CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

1. San Miguel Corporation Employee Union v. Hon. Bersamira

G.R. No. 87700, June 13, 1990

FACTS:

SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite,
independent contractors duly licensed by DOLE, to maintain its competitive position and
in keeping with the imperatives of efficiency, business expansion and diversity of its
operation. It was expressly understood and agreed that the workers employed by the
contractors were to be paid by the latter and that none of them were to be deemed
employees or agents of SanMig.

Petitioner Union, is the duly authorized representative of the monthly paid rank-and-file
employees of SanMig executed a CBA, which expressly states that temporary,
probationary, or contract employees and workers are excluded from the bargaining unit
and, therefore, outside the scope of this Agreement."

The Union advised SanMig that the contractual workers had signed up for union
membership and sought the regularization of their employment with SMC on the ground
that they have been continuously working for the period of 6 months to 15 years. And
that their work is neither casual nor seasonal as they are performing work or activities
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of SanMig.

Due to failure to receive favorable response, notice to strike for unfair labor practice was
twice given. Several conciliation conferences were held to settle the dispute before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board. Series of pickets were staged by Lipercon
and D'Rite workers in various SMC plants and offices.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Civil Courts has jurisdiction over labor disputes?

RULING:

Yes. The existence of a labor dispute is not negative by the fact that the plaintiffs and
defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

As the case is indisputably linked with a labor dispute, jurisdiction belongs to the labor
tribunals. As explicitly provided for in Article 217 of the Labor Code, prior to its amendment
by R.A. No. 6715 on 21 March 1989, since the suit below was instituted on 6 March 1989,
Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases involving all workers including "1. unfair labor practice cases; 2. those that workers
may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
... and 5. cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions

1|Guerrero, John Kristopher D.

CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

involving the legality of strikes and lockouts. ..." Article 217 lays down the plain command
of the law.

2. Philtranco Services v. BLR

G.R. No. 85343 June 28, 1989

FACTS:

KASAMA KO, a registered labor organization filed a petition for certification election with
the DOLE, desires to represent all professional, technical, administrative, and confidential
employees personnel of respondent at its establishments in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao
for purposes of collective bargaining.

The aforementioned employees were always expressly excluded from participating in

the certification election conducted among the rank and file employees (drivers,
conductors, coach drivers, coach stewards, and mechanics) of respondent and are
excluded from the bargaining unit covered by the CBA between respondent and its rank
and file employees.

The National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU-MIF) filed a motion for
intervention alleging that it is the bargaining agent of the workers at Philtranco and as
such it has a substantial interest in the outcome of the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the questioned workers may be part of the union for rank and file?

RULING:

No. The Labor Code did away with existing supervisors' unions classifying the members
either as managerial or rank and file employees depending on the work they perform. If
they discharge managerial functions, supervisors are prohibited from forming or joining
any labor organization. If they do not perform managerial work, they may join the rank
and file union and if none exists, they may form one such rank and file organization.

It, therefore, follows that the members of the KASAMA KO who are professional, technical,
administrative and confidential personnel of PHILTRANCO performing managerial
functions are not qualified to join, much less form a union. This rationalizes the exclusion
of managers and confidential employees exercising managerial functions from the ambit
of the collective bargaining unit.

3. St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC

G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998

2|Guerrero, John Kristopher D.

CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

FACTS:

Private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for
financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude,
private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.

The mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the management of the
business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other
government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already
paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private
respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management
thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had
illegally terminated his employment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petition for certiorari is a proper remedy for decisions made by NLRC?

RULING:

Yes, however it should have been first filed with the CA. Created and regulated therein
is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment
for program and policy coordination only. Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof
also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to
the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and
abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for.

There is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on
questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that
the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction
and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and
balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications.

Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already
have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that
this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due
process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65.

While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the
wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a growing
number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has
at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or

3|Guerrero, John Kristopher D.

CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that
purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is
undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect
of constitutional protection to labor.

4. D’armoured Security v. Orpia

G.R. No. 151325 June 27, 2005

FACTS:

Respondents, who were employed as security guards by D’Armoured Security and

Investigation Agency, Inc., and assigned to Fortune Tobacco, Inc., filed with the Labor
Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and various monetary claims against petitioner
and Fortune Tobacco,

Fortune Tobacco interposed an appeal to the NLRC. Petitioner did not appeal. NLRC
rendered its Decision affirming with modification the assailed Arbiter’s Decision in the
sense that the complaint against Fortune Tobacco was dismissed. This Decision became
final and executory. Thus, the award specified in the Decision of the Arbiter became the
sole liability of petitioner.

The Arbiter issued a writ of execution. Eventually, the sheriff served a writ of garnishment
upon the Chief Accountant of Foremost Farms, Inc., a corporation with whom petitioner
has an existing services agreement. Thus, petitioner’s receivables with Foremost were
garnished.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the receivables from Foremost Farms, Inc. are exempt from execution?

RULING:

No. An order of execution of a final and executory judgment, as in this case, is not
appealable, otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. On this ground alone, the
instant petition is dismissible. Assuming that an appeal is proper, still we have to deny the
instant petition.

It is apparent that the exemption pertains only to natural persons and not to juridical
entities. On this point, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner, being a
corporate entity, does not fall within the exemption.

5. Maneja v. NLRC
G.R. No. 124013 June 5, 1998

4|Guerrero, John Kristopher D.

CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

FACTS:

Maneja works as a telephone operator at Manila Midtown Hotel, he filed for illegal
dismissal against the latter.

The hotel has dismissed Maneja on the ground of Offenses Subject to Disciplinary Actions
(OSDA): (1) OSDA 2.01: forging, falsifying official document(s), and (2) OSDA 1.11:
culpable carelessness — negligence or failure to follow specific instruction(s) or
established procedure(s).

