ADMIN LAW - CASES

CREATION AND ABOLITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Buklod ng Deactivate and Abolish are distinct. To deactivate means to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by
Kawaning EIIB discharging or reassigning personnel, while to abolish means to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy
vs. Zamora completely.
Abolition denotes an intention to do away with the office wholly and permanently; the office ceases to exist.
While deactivation continues to exist, albeit remaining dormant or inoperative.
GR = the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature.
The power to create includes the power to destroy.
A public office is either created by the Constitution, by a Statute, or by Authority of law. Except where the office
was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into
existence.
With bureaus, agencies, or offices in the Executive Department, the President’s power to control may justify
him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry
out reorganization measures.
Reorganization is valid, provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is in good faith if the purpose
is for the economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. It is one designed to (1) trim the fat off the
bureacracy and (2) institute economy and greater efficiency in its operation.
The Deactivation of EIIB and the creation of Task Force Aduana were done in good faith. It was not for the
purpose of removing the EIIB employees, but to achieve the ultimate purpose of EO 191, which is economy.
Task Force Aduana was created to take the place of EIIB.
The petitioners right to security of tenure is not violated. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor
separation of the incumbents. There is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional
offices which provide for special immunity, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its
salary.
Banda vs. The President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the Executive Department. It is in line
Ermita with his constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices, and by virtue of previous delegation of
the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
To achieve simplicity, economy, and efficiency, the President shall have a continuing authority to reorganize,
the administrative structure of the Office of the President. He may (1) restructure the the internal organization
of the Office of the President, (2) transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency, and (3) transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department
or agency.
The National Printing Office, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary, is part of the Office
of the President. There was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions. The NPO
remains the main printing arm of the government for all kinds of government forms and publications.
In the interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, NPO must now compete with
the private sector for certain government printing jobs, with the exception of election paraphernalia which
remains the exclusive responsibility of the NPO, with the BSP, as the COMELEC may determine.
The President implicitly has the power to effect less radical or less substantive changes to the functional and
internal structure of the Office of the President, as the exigencies of the service may require.
At most, there was a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity of its printing
responsibility to election forms.
Biraogo vs. Authority of the President to create public offices with the Office of the President is recognized. Like the 2
The Philippine branches of government, it possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding committees to assist it in the
Truth performance of its constitutionality mandated functions and in the exercise of its administrative functions. This
Commission is adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the President.
Sec. 31 of the Admin Code refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions. A body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned in Sec. 31.
To say that PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Sec. 31 is a misplace
supposition. The PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of
Executive Order No. 1.
President’s power to reorganize cannot be denied. It is strictly limited to transfer of functions and offices.
Reorganization is properly made in accordance in accordance with law if it is pursued in good faith.
PD 1772 expressly grants the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government. It
includes power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish, transfer functions, create and classify
functions, to standardize salaries and materials.
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS
US vs Ang Act. 2868 authorizes the Governor-General, with consent of the Council State, to issue the necessary rules
Tang Ho and regulations, and create appropriation for this purpose. Thereafter, he issued a proclamation fixing the
price of rice.
The legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued “for any cause,” and leaves the
question as to what is “any cause” to the discretion of the Governor-General.
A.) law must be complete, in all terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch. Nothing must be
left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
B.) in form or substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
A Statute may be complete = when the subject, manner, and the extent of its operation are stated in it. The
test of completeness is whether the provision is sufficiently definite and certain to enable one to know his
rights and obligations.
It is not necessarily incomplete - hence an undue delegation of power, because it delegates discretion. It
depends on the discretion that is delegated. A Discretion as to what the law shall be, and conferring authority
to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
A.L.A The constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and
Schechter practicality that enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards while
Poultry Corp. leaving to selected instrumentality the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits, and the
vs. US determination of facts to which the policy, as declared by the legislature, is to apply.
The constant recognition of the necessity and validity of provisions, and the wide range of administrative
authority which has been developed by means of the latter, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the
authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained.
In view of the scope of broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the
discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of
trade and industry is virtually unfettered.
The code-making authority this conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
Vigan Electric The principle of separation of powers which separates, which underlies our constitutional system, legislative
Light Co., Inc. powers may not be delegated - except to local governments, and only as to matters purely local.
vs. Public
Service The power to supply may be delegated to admin, the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy.
Commission
Law is not deemed complete, unless it lays down a standard pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at
least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the
performance of its duty to implement or enforce said policy.
As a consequence, the power of legislation would eventually be exercised by a branch of the Government
other than that in which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation, not only of the allocation of powers therein
made, but also of the principle of separation of powers.
The Congress has not delegated, and cannot delegate legislative powers to the Public Service Commission.
Pelaez v A new municipality can be created without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the
Auditor jurisdiction of the new municipality. The statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio
General implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The
cogency and force of this argument is too obvious to be denied or even [Link] upon logic and
experience, it cannot be offset except by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary, and no
such manifestation, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act No. 2370, has been brought to our attention.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers.
The said law: (a) be complete in itself--- it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate, and (b) fix a standard-the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable-to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is
the essence of every law. Without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also to unmake it, by
adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the
very foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet the well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be
carried out or implemented by the President, and neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid
the evil effects above referred to.
Under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President: “may change the seat of the
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require". It is apparent,
however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may require" qualified, not
the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the government may be
transferred.
Ynot v. IAC, It is then authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
G.R. No. institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef,
74457, March and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
20, 1987,148 carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous
SCRA 659. condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even
corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options
are apparently boundless. Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose
the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.

Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative
powers,To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the
law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated
is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment
on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally,
also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive
Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
Confederation HELD: On its own, E.O. Nos. 179 and 180 appears to have been executed within the legislative parameters
of Coconut set by COCOFED. P.D. No. 1234, however,does not actually provide a mechanism for how the SAGF is to be
Farmers disbursed. Thus, the assailed issuances do not just implement P.D. No. 1234- it implements P.D. No. 755 and
Organizations P.D. No. 1468 as well. xxx xxx xxx While most of the provisions are aligned with the avowed purpose to
of the benefit the coconut Industry, Section 3(e), Article III provides that any remaining balance may be used by
Philippines, UCPB to purchase shares and stocks in corporations related to the coconut [Link] xXX xxx The surplus
Inc. v. Aquino created by this particular Section of P.D. No. 1468 eventually became known as the Coconut Industry
Investment Fund (CIIF). With the use of the CIIF, UCPB acquired coconut oil mills corporation, 14 holding
companies, and San Miguel Corporation shares In short, Section 9 of P.D. No. 1468 allowed Marcos cronies
to grow their wealth - to the detriment of the coconut industry. A law which provides this kind of open-ended
provision cannot be Considered a law which provides clear legislative barameters. Too much unbridled
discretion is given for any surplus or balance that remains unutilized from the CIDF. The provision of P.D. No.
1468 are simply too broad to limit the amount of spending that may be done by the implementing authority.
Considering that no statute provides for specific parameters on how the SAGF may be spent, Congress must
first provide a law for the disbursements of the funds, in line with its constitutional [Link] absence of the
requisite legislative authority in the disbursement of public funds cannot be remedied by executive fiat. For this
reason,Sections 6, 7, 8, and 936 of E.O. No. 180 are declared void because they are not in conformity with the
law. Through these sections, the President went beyond the authority delegated by law in the disbursement of
the coconut levy funds.
Lagman v. HELD: Republic Act No. 10149 complied with the completeness and sufficient standard [Link] abolition or
Executive reorganization was already determined in the assailed law. The Governance Commission will only determine
Secretary, G.R. whether it will take effect in accordance with the policy and standards provided in the law. Section 5(a)
No. 197422, mandates the abolition or reorganization of GOCCs only when the following standards are met: (1) The
November 03, functions or purposes for which the GOCC was created are no longer relevant to the State or no longer
2020. consistent with the national development policy of the State; (2) The GOCC's functions or purposes duplicate
or unnecessarily overlap with functions, programs, activities or projects already provided by a Government
Agency; (3)The GOCC is not producing the desired outcomes,or no longer achieving the objectives and
purposes for which it was originally designed and implemented,and/or not cost efficient and does not generate
the level of social, physical and economic returns vis-à-vis the resource inputs; (4) The GOCC is in fact
dormant or nonoperational; (5) The GOCC is involved in an activity best carried out by the private sector; and
(6) The functions, purpose or nature of operations of any group of GOCCs require consolidation under a
holding [Link] authorizing the Governance Commission to make reforms in the GOCCs, Section 2 lays
down the following policies (to ensure that) "The corporate form of organization through which government
carries out activities is utilized judiciously" and "(t)he operations of GOCCs are tationalized and monitored
centrally in order that government assets and resources are used efficiently and the government exposure to
al]forms of liabilities including subsidies is warranted and incurred through prudent means."
Moreover,delegating the power to ascertain facts-in order to determine the propriety of the
reorganization,abolition, merger, streamlining or privatization of GOCCs—is not an undue delegation of
legislative powers. The standards were set; the policy, [Link] Governance Commission only needs to carry
out the mandate. In ascertaining the determinants for abolishing or reorganizing GOCCs, the Governance
Commission only acts as an investigative body on behalf of Congress. Similarly, the standards provided in
Republic Act No. 10149, and the policy framework embodied in other existing compensation' and position
classification laws,including Joint Resolution No. 4, series of 2009,are sufficient to map out the boundaries of
the Governance Commission's authority in establishing the compensation system for GOCCs. All told,we
uphold the assailed powers and functions of the Governance Commission considering that the completeness
and sufficient standard tests were satisfied in the law. We find no undue delegation of legislative power.
Calalang v. HELD: Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount
Williams, 70 police power of the state. Said Act,by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were
Phil. promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads,in the interest and
726(1940). convenience of the [Link] enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is,to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of
said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus,
31 Phil., 218).To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are [Link]
is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over' authority because
then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his
mind through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium,
which means peace and order and happiness for [Link] moment greater authority is conferred upon the
government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.
Cervantes v. HELD: Republic Act No. 51 was approved authorizing the President of the Philippines,among other things, to
Auditor effect such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of
General, 91 promoting simplicity,economy and efficiency in their operation. Pursuant to this authority, the President, on
Phil. October 4,1947, promulgated Executive Order No. 93 creating the Government Enterprises Council xxx to
359(1952). advise the President in the exercise of his power of supervision and control over these corporations and to
formulate and adopt such policy and measures as might be necessary to coordinate their functions and
activities. xxx With its controlling stock owned by the Government and the power of appointing its directors
vested in the President of the Philippines, there can be no question that the NAFCO is a Government
controlled corporation subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 51 and the Executive Order No. 93
promulgated in accordance therewith, Consequently, it was also subject to the powers of the Control
Committee created in said executive order, among which is the power of supervision for the purpose of
insuring efficiency and economy in the operations of the corporation and also the power to pass upon the
program of activities and the yearly budget of expenditures approved by the board of directors. It can hardly be
questioned that under these powers the Control Committee had the right to pass upon, and consequently to
approve or disapprove, the resolution of the NAFCO board of directors granting quarters allowance to the
 petitioners as such allowance necessarily constituted an item of expenditure in the corporation's budget. That
the Control Committee had good grounds for disapproving the resolution is also clear, for, as pointed out by
the Auditor General and the NAFCO auditor,the granting of the allowance amounted to an illegal increase of
petitioner's salary beyond the limit fixed in the corporate charter and was furthermore not justified by the
precarious financial condition of the corporation. xxx xxx The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down
a policy and a standard is established by the statute" there is no undue delegation. (11 [Link]. 957). Republic
Act No. 51, in authorizing the President of the Philippines to make reforms and changes in government-
controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies
attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent Government of the Philippines and to promote
simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The
President had to carry out the mandate, and this he did by promulgating Executive Order (No. 93) in
accordance with Republic Act No. 51, which, tested by the said rule, does not constitute an undue delegation
of legislative power.
People v. HELD: Distinction should be made between the delegation of the power to determine what the law shall be,
Jolliffe, 105 and to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law
Phil. 677 itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing
(1959).] the delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the
Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative
will. (Yakus [Link] States, 88 L. ed. 848.) Referring to the case at bar, section 74 of Republic Act No, 265
conferred upon the Monetary Board and the President the power to subject to licensing all transactions in gold
and foreign exchange "in order to protect the international reserve of the Central Bank during an exchange
crisis and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time in which to take constructive measures to
combat such crisis." The Board is,likewise, authorized "to take such appropriate remedial measures as are
appropriate" to protect the international stability of the peso,"whenever the international reserve is falling,as a
result of payment or remittances abroad which, in the opinion of the Monetary Board,are contrary to the
national welfare" (section 70, Rep. Act No. 265). It should be noted,furthermore, that these power must be
construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central Bank, which are, among
others, "to maintain monetary stability in the Philippines," and "to promote a rising level of production,
employment and real income in the Philippines' (Section 2,Rep. Act No. 265.) These standards are sufficiently
concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority the character of administrative details in the
enforcement of the law and to place the grant of said authority beyond the category of a delegation of
legislative powers (Cardona [Link] of Binañgonan, 36 Phil, 547; Compañia General de Tabacos vs.
Board of Utility, 34,Phil., 136; Rubi vs. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil.,660; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs, 53
Phil., 394;People vs. Rosenthal, 63 Phil., 328; Antamok Gold Fields vs. C.I.R., 68 Phil., 340; Calalang vs.
Williams, 70 Phil., 276; Cervantes vs. Auditor General, 91 Phil., 359; Phil., Association of Colleges&
Universities vs. Sec. of Education, 97 Phil.,806; 51 Of. Gaz., (12),6230; Mutual Films [Link]. Industrial
Commission, 276 U.S. 230; Mulford vs. Smith, 307 U.S. 48; National Broadcasting Co. vs. U.S. 319 U.S. 225;
Yakus vs. White, 321 U.S. 414; Ammann vs. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245).
