DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY 0F COURTS

1. SAINT MARY CRUSADE V. RIEL

GR NO. 186508, JANUARY 12, 2015

2. ALFREDO NON V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

GR NO. 251177

DOCTRINE OF ANCILLARY JURISDICTION

3. UIC V. OFFICE OF THE SEC. OF DOLO

GR NO. 178085-178086, SEPT. 14, 2015

REAL ACTION; INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION

4. ROLDAN V. BARRIOS
GR NO. 214803, APRIL 23, 2018

5. FIRST SARMIENTO
GR NO. 202836, JUNE 19, 2018

ASPECTS OF JURISDICTION

6. FRIAS V. ALCAYDE
GR NO. 194262

DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPLE AND JURISDICTION

7. AMOGUIS V. BALLADO ET. AL
GR NO. 189626, AUGUST 20, 2018

FACTS:
On November 24, 1969, spouses Francisco Ballado and Concepcion Ballado
entered into two contracts to sell with owner and developer St. Joseph Realty, Ltd.
to buy on installment parcels of land, designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2. The Ballado
Spouses amortized until 1979 when Crisanto Pinili, St. Joseph Realty’s collector,
refused to receive their payments because of a small house they had erected
therein in violation of the rules of the subdivision. Francisco informed St. Joseph
Realty that the small house had already been taken down, but Pinili still did not
come to collect.

On February 17, 1987, the Ballado Spouses discovered that St. Joseph Realty
rescinded their contracts. Meanwhile, St. Joseph Realty sold Lot Nos. 1 and 2 to
Epifanio Amoguis,father of Gregorio Amoguis and Tito Amoguis (collectively,
the Amoguis Brothers).After making payments, the Amoguis Brothers then
occupied the lots. Francisco confronted the Amoguis Brothers when he saw that
the barbed fences, which he had installed around the lots, were taken down.
Epifanio told him that he bought the lots from St. Joseph Realty.

The Ballado Spouses filed a Complaint for damages, injunction with writ of
preliminary injunction, mandatory injunction, cancellation and annulment of titles,
and attorney’s fees. St. Joseph Realty filed its Answer. It was its affirmative
defense that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case, and that
jurisdiction was properly vested in the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission.

The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the Ballado Spouses, and against St.
Joseph Realty and the Amoguis Brothers. The Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision, affirming the Regional Trial Court. Though not raised, the Court of
Appeals discussed at the outset the issue of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
ruled that since neither St. Joseph Realty nor the Amoguis Brothers raised the
issue of jurisdiction before the Regional Trial Court, they must be considered
estopped from raising it on appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction was lost by waiver or estoppel?

RULING:
Yes. Petitioners are already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. Laches had already set in.

Presidential Decree No. 957 was approved on July 12, 1976, 11 years before the
Ballado Spouses filed their complaint. This means that the law mandating the
jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority, which later on became the House
and Land Use Regulatory Board, had long been in effect when petitioners filed
their Answer and participated in trial court proceedings. It behooved them to raise
the issue of jurisdiction then, especially since St. Joseph Realty, their co-
respondent, raised it in its Answer albeit superficially and without any discussion.

The Ballado Spouses’ rights and interests lie not just as buyers of any property,
but buyers of subdivision lots from a subdivision developer. From the
circumstances between St. Joseph Realty and the Ballado Spouses, there is no
doubt that the then National Housing Authority had jurisdiction to determine the
parties’ obligations under the contracts to sell and the damages that may have
arisen from their breach. The Ballado Spouses’ Complaint should have been filed
before it.

However, this Court has discussed with great nuance the legal principle
enunciated in Tijam vs Sibonghanoy. In estoppel by laches, a claimant has a right
that he or she could otherwise exercise if not for his or her delay in asserting it.
This delay in the exercise of the right unjustly misleads the court and the opposing
party of its waiver. Thus, to claim it belatedly given the specific circumstances of
the case would be unjust.

However, Calimlim v. Hon. Ramirez unequivocally ruled that it is only when the
exceptional instances in Tijam are present should estoppel by laches apply over
delayed claims. Calimlim clarified the additional requirement that for estoppel by
laches to be appreciated against a claim for jurisdiction, there must be an
ostensible showing that the claimant had “knowledge or consciousness of the facts
upon which it is based.”

