159-A Phil.

381

FERNANDO, J.:
This certiorari and prohibition proceeding to disqualify respondent Judge
Constante A. Ancheta[1] appears to be traceable to deeply-felt misgivings
about his partiality for the three accused in a pending criminal case[2] for
frustrated homicide. The allegations in the petition, while not overly
impressive, amounting at the most to equivocal circumstances which could
be the basis for suspicion, led this Court to require comment from
respondents and to issue in the meanwhile a restraining order. Such a
response was prompted by the oft-repeated judicial pronouncement that
every litigant "is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge."[3] In the Comment of respondent Judge, there was not
only a vehement denial of the allegation of partiality, but also a show of
indignation in view of what he considered to be the unfairness of his
character being traduced from evidence which did not rise above the level
of hearsay. Nonetheless, so strong is the commitment to the ideal of
impartiality that the parties were duly heard. What became rather evident
was that the private prosecutor, no doubt fired by the zeal expected of
counsel, did tend to identify active participation of respondent Judge in
examining witnesses as well as rumors coming from one of his own
witnesses as sufficient basis for disqualification. We do not see it that way.
The petition must fail.

The petition discloses that at present, pending before respondent Judge is a

case for frustrated homicide, with respondents Rolando Javier, Rolando
Fajardo and Alberto Caparas as the accused,[4] It was then alleged that on
December 27, 1974, one of the witnesses for the prosecution Flordeliza
Tuazon, in the course of a conversation with a woman engaged in selling
pieces of jewelry, was informed that a certain Mila delos Santos, with a
store at the back of the Malolos Provincial Capitol, was a good friend of
respondent Judge and that this lady would be approached to influence the
latter for the purpose of obtaining a verdict of acquittal.[5] The next day,
the father of complainant Edgardo Guarin was duly informed. While it was
asserted that at first, the prosecution was not inclined to take the matter
seriously, "believing as it did in the integrity and impartiality of the
respondent judge," there did transpire "a quick succession of events
immediately following the December 27 incident [which] altered the
situation: a. on January 2, 1975 or only five (5) days thereafter at about
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the respondent judge conducted an ocular
inspection of the place in Plaridel, Bulacan where the incident,
subject-matter of the criminal prosecution took place, and surprisingly,
Mila delos Santos who is not a party to the case and who is not even a
resident of Plaridel, Bulacan, was conspicuously present and was even
having a lively conversation with the mothers of accused Rolando Javier
and Rolando Fajardo at the front door of the house of Rolando Javier, [with
the] criminal incident [having] occurred almost in front of said house; b. At
the resumption of the trial of Criminal Case No. V-1009 in the morning of
January 3, 1975, Mila delos Santos instead of dutifully attending to her
store nearby was again present in Court as if she was making her presence
felt; c. During the trial of the case on January 2 and 3, 1975, the respondent
judge showed unusual interest in cross-examining the witnesses for the
prosecution at great length a fact which did not happen prior thereto . . .; d.
When the prosecution moved to inhibit the respondent judge from
continuing with the trial of the case on January 7, 1975 and despite its plea
that it be given time to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court after the
denial of the motion, said respondent judge proceeded with the hearing
thereby further exhibiting his unusual interest in the case."[6]

In the Comment submitted by respondent Judge, there was a reference to

that portion of the petition which could, according to him, "reflect upon his
actuations"[7] but which "is pure hearsay."[8] Then came this portion: "The
last sentence, however, which at the expense of being repetitious we hereby
quote: Mila delos Santos is supposed to be close to the respondent Judge' is
a downright falsity, for the truth of the matter is that the respondent Judge
has not even known how this Mila delos Santos looks like or have had not at
anytime-talked to or seen her. For one thing, in the petition of the private
prosecutor, filed before this Court, there is no such statement. For if there
was, the Court could have touched on the matter in its Order denying the
Motion to Inhibit. Even the affidavits of Flordeliza Tuazon and Rafael
Guarin submitted in support of the petition do not contain any indication
that the respondent Judge knows the said Mila delos Santos. They only
referred to a woman saying something that she will fix the case of the
accused. The fact that this woman had been seen later in the Court is a
matter which the respondent Judge does not even know because he does
not know this Mila delos Santos. There are no statements in the affidavits
upon which to base the bias and prejudice of the Presiding Judge. At most
the statements . . . were only stated by the private prosecutor to create some
semblance of validity of his petition. It was something unfair to the
respondent Judge and for which the private prosecutor, who admitted
having prepared the said petition and made the conclusions there, should
be made to account for to this Honorable Tribunal."[9] Further: "Now,
regarding the statement that the respondent Judge had showed unusual
interest in cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution at great length
after the supposed December 27, 1974 conversation which Flordeliza
Tuazon heard is likewise not true. Even before that date, in the hearing of
this case, the Presiding Judge had already asked lengthy clarificatory
questions to the witnesses for the prosecution. It was not only on January 2
and 3, 1975. As a matter of fact, the asking of clarificatory questions by the
respondent Judge has been his practice ever since he presided over the
Circuit Criminal Court. Any Fiscal or lawyer appearing before this Court
can attest to that fact. The private prosecutor has again twisted the facts to
suit his purpose. It is true that the District State Prosecutor signed the
petition, but he executed an affidavit, which is hereto attached, disputing
the truth of the allegations in the petition that Mila delos Santos is
supposed to be close to the respondent Judge and that during the trial of
the case on January 2 and 3, 1975, the respondent Judge showed unusual
interest in cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution at great
length, which only show that the above conclusions were those of the
private prosecutor."[10] The affidavit of the state prosecutor categorically
affirms: "That when the Private Prosecutor and undersigned conferred with
respect to the move to disqualify the Trial Judge, the undersigned informed
the Private Prosecutor that to his knowledge the Trial Judge and Mila delos
Santos do not know each other; . . ."[11] There was this explanation why he
signed the petition: "That the petition before the Supreme Court was
prepared by the Private Prosecutor and while it is true that the undersigned
before affixing his signature in the said petition read the petition, he failed
to note the sentence that the Trial Judge is supposedly close to Mila delos
Santos; That the petition was only hurriedly read by the undersigned
believing that the contents of the same would be substantially the same as
that of the motion to disqualify the Trial Judge; …"[12] Then came this
reiteration of respondent Judge not being acquainted with Mila delos
Santos: "That to the knowledge of the undersigned up to now Mila delos
Santos and Trial Judge do not know each other."[13]

