old girl in 2016,
prompting accusations of bad taste.
By Aisyah Llewellyn

Indonesia has a new controversial horror flick in the form of “Vina:

Sebelum 7 Hari” (Vina: Before 7 Days) which (loosely) tells the horrific
tale of Vina Dewi Arsita, a 16-year-old from Cirebon in West Java who
was gang raped and murdered in 2016.
The film was shot as a horror story, and the plot revolves around a friend
of Vina being possessed by her spirit some three days after her death, and
narrating her tragic demise to Vina’s distraught family.
Apparently, this also happened in real life.
“[The friend who was possessed by] Vina’s spirit told us everything about
what happened, she said ‘don’t be fooled by the police, it wasn’t an
accident…I was raped, killed, tortured, hit by wooden block,’” Marliana,
Vina’s sister said of the incident.
She also said that she recorded the possessed voice and took the
recording to the police.
The film has sold some 6 million tickets since it was released in May,
making it Indonesia’s second highest grossing film of 2024 after the
comedy-horror film “Agak Laen.” It is one of a spate of recent Indonesian
horror films that are dominating the box office.
In both the real life case and the film, Vina’s body was found under a
bridge in Cirebon alongside her 16-year-old boyfriend, Muhammad “Eky”
Rizky.
Initially, the police told the family that the teenagers had been involved
in a traffic collision, although this appeared unlikely as the motorbike the
couple had been riding was not damaged.
Following a more thorough investigation, the police concluded that the
young couple had been attacked by a motorcycle gang who had raped
and tortured Vina and murdered both her and Eky before dumping their
bodies.
Some eight people were arrested following the crime out of 11 sought by
the police, and seven were sentenced to life imprisonment back in 2017.
The eighth perpetrator received an eight-year sentence as he was a minor
at the time of the attack
Three suspects were never found.
Now, eight years later, the film about the case has been made and
released, and caused immediate controversy for a number of reasons.
Most notable was the decision to make the story into a horror film, rather
than a documentary or simple dramatization of the true events, which
many commentators found tasteless and insulting to Vina and her family.
The film is graphic in its depictions of the sexual assault and violence
faced by Vina and Eky, earning it a rare 17+ certification in Indonesia.
Then, an even more dramatic twist.
Following the release of the film on May 8, police arrested two men and a
construction worker named Pegi Setiawan on May 21 – alleging that
Setiawan was the mastermind of the crime.
Some may wonder why, when the Cirebon police had made no headway
in the case since 2016, the West Java police, who swiftly took over the
case, were suddenly able to arrest the alleged ringleader some two weeks
after the film premiered.
Apparently, Setiawan had been on the run for eight years, living under
false names, although in a press conference, he claimed that he was
“willing to die” to prove his innocence.
Legal experts and commentators have also pushed back, pointing out that
the police may now feel under undue pressure to solve the case, causing
them to cut corners. Critics accuse the police of not taking the double
murder seriously from the outset.
Most unfortunately, Vina’s family have been caught up in the storm of
controversy surrounding Setiawan’s arrest, after having originally given
their consent for the film to be made in the hopes that it would prompt a
review of the cold case.
Marliana, Vina’s sister, said that the family has been blamed for
Setiawan’s alleged wrongful arrest by online sleuths protesting his
innocence, causing yet more emotional distress.
“They blame my family. How does my family have anything to do with
it?” she said.
It does not stop there.
In early June, the director of the film, Anggy Umbara, was questioned for
seven hours about the case by West Java Police investigators – something
of a bizarre development to anyone watching either the film or its real
life repercussions.
Of course, any developments in a cold case are certainly always welcome,
and it would not be the first time that a film or documentary released
years after a crime has reactivated and solved a case.
Yet the choice to portray the story of Vina’s death in such a gratuitous
way on screen, coupled with the seeming sudden desire to reinvestigate
the case by the police seems like a hollow attempt at justice, which has
only served to further muddy the waters.
Should the film have been made at all?

The Author
Aisyah Llewellyn is a British writer based in Medan, Indonesia, and a columnist for The
Diplomat.

