How science tracks things from happening (at least typ-

understanding ically; the author explores multiple

ways in which explanation and pre-
diction or successful intervention
Kevin McCain, Understanding: How
might come apart in chapter 4). On
Science Explains the World.
the other hand, a world that we can
Cambridge University Press, explain adequately or successfully
Cambridge 2022, [Link] + 122. is a world that makes sense to us. It
The aim of McCain’s book is an am- is a world that we understand. Ad-
bitious one: to provide the readers equate or successful explanations,
with an understanding of science— thus, contribute to making the world
i.e., of what science does, of how an intelligible place. The author con-
science works, of what science aims ceives of these two goals of explana-
to achieve, and, more generally, of tion, the practical and the epistemic,
what makes science a successful as tightly intertwined. Given that we
epistemic endeavor. understand a phenomenon or sub-

Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)

The author states in chapter 1 ject matter, he claims, we will—at
that, at its core, science is about least typically—be effective in our
explanation. Somewhat more pre- practical interaction with it. Under-
cisely: the scientific enterprise is an standing a phenomenon gives us
enterprise of formulating, evaluat- some sort of power over it: it turns
ing, and testing explanations for em- it into something that we can handle
pirical phenomena. Why do scien- and, to some extent, bend to our will.

No 74 (2023), pp. 317–320 ∙ CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0

tists care about explanation? What
is gained once one has access to But what exactly is an expla-
an adequate or successful explana- nation? What does it mean to ex-
tion for some phenomenon? Ade- plain a phenomenon? What is the
quate or successful explanations, the general structure of an explanation?
author notices, are means to many What does an explanans tell us about
ends that we value. Some of these an explanandum? These questions
ends are practical; other are epis- are notoriously difficult to answer,
temic. On one hand, a world that which is reflected in the somewhat
we can explain adequately or suc- intimidating variety of models of
cessfully is a world in which we can explanation that has been flourish-
act effectively, i.e., in which we can ing in the philosophical literature in
predict what will happen, contribute the last decades. In chapter 2, Mc-
to make things happen, and prevent Cain manages to offer a very broad
318 Book reviews

and yet instructive explication of the edge when he writes: ‘[w]e can
term ‘explanation’—one that could know that a[n] . . . explanation is cor-
be deployed as a sort of compass rect when it is in fact correct and
to orient oneself while navigating we have sufficient evidence for be-
this variety of models. Explaining lieving that it is correct’ (McCain,
(prominently in science, but prob- 2022, p.38, emphasis added). And
ably also in everyday life), the au- yet, a couple of pages later, the au-
thor suggests, is a matter of ‘track- thor claims something different. He
ing dependency relations’ (p. 23). writes: ‘we can know that a[n] . . .
Somewhat more precisely: an expla- explanation is correct by possess-
nation of a phenomenon 𝜙 provides ing evidence that makes the truth
answers to why- and how-questions of that explanation beyond a reason-
relevant to 𝜙, and in doing so, it able doubt’ (McCain, 2022, p.40).
aims at showing what 𝜙 depends This second quote suggests the fol-
upon and what depends upon 𝜙 (e.g., lowing: whether we have knowledge
causally, nomologically. . . ). of an explanation or not is not a mat-
The author points out in chap- ter of how accurately the explana-
ter 3, while zooming in on specific tion mirrors the facts; this rather
kinds of scientific explanation, that depends on the evidence that we
scientists are after scientific knowl- have in support of the explanation,
edge of explanations. As standardly and probably also on our eviden-
conceived in epistemology, knowl- tial standards—standards that are
edge requires, among other things, not carved in stone, but likely to
the fulfillment of a truth-condition. change over time. These strike me
We cannot know that 𝑝 if 𝑝 is false. as two quite different conceptions of
If we know that 𝑝, then 𝑝 is true. If (scientific) knowledge, that at least
this conception of knowledge holds, prima facie, are not easy to recon-
then, for us to know that 𝑞 explains cile. If the second conception holds,
𝑝, it must be that 𝑞 correctly ex- what counts as scientific knowledge
plains 𝑝. In other words: an explana- at a certain point in time might be
tion that is known is one that mir- overturned at a later point in time.
rors the facts, that depicts depen- We can have scientific knowledge of
dency relations actually holding in explanations that are extremely well-
the real world. The author seems to grounded in light of our evidential
align to this conception of knowl- standards and yet fail to mirror the
 Book reviews 319

