PROPERTY LAW | Atty.

Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

G.R. NO.157044. OCTOBER 5, 2005 HELD:

ROSALES VS. CASTELLFORT Under the foregoing provision (Art 448), the
landowner can choose between appropriating the
FACTS: building by paying the proper indemnity or
Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily obliging the builder to pay the price of the land,
Rosqueta-Rosales (petitioners) are the registered unless its value is considerably more than that of
owners of a parcel of land with an area of the structures, in which case the builder in good
approximately 315 square meters, covered by faith shall pay reasonable rent. If the parties
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36856[4] cannot come to terms over the conditions of the
and designated as Lot 17, Block 1 of Subdivision lease, the court must fix the terms thereof.
Plan LRCPsd-55244 situated in Los Baños,
Laguna. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a
rule that accords with the principle of accession,
On August 16, 1995, petitioners discovered that a i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and
house was being constructed on their lot, without not the other way around. Even as the option lies
their knowledge and consent, by respondent with the landowner, the grant to him,
Miguel Castelltort (Castelltort). nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot
refuse to exercise either option and compel
It turned out that respondents Castelltort and his instead the owner of the building to remove it
wife Judith had purchased a lot, Lot 16 of the from the land.
same Subdivision Plan, from respondent Lina
Lopez-Villegas (Lina) through her son-attorney- The raison d’etre for this provision has been
in-fact Rene Villegas (Villegas) but that after a enunciated thus:
survey thereof by geodetic engineer Augusto Where the builder, planter or sower has
Rivera, he pointed to Lot 17 as the Lot 16 the acted in good faith, a conflict of rights
Castelltorts purchased. arises between the owners, and it
becomes necessary to protect the owner
Negotiations for the settlement of the case thus of the improvements without causing
began, with Villegas offering a larger lot near injustice to the owner of the land. In view
petitioners’ lot in the same subdivision as a of the impracticability of creating a state
replacement thereof. In the alternative, Villegas of forced co-ownership, the law has
proposed to pay the purchase price of petitioners’ provided a just solution by giving the
lot with legal interest. Both proposals were, owner of the land the option to acquire
however, rejected by petitioners whose counsel, the improvements after payment of the
by letter of August 24, 1995, directed Castelltort proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder
to stop the construction of and demolish his house or planter to pay for the land and the
and any other structure he may have built hereon, sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse
and desist from entering the lot. Petitioners to exercise either option. It is the owner
subsequently filed on September 1, 1995 a of the land who is authorized to exercise
complaint for recovery of possession and the option, because his right is older, and
damages with prayer for the issuance of a because, by the principle of accession, he
restraining order and preliminary injunction is entitled to the ownership of the
against spouses-respondents Miguel and Judith accessory thing.
Castelltort before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna,
docketed as Civil Case No.2229-95-C J.M. TUASON and CO., INC. V ESTRELLA
VDA. DE LUMANLAN and CA
ISSUE: G.R. No: L-23497
1. Under Art 448, who has the right of option?
2. Whether or not Petitioner can demolish and FACTS:
recover damages against Respondent? Tuason filed a case against Lumanlan after the
- Petitioner cannot demolish and recover latter unlawfully entered into his property known
damages against Respondent. as Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision (situated at
Barrio North Tatalon, Quezon City). Lumanlan
took possession of 800 sq. m. land and

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

constructed her house on the said land. Tuason Tuason & Co., Inc., If he failed to make
prays for ejectment and damages for occupancy. the necessary inquiry, appellant is now
bound conclusively by appellee's Torrens
Lumanlan argues that she bought the property title.
from Pedro Deudor and that there is a
Compromise Agreement between Deudor and Lumanlan had chosen to ignore the Torrens title
Tuason stating that she was one of the buyers of Tuason & Co., Inc. and relied instead upon the
recognized therein. Deudors' claim of ownership, perhaps because
such course appeared to her as more
a) Petitioner’s Arguments advantageous; hence, she has only herself to
(JM Tuazon Co. Inc. – Win) blame for the consequences now that the
- Filed a case to demolish and recover damages Deudors' claim has been abandoned by the
against Respondent for the latter constructed his Deudors themselves, and cannot pretend good
house on Petitioner’s property known as Santa faith. The Court of First Instance, therefore, did
Mesa Heights Subdivision situated at Barrio not err in holding that she was not a rightful
North Tatalon, Quezon City possessor and sentencing her to vacate.

b) Respondent’s Arguments Quevada vs CA

(Vda. de Lumanlan – Lost) GR No. 140798
- Argued that Petitioner cannot demolish and
recover damages from her because she was a FACTS:
builder in good faith a) Petitioner’s Arguments
-Argued that she had bought the property she was (Quevada – Win)
occupying from one Pedro Deudor.
b) Respondent’s Arguments
(CA and Veldaverde – Lost)
ISSUE:
- Filed a case against Petitioner for the removal
Whether or not Petitioner can demolish and
with damages of Petitioner’s house which was
recover damages against Respondent
constructed on his land
- Argued that Petitioner is in bad faith because
RULING:
Petitioner was a lessee of Respondent’s land who
Conclusion:
refused to vacate after the termination of their
Petitioner can demolish and recover damages
lease agreement and even constructed his house
against Respondent. The appeal is granted
thereon.
Application:
ISSUE:
In this case, as to Lumanlan's allegation in her
Whether or not Respondent can remove with
counterclaim that she should be deemed a builder
damages Petitioner’s house which was
in good faith, a similar contention has been
constructed on his land.
rejected in Tuason & Co. vs. Macalindong, L-
15398, December 29, 1962, where we ruled that
RULING:
there being a presumptive knowledge of the
Conclusion:
Torrens titles issued to Tuason & Co. and its
Respondent cannot remove with damages
predecessors-in-interest since 1914, the buyer
Petitioner’s house which was constructed on his
from the Deudors (or from their transferees) can
land. Respondent can only acquire such house
not, in good conscience, say now that she
upon payment of value thereof minus the rentals
believed her vendor had rights of ownership over
due of Petitioner.
the lot purchased.

Rule:
The reason given by the Court is that —
ARTICLE 448. The owner of the land on which
Had he investigated before buying and
anything has been built, sown or planted in good
before building his house on the
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his
questioned lot, he would have been
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
informed that the land is registered under
of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and
the Torrens system in the name of J. M.
548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, had invited them to construct their residence and
the proper rent. However, the builder or planter business on the subject lots in order that they
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is could live near one another, employ Marivic, the
considerably more than that of the building or sister of Ismael, and help resolving the problems
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, of the family.
if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper They added that it was the policy of the
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms respondents to allot the land they owned as an
of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court advance grant of inheritance in favor of their
shall fix the terms thereof. children.

The above-cited article "covers only cases in a) Petitioner’s Arguments

which the builders, sowers[,] or planters believe (Spouses Ismael and Teresita Macasaet – Win)
themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to - Argued that they should be compensated for the
have a claim of title thereto. However, it is also full amount of the house that they constructed on
applied to cases where the builder is in bad faith Respondent’s land for they are not lessees but
as long as the landowner is also in bad faith. builders in good faith

Application: b) Respondent’s Arguments

In this case, both Petitioner, as landowner, and (Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet – Lost)
Respondent, as builder, are in bad faith. Thus, - Filed a case to eject Petitioners, their son and
they should be considered as in good faith daughter-in-law, from their land who constructed
their house thereon by mere tolerance
There is no indication that private respondent will -Argued that since they only tolerated Petitioners,
oblige petitioner to pay the price of the land. In Petitioners are considered as lessee. Hence,
fact, the former refuses to sell it to the latter. The Respondent should only pay one-half of the value
value of the portion of the house covered by the of the house constructed by Petitioners by virtue
lease should be determined so that compensation of Article 1678 of the Civil Code
of its value against the rentals due can take effect.
ISSUE:
SPS. MACASAET vs SPS. MACASAET Whether or not Petitioners should be
G.R. 154391-92 Sept. 30, 2004 compensated for the full amount of the house that
they constructed on Respondent’s land
FACTS:
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and RULING:
Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet are Conclusion:
first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of Petitioners should be compensated for the full
respondents and Teresita is his wife. amount of the house that they constructed on
Respondent’s land.
On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the
MTC of Lipa and ejectment suit against the Rule:
children. When a person builds in good faith on the land of
another, the applicable provision is Article 448,
Respondents alleged that they were the owners of which reads:
2 parcels of land, situated at Banay-banay, Lipa "Article 448. The owner of the land on
City; that by way of verbal lease agreement, Ismal which anything has been built, sown or
and Teresita occupied these lots in Mar. 1992 and planted in good faith, shall have the right
used them as their residence and situs of their to appropriate as his own the works,
construction business; and that despite repeated sowing or planting, after payment of the
demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed indemnity provided for in Articles 546
rental of 500 pesos. and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and
Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any the one who sowed, the proper rent.
lease agreement. They claimed that respondents However, the builder or planter cannot be

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

obliged to buy the land if its value is Article 1678:

considerably more than that of the If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful
building or trees. In such case, he shall improvements which are suitable to the use for
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the which the lease is intended, without altering the
land does not choose to appropriate the form or substance of the property leased, the
building or trees after proper indemnity. lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay
The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lessee one-half of the value of the
the lease and in case of disagreement, the improvements at that time. Should the lessor
court shall fix the terms thereof." refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may
remove the improvements, even though the
Application: principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He
In this case, Article 448 applies to the present shall not, however, cause any more impairment
factual milieu. The established facts of this case upon the property leased than is necessary.
show that respondents fully consented to the
improvements introduced by petitioners. In fact, With regard to the ornamental expenses, the
because the children occupied the lots upon their lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement,
invitation, the parents certainly knew and but he may remove the ornamental objects,
approved of the construction of the improvements provided no damage is caused to the principal
introduced thereon. Thus, petitioners may be thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain
deemed to have been in good faith when they them by paying their value at the time the lease is
built the structures on those lots. extinguished

Mores vs Yu- Go Application:

GR No. 172292 In this case, there is thus no reason for the
appellate court’s award of moral damages to the
FACTS: Yu siblings. We agree with the trial court’s
a) Petitioner’s Arguments finding that the spouses Mores "removed only the
(Mores – Win) improvements they introduced without
- Argued that what they removed or appropriate destroying the principal building, after the [Yu
was only the improvements they introduced in siblings] refused to pay them the reasonable value
Respondent’s property and not Respondent’s of the improvements." When the spouses Mores
property itself demanded reimbursement, the Yu siblings should
have offered to pay the spouses Mores one-half
b) Respondent’s Arguments of the value of the improvements. Since the Yu
(Yu-Go, et al. – Lost) siblings failed to make such offer, the spouses
- Filed a case against Petitioner for the award of Mores had the right to remove the improvements.
moral damages worth P100,000.
-Argued that Petitioner is liable for such moral Spouses Del Campo vs. Abesia
damages for Petitioner demolished and even GR No. L- 49219
appropriate to themselves the materials of a
residential building owned by Respondent which Facts:
Petitioner occupied before as a lessee. This case involves a parcel of land, situated at the
corner of F. Flores and Cavan Streets, Cebu City.
ISSUE: An action for partition was filed by plaintiffs in
Whether or not Respondent can claim such moral the CFI of Cebu. Plaintiffs and defendants are co-
damages from Petitioner owners pro indiviso of this lot in the proportion
of and 1/3 share each, respectively. The trial court
RULING: appointed a commissioner in accordance with the
Conclusion: agreement of the parties. ,the Id commissioner
- Respondent cannot claim such moral damages conducted a survey, prepared a sketch plan and
from Petitioner. submitted a report to the trial court on May 29,
Rule: 1976, recommending that the property be divided
Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply in the into two lots: Lot 1161-A with an area of 30
present case. square meters for plaintiffs and Lot No. 1161-B

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

with an area of 15 square meters for the pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed,
defendants. The houses of plaintiffs and the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
defendants were surveyed and shown on the cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
sketch plan. The house of defendants occupied considerably more than that of the building or
the portion with an area of 5 square meters of Lot trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent,
1161-A of plaintiffs. The parties manifested their if the owner of the land does not choose to
conformity to the report and asked the trial court appropriate the building or trees after proper
to finally settle and adjudicate who among the indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms
parties should take possession of the 5 square of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
meters of the land in question. shall fix the terms thereof.