Eastern HELD: Administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by"filling in' the details
Shipping Lines, which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to [Link] is effected by their
Inc. v. POEA, promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative [Link] model contract prescribed thereby has
been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA
(and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a
sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in
the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,mandated it to
protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices." Parenthetically, it
is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards"Public interest" in People v. Rosenthal, "justice
and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR"public convenience and welfare" in Calalang [Link], and
"simplicity, economy and efficiency'in Cervantes v. Auditor General, to mention only a few cases. In the United
States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, and
"national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States. It is not denied that the private respondent has been
receiving a monthly death benefit pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also paid a
P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received a
P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude
allowance of the private respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the
standard contract of employment for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, xxx xxx consistently
with the social justice policy and the specific provisions in the Constitution for the protection of the working
class and the promotion of its interest.
Tatad v. HELD: Given the groove of the Court's rulings,the attempt of petitioners to strike down Section 15 on the
Secretary of ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness
the Department test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full
of Energy, deregulation will start at the end of March 1997,regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at
[Link]. the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported
124360, reason. Thus,the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to
November 5, the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997 Section 15 lays down
1997,281 the standard to guide the judgment of the President -— he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of
SCRA 330. crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in
relation to the US dollar is [Link] contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and
"stable" should have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable
[Link] stubborn submission deserves scant [Link] dictionary meanings of these words are
well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines "practicable" as meaning
possible to practice or perform, "decline'as meaning to take a downward direction, and"stable" as meaning
firmly established. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that
will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more general
 standards in other cases.
Abakada HELD: Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
GuroParty List sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
v. Purisima, implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
G.R. No. 166 limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate's authority,announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be [Link] 9335 adequately states
the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in
carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law xxx "xxx to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of
encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets." Section 4 provided for the
delegated power to the President to fix revenue targets xxx "xxx to be sourced from the collection of the BIR
and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the Development
Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages xxx Revenue targets shall refer to
the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in
the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. xxx"
xxx Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR
and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the
President to Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it
also undergoes the scrutiny of the DECC. On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board's
authority and identifies the conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short
of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the [Link], RA 9335 in no way violates the
security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only
means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law
and only after due process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable
yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due
consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency
and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws.
The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with
substantive and procedural due process. At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient
standards: "public interest," "justice and equity,""public convenience and welfare" and "[Link] and
welfare." In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
Belgica v. HELD: In determining the constitutionality of the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, the
Executive Court in the 2013 Belgica case explained that while the designation of a determinate or determinable amount
Secretary, G.R. for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain
No. 210503, adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the
October purpose of: (1)filling up the details of the law for its enforcement,known as supplementary rule--making; or
8,2019. (2)ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent [Link], in order
to appraise the merits of Petitioner's proposition with respect to the LGSF, the Court must examine the LGSF
provision of the 2014 GAA vis-a-vis the two jurisprudential tests that are used to measure the sufficiency of
legislative guidelines for purposes of delegating rule-making authority. The first test is called the
"completeness test." A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate. The second test is called the"sufficient standard test." A law lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of
the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must
specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under
which it is to be implemented. With respect to the first test, it is easily discernible that the LGSF satisfies the
completeness test. It is clear from the 2014 GAA that the policy consideration for the institution of the LGSF is
"genuine local development and the assistance of LGUs". While couched in general terms, this policy
consideration effectively sets forth the purpose for which the LGSF should be carried out. To be sure, the
Court has recognized the validity of similarly worded policy considerations such as "public interest","justice and
equity", "public convenience and welfare", and "simplicity, economy and welfare."With respect to the second
test, contrary to the argument of Petitioner, the President is not granted unfettered and unabated discretion in
disbursing the LGSF. The 2014 GAA provides adequate guidelines and limitations to map out the boundaries
of the Executive's authority in disbursing the LGSF. On this score, the Court finds that the 2014 GAA contains
sufficient limitations that prevent the Executive from running riot in disbursing the LGSF, thereby satisfying the
sufficient standard test. The Court notes that the amount allotted for the LGSF is specifically identified, i.e.,
Four Hundred Five Million Pesos (P405,000,000.00). Not only is the amount allotted for disbursement
specifically determined, the nature of the fund was likewise defined with sufficient specificity. The LGSF,in the
aforesaid specified amount, is limited to the expenditure of "Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses" or
MOOEs. The 2014 GAA specifies that the disbursement of the LGSF shall be subject to applicable DBM
guidelines, embodied in DBM Local Budget Circular No. 104, as amended by DBM Local Budget Circular No.
105.54 These guidelines, in turn, identify the programs and projects for which the LGSF may be expended in
connection with the specific purpose detailed in the 2014 GAA. As precisely mandated by the 2014 GAA, the
projects that may be financed through the LGSF are limited to specific initiatives laid down in the applicable
DBM guidelines and are likewise reserved to cover MOOEs incurred in relation to these aforesaid specific
initiatives. In fine, the LGSF, as structured under the 2014 GAA, identifies not only the specific purpose for
which the same may be expended, but effectively limits, through applicable DBM guidelines, the projects for
which the said fund may be [Link], based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the 2014
GAA sufficiently: (1)specifies the standards which set the limits of the Executive's authority to disburse the
LGSF.(2) determines the legislative policy behind the fund; and (3) identifies the conditions under which the
fund may be utilized. Proceeding therefrom,the Court finds that the LGSF satisfies both the completeness and
sufficient standard tests, and is thus, valid and constitutional.
 POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Makati Stock HELD: It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him by
Exchange Inc. the statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. In its brief and its resolution now subject to
v. Securities review, the Commission cites no provision expressly supporting its rule. Nevertheless, it suggests that the
and Exchange power is "necessary for the execution of the functions vested in it"; but it makes no explanation, perhaps
Commission,G. relying on the reasons advanced in support of its position that trading of the same securities in two or more
R. No. L- stock exchanges,fails to-give -protection to the investors, besides contravening public interest. xxx According
23004, June to many court precedents,the general power to "regulate" which the Commission has (Sec. 33) does not imply
30,1965, 14 authority to prohibit."The Legislature has specified the conditions under which a stock exchange may legally
SCRA 620. obtain a permit (sec. 17, Securities Act); it is not for the Commission to impose others. If the existence of two
competing exchanges jeopardizes public interest — which is doubtful — let the Congress speak. Undoubtedly,
the opinion and recommendation of the Commission will be given weight by the Legislature, in judging whether
or not to restrict individual enterprise and business opportunities. But until otherwise directed by law, the
operation of exchanges should not be so regulated as practically to create a monopoly by preventing the
establishment of other stock exchanges and thereby contravening: "(a) the organizers' (Makati's)
Constitutional right to equality before the law; (b) their guaranteed civil liberty to pursue any lawful employment
or trade; and (c) the investor's right to choose where to buy or to sell, and his privilege to select the brokers in
his employment." And no extended elucidation is needed to conclude that for a licensing officer to deny license
solely on the basis of what he believes is [Link] the economy of the country may amount to regimentation or,
in this instance, the exercise of undelegated legislative powers and [Link], it has been held that
where the licensing statute does not expressly or impliedly authorize the officer in charge, he may not refuse to
grant a license simply on the ground that a sufficient number of licenses to serve the needs of the public have
already been issued. (53 C.J.S. p. 636.)xxx xxx Surely, this petition for review has suitably been coursed. And
making reasonable allowances for the presumption of regularity and validity of administrative action, we feel
constrained to reach the conclusion that the respondent Commission possesses no power to impose the
condition of the rule, which, additionally,results in discrimination and violation of constitutional rights.
An administrative officer, it has been held, has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
Ople [Link], FACTS: Petitioner contends that Administrative Order No. 308, for the purpose of the establishment of a
G.R. No. national computerized identification reference system, requires a legislative act, that the issuance of A.O. no.
127685, July 308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of Congress;thus, the
23, 1998 293 appropriation of public funds by the president for the implementation of A.0. no.308 is an unconstitutional
SCRA 141 usurpation of the exclusive right of congress to appropriate public funds for expenditure.
HELD: A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An
administrative order is: "Sec. [Link] Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects
of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders." An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to
specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should
be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. We reject the argument
that A.0. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general
law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of
governance" and "embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve the
people." It cannot be simplistically argued that A.0. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of
[Link] establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference [Link] a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies - the primacy of national security, the extent
of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government,the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of
Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No.308 involves the all-important freedom of [Link] said
administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well
as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of
Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law. Nor is it correct to
argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords
no protection, and creates no office. Under A.0. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government
agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will
refuse to get this identification card for no One can avoid dealing with the government. It is thus clear as
daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given
this reality,the contention that A.0. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Commissioner HELD: The authority of the Minister of Finance(now the Secretary of Finance), in conjunction with the
of internal Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective
Revenuevs. enforcement of internal revenue laws cannot be controverted. Neither can it be disputed that such rules and
Court of regulations, as well as administrative opinions and rulings,ordinarily should deserve weight and respect by the
Appeals, G.R. courts. Much more fundamental than either of the above, however, is that all such issuances must not
No. 108 override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement.
Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the [Link]
Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed
(administratively) prior to 22 August 1986, the law could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It
did [Link] conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been designed to be in the nature
of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it.
To reiterate, matters of detail may be left by the legislature to be filled by rules and regulations to be adopted
or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, to fill up the details or to find facts to carry the
legislatively declared policies into effect.
Victoria Milling HELD: Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment
Co. [Link] of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation"contained in Section 8 (f) of
Security Republic Act No.1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows:"(f) Compensation -All remuneration for
Commission, employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that
114 Phil. 555 part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2)bonuses, allowances or overtime
 pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to
do so." Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to: "(f) Compensation — All
remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash
except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month."It will thus be seen that
whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or
base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such
exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory,]elaw. It thus became necessary for the Social
Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore,
issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as
amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as
amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be
construed. xxx xxx We find, therefore,that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of
the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly
compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based,and that such
circular did not require presidentia approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.
Philippine HELD: It is not here disputed that the Rules and Regulations of the SSS, having been promulgated in
Blooming Mills implementation of a law, have the force and effect of a statute;" that the amendment thereto,although
v. Social approved by the President on January 14, 1958, was published in the Official Gazette in November, 1958, or
Security after the employment of the Japanese technicians had ceased and the corresponding claim for the refund of
System, 124 the premium contributions was filed with the System. The question pertinent to this case now is whether or not
Phil. appellants are bound by the amended Rules requiring membership for two years before refund of the premium
contributions may be [Link] rules and regulations were promulgated to provide guidelines to be
observed in the enforcement of the law. As a matter of fact,Section 3 of Rule I is merely an enumeration of the
"general principles to (shall) guide the Commission" in the determination of the extent or scope of the
compulsory coverage of the law. One of these guiding principles is paragraph(d) relied upon by appellants, on
the coverage of temporarily-employed aliens. It is not here pretended, that the amendment of this Section 3(d)
of Rule I, as to eliminate the provision granting to these aliens the right to a refund of part of their premium
contributions upon their departure from the Philippines, is not in implementation of the law or beyond the
authority of the Commission to do.
Comm of HELD: It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its
Internal applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the
Revenue v. CA law itself has already prescribed. When, upon the other hand,the administrative rule goes beyond merely
(G.R. No. providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
119761, substantially adds-to-or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to
August those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is
29,1996.261SC given the force and effect of law. A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under
RA 236. which it has been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure
(revoking in the process the previous holdings of past Commissioners) or merely as construing Section 142(c)
(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly, been made in order to place "Hope
Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion"within the classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing
foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654. Specifically, the new law would have its
amendatory provisions applied to locally manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity were not so
classified as bearing foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the questioned circular, "Hope Luxury," "Premium
More," and "Champion" cigarettes were in the category of locally manufactured cigarettes not bearing foreign
brand subject to 45% ad valorem tax. Hence, without RMC 37-93, the enactment of RA 7654, would have had
no new tax rate consequence on private respondent's [Link], in order to place "Hope
Luxury,""Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes within the scope of the amendatory law and subject them
to an increased tax rate, the now disputed RMC 37-93 had to be issued. In so doing, the BIR not simply
intrepreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative [Link] due observance of the
requirements of notice,of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored.
GMA Network HELD: The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 on January 15, 2013 then came up with a public
v. Commission hearing on January 31, 2013 to explain what it had done, particularly on the aggregate-based air time limits.
on This circumstance also renders the new regulation, particularly on the adoption of the aggregate-based airtime
Elections,G.R. limit, questionable. It must not be overlooked that the new Resolution introduced a radical change in the
No. 205357, manner in which the rules on airtime for political advertisements are to be reckoned. As such there is a need
September 2, for adequate and effective means by which they may be adopted, disseminated and implemented. In this
2014, 734 regard, it is not enough that they be published- or explained - after they have been adopted. While it is true
SCRA 88. that the COMELEC is an independent office and not a mere administrative agency under the Executive
Department, rules which apply to the latter must also be deemed to similarly apply to the former, not as a
matter of administrative convenience but as a dictate of due process. And this assumes greater significance
considering the important and pivotal role that the COMELEC plays in the life of the nation. Thus,whatever
might have been said in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, should also apply mutatis
mutandis to the COMELEC when it comes to promulgating rules and regulations which adversely affect, or
impose a heavy and substantial burden on, the citizenry in a matter that implicates the very nature of
government we have adopted: "It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already [Link], upon the other hand, the
administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome
the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves
the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of [Link]" For failing to conduct prior hearing
before coming up with Resolution No. 9615, said Resolution,specifically in regard to the new rule on aggregate
airtime is declared defective and ineffectual.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within
the delegated authority of, the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable,and (iii) whether it wa?issued
pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or
 wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has committed those
questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments
Cruz v. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the
Youngberg, 56 rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law
Phil. to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute Its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of
234(1931). authoritative weight to the interpretative rule.