Figueroa v. People of the Philippines framed the exceptional character of Tijam:

The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional

circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general
rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at
length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it
has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from
asserting the court’s absence or lack of jurisdiction, only
supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts
to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop
him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject
matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by
mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the
person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court
does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party
does not suffer any harm.

Thus, Tijam will only apply when given the circumstances of a case, allowing the
belated objection to the jurisdiction of the court will additionally cause irreparable
damages, and therefore, injustice to the other party that relied on the forum and
the implicit waiver.
 In summary, Tijam applies to a party claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction
when:

1. there was a statutory right in favor of the claimant;

2. the statutory right was not invoked;
3. an unreasonable length of time lapsed before the claimant
raised the issue of jurisdiction;
4. the claimant actively participated in the case and sought
affirmative relief from the court without jurisdiction;
5. the claimant knew or had constructive knowledge of which
forum possesses subject matter jurisdiction; and
6. irreparable damage will be caused to the other party who
relied on the forum and the claimant’s implicit waiver.

Tijam applies in this case. The allegations, determinative of subject matter

jurisdiction, were apparent on the face of the Complaint. The law that determines
jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority had been in place for more than a
decade when the Complaint was filed. St. Joseph Realty raised lack of jurisdiction
in its Answer. Petitioners sought affirmative relief from the Regional Trial Court
and actively participated in all stages of the proceedings. Therefore, there was no
valid reason for petitioners to raise the issue of jurisdiction only now before this
Court.

8. VELASQUEZ V. LISONDRA LAND INC.

GR NO. 231290, AUGUST 27, 2020

FACTS:
Perfecto files a case at RTC for breach of contract. Lisondra, sought to dismiss the
case for lack of jurisdiction contending that it is the HLURB that has jurisdiction
over the case. RTC ruled to decide on the case. CA dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. The CA's ruling lapsed into finality.

Consequently, Perfecto instituted a complaint with the HLURB contending that

Lisondra Land committed unsound real estate practices. HLURB arbiter ruled in
favor of Perfecto. Consequently, the contract was rescinded, transferred the
project management to Perfecto, and ordered Lisondra Land to pay fines, damages
and attorney's fees. HLURB BOC denied Lisondra Land's appeal and affirmed the
findings of the HLURB Arbiter with modifications as to the amount of damages
and attorney's fees.

Dissatisfied, Lisondra Land brought the case to the Office of the President (OP).
In its Decision dated August 1, 2013, the OP denied the appeal and affirmed the
HLURB Board's resolution. Aggrieved, Lisondra Land filed a petition for review
to the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 131359 on the ground that the HLURB
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

The CA dismissed Perfecto's complaint clarifying that the HLURB's authority is

limited only to cases filed by the buyers or owners of subdivision lots and
condominium units. Perfecto sought reconsideration but was denied. With two
conflicting CA decision, Perfecto filed this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Lisondra Lands is estopped to assail the jurisdiction of HLURB.

RULING:
Yes. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate
or question that same jurisdiction.

Here, Perfecto originally filed his complaint against Lisondra Land before the
RTC which, as discussed earlier, has jurisdiction over the controversy between the
parties. However, Lisondra Land claimed that the case is within the HLURB's
exclusive authority. It maintained this theory before the CA which eventually
ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Thereafter, Perfecto relied on the final and
executory decision of the appellate court and refiled the action against Lisondra
Land with the HLURB. Lisondra Land actively participated in the proceedings
before the HLURB. After receiving an adverse decision, Lisondra Land
questioned the jurisdiction of the HLURB and claimed that the RTC has the
authority to hear the case. This is where estoppel operates and bars Lisondra Land
from assailing the HLURB's jurisdiction. Lisondra Land cannot now abandon the
theory behind its arguments before Civil Case No. 18146, CA-G.R. SP No. 72463
and the HLURB. The Court cannot countenance Lisondra Land's act of adopting
inconsistent postures - first, by attacking the jurisdiction of the trial court and,
subsequently, the authority of the HLURB. Otherwise, the consequence is
revolting as Lisondra Land would be allowed to make a complete mockery of the
judicial system. In fact, Lisondra Land's conduct had resulted in two conflicting
appellate court decisions in CA-G.R. SP No. 72463 and CA-G.R. SP No. 131359
eroding the stability of our legal system and jurisprudence.