The Labor Arbiter said in his decision that “on the face of the instant complaint, it is one
that revolves on the matter of the implementation and interpretation of existing
company policies.” Despite the aforequoted preliminary statement, the Labor Arbiter still
assumed jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:

Yes. Termination cases fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter.

Article 217 (c) should be read in conjunction with Article 261 of the Labor Code which
grants to voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective
bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personel policies. Note the phrase "unresolved grievances." In the case at bar,
the termination of petitioner is not an unresolved grievance.

Where there was already actual termination, i.e., violation of rights, it is already
cognizable by the Labor Arbiter.

6. Pantranco v. NLRC
G.R. No. 114333 January 24, 1996

FACTS:

Rueda was employed as a bus conductor by petitioner and later promoted to the
position of Line Inspector-I. Several years later, petitioner suffered financial setbacks and
retrenched some of its employees. Rueda was among those retrenched.

5|Guerrero, John Kristopher D.

CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

Rueda was re-hired as a line inspector by petitioner. He again became a permanent

(regular) line inspector after the probationary period of six (6) months.

Rueda got involved in a quarrel with a co-employee. He stabbed bus driver Bonifacio
Bartolome. Criminal and administrative complaints were filed against him. Rueda met a
vehicular accident. He suffered back injuries and went on sick leave. Even before the
accident, Rueda has been diagnosed to be suffering from moderately advanced stage
of tuberculosis.

It appears that petitioner desisted from dismissing Rueda for stabbing Bartolome. Instead,
it approved his retirement "due to medical reasons."

Rueda appealed to petitioner not to retire him from the service. His request was denied.
He also learned that his retirement benefits would be computed from the date of his
reemployment on February 9, 1981. He pleaded that his service with petitioner be
computed continuously from the original date of his employment on May 14, 1956, up to
the last day of his sick leave on August 9, 1989. Petitioner rejected his plea.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rueda was illegally dismissed?

RULING:

Petitioner anchors its right to terminate the employment of Rueda on the ground of
serious misconduct. The facts show that petitioner abandoned serious misconduct as a
ground to dismiss Rueda when it opted to retire him due to illness.

Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an employee. It must, therefore,
be based on a clear and not on an ambiguous or ambivalent ground. Any ambiguity or
ambivalence on the ground relied upon by an employer in terminating the services of
an employee denies the latter his full right to contest its legality.

Neither can we affirm the legality of Rueda's retirement due to illness. In this case,
petitioner did not submit the required certification by a competent public health
authority to show that Rueda's illness could not be cured within the period specified under
the aforequoted rule. The radiograph report submitted by petitioner merely stated
Rueda's disease. In the absence of such certification, Rueda's retirement due to illness
has no leg to stand on.

7. Air Material Wing v. NLRC

G.R. No. 111870 June 30, 1994

FACTS:

6|Guerrero, John Kristopher D.

CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

Private respondent Salas was appointed "notarial and legal counsel" for petitioner Air
Material Wings Savings and Loan Association (AMWSLAI) in 1980. The appointment was
renewed for three years

The petitioner issued another order reminding Salas of the approaching termination of his
legal services under their contract. This prompted Salas to lodge a complaint against
AMWSLAI for separation pay, vacation and sick leave benefits, cost of living allowances,
refund of SSS premiums, moral and exemplary damages, payment of notarial services
rendered from February 1, 1980 to March 2, 1990, and attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the claim on notarial fees may be decided by the Labor Arbiter?

RULING:

Yes. The terms and conditions set out in the letter-contract entered into by the parties on
January 23, 1987, clearly show that Salas was an employee of the petitioner. His selection
as the company counsel was done by the board of directors in one of its regular
meetings. The petitioner paid him a monthly compensation/retainer's fee for his services.
Though his appointment was for a fixed term of three years, the petitioner reserved its
power of dismissal for cause or as it might deem necessary for its interest and protection.
No less importantly, AMWSLAI also exercised its power of control over Salas by defining
his duties and functions as its legal counsel.

Labor arbiters have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims of workers
when such claims have some reasonable connection with the employer-employee
relationship. Salas' claim for notarial fees is based on his employment as a notarial officer
of the petitioner and thus comes under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.

8. Ang Tibay v. CIR

G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

FACTS:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to an alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a
number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the
validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU
while no members of the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off.
NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right to a new trial on the ground

7|Guerrero, John Kristopher D.

CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

of newly discovered evidence. The Court granted a new trial. Thus, the Solicitor General,
arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union is entitled to a new trial?

RULING:

Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by
NLU, which they attached to their petition with the Supreme Court, were evidence so
inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence
they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the
Court of Industrial Relations.

Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and
effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory
accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).

9. College of Immaculate Concepcion v. NLRC

G.R. No. 167563 March 22, 2010

FACTS:

Atty. Carlos was a dean of the Department of Business Administration and Accountancy
of the petitioner College for a designated term. Upon the expiration of his term as Dean,
he will be appointed as full-time professor of Law and Accounting without diminution of
his teaching salary as Dean.

When his term was over, he requested for additional payment in excess of the 6 teaching
loads he had. Petitioner denied the request and explained that the regular full-time
teaching load is 8. In the same letter, petitioner requested the respondent to vacate the
Dean's office. Petitioner also directed respondent to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him for engaging in the practice of law and teaching law in
another law school without prior permission from the petitioner.

Petitioner has given Atty. Carlos to options: (1) to remain as a full time employee but
without teaching loads outside the college and cases that he will be handling as counsel
would be subject to prior approval from the College; or (2) Become a part-time professor
with a load of 15 units with freedom to teach elsewhere and practice his profession.