HELD: This court has several times declared that it will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it
is necessary to do so(McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil, 563,568; Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese
and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259) but in this case it is not necessary to pass upon the validity of the statute attacked
by the petitioner because even if it were declared unconstitutional, the petitioner would not be entitled to relief
inasmuch as Act No. 3052 is not in issue. But aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, we are of the opinion
that Act No. 3155 is entirely valid. As shown in paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the Legislature passed
Act No. 3155 to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases
through importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting
the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the
police power(12 C.J., 927; 6 R.C.L., 203-206 and decisions cited therein; Reid vs. Colorado, 187 U.S.,
137,147, 152; Yeazel vs. Alexander, 58 Ill, 254). In this connection it is said in the case of Punzalan vs.
Ferriols and Provincial Board of Batangas(19 Phil., 214), that the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, did not have the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands the right to the exercise of
the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. The facts recited in
paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was
reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act.
Zabal v. HELD: The activities proposed to be undertaken to rehabilitate Boracay involved inspection,testing, demolition,
Duterte, G.R. relocation, and [Link] could not have been implemented freely and smoothly with tourists coming
No. 238467 in and out of the island not only because of the possible disruption that they may cause to the works being
undertaken, but primarily because their safety and convenience might be [Link], the contaminated
waters in the island were not just confined to a small manageable area. The excessive water pollutants were
all over Bolabog beach and the numerous illegal drainpipes connected to and discharging wastewater over it
originate from different parts of the [Link], the activities occasioned by the necessary digging of these
pipes and the isolation of the contaminated beach waters to give way to treatment could not be done in the
presence of tourists. Aside from the dangers that these contaminated waters pose, hotels, inns, and other
accommodations may not be available as they would all be inspected and checked to determine their
compliance with environmental laws. Moreover, it bears to state that a piecemeal closure of portions of the
island would not suffice since as mentioned, illegal drainpipes extend to the beach from various parts of
Boracay. Also, most areas in the island needed major structural rectifications because of numerous resorts
and tourism facilities which lie along easement areas, illegally reclaimed wetlands, and of forested areas that
were illegally cleared for construction [Link], the need to close the island in its entirety and ban
tourists therefrom. In fine,this case does not actually involve the right to travel in its essential sense contrary to
what petitioners want to portray. Any bearing that Proclamation No. 475 may have on the right to travel is
merely corollary to the closure of Boracay and the ban of tourists and nonresidents therefrom which were
necessary incidents of the island's rehabilitation. There is certainly no showing that Proclamation No.475
deliberately meant to impair the right to travel. Tue questioned proclamation is clearly focused on its purpose
of rehabilitating Boracay and any intention to directly restrict the right cannot, in any manner, be deduced from
its import. xxx xxx Also significant to note is that the closure of Boracay was only temporary considering the
categorical pronouncement that it was only for a definite period of six [Link], if at all, the impact of
Proclamation No.475 on the right to travel is not direct but merely consequential; and, the same is only for a
reasonably short period of time or merely temporary.
Cebu Oxygen HELD: This petition is impressed with [Link] to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules
&Acetylene Co. implementing Republic Act No. 6640,which prohibits the employer from crediting the anniversary wage
v. Drilon increases provided in collective bargaining agreements, it is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot
add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No.6640,
do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act
No. 6640. The implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony
with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.
The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress. Thus petitioners contention that the salary increases granted by it pursuant to the existing CBA
including anniversary wage increases should be considered in determining compliance with the wage increase
mandated by Republic Act No. 6640, is [Link], the amount that should only be credited to petitioner
is the wage increase for 1987 under the CBA when the law took effect. The wage increase for 1986 had
already accrued in favor of the employees even before the said law was enacted. Petitioner therefor correctly
credited its employees P62.00 for the differential of two(2) months increase and P31 .00 each for the
differential in 13th month pay, after deducting the P200.00 anniversary wage increase for 1987 under the CBA.
Indeed, it is stipulated in the CBA that in case any wage adjustment or allowance increase decreed by law,
legislation or presidential edict in any particular year shall be higher than the foregoing increase in that
particular year, then the company (petitioner)shall pay the difference.
Shell, HELD: While it is true that under the same law the Central Bank was given the authority to promulgate rules
Philippines, and regulations to implement the statutory provision in question, we reiterate the principle that this authority is
Inc. v. Central limited only to carrying into effect what the law being implemented provides. Considering the foregoing,we rule
Bank of the that the trial court was correct in declaring that "Monetary Board Resolution No. 47 is void insofar as it
Philippines, imposes the tax mentioned in Republic Act No. 6125 on the export seria residue of (plaintiff) the aggregate
G.R. No. L- annual F.0.B., value of which reached five million United States dollars in 1971 effective on January 1, 1972."
51353,June 27, The said resolution runs counter to the provisions of R.A. 6125 which provides that "(A)ny export product the
1988, 162 aggregate annual F.0.B. value of which shall exceed five million United States dollars in any one calendar year
SCRA 628 during the effectivity of this Act shall likewise be subject to the rates of tax in force during the fiscal year
following its reaching the said aggregate value."
Boie-Takeda HELD: Contrary to respondents' contention Memorandum Order No. 28 did not repeal,supersede or abrogate
Chemicals Inc. P.D. 851. As may be gleaned from the language of the Memorandum Order No. 28, it merely
v. De La Serna, "modified"Section 1 of the decree by removing the P1,000.00 salary ceiling. The concept of 13th Month Pay as
G.R. No. envisioned, defined and implemented under P.D. 851 remained unaltered, and while entitlement to said
92174, benefit was no longer limited to employees receiving a monthly basic salary of not more than P1,000.00,said
December 10, benefit was, and still is, to be computed on the basic salary of the employee-recipient as provided under P.D.
1993,228 851. Thus, the interpretation given to the term "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851 applies equally to "basic
SCRA 329 salary" under Memorandum Order No. 28. xxx xxx xxx In including commissions in the computation of the 13th
month pay, the second paragraph of Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th
Month Pay Law unduly expanded the concept of "basic salary'as defined in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule
that implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony
with the provisions of the law they are intended to carry into effect. They cannot widen its scope. An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use
either to abridge the authority given it by Congress or the Constitution, or to enlarge its power heyond
[Link] intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control what rules and regulations may be
promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not
make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute,
particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the
purpose of a statute.
Taxicab HELD: As public contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring
Operators of evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible
Metro Manila, collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles
Inc.v. The affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of
Board of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered,and a fair return on
Transportation, investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to
the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three
shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness,the
requirement of due process has been met.
Corona v. HELD: It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
United Harbor profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that
Pilots after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which
Association, they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under
G.R. No. the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or
111953 permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are
December 12, suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that [Link] of their
1997, 283 license is now dependent on a"rigid evaluation of performance" which is conducted only after the license has
SCRA 31 already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term"renewal" It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which
primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation
of property without due process of law. The Court notes that [Link] No. 04-92 and PPA-MO No. 08-92 are
already covered by PPA-AO No. 03-85, which is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out that
PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a surplusage" and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is a
comprehensive order setting forth the "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of
Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports."It provides, inter alia, for the qualification,appointment,
performance evaluation, disciplining and removal of harbor pilots — matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO
No. 04-92 and its implementing memorandum order. Since it adds nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No.04-
92 must be struck down.
Lupangco v. HELD: It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
Court of capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
Appeals, reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for
[Link].77372, which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. Resolution No. 105 is not only
April 29, 1988, unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.
160 SCRA 446. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for
the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the
fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties
in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful
knowledge that will promote their personal growth, xxx xxx xxx Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution
No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at
least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation
on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in
the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would
be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find
out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated
from their loss, then so be [Link] or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by
examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked.
These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223.
But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the
examinations should not be curtailed.
Executive HELD: There is no doubt that the issuance of the ban to protect the domestic industry is a reasonable exercise
Secretary of police power. The deterioration of the local motor manufacturing firms due to the influx of imported used
[Link] motor vehicles is an urgent national concern that needs to be swiftly addressed by the President. In the
Heavy exercise of delegated police power, the executive can therefore validly proscribe the importation of these
Industries Inc., vehicles. xxx The problem,however, lies with respect to the application of the importation ban to the Freeport.
G.R. The Court finds no logic in the all encompassing application of the assailed provision to the Freeport which is
No.164171, outside the customs territory. As long as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury
February 20, or harm sought to be prevented or remedied will not arise. The application of the law should be consistent with
2006, 482 the purpose of and reason for the [Link] cessat lex, et cessat lex. When the reason for the law ceases,
SCRA 673 the law ceases. It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. To apply the proscription
to the Freeport would not serve the purpose of the EO. Instead of improving the general economy of the
country, the application of the importation ban in the Freeport would subvert the avowed purpose of RA 7227
which is to create a market that would draw investors and ultimately boost the national economy. XXx XXx xxx
In sum, the Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is void insofar as it is made applicable to the
presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Pursuant to
the separability clause of EO 156, Section 3.1 is declared valid insofar as it applies to the customs territory or
the Philippine territory outside the presently secured fencedin former Subic Naval Base area as stated in
Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Hence, used motor vehicles that come into the Philippine territory via the secured
fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may be stored, used or traded therein, or exported out of the
Philippine territory, but they cannot be imported into the Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in
former Subio Naval Base area.
United States HELD: The Solicitor-General suggests, but does not argue, that section 6 is applicable to the case at bar.
v. Panlilio,28 Section 6 simply authorizes the Director of Agriculture to do certain things, among them,paragraph (c) "to
Phil.608(1914) require that animals which art suffering from dangerous communicable diseases or have been exposed
thereto be placed in quarantine at such place and for such time as may be deemed by him necessary to
prevent the spread of the disease." Nowhere in the law,however, is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders.
Section 8 provides that "any person violating any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or
by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for each offense."'A violation of the orders of
the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph (c), is not a violation of the provisions of the Act. The
orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are not statutes
and particularly not penal statutes,and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself
somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes [Link] in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the
orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein.
United States HELD: Act No. 4003 contains no similar provision prohibiting boats not subject to license from fishing within
v. Santos three kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and
military authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities [Link] as the only authority granted
to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by section 4 of Act No. 4003, is to issue from time to time such
instructions, orders, rules, and regulations consistent with said Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry
into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such provisions; and
inasmuch as said Act No. 4003, as stated,contains no provisions similar to those contained in the above
quoted conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, the conditional clause in question
supplies a defect of the law,extending it. This is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not
been and cannot be delegated to him, it being exclusively reserved to the then Philippine Legislature by the
Jones Law, and now to the National Assembly by the Constitution of the Philippines. Such act constitutes not
only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, but also
an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore said conditional clause is null and
void and without effect (12 Corpus Juris, 845; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil, 660; U.S. vs. Ang
Tang Ho, 43 Phil, 1; U.S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phil.,327). For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and
so hold that the conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2. issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, is null and void and without efect, as constituting an excess of the regulatory
power conferred upon him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 and an exercise of a legislative power which has not
been and cannot be delegated to him.
People vs. HELD: It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish "electro fishing."Notwithstanding the
Exconde 101 silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,upon the recommendation of the
Phil. 1125, Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84(62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting
People v. Hon. electro fishing in all Philippine waters. Section 2 of the said AO provides: "SEC. 2. - Prohibition.- It shall be
Maceren, G.R. unlawful for any person to engage in electro fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion
No. of the Philippine waters except for research, educational and scientific purposes which must be covered by a
permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which shall be carried at all times." On
June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries
Commission,issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No.
84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).Thus, the phrase "in
any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the amendatory order to read as
follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and
other bodies of fresh water." xxx xxx We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic
Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro
fishing is not banned under that law,the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner
of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words,Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing
electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a
penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. That law punishes
(1)the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea
fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca,(4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to
report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations. Nowhere in that law is electro fishing
specifically [Link] Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such
an offense fails within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro
fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances,
fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for"other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in
section 83 of the Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to
 declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition
of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
People [Link] HELD: We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the
Po Lay, 94 circulars, regulations or notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two
Phil.640(1954) laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,notices and
documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and
make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette,presumably, for the guidance of the different
branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing. However, section 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take
effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official
Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation
of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. (See U.
S.v. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations
especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation
should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public
is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and especifically informed of said contents and its penalties. xxx In the present case,
although Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November
1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said Circular,
particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the
Official Gazette or after November [Link] other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it
was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession within
one day following his taking possession thereof.
Pesigan v. HELD: We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982
Judge Angeles, because xxx it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June
G.R. No. L- 14,1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section
64279 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes
circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. (People vs.
Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna [Link] of
Education, 110 Phil. 150.) xxx xxx (A)violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and
forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be
informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be
bound thereby. XXx Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section
551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become
effective only when approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
publicly promulgated"(See Commissioner of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.) In the instant case, the
livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Publio Affairs Office
of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been
expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.
Vigan Electric HELD: Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates - when such rules and/or rates are
Light Co., Inc. meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines—may partake of a legislative
vs. Public character such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed,the same applies exclusively to petitioner
Service [Link] is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact -based upon a report submitted by the General
Commission, Auditing Office — that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by
[Link]. L- petitioner. Obviously,the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence
19850, January to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion
30, 1964, 10 drawn therefrom by the [Link] other words, in making said finding of fact,respondent performed a
SCRA 46. function partaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and
[Link] xxx Since compliance with law must be presumed, it should be assumed that petitioner's current
rates were fixed by respondent after proper notice and hearing. Hence, modification of such rates cannot be
made, over petitioner's objection, without such notice and hearing,particularly considering that the factual
basis of the action taken by respondent is assailed by petitioner. The rule applicable is set forth in the
American Jurisprudence the following language:"Whether notice and a hearing in proceedings before a public
service commission are necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional provisions applicable to
such proceedings, which make notice and hearing, prerequisite to action by the commission, and upon the
nature and object of such proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are, on the one hand, legislative and
rule-making in character, or are, on the other hand, determinative and judicial or quasijudicial, affecting the
rights an property of private or specific persons. As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public
service commission.(43 Am. Jur. 716)" Wherefore, we hold that the determination of the issue involved in the
order complained of partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial function and that having been issued without
previous notice and hearing said order is clearly violative of the due process clause,and, hence, null and void.