Also, we are mindful that Tijam presented an extraordinary case because the party
invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after 15 years and at a stage when the
proceedings had already been elevated to the appellate court. This case is likewise
exceptional since many years had lapsed from 2001 when Perfecto filed his
complaint in the RTC until 2016 when the Court of Appeals dismissed the
complaint before the HLURB. Like in Tijam, it is now too late for Lisondra Land
to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction.
SPS. PEREZ AND AVISO V. HERMANO
GR NO. 147417, JULY 8, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a civil case for Enforcement of Contract and Damages with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction against Zescon
Land, Inc. and/or its President, Atty. Vitan-Ele and the respondent before the RTC of
Quezon City. Petitioners presented three causes of action in their complaint, the first for
enforcement of contract to sell entered into between petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc.,
the second for annulment or rescission of two contracts of mortgage entered into between
petitioners and respondent Hermano and the third for damages against all defendants. In
response, Hermano filed a Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered
Severed for Separate Trial. The court granted the motion.

Petitioners now assert that respondent Hermano should not have been dismissed from the
complaint because: (1) He did not file a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court and, in fact, his "Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed
for Separate Trial" was filed almost two years after he filed his Answer to the complaint;
(2) There was no misjoinder of causes of action in this case; and (3) There was no
misjoinder of parties.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court may grant the motion to sever from the complaint Hermano as a
respondent.

FACTS:
No. By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the
uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of more
than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of
action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint,
declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct
demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.

While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5,
Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint
conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction,
venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract,
transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the
same nature and character.

There is misjoinder of causes of action when the conditions for joinder under Section 5,
Rule 2 are not met. Section 5 provides:

Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative
or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject
to the following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of
parties;
 (b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by
special rules;

(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to
different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial
Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said
court and the venue lies therein; and

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.

As far as can be gathered from the assailed Orders, it is the first condition - on joinder of
parties - that the trial court deemed to be lacking. It is well to remember that the joinder
of causes of action may involve the same parties or different parties. If the joinder
involves different parties, as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law
common to both parties joined, arising out of the same transaction or series of
transaction.19

In herein case, petitioners have adequately alleged in their complaint that after they had
already agreed to enter into a contract to sell with Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-
Contreras, the latter also gave them other documents to sign, to wit: A Deed of Absolute
Sale over the same properties but for a lower consideration, two mortgage deeds over the
same properties in favor of respondent Hermano with accompanying notes and
acknowledgment receipts for Ten Million pesos (P10,000,000) each. Petitioners claim
that Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, misled them to mortgage their properties
which they had already agreed to sell to the latter.

From the above averments in the complaint, it becomes reasonably apparent that there are
questions of fact and law common to both Zescon Land, Inc., and respondent Hermano
arising from a series of transaction over the same properties. There is the question of fact,
for example, of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., indeed misled petitioners to sign the
mortgage deeds in favor of respondent Hermano. There is also the question of which of
the four contracts were validly entered into by the parties. Note that under Article 2085 of
the Civil Code, for a mortgage to be valid, it is imperative that the mortgagor be the
absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. Thus, respondent Hermano will definitely be
affected if it is subsequently declared that what was entered into by petitioners and
Zescon Land, Inc., was a Contract of Sale (as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale
signed by them) because this would mean that the contracts of mortgage were void as
petitioners were no longer the absolute owners of the properties mortgaged. Finally, there
is also the question of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., as represented by Sales-
Contreras, and respondent Hermano committed fraud against petitioners as to make them
liable for damages.

Prescinding from the foregoing, and bearing in mind that the joinder of causes of action
should be liberally construed as to effect in one action a complete determination of all
matters in controversy involving one subject matter, we hold that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in severing from the complaint petitioners’ cause of
action against respondent Hermano.
SPS. ABOITIS AND CABARRUS V. SPS. PO
GR NO. 208450, JUNE 05, 2017

FACTS:
This case involves a parcel of land located in Cabancalan, Mandaue City, initially
registered under the name of Roberto Aboitiz. This parcel of land originally belonged to
the late Mariano Seno. On July 31, 1973, Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno. On May 5, 1978, Ciriaco sold the two (2) lots to Victoria
Po (Victoria). The parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. On July 15, 1982, Mariano
died and was survived by his five (5) children.