Issue: Boyer- Roxas vs. Court of Appeals

Whether or Not Article 448 of the Civil Code is GR No. 100866
applicable to a builder in good faith when the
property involved is owned in common. Facts:
When Eugenia V. Roxas died, her heirs formed a
Held: corporation under the name and style of Heirs of
When the co-ownership is terminated by the Eugenia V. Roxas, Inc. using her estate as the
partition and it appears that the house of capital of the corporation, the private respondent
defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 herein. It was primarily engaged in agriculture
square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs business, however it amended its purpose to
which the defendants obviously built in good enable it to engage in resort and restaurant
faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the business. Petitioners are stockholders of the
new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and corporation and two of the heirs of Eugenia. By
Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of tolerance, they were allowed to occupy some of
the Civil Code may apply even when there was the properties of the corporation as their
co-ownership if good faith has been established. residence. However, the board of directors of the
corporation passed a resolution evicting the
Applying the aforesaid provision of the Civil petitioners from the property of the corporation
Code, the plaintiffs have the right to appropriate because the same will be needed for expansion.
said portion of the house of defendants upon
payment of indemnity to defendants as provided a) Petitioner’s Arguments
for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, (Boyer Roxas, et al. – Win)
the plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to pay the - Argued that the Respondent cannot remove their
price of the land occupied by their house. houses because they are builders in good faith
However, if the price asked for is considerably
much more than the value of the portion of the b) Respondent’s Arguments
house of defendants built thereon, then the latter (CA and Heirs of Eugenia Roxas, Inc. – Lost)
cannot be obliged to buy the land. The defendants - Filed a case for the ejectment of the Petitioners
shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiff -Argued that the Petitioners constructed their
upon such terms and conditions that they may houses on the property of Respondent which is
agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court the Hidden Valley Springs Resort located at
shall fix the terms thereof. Of course, defendants Limao, Calauan, Laguna
may demolish or remove the said portion of their -Argued that the houses which Petitioner
house, at their own expense, if they so decide. constructed on their property should be removed
ISSUE:
Article 448 of the New Civil Code provides as Whether or not Respondent can remove the
follows: houses which Petitioner constructed on their
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which property
anything has been built, sown, or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his RULING:
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment Conclusion:
of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and - Respondent cannot remove the houses which
548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to Petitioner constructed on their property.

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

RESIDENTIAL HOUSE whom Ernesto did

Rule: construct a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on the
Article 453 of the Civil Code provides: LAND at a cost of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 who
If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the probably assumed that the wife's mother was the
person who built, planted or sown on the land of owner of the LAND and that, it would be
another but also on the part of the owner of such transferred to the spouses. Subsequently turned
land, the rights of one and the other shall be the out that the LAND had been titled in the name of
same as though both had acted in good faith. Mr. & Mrs. Jose C. Santo, Jr. who, sold the same
to petitioner SARMIENTO. SARMIENTO filed
Art. 448 — The owner of the land on which an Ejectment suit against them. In the evidentiary
anything has been built, sown or planted in good hearings before the Municipal Court,
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his SARMIENTO submitted the deed of sale of the
own the works, sowing or planting after payment LAND in her favor, which showed the price to be
of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and P15,000.00. On the other hand, ERNESTO
548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to testified that the then cost of the RESIDENTIAL
pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, HOUSE would be from P30,000.00 to
the proper rent. However, the builder or planter P40,000.00. Sarmiento refuse to pay and give
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is option to buy the property.
considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, ISSUE:
if the owner of the land does not choose to Whether or not Petitioner can eject and compel
appropriate the buildings or trees after proper Respondents to vacate from her land
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms
of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court RULING:
shall fix the terms thereof. Conclusion:
Petitioner cannot eject and compel Respondents
Application: to vacate from her land.
-In this case, the construction of the unfinished
building started when Eriberto Roxas, husband of Rule:
Rebecca Boyer-Roxas, was still alive and was the ART. 448. The owner of the land on which
general manager of the respondent corporation. anything has been built, sown or planted in good
The couple used their own funds to finance the faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his
construction of the building. The Board of own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
Directors of the corporation, however, did not of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and
object to the construction. They allowed the 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to
construction to continue despite the fact that it pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed,
was within the property of the corporation. Under the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
these circumstances, we agree with the cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
petitioners that the provision of Article 453 of the considerably more than that of the building or
Civil Code should have been applied by the lower trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent,
courts. if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper
Sarmiento vs. Agana indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms
GR No. 57288 of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof.
Doctrine:
The landowner on which a building has been Application:
constructed in good faith by another has the In this case, Petitioner cannot just ask Respondent
option to buy the building or sell his land to the to vacate the land. Under Article 448 of the Civil
builder, he cannot refuse to exercise either option. Code, SARMIENTO was required, within 60
days, to exercise the option to reimburse
Facts: ERNESTO and wife the sum of 40,000.00 as the
ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the latter's value of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, or the
mother had told him the couple could build a

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

option to allow them to purchase the LAND for Parenthetically, considering that petitioners and
P25,000. their predecessors-in-interest have built their
houses and apartment building on Lot No. 1580,
Petitioner cannot refuse both to pay for the should respondents be allowed to take possession
building and to sell the land and compel the of those improvements? In order to settle this
owner of the building to remove it from the land matter, we should determine whether petitioners
where it is erected. She is entitled to such were builders in good faith.
demolition only when, after having chosen to sell
his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality
with no technical meaning or statutory definition,
Ochoa vs. Apeta and it encompasses, among other things, an
GR No. 146259 honest belief, the absence of malice and the
absence of design to defraud or to seek an
FACTS: unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of
a) Petitioner’s Arguments intention, and freedom from knowledge of
(Ochoa, et al. – Lost) circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
- Argued that they are the owners of the land as inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) honest belief in the validity of one’s right,
No. T-40624 ignorance of a superior claim and absence of
intention to overreach another. Applied to
b) Respondent’s Arguments possession, one is considered in good faith if he
(Apeta and Almazan – Win) is not aware that there exists in his title or mode
- Filed a case against Petitioner for the recovery of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
of possession of their land which was occupied Using the above parameters, we are convinced
by Petitioner and was constructed with that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest
apartments were in good faith when they built their houses
-Argued that they are the owners of the land as and apartment building on Lot No. 1580 since
covered by Certificate of Title No. RT-599 they were convinced it was covered by their TCT
(10731) No. T-40624.

ISSUE: Under Art. 448 of the Civil Code, the landowner

Whether or not Respondent can recover can make a choice - either by appropriating the
possession over the land building by paying the proper indemnity or
obliging the builder to pay the price of the land.
RULING: The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a
Conclusion: rule that accords with the principle of accession
Respondent can recover possession over the land. that the accessory follows the principal and not
the other way around. He must choose only one.
Application:
In this case, upon agreement of the parties, the Depra vs Dumlao
trial judge commissioned Engr. Romulo Unciano GR No. L – 57348
of the Bureau of Lands of Region IV to conduct a
resurvey of the disputed property. The result of FACTS:
the resurvey (approved by the Bureau of Lands) Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land
shows that Lot No. 1580, occupied by petitioners, registered, situated in the municipality of
was registered in the name of Margarita Almada, Dumangas, Iloilo. Agustin Dumlao, defendant-
respondents’ predecessor-in-interest; and that the appellant, owns an adjoining lot. When
lot covered by TCT No. T-40624 is not Lot No. DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot, the
1580, but Lot No. 1581 registered in the name of kitchen thereof had encroached on an area of
Servillano Ochoa, petitioners’ predecessor-in- thirty four (34) square meters of DEPRA’s
interest. This lot has been occupied by Isidro property, After the encroachment was discovered
Jasmin. in a relocation survey of DEPRA’s lot made on
November 2, 1972, his mother, Beatriz Depra
after writing a demand letter asking DUMLAO to

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move back from his encroachment, filed an action Spouses Nuguid vs Court of Appeals (Pecson)
for Unlawful Detainer. Said complaint was later GR No. 151815
amended to include DEPRA as a party plaintiff.
After trial, the Municipal Court found that FACTS:
DUMLAO was a builder in good faith, and Pedro Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot
applying Article 448 of the Civil Code. DEPRA on which he built a 4-door-2-storey apartment
did not accept payment of rentals so that building. He failed to pay realty taxes amounting
DUMLAO deposited such rentals with the to P12k so the lot was sold at public auction to
Municipal Court. In this case, the Municipal Mamerto Nepomuceno who later on sold it to the
Court, acted without jurisdiction, its Decision Sps. Nuguid.
was null and void and cannot operate as res
judicata to the subject complaint for Queting of a) Petitioner’s Arguments
Title. The court conceded in the MCs decision (Spouses Nuguid – Win)
that Dumlao is a builder in good faith.
b) Respondent’s Arguments
Held: (CA and Pecson – Lost)
Owner of the land on which improvement was - Filed a case against Petitioner for the collection
built by another in good faith is entitled to of the amount of P1,344,000 (Rentals)
removal of improvement only after landowner -Argued that he is the owner of a 4-unit
has opted to sell the land and the builder refused apartment. However, the land where the 4-unit
to pay for the same. Res judicata doesn’t apply apartment stood was sold in public auction to
wherein the first case was for ejectment and the Petitioner. Petitioner then appropriated the 4-unit
other was for quieting of title. apartment of Respondent pursuant to Art. 448 of
the Civil Code. However, Petitioner was only
In this case, DEPRA has the option either to pay able to pay to Respondent after 4 years. Within
for the encroaching part of DUMLAO's kitchen, this period of 4 years, Respondent was
or to sell the encroached 34 square meters of his dispossessed and was not able to earn its rentals
lot to DUMLAO. He cannot refuse to pay for the from the 4-unit apartment amounting to
encroaching part of the building or to sell the P1,344,000
encroached part of his land. He is entitled to such
removal only when, after having chosen to sell his ISSUE:
encroached land, DUMLAO fails to pay for the Whether or not Respondent can collect the
same amount of P1,344,000 as the unearned rentals of
Respondent of his 4-unit apartment
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which
anything has been built sown or planted in good RULING:
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his Conclusion:
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment Respondent can collect the amount of
of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and P1,344,000.
548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to
pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, Application:
the proper rent. In this case, it is not disputed that the construction
of the four-door two-storey apartment, subject of
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged this dispute, was undertaken at the time when
to buy the land if its value is considerably more Pecson was still the owner of the lot. When the
than that of the building or trees. In such case, he Nuguids became the uncontested owner of the lot
shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land on June 23, 1993, by virtue of entry of judgment
does not choose to appropriate the building or of the Court’s decision, dated May 25, 1993, in
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall G.R. No. 105360, the apartment building was
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of already in existence and occupied by tenants. In
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms its decision dated May 26, 1995 in G.R. No.
thereof. 115814, the Court declared the rights and
obligations of the litigants in accordance with
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. These