Philippine HELD: The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an
Consumers adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected
Foundation, parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the
Inc. v. The exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When
Secretary of the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given
Education, kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates
Culture and imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in
Sports [Link] Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We
believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all
private schools in the country for school year 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of its issuance. This observation notwithstanding, there is a failure on the part of the
 petitioner to show clear and convincing evidence of such [Link] the record of the case discloses, the
DECS is not without any justification for the issuance of the questioned Department Order. It would be
reasonable to assume that the report of the Task Force created by the DECS, on which it based its decision to
allow an increase in school fees, was made judiciously. Moreover, upon the instance of the petitioner, as it so
admits in its Petition, the DECS had actually reduced the original rates of 15% to 20% down to 10% to 15%,
accordingly. Under the circumstances peculiar to this case, We cannot consider the assailed Department
Order arbitrary.
PHILCOMSAT HELD: The order in question which was issued by the NTC no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-
v. Alcuaz, judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other.
[Link]. 84818 Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial,that there is merit in a reduction of
December 18, some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording
1989,180 petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements
SCRA 218. warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies,
if any, discussed,which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It
is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the
viability of its business [Link] rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it
conducts of the multifaceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and
[Link] are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate
reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public
considering the maintenance requirements,the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay
involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued
the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order. At any rate, there remains the categorical
admission made by respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial
functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely
incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit. While
respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-
fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice
and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it
may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary
in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would
otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable [Link]
the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides:
"Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the Commission shall have power,
upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the
limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary: xxx xxx XXX(c) To fix and
determine individual or joint rates, .. which shall be imposed, observed and followed thereafter by any public
service;..."There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent NTC,there
being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196. It is
thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving
petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is
made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present
case. That such a hearing is required is evident in respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in NTC Case No
87-94 which granted PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to continue operating its existing facilities, to
render the services it presently offers, and to charge the rates as reduced by them "under the condition that
"(s)ubject to hearing and the final consideration of the merit of this application, the Commission may modify,
revise or amend the rates..." While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other
sources of information or data, still, since a hearing is essential,respondent NTC should act solely on the basis
of the evidence before it and not on knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered
in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity to controvert.
Freedom from HELD: Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR does not require the conduct of a hearing prior to the issuance of a
Debt Coalition, provisional order. However, reading the aforementioned provisions of the Public Service Act, the ERB Charter
et al. v. Energy and the IRR in relation to one another, as they should be read,the inexorable conclusion is that the provisional
Regulatory order cannot be issued under the circumstances based exclusively on the application and supporting
Commission, documents thereof. The IRR explicitly requires,as a prerequisite to such issuance, that the ERC consider also
G.R. No. the comments of the consumers and the LGUs concerned on the application which were filed within thirty (30)
161113, June days from their receipt of a copy of the application or the publication thereof. In other words, the ERC must
15, wait for thirty (30) days from service of copies of the application for rate adjustments on interested parties or
from the publication of such application before it can issue a provisional order. If after the 30th day, no
comments are filed by concerned parties, then and only then may the ERC, if it deems proper under the
circumstances, issue a provisional order on the basis of the application and its supporting documents. xxx xxx
Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR, outlining as it does the approval process for an application or petition for
provisional rate adjustment, enforces not only Section 43(u)thereof but also Sections 44 and 80 which, as
earlier stated, refer to the powers of the ERB passed on to the ERC and found in other prevailing laws, such
as Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act. The validity of the IRR,including Section 4(e) under Rule 3 thereof,
is not in dispute. The IRR was crafted by the Department of Energy (DOE) in consultation with relevant
government agencies in accordance with its mandate under the EPIRA. It was promulgated on the same day
that it was approved by the Joint Congressional Power Commission on February 27, 2002. This Commission
is composed of fourteen(14) members of the Senate and the House. It is settled that an administrative agency
possesses the power to issue rules and regulations to implement the statute which it is tasked to enforce,
unless another agency is the one so authorized by the law as in the case of the EPIRA. This is so because it is
impracticable, if not impossible, for the legislature to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex
situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. So long as the rules and regulations are germane to
the objects and purposes of the law and conforms to the standards prescribed thereby, they are deemed to
have the force and effect of law. xxx The challenged provisional rate increase transgresses Section 4(e), Rule
3 of the IRR in two major respects. The violations involve a couple of new requirements prescribed by the IRR.
These are, first, the need to publish the application in a newspaper of general Circulation in the locality where
 the applicant Operates; and second, the need for ERC to consider the comments or pleadings of the
customers and LGU concerned in its action on the application or motion for provisional rate
adjustment,Obviously, the new requirements are aimed at protecting the consumers and diminishing the
disparity or imbalance between the utility and the consumers. The publication requirement gives them
enhanced opportunity to consciously weigh the application in terms of the additional financial burden which the
proposed rate increase entails and the basis for the application. With the publication of the application itself,
the consumers would right from the start be equipped with the needed information to determine for themselves
whether to contest the application or not and if they so decide, to take the needed further steps to repulse the
application. On the other hand, the imposition on the ERC to consider the comments of the customers and the
LGUs concerned extends the comforting assurance that their interest will be taken into account. Indeed, the
requirements address the right of the consuming public to due process and at the same advance the cause of
people empowerment which is also a policy goal of the EPIRA along with consumer protection.
National HELD: Among the important requirements introduced under (Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA)
Association of are: first, the publication of the application itself, not merely the notice of hearing issued by the ERC, in a
Electricity newspaper of general circulation in the locality where the applicant operates and; second, the need for the
Consumers for ERC to consider the comments or pleadings of the customers and LGU concerned in its action on the
Reforms et al. application or motion for provisional rate adjustment. The Court reasoned that the publication and comment
v. Energy requirements are in keeping with the avowed policies of the EPIRA, to wit:"...[T]o protect the public interest vis-
Regulation à-vis the rates and services of electric utilities and other providers of electric power, to ensure transparent and
Commission, reasonable prices of electricity in a regime of free and fair competition and full public accountability for greater
G.R. No. 16393 operational and economic efficiency, to enhance the competitiveness of Philippine products in the global
market,and to balance the interests of the consumers and the public utilities providing electric power through
the fair and non-discriminatory treatment of the two sectors. Clearly, therefore, although the new requirements
are procedural in character,they represent significant reforms in public utility regulation as they engender
substantial benefits to the consumers. It is in this light that the new requirements should be appreciated and
their observance enforced. The lack of publication of respondent MERALCO's amended application for the
increase of its generation charge is thus fatal. By this omission, the consumers were deprived of the right to
file their comments thereon. Consequently, the assailed Order dated June 2, 2004 issued by the ERC xxx was
made without giving the consumers any opportunity to file their comments thereon in violation of Section 4(e),
Rule 3 of the IRR of the [Link], the basic postulate of due process ordains that the consumers be
notified of any application, and be apprised of its contents,that would result in compounding their economic
burden. In this case, the consumers have the right to be informed of the bases of respondent MERALCO's
amended application for the increase of its generation charge in order to, if they so desire, effectively contest
the [Link] requirement of publication in applications for rate adjustment is not without reason or purpose. It
is ancillary to the due process requirement of notice and hearing. Its purpose is not merely to inform the
consumers that an application for rate adjustment has been filed by the public utility. It is to adequately inform
them that an application has been made for the adjustment of the rates being implemented by the public utility
in order to afford them the opportunity to be heard and submit their stand as to the propriety and
reasonableness of the of the rates within the period allowed by the Rule. Without the publication of the
application,the consumers are left to second-guess the substance and merits of the application. At this point, it
should be stated that the Court is not convinced by respondent MERALCO's argument that to require it to
comply with Section 4(e),Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA would be a violation of its right to due process
because it would be subjected to a long and tedious process of recovering its fuel and purchased power costs.
xxx xxx (R)espondent MERALCO's apprehension of being subjected to a long and tedious process with
respect to the recovery of its fuel and purchased power costs is, in fact,addressed by the power of the ERC to
grant provisional rate adjustments. The ERC is not,of course, precluded from promulgating [Link] or
methodology, such as the GRAM,for the recovery by the distribution utilities of their fuel and purchased power
costs. However,these rules, guidelines or methodology so adopted should conform to the requirements of
pertinent laws, including Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA.
Tañada v. HELD: Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
Tuvera, G.R. usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. xxx xxx We hold therefore that all statutes, including
No. L-63915, those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,which shall
December begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this
29,1986,146 rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
SCRA 446. powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature, or at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, that is,regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
[Link] is publication required of the so-called Letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
[Link], even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion
of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be
published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from
certain prohibitions or [Link] circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
[Link], no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on
the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government
agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.
Parenthetically,municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
Article 2 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 200, provides that Laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided." Additionally, rules, orders, circulars and
other related issuances should comply with the requirement stated under Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VIl of the
Administrative Code of 1987,39 by filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) in the
University of the Philippines Law Center for rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative Code
of 1987 became effective,
 These requirements of publication and filing were* put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of
lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public
concern and, therefore, require strict compliance.
Republic v. HELD: The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating that
Extelcom the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken
effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules
were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative
Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives
the rules force and effect. xxx xxx The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules
and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress,all appellate courts, the National Library, other
public offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover
publication and mailing or distribution costs. Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. This is explicit from
Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code xxx The Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the NTC, which implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act (C.A. 146, as amended), fall squarely
within the scope of these laws. xxx Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates
that said Rules shall take effect only after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In the
absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs.
De Jesus v. HELD: On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the [Link] the
Commission on doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
Audit, G.R. the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of
No.109023 which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC
August 12, No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
1998,294 in the Philippines. In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which
SCRA 152. completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and
employees, starting November 1,1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more
than [Link] why not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional
compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the said circular under
attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees
concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines - to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice
out whatever opposition they may have,and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in
keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency.
National HELD: It does not appear from the records that the GRAM Implementing Rules, as set forth in the ERC Order
Association of dated February 24, 2003 in ERC Case No. 2003-44, has been published in the Official Gazette or in a
Electricity newspaper of general circulation. A careful review of the procedural steps undertaken by the ERC leading to
Consumers for its issuance of the Order dated February 24, 2003 in ERC Case No. 2003-44, which set forth the GRAM
Reforms et Implementing Rules, as well as the Order dated June 2, 2004 in ERC Case No. 2004-112, which approved the
al.v. Energy increase of respondent MERALCO's generation charge purportedly in accordance with the GRAM
Regulation Implementing Rules,shows that there was no publication of the same in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
Commission, of general circulation. Nowhere from the (established procedural antecedents) does it show that the GRAM
G.R. Implementing Rules was published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
No.163935, Significantly, the effectivity clauses of both the GRAM and ICERA Implementing Rules uniformly provide that
February 2, they "shall take effect immediately." These clauses made no mention of their publication in either the Official
2006, 481 Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Moreover,per the Certification dated January 11, 2006 of the
SCRA 480. Office of the National Administrative Register(ONAR), the said implementing rules and regulations were not
likewise filed with the said office in contravention of the Administrative Code of 1987. xxx However, the fact
that the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their respective comments is not
compliance with the fundamental rule that the GRAM Implementing Rules, or any administrative rules whose
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law, must be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general [Link] requirement of publication of implementing rules of statutes is mandatory and may not
be dispensed with altogether even if, as in this case, there was public consultation and submission by the
parties of their comments. xxx xxx With respect to the GRAM Implementing Rules, its publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation is mandated by the fact that these rules seek to implement
key provisions of the EPIRA. More importantly, the GRAM Implementing Rules, insofar as it lays down the
procedure by which generation costs of distribution utilities are recovered, affect ultimately the public as
consumers of electricity and who pay the charges therefor. Clearly, the GRAM Implementing Rules affects the
public inasmuch as it determines the costs of electricity [Link] public, not only the parties to the
cases before the ERC, has the right to be apprised of the contents of the GRAM Implementing Rules by
publication of the same in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines - to
the end that it be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition it may have, and to ventilate its
stance on the matter.
It must be noted, however, that the publication requirement does not apply when the administrative regulation
is merely -interpretative or merely furnishes the implementing details of another regulation already duly
published.
Cawad v. HELD: Indeed, publication, as a basic postulate of procedural due process, is required by law in order for
Abad, administrative rules and regulations to be effective. There are, however, several exceptions, one of which are
[Link].20714 interpretative regulations which "need nothing further than their bare issuance for they give no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed."These regulations need not be published
for they add nothing to the law and do not affect substantial rights of any person. xxx In this case, the DBM-
DOH Joint Circular in question gives no real consequence more than what the law itself had already
prescribed. As previously discussed, the qualification of actual exposure to danger for the PHW's entitlement
to,hazard pay, the rates of P50 and 25 subsistence allowance, and the entitlement to longevity pay on the
basis of PHW's status in the plantilla of regular positions were already prescribed and authorized by pre-
existing [Link] is really no new obligation or duty imposed by the subject circular for it merely reiterated
 those embodied in RA No. 7305 and its Revised IRR. The Joint Circular did not modify, amend nor supplant
the Revised IRR,the validity of which is undisputed. Consequently,whether it was duly published and filed with
the UP Law Center - ONAR is necessarily immaterial to its validity because in view of the pronouncements
above, interpretative regulations, such as the DBM-DOH circular herein, need not be published nor filed with
the UP Law Center - ONAR in order to be effective. Neither is prior hearing or consultation mandatory.
Republic v. HELD: A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that AO 67, s. 1989 is actually the rule that
Drugmaker's originally introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a component of applications for the issuance of CPRs
Laboratories, covering certain pharmaceutical products. As such, it is considered an administrative regulation - a legislative
Inc. rule to be exact - issued by the Secretary of Health in consonance with the express authority granted to him by
RA 3720 to implement the statutory mandate that all drugs and devices should first be registered with the FDA
prior to their manufacture and sale. Considering that neither party contested the validity of its issuance, the
Court deems that AO 67, s. 1989 complied with the requirements of prior hearing, notice, and publication
pursuant to the presumption of regularity accorded to the government in the exercise of its official duties On
the other hand, Circular Nos. 1 and 8,s. 1997 cannot be considered as administrative regulations because
they do not: (a) implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof;(b) interpret, clarify, or explain
existing statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain the existence of certain facts
or things upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these circulars is for
the FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of A0 67, s. 1989, including those
covering the BA/BE testing requirement, consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720. Therefore, the FDA has
sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and since they would not affect the substantive rights of the
parties that they seek to govern - as they are not, strictly speaking,administrative regulations in the first place -
no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed for their validity.