In 1990, Peter Po discovered that Ciriaco “had executed a quitclaim dated August 7, 1989
renouncing his interest in favor of Roberto. In the quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that he was
“the declared owner of Lot Nos. 2835 and 2807.

The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the Spouses Po
executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in which Ciriaco agreed to
pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses Po as consideration for
the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po were left with after the
quitclaim. However, also in 1990, Lot No. 2835 was also sold to Roberto. The Mariano
Heirs, including Ciriaco, executed separate deeds of absolute sale in favor of Roberto.
Thereafter, Roberto immediately developed the lot as part of a subdivision called North
Town Homes. On April 19, 1993, Roberto filed an application for original registration of
Lot No. 2835, the trial court granted the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-
887 in the name of Roberto. The lot was immediately subdivided with portions sold to
Ernesto and Jose.

On November 19, 1996, the Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to
declare nullity of title with damages.

ISSUE:
Whether the Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed of conveyance of realty, are indispensable
parties.

RULING:
No. Rule 3, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that Parties in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants.”

An indispensable party is the party whose legal presence in the proceeding is so necessary
that "the action cannot be finally determined" without him or her because his or her
interests in the matter and in the relief "are so bound up with that of the other parties."

The property owners against whom the action for reconveyance is filed are indispensable
parties. However, the seller of the property is not an indispensable party. The Mariano
Heirs, as the alleged sellers of the property, are not indispensable parties. They are at best
necessary parties, which are covered by Rule 3, Section 8 of the Rules of Court.
Necessary parties may be joined in the case "to adjudicate the whole controversy," but the
case may go on without them because a judgment may be rendered without any effect on
their rights and interests. The Mariano Heirs may likewise be considered material
witnesses to the action.

The validity of the Deeds of Sale allegedly executed by the parties in this case is a
material matter in determining who the true owner of the property is. Thus, the Mariano
Heirs, including Ciriaco, may testify as to the Deeds of Sale they executed to prove which
sale is the valid one.

However, it is clear that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. They have
already sold all their interests in the property to the Spouses Aboitiz. They will no longer
be affected, benefited, or injured by any ruling of this Court on the matter, whether it
grants or denies the complaint for reconveyance. The ruling of this Court as to whether
the Spouses Po are entitled to reconveyance will not affect their rights. Their interest has,
thus, become separable from that of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel. In Spring Homes
Subdivision Co., Inc. v. Spouses Tablada, Jr.:

Similarly, by virtue of the second Deed of Absolute Sale between

Spring Homes and the Spouses Lumbres, the Spouses Lumbres became
the absolute and registered owner of the subject property herein. As
such, they possess that certain interest in the property without which,
the courts cannot proceed for settled is the doctrine that registered
owners of parcels of land whose title is sought to be nullified should be
impleaded as an indispensable party. Spring Homes, however, which
has already sold its interests in the subject land, is no longer regarded
as an indispensable party, but is, at best, considered to be a necessary
party whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy,
but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made
in its absence without affecting it. This is because when Spring Homes
sold the property in question to the Spouses Lumbres, it practically
transferred all its interests therein to the said Spouses. In fact, a new
title was already issued in the names of the Spouses Lumbres. As such,
Spring Homes no longer stands to be directly benefited or injured by
the judgment in the instant suit regardless of whether the new title
registered in the names of the Spouses Lumbres is cancelled in favor of
the Spouses Tablada or not. Thus, contrary to the ruling of the RTC,
the failure to summon Spring Homes does not deprive it of jurisdiction
over the instant case for Spring Homes is not an indispensable party.
HEIRS OF DINGLASAN V. AYALA CORP.
GR NO. 204378, AUGUST 5, 2019

FACTS:
Petitioners are the heirs of Juan Dinglasan who was the sole registered cadastral
claimant and a consequent owner of a parcel of land located at Brey. Tabangao,
Batangas City designated as Cadastral Lot 11808. The land contains an area of
Ninety-Three Thousand One Hundred and Twenty-Three (93,123) square meters.
Juan acquired the said property from his forebears since time immemorial and that
petitioners subsequently inherited it from Juan who died intestate. Petitioners are in
public, peaceful, uninterrupted possession of the said parcel of land in the concept of
an owner since time immemorial and are regularly paying taxes thereon. Respondent
Ayala Corporation, on the other hand, alleged that they are the registered owner of the
several lots inside Cadastral Lot 11808 as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title.
The petitioners filed an Application for Registration of Title with the RTC Batangas
involving Cadastral Lot 11808. The application was opposed the petition.