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provisions of the Code are directly applicable to upon his death, was continued by his heirs up to
the instant case. the present, publicly and in the concept of owner.
The land taxes thereon since 1924 was religiously
Under Article 448, the landowner is given the paid by Maximo Francisco up to 1955. Despite
option, either to appropriate the improvement as the sale, the Torrens title continued until 1937 in
his own upon payment of the proper amount of the name of the vendor Exequiel Ampil.
indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor in
good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a Prior to October 21, 1933, Exequiel Ampil was
builder in good faith is entitled to full indebted to various creditors:
reimbursement for all the necessary and useful (1) China Banking Corporation — P11,995.00,
expenses incurred; it also gives him right of (2) Philippine National Bank — P9,000.00,
retention until full reimbursement is made. (3) Don Wenceslao Trinidad — P10,000.00,
total — P31,395.00.
The right of retention is considered as one of the
measures devised by the law for the protection of These loans were guaranteed by Eulogio
builders in good faith. Its object is to guarantee Rodriguez, Sr. which they execute in a document
full and prompt reimbursement as it permits the entitled "Venta Condicional" and was registered
actual possessor to remain in possession while he in office of the register of deeds on November 15,
has not been reimbursed (by the person who 1933. This deed conveyed the land together with
defeated him in the case for possession of the some other parcels to plaintiff by a conditional
property) for those necessary expenses and useful sale, the conveyance to be absolute upon the
improvements made by him on the thing fulfillment of certain conditions specified therein.
possessed. Accordingly, a builder in good faith
cannot be compelled to pay rentals during the February 9, 1934, Exequiel Ampil made payment
period of retention nor be disturbed in his amounting to P15,181.67 and so Rodriguez
possession by ordering him to vacate. In addition, executed "Release of Part of the Conditionally
as in this case, the owner of the land is prohibited Sold Premises in effect some of ampil’s property
from offsetting or compensating the necessary were release. Others were conditionally sold and
and useful expenses with the fruits received by were held and retained by the plaintiff as security
the builder-possessor in good faith. Otherwise, for the money remaining due on the conditional
the security provided by law would be impaired. sale.
This is so because the right to the expenses and
the right to the fruits both pertain to the possessor, December 10, 1936 the said sale becomes
making compensation juridically impossible; and absolute and so Rodriguez filed an affidavit
one cannot be used to reduce the other consolidating ownership over the land. However,
the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title was
TN: unavailable, so a petition was filed in the original
Nuguid owns the property but is obligated to registration proceedings for the issuance of a new
pay Pecson the unearned rentals for the 4 owner's duplicate and after due notice and
years (1993 to 1997). Right of retention by hearing the Court ordered that the lost certificate
Pecson. be cancelled and a new one issued to the owner
(in the name of Rodriguez).
Rodriguez Sr. vs Francisco
GR No. L - 13343 Trial Court Decision in favor of Rodriguez but
found Francisco as possessor in good faith and
Facts: hence free from liability for damages.
Exequiel Ampil, now deceased, was the
registered owner of the land in question under Both parties appeal but CA affirmed the TC
Original Certificate of Title No. 2497 issued way decision.
back on May 25, 1918. On March 24, 1924,
Exequiel Ampil executed a deed of sale covering Issue:
the land in favor of defendant Maximo Francisco WON Maximo Francisco is a possessor in good
for the sum of P1,500. Sometime thereafter, the faith.
defendant took possession of the premises which,

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

Ruling: of the land with interest at the legal rate, plus

Rodriguez draws the inference of bad faith in the costs.
possession of Maximo:
1. that the description of the land in the deed of Mindanao Academy Inc. vs. Yap
sale executed by Exequiel Ampil in favor of GR No. L-17681
Maximo Francisco in 1924 does not tally with the
description in the vendor's certificate of title, No. FACTS:
2497 a) Plaintiff-Appellee’s Arguments
2. that Maximo Francisco never registered the (Mindanao Academy Inc., Bas, Diaz, et al. – Win)
sale in the office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal -Filed a case to nullify the sale of their co-owned
thereafter land by co-owner Respondent Nuqui to
3. Francisco did not appear that when Rodriguez Respondent Yap
consolidated in himself the ownership of the land -Argued that such sale was void for they were not
in 1926. able to give their consent to such sale because
they were not informed thereof
The Court favored Francisco and said that he was
a possessor in good faith. Those allege by b) Defendant-Appellant’s Arguments
Rodriguez above were immaterial because the (Yap, Nuqui, et al. – Lost)
land sold was covered in the same title. - Defendant Yap, as the buyer, argued that should
the sale be nullified, he should be entitled to
Francisco was then and for a long time had been reimbursement for the value of the improvements
in possession of the land, and there can be no he allegedly introduced in the schools, consisting
question that for purposes of such possession the of a new building worth P8,000.00 and a toilet
deed of sale was a good and sufficient title. The costing P800.00, besides laboratory equipment,
possession having begun in good faith the furniture, fixtures and books for the libraries
presumption is that it continued to be enjoyed in
the same character until it could be proven that ISSUE:
the possessor was not unaware that his possession 1. Whether or not the sale of the co-owned land
was wrongful. Furthermore, even though by co-owner Respondent Nuqui to Respondent
Rodriguez was adjudge to be the owner the Yap is void
property he never attempted to exercise 2. Whether or not Defendant Yap, as the buyer,
possessory rights over the property or paid taxes be entitled to reimbursement
thereon, nor did he demand its possession.
RULING:
However, since the judgment of ownership in Conclusion:
favor of Rodriguez had become final and The sale of the co-owned land by co-owner
executor Francisco’s possession in good faith was Respondent Nuqui to Respondent Yap is void.
interrupted (from the time he knows of the Defendant Yap, as the buyer, is not entitled to
complaint) and hence from that time he lost the reimbursement.
right to the fruits. As stated in the case of Tacas
vs. Tobon Application:
In this case, the appellant claims reimbursement
“ But to every possessor in good faith there comes for the value of the improvements he allegedly
a time when he is considered a possessor in bad introduced in the schools, consisting of a new
faith. When the owner possessor with a better building worth P8,000.00 and a toilet costing
right comes along, when he becomes aware that P800.00, besides laboratory equipment, furniture,
what he had taken for granted is at least doubtful, fixtures and books for the libraries. It should be
and when he learns the grounds in support of the noted that the judgment of the trial court
adverse contention, good faith ceases. specifies, for delivery to the plaintiffs (in Civil
Case No. 1907), only "the buildings and grounds
The court ordered the administrator of the estate described in the mutual agreement together with
of the deceased Maximo Francisco to pay all the permanent improvements thereon." If the
Rodriguez the sum of P200.00 yearly, starting defendant constructed a new building, as he
from 1951 until the restoration of the possession alleges, he cannot recover its value because the

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

construction was done after the filing of the Santos vs. Mojica
action for annulment, thus rendering him a GR No. L-25450
builder in bad faith who is denied by law any right
of reimbursement. FACTS:
A case for partition and annulment of certain
Conclusion: conveyances of a 360 square meter parcel of land
Thus, the sale of the co-owned land by co-owner was filed by eleven brothers and sisters, all
Respondent Nuqui to Respondent Yap is void. surnamed Allanigue against their sister, Lorenza
Defendant Yap, as the buyer, is not entitled to Allanigue her husband Simeon Santos, Maria San
reimbursement Agustin and Felicidad San Agustin.

Lumungo vs Usman The TRIAL COURT, rendered a judgment

GR No. L- 25359 ordering the partition of the land among the
Allanigue siblings including Lorenza. However,
FACTS: due to failure to pay rents as directed in the
Dominga Usman sold and transfers her rights in decision, the court issued a subsequent order
and to the 3 lots in question to Jose Angeles. The setting off Lorenza's share.
latter made the purchase with the knowledge that
the property was already in dispute by Atty. The court then ordered the defendants (those to
Usman, husband of Dominga, and by the whom lands were conveyed) in the present case
plaintiffs. Angeles, upon taking possession of the to vacate the land and to deliver the possession to
land, planted the same with coconuts, which, the plaintiffs (Allanigue siblings). Leonardo
together with those already planted by Dominga Santos, son of Lorenza Allanigue and husband
Usman, numbered about 3,000, most of which are Simeon Santos, filed a third party claim and a
now fruit-bearing. In short, Angeles was a motion to recall the writ of execution. (because
purchaser and a builder in bad faith. may house sya sa subject land)

ISSUE: Since the defendants and Leonardo refused to

Whether or not Angeles is entitled to vacate the land, the court ordered the sheriff for
reimbursement for the coconuts tree he planted the demolition of the houses. Leo and the
on the property in litigation. defendants then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition against Judge Angel Mojica and the
HELD: Sheriff questioning the jurisdiction of the lower
No. It should be noted that said trees are court to order the demolition which was
improvements, not "necessary expenses of subsequently denied by the Supreme Court.
preservation," which a builder, planter or sower
in bad faith may recover under Arts. 452 and 546, After the decision became final Judge Mojica
first paragraph, of the Civil Code. The facts and ordered the postponed demolition. The
findings of both the trial court and the Court of defendants voluntarily removed their houses. The
Appeals leave no room for doubt that Jose only house that remained was that of Leo Santos.
Angeles was a purchaser and a builder in bad Judge then (for the second time) ordered the
faith. demolition of the house of Leo. Hence the present
petition on certiorari and prohibition filed by Leo
The provision applicable to this case is, Santos (plaintiff) against Judge Mojica.
accordingly, Article 449 of the Civil Code, which
provides that, "he who builds, plants or sows in ISSUE:
bad faith on the land of another, loses what is Whether or not the present petition filed by
built, planted or sown without right to petitioner be denied
indemnity."

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

RULING: first reimbursed for the value of the house he

YES OF COURSE! built.

1. First, Leo as son of the Lorenza and Simeon Evangelista’s filed a complaint. CFI ruled based
(defendants of the prior case CC 217-R) is bound on Art, 448 of the Civil Code saying that
by the judgment being a successor in interest. The Evangelista’s have the choice between
fact that the sale from his parents was registered, purchasing the house or selling the land to
is of no moment because he is BOUND by the Floreza. CA ruled that Art. 448 was inapplicable
judgment, as already mentioned. and that Floreza was not entitled to the
reimbursement of his house and could remove the
Leo was also considered as builder IN BAD same at his own expense.
FAITH. Why? His parents were summoned
1959, and Leo Santos' house having been built ISSUE:
and reconstructed into a bigger one after his 1. WON Floreza was entitled to reimbursement
parents were summoned (after March 1962). of the cost of his house.
Obviously, BAD FAITH. So, Allanigue sibling 2. WON he (his heirs who replaced him) should
became the owners if they choose to appropriate pay rental of the land.
the accession but they choose to demolish it at the
expense of the builder. HELD:
1. NO.
And applying ART. 449 - As a builder in bad Issue of reimbursement is not moot because if
faith he lost the improvement made by him Floreza has no right of retention, then he must pay
consisting the reconstructed house to the owners damages in the form of rentals. Agree with CA
of the land without the right to be indemnified :( that Art. 448 is inapplicable because it applies
only when the builder is in good faith (he believed
2. Second, present petition is barred by res he had a right to build). Art. 453 is also not
judicata---- the question on the validity of the applicable because it requires both of the parties
demolition order has already been decided by SC to be in bad faith. Neither is Art. 1616 applicable
and such decision is res judicata to the present because Floreza is not a vendee a retro. The house
petition raising the same question of validity was already constructed in 1945 (light materials)
involving same parties and same subject matter. even before the pacto de retro was entered into in
1949. Floreza cannot be classified as a builder in
Floreza vs. Evangelista good faith nor a vendee a retro, who made useful
GR No. L-25462 improvements during the pacto de retro, he has no
right to reimbursement of the value of the house,
FACTS: much less to the retention of the premises until he
The Evangelista’s were the owner of a residential is paid.
lot in Rizal with an area of 204.08 sq. m. assessed
at P410. They borrowed P100 from Floreza. His rights are more akin to a usufructury under
Floreza occupied the residential lot and built a Art. 579, who may make on the property useful
house of light material (barong-barong) with the improvements but with no right to be indemnified
consent of the Evangelista’s. Additional Loans thereof, He may, however, remove such
were made by the Evangelista’s. improvements should it be possible to do so
without damage to the property.
Floreza demolished the house of light material
and constructed one of strong material assessed. 2. YES.
Floreza has not been paying any rentals since the From the time the redemption price was paid in
beginning of their transactions. Eventually, January 3, 1955, Floreza’s right to use the
Evangelista’s sold, with a right to repurchase residential lot without rent ceased. He should be
within 6years, their land to Floreza. Seven held liable for damages in the form of rentals for
months before the expiry of the repurchase the continued use of the lot for P10 monthly from
period, the Evangelista’s were able to pay in full. January 3, 1955 until the house was removed and
Floreza refused to vacate the lot unless he was the property vacated by Floreza or his heirs.
Judgment affirmed with modification.