Association of HELD: RR 15-2013 merely sums up the rules by which international carriers may avail of preferential rates or
International exemption from income tax on their gross revenues derived from the carriage of persons and their excess
Shipping baggage based on the principle of reciprocity or an applicable tax treaty or international agreement to which
Lines,Inc. v. the Philippines is a signatory. Interpretative regulations are intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing
Secretary of statutory regulations under which the administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective is merely to
Finance, G.R. construe the statute being administered and purport to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply,they try to
No. 222239 say what the statute means and refer to no single person or party in particular but concern all those belonging
to the same class which may be covered by the said [Link], when an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. As such, RR 15-2013 need not pass
through a public hearing or consultation, get published, nay, registered with the U.P. Law Center for its
effectivity.
Villafuerte v. HELD: On this note, the nature of municipal ordinances or resolutions which require publication is embodied in
Cordial Jr., Sections 59, 188, and 511 of the LGC. xxx xxx xxx In the instant case, what was being assailed is Resolution
G.R. No. No. 13-2013,which provides for the rules of procedure concerning the conduct of investigation against
222450, July municipal officials in said province, issued by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur. Clearly, it is
07, 2020. neither penal in nature as it does not provide for any sanction or punishment nor a tax measure. It is merely
interpretative) of Title II, Chapter 4 of the LGC, which outlines the procedure when a disciplinary action is
instituted against an elective local [Link] on the foregoing, Resolution No. 13-2013 need not be
published.
Accordingly, an administrative regulation can be construed as simply interpretative or internal in
nature,dispensing with the requirement of publication, when its applicability needs nothing further than its bare
issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When,
however, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to bé heard, and thereafter, to be
duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
Peralta v. Civil HELD: When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it
Service merely interprets a pre-existing law;and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is
Commission,G. the courts that finally determine what the law means. In promulgating as early as 12 February 1965 the
R. No. 95832, questioned policy, the Civil Service Commission interpreted the provisions of Republic Act No.2625 (which
August 10, took effect on 17 June 1960)amending the Revised Administrative Code. xxx The Civil Service Commission in
1992 its here questioned Resolution No. 90-797 construed R.A. 2625 as referring only to government employees
who have earned leave credits against which their absences may be charged with pay, as its letters speak
only of leaves of absence with full pay. The respondent Commission ruled that a reading of R.A. 2625 does
not show that a government employee who is on leave of absence without pay on a day before or immediately
preceding a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said [Link]
construction, if we may repeat,is not necessarily binding upon the [Link] of an administrative agency
may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative
enactment. We find this petition to be impressed with merit. xxx The intention of the legislature in the
enactment of R.A.2625 may be gleaned from, among others, the sponsorship speech of Senator Arturo
[Link] during the second reading of House Bill No. 41 (which became R.A. 2625). He said:"The law
actually provides for sick leave and vacation leave of 15 days each year of service to be with full pay. But
under the present law,in computing these periods of leaves, Saturday,Sunday and holidays are included in the
computation so that if an employee should become sick and absent himself on a Friday and then he reports for
work on a Tuesday, in the computation of the leave the Saturday and Sunday will be included, so that he will
be considered as having had a leave of Friday,Saturday, Sunday and Monday, or four [Link] purpose of
the present bill is to exclude from the computation of the leave those days, Saturdays and Sundays, as well as
holidays,because actually the employee is entitled not to go to office during those days. And it is unfair and
unjust to him that those days should be counted in the computation of leaves." With this in mind, the
construction by the respondent Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent. R.A.
2625 specifically provides that government employees are entitled to fifteen (15) days vacation leave of
absence with full pay and fifteen (15) days sick leave with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and
 Holidays in both cases. Thus, the law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does not provide for a
distinction between those who have accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their leave
credits in order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The fact remains that
government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to work
on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and thus they can not be declared absent on such non-working days.
They cannot be or are not considered absent on non-working days;they cannot and should not be deprived of
their salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they were absent without pay on the day
immediately prior to, or after said non-working days. A different rule would constitute a deprivation of property
without due process.
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
Source HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not
Cariño v. CHR, meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
G.R. No. less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
96681, adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
December 2, claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and
1991, 204 cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
SCRA 483 function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in
a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not
have. xxx xxx xxx The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own
initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it
may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In
the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to
any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient
to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be
required by its findings.
United Coconut HELD: A perusal of Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, and Section 1, Rule 43 of the
Planter's Bank 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure reveals that the BSP Monetary Board is not included among the quasi-
v. E. Ganzon, judicial agencies explicitly named therein, whose final judgments, orders, resolutions or awards are appealable
Inc., G.R. No. to the Court of Appeals. Such omission, however, does not necessarily mean that the Court of Appeals has no
168859, June appellate jurisdiction over the judgments, orders, resolutions or awards of the BSP Monetary Board, A perusal
30, 2009, 591 of Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, and Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
SCRA 321 Procedure reveals that the BSP Monetary Board is not included among the quasi judicial agencies explicitly
named therein, whose final judgments, orders, resolutions or awards are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
Such omission, however, does not necessarily mean that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction
over the judgments, orders, resolutions, or awards of the BSP Monetary Board. It bears stressing that Section
9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, on the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, generally
refers to quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions. The use of the word "including" in
the said provision, prior to the naming of several quasi-judicial agencies, necessarily conveys the very idea of
non-exclusivity of the enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where
other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive, or where the enumeration
is by way of example only. Similarly, Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely
mentions several quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity in the phraseology. The enumeration of the
agencies therein mentioned is not exclusive. The introductory phrase "[a]mong these agencies are" preceding
the enumeration of specific quasi-judicial agencies only highlights the fact that the list is not meant to be
exclusive or conclusive. Further, the overture stresses and acknowledges the existence of other quasi-judicial
agencies not included in the enumeration but should be deemed included. Xxx Undoubtedly, the BSP
Monetary Board is a quasi-,judicial agency exercising quasi-,judicial powers or functions. As aptly observed by
the Court of Appeals, the BSP Monetary Board is an independent central monetary authority and a body
corporate with fiscal and administrative autonomy, mandated to provide policy directions in the areas of
money, banking, and credit. It has the power to issue subpoena, to sue for contempt those refusing to obey
the subpoena without justifiable reason, to administer oaths and compel presentation of books, records and
others, needed in its examination, to impose fines and other sanctions and to issue cease and desist order.
Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653, in particular, explicitly provides that the BSP Monetary Board shall
exercise its discretion in determining whether administrative sanctions should be imposed on banks and quasi-
banks, which necessarily implies that the BSP Monetary Board must conduct some form of investigation or
hearing regarding the same.
Jurisdiction HELD: For the reason that we have already decided several cases on the same point raised in this appeal, to
La Union Labor the effect that the Wage Administration Service and its agents have no power or authority to decide cases
Union v. Phil. involving claims for wages under the Minimum Wage Law, where the parties, employer and employee, have
Tobacco Flue- not submitted their cases for arbitration by the WAS, we find it unnecessary to enter into an extensive and
Curing and detailed discussion of this case. In quite a number of cases, we have held that the Wage Administration
Redrying Service is not empowered to render a decision binding on the parties in cases involving claims for wages,
Corporation, underpayment, etc., unless the parties enter into a written agreement to submit their dispute or differences to
108 Phil. 845 the WAS for arbitration, pursuant to Section 9, Article 7(c), Chapter 3 of the Code of Rules and Procedure
(1960) promulgated on January 20, 1953 by the Secretary of Labor, to implement the provisions of the Minimum
Wage Law; that the ordinary function of the Wage Administration Service is to hear complaints or claims for
wages; and conciliate the parties if possible, and if they are willing to submit the case for arbitration, to have
said parties enter into a written agreement that they would abide by the result of said arbitration, otherwise, all
that the WAS could do if it found the claim for wages meritorious, is to file the corresponding complaint in a
competent court. (Cebrero vs. Talaman, 103 Phil., 687; Winch vs. P. J. Kiener Co. Ltd., 104 Phil., 735; 55 Off.
Gaz. (35] 7337; Potente vs. Saulog Transit, Inc., 105 Phil., 525; Ortega vs. Saulog Transit, Inc., 105 Phil., 907,
 57 Off. Gaz. [46] 8299; Figueroa vs. Saulog, 105 Phil., 1012; 57 Off. Gaz. [8) 1395; Garcia vs. Garcia, 106
Phil., 413; 57 Off. Gaz. [3) 460; and Ponce vs. Co King Lian, 107 Phil., 263; 57 Of Gaz. [26] 4762.) The trial
court, however, believed that the agreement of the parties before the Industrial Court in the aforementioned
Case No. 867-V, particularly, the stipulation above-reproduced, that all other points of controversy not covered
by the agreement would be submitted to the WAS for adjudication, fully authorized the WAS thru its agent to
render a decision. We consider that stipulation to be insufficient to confer power and jurisdiction on the WAS to
decide the case. The law and the Code of Rules and Procedure issued by the Secretary of Labor require a
written agreement signed by the parties to submit to arbitration and to abide by the result of the decision
flowing from said arbitration.
Jurisdiction HELD: We agree with petitioner RCPI. In one case We have ruled that the Public Service Commission and its
RCPI vs. Board successor in interest, the Board of Communications, "being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can
of exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication,. conferred upon it by
Communication statute". The functions of the Public Service Commission are limited and administrative in nature and it has
s, G. R. No. L- only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. As
43653 and L- successor in interest of the Public Service Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same
45378, powers jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public Service
November 29, Commission. One of these powers as provided under Section 129 of the Public Service Act governing the
1977, 80 SCRA organization of the Specialized Regulatory Board, is to issue certificate of public convenience. But this power
471 to issue certificate of public convenience does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over
matters not related to the issuance of certificate of public convenience or in the performance therewith in a
manner suitable to promote public interest.
Jurisdiction HELD: The issues of due process and real parties in interest do not have to be discussed in this case. This
Radio decision will dwell on the primary question of jurisdiction of the NTC to administratively impose fines on a
Communication telegraph company which fails to render adequate service to a consumer. E.O. 546, it will be observed, is
s of the couched in general terms. The NTC stepped "into the shoes" of the Board of Communications which exercised
Philippines, powers pursuant to the Public Service Act. The power to impose fines should therefore be read in the light of
Inc. v. Nat'l the Francisco Santiago case because subsequent legislation did not grant additional powers to the Board of
Telecommunic Communications. The Board in other words, did not possess the power to impose administrative fines on
ation public services rendering deficient service to customers, ergo its successor cannot arrogate unto itself such
Communication power, in the absence of legislation. It is true that the decision in RCPI vs. Board of Communications seems to
, G.R. No. have modified the Santiago ruling in that the later case held that the Board of Communications can impose
93237, fines if the public service entity violates or fails to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any
November 6, order, decision or regulation of the Commission. But can private respondent's complaint be similarly treated
1992, 215 when the complaint seeks redress of a grievance against the company? NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a
SCRA 455 fine. xxx xxx No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the
Solicitor General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to
impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to
render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and
regulatory power of the agency.
Procedural HELD: To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative
Due Process: charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the
Notice and preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to
Hearing the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service law. This, it is believed, is not conducive to the
Garcia v. maintenance of a robust, effective and efficient civil service, the integrity of which has, in this jurisdiction,
Executive received constitutional guarantee, as it places in the hands of the Chief Executive a weapon that could be
Secretary, G.R. wielded to undermine the security of tenure of public officers. Of course, this is not so in the case of those
No. L-19748, officers holding office at the pleasure of the President. But where the tenure of office is fixed, as in the case of
September 13, herein petitioner, which according to the law he could hold "for 6 years and shall not be removed therefrom
1962, 6 SCRA except for cause", to sanction the stand of respondents would be to nullify and render useless such specific
1 condition imposed by the law itself. If he could be preventively suspended indefinitely, until the final
determination of the administrative charges against him (and under the circumstances, it would be the
President himself who would decide the same at a time only he can determine) then the provisions of the law
both as to the fixity of his tenure and the limitation of his removal to only for cause would be meaningless. In
the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could, in effect, be removed
without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. This would set
at naught the laudable purpose of Congress to surround the tenure of office of the Chairman of the National
Science Development Board, which is longer than that of the President himself, with all the safeguards
compatible with the purpose of maintaining the office of such officer, considering its highly scientific and
technological nature, beyond extraneous influences, and of insuring continuity of research and development
activities in an atmosphere of stability and detachment so necessary for the fulfillment of its mission,
uninterrupted by factors other than removal for cause. Upon these considerations, there is unanimity of opinion
among the members of this Court that the preventive suspension in the case of officers, although appointed by
the President but with a fixed term and removable only for cause, cannot be indefinite.
Necessity of HELD: These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless
Actual the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during
Hearing custodial investigation.
Lumiqued v. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding Land, with more
Exevea, G.R. reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal
No. 117565, proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not
November 18, accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by
1997, 282 Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under
SCRA the law for the complaints filed against him. xxx xxx As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating
committee was not part of a criminal prosecution. Xxx While investigations conducted by an administrative
body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being
 investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding such as the one that transpired below, a respondent
(such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions
of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39,
paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on Discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). xxx xxx xxx In administrative proceedings, the essence
of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments,
through pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party
was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due
process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this
constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration
cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee.
Necessity of HELD: Petitioner's position cannot be sustained.