Atty. Carlos failed to reply. Thus, petitioner informed respondent that he will not be
assigned any teaching load for the succeeding semester. The LA ruled that there is illegal

8|Guerrero, John Kristopher D.

CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

dismissal in the case. The Petitioner opted to reinstate respondent in its payroll only. The
NLRC reversed the decision of the LA. Petitioner asked for the return all the monetary
benefits Atty. Carlos had received on account of his payroll reinstatement as Dean. The
NLRC denied petitioner’s motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner should be refunded with the amounts received by Atty. Carlos
as a result of the payroll reinstatement?

RULING:

No. Hence, even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal,
it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On
the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such
reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse
whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered
services during the period.

It is not disputed at this point that the LA erred in ordering respondent's reinstatement as
Dean. The NLRC ruled that respondent should have been merely reinstated as a full-time
law professor, because the term of his appointment as Dean had long expired. However,
such mistake on the part of the LA cannot, in any way, alter the fact that during the
pendency of the appeal of his decision, his order for respondent's reinstatement as Dean
was immediately executory.

10. ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union v. ABS-CBN

G.R. No. 106518 March 11, 1999

FACTS:

the ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union, represented by respondent Union Officers,

and ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, signed and concluded a CBA with check-off
provision.

Petitioners filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations, DOLE-NCR, Quezon City, a Complaint
against the Union Officers and ABS-CBN Broadcasting corporation, praying that the
special assessment of ten percent (10%) of the sum total of all salary increases and signing
bonuses granted by respondent Company to the members of the Union be declared
illegal and that respondent Company be ordered to suspend further deductions from
petitioners' salaries for their shares thereof.

ISSUE:

9|Guerrero, John Kristopher D.

CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

Whether or not the check off is valid?

RULING:

Yes, but only for those who has expressly consented to it. A check-off is a process or
device whereby the employer, on agreement with the Union, recognized as the proper
bargaining representative, or on prior authorization from its employees, deducts union
dues or agency fees from the latter's wages and remits them directly to the union.

Noticeably, Article 241 speaks of three (3) requisites that must be complied with in order
that the special assessment for Union's incidental expenses, attorney's fees and
representation expenses, as stipulated in Article XII of the CBA, be valid and upheld
namely: 1) authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the
general membership meeting duly called for the purpose; (2) secretary's record of the
minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for check-off duly signed
by the employee concerned.

It appearing from the records of the case that twenty (20)25 of the forty-two (42)
petitioners executed a Compromise Agreement ratifying the controversial check-off
provision in the CBA. Premises studiedly considered, we are of the irresistible conclusion
and, so find, that the ruling in BPIEU-ALU vs. NLRC that (1) the prohibition against attorney's
fees in Article 222, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code applies only when the payment of
attorney's fees is effected through forced contributions from the workers; and (2) that no
deductions must be taken from the workers who did not sign the check-off authorization,
applies to the case under consideration

11. Belyca Corporation v. Caleja

G.R. No. L-77395, November 29, 1988

FACTS:

Private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, a legitimate labor organization,

filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all
the rank and file employees/workers of Belyca Corporation, a duly organized, registered
and existing corporation, employing approximately 205 rank and file employees/workers.

Respondent employer, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper, among others,
(1) that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who authorized, signed and supported
the filing of the petition (a) 14 were no longer working as of June 3, 1986 (b) 4 resigned
after June, 1986 (c) 6 withdrew their membership from petitioner union (d) 5 were
retrenched on June 23, 1986 (e) 12 were dismissed due to malicious insubordination and
destruction of property and (f) 100 simply abandoned their work or stopped working; and
(2) that the statutory requirement for holding a certification election has not been
complied with by the union.

10 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

ISSUE:

Whether or not the statutory requirement of 30% (now 20%) of the employees in the
proposed bargaining unit, asking for a certification election had been strictly complied
with?

RULING:

A certification election is the sole concern of the workers. The only exception is where the
employer has to file a petition for certification election because the latter was requested
to bargain collectively. But thereafter the role of the employer in the certification process
ceases. The employer becomes merely a bystander.

Once the statutory requirement is met, the Director of Labor Relations has no choice but
to call a certification election. It is significant to note that 124 employees out of the 205
employees of the Belyca Corporation have expressed their written consent to the
certification election or more than a majority of the rank and file employees and workers;
much more than the required 30% and over and above the present requirement of 20%
applicable only to unorganized establishments under Art. 257, of the Labor Code, to
which the BELYCA Corporation belongs. Once the required percentage requirement has
been reached, the employees’ withdrawal from union membership taking place after
the filing of the petition for certification election will not affect said petition.

12. Alhambra Cigar v. Kapisanan

G.R. No. L-13573. February 20, 1960

FACTS:

Respondent Alhambra Employees' Association (PAFLU) filed with the above-mentioned

court a petition, which was later amended, praying that it be certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent for all the employees, 82 in number, in the administrative,
sales, engineering, and dispensary departments of petitioner Alhambra Cigar &
Cigarette Manufacturing Company. Petitioner company, later joined by the co-
petitioner Kapisanan Ng Manggagawa sa Alhambra (FOITAF), as Intervenor, opposed
the petition, on the ground that there was in force an existing collective bargaining
agreement covering all the workers of the company, signed by the latter and Intervenor
union.

ISSUE:

Whether or not employees having community or interest entitled to separate collective

bargaining unit?

11 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

RULING:

Yes. It appearing that the employees in the administrative, sales, and dispensary
departments of the petitioner company, with the exception of the supervisors, security
guards, and confidential employees therein, are engaged in an entirely different kind of
work which does not involve production and maintenance and the places where they
work are separate from those of the workers in the other department of the company, it
can be said that they have a community of interest among themselves which justifies
their formation or existence as a separate appropriate collective bargaining unit.