Facebook, 賴清德
Taiwan’s LGBTQ Progress Under
Lai Ching-te: From Rhetoric to
Action
With the DPP’s legacy on marriage equality as a
springboard, President Lai should advance LGBTQ rights in
Taiwan through a two-pronged strategy.
By Huynh Tam Sang and Phan Van Tim

During her eight years in office, Taiwan’s previous President Tsai Ing-wen
endorsed marriage equality and aspired to build a Taiwan where
individuals can freely express themselves and marry their loved ones,
irrespective of their gender identity or sexual orientation. The
legalization of same-sex marriage in 2019 highlighted her
administration’s support for gender equality and LGBTQ activism,
helping to bolster Taiwan’s standing as a staunch advocate of LGBTQ
rights.
Many Taiwanese, particularly the younger generation, see being pro-
LGBTQ as a new identity marker of the democratic island. Distinctive and
progressive values help Taiwan distinguish itself from China’s
government, which has intensified crackdowns on queer people.
In October 2023, then-Vice President Lai Ching-te of Taiwan’s Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) sported a rainbow-patterned scarf and
participated in Taipei’s annual pride parade – East Asia's largest gay pride
event. In doing so, Lai became the most prominent Taiwanese official to
attend the parade since its launch in 2003.
At the event, Lai said, “Equal marriage is not the end – it’s the starting
point for diversity,” and vowed to “stand steadfast on this path,” sending
an unequivocal message to Taiwan’s LGBTQ community about the
government’s acceptance.
Lai, who assumed the presidency on May 20, should build upon Tsai’s
legacy to realize his promise of enhancing social diversity and gender
equality in Taiwan. Lai should embrace a two-pronged strategy: forging a
LGBTQ-friendly society at home and boosting Taiwan’s profile abroad
through the utilization of “queer diplomacy.”
Promoting Gender Equality at Home
There has been a surge of support for LGBTQ rights in Taiwan. The most
recent survey conducted by the Executive Yuan’s Department of Gender
Equality found that 69.1 percent of respondents endorsed same-sex
marriage. That reflects a marked increase from just 37.4 percent support
in 2018, the year prior to Taiwan’s legalization of same-sex unions. This
shift demonstrates the importance of government policies in changing
public perceptions of the LGBTQ community and accelerating the
visibility of LGBTQ individuals in Taiwanese society.
The historic win of Huang Jie, Taiwan’s first openly gay legislator, in the
2024 election, will help invigorate the domestic LGBTQ rights movement.
LGBTQ rights will likely be better protected in legislation and regulations
when more openly gay persons are visible in political arenas.
Although the LGBTQ movement made great strides during Tsai’s two
terms in power, Taiwan’s gay community faces obstacles ranging from
hurdles in accessing assisted reproduction and surrogacy services, to
restrictions on same-sex marriages between Taiwanese and Chinese
citizens. Additionally, LGBTQ members of Indigenous communities, who
endure double prejudice because of their sexual orientation and their
Indigenous status, are overlooked and marginalized in mainstream
debates about LGBTQ inclusion.
Likewise, despite some progress in transgender rights, transgender
people continue to encounter discrimination and misapprehension in
daily life, at work, and in medical settings. If a transgender person wishes
to change their legal gender on official documents, they are required by
law to submit proof of undergoing gender-affirming surgery. The
financial burden of this medical procedure for transgender individuals is
substantial.
Since this hurdle prevents about 90 percent of Taiwanese transgender
persons from obtaining national identification cards that match their
gender identity, the elimination of the aforementioned surgical
requirement is a requisite. Abolishing the need for costly and time-
consuming processes will help transgender people be free from
prejudice, enjoy full access to healthcare rights, and perhaps most
importantly, live and express their true selves.
However, Lai’s goals for a more inclusive and equitable Taiwan would
have a tough time getting off the ground as the ruling DPP lost its
majority in the Legislative Yuan in the 2024 polls. Many saw the
installation of Han Kuo-yu of the Kuomintang (KMT) as the president
(speaker) of the Legislative Yuan as a major setback for the LGBTQ rights
movement. Due to his controversial stance on same-sex marriage, Han
would likely use his power to halt or impede the passage of legislation
that support the rights of the LGBTQ community. Some legislators of the
KMT, the DPP’s main opposition party, even threatened to repeal the
same-sex marriage law if their party were to win a majority in the
Legislative Yuan.
The fragmented and divided parliament poses a burden on Lai’s
shoulders in many policy areas, including the pursuit of equal rights for
Taiwan’s LGBTQ community.
But Lai has initiatives in mind to support LGBTQ rights. Through the
“National Project of Hope” policy plan announced in his inaugural
