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POSITION PAPER
Delegate Name: Saiarjun Gopinath
Committee: C34 {Peacekeeping Committee}
Country: Russia Federation
Agenda: The failures of UN peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Rwanda, and other
countries.
Overview
I. Rwanda is a small country in central Africa. The genocide that occurred there in
1994 was a tragic and brutal struggle. The Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority
are the two main ethnic groupings with which the genocide began. These
hostilities date back many years. Although Hutu and Tutsi had coexisted
traditionally, ethnic divides were made worse by colonial pressures, especially
during Belgian control. The ethnic divide was a very important factor that
contributed to the genocide.
II. In Rwanda, there have long been ethnic conflicts and prejudice between the Hutu
and Tutsi communities' giving preference to the Tutsi minority during their
colonial authority, the Belgians deepened racial tensions and created an identity
card system that categorized people according to their ethnicity.
III. The plane carrying Hutu president of Rwanda, Juvénal Habyarimana, was shot
down on April 6, 1994. The genocide was sparked by this incident. After the
assassination, moderate Hutus and Tutsis were widely and methodically killed.
The military, militias, and government under Hutu leadership planned the
violence. This was one of the main causes of the genocide.
IV. Between April and July of 1994, radical Hutu factions planned a genocide against
the Tutsi people over a 100-day period. Machetes, guns, and other weapons were
used in a methodical manner in the killings. The two ethnic groups' jealousy were
heightened by this use of aggression. The dissemination of hate speech and
propaganda through several media channels was essential in constructing a
narrative that degraded the Tutsi community. This propaganda had a part in
fostering an environment of distrust, fear, and hatred.
V. The mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which was
created to support the promotion of peace in Rwanda and assist in implementing
the Arusha Accords, was inadequate. The mandate of UNAMIR lacked the
requisite power, resources, and operational capacity to adequately tackle the
mounting violence.
VI. In addition to having little funding, UNAMIR did not have enough troops or
resources to deal with the extent of the violence. At the height of the genocide, the
unit was downsized from an initial contingent of over 2,500 soldiers to little over
250.
VII. Strong intervention to halt the genocide was not possible because to UNAMIR's
narrow rules of engagement. In certain cases, peacekeepers were forbidden from
utilising force to defend civilians.
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VIII. Additionally, the widespread use of firearms by Rwandan citizens increased
friction within the UN because of the deployment of sophisticated weaponry and
an excessive number of guns in the population, making it difficult for the UN to
exert authority, deploy more soldiers, and negotiate a ceasefire.
IX. Operation Turquoise was launched in June 1994 by a number of Western
countries, including France, as the genocide intensified and the level of violence
in Rwanda increased. This operation's main goal was to remove foreigners from
Rwanda, including expatriates and citizens of Europe. Many countries opposed
this action, including Russia, fearing that it would escalate the conflict and lead
this genocide to a next level. It was also a perilous decision during a time of war.
X. Under President Bill Clinton, the US was reluctant to use force to intervene in
Rwanda.
XI. At first, the US government was hesitant to classify the events in Rwanda as
genocide because they believed the situation wasn't grave enough to warrant a US
violation of the genocide agreement. The Clinton administration thought that the
assistance from other African armed forces should've been more as it's African
nations duty to safeguard other countries as well.
XII. Belgium was involved in the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR),
but it was forced to leave the assignment due to a terrible incident. A total of ten
Belgian peacekeepers lost their lives, while some were captured. Belgium
withdrew its forces from UNAMIR following the deaths of its soldiers, severely
impairing the mission's efficacy and adding to the dearth of a sufficient
international reaction.
XIII. A great genocide occurred in Rwanda as a result of the UN's lack of involvement,
the absence of powerful countries' involvement, and the extensive use of weapons.
This example vividly illustrated the UN's failure to maintain peace in other
countries like Rwanda.
XIV. In July 1995, the UN was powerless to stop the carnage at Srebrenica. UN
peacekeeping forces, especially the Dutch battalion, failed to defend Bosnian
Muslim citizens from General Ratko Mladić's Bosnian Serb forces, even after
proclaiming Srebrenica a safe area. One of the biggest massacres in Europe since
World War II was the outcome of the failure.