Actual The essence of due process is that a party be afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
Hearing evidence he may have in support of his defense. In administrative proceedings such as the one at bench, due
Padilla v. Sto. process simply means the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
Tomas, G.R. action or ruling complained of. In the instant case, petitioner does not deny the fact that he was furnished a
No. 109444, copy of the charges against him wherein he was required to file an answer and to state whether he wanted a
March 31, formal investigation. Petitioner did file his answer. As to the scheduled hearing on April 20, 1989, petitioner
1995, 243 admits that he was notified. The fact that he filed a motion for postponement did not necessarily mean that his
SCRA 155 motion was granted, hence, the scheduled hearing proceeded ex-parte. Consequently, a decision was
rendered by the AAB-DOTC. From said decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, on
account of the liberality of the AAB-DOTC, he was heard and was allowed to present his evidence. His motion
for reconsideration having been denied, he filed an appeal with the MSPB and, later on, a motion for
reconsideration. Not satisfied, he again filed an appeal with respondent CSC and, later on, a motion for
reconsideration. Clearly therefore, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present his case. He was not
denied his right to due process. One may be heard, not only by verbal presentation but also, sometimes more
eloquently, through pleadings. "Due process is not semper et ubique judicial process." Hence, a formal or trial-
type hearing is not, at all times, necessary. So long as a party is afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain his side, the requirement of due process is complied with.
Opportunity to HELD: As well stated by the Court of Appeals, there is an existing guideline of the CSC distinguishing simple
be heard and grave misconduct. In the case of Landrito v. Civil Service Commission, we held that "in grave
Civil Service misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
Commission v: law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest," which is obviously lacking in respondent's
Lucas, GR No. case. Respondent maintains that as he was charged with simple misconduct, the CSC deprived him of his
127838; Jan. 1, right to due process by convicting him of grave misconduct. We sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that:
1999, 301 (a) a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him and
SCRA 560 that (b) a person cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged. Administrative proceedings
are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable in
administrative proceedings. Of course, we do not in any way condone respondent's act. Even in jest, he had
no right to touch complainant's leg. However, under the circumstances, such act is not constitutive of grave
misconduct, in the absence of proof that respondent was maliciously motivated. We note that respondent has
been in the service for twenty (20) years and this is his first offense.
Rules of HELD: The petition is impressed with merit. The issue confronting the Court is not without precedent in
Procedure jurisprudence. The oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC squarely grapples a similar challenge involving the
Bantolino, et al. propriety of the use of affidavits without the presentation of affiants for cross-examination. In that case, we
v. Coca-Cola held that "the argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-
Bottlers Phils., examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before
Inc. G.R. No. administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only." In
153660, 10 Rase v. NRC, this Court likewise sidelined a similar challenge when it ruled that it was not necessary for the
June 2003, 403 affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise
SCRA 699 would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the
Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence. Southern Cotabato Dev. and
Construction Co. v. NLRC succinctly states that under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Further, it notes
that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each
case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of
due process. We find no compelling reason to deviate therefrom. To reiterate, administrative bodies like the
NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law .
Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, ie.,
by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
Substantial HELD: On the aspect of procedural due process, suffice it to say that petitioner was given every chance to
Evidence present his side. The rule is well settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a
Larin v. party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of
Executive his defense. The records clearly show that on October 1, 1993 petitioner submitted his letter-response dated
Secretary, G.R. September 30, 1993 to the administrative charge filed against him. Aside from his letter, he also submitted
No. 112745, various documents attached as annexes to his letter, all of which are evidences supporting his defense. Prior
October 16, to this, he received a letter dated September 17, 1993 from the Investigation Committee requiring him to
1997, 280 explain his side concerning the charge. It cannot therefore be argued that petitioner was denied of due
SCRA 713 process.
Substantial HELD: More than a mere scintilla of evidence, substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a
Evidence reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable
Diaz v. Office might conceivably opine otherwise. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe
of the that the respondent is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be
Ombudsman, overwhelming. Applying this standard of proof, the Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the Ombudsman's
G.R. No. conclusions, as affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the SLC showed gasoline withdrawals from 1999 to 2003 for
203217, July vehicles with engine no. 406Y18 and plate numbers SCB-995 and PPR-691. However, engine no. 406Y18
02, 2018, 869 was already decommissioned as of 1998. This is reflected in the Report of Waste Materials, indorsed by
SCRA 233 petitioner on December 29, 1998 to the Appraisal/Disposal and Sub-Committee on Canvass and Bidding,
indicating that the item could be found in the storeroom of the Slaughterhouse Operation and Maintenance
Division. Likewise, the vehicle with plate no. SCB-995, a Toyota Land Cruiser, was already declared
"unserviceable" on August 31, 1999, as evidenced by the Inventory and Inspection Report of even date which
was signed by petitioner himself. In fact, in a letter dated July 9, 2001 addressed to the VIB's security
personnel, petitioner authorized the withdrawal of said vehicle by the Appraisal/Disposal and SubCommittee
on Canvase and Bidding, for disposal at the latter's dumping area in Arroceros, Manila. Furthermore, petitioner
had acknowledged that the vehicle with plate no. PPR-691 was his personal property. The Ombudsman also
found and petitioner himself admitted that he was already receiving transportation allowahce during the period
covered by the subject gasoline withdrawals. The foregoing circumstances ineluctably justify the
Ombudsman's finding that petitioner committed dishonesty.
Substantial HELD: It appears that complainants did not have personal knowledge of the acts imputed against respondents
Evidence as they merely relied on hearsay to support their claims. For one, Adante clearly stated in her letter complaint
Re: Letter of that the alleged offense was only "intimated to (her]," while Ofendoreyes simply asks the Court to "investigate
Lucena and stop" the said illicit activities without providing any further details on the information. The Court has
Ofendoreyes emphasized that "to satisfy the substantial evidence requirement for administrative cases, hearsay
Alleging Illicit evidence should necessarily be supplemented and corroborated by other evidence that are not
Activities of a hearsay," which, however, was not presented here. Jurisprudence dictates that in administrative proceedings,
Certain Atty. complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence. If they fail
Cajayon to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which their claims are based, the respondents are not obliged
Involving to prove their exception or defense. The same goes with administrative cases disciplining for grave offense
Cases in the court employees or magistrates. The evidence against the respondent should be competent and should be
Court of derived from direct knowledge. Thus, considering that the complainants not only failed to comply with the
Appeals, formal requirements provided in the Rules of Court, but also did not present evidence to lend any ostensible
Cagayan de merit to their letter-complaints that accuse herein respondents of serious ethical violations (i.e., bidding out
Oro City, AM court decisions in favor of moneyed clients), the Court finds no proper conclusion other than to dismiss outright
No. 16-12-03- the present cases.
CA, June 6,
2017, 826
SCRA 74
Substantial HELD: After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the evidence on record sufficiently demonstrates
Evidence Saligumba's culpability for Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty, and fully satisfies the standard of
Saligumba v. substantial evidence. The evidence shows that the state auditors prepared a Report of Cash Examination
Commission on which stated the total shortage of public funds and demanded upon Saligumba to produce all cash for which
Audit, Regional she is officially accountable. Saligumba signed and acknowledged said report. It is undisputed that Saligumba
Office No. XIII, offered no explanation to the state auditors for such shortage of funds when the demand was made but,
G.R. No. instead, admitted her accountability. Grave Misconduct was committed when Saligumba failed to keep and
238643, account for cash and cash items in her custody. Her corrupt intention was apparent from her failure to give a
September 08, satisfactory explanation as to what happened to the missing public funds despite reasonable opportunity to do
2020 the same. Saligumba's act constitutes Serious Dishonesty because her dishonest act deals with money on her
account. Saligumba's failure to account for the cash shortage showed an intent to commit material gain, graft
and corruption. Evidence of misappropriation of the missing funds is not required because the existence of
shortage of funds and the failure to satisfactorily explain the same would suffice. In her futile attempt at
exculpation, Saligumba offered before the Ombudsman the explanation to the effect that there were actually
no missing funds to speak of as she merely obeyed the order of Municipal Mayor Ronquillo to issue official
receipts to make it appear that the market vendors have fully settled their unpaid taxes so that they could
renew their business permits, even though they did not make any of such payments. Curiously, Saligumba
never proffered said explanation to the state auditors when the latter demanded from her the production of the
shortage of public funds. The Court finds her assertion to be flimsy and a mere afterthought. Assuming her
explanation is factual, the same would not exonerate Saligumba from administrative liabilities. On the contrary,
it fortified Saligumba's liability for Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty because it sufficiently
demonstrated her propensity to disregard the law and established rules, and her predilection to distort the
truth. Saligumba's act of issuing official receipts despite non-payment of taxes is unlawful, it being violative of
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, and of the basic accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
She undeniably deprived the government of taxes that are essentially its lifeblood. At the very least, the act of
issuing official receipts and making it appear that the supposed payee remitted funds when no such funds
were received constitutes the crime of falsification of public documents committed by a public officer,
punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Saligumba claims that she was well aware of the
repercussions of her act but she, nonetheless, issued the official receipts without the corresponding funds
being remitted to the coffers of the Municipal Government of Barobo because she did not want to incur the ire
of Municipal Mayor Ronquillo. This, however, does not excuse her from any liability. It is grave misconduct
when Saligumba participated or consented to the commission of the unlawful act. As an Assistant Municipal
Treasurer of the local government, Saligumba fully knew that it is her duty to exercise proper management of
the funds under her custody. As a public officer, her duty was not only to perform her assigned tasks, but to
prevent the commission of acts inimical to the government and to the public in general. Her compliance with a
patently illegal order, without any written objection, clearly demonstrated her intention to violate the law, and
her flagrant disregard of the accounting and auditing rules and regulations. In the light of the above
disquisitions, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the similar conclusions reached by the
Ombudsman and the CA. The facts established and the evidence presented support the finding of
Saligumba's guilt. xxx xxx Indeed, the evidence presented by the COA is more convincing than that of
Saligumba. Saligumba failed to substantiate her defense by clear, convincing and competent evidence. The
certificate executed by her former officemate and the joint affidavit of the market vendors to corroborate her
 excuse deserve scant consideration. The statements contained in the certificate and joint affidavit are viewed
with skepticism due to the very nature of Saligumba's excuse that the affiants affirmed. Saligumba can easily
fabricate an explanation for the missing funds and ask her friends to corroborate it. Besides, we find the
statements given by said affiants less than convincing. Even granting arguendo that Saligumba was able to
prove the veracity of her explanation regarding the subject cash shortage, the same would not absolve her
from administrative liabilities as discussed above.
Substantial HELD: In this regard, it is a well-established rule that the party-litigant who alleges the existence of a fact or
Evidence thing necessary to establish his/her claim has the burden of proving the same by the amount of evidence
JR Hauling required by law, which, in labor proceedings, is substantial evidence, or "such relevant evidence as a
Services v. reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." To be clear; in the hierarchy of
Solamo, G.R. evidentiary values, "proof beyond reasonable doubt is placed at the highest level, followed by clear and
No. 214294, convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that order." Thus, in the
September 30, hierarchy of evidence, it is the least demanding. "Corollarily, the ground for the dismissal of an employee does
2020 not require proof beyond reasonable doubt." The quantum of proof required is merely substantial evidence -
which only entails evidence to support a conclusion, "even if other minds, equally reasonable, might
conceivably opine otherwise." Accordingly, requiring a quantum of proof that is over and above substantial
evidence is contrary to law. Notably, respondents argued before the CA that the affidavits presented by
petitioners were inadmissible to prove their culpability which would justify their dismissal from employment.
Particularly, respondents averred that: (1) the affidavits were taken ex-parte and, thus, incomplete and
inaccurate; (2) statements therein are self-serving and hearsay, and unsubstantiated by concrete evidence;
and (3) the admissions of culpability made by their co-employees are binding only on them and not on
respondents. It is for these reasons that the CA, in finding that respondents were illegally dismissed,
disregarded these affidavits and held as follows: Even the affidavits submitted by (petitioners] only contain
mere allegations uncorroborated by any other evidence which, to this Court, clearly do not constitute
substantial evidence to show [respondents] involvement in the alleged deliveries and deficiencies indicated in
the summary of deliveries. It is noteworthy, however, that although the affidavits do not address respondents'
participation in the delivery shortages of broilers, it is apparent that the statements in the same affidavits attest
to their involvement in the unauthorized sale of excess broilers and broiler crates. We now address the next
issue - Are the affidavits sufficient to establish respondents' involvement in the alleged acts in question? We
answer in the affirmative. This Court has held that in labor cases, "[a]ffidavits may be sufficient to
establish substantial evidence." Respondents argued, however, that affidavits taken ex-parte should not be
given due weight for being self-serving, hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. By citing pertinent provisions on
the rules on evidence, respondents insisted that any admissions made therein cannot be used to establish
their culpability, but only of the confessants themselves. The argument that the affidavits are hearsay for
having been taken ex parte i.e., that the affiants were not presented for cross-examination, does not persuade
us. The rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the labor tribunals
where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers, accompanied by supporting documents,
including affidavits of witnesses, and other allied pleadings. xxx xxx Clearly, to disregard the affidavits on the
ground that they were taken ex-parte would necessarily require the application of the technical rules of
evidence and thereby negate the purpose of the summary nature of labor proceedings mandated by the Labor
Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure. At any rate, we find that the affidavits executed by various co-
employees constitute substantial evidence to prove respondents' involvement in the unauthorized sale of
excess broilers and broiler crates. We are inclined to give them evidentiary weight absent any evidence to
rebut their validity. It is well settled that "a document acknowledged before a notary public is a public
document that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution." We also note that even the Labor
Arbiter's Decision on this matter is wanting in reference to any evidence that would support findings in favor of
petitioner. As between petitioner's bare allegation and the Affidavit of a witness to the contrary, we give
credence to the latter. xxx xxx Considering the foregoing premises, we hold that petitioners had sufficiently
discharged its burden in proving that respondents were indeed involved in the unauthorized sale of excess
broilers and broiler crates. By regarding the various affidavits supporting respondents' transgressions as
unsubstantial, it appears that the CA is requiring petitioners to prove respondents' culpability over and above
the quantum of proof of substantial evidence, which, as discussed above, is contrary to law and settled
jurisprudence. 'The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer has reasonable ground to
believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct, and his participation therein renders him unworthy
of the trust and confidence demanded by his position."