Petitioners basic contention is that the TCT in the name of Ayala is null and void
because the subject lots were never brought under registration and that OCT 18989,
issued in the name of one Severina Orosa, from which the Ayala's title was ultimately
derived, is fake and spurious. RTC ruled against the Petitioners. It found that Orosa
and all other persons who opposed the petition are parties indispensable to the case
but nonetheless were not impleaded as defendants. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC. Hence, the appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:
The spouses Orosa are indispensable parties to the case.
RULING:
Yes. An indispensable party is one who stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome
of the petition. He has an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily
affect his rights, such that the courts cannot proceed without his presence. It is settled that
the joinder of all indispensable parties is required under any and all conditions, their
presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. Stated differently, the
joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot proceed without their
presence. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case.
Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, the judgment
of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties, but even as to those present.

In the present case, the Court agrees with both the RTC and the CA that Severina Luna
Orosa is an indispensable party because the main issue in the instant case is whether or
not the issuance of OCT 18989, which was alleged to be registered under Orosa's name,
was fraudulently obtained.

It is clear that Orosa's rights are directly affected by the present controversy and that she
stands to be injured by the outcome of the Complaints filed by petitioners. In fine, the
absence of Orosa in the Complaints filed by petitioners renders all subsequent actions of
both the RTC and the CA null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties, but even as to those present.

As to whether or not the subject Complaints should be dismissed, the settled rule is that
the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by
order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
and/or at such times as are just.
THE WORD WIDE INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC. V. BENITO
MACROHON, ET AL.
GR NO. L-12365, FEBRUARY 28, 1959

FACTS:
The complaint alleges that plaintiff is the owner of certain personal properties listed
therein by virtue of certain conditional sale executed by Catalina de Leon and Leuterio
Limcaco in its favor, and in reliance thereon it invokes two agreement which are
embodied in Annexes A and A-1. And because said properties were levied upon and sold
at public auction by defendants despite the third-party complaint it had filed with the
sheriff, plaintiff claims that it suffered damages in the amount of P1,800.

It now seeks to collect said damages under the indemnity bond executed in favor of the
sheriff by his co-defendants. It turned out however, as found by the trial court, that said
agreements do not represent any conditional sale of the properties claimed by the plaintiff
but merely refer to a chattel mortgage or pledge covering properties which are distinct
and different from those listed in the complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court may consider the annexes in acting on the motion to dismiss apart
from the allegations of the complaint?

RULING:
Yes. One cannot separate the complaint from its annexes since it clearly appears in said
complaint that the claim of plaintiff to be the owner of the properties in question is
predicated on said annexes which are alleged to contain agreements of conditional sale.
However, such claim was found to be untrue for as already stated said annexes merely
embody a contract of chattel mortgage or pledge of properties distinct and different from
those listed in the complaint.

If from the very fact of the complaint, as supplemented by its annexes, plaintiff is not the
owner, nor entitled to the properties it claims to have been levied upon and sold at public
auction by the defendants and for which it now seeks indemnity, it is evident that the
complaint does not give plaintiff any right of action against defendants. The trial court
therefore acted properly in dismissing the complaint.

It is likewise claimed that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint outright for it
could have merely ordered plaintiff to amend the same to make it conform to the contents
of the annexes or otherwise reconcile the discrepancies, if any, and require defendants to
answer the complaints. This claim is untenable for it would be futile to make the
complaint conform to what appears in the annexes because the latter embody merely
certain contracts of chattel mortgage or pledge which would at most give plaintiff a lien
on the properties in question. But the great flaw we find in this claim lies in the fact that
the said annexes refer to properties which are different from those listed in the complaint.
The case above alluded to is inapplicable for if in that case the complaint and the
document annexed thereto were reconciled it was because the alleged discrepancy
appears explained in the very body of the complaint.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. V. SPOUSES BENEDICTO & TERESITA
YUJUICO,
GR NO. 175796, JULY 22, 2015

FACTS:
The Regional Trial Court in Manila (Manila RTC) rendered its judgment declaring the
five parcels of land expropriated for public use. The lands, which are located in Tondo,
Manila, are all registered in the name of Teresita Yujuico and two of which were
previously mortgaged to Citytrust Banking Corporation, BPI’s predecessor-in-interest.