While it may be true that the benefits granted under the existing collective bargaining
agreements entered into between the petitioner Union and the Company were
extended to, and enjoyed, by all the workers in all the departments of the company the
fact remains that those in the administrative, sales, and dispensary departments were not
expressly covered, and should the company, at any time, decide not to extend to them
said benefits, they cannot legally demand their extension to them, as they would have
nothing to invoke in support of said demand. In fine, they have no legal right to said
benefit enforceable before the courts.

13. NAFTU v. MALDECOWU-ULGWP

G.R. No. 79526, December 21, 1990

FACTS:

Private respondent Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers Union-United Lumber

and General Workers of the Philippines, (ULGWP, for short), a legitimate labor
organization, filed with Ministry of Labor and Employment, a petition for certification
election to determine the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative among
the rank and file workers/employees of Mainit Lumber Development Company Inc.
(MALDECO).

Petitioner ULGWP, private respondent herein, in its petition and position paper alleged,
among others: (1) that there was no certification election conducted within 12 months
prior to the filing of the petition; (2) that the petition was filed within the 60 day freedom
period; (3) that the petition is supported by the signatures of 101 rank and file employees
out of a total of 201 employees of the employer or more than thirty percent (30%) than
that required by law

The Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election. NAFTU appealed the
decision on the ground that MALDECO was composed of two (2) bargaining units, the
Sawmill Division and the Logging Division, but both the petition and decision treated
these separate and distinct units only as one

12 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Med-Arbiter is correct in changing the employer from two separate
bargaining units to only one?

RULING:

YES. The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interests. This is so because "the
basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of
their collective bargaining rights."

Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees of the Sawmill Division
and the Logging Division. Their functions mesh with one another. One group needs the
other in the same way that the company needs them both. There may be difference as
to the nature of their individual assignments but the distinctions are not enough to warrant
the formation of a separate bargaining unit.

14. SMC Employees Union v. Confesor

G.R. No. 111262, September 19, 1996

FACTS:

San Miguel Corporation Employees Union — PTGWO entered into a CBA with SMC to take
effect upon the expiration of the previous CBA or on June 30, 1989.

Meanwhile, effective October 1, 1991, Magnolia and Feeds and Livestock Division were
spun-off and became two separate and distinct corporations: Magnolia Corporation
(Magnolia) and San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI). Notwithstanding the spin-offs, the CBA
remained in force and effect.

The CBA was renegotiated. Petitioner-union insisted that the bargaining unit of SMC
should still include the employees of the spun-off corporations: Magnolia and SMFI; and
that the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be effective only for the remaining period
of two years or until June 30, 1994.

SMC, on the other hand, contended that the members/employees who had moved to
Magnolia and SMFI, automatically ceased to be part of the bargaining unit at the SMC.

Unable to agree on these issues with respect to the bargaining unit and duration of the
CBA, petitioner-union declared a deadlock.

13 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the duration of the renegotiated terms of the CBA is to be effective
for three years or two years?
2) Whether or not the bargaining unit of SMC includes also the employees of the
Magnolia and SMFI?

RULING:

1.
The law is clear and definite on the duration of the CBA insofar as the representation
aspect is concerned, but is quite ambiguous with the terms of the other provisions of the
CBA. It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that the Court must ascertain the
legislative intent for the purpose of giving effect to any statute.

Obviously, the framers of the law wanted to maintain industrial peace and stability by
having both management and labor work harmoniously together without any
disturbance. It can be gleaned from their discussions that it was left to the parties to fix
the period.

The issue as to the term of the non-representation provisions of the CBA need not
belaboured. The parties, by mutual agreement, enter into a renegotiated contract with
a term of three (3) years or one which does not coincide with the said 5-year term, and
said agreement is ratified by majority of the members in the bargaining unit, the subject
contract is valid and legal and therefore, binds the contracting parties.

2.
Undeniably, the transformation of the companies was a management prerogative and
business judgment which the courts cannot look into unless it is contrary to law, public
policy or morals. Neither can we impute any bad faith on the part of SMC so as to justify
the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Ever mindful of the
employees’ interests, management has assured the concerned employees that they will
be absorbed by the new corporations without loss of tenure and retaining their present
pay and benefits according to the existing CBAs.

Indubitably, therefore, Magnolia and SMFI became distinct entities with separate juridical
personalities. Thus, they cannot belong to a single bargaining unit.

Considering the spin-offs, the companies would consequently have their respective and
distinctive concerns in terms of the nature of work, wages, hours of work and other
conditions of employment. It would then be best to have separate bargaining units for
the different companies where the employees can bargain separately according to their
needs and according to their own working conditions.

14 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

15. Kapisanan v. Noriel

G.R. No. L-45475, June 20, 1977

FACTS:

Private respondent Federation of Free Workers, La Suerte Chapter, filed a petition for
certification election alleging that out of a bargaining unit of more or less 3,500, there
were 1,068 signatories. The previous certified collective bargaining agreement between
the employer La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory and petitioner labor union
terminated on December 5, 1975. There was, eleven days later, a motion to intervene
filed by petitioner followed by a motion to dismiss on the ground that respondent Union
had not complied with the 30% consent requirement and that the petition for certification
was filed beyond the sixty-day period to the expiration of the collective bargaining
contract.

The employer submitted a list of the rank and file employees numbering 4,055, private
respondent countered with an additional list of signatories, 331 in number, making a total
of 1,339 signatories. Private respondent thereafter opposed the motion to dismiss, stating
that there was compliance with the 30% consent requirement and that the filing was
within the period allowed by law.