Decisions HELD: The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he was
Based on the not notified nor charged. Summary dismissal proceedings are governed by specific requirements of notification
Facts and Law of the charges together with copies of affidavits and other attachments supporting the complaints, and the
The Summary filing of an answer, together with supporting documents. It is true that consistent with its summary nature, the
Dismissal duration of the hearing is limited, and the manner of conducting the hearing is summary, in that sworn
Board and The statements may take the place of oral testimonies of witnesses, cross-examination is confined only to material
Regional and relevant matters, and prolonged arguments and dilatory proceedings shall not be entertained. (Section 4,
Appellate Memorandum Circular No. 92-006). However, notification of the charges contemplates that respondent be
Board, PNP, informed of the specific charges against him. Torcita was entitled to know that he was being charged with
Region VI, being drunk while in the performance of duty, so that he could traverse the accusation squarely and adduce
Iloilo City v. evidence in his defense. Although he was given an opportunity to be heard on the multiple and broad
Torcita, G.R. charges initially filed against him, the absence of specification of the offense for which he was
No. 130442, eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short cut to the legal
April 6, 2000, process (Alonte v. Savellano Jr., 287 SCRA 245). It is a requirement of due process that the parties be
330 SCRA 153 informed of how the litigation was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the Court (ABD Overseas Manpower Corp. v. LRC, 286 SCRA 454). Memorandum Circular No.
92-006 specifically prescribes that the decision shall contain "a brief statement of the material facts and the
findings of the summary dismissal authority as well as the disposition thereof' (Sec. 6). The cursory conclusion
of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the
performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this particular offense.
 xxx Premises considered, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the decision of the petitioners
Board was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, as respondent Torcita was found guilty of an offense
for which he was not properly charged.
Decisions HELD: The NTC Order is not supported by substantial evidence. Neither does it sufficiently explain the
Based on the reasons for the decision rendered. Our earlier discussion pertained to the lack of clear legal basis for
Facts and Law classifying SMS as VAS, owing to the failure of the NTC to adopt clear rules and regulations to that effect.
Globe Telecom Muddled as the legal milieu governing SMS already is, NTC's attempt to apply its confusing standards in the
Inc. v. National case of Globe and Smart is even more disconcerting. The very rationale adopted by the NTC in its Order
Telecommunic holding that SMS is VAS is short and shoddy. Astoundingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the rationale bereft
ations of intelligent inquiry, much less comment. xxx xxx The Court usually accords great respect to the technical
Commission, findings of administrative agencies in the fields of their expertise, even if they are infelicitously worded.
G.R. No. However, the above-quoted "finding" is nothing more than bare assertions, unsupported by substantial
143964, July evidence. The Order reveals that no deep inquiry was made as to the nature of SMS or what its provisioning
26, 2004, 435 entails. In fact, the Court is unable to find how exactly does SMS "fits into a nicety" with NTC M.C. No. 8-9-95,
SCRA 110 which defines "enhanced service" as analogous to "format, media conversion, encryption, enhanced security
features, computer processing, and the like." The NTC merely notes that SMS involves the "transmission of
data over (the] CMTS," a phraseology that evinces no causal relation to the definition in M.C. No. 8-9-95.
Neither did the NTC endeavor to explain why the "transmission of data" necessarily classifies SMS as a VAS.
In fact, if "the transmission of data over [the] CMTS" is to be reckoned as the determinative characteristic of
SMS, it would seem that this is already sufficiently covered by Globe and Smart's respective legislative
franchises. Smart is authorized under its legislative franchise to establish and operate integrated
telecommunications/ computer/ electronic services for public domestic and international communications,
while Globe is empowered to establish and operate domestic telecommunications, and stations for
transmission and reception of messages by means of electricity, electromagnetic waves or any kind of energy,
force, variations or impulses, whether conveyed by wires, radiated through space or transmitted through other
media and for the handling of any and all types of telecommunications services. The question of the proper
legal classification of VAS is uniquely technical, tied as at is to the scientific and technological application of
the service or feature. Owing to the dearth of substantive technical findings and data from the NTC on which a
judicial review may reasonably be premised, it is not opportunely proper for the Court to make its own
technical evaluation of VAS, especially in relation to SMS. xxx Moreover, the Order does not explain why the
NTC was according the VAS offerings of Globe and Smart a different regulatory treatment from that of
Islacom. Indeed, to this day, NTC has not offered any sensible explanation why Islacom was accorded to a
less onerous regulatory requirement, nor have they compelled Islacom to suffer the same burdens as Globe
and Smart. While stability in the law, particularly in the business field, is desirable, there is no demand that the
NTC slavishly follow precedent. However, we think it essential, for the sake of clarity and intellectual honesty,
that if an administrative agency decides inconsistently with previous action, that it explain thoroughly why a
different result is warranted, or if need be, why the previous standards should no longer apply or should be
overturned. Such explanation is warranted in order to sufficiently establish a decision as having rational basis.
Any inconsistent decision lacking thorough, ratiocination in support may be struck down as being arbitrary.
And any decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.
Independent HELD: It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant
Consideration Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. When
Anzaldo vs Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was "inclined to concur in the
Clave, G.R. recommendation of the Civil Service Commission", what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman
No. L-54597, Clave's recommendation: he was concurring with himself. Due process of law means fundamental fairness.
December 15, It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own
1982, 119 recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor
SCRA 353 Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the
Philippines. Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who
should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a person different from the person in the Office
of the President who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment. We hold that
respondent Clave committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding the appeal in favor of Doctor Venzon . The
appointing authority, Doctor Afable, acted in accordance with law and properly exercised his discretion in
appointing Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position.
Independent HELD: Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner attributes
Consideration partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case
Tejano v. despite the fact that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was a
Ombudsman, Special Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the filing of the information before the
G.R. No. Sandiganbayan. We agree with the petitioner. Steadfastly, we have ruled that the officer who reviews a case
159190, June on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review. Having participated in the initial
30, 2005 preliminary investigation of the instant case and having recommended the filing of an appropriate information,
it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during the
reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his Deputies pursuant to Section 15 of Rep. Act No.
6770 xxx. Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not review his decision
on appeal. xxx xxx xxx The fact that the motion for reconsideration of Ombudsman Desierto's disapproval of
the 03 November 1999 memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael recommending the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 21654 was denied by another reviewing officer, Ombudsman Marcelo, does not cure the
infirmity of Ombudsman Desierto's actuation.
Independent HELD: The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to investigate and
Consideration decide matters involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under the former's jurisdiction. Thus,
Department of the health secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents. xxx As a matter of administrative
Health v. procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report the facts from which a
Camposano, decision may be based. In the present case, the secretary effectively delegated the power to investigate to
G.R. No. the PCAGC. Neither the PCAGC nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the
157684, April power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to conducting investigations
27, 2005, 457 and preparing their findings and recommendations. The power to impose sanctions belonged to the
SCRA 438 disciplining authority, who had to observe due process prior to imposing penalties. Due process in
administrative proceedings requires compliance with the xxx cardinal principle (that)"in arriving at a
decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the
controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate;" xxx The CA correctly ruled
that administrative due process had not been observed in the present factual milieu. Noncompliance with the
sixth requisite is equally evident from the health secretary's Order dismissing the respondents xxx.
Concededly, the health secretary has the competence and the authority to decide what action should be taken
against officials and employees who have been administratively charged and investigated. However, the
actual exercise of the disciplining authority's prerogative requires a prior independent consideration
of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with this requirement results in an invalid decision. The disciplining
authority should not merely and solely rely on an investigator's recommendation, but must personally weigh
and assess the evidence gathered. There can be no shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation,
and the livelihood of the person administratively charged. In the present case, the health secretary's two-page
Order dismissing respondents pales in comparison with the presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais.
Prior to the issuance of his seven-page decision, President Fidel V. Ramos conducted a restudy of the
doctor's case. He even noted a violation that had not been considered by the PCAGC. On the other hand,
Health Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica simply and blindly relied on the dispositive portion of the
Commission's Resolution. She even misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the recommendation with regard to
Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin. The Order of Secretary Reodica denying respondents'
Motion for Reconsideration also failed to correct the deficiency in the initial Order . She improperly relied on the
President's findings in AO 390 which, however, pertained only to the administrative charge against Dr.
Majarais, not against respondents. To repeat, the Chief Executive recognized that the disciplinary jurisdiction
over respondents belonged to the health secretary, who should have followed the manner in which the
President had rendered his action on the recommendation. The President's endorsement of the records of the
case for the "appropriate action" of the health secretary did not constitute a directive for the immediate
dismissal of respondents. Like that of President Ramos, the decision of Secretary Reodica should have
contained a factual finding and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable respondents to know the
bases for their dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desired. xxx xxx Inasmuch
as the health secretary's twin Orders were patently void for want of due process, the CA did not err in refusing
to discuss the merit of the PCAGC's (or the Ad Hoc Committee's) recommendations. Such a discussion should
have been made by the health secretary before it could be passed upon by the CA . In representation of
petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General insists that respondents are guilty of the charges and xxx deserve
dismissal from the service. Suffice it to stress that the issue in this case is not the guilt of respondents, but
solely due process. In closing, the Court reiterates the oft-quoted aphorism that the end does not justify the
means. Guilt cannot be pronounced non penalty imposed, unless due process is first observed. This is the
essence of fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.
Res Judicata HELD: The doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings. As early
and Stare as 1956, in Brillantes v. Castro, we sustained the dismissal of an action by a trial court on the basis of a prior
Decisis administrative determination of the same case by the Wage Administration Service, applying the principle of
United Pepsi- res judicata. Recently, in Abad v. NLRC we applied the related doctrine of stare decisis in holding that the prior
Cola determination that certain jobs at the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., were project employments was binding in
Supervisory another case involving another group of employees of the same company. Indeed, in Nasipit Lumber Co., this
Union v. Court clarified toward the end of its opinion that "the doctrine of res judicata applies to judicial or quasi-
Laguesma, judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers." Now proceedings for certification
G.R. No. election, such as those involved in Case No. OS-M-A-10-318-91 and Case No. 05-A-3-71-92, are quasi-
122226, March judicial in nature and, therefore, decisions rendered in such proceedings can attain finality.
25, 1998, 288
SCRA 15
Res Judicata HELD: Petitioner's stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered
and Stare the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic shall fail. To be sure, the decision
Decisis of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine
Montemayor v. of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
Bundalian, administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for
G.R. No. the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised
149335, July Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, Petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the
12,2003, 405 PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGCs
SCRA 264 investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no
application in the case at bar.

Prejudicial HELD: A prejudicial question/is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of
Question which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains
Quiambao v. to another tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where
Hon. Osorio, civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely
GR No. L- related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can
48157, March proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal case to cause
16, 1988, 158 the suspension of the latter pending final determination of the former. xxx The actions involved in the case at
SCRA 647 bar being respectively civil and administrative in character, it is obvious that technically, there is no
prejudicial question to speak of. Equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation between said two [2]
proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed
portion depends primarily on the resolution of the pending administrative case. For while it may be true that
private respondents had prior possession of the lot in question, at the time of the institution of the ejectment
case, such right of possession had been terminated, or at the very least, suspended by the cancellation by the
Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their favor. Whether or not private respondents can
continue to exercise their right of possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in
the pending administrative case assailing the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the
subsequent award of the disputed portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the
 subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then private respondents would have every right to eject petitioner
from the disputed area. Otherwise, private respondent's light of possession is lost and so would their right to
eject petitioner from said portion. Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial
court to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the
administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move. To allow the
parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's right of possession being upheld in the
pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the parties but the court as well to expend time,
effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer exercise in futility.
ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS: ENFORCEMENT AND SANCTIONS
Subpoena HELD: Respondent Subido also invokes section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, which reads as
Power follows: "SEC. 580. Powers incidental to taking of testimony. - When authority to take testimony or evidence is
Francia v. Hon. conferred upon as administrative officer or upon any nonjudicial person, committee, or other body, such
Pecson, 87 Phil authority shall be understood to comprehend the right to administer oaths and summon witnesses and shall
100 (1950) include authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject
in all respects to the same restriction and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.
xxx" But in order that he may invoke that section, Subido must show that he has "authority to take testimony or
evidence." There is no law giving him such authority. We have seen that he is not even one of those
authorized by law to administer oaths. We do not think the mayor can delegate or confer the powers to
administer oaths, to take testimony, and to issue subpoenas. All that respondent Subido may lawfully do as
investigator for the mayor is to gather proofs and present them to the city fiscal, who may subpoena witnesses
if he finds it necessary to do so. The temerity and excesses of the respondent Subido are emphasized by his
issuance to subpoenas to the petitioner Francia in his own name and authority and by his threat "to use my
police power" to have the petitioner Francia arrested, without applying to the court for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
Subpoena HELD: The foregoing discussion will disclose that there are two factors involved in the correct solution of the
Power question before us. The first fact which must be made to appear clear and unequivocal proof, as a condition
Jose Sy Jong precedent to the right of a court, and, by analogy, an internal revenue officer, to require a person to deliver up
Chuy v. Reyes, for examination by the court or an internal revenue officer his private books and papers, is their relevancy; and
59 Phil. 244 the second fact which must be established in the same manner is the specification of documents and an
(1933) indication of them with as much precision as is fair and feasible (Liebenow vs. Philippine Vegetable Oil Co.,
supra; Kullman, Salz & Co. vs. Superior Court [1911], 114 Pac., 589) Speaking to the fact of relevancy, there
is absolutely no showing of the nature of any official investigation which is being conducted by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, and this is a prerequisite to the use of the power granted by section 436 of the
Administrative Code. Moreover, when the production under a subpoena duces tecum is contested on the
ground irrelevancy, it is for the movant or the internal revenue officer to show facts sufficient to enable the
court to determine whether the desired documents are material to the issues. And here, all that we have to
justify relevancy is the typewritten part of a mimeographed form reading: "it being necessary to use them
(referring to the books) in an investigation now pending under the income Tax and Internal Revenue Laws."