Consequently, BPI filed a Motion Motion to Intervene in Execution with Partial

Opposition to Defendant’s Request to Release, but the RTC denied the motion for having
been “filed out of time.” Hence, the petitioner decided to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgage constituted on the two parcels of land subject of the respondents’ loan. After
holding the
public auction, the sheriff awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder at
P10,000,000.00.

Claiming a deficiency amounting to P18,522.155.42, the petitioner sued the respondents

to recover such deficiency in the Makati RTC. The respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint on theory that the suit was barred by res judicata; that the complaint stated no
cause of action; and that the plaintiff’s claim had been waived, abandoned, or
extinguished.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. On its reply to the petitioner’s comment to their
motion for reconsideration, the respondent raised for the first time their objection on the
ground of improper venue. They contended that the action for the recovery of the
deficiency, being a supplementary action of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, was
a real action that should have been brought in the Manila RTC because Manila was the
place where the properties were located.

ISSUE:
Whether the venue of the action is in Manila RTC.

RULING:
No. An action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein. Thus, the petitioner correctly brought Civil Case No. 03-
450 in the Makati RTC because Makati was the place where the main office of the
petitioner was located.

It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action.
The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by
the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an
interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is to be commenced and tried
in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or
a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local
action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. Such
actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery
of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue of a
personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which
reason the action is considered a transitory one.

Moreover, the Makati RTC observed, and the observation is correct in our view, that it
would be improper to dismiss the Civil Case on the ground of improper venue, assuming
that the venue had been improperly laid, considering that the respondents had not raised
such ground in their Motion to Dismiss. As earlier indicated, they came to raise the
objection of improper venue for the first time only in their reply to the petitioner’s
comment on their Motion for Reconsideration. They did so belatedly.

We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may
be waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.

As it relates to the place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide convenience to the
parties, rather than to restrict their access to the courts. In other words, unless the
defendant seasonably objects, any action may be tried by a court despite its being the
improper venue.
SPS. SARAZA V. FRANCISCO
GR NO. 198718, NOVEMBER 27, 2013

FACTS:
Francisco and Fernando executed an Agreement that provided for the latter’s sale of his
100-square meter share in a lot situated in Bangkal, Makati City, for a total consideration
of PHP 3,200,000.00. The amount of PHP 1,200,000.00 was paid upon the Agreement’s
execution, while the balance of PHP 2,000,000.00 was to be paid on installments to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), to cover a loan of Spouses Saraza, Fernando’s parents,
with the bank. A final deed of sale conveying the property was to be executed by
Fernando upon full payment of the PNB loan.

It was also agreed upon that should the parties fail for any reason to transfer the subject
property to the respondent’s name, Rosario and Fernando’s 136-sq m property covered by
TCT No. 156126 and encumbered to PNB to secure the loan that was to be paid by the
respondent shall be considered a collateral in favor of the respondent. Spouses Saraza
signified their conformity to the Agreement. The respondent was also allowed to take
immediate possession of the property covered by TCT No. 156126 through a contract of
lease. The petitioners likewise furnished PNB with an Authority, allowing the respondent
to pay their obligations to the PNB, to negotiate for a loan restructuring, to receive the
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan secured by its
mortgage, and to perform such other acts as may be necessary in connection with the
settlement of the loan.

When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached ₱226,582.13, the respondent asked
for the petitioners’ issuance of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) that would authorize
him to receive from PNB the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full
payment of the loan. The petitioners denied the request. Upon inquiry from PNB, the
respondent found out that the petitioners had instead executed an Amended Authority,
which provided that the owner’s copy of TCT No. 156126 should be returned to the
mortgagors upon full payment of the loan. Spouses Saraza also caused the eviction of the
respondent from the property covered by TCT No. 156126. These prompted the
respondent to institute the civil case for specific performance, sum of money and damages
with the RTC of Imus, Cavite on December 7, 2004.

ISSUE:

RULING:
As to the issue of venue, the petitioners’ argument that the action should have been
instituted with the RTC of Makati City, and not the RTC of Imus, Cavite, is misplaced.
Although the end result of the respondent’s claim was the transfer of the subject property
to his name, the suit was still essentially for specific performance, a personal action,
because it sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract
which he had previously made.