Thereafter, Med-Arbiter Jimenez issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and
granting the petition for certification election, the choice being between petitioner and
respondent unions, with employees likewise being given the opportunity to vote for “No
Union.” An appeal was taken to respondent Noriel as Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent Noriel has the authority to call the holding of a
certification election?
2. Whether or not the requirement that no certification election shall issue except
‘within 60 days prior to the expiration of a CBA bars the calling of an election
after the expiration of a CBA which had, not replaced by another agreement?

RULING:

1.
Yes. Petitioner did miss the point that such a requirement of thirty percent of all the
employees in the bargaining unit is relevant only when it becomes mandatory for
respondent Noriel to conduct a certification election. So Article 258 explicitly provides.
Petitioner ignored that respondent Noriel is likewise possessed of discretionary power
whether or not a certification election should be held. In such a case, there is no such
thirty percent requirement.

15 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

2.
No. Applied to the present situation, except that the former collective bargaining
agreement having expired on December 5, 1975, sixty days prior to that date, a petition
for certification election could have been filed. It does not mean that after December 5,
1975, no such petition could be entertained by respondent Noriel, provided there was no
certified collective bargaining agreement that had taken its place. It is undisputed that
no subsequent certified collective contract was in existence at the time the petition for
holding the certification election was filed by respondent union on February 6, 1976.
There was no legal bar then to such a move. Moreover, the restrictive interpretation
sought to be fastened on such a provision by petitioner would set at naught the basic
objective of the Labor Code to institute a true system of industrial democracy, through
the collective bargaining process with the representative of labor chosen after a free
and honest certification election.

16. R Transport Corp. v. Laguesma

G.R. No. 106830, November 16, 1993

FACTS:

On January 4, 1991, respondent Christian Labor Organization of the Philippines (CLOP),

filed with the Med Arbitration Unit of the DOLE a petition for certification election among
the rank and file employees of the petitioner. Med-Arbiter Dizon dismissed the petition on
the ground that the bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent CLOP did
not include all the eligible employees of petitioner but only the drivers, conductors, and
conductresses to the exclusion of the inspectors, inspectresses dispatchers, mechanics
and washer boys.

Respondent CLOP rectified its mistake and filed a second petition for certification
election, which included all the rank and file employees of the company, who hold non-
managerial and non-supervisorial positions. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the second
petition and contended that the dismissal of the first petition constituted res judicata.

Med-Arbiter Parungo ordered that a certification election among the regular rank and
file workers of petitioner company be conducted. The Associated Labor Unions (ALU-
TUCP) filed a motion for intervention and alleged that it has members in the proposed
bargaining unit. Subsequently, the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) filed a
separate petition for certification election and a motion to consolidate related cases to
avoid confusion. Dissatisfied with the Decision of Med-Arbiter Parungo, petitioner
appealed to the DOLE Secretary, who, through Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma,
affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter calling for the conduct of the certification election.

ISSUES:

16 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

1. Whether or not the Med-Arbiter was correct when he gave due course to the
second petition for certification election after respondent CLOP corrected its
mistake?
2. Whether or not a certification election may be held within one year from the
date of issuance of a final certification election result?
3. Whether or not employees with an unresolved illegal dismissal be barred from
voting in the certification election?
4. Whether or not an employer can interfere in the election?

RULING:

1.
Yes. It cannot be said that the parties in the first and second actions were identical. The
first action was dismissed by the MedArbiter because it excluded parties essential to the
bargaining unit such as inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers and washer boys. The
second petition included all the employees who were excluded in the first petition.
Therefore, the Med-Arbiter was correct when he gave due course to the second petition
for certification election after respondent CLOP corrected its mistake.

2.
Yes. The phrase "final certification election result" means that there was an actual
conduct of election i.e., ballots were cast and there was a counting of votes. In this case,
there was no certification election conducted precisely because the first petition was
dismissed, on the ground of a defective petition which did not include all the employees
who should be properly included in the collective bargaining unit.

3.

No. Employees are entitled to vote in certification election regardless of the period or
status of their employment. it is now well-settled that employees who have been
improperly laid off but who have a present, unabandoned right to or expectation of re-
employment, are eligible to vote in certification elections. Thus, and to repeat, if the
dismissal is under question, as in the case now at bar whereby a case of illegal dismissal
and/or unfair labor practice was filed, the employees concerned could still qualify to
vote in the elections.”

4.
No. An employer has no right to interfere in the election and is merely regarded as a
bystander.

17. Kampil Katipunan v. Trajano

G.R. No. 75810, September 9, 1991

FACTS:

17 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

On February 27, 1981, the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) was declared the
exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees of Viron Garments
Manufacturing Co., Inc. (VIRON). April 11, 1985, another union, the Kaisahan ng
Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL Katipunan filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a
petition for certification election among the employees of VIRON. The petition allegedly
counted with the support of more than thirty percent (30%) of the workers at VIRON.
NAFLU opposed the petition. The Med-Arbiter however ordered, on June 14, 1985, that a
certification election be held at VIRON as prayed for, after ascertaining that KAMPIL had
complied with all the requirements of law and that since the certification of NAFLU as
sole bargaining representative in 1981, no collective bargaining agreement had been
executed between it and VIRON. NAFLU appealed. It contended that at the time the
petition for certification election was filed on April 11, 1985, it was in process of collective
bargaining with VIRON; that there was in fact a deadlock in the negotiations which had
prompted it to file a notice of strike; and that these circumstances constituted a bar to
the petition for election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the prohibition on the holding of a certification election within

one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification
election result apply to the case at bar?

2. Whether or not KAMPIL's petition for certification election is barred because,

before its filing, a bargaining deadlock between VIRON and NAFLU had been
submitted to conciliation or arbitration, which became the subject of a valid
notice of strike or lockout?