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to

PARAÑAQUE CITY v. MARIO D.EBIO the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and
AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS applied for a writ of preliminary injunction
G.R. No. 178411 against petitioners.

FACTS: ISSUE:
Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 Whether or not the State may build on the land in
sq. m. parcel of land in Parañaque City covered question.
by Tax in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio.
Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. HELD:
No. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land
Respondents assert that the original occupant and was formed from the alluvial deposits that have
possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut
Vitalez, which was given to his son, Pedro creek. This being the case, the law that governs
Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84
continuously and exclusively occupied and of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which
possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the
affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. He Civil Code.
also paid taxes for the land. ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually
upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams,
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio rivers, and lakes, by accessions or
married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. In April 1964 sediments from the waters thereof,
and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured belong to the owners of such lands.
building permits from the Parañaque municipal Art. 457. To the owners of lands
office for the construction of their house within adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
the land. On April 21, 1987, Pedro transferred his accretion which they gradually receive
rights over the land in favor of Ebio. from the effects of the current of the
waters.
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the It is therefore explicit from the foregoing
Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks
Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking of a creek do not form part of the public domain
assistance from the City Government of as the alluvial property automatically belongs to
Parañaque for the construction of an access road the owner of the estate to which it may have been
along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. added. The only restriction provided for by law is
The proposed road will run from Urma Drive to that the owner of the adjoining property must
the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing register the same under the Torrens system;
the lot occupied by the respondents. Respondents otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to
immediately opposed and the project was acquisition through prescription by third persons.
suspended.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot
In January 2003, however, respondents were be acquired by prescription. No matter how long
surprised when several officials from the the possession of the properties has been, there
barangay and the city planning office proceeded can be no prescription against the State regarding
to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said property of public domain. Even a city or
lot. municipality cannot acquire them by prescription
as against the State.
On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent
a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of
the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be public dominion, the land which is formed by the
physically evicted from the said property. gradual and imperceptible accumulation of
Respondents sent a reply, asserting their claim sediments along its banks does not form part of
over the subject property and expressing intent the public domain by clear provision of law.
for a further dialogue. The request remained
unheeded.

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

Republic vs Abrille the Director of Lands. For an applicant to have

GR No. L – 39248 his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land
to be originally registered under Act 496, the
SYNOPSIS following requisites should all be satisfied:
The Republic, represented by the Director of 1. Survey of land by the Bureau of
Lands, filed a Complaint for Annulment of Lands or a duly licensed private
Certificate of Title alleging that: the subdivision surveyor;
of a parcel of land owned by defendant into two 2. Filing of application for registration
lots included an excess area of 82,127 square by the applicant;
meters; the Land Registration Commissioner 3. Setting of the date for the initial
approved said petition for subdivision and; in hearing of the application by the Court;
view of which transfer certificate of title, which 4. Transmittal of the application and the
included the excess area, were issued by the date of initial hearing together with all
Register of Deeds. The lower court rendered the documents or other evidences
judgment cancelling the new certificates of title attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to
(one of the subdivided lots having been further the Land Registration Commission;
subdivided and new certificates of title issued 5. Publication of a notice of the filing of
therefor) containing the increased area and the application and date and place of the
ordered the Register of Deeds to issue new ones hearing in the Official Gazette;
in lieu thereof after the increased portion had 6. Service of notice upon continuous
been deducted. Appealed to the Court of Appeals, owners, occupants and those known to
the latter certified the case to the Supreme Court have interests in the property by the
since it involved purely a question of law. sheriff;
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment 7. Filing of answer to the application by
holding that to bring the increased area under the any person whether named in the notice
operation and coverage of the Land Registration or not;
Act proceedings for registration of the land 8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
should be filed. 9. Promulgation of judgment by the
ISSUE: Court;
Whether or not the subdivision of Defendant’s 10. Issuance of the decree by the Court
land is valid. declaring the decision final and
RULING: instructing the Land Registration
Conclusion: Commission to issue a decree of
The subdivision of Defendant’s land is valid. The confirmation and registration;
appeal is dismissed 11. Entry of the decree of registration in
the Land Registration Commission;
Application: 12. Sending of copy of the decree of
In this case, the step taken by defendant-appellant registration to the corresponding Register
in petitioning the court for the approval of their of Deeds; and
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd- 13. Transcription of the decree of
71236 to include the questioned increased area of registration in the registration book and
82,127 square meters is, to say the least, the issuance of the owner’s duplicate
unwarranted and irregular. In order to bring this original certificate of title to the applicant
increase in area, which the parties admitted to by the Register of Deeds, upon payment
have been a former river bed of the Davao River, of the prescribed fees.
under the operation and coverage of the Land
Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in Grande vs. CA
registrations of land title should have been filed GR No. L – 17652
instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision
plan. FACTS:
The Grande’s are owners of a parcel of land in
Worse still, the approval of Subdivision Plans Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased
(LRC) Psd-09322 and Psd-71236 was without mother, Patricia Angui, who likewise, inherited it
notice to all parties in interest, more particularly from her parents. In the early 1930’s, the

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

Grande’s decided to have their land surveyed for registration for the reason that the land to be
registration purposes. The land was described to registered is an area of public domain and that the
have Cagayan River as the northeastern applicant nor his predecessor-in-interests
boundary, as stated in the title. possessed sufficient title for the land. The parcel
of land applied was acquired from the
By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the government by the virtue of a free patent title.
action of the current of the river, and an alluvial However, the land in question was formed by
deposit of almost 20,000 sq. m. was added to the accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the
registered area. The Grande’s filed an action for action of the Manila bay. The petition was denied
quieting of title against the Calalungs, stating that by the lower court and decided that the land to be
they were in peaceful and continuous possession registered are part of the public domain. Faustino,
of the land created by the alluvial deposit until however, contended that the court could have
1948, when the Calalungs allegedly trespassed declared the land not to be part of the public
into their property. The Calalungs, however, domain.
stated that they were the rightful owners since
prior to 1933. Issue: (Note: Check issue full text)
Whether or not the courts have the power to
The CFI found for the Grande’s and ordered the reclassify a land.
Calalungs to vacate the premises and pay for
damages. Upon appeal to the CA, however, the Ruling:
decision was reversed. No, the courts do not have the power to reclassify
a land. The courts are primarily called upon to
ISSUE: determine whether a land is to be used for public
Whether or not the alluvium deposited land purpose. However, it is only limited there. A
automatically belongs to the riparian owners? formal declaration of reclassification of land
should come from the government, specifically
HELD: from the executive department or the legislature.
Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land These bodies should declare that a land in
belong to the owners of the adjacent land. question is no longer needed for public use, some
However, this does not ipso jure become theirs public use or for the improvement of national
merely believing that said land have become wealth.
imprescriptible. The land of the Grande’s only
specifies a specific portion, of which the alluvial If no such declaration has been made by said
deposits are not included, and are thus, subject to departments, the lot in question forms part of
acquisition by prescription. Since the Calalungs the public domain. They continue to be part of
proved that they have been in possession of the the public domain, not available for private
land since 1934 via two credible witnesses, as appropriation or ownership. Applicant cannot
opposed to the Grande’s single witness who register the land.
claims that the Calalungs only entered the land in
1948, the Calalungs have been held to have HEIRS OF NAVARRO V. IAC
acquired the land created by the alluvial deposits GR No. 68166
by prescription. This is because the possession Accretion along an area adjacent to the sea is
took place in 1934, when the law to be followed public domain, even if the accretion results from
was Act 190, and not the New Civil Code, which rivers emptying into the sea. It cannot be
only took effect in 1950. registered.

Faustino Ignacio vs Director of Lands FACTS:

GR No. L - 12958 Sinforoso Pascual sits in the midst of a land
registration case. The story begins on 1946 upon
Facts: his desire to register land on the northern section
Ignacio applied for the registration of a parcel of of his existing property. His current registered
a mangrove land in Rizal. It was stated in the property is bounded on the east by Talisay River,
application that he owned the parcel by right of on the West by Bulacan River and on the North
accretion. The director of land opposed the by the Manila bay. Both rivers flow towards the

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

Manila Bay. Because of constantly flowing HELD:

water, extra land of about 17 hectares (that’s It cannot be registered. This is land of Public
about the size of Disney Park!) formed in the domain. Pascual claimed ownership under Article
northern most section of the property. It is this 457 of the Civil Code saying that the disputed 14-
property he sought to register. hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint
action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers Art 457:
The RTC denied the registration claiming this to Accretion as a mode of acquiring property and
be foreshore land and part of public domain requires the concurrence of the following
(remember, accretion formed by the sea is public requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or
dominion). His Motion for Reconsideration sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it
likewise burned. In 1960, he attempted registry be the result of the action of the waters of the
again, claiming that the Talisay and Bulacan river; and (3) that the land where the accretion
rivers deposited more silt resulting on accretion. takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
He claimed this land as riparian owner. The
Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of
Fiscal opposed. ownership based on Art 457 is misplaced. If
there’s any land to be claimed, it should be land
Then a new party surfaced. Mr. Emiliano Navarro ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan.
jumped into the fray opposing the same The law is clear on this. Accretion of land along
application, stating the he leased part of the the river bank may be registered. This is not the
property sought to be registered. He sought to case of accretion of land on the property adjacent
protect his fishpond that rested on the same to Manila Bay.
property. Sinforoso was not amused and filed
ejectment against Mr. Navarro, claiming that Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a
Navarro used stealth force and strategy to occupy sea bank is foreshore land and the applicable law
a portion of his land. Pascual lost the case against is not Art 457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of
Navarro so he appealed. During the appeal, his Waters of 1866. This law, while old, holds that
original land registration case was consolidated accretion along sea shore cannot be registered as
and tried jointly. (alas Pascual died) The heirs of it remains public domain unless abandoned by
Pascual took over the case. government for public use and declared as private
property capable of alienation.
On 1975, the court decided that the property was
foreshore land and therefore part of public
domain. The RTC dismissed the complaint of Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August
Pascual for ejectment against Navarro and also 3, 1866 provides as follows:
denied his land registration request. Pascual’s Lands added to the shores by accretions
heirs appealed and the RTC was reversed by the and alluvial deposits caused by the
IAC. The Appellate court granted petition for action of the sea, form part of the public
registration! The reason? The accretion was domain. When they are no longer washed
caused by the two rivers, not manila bay. Hence by the waters of the sea and are not
it wasn’t foreshore land. (BUT the confusion lies necessary for purposes of public utility,
in the fact that the accretion formed adjacent to or for the establishment of special
Manila Bay… which is sea!) Aggrieved, the industries, or for the coast-guard service,
Director of Forestry moved for reconsideration the Government shall declare them to be
(Government insists it is foreshore and hence, the property of the owners of the estates
public domain). The Appellate court denied all adjacent thereto and as increment
motions of the Director and the Government. thereof.

ISSUE: The IAC decision granting registration was

Whether or not the accretion taking place on reversed and set aside. Registration cannot be
property adjacent to the sea can be registered allowed.
under the Torrens system.