facts. This is not possible under the explanation in the production of sci-
first conception. If we know an ex- entific knowledge and he makes it
planation, then it must be true. clear that the function of an infer-
How could this tension be re- ence to the best explanation is to
solved? Maybe what McCain is help identify not truth, but what is
telling us is that genuine knowledge reasonable to endorse in the given
of explanations, i.e., knowledge of epistemic circumstances.
explanations that are correct, func- While this reading is certainly
tions at best as a regulative ideal in in line with the book’s overall spirit,
the scientific endeavor. In scientific I am not sure it fully captures what
practice we have no way of stepping McCain has in mind. Here and there
out of our representational systems throughout the book, one gets the
and comparing them to an indepen- impression that truth and genuine
dent reality. Thus, we have no in- knowledge are more for the au-
fallible way to tell whether we re- thor than regulative ideals orienting
ally know, and whether the expla- the scientific endeavor. Somewhat
nations that we formulated and de- more radical realist tendencies shine
ploy are indeed corresponding to the through the book’s pages. Consider,
facts. The best we can do in prac- for example, chapter 5: there, the
tice is hold true or commit ourselves author deals with the question of
to those explanations that we rea- how explanations are evaluated and
sonably judge as acceptable—i.e., explores the role of empirical and
to those that perform best in light theoretical virtues in such evalua-
of our evidential standards. Given tion. At the end of the chapter, in
that we have sufficient grounds to what seems like a sort of ‘optimistic
endorse an explanation, we have sci- meta-induction’, he claims that in
entific knowledge of it. But scien- light of how successful we have
tific knowledge is not necessarily been in the past by letting empiri-
genuine knowledge; it can be di- cal and theoretical virtues orient our
rected to representational systems theory choice, it is reasonable for us
that, despite all evidence suggesting to trust that ‘such virtues are good
the contrary, do not fulfill a truth- indicators of the truth’ (McCain,
requirement. The final chapter of the 2022, p.68). Of the truth, then—not
book, chapter 8, seems to provide at of some weaker epistemic desidera-
least some support to this reading. In tum such as reasonable acceptabil-
the chapter, the author investigates ity! In chapter 6, truth peeps out
the role of the inference to the best prominently again. While investigat-
320

ing the role that explanations play 2022, p.68). But then, he must be
in fostering understanding, the au- endorsing some form of scientific re-
thor asks: ‘Is truth important for alism. That is, he must believe that
understanding or scientific explana- science not only targets truth, but
tions?’ (McCain, 2022, p.78). His has actually achieved it (at least to
answer does not leave much room some extent); he must believe that
for interpretation: ‘Yes, truth is ex- science has managed to formulate
tremely important for both. While explanations that are not only wor-
a false explanation might be such thy of being endorsed in the given
that if it were true it would provide epistemic circumstances and in light
understanding, genuine understand- of our evidential standards, but ac-
ing requires accurate explanations’ tually correct, i.e., corresponding to
(ibidem). Even allegedly inaccurate reality (at least approximately so).
scientific representations, such as I think McCain’s excellent book
idealized models, or so the author would have gained in further clarity
claims in chapter 7, provide us with and depth if such a realist or opti-
understanding only insofar as they mistic stance towards science would
make us appreciate truths about de- have been not just presupposed and
pendency relations that we would used as an unquestionable basis to
otherwise overlook. build on, but rather put on the ta-
Genuine understanding then, ble, made explicit, articulated, and
according to the author, requires defended against alternatives. The
truth and is gained via explanations book certainly succeeds in its aim: it
that mirror the facts. We need gen- provides the readers with an under-
uine knowledge of explanations in standing of science; but as scientific
order to understand; a less demand- realism is not the only available and
ing epistemic state such as scien- viable stance, what is offered is just
tific knowledge (as clarified above) one way in which science could be
won’t do if it does not guarantee understood.
that truth has been reached. Now, Federica I. Malfatti
McCain clearly does not take un-
University of Innsbruck
derstanding to be something that
only a final science will achieve. He McCain, K., 2022. Understand-
takes understanding to be instanti- ing: How Science Explains the
ated in real-life scientific practice. World, Understanding Life. Cam-
Our scientific understanding grows, bridge: Cambridge University
he claims; we make advancements Press. [Link]
in understanding (see, e.g. McCain, 9781108997027.