As noted, there was a hearing on the merits of the petition. The private
prosecutor,[14] as was to be expected, had an earnest and impassioned plea
for what he considered to be the imperative character of the Gutierrez
ruling, which in his view could be satisfied with nothing less than the
disqualification of a judge at whose actuations the finger of suspicion may
be pointed. It did not suffice. There was a straight-forward explanation by
respondent Judge, whose defense of his impartiality was aided by the
admission of the state prosecutor that it was his wont to examine witnesses
minutely and that there was, to his knowledge, no basis for the imputation
of the alleged friendly relations with that certain Mila delos Santos.
Necessarily then, as was stated earlier, the petition lacks legal foundation.

1. The due process requirement so vividly expressed in the language of the

"cold neutrality of an impartial judge" is embodied in a Rules of Court
provision on disqualification of judicial officers.[15] Pecuniary interest,
family ties, whether by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth degree to
either party, and previous connection with the case, are grounds of
inhibition unless there he a "regular consent of all parties in interest, signed
by them and entered upon the record."[16] A judge, moreover "in the
exercise of his sound discretion", is encouraged to "disqualify himself from
sitting in a case for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned
above."[17] This 1974 amendment to the present rule on disqualification
embodies a principle that dates back to Gutierrez vs. Santos,[18] where this
Court did lend approval to an order of the then Judge Arsenio Santos, who
refused to try a case although not subject to disqualification, in view of his
previous law practice defending fishpond owners, the controversy dealing
with conflicting rights over such kind of property, lending itself to the
misinterpretation that it could be a possible source of prejudice. In Del
Castilo vs. Javelona,[19] where a judge of a court of first instance sustained
the voluntary inhibition of a justice of the peace because he was a
first-degree cousin of defendant's counsel, not of any of the parties as
required by the Rule, this Court found nothing objectionable. The language
of permissiveness has moreover, as lately construed, assumed in effect a
mandatory character in accordance with Mateo vs. Villaluz.[20] Thus, in
referring to the 1964 amendment to the Rules, this Court stressed in its
opinion: "Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of the bench that
outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the
matter that calls for adjudication, there may be other causes that could
conceivably erode the trait of objectivity thus calling for inhibition. That is
to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences or
predilections are many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if any such
should make its appearance and prove difficult to resist, the better course
for a judge is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being
misunderstood. His reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved.
What is even more important, the ideal of an impartial administration of
justice is lived up to. Thus is due process vindicated."[21] It is to be
remembered, however, in the interest of a sound administration of justice,
that the disqualification must come "for just or valid reasons." It is such an
element that is precisely lacking in this case. To sustain the petition then is
far from warranted.

2. It may not be amiss to add a few more words on the imputation of the
alleged partiality of respondent Judge as evidenced by the mode and
manner he would question prosecution witnesses. It was asserted that he
would examine them at length and in detail on relatively unimportant
matters. For the private prosecutor, that was another highly suspicious
circumstance. Such an appraisal on its face is hardly convincing. It would
be to curtail or limit unduly the discretion of a trial judge if minute and
searching queries from the bench would be invested with a sinister
significance. Litigants should remember that a judge is there precisely to
ascertain the truth of the controversy before him. He enjoys a great deal of
latitude therefore in examining witnesses within the limits of course of
evidentiary rules. It is fitting and proper that a testimony should not be
incomplete or obscure. After all, the judge is the arbiter and he must be in a
position to satisfy himself as to the respective merits of the claims of both
parties.[22] That is merely to manifest fidelity to the basic doctrine of
fairness implicit in due process. This is not to deny, of course, that there
may be cases where an analysis of the questions asked will reveal bias. This
is not, however, one of them. Thus we conclude, especially so in view of the
admission of the state prosecutor assigned to the sala of respondent Judge
that it is the latter's invariable practice to probe in a meticulous and
searching manner the testimony of the witnesses, whether from the
prosecution or the defense.

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed

for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order issued on January 24,
1975 is lifted. No costs.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.