Our ruling in Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction & Development Corporation31 is

instructive. In the said case, a complaint for specific performance that involved property
situated in Parañaque City was instituted before the RTC of Pasig City. When the case’s
venue was raised as an issue, the Court sided with therein petitioner who argued that "the
fact that ‘she ultimately sought the conveyance of real property’ not located in the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig is x x x an anticipated consequence and beyond
the cause for which the action [for specific performance with damages] was instituted."32
The Court explained:

[I]n La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. v. Ponferrada, private respondents filed an action for
specific performance with damages before the RTC of Bacolod City. The defendants
allegedly reneged on their contract to sell to them a parcel of land located in Bago City –
a piece of property which the latter sold to petitioner while the case was pending before
the said RTC. Private respondent did not claim ownership but, by annotating a notice of
lis pendens on the title, recognized defendants’ ownership thereof. This Court ruled that
the venue had properly been laid in the RTC of Bacolod, even if the property was situated
in Bago.

In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, private respondent filed a case for specific performance
with damages before the RTC of Quezon City. It alleged that after it accepted the offer of
petitioners, they sold to a third person several parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal.
The Supreme Court sustained the trial court’s order allowing an amendment of the
original Complaint for specific performance with damages. Contrary to petitioners’
position that the RTC of Quezon City had no jurisdiction over the case, as the subject lots
were located in Montalban, Rizal, the said RTC had jurisdiction over the original
Complaint. The Court reiterated the rule that a case for specific performance with
damages is a personal action which may be filed in a court where any of the parties
reside.33 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

The Court compared these two cases with the case of National Steel Corporation v. Court
of Appeals34 where the Court held that an action that seeks the execution of a deed of
sale over a parcel of land is for recovery of real property, and not for specific
performance, because the primary objective is to regain ownership and possession of the
property.35 It was explained that the prayer in National Steel was not in any way
connected to a contract that was previously executed by the party against whom the
complaint was filed, unlike in Cabutihan where the parties had earlier executed an
Undertaking for the property’s transfer, correctly giving rise to a cause of action either for
specific performance or for rescission, as in this case.

Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the respondent’s
action. It provides that personal actions "may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff
or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at
the election of the plaintiff." Considering the respondent’s statement in his complaint that
he resides in Imus, Cavite,36 the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper.
UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. V. ROSEMOORE MINING &
DEVELOPMENT CORP.
G.R. Nos. 159669 & 163521

FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. and JENS PETER
HENRICHSEN V. KLAUS K. SCHONFELD GR NO. 166920, FEBRUARY 19,
2007

FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
OCHOA V. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
GR NO. 192877, MARCH 23, 2011

FACTS:
Spouses Ochoa mortgaged their real properties located in Parañaque City in favor of
China Banking Corporation. The parties agree that the necessary action for the
foreclosure of the mortgage shall be instituted at China Banking's option which is in the
RTC - Makati City. However, Petitioners insist that it was error for the CA to rule that the
stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is binding only on petitioners' complaint for
Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City, but not on respondent bank's Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of
Mortgage, which was filed with the same court.

ISSUE:
Whether the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is not binding on China Bank’s
Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage.

RULING:
Yes. The extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage is governed by Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, which provides that sale cannot be made legally
outside of the province in which the property sold is situated. The exclusive venue of
Makati City, as stipulated by the parties cannot be made to apply to the Petition for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by China Bank since the provisions of Rule 4 pertain to
venue of actions, which an extrajudicial foreclosure is not.

In Hagans v. Wislizenus, an action is defined as a formal demand of one's legal rights in a

court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. × xx." It is clear that
the determinative or operative fact which converts a claim into an "action or suit" is the
filing of the same with a "court of justice." Filed elsewhere, as with some other body or
office not a court of justice, the claim may not be categorized under either term. Unlike an
action, an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is initiated by filing a petition
not with any court of justice but with the office of the sheriff of the province where the
sale is to be made. By no stretch of the imagination can the office of the sheriff come
under the category of a court of justice. And as aptly observed by the complainant, if ever
the executive judge comes into the picture, it is only because he exercises administrative
supervision over the sheriff. But this administrative supervision, however, does not
change the fact that extrajudicial foreclosures are not judicial proceedings, actions or
suits.