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

HEIRS OF ENRIQUE DIAZ vs. VIRATA, in In January 1997, the relocation survey conducted
her capacity as the Administratrix of the Estate showed that the driveway was truly outside
of ANTENOR VIRATA Enrique’s property. During the hearing,
G. R. No. 162037 petitioners, through counsel, manifested that they
will present their own surveyor who will testify
FACTS: that the improvements made on the said lot are
In 1959, Antenor bought, by installments, from within the boundaries of their property, however,
Miguela Crisologo, in good faith and for value, they failed to present such surveyor. In
two parcels of land located in Palico, Imus, September of the same year, Enrique in his
Cavite, covered by TCTs No. (T-3855) RT-2633 Motion for Leave To File An Amended Answer
and NO. (T-11171) RT-1228, which are stated, among others, that he discovered a
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite. certification issued by the Register of Deeds of
Consequently, TCT Nos. 517 and 518 were Cavite signifying that TCT No. T-11171 (RT-
issued in the former’s name upon full payment of 1228), in Miguela Crisologo’s name, appeared to
those lots. These lots were then partitioned by have been reconstituted but nothing is recorded in
Antenor into several lots, and titles were issued the Primary Entry Book of said Registry
again in Antenor’s favor, as follows: TCT Nos. pertaining to such administrative reconstitution,
4983-4986 and 5027-5033. In 1992, Enrique filed thereby affecting not only Crisologo’s title over
a claim with the Department of Environment and the same, but also Antenor’s, as purchaser
Natural Resources (DENR), alleging that he and thereof. The court denied said motion holding
his predecessors-in-interest had been in that it is a collateral attack on the title which can
continuous possession of the same lots owned by only be done in a proceeding precisely brought
Antenor, thereby creating a cloud which may be for that purpose.
prejudicial to the titles issued in the name of
Antenor, and now managed by his Estate. The trial court upheld the validity of the titles in
Enrique had fenced the lot and used it as a the name of Antenor and declared them as the
driveway. only official titles to the property and ruled as
void and illegal the claim of Diaz and his
In his Answer with Counter-Claim, Enrique possession of some portions thereof. The Court of
contended that the fence and the driveway were Appeals held that petitioner’s reliance on a
located within the boundaries of his and his heirs’ certification issued by the Register of Deeds was
exclusive property per TCT Nos. T-304191 and an indirect attack on the said titles and that laches
T-66120, and that his predecessors-in-interest is inapplicable because Antenor, as the registered
have been in possession of and occupied the said owner, was within his rights to demand the return
realty since time immemorial, among others. He of the properties at any time as the possession of
also asserted that Antenor disturbed their the petitioners was unauthorized.
peaceful and actual possession sometime in 1962
when Antenor claimed a portion thereof after ISSUE:
allegedly buying the same from Miguela Whether or not Respondent is the owner of the
Crisologo. land.

Enrique, invoking laches, posited that for almost RULING:

27 years after the dismissal of the action for Conclusion:
reconveyance, the heirs of Antenor were silent, Respondent is the owner of the land. The appeal
while he was in actual and continuous possession is dismissed.
of the disputed properties in the character and
concept of an owner, until again, his possession Rule:
is disturbed by the suit. He pointed out that Article 477 of the same Code mandates that in an
respondent’s failure or neglect for an action to quiet title, the party bringing the action
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to must have a legal or, at least, an equitable title to
assert her right, created a presumption that she the real property subject of the action and that the
had abandoned or declined to assert said right. alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in
fact invalid. Verily, for an action to quiet title to
prosper, two indispensable requisites must

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant not find basis to digress from the ruling
has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the articulated by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
real property subject of the action; and (2) the Well-established is the principle that the
deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed person holding a prior certificate is
to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to entitled to the land as against a person
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima who relies on a subsequent certificate.
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. This rule refers to the date of the
certificate of title. Absent any muniment
Application: of title issued prior to 1959 in favor of
In this case, First. The determination of the appellants [Enrique, et al.] which could
circumstances leading to Antenor's acquisition of prove their ownership over the contested
the subject properties is a factual matter. lots, this Court is left with no other
The court a quo found that in 1959, Antenor alternative but to declare appellants'
purchased from Miguela Crisologo two parcels of claim over the properties as void.
land located at Palico, Imus, Cavite, and covered
by TCTs No. T-3855 and No. T-11171. Antenor Calacala vs Republic
paid for the aforesaid properties in installment, GR No. 154415
and after having fully paid for the same, TCTs
No. T-3855 and No. T-11171 in the name of Facts:
Miguela Crisologo were cancelled, and TCTs No. Spouses Camilo Calacala and Conchita Calacala,
T-517 and No. T-518 were issued to Antenor. In predecessors in interest of the herein petitioners,
1963, the properties were subdivided and, are the registered owners of a parcel of land
therefrom, TCTs No. T-4983, T-4984, T-4985, T- situated at Barangay Balincanaway, Rosales,
4986, T-5027, T-5028, T-5029, T-5030, T-5031, Pangasinan and covered by Transfer Certificate
T-5032 and T-5033, all in the name of Antenor of Title No. 21204 of the Registry of Deeds of
were issued. On 4 May 1982, respondent was Pangasinan.
appointed administratrix of the Estate of Antenor.
On appeal, such findings of facts were not To secure the provisional release of an accused in
disturbed by the appellate court. Nothing is more a criminal case then pending before the then
settled than the rule that where, as in the case Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan, the
herein, the findings of fact of the trial court are spouses offered their aforementioned parcel of
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are land as a property bond in said case
final and conclusive upon this Court. Indeed, the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. None of the For failure of the accused to appear at his
exceptions to this rule appears to be present in the scheduled arraignment on 4 November 1981, the
case at bar, and so should we apply the rule with CFI ordered the bond forfeited in favor of the
force. government, and, following the bondman’s
failure to produce in court the body of the
Second. Antero's certificates of title, as found by accused, rendered judgment against the bond in
the trial court and sustained by the appellate the amount of P 3, 500,000.
court, were issued as early as 22 October 1959.
Time and again, we have upheld the fundamental Thereafter, the court issued a Writ of Execution
principle in land registration that a certificate of [1] directing the provincial sheriff to effect a levy
title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and on the subject parcel of land and to sell the same
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of at a public auction to satisfy the amount of the
the person whose name appears therein. It bond in compliance with the writ, the deputy
becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel provincial sheriff issued on 26 July 1982 a Notice
of land. The validity of Antero's titles were of Levy [2] addressed to the Register of Deeds of
upheld by the court a quo and the Court of Pangasinan who, on 19 August 1982, caused the
Appeals and were not found to be tainted with any annotation thereof on TCT No. T-21204 as Entry
defect. Even as Enrique possessed certificates of No. 83188.
title over certain portions of the subject
properties, these were issued only on 7 March Not long thereafter, a public auction of the subject
1973 and 6 March 1991. On this matter, we do parcel of land was held on 24 September 1982, at

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

which respondent Republic submitted its bid for Application:

P 3, 500, which is the amount of the judgment on In this case, unfortunately, the foregoing
the bond. Hence, on that same day, a Sheriff’s requisites are wanting in this case. For one, it
Certificate of Sale [3] was issued in favor of the bears stressing that petitioners' predecessors-in-
Republic as the winning bidder. interest lost whatever right they had over land in
question from the very moment they failed to
On October 5, 1982, the same Certificate of Sale redeem it during the 1-year period of redemption.
was registered and annotated on TCT No. T- Certainly, the Republic's failure to execute the
21204 as Entry No. 83793, thereby giving the acts referred to by the petitioners within ten (10)
spouses Calacala a period of one (1) year years from the registration of the Certificate of
therefrom within which to redeem their property. Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore
Unfortunately, they never did up to the time of whatever rights petitioners' predecessors-in-
their respective deaths on 13 January 1988 and 8 interest had over the same. For sure, petitioners
January 1994. have yet to cite any provision of law or rule of
jurisprudence, and we are not aware of any, to the
Claiming ownership of the same land as legal effect that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure
heirs of the deceased spouses, petitioners filed sale to secure a Certificate of Final Sale, execute
with the Regional Trial Court at Rosales, an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and
Pangasinan a complaint [4] for Quieting of Title obtain a writ of possession over the property thus
and Cancellation of Encumbrance on TCT No. T- acquired, within ten (10) years from the
21204 against respondents Republic and Sheriff registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate
Juan C. Marquez. In their complaint, docketed as to bring ownership back to him whose property
Civil Case No. 1239-R and raffled to Branch 53 has been previously foreclosed and sold.
of the court, petitioners prayed, inter alia, for the
cancellation of Entries No. 83188 and 83793 on As correctly observed by the trial court, the
TCT No. T-21204 or the declaration of said Republic's failure to do anything within ten (10)
entries as null and void. years or more following the registration of the
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale cannot give rise to a
To the complaint, respondent Republic presumption that it has thereby waived or
interposed a motion to dismiss [5] grounded on abandoned its right of ownership or that it has
the (1) complaint’s failure to state a cause of prescribed, "for prescription does not lie against
action and (2) prescription of petitioner’s right to the government", nor could it "be bound or
redeem. estopped by the negligence or mistakes of its
officials and employees"
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner is still the owner of the With the reality that petitioners are not holders of
land. any legal title over the property subject of this
case and are bereft of any equitable claim thereon,
RULING: the very first requisite of an action to quiet title,
Conclusion: i.e., that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
Petitioner is not the owner of the land. The appeal an equitable title to or interest in the real property
is dismissed. subject matter of the action, is miserably wanting
in this case.
Rule:
- Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two Robles vs. Court of Appeals
(2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely: GR No. 123509
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property FACTS:
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, Leon Robles primitively owned a land in Morong
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting Rizal. When Leon died, his son Silvino Robles
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact inherited the land. Both of them declared the
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie property under their name for taxation purposes.
appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Upon the death of Silvino, his widow Maria dela
Cruz and his children inherited the property. They

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

took adverse possession of it and paid the taxes That there is an instrument or a document which,
thereon. The task of cultivating the land was on its face, is valid and efficacious is clear in the
assigned to one of Silvino’s son, Lucio Roles present case. Petitioners allege that their title as
while the payment of the taxes was entrusted to owners and possessors of the disputed property is
their half- brother, Hilario Robles. clouded by the tax declaration and, subsequently,
the free patent thereto granted to Spouses Vergel
In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration and Ruth Santos. The more important question to
of the parcel of land in the name of Silvino Robles be resolved, however, is whether the petitioners
was canceled and transferred to one Exequiel have the appropriate title that will entitle them to
Ballena, father of Andrea Robles who is the wife avail themselves of the remedy of quieting of
of defendant Hilario Robles. Thereafter, Exequiel title.
Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural
Bank, using the tax declaration as security. In a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential
Somehow, the tax declaration was transferred to that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the
the name of Antipolo Rural Bank and later on, property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the
was transferred to the name of defendant Hilario mortgage is void. In the present case, it is
Robles and his wife. In 1996, Andrea Robles apparent that Hilario Robles was not the absolute
secured a loan from the Cadona Rural Bank, Inc., owner of the entire subject property; and that the
using the tax declaration as security. For failure Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., in not fully
to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure ascertaining his title thereto, failed to observe due
proceedings were had and defendant Rural Bank diligence and, as such, was a mortgagee in bad
emerged as the highest bidder during the auction faith.
sale in October 1968.
In the light of their open, continuous, exclusive
The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the and notorious possession and occupation of the
property and so the tax declaration was land, petitioners are "deemed to have acquired, by
transferred in the name of defendant Rural Bank. operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
On September 25, 1987, defendant Rural Bank grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
sold the same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and being issued." The land was "segregated from the
Ruth Santos who took possession of the property public domain." Accordingly, the director of
and was able to secure Free Patent No. IV-1- lands had no authority to issue a free patent
010021 in their names. thereto in favor of another person. Verily,
jurisprudence holds that a free patent covering
ISSUE: private land is null and void.
Whether or not Petitioners are the owners of the
land Tan vs. Valdehueza
GR No. L-38745
RULING:
Conclusion: FACTS:
Petitioners are the owners of the land. The appeal A parcel of land described in a cause of action
is granted. was the subject matter of the public auction sale
wherein the plaintiff, Lucia Tan was the highest
Application: bidder and as such a Certificate of Sale was
In this case, an action to quiet title is a common- executed in favor of herein plaintiff. Due to the
law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt failure of defendant Arador Valdehueza to
or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is redeem the said land within the period of one year
essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have as being provided by law, an Absolute Deed of
a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real Sale in favor of the plaintiff was executed. The
property which is the subject matter of the action. defendants Valdeheuza have executed two
Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or documents of Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale in
proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on favor of the plaintiff of two portions of a parcel
plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid of land which is described in the second cause of
or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance action with the total amount of P1, 500. From the
of validity or legal efficacy. execution of the Deed of Sale with right to