address, Lai pledged to promote gender equality, build a more equitable
society in which everyone can “comfortably express their true identity,”
and establish gender education programs that support LGBTQ families’
equality and liberty. Lai’s grand vision of a Taiwan built on equality,
justice, and inclusivity deserves credit, but ultimately, actions speak
louder than words.
Lai would do well to provide space for social activists and civil society
leaders, who have been at the forefront of the LGBTQ movement, to
further LGBTQ rights. He should encourage more meaningful coverage of
activist groups’ endeavors for upholding LGBTQ rights and Taiwanese
influential LGBTQ individuals on social media and local news. Their
candor and unique personalities provide real-life experiences and richer
narratives on the intertwined relations between Taiwan’s status as a
vibrant democracy and society’s acceptance of gender and sexual rights.
But in the long run, the success of Lai’s efforts to promote LGBTQ rights
will likely hinge on his adeptness to harmonize interests and concerns
with opposition parties and work together toward social and political
reform.
Promote Taiwan’s “Queer Diplomacy”
Taiwan holds a peculiar status in international politics: It meets all the
requirements for statehood but has failed to secure robust diplomatic
recognition due to mounting pressure from the behemoth next door,
China, which claims full sovereignty over the island. Tsai’s “steadfast
diplomacy” has helped elevate Taiwan’s international profile, win like-
minded democracies’ support and sympathy, and safeguard Taiwan’s
sovereignty against Beijing’s intensive pressure.
By pledging to steer the self-governed island through “values-based
diplomacy,” Lai is expected to frame Taiwan’s democratic feats as both a
model and inspiration for countries grappling with democratic
regression. In his inaugural address, Lai touted democracy as one of the
“four pillars plan for peace,” vowing that Taiwan would foster
collaboration with other democracies “to form a democratic community,
and share our experiences across a range of fields.” Despite the absence
of formal diplomatic relations, Taiwan has never been more affiliated
with Western democracies than it is now.
Here is where tongzhi (LGBTQ) diplomacy, also known as “queer
diplomacy,” slots in nicely.
Given Taiwan’s progressive policies on human rights – it was the first in
Asia to legalize same-sex marriage – Lai should utilize LGBTQ rights
diplomacy to leverage Taiwan’s international standing as a thriving
democracy where all citizens enjoy equal rights. The Western democratic
world, particularly the European Union, now views human rights as the
most pressing issue. Hence, Lai should team up with those nations to
form a democratic cohort that commits to supporting LGBTQ rights.
The Program for EU-Taiwan Gender Equality Cooperation and Training
Framework (EU-Taiwan GECTF), launched in 2019 to exchange
experiences in LGBTQ rights credentials, is one avenue that Lai may use
to deepen collaboration with European democracies. This would allow
Taiwan to expand its global footprint while also strengthening ties with
like-minded partners.
To counter Beijing’s persistent attempts to squeeze Taipei’s maneuvering
space, democratic Taiwan should engage in niche diplomacy by
promoting its LGBTQ rights achievements. Promoting Taiwan’s image as
an unwavering advocate for human rights and equality could be a
strategic move, considering the striking contrast between China’s
conservative policies and Taiwan’s thriving LGBTQ community. In the
quest for a unique identity, Taiwan might utilize “queer diplomacy” to set
itself apart from China, particularly when Taiwan has garnered global
attention for its efforts to defend LGBTQ rights.
Tsai Ing-wen made history in her last days in office when she invited
Nymphia Wind, a Taiwanese-American drag queen, to perform the first-
ever drag show at the Presidential Office, showcasing her steadfast
support for the LGBTQ community – and her hope that Lai, her successor,
would follow in her footsteps to advance gender equality in Taiwan. Lai’s
remarks at the 2023 pride march should be taken as serious promises
toward backing LGBTQ rights in Taiwan, much like Tsai’s 2016
presidential campaign pledge to support marriage equality, which she
eventually delivered on.
To uphold Tsai’s legacy, Lai should elevate LGBTQ rights domestically
while utilizing the island democracy’s progressive modernity to enhance
collaboration with like-minded democracies.

The Authors
Huynh Tam Sang is lecturer at Ho Chi Minh City-University of Social Sciences and Humanities
(HCM-USSH), Young Leaders Program member of the Pacific Forum, research fellow at the
Taiwan NextGen Foundation, and visiting scholar at National Taiwan University.
Phan Van Tim is research assistant at HCM-USSH, editor of “World News Desk” at Vietnam-based
Ho Chi Minh City Law Newspaper (PLO), and columnist for the Vietnam Strategic Forum (VSF).

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Abdul Basit
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