XV. Although "safe areas" were supposed to protect citizens, they weren't adequately
guarded. The UN peacekeepers were frequently hampered by stringent rules of
engagement and lacked a strong mandate. Furthermore, a major contributing cause
to the Bosnian Serb forces' use of force is the absence of troops to protect the safe
areas.
XVI. The United Nations Protection Force, or UNPROFOR, lacked the military might
and enforcement authority required for a swift operation. This vulnerability made
it more difficult to put an end to the hostilities and crimes that the opposing sides
were committing.
XVII. Coordination of activities and communication between UN agencies and
participating member nations in the peacekeeping deployment presented
difficulties. The UN's ability to effectively respond to the developing crisis was
impeded by this lack of coordination. An arms embargo was imposed by the UN
on all sides to the conflict, including the government of Bosnia. The goal of the
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embargo was to keep the fighting from getting worse, but in the process, it made it
more difficult for the Bosnian government to defend itself. Serbian military
assistance to Bosnian Serb forces persisted throughout the meantime. The arms
embargo has come under fire for extending the war and producing an imbalance in
military power.
XVIII. The UN was powerless to stop massive ethnic cleansing, which involved the
forcible relocation of people along racial lines. Human rights were violated by this
policy, which also made the humanitarian catastrophe worse. The UN was unable
to reach a peaceful resolution despite numerous breaches.
XIX. Under President Franjo Tudjman, Croatia attempted to divide Bosnia into areas
designated for the ethnic Croats. With Bosnian Croat forces in tow, Croatian
forces participated in combat operations. Croatia's involvement in the conflict
added to its complexity, even if it was not the only cause of it.
XX. The way the world community responded to the conflict drew condemnation, even
from the United Nations. The Bosnian government was more impacted by the UN
arms embargo than the more well-armed Bosnian Serbs. There have also been
cases of insufficient action and failure to stop crimes, such the massacre at
Srebrenica.
XXI. The geographical differences within the UN Security Council impeded the
development of a unified policy. Disagreements among member nations made it
more difficult for the UN to handle the complicated crisis, as did a lack of political
resolve to act aggressively. Even while the imposed arms embargo was meant to
stop the situation from getting worse, it disproportionately hurt the Bosnian
government, which was being attacked by stronger military forces. These
shortcomings sparked critical analysis of UN peacekeeping efforts, which in turn
sparked talks about reform and the requirement for a stronger, more coordinated
international response to hostilities.
Russian Federation’s Stance
I. Russia participated in talks and decisions on the genocide in Rwanda. In order to
assist in putting the Arusha Peace Agreement into effect, the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was founded in 1994 after the UN
Security Council adopted (Resolution 912) on April 21.
II. Due to the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Russia's foreign
policy changed significantly in the 1990s. Russia was going through a difficult
transition, and its objectives in terms of foreign policy were changing. During this
time, internal problems and the Russian state's restructuring were the main
priorities.
III. Rwanda gave humanitarian assistance to Rwanda following the genocide. The
provision of humanitarian aid demonstrated support for the impacted populace and
was a sign of peace by Russia.
IV. Russia kept diplomatic ties and participated in a number of alliances with African
nations. These interactions included organised peace negotiations between the two
ethnic groups implicated in the Rwandan genocide, as well as diplomatic
encounters, military sales, and economic collaboration. It is noteworthy that the
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extent and character of Russia's engagement differed among African countries,
contingent upon their respective geopolitical, economic, and social positions.
V. The UN Security Council founded the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) in 1994 to bring cases against those accountable for the genocide and
other grave transgressions of international humanitarian law. In order to hold
important individuals responsible for their acts during the genocide, the ICTR was
essential. The Russian military provided strong support to the ICTR.
VI. Apart from media headlines that generally follow reactions against the Russian
Federation, not much has been said about Russia's stance regarding the Rwandan
Tribunal's activities. However, Russia unanimously decided in favour of the
Tribunal's creation during the 1994 genocide. It endorsed every UN Secretary
General report that preceded its formation, including the Commission of Experts'
report.
VII. As Russia grew closer to the Serbs in Bosnia, its position began to change. This
relationship was shaped in part by the historical and cultural ties that existed
between Russia and the Slavic Serbs. Russia voiced worries about Bosnia's
sovereignty and argued against NATO and UN military action, favouring a
diplomatic resolution.