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

repurchase mentioned in the second cause of actions to quiet title "need not be in possession of
action, defendants remained in the possession of said property."
the land.
Pingol vs. Court of Appeals
A complaint for injunction was filed by Tan to GR No. 102909
enjoin the Valdehuezas "from entering the parcel
of land and gathering the nuts therein ". The Facts:
complaint and the counterclaim were later on In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot (Lot No. 3223)
dismissed for failure of the parties to seek for in Caloocan City, executed a DEED OF
immediate trial, thus evincing lack of interest on ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF AN
their part to proceed with the case. The Deed of UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF
Pacto de Retro referred to was not registered in LAND in favor of Donasco (private respondent),
the Registry of Deeds, while the second Deed of payable in 6 years.
Pacto de Retro was registered.
In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to pay
ISSUE: P8,369 plus P2,000 downpayment, leaving a
Whether or not Plaintiff can recover the land balance of P10,161. The heirs of Donasco
remained in possession of such lot and offered to
RULING: settle the balance with Pingol. However, Pingol
Conclusion: refused to accept the offer and demanded a larger
Plaintiff can recover the land. The appeal is amount. Thus, the heirs of Donasco filed an
dismissed. action for specific performance (with Prayer for
Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol were
Application: encroaching upon Donasco’s lot). Pingol averred
In this case, the Valdehuezas submit that the that the sale and transfer of title was conditional
dismissal of civil case 2002 operated, upon the upon the full payment of Donasco (contract to
principle of res judicata, as a bar to the first cause sell, not contract of sale). With Donasco’s breach
of action in civil case 2574. We rule that this of the contract in 1976 and death in 1984, the sale
contention is untenable as the causes of action in was deemed cancelled, and the heirs’ continuous
the two cases are not identical. Case 2002 was for occupancy was only being tolerated by Pingol.
injunction against the entry into and the gathering
of nuts from the land, while case 2574 seeks to ISSUE:
"remove any doubt or cloud of the plaintiff's Whether or not Respondent can compel Petitioner
ownership . . ." (Amended complaint, Rec. on to accept the remaining balance of the sale
App., p. 27), with a prayer for declaration of
ownership and recovery of possession. RULING:
Conclusion:
Applying the test of absence of inconsistency Respondent can compel Petitioner to accept the
between prior and subsequent judgments, we remaining balance of the sale. The appeal is
hold that the failure of Tan, in case 2002, to dismissed
secure an injunction against the Valdehuezas to
prevent them from entering the land and Application:
gathering nuts is consistent with her being Although the private respondents' complaint
adjudged, in case 2574, as owner of the land with before the trial court was denominated as one for
right to recover possession thereof. Case 2002 specific performance, it is in effect an action to
involved only the possession of the land and the quiet title.
fruits thereof, while case 2574 involves
ownership of the land, with possession as a mere That a cloud has been cast on the title of the
attribute of ownership. The judgment in the first private respondents is indubitable. Despite the
case could not and did not encompass the fact that the title had been transferred to them by
judgment in the second, although the second the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery
judgment would encompass the first. Moreover, of the object of the contract, the petitioners
the new Civil Code provides that suitors in adamantly refused to accept the tender of
payment by the private respondents and

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

steadfastly insisted that their obligation to interested in buying the land”. Further, there was
transfer title had been rendered ineffective. misrepresentation on the citizenship of Cresencia
is a Filipino citizen.
A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who
had made part payment thereof, entered upon the Petitioners claimed that there was really no co-
land and had made valuable improvements ownership since the parents executed three deeds
thereon, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title of sale assigning specific properties to the
against the vendor who had refused to transfer the brothers. Since there is no-ownership it follows
title to him. It is not necessary that the vendee has that there is no right to redemption. Petitioners
an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient pointed out that it was only because the brothers
to clothe him with personality to bring an action failed to submit a subdivision plan which is the
to quiet title reason why there is only one certificate of title.

Prescription thus cannot be invoked against the Lower court dismissed the petition. CA reversed
private respondents for it is aphoristic that an and said that co-ownership still exists and that the
action to quiet title to property in one's possession land was undivided. Petitioners filed a motion for
is imprescriptible. The rationale for this rule has new trial on the basis that there was annotation at
been aptly stated thus: the back of the original TCT due to the sale in
"The owner of real property who is in favor of the brothers. CA denied because the
possession thereof may wait until his reglementary period had lapsed and the decision
possession is invaded or his title is has become final and executory.
attacked before taking steps to vindicate
his right. A person claiming title to real ISSUE:
property, but not in possession thereof, Whether or not Respondent can recover the land
must act affirmatively and within the
time provided by the statute. Possession RULING:
is a continuing right as is the right to Conclusion:
defend such possession. So it has been Respondent cannot recover the land. The appeal
determined that an owner of real property is granted.
in possession has a continuing right to
invoke a court of equity to remove a Application:
cloud that is a continuing menace to his In this case, the lot in question had already been
title. Such a menace is compared to a partitioned when their parents executed three (3)
continuing nuisance or trespass which is deed of sales (sic) in favor of Jose, Crisostomo
treated as successive nuisances or and Severo, all surnamed Armada (Exh. 1, 2, &
trespasses, not barred by statute until 3), which documents purports to have been
continued without interruption for a registered with the Register of Deeds of Pasay
length of time sufficient to affect a City, on September 18, 1970, and as a
change of title as a matter of law." consequence TCT No. 16007 (Exh. A) was
issued. Notably, every portion conveyed and
Spouses Si vs. CA & Spouses Armada transferred to the three sons was definitely
GR No. 122047 described and segregated and with the
corresponding technical description (sic). In
FACTS: short, this is what we call extrajudicial partition.
Spouses Armada transferred their property to the
names of their three sons namely, Crisotomo, Moreover, every portion belonging to the three
Jose and Severo. Crisostomo through Cresencia sons has been declared for taxation purposes with
(atty-in-fact) executed a deed of sale in favor the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September
Anita Si. 21, 1970. These are the unblinkable facts that the
portion sold to defendant spouses Si by
Spouses Jose Armada (other brother) filed a defendants Crisostomo Armada and Cresenciana
complaint to annul the sale on the ground that Armada was concretely determined and
there was no written notice of such sale whereas identifiable. The fact that the three portions are
the deed stated that “the co-owners are not embraced in one certificate of title does not make

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

said portions less determinable or identifiable or have no cause of action against him because he
distinguishable, one from the other, nor that has been in possession in good faith since 1949
dominion over each portion less exclusive, in with the respondents’ knowledge and
their respective owners. Hence, no right of acquiescence. He further avers that acquisitive
redemption among co-owners exists." prescription has set in.

After the physical division of the lot among the ISSUE:

brothers, the community ownership terminated, Whether or not Respondent can recover
and the right of preemption or redemption for possession over the land
each brother was no longer available. Under Art.
484 of the Civil Code, 23 there is co-ownership RULING:
whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or Conclusion:
right belongs to different persons. There is no co- Respondent cannot recover possession over the
ownership when the different portions owned by land. Petitioner is a builder in good faith. Art. 448
different people are already concretely of the Civil Code should apply. However,
determined and separately identifiable, even if Petitioner could have been adjudicated to be the
not yet technically described. 24 This situation owner of the land where they build their house
makes inapplicable the provision on the right of because such land does not form part of the co-
redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code ownership between them with Respondent.

Heirs of Cabal vs. Spouses Cabal Application:

GR No. 153625 In this case, it is undisputed that Marcelino built
his house on the disputed property in 1949 with
FACTS: the consent of his father. Marcelino has been in
During his lifetime, Marcelo Cabal was the owner possession of the disputed lot since then with the
of a parcel of land situated. Sometime in 1954, knowledge of his co-heirs, such that even before
Marcelo died, survived by his wife and his his father died in 1954, when the co-ownership
children. It appears that sometime in 1949, five was created, his inheritance or share in the co-
years before he died, Marcelo allowed his son, ownership was already particularly designated or
Marcelino, to build his house on a portion of the physically segregated. Thus, even before Lot G
lot. Since then, Marcelino resided thereon. Later, was subdivided in 1976, Marcelino already
Marcelino’s son also built his house on the occupied the disputed portion and even then co-
disputed property. ownership did not apply over the disputed lot.

In 1964, Marcelo’s heirs extra-judicially settled Elementary is the rule that there is no co-
among themselves the lot. In the interim, based ownership where the portion owned is concretely
on a consolidated subdivision plan, it was determined and identifiable, though not
revealed that Marcelino and his son occupied and technically described, 45 or that said portion is
built their houses on an area located on the still embraced in one and the same certificate of
southernmost portion of another lot and not the title does make said portion less determinable or
adjacent lot designated to him. The spouses identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the
Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal (respondents) other, nor that dominion over each portion less
confronted Marcelino on this matter which exclusive, in their respective owners.
resulted to an agreement to a re-survey and
swapping of lots for the purpose of reconstruction Thus, since Marcelino built a house and has been
of land titles. However, the agreed resurvey and occupying the disputed portion since 1949, with
swapping of lots did not materialize. the consent of his father and knowledge of the co-
heirs, it would have been just and equitable to
Hence, respondents filed a complaint for have segregated said portion in his favor and not
Recovery of Possession with Damages against one adjacent to it. Undoubtedly, the subdivision
Marcelino. They alleged that Marcelino survey effected in 1976 spawned the dilemma in
introduced improvements in bad faith on their the present case. It designated Lot G-1 as
land with knowledge that the adjacent lot is titled Marcelino's share in the inheritance
in his name. Marcelino contends that respondents notwithstanding his possession since 1949 of a

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

definite portion of Lot G, now the southernmost Application:

portion of Lot 1-E. In this case, Glenn and Karen Go are effectively
co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the
Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith at properties registered under this name; hence, both
least until the time he was informed by have an equal right to seek possession of these
respondents of his encroachment on their properties. Applying Article 484 of the Civil
property. In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao, Code, which states that "in default of contracts, or
this case must be remanded to the trial court to special provisions, co-ownership shall be
determine matters necessary for the proper governed by the provisions of this Title", we find
application of Article 448 in relation to Articles further support in Article 487 of the Civil Code
546 and 548. Such matters include the option that that allows any of the co-owners to bring an
respondents would take and the amount of action in ejectment with respect to the co-owned
indemnity that they would pay, should they property.
decide to appropriate the improvements on the
lots. While ejectment is normally associated with
actions involving real property, we find that this
Navarro vs. Escobido rule can be applied to the circumstances of the
GR No. 153788 present case, following our ruling in Carandang
v. Heirs of De Guzman. 24 In this case, one
FACTS: spouse filed an action for the recovery of credit, a
Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints personal property considered conjugal property,
before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money without including the other spouse in the action.
with damages against Navarro. In these
complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may
writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor bring an action against Navarro to recover
vehicles in Navarro’s possession. In his Answers, possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased
Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense vehicles which they co-own. This conclusion is
that the two complaints stated no cause of action, consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code,
since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease supporting as it does the position that either
Agreements with Option to Purchase spouse may act on behalf of the conjugal
(collectively, the lease agreements) — the partnership, so long as they do not dispose of or
actionable documents on which the complaints encumber the property in question without the
were based. RTC dismissed the case but set aside other spouse's consent.
the dismissal on the presumption that Glenn Go’s
(husband) leasing business is a conjugal property Plasabas vs. CA
and thus ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the GR No. 166519
inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff as per Rule
4, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Navarro filed FACTS:
a petition for certiorari with the CA. According to a) Petitioner’s Arguments
Navarro, a complaint which failed to state a cause (Plasabas and Malazarte - Win)
of action could not be converted into one with a -Filed a complaint against Respondent for
cause of action by mere amendment or recovery of title to property with damages. The
supplemental pleading. CA denied petition. property subject of the case was a parcel of
coconut land in Canturing, Maasin, Southern
ISSUE: Leyte, declared with an area of 2.6360 hectares.
Whether or not Respondent can recover the motor -Argued that they are the owners of the subject
vehicles. property but defendant is currently occupying
such land
RULING:
Conclusion: b) Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent can recover the motor vehicles. The (CA, Lumen, and Aunzo - Lost)
appeal is granted -Argued that the case should be terminated due to
petitioners' failure to implead indispensable