RULING:

1.
No. It is evident that the prohibition imposed by law on the holding of a certification
election “within one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification
election result"—in this case from February 27, 1981, the date of the Resolution declaring
NAFLU the exclusive bargaining representative of rank-and-file workers of VIRON—can
have no application, to the case at bar. That one-year period—known as the
“certification year” during which the certified union is required to negotiate with the
employer, and certification election is prohibited—has long since expired.

2.
No. It seems fairly certain that prior to the filing of the petition for election in this case,
there was no such “bargaining deadlock x x (which) had been submitted to conciliation
or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.” To be sure,
there are in the record assertions by NAFLU that its attempts to bring VIRON to the

18 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

negotiation table had been unsuccessful because of the latter’s recalcitrance, and
unfulfilled promises to bargain collectively; but there is no proof that it had taken any
action to legally coerce VIRON to comply with its statutory duty to bargain collectively.
It could have charged VIRON with unfair labor practice; but it did not. It could have gone
on a legitimate strike in protest against VIRON’s refusal to bargain collectively and
compel it to do so; but it did not. There are assertions by NAFLU, too, that its attempts to
bargain collectively had been delayed by continuing challenges to the resolution
pronouncing it the sole bargaining representative in VIRON; but there is no adequate
substantiation thereof, or of how it did in fact prevent initiation of the bargaining process
between it and VIRON.

18. National Congress of Unions v. Trajano

G.R. No. L-67485, April 10, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines

(NACUSIP)-TUCP is the certified exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file
workers of Calinog Refinery Corporation. Private respondent Federation of Unions of Rizal
(FUR)-TUCP is a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment while private respondent Calinog Refineries Employees Union (CREU)-
NACUSIP is the certified exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file workers
of the private respondent Calinog Refinery Corporation by virtue of the certification
election held on March 30, 1981.

On June 21, 1982, petitioner union filed a petition for deadlock in collective bargaining
with the Ministry of Labor and Employment. On July 21, 1982, private respondent FUR-
TUCP filed with the Regional Office No. VI, MOLE Iloilo City a petition for certification
election among the rank and file employees of private respondent company, alleging
that: (1) about forty-five percent (45%) of private respondent company's employees
had disaffiliated from petitioner union and joined private respondent union; (2) no
election had been held for the past twelve (12) months. Med-Arbiter ruled in favor of
Petitioner dismissing the petition for certification for lack of merit since the petition is
barred by bargaining deadlock.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a representation question may still be entertained if a bargaining

deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party had been
submitted to conciliation or arbitration before filing of a petition for certification election?

RULING:

19 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

No. A petition for certification election may be filed at any time, in the absence of a
collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition
for certification election in the following cases: (1) during the existence of a collective
bargaining agreement except within the freedom period; (2) within one (1) year from the
date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result; or (3) during the
existence of a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent
is a party and which had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become
the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout. The Deadlock Bar Rule simply provides
that a petition for certification election can only be entertained if there is no pending
bargaining deadlock submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject
of a valid notice of strike or lockout. The principal purpose is to ensure stability in the
relationship of the workers and the management.

19. Benguet Cosolidated Inc. v. BCI Employees

G.R. No. L-24711, April 30, 1968

FACTS:

Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union ("BBWU"), for and in behalf of all BENGUET

CONSOLIDATED, INC (BENGUET) employees entered into a Collective Bargaining
Contract, with BENGUET effective for 4-½ years containing a a No-Strike, No-Lockout
clause.

About three years later, upon defeating BBWU in a certification election, BCI Employees
& Workers Union (UNION) was certified as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
agent of all BENGUET employees.

After filing a notice of strike, Members of the UNION who were employees of BENGUET
went on strike. The strike caused destruction of several properties of BENGUET. The strike
ended when a collective bargaining agreement was made between UNION and
BENGUET.
As a result, allegedly, of the strike staged by UNION, BENGUET had to incur expenses for
the rehabilitation of its properties amounting to P1,911,363.83. So, BENGUET sued UNION,
PAFLU and their respective Presidents to recover said amount in the Court of First Instance
of Manila, invoking substitutionality doctrine saying defendants breached their
undertaking in the existing CONTRACT not to strike during the effectivity thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not substitutionality doctrine applies as UNION be bound by the CONTRACT

which BBWU, the defeated union, had executed with BENGUET?

RULING:

20 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

No. The substitutionality doctrine provides that even during the effectivity of a collective
bargaining agreement executed between employer and employees thru their agent,
the employees can change said agent but the contract continues to bind them up to its
expiration date. They may bargain however for the shortening of said expiration date.

The "substitutionary" doctrine, therefore, cannot be invoked to support the contention

that a newly certified collective bargaining agent automatically assumes all the personal
undertakings — like the no-strike stipulation here — in the collective bargaining
agreement made by the deposed union. Here, it was the previous agent who expressly
bound itself to the other party, BENGUET. UNION, the new agent, did not assume this
undertaking of BBWU.

20. Rivera et. al. v. Hon. Espiritu

G.R. No. 135547, January 23, 2002

FACTS:

PAL pilots affiliated with the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) went on a
three-week strike, causing serious losses to the PAL. PAL employed retrenchment
measures which caused PAL Employees Association (PALEA) in conducting a strike.

Because of the labor problems of PAL, it ceased its operations and sent notices of
termination to its employees.

PALEA agreed to PAL the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten (10) years
which includes strikes and similar actions. This was ratified by a referendum which made
PAL resume its operations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PAL-PALEA agreement abrogated the right of workers to self-
organization and their right to collective bargaining?

RULING:

No. The primary purpose of a CBA is the stabilization of labor-management relations in

order to create a climate of a sound and stable industrial peace.