VIII. As the fighting carried on, worldwide demand for a stronger response to the
Bosnian War grew, especially following the Srebrenica tragedy in July 1995.
IX. Under President Boris Yeltsin, Russia started to turn away from the Bosnian Serbs
after threats were sent to the Russian government and became more open to
backing peace attempts.
X. Russia backed a UN resolution in September 1995 authorizing attacks against
locations held by Bosnian Serbs. This resolution was passed by Russia merely on
the basis of threats by the forces of Bosnian Serbs.
XI. The international world, including Russia, actively participated in the negotiations
of the Dayton Agreement, which put an end to the war in November 1995.
XII. Russia supplied most troops to the international peacekeeping force (IFOR)
stationed in Bosnia and participated in the execution of the Dayton Agreement.
XIII. Russia backed Resolution 1199 of the UN Security Council, which gave NATO
permission to launch airstrikes against positions held by Bosnian Serbs inside the
safe zones. This was different from Russia's earlier opposition to foreign
interference.
XIV. The goal of the airstrikes was to coerce the Bosnian Serbs into accepting a peace
agreement, and Russia's backing of this resolution showed a more cooperative
stance.
Conclusion
I. Establishing truth, pursuing targeted economic growth, and ensuring prompt
justice through international cooperation are all necessary to handle the legacy of
the Rwandan genocide. Together with initiatives to advance human rights and
tolerance, international assistance in the form of infrastructure development and
humanitarian relief can help maintain long-term stability and avert future
hostilities.
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II. It is imperative to establish efficacious disarmament and demobilisation initiatives
to guarantee the successful reintegration of former fighters into society. To help
them adjust to civilian life, this entails offering them psychological support and
vocational training. The healing process can also be aided by community-based
programmes that promote a common national identity and encourage
communication amongst various ethnic groups. In addition to addressing the
immediate aftermath, these initiatives—when paired with continued international
assistance—will help foster a resilient and cohesive Rwandan society.
III. The UN can help international collaboration in the search for justice by endorsing
or establishing courts that will try and convict individuals who have committed
crimes linked to genocide. UN organisations can also operate locally to carry out
comprehensive humanitarian relief initiatives that include education, health care,
and infrastructure development.
IV. The diplomatic channels of the UN can be very helpful in settling disputes
between countries and promoting cooperation within the region. Furthermore, by
establishing truth and reconciliation institutions and encouraging communication
at the local and national levels, the UN can aid in efforts towards reconciliation.
V. The United Nations has played a pivotal role in offering a comprehensive
framework for lasting solutions in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide by
utilising its proficiency in conflict resolution and international cooperation.
VI. Diplomatic mediation is necessary to end the Bosnian Civil War and bring about
the Dayton Agreement, which splits the nation in half. Stability depends on
international peacekeeping forces, and the office of the High Representative must
supervise the application of peace and constructive projects. While truth and
reconciliation commissions encourage healing and interethnic communication,
humanitarian aid should also be given. Together, these initiatives need to work
towards establishing a more comprehensive and long-lasting peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
VII. In order to address the Bosnian Civil War, it is essential to promote economic
recovery and infrastructural reconstruction. International development aid and
financial support are crucial for boosting the economy, generating employment,
and enhancing living conditions for those affected by conflict. Ethnic divisions
should be bridged and a sense of national cohesion should be promoted through
educational and cultural exchange initiatives. The international community will
work to establish a basis for enduring peace and reduce the likelihood of future
hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina by funding economic development and
education.
VIII. Early and strong peacekeeping action, including the disarmament of warring
parties, could have improved the United Nations' strategy during the Bosnian
Civil War. Furthermore, the death toll might have been reduced by taking a more
proactive and prompt approach to humanitarian emergencies, which included the
creation of safe zones and effective relief distribution.
IX. A more thorough and long-lasting settlement would have resulted from
strengthening the UN forces' mandate for proactive peace enforcement and putting
in place a coordinated plan for post-conflict reconstruction.
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X. A more peaceful and stable transition would have also been facilitated by
persistent attempts to promote interethnic discussion and reconciliation as well as
a stronger focus on diplomatic initiatives to address the underlying problems.
Refining the UN's future conflict resolution strategies will need learning from
these experiences in resolving disputes and maintaining peace.
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