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

parties, the other co-owners — Jose, Victor and Adlawan vs. Aldlawan
Victoria GR No. 161916

ISSUE: FACTS:
Whether or not Petitioner need to implead as A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the
parties the other co-owners name of Dominador Adlawan, the father of
(petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the
RULING: acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador
Conclusion: who is claiming that he is the sole heir. He then
Petitioner need not implead as parties the other adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to
co-owners. The appeal is dismissed himself and out of generosity allowed the siblings
of his father to occupy the property provided that
Application: they vacate when asked. Time came when he
In this case, Article 487 of the Civil Code demanded that they vacate and when they refused
provides that any one of the co-owners may bring he filed an ejectment suit against them.
an action for ejectment. The article covers all
kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70)
including an accion publiciana and a and Emeterio (59) denied his allegations claiming
reivindicatoria action. A co-owner may file suit that the said lot was registered in their parents
without necessarily joining all the other co- name and they had been living in the said house
owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed and lot since birth. The only reason why the said
to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any house and lot was transferred in Dominador’s
judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will name was when their parents were in need of
benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment money for renovating their house, their parents
is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of were not qualified to obtain a loan and since
the unimpleaded co-owners. Dominador was the only one who had a college
education, they executed a simulated deed of sale
With this disquisition, there is no need to in favor of Dominador.
determine whether petitioners' complaint is one
for ejectment or for recovery of title. To repeat, The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that
Article 487 of the Civil Code applies to both Arnelito’s filiation and the settlement of the
actions. estate are conditions precedent for the accrual of
the suit. And since Dominador was survived by
Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have his wife, Graciana, her legal heirs are entitled to
to implead their co-owners as parties. The only their share in the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa
exception to this rule is when the action is for the and Emeterio to turn over the possession of the
benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the lot to Arnelito. It also granted the motion of
sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the possession execution which was opposed by the nephew and
thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper nieces of Graciana who claim that they have a
unless the plaintiff impleads the other co-owners share in the lot.
who are indispensable parties.
The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC
Here, the allegation of petitioners in their holding that Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana
complaint that they are the sole owners of the are co-heirs thus he cannot eject them from the
property in litigation is immaterial, considering property via unlawful detainer. Thus the case at
that they acknowledged during the trial that the bar.
property is co-owned by Nieves and her siblings,
and that petitioners have been authorized by the ISSUE:
co-owners to pursue the case on the latter's Whether or not Petitioner can eject Respondent
behalf. 15 Impleading the other co-owners is,
therefore, not mandatory, because, as mentioned RULING:
earlier, the suit is deemed to be instituted for the Conclusion:
benefit of all. Petitioner cannot eject Respondent. The appeal is
dismissed.

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

Application: Guia. However, Abejo failed to present evidence

In this case, the Court notes, however, that the of the judicial or extrajudicial partition of the
RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of fishpond.
succession invoked by petitioner would end up
proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. ISSUE:
This is so because Dominador was survived not -Whether or not Respondent’s action for recovery
only by petitioner but also by his legal wife, of possession is proper.
Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of -Whether or not Respondent can recover rents
Dominador on May 28, 1987. 24 By intestate from Petitioner.
succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-
owners of Lot 7226. 25 The death of Graciana on RULING:
May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute Conclusion:
owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana Respondent’s action for recovery of possession is
passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not proper. Respondent can recover rents from
to petitioner with whom she had no blood Petitioner
relations. The Court of Appeals thus correctly
held that petitioner has no authority to institute Application:
the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226. In this case, we rule that a co-owner may file an
action for recovery of possession against a co-
Petitioner contends that even granting that he has owner who takes exclusive possession of the
co-owners over Lot 7226, he can on his own file entire co-owned property. However, the only
the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the effect of such action is a recognition of the co-
Civil Code which provides: ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the
ART. 487.Any one of the co-owners may actual partitioning of the co-owned property.
bring an action in ejectment. Thus, judicial or extra-judicial partition is
necessary to effect physical division of the
A co-owner may bring such an action without the FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An
necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co- action for partition is also the proper forum for
plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have accounting the profits received by DE GUIA
been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be from the FISHPOND. However, as a necessary
stressed, however, that where the suit is for the consequence of such recognition, ABEJO shall
benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the exercise an equal right to possess, use and enjoy
sole owner and entitled to the possession of the the entire FISHPOND.
litigated property, the action should be dismissed.
The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After
GR No. 120864 DE GUIA's lease expired in 1979, he could no
longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying
Facts: rent. To allow DE GUIA to continue using the
Two parcels of land covering a fishpond equally entire FISHPOND without paying rent would
owned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza prejudice ABEJO's right to receive rent, which
Araniego. The one half undivided portion owned would have accrued to his ½ share in the
by Araniego was later purchased by plaintiff from FISHPOND had it been leased to others
his father Teofilo Abejo, the only heir of the
original owner (husband of Araniego). Prior to
this sale, the whole fishpond was leased by the
heirs of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge and
consent of Teofilo A. Abejo in favor of De Guia.
De Guia continues to possess the entire fishpond
and derived income therein despite the expiration
of the lease contract and several demands to
vacate by Teofilo Abejo and by his successor-in-
interest, Jose Abejo. Abejo filed a complaint for
recovery of possession with damages against De

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

Bailon- Casilao vs. CA LC declared Afable co-owner because he

GR No. 78178 validly bought 2/6 of the land (the shares
of Rosalia and Gaudencio)
Facts: CA affirmed. Prescription does not apply
The fate of petitioners' claim over a against the Bailons because they are co-
parcel of land rests ultimately on a owners of the original sellers. But, an
determination of whether or not said action to recover may be barred by
petitioners are chargeable with such laches.
laches as may effectively bar their - CA held the Bailons guilty of laches
present action. and dismissed their complaint
There is a parcel of land in the names of
the Bailons (Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina ISSUE:
Bernabe, Nenita and Delia) as co- Whether or not Petitioner can recover the land
owners, each with a 1/6 share.
- Gaudencio and Nenita are now dead, RULING:
(Nenita being represented in this case Conclusion:
by her children) Petitioner cannot recover the land. The sale is
- Bernabe went to China and had not valid with respect to the undivided share of co-
been heard from since owner Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon.
It appears that Rosalia and Gaudencio Respondent Alfable is then considered as a co-
sold a portion of the land to Donato owner. The proper remedy is partition of co-
Delgado. ownership.
Rosalia alone, then sold the remainder of
the land to Ponciana Aresgado de Rule:
Lanuza. From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since
- On the same date, Lanuza acquired a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share,
from Delgado land which the a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
Delgado had earlier acquired from without the consent of the other co-owners is not
Rosalia and Gaudencio. null and void. However, only the rights of the co-
Husband John Lanuza, acting under a owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the
special power of attorney given by his buyer a co-owner of the property
wife, Ponciana, sold the two parcels of
land to Celestino Afable, Sr. Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate
In all these transfers, it was stated in the recourse of co-owners in cases where their
deeds of sale that the land was not consent were not secured in a sale of the entire
registered under the provisions of Act property as well as in a sale merely of undivided
No.496 when the fact is that it is. shares of some of the co-owners is an action for
- It appears that the land had been PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules
successively declared for taxation of Court. Neither recovery of possession nor
first, in the name of Ciriaca restitution can be granted since the defendant
Dellamas, mother of the co-owners, buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors
then in the name of Rosalia Bailon, in joint ownership of the common property
then in that of Donato Delgado, then claimed [Ramirez v. Bautista, supra].
in Poncianade Lanuza's name, and
finally in the name of Celestino Pamplona vs. Moreto
Afable, Sr. GR No. L- 33187
The petitioners in this case, the Bailons,
filed a case for recovery of property Facts:
against Celestino Afable. Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega, a husband
In his answer, Afable claimed that he had and wife, who acquired adjacent lots nos. 1495,
acquired the land in question through 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land Estate
prescription and said that the Bailons are covered by certificates of title issued in the name
guilty of laches. of Flaviano Moreto married to Monica Maniega.
They had 6 children who left heirs after their

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

death as well as became co-heirs with respect to location and even indicated the boundaries over
the property owned by Flaviano and Monica. which the fences were to be erected without
More than 6 yrs after Monica Maniega’s death, objection, protest or complaint by the other co-
Flaviano sold lot 1495 for P900 to spouses owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and
Pamplona without the consent of his heirs and tolerated such alienation, occupation and
without any liquidation of the conjugal possession, We rule that a factual partition or
partnership. The spouses Pamplona constructed termination of the co-ownership, although partial,
their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as it was created, and barred not only the vendor,
was pointed out by Flaviano which was a mistake Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private
on the part of both seller and buyer. Flaviano died respondents herein from asserting as against the
intestate on August 12, 1956 and in 1961, the vendees-petitioners any right or title in
plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to vacate derogation of the deed of sale executed by said
the premises where they had their house and vendor Flaviano Moreto.
piggery on the ground that Flaviano had no right
to sell the lot which he sold to Pamplona as the Del Campo vs. CA
same belongs to the conjugal partnership. The GR No. 108228
spouses Pamplona refused to vacate the premises
and this suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica FACTS:
Maniega seeking for the declaration of nullity of The Bornales (Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria,
the deed of sale executed in the former’s favor. Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita) were the
The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff declaring original co-owners of a lot in Capiz. Salome had
null and void the sale with respect to 390.5 sq.m. sold her 4/16 share to Daynolo with Salome,
of the total 781 sq.m. of which is rightfully owned Consorcia and Alfredo signing the Deed of
by the plaintiffs. The RTC decision was affirmed Absolute Sale, which had described the metes
by the CA; hence, this petition was instituted and bounds of the property. Daynolo
appealing the decision of the CA. immediately took possession and mortgaged the
portion to Regalado. Simplicio Distajo, heir of
ISSUE: Daynolo, had paid the mortgaged debt and
Whether or not the sale to Petitioner is void as to redeem the lot from Regalado, who executed a
½ thereof Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in favor of
Daynolo’s heirs (Simplicio Distajo, Rafael Distajo
RULING: and Teresita Distajo). They sold the redeemed
Conclusion: portion to the spouses Del Campo and Quiachon.
The sale to Petitioner is valid in its entirety. The
appeal is granted Meanwhile, Regalado had caused the
reconstitution of the OCT initially reflecting the
Application: share of the Bornales but the title was later
In this case, Petitioners point to the fact that transferred to Regalado, who had the entire
spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega property subdivided and titled into smaller lots.
owned three parcels of land denominated as Lot
1495 having an area of 781 sq. meters, Lot 1496 The spouses Del Campo brought this complaint
with an area of 1,021 sq. meters, and Lot 4545 for the repartition, resurvey and reconveyance
with an area of 544 sq. meters. The three lots have of lot against the heirs of Regalado (deceased).
a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. Henc, Flaviano  Owned the portion of land erroneously
Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of included in the TCT in the name of
the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his Regalado
share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to  Had occupied the lot as a residential
dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the dwelling ever since their purchase of it
Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there was still a from the Distajos
remainder of some 392 sq. meters belonging to  Had declared the land for tax purposes
him at the time of the sale. and paid the corresponding taxes
 Presented the Deed of Absolute Sale
The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the
executed between Soledad and Salome,
moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its
Deed of Mortgage and Deed of