In the instant case, it was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent of PALs ground
employees, that voluntarily entered into the CBA with PAL. It was also PALEA that
voluntarily opted for the 10-year suspension of the CBA. Either case was the unions
exercise of its right to collective bargaining. The 10-year suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA
did not contravene the protection to labor policy of the Constitution. The agreement
afforded full protection to labor; promoted the shared responsibility between workers

21 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

and employers; and the exercised voluntary modes in settling disputes, including
conciliation to foster industrial peace

The PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining negotiations
undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with the
peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL, but
preventing the latter’s closure.

21. Salunga v. CIR

G.R. No. L-22456, September 7, 1967

FACTS:

Petitioner Francisco Salunga was a member of the National Brewery and Allied Industries
Labor Union of the Philippines (PAFLU) since 1953. On August 18, 1961, he tendered his
resignation from the Union. The Union has a stipulation to its CBA that once a member
resigns from the Union, it has the effect of termination from employment. The Union
accepted the resignation, and transmitted it to the Company, with a request for the
immediate implementation of said stipulation.

The company explained to Petitioner that if he resigns, it will cause his termination.
Because of this, Petitioner withdrew his resignation from the Unionand filed for readmission
however, the Union did not accept it but went on to the Company for implementation
of the stipulation of the CBA. The company tried to persuade the Union to not to
implement the CBA which proved futile. Hence, the Company followed the Union and
terminated Petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner should be readmitted?

RULING:

Yes. Having been denied readmission into the Union and having been dismissed from
the service owing to an unfair labor practice on the part of the Union, petitioner is entitled
to reinstatement as member of the Union.

It is well settled that such unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants
for membership. Needless to say, if said unions may be compelled to admit new
members, who have the requisite qualifications, with more reason may the law and the
courts exercise the coercive power when the employee involved is a long standing union
member, who, owing to provocations of union officers, was impelled to tender his
resignation, which he forthwith withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may, at least, invoke the

22 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

rights of those who seek admission for the first time, and can not arbitrarily be denied
readmission.

22. Vidoriano v. Vs Elizalde Rope Workers Union

GR No. L-25246, September 12 1974

FACTS:

Victoriano a member of Iglesia ni cristo had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope
factory Inc since 1958. He was a member of Elizalde rope worker’s union which had with
the company a CBA containing a closed shop provision which reads as follow
“Membership union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent
employee’s worker covered by this agreement.” RA 3350 was enacted introducing an
amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of RA 875 as follows “ but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their
member in any such labor organization” Benjamin Victoriano presents his resignation to
appellant union thereupon the union wrote a formal letter to separate the appellee from
the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the union as member of the
company notified the appellant and his counsel that unless the appellee could achieve
a satisfactory arrangement with the union the company would be constrained to dismiss
him from the service . this prompted the appellee to file an action for injunction to enjoin
the company and the union from dismissing appellee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 3350 violates the right to association?

RULING:

No. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor
unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to
affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said
religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and
fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not
coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the
employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not
violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.

23. Guijarno v. CIR

G.R. Nos. L-28791-93, August 27, 1973

FACTS:

23 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

Central Santos Lopez Co., Inc dismissed nineteen employees upon their expulsion from
United Sugar Workers Union-ILO. The sugar company assumed that it had to dismiss the
workers by virtue of the closed-shop provision in the then existing collective bargaining
agreement which states that laborers who are no longer members of good standing in
the union may be dismissed by the respondent company if their dismissal is sought by the
union.

It was established that the terminated workers were employed long before the collective
bargaining contract has been entered into. The lower courts held that the dismissal was
justifiable under the closed-shop provision of the collective bargaining agreement.
Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a closed-shop provision in a collective bargaining contract is retroactive?

RULING:

No. The closed-shop agreement is inapplicable to those already in the service who are
members of another union. To hold otherwise, i. e., that the employees in a company
who are members of a minority union may be compelled to disaffiliate from their union
and join the majority or contracting union, would render nugatory the right of all
employees to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own
choosing, a right guaranteed by the Industrial Peace Act.

The authoritative doctrine that a closed-shop provision in a collective bargaining

agreement is not to be given a retroactive effect so as to preclude its being applied to
employees already in the service.

24. Philippine Embroideries v. Embroidery and Garment Workers

G.R. No. L-20143, January 27, 1969

FACTS:

Embroidery and Garments Workers Union filed a complaint of unfair labor practice
against Philippine American Embroideries, Inc (PAEI) before the CIR. The trial Judge
dismissed the complaint. On motion for reconsideration, the Court en banc, by a divided
vote, resolved that the respondents are guilty of unfair labor practice. Hence the petition.
The respondents aver the facts that, the company received the collective bargaining
proposals (Exh. "C") embodying the usual terms and conditions of work like increase of
wages, security of employment, and fringe benefits;

24 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

In the afternoon of the same day, the company through Nasser, announced the closure
of the Machine Made Department, thereby dismissing all the members of the
complainant, and the opening of a new department, the Knitting Gloves Department

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents are guilty of unfair labor practice?

RULING:

No. "It has been the practice to lay off employees who could not fulfill their quotas." The
statement is plain enough, but stripped of the other relevant facts and circumstances it
fails to picture the situation in proper perspective.

It is clear from the testimony that the practice of the company in laying-off workers
started in 1956 wherein the employees were given a period of 15 days to 1 month to fulfill
their quotas, and indeed, the reasons therefor were justified for, as admitted by Mrs. Ros,
only those who were not industrious and unable to fulfill their quotas were laid-off. Such
practice was not motivated by the union activities and/or affiliations of said workers."