This is insufficient. But it is in the second respect that the subpoena is most fatally defective. It will be recalled
that it required the production of "all the commercial books or any other papers on which are recorded your
transactions showing income and expenses for the years 1925, 1926, 1927, and 1928 inclusive", that these
books numbered fifty-three in all, and that they are needed in the business of the corporation. In the parlance
of equity, the subpoena before us savored of a fishing bill, and such bills are to be condemned. That this is so
is shown by the phraseology of the subpoena which is a general command to produce all the books of account
for four years. This, it seems to us, made the subpoena unreasonably broad in scope. The internal revenue
officer had it within his power to examine any or all of the books of the corporation in the offices of the
corporation and then having ascertained what particular books were necessary for an official investigation had
it likewise within his power to issue a subpoena duces tecum sufficiently explicit to be understood and
sufficiently reasonable not to interfere with the ordinary course of business. But this method was not followed.
Obviously, if the special deputy could be in 1930 call for the production of the books of the corporation for
1925, 1926, 1927, and 1928, the officer could have called for the production of the books for the year just
previous, or 1929, and for the books of the current year, and if this could be done, the intrusion into private
affairs with disastrous paralyzation of business can easily be visualized.
Subpoena HELD: To begin with, there is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local Government
Power Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the
Negros power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these
Oriental II powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members
Electric for contumacious behaviour would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated
Cooperative, legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot
Inc. v. be implied "in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of
Sangguniang legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers
Panglunsod of without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, the contempt
Dumaguete, power, as well as the subpoena power, which the framers of the fundamental law did not expressly provide for
G.R. No. but which the then Congress has asserted essentially for self-preservation as one of three co-equal branches
72492, of the government cannot be deemed implied in the delegation of certain legislative functions to local
November 5, legislative bodies. These cannot be presumed to exist in favor of the latter and must be considered as an
1987, 155 exception to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337 which provides for liberal rules of interpretation in favor of local autonomy.
SCRA 421 Since the existence of the contempt power in conjunction with the subpoena power in any government body
inevitably poses a potential derogation of individual rights, i.e. compulsion of testimony and punishment for
refusal to testify, the law cannot be liberally construed to have impliedly granted such powers to local
legislative bodies. It cannot be lightly presumed that the sovereign people, the ultimate source of all
government powers, have reposed these powers in all government agencies. The intention of the sovereign
people, through their representatives in the legislature, to share these unique and awesome powers with the
local legislative bodies must therefore clearly appear in pertinent legislation. There being no provision in the
Local Government Code explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and
the power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the
 petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less
basis to claim that it can exercise these powers.
Contempt HELD: Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several
Power dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its
Guevara v. administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on
COMELEC, this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it
104 Phil 268 could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently
(1958) judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its
existence Is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice" (Slade Perkins
vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U.S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 Off. Gaz. 2570; In Re
Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and
attribute of courts (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has been
invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony (People vs. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the
exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held
invalid (Langenberg vs. Decker, 31 N.E. 190; In Re Sims 37 P., 135; Roberts vs. Hacney, 58 S.W., 810). We
are therefore persuaded to conclude that the Commission on Elections has no power nor authority to submit
petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him because of the publication of the article
mentioned in the charge under consideration,
Contempt HELD: The resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the charge for contempt
Power was filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function
Masangcay v. for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election
COMELEC, paraphernalia among the different municipalities. In fact, Masangcay, who as provincial treasurer of Aklan was
G.R. No. L- the one designated to take charge of the receipt, custody and distribution of election supplies in that province,
13827, was charged with having opened three boxes containing official ballots for distribution among several
September 28, municipalities in violation of the instructions of the Commission which enjoin that the same cannot be opened
1962, 6 SCRA except in the presence of the division superintendent of schools, the provincial auditor, and the authorized
27 representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party, and the Citizens' Party, for he ordered their
opening and distribution not in accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in said resolutions. And
because of such violation he was dealt as for contempt of the Commission and was sentenced accordingly. In
this sense, the Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is
null and void.
Contempt HELD: On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and
Power rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court."
Simon v. Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any
Commission on person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the
Human Rights, procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should
G.R. No. be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential
100150, to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against
January 5, persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who
1994, 229 decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic
SCRA 117 interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but
prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.
Rights HELD: At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
Against Self- incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand (3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, pp. 1959-1960;
Incrimination 98 C.J.S., p. 264). Hence, the issue before us boils down to whether or not the proceedings before the
Cabal v. Hon. aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character. In this connection, it should be noted that, although
Kapunan, G.R. said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth, there seems to be
No. L-19052, no question that Col. Maristela does not seek the removal of petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the Armed
December 29, Forces of the Philippines. As a matter of fact he no longer holds such office. It seems, likewise conceded that
1962, 6 SCRA the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as amended,
1059 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public
officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and
his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such for forfeiture has been held,
however, to partake of the nature of a penalty. xxx xxx As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of proper
are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to
be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.
Rights HELD: We affirm the lower court decision on appeal as it does manifest fealty to the principle announced by us
Against Self- in Cabal v. Kapunan. In that proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Judge Kapunan, xxx
Incrimination We found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case
Pascual v. may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand. "It was noted in
Board of the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while the matter referred to an administrative charge of
Medical unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property a public officer or
Examiners, employee may acquire, manifestly out of proportion to his salary and his other lawful income, there is clearly
G.R. No. L- the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character thus possesses a
25018 May 26, criminal or penal aspect. The case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He
28 SCRA 344 could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as medical practitioner, for some an
even greater deprivation. To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus be distinguished, it suffices to
refer to an American Supreme Court opinion highly persuasive in character. In the language of Justice
Douglas: "We conclude.. that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the
Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be
watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for
asserting it." We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result
in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.
Summary HELD: The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a)
Powers of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section
Harvey v. 37(a) xxx should be construed in ite entirety in view of the summary and indivisible nature of a deportation
Defensor- proceeding, otherwise, the very purpose of deportation proceeding would be defeated. Section 37(a) is not
Santiago, G.R. constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562). The specific constraints
No. 82544, in both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which are substantially Identical, contemplate prosecutions
June 28, 1988, essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An
182 SCRA 840 order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. "It is of course well-settled that deportation
proceedings do not constitute a criminal action. The order of deportation is not a punishment, (Maliler vs. Eby,
264 U.S., 32), it being merely the return to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which
he could continue to reside within our borders (U.S. vs. De los Santos, 33 Phil., 397). The deportation
proceedings are administrative in character, (Kessler vs. Stracker 307 U.S., 22) summary in nature, and need
not be conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings (Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d],
155). It is essential, however, that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the
charges against him, relating the facts relied upon. (U.S. vs. Uhl 211 F., 628.) It is also essential that he be
given a fair hearing with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unprejudiced investigators (Strench
vs. Pedaris, 55 F. [2d], 597; Ex parte Jew You On, 16 F. [2d], 153). However, all the strict rules of evidence
governing judicial controversies do not need to be observed; only such as are fumdamental and essential like
the right of cross-examination. (U.S. vs. Hughes, 104 F. [2d], 14; Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155.) Hearsay
evidence may even be admitted, provided the alien is given the opportunity to explain or rebut it (Morrell vs.
Baker, 270 F., 577; Sercerchi vs. Ward, 27 F. Supp., 437). (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948])." xxx
xxx Section 37 of the Immigration Law, which empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants
for the arrest of overstaying aliens is constitutional. The arrest is a stop preliminary to the deportation of the
aliens who had violated the condition of their stay in this country, To rule otherwise would be to render the
authority given the Commissioner nugatory to the detriment of the State.
Summary HELD: This theory is incorrect. As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171
Powers for he has not shown that his case falls within the coverage of the law. Office Memorandum No. 34 dated
Tabasa v. August 21, 1989 of the BID is enlightening on summary deportation: "2. The Board of Special Inquiry and the
Court of Hearing Board IV shall observe summary deportation proceedings in cases where the charge against the alien
Appeals, G.R. is overstaying, or the expiration or cancellation by his government of his passport. In cases involving
No. 125793, overstaying aliens, BSI and the Hearing Board IV shall merely require the presentation of the alien's valid
August 29, passport and shall decide the case on the basis thereof. 3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the
2006, 500 alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country, under
SCRA 9 the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15 (Schonemann v. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 81461 [sic, should be
'86461], 30 May 1989). The automatic loss of the privilege obviates deportation proceedings. In such instance,
the Board of Commissioners may issue summary judgment of deportation which shall be immediately
executory." In addition, in the case of Schonemann v. Defensor Santiago, et al., this Court held: "It is
elementary that if an alien wants to stay in the Philippines, he must possess the necessary documents. One of
these documents is a valid passport. There are, of course, exceptions where in the exercise of its sovereign
prerogatives the Philippines may grant refugee status, refuse to extradite an alien, or otherwise allow him or
her to stay here even if he [the alien] has no valid passport or Philippine visa. "Boat people" seeking residence
elsewhere are examples. However, the grant of the privilege of staying in the Philippines is discretionary on
the part of the proper authorities. There is no showing of any grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
whimsicality in the questioned summary judgment. xxx" Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled
after his admission into the country, became an undocumented alien who can be súmmarily deported. His
subsequent "repatriation" cannot bar such deportation especially considering that he has no legal and valid
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Phil American Section 5 (b) of said act, the judicial review of “any decisison of the Commission xxx shall be permitted only
Life Insurance after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted his remedies before the Commission.” Plaintiff
Co. Vs. Social has not exhausted its remedies before the Commission. The Commission has not even been given a chance
Security to render a decision. The latter has not appealed to the Commission.
Commission
Sta. Rosa It is premature for the Court to now make a finding on the matter of whether petitioner had abandoned its
Mining vs. mining claims. Until petitioner’s appeal have been decided by the Office of the President, petitioner’s attempt
Leido to seek judicial recognition of the continuing validity of its mining claims, cannot be entertained by the Court.
Applying the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Lopez vs. City As a general rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative board, body
of Manila or officer, relief to the courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided.
Ration of the GR = Presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error,
may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly.
Where a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can
be made to the courts (1) to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter by itself
correctly, and (2) to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts.
XPN = Sec. 187 of RA 7160 - the taxpayer mat question the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance on
appeal within 30 days from effectivity to the Secretary of Justice.
The petitioner after finding his assessment is unjust, confiscatory, or excessive, must have brought the case
before the Secretary of Justice for questions of legality or constitutionality of the city ordinance. Under Sec.
226 of RA 7160, an owner of real property who is not satisfied with the assessment of his property may, within
60 days from notice of the assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals. Should the taxpayer
question the excessiveness, he must first pay the amount due, and request the annotation of the phrase “paid
under protest” and accordingly appeal to the Board of Assessment.
It is a well-settled rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion
of the government agencies entrusted with the regulations of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.
Laguna CATV Under Art. 128 of the Labor Code, an order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of
Network Inc. Labor may be appealed to the latter. The petitioner should have first appealed to the Sec. of Labor instead of
vs. Marran filing with the CA.
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES - Courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience,
should not entertain suits unless the availbel administrative remedies have been first resorted to and the
proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any,
committed in the administrative forum.
Observance of this doctrine is a sound practice and policy. It ensures the orderly procedure which favors a
preliminary shifting process, with respect to (1) matters peculiarly within the competence of the administrative
agency, (2) avoidance of interference with functions, and (3) prevention of attempts to swamp the courts by
resort to them in the first instance.
Petitioner should have completed the administrative process by appealing the questioned Orders to the
Secretary of Labor. Although the SC has allowed certain exceptions to this Doctrine. Petitioner fails to show
that the instant case faills under any of the exceptions. Its contention that an appeal would be futile as it will
surely be disapproved, is purely conjectural and definitely misplaced.
Caballes vs. Rep. Act No. 8050 specifically vests in the Board of Optometry the power to conduct hearings and
Perez-Sison investigations to resolve complaints against practitioners of optometry for malpractice,unethical and
unprofessional conduct, or violation of any of the provisions of the Act or any of its regulations and authorizes
the said Board to render a decision thereon. Thus, the Board may, after giving proper notice and hearing to
the party concerned, revoke an optometrist's certificate of registration or suspend his license to practice on the
foregoing grounds, or upon the conviction of the optometrist of a crime involving moral turpitude. The
revocation of a certificate or suspension of a professional license by the Board shall become final, unless
appealed to the PRC within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision.
The petitioners' premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to their cause of action. The courts
must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities
within the specialized areas of their respective competence. Furthermore,reasons of law, comity and
convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
Wyeth PH, Inc. Petitioner is asking the Court to pass upon claims which are either clearly factual or require previous
vs. determination of factual issues. Attempts to re-litigate before the SC the detailed factual claims it already made
Construction before the Arbitral Tribunal and asserts that its review falls within the exceptions. Reasons raised are not
Industry among the exceptional grounds. Exceptions allowed in the review of Rule 45 petitions do not apply to reviews
Arbitration of the Arbitral Tribunal’s decisions. Exceptions must pertain to its conduct and the qualifications of the
Commission arbitrator, and NOT to its errors of fact and law, misappreciation of evidence or conflicting findings of fact.
The present dispute is better left to the Commission, a quasi-judicial body with the technical expertise to
resolve disputes outside the expertise of regular courts. The Arbitral Tribunal is in a better position to
adjudicate and determine the claims and rights of the parties. It fulfilled its tasks with technical competence
and complied with the requirements of the CIAC Rules of Procedure. It was given the full opportunity to
exclusively preside over the arbitral proceedings for 19 months.
Any review by the SC of their findings would require conducting its own ocular inspection, hiring its own
expertsm and providing its own interpretations of the findings of a highly technical agency. A review of factual
findings requires substantial proof “that integtrity of the arbitral tribunal has been compromised” OR “in a
haphazard, immodest manner.” Absent such proof, the Court will not disturb the factual findings by the arbitral
tribunal.