Thus, petitioner company was not guilty of unfair labor practice as charged, and that the
closure of its department where the members of respondent union were employed was
not an act of discrimination or a means of dismissal but rather the result of continued
losses in operations - a ground that is entirely justified by law.

25. Judric Canning v. Inciong

G.R. No. L-51494, August 19, 1982

FACTS:

Complainants were allegedly not allowed to report for work due to their union activities
in soliciting membership in a union yet to be organized in the company and their
timecards were removed from the rack. As a result, the said complainants and their labor
union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioner.

The herein petitioner denied having locked out the complainants and claims that the
said complainants failed to report for work and abandoned their positions. The petitioner
also denied having knowledge of the union activities of the complainants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice?

RULING:

25 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

Respondent Regional Director found that the private respondents did not abandon their
jobs but were dismissed because of their union activities. This is a finding of fact which
may not now be disturbed. It would be illogical for the private respondents to abandon
their work and then immediately file an action seeking their reinstatement.

No employee with a family to support, like the private respondents, would abandon their
work knowing fully well of the acute unemployment... and underemployment problem
and the difficulty of looking for a means of livelihood. But, most of all, the petitioner stated
that in spite of its position that the private respondents had abandoned their jobs, it
"offered to pay respondent union members severance pay of one (1) month." This is a
clear admission of the charge of... arbitrary dismissal, for why should the petitioner offer
to pay what it calls "severance pay" if the private respondents were not, indeed,
dismissed, or if the petitioner sincerely believed in the righteousness of its stance.

26. Insular Life Employees v. Insular Life and FGU Insurance

G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971

FACTS:

Unions of the two Respondent-Companies jointly submitted proposals to the latter;

negotiations were conducted on the Union’s proposals, but these were snagged by a
deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed a notice of strike
for “deadlock on collective bargaining.” The issue was dropped subsequently (in short,
nagkasundo). But, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory
result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases.
The Company sent a letter to the strikers informing them that they may strike or avail
benefits and freebies if they stop striking. Unions, continued on strike, with the exception
of a few unionists who were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter.
Another letter was sent by the company to the individual strikers stating their intent to
charge the strikers. Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against
the members of the Unions, except 3, were dismissed by the fiscal’s office and by the
courts.
However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to
secure clearances from the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila but also to be screened by a
management committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The
screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent company is guilty of unfair labor practices.

RULING:

26 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

Yes. The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike
following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated
the next day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has
been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of
collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through
their collective bargaining representatives.

Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to “bribe” the
strikers with “comfortable cots,” “free coffee and occasional movies,” “overtime” pay for
“work performed in excess of eight hours,” and “arrangements” for their families, so they
would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or
union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt
to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually,
when they are represented by a union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement
are unable to determine what the consequences of returning to work would be.

27. Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller

G.R. No. L-8116, August 25, 1956

FACTS:

Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Department Store. Micaller filed
charges of unfair labor practice against her employers alleging that she was dismissed
by them because of her membership in the National Labor Union. That, prior to her
separation, said had been questioning their employees regarding their membership in
said union. Employers claimed that complainant was dismissed from the service because
of her misconduct and serious disrespect so much so that several criminal charges were
filed against her.

For three consecutive years, 1950, 1951 And 1952, she was given a first prize for being the
best seller, the most cooperative and most honest employee. She organized a union
which was latter affiliated with the National Labor Union.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is ULP?

RULING:

In American Cases, it was held that, as to the Board's finding of interference, there is
abundant evidence of the questioning of employees as to membership in the union and
of anti-union expressions by the company's superintendent made in such a way as to
discourage union membership.

27 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

In another American case, it was ruled that Questioning of employees concerning union
membership and activities and disparaging remarks by supervisory employees made in
such a way as to hamper the exercise of free choice on the part of the employees, have
been uniformly condemned as a violation.

28. MD Transit v. De Guzman

G.R. No. L-18810, April 23, 1963

FACTS:

Petitioners MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. and CAM Transportation Co. are separate entities
engaged in business as common carriers, but under joint management, which had
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the MD-CAM Local 3 (PTWO), a
labor union composed of employees of said entities, to which, complainants de Guzman,
Cajoles and Oracion were rendering services.

Complainants secured the signatures of their co-employees to a petition for an auditing

of the mutual aid fund of said Union, collected by its president, Felipe. As the auditing
requested took place, the DOLE found that there was a shortage of over P22,000.00.
Complainants were suspended as members of the Union by order of Felipe, and also
expelled by the Union several days later. Hence, complainants brought their case to the
Court of Industrial Relations which subsequently filed a complaint charging the
petitioners, as well as the President, the Vice-President and the members of the Board of
Directors of the Union, with unfair labor practice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners committed Unfair Labor Practice?

RULING:

Yes. The lower court found that complainants were dismissed before said Exhibit 5 was
received by petitioners herein. Said dismissal could not have been made, therefore, in
pursuance either of the request contained in said communication or of the closed shop
provision of the aforementioned collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the lower
court found-and this is amply supported by the evidence on record-that complainants'
suspension by the President of the Union, their subsequent expulsion by its Board of
Directors, were due to the charges preferred by said complainants against the officers of
the Union, which led to the discovery of an alleged shortage in its Mutual Aid Fund, and
the reference of the case to the City Fiscal of Quezon City.

Thus, the Union was guilty of unfair labor practice under subdivision (b) (2) of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 875. Necessarily, this was, also, the reason why complainants were
dismissed by the petitioners herein-since there is no other possible cause for said dismissal,

28 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .
CASES IN LABOR LAW 2

in the light of the circumstance adverted to, above-thereby committing an unfair labor
practice under subdivision (a) (5) of said Section 4.

29 | G u e r r e r o , J o h n K r i s t o p h e r D .