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

Discharge of Mortgage signed by The lower court's reliance on the doctrine that
Regalado and Deed of Absolute sale mere possession cannot defeat the right of a
showing their purchase holder of a registered Torrens title over property
is misplaced, considering that petitioners were
The trial court dismissed the complaint. deprived of their dominical rights over the said lot
 Salome could alienate her pro-indivisio through fraud and with evident bad faith on the
share but could not have validly sold an part of Regalado.
undivided portion of the lot by metes
and bounds to Soledad, from whom the Cruz v. Cristobal
G.R. No. 140422, August 7, 2006
Del Campos had derived their title.
 Del Campos could not have a better right
FACTS:
to the property even if they were in
Petitioners claim that they are the legitimate
physical possession and had declared for children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his
tax purposes because mere possession first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other
cannot defeat the right of Regalado, who hand, private respondents are also the children of
had a Torrens title. Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second
marriage to Donata Enriquez. On 18 June 1926,
CA had affirmed the decision. Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of
land with an area of 535 square meters. Sometime
ISSUE: in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died
Whether or not Petitioner can recover the land intestate. More than six decades later, petitioners
learned that private respondents had executed an
RULING: extrajudicial partition of the subject property and
Conclusion: transferred its title to their names. A Complaint
Petitioner can recover the land. The appeal is for Annulment of Title and Damages was filed
granted. before the RTC by petitioners against private
respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso
Application: shares in the subject property. To prove their
In this case, we are aware of the principle that a filiation with the deceased Buenaventura
co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of Elisa,
portion of a co-owned property prior to partition Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented. In
among all the co-owners. However, this should the case of Mercedes who was born on 31 January
not signify that the vendee does not acquire 1909, she produced a certification issued by the
anything at all in case a physically segregated Office of the Local Civil Registrar attesting to the
area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909,
1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all
In the case of Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. After
Appeals, we had occasion to hold that where the trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a
transferees of an undivided portion of the land judgment dismissing the case, ruling that
allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the
definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the
same for a period too long to be ignored, the baptismal and birth certificates presented have
possessor is in a better condition or right than said scant evidentiary value and that petitioners’
transferees. (Potior est condition possidentis). inaction for a long period of time amounts to
Such undisturbed possession had the effect of a laches. On appeal, the CA ruled that they were
partial partition of the co-owned property which able to prove their filiation with the deceased
entitles the possessor to the definite portion Buenaventura Cristobal thru “other means
which he occupies. Conformably, petitioners are allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,”
entitled to the disputed land, having enjoyed but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring
uninterrupted possession thereof for a total of 49 their right to recover their share of the subject
years up to the present. property because of laches.

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

ISSUE: annul private respondents' title over the land.

Whether or not Petitioner can recover their share There is no evidence showing failure or neglect
over the land on their part, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
RULING: exercising due diligence, could or should have
Conclusion: been done earlier. The doctrine of stale demands
Petitioner can recover their share over the land. would apply only where for the reason of the
The appeal is granted lapse of time, it would be inequitable to allow a
party to enforce his legal rights.
Application:
In this case, as to the validity of the Deed of Monteroso vs. CA
Partition of the subject property executed by the GR No. 105608
private respondents among themselves to the
exclusion of petitioners, the applicable rule is Facts:
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which Don Fabian married twice and sired eight
states: children, four from each union. In 1906, Don
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or Fabian married Soledad Doldol. Out of this
administration shall be published in a marriage were born Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin,
newspaper of general circulation in the and Tirso. On April 8, 1927, Soledad Doldol
manner provided in the next succeeding Monteroso passed away. A little over a year later,
section; but no extrajudicial settlement Don Fabian contracted a second marriage with
shall be binding upon any person who Sofia Pendejito. From this union were born
has not participated therein or had no Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and Fabian, Jr. Don
notice thereof. (Underscoring supplied) Fabian filed an intestate proceeding for the estate
of his deceased first wife to avoid disputes over
Under the said provision, without the the inheritance of his children from his first
participation of all persons involved in the marriage. The partition of the land were labeled
proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not as F-1 to F-8 and S-1 to S-4 for the first and the
binding on said persons. second marriage, respectively.

Since petitioners were not able to participate in Benjamin, son during the first marriage, died in
the execution of the Deed of Partition, which 1947. His children Ruby, Marlene, Henrieto, and
constitutes as an extrajudicial settlement of the Adelita, filed with the RTC a Complaint for
estate of the late Buenaventura Cristobal by Recovery of Property with Damages against their
private respondents, such settlement is not uncle, Tirso. The heirs of Benjamin alleged in
binding on them. As the extrajudicial settlement their complaint, their uncle, Tirso, was entrusted
executed by the private respondents in February with one-fourth portion of Parcel F-4 as part of
1948 did not affect the right of petitioners to also the share from the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso
inherit from the estate of their deceased father, it allotted to their father. However, their uncle
was incorrect for the trial and appellate court to refused to surrender and deliver the same when
hold that petitioners' right to challenge the said they demanded such delivery upon their reaching
settlement had prescribed. the majority age. Tirso countered that the portion
pertaining to Benjamin was never entrusted to
In our view, the doctrine of laches does not apply him; it was in the possession of their sister,
in the instant case. Note that upon petitioner Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, who was not
Elisa's knowledge in 1994 that the title to the entitled to any share in Parcel F-4, having
subject property had been transferred to the previously opted to exchange her share in said
private respondents to the exclusion of herself property for another parcel of land, i.e., Parcel F-
and her siblings from the first marriage of 7, then being occupied by her. Tirso, in turn, filed
Buenaventura Cristobal, petitioners filed in 1995 a Complaint for Partition and Damages with
a petition with their barangay to settle the case Receivership, involving 12 parcels of land
among themselves and private respondents, but against his stepmother, Pendejito, and all his full
since no settlement was had, they lodged a and half-siblings and/or their representatives.
complaint before the RTC on 27 March 1995, to

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

ISSUE: evident bad faith, the required extraordinary

Whether or not Respondent can recover his share prescription period of 30 years has not yet lapsed,
over the co-owned property counted from said considered repudiation. Such
would still be true even if the period is counted
RULING: from the time of the death of Don Fabian when
Conclusion: the Cagampang spouses took exclusive
Respondent can recover his share over the co- possession of the subject properties
owned property. The appeal is dismissed.
Vda. De Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
Application: GR No. L- 29759
In this case, from the foregoing disquisition, what
the appellate court tried to convey is clear and Facts:
simple: partition is the proper remedy available to The case originated from a complaint for
Tirso who is a co-owner of the subject properties acknowledgment and partition filed on
by virtue of his being a compulsory heir, like September 8, 1960 with the then Court of First
siblings Soledad, Reygula, and Benjamin, of Don Instance of Manila by the herein private
Fabian. The right to seek partition is respondent, a minor, 18 years of age, assisted by
imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches. his mother, Andrea Jongco, as his natural
The general rule being that prescription does not guardian, against the herein petitioners (Record
run against a co-owner or co-heir. The only on Appeal, pp. 2-8). In the said Complaint,
exception to the imprescriptibility of an action for private respondent alleged, in substance, that in
partition against a co-owner is when a co-owner 1941 his alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto, and
repudiates the co-ownership. his mother, Andrea Jongco, lived together as
husband and wife and as a result of which, he was
Acquisitive prescription may set in in favor of a born on September 10, 1942; that during the time
co-owner, "where there exists a clear repudiation that his alleged father and mother lived together
of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are as husband and wife and up to the time of his
apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive birth, both were single and had no legal
ownership." 31 In the instant case, however, no impediment to marry each other; that after his
extinctive or acquisitive prescription has set in birth, his father and mother continued living
against Tirso and other compulsory heirs in favor together as husband and wife, his father
of the Cagampang spouses because effective supporting them and introducing him to the
repudiation had not timely been made against the public as his natural child; that even the family of
former. As aptly put by the appellate court, the his father recognized him as such; that on or about
repudiation which must be clear and open as to the year 1944, his father and mother separated,
amount to an express disavowal of the co- and subsequently, his father married herein
ownership relation happened not when the deeds petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a result
of absolute sale were executed in 1939, as these of the marriage, two (2) children were born—
could not have amounted to a clear notice to the herein petitioners Lourdes Alberto and Antonio
other heirs, but in 1961 when the Cagampang Alberto, Jr.; that although his father was
spouses refused upon written demand by Tirso separated from his mother, he continued to
for the partition and distribution of the intestate support him and recognized him as his own child;
estate of Don Fabian. Since then, Tirso was
deemed apprised of the repudiation by the that on July 3, 1949, his father died, and without
Cagampang spouses. notice to him, petitioner Natividad del Rosario
Vda. de Alberto, on July 17, 1949, instituted
The records show that Tirso's cause of action has before the then Court of First Instance of Manila
not prescribed as he instituted an action for an intestate proceedings for the estate of his
partition in 1970 or only nine years after the deceased father, docketed therein as Special
considered express repudiation. Besides, Proceedings No. 9092; that in the said intestate
acquisitive prescription also does not lie against proceedings, petitioners deliberately omitted him
Tirso even if we consider that a valid express as one of the heirs and for this reason they
repudiation was indeed made in 1961 by the succeeded in having the properties of his
Cagampang spouses since in the presence of deceased father adjudicated and partitioned

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

among themselves; that the said intestate Lantin, 124 SCRA 483 [1983]). The court
proceedings were terminated on November 9, acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested,
1953; that his father left properties valued at through the publication of the notice prescribed .
P74,963.81, and accordingly, as a natural child of . . and any order that may be entered therein is
his father, he is entitled to at least P18,000.00; binding against all of them
and that he had absolutely no previous knowledge
of the intestate proceedings and came to know While as a general rule the action for partition
about it only recently and thereupon made a among co-owners does not prescribe so long as
demand from the petitioners who refused to give the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly
him his share. Accordingly, he prays that the recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners
petitioners be ordered to acknowledge him as the herein had never recognized respondent as a co-
natural child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his one- owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly.
fourth share be turned over to him; and that Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of
petitioners be sentenced to pay him the sum of action for partition of property owned in common
P5,000.00 as attorney's fee and the cost of suit (Art. 494) does not apply to the case at bar.
(Record on Appeals, pp. 2-9).
Bicarme vs CA
a) Petitioner’s Arguments GR No. 51914
(Vda. De Alberto – Win)
-Argued that the cause of action is barred by prior FACTS:
judgment and the cause of action is also barred by Cristina claims that upon the death of her
the statute of limitation grandparents, Sps. Juan and Florencia, her
mother Victorina and her aunt, Maria, became co-
b) Respondent’s Arguments owners or co-heirs of the litigated parcels of land.
(CA and Antonio Alberto, Jr. – Lost) Upon the death of her mother, Victorina, Cristina
- Filed a case for acknowledgement and partition became co-heirs with Maria, having inherited the
to recover his share on the estate of his deceased share and interest of her mother corresponding to
father Antonio C. Alberto one-half of the two parcels of land.
-Argued that Petitioner, without notice to him,
instituted before an intestate proceedings for the Cristina instituted this action for partition,
estate of his deceased father. That in the said because her aunt, Maria, refused to share with her
intestate proceedings, Petitioners deliberately the yearly fruits of the disputed parcels of land.
omitted him as one of the heirs and for this reason
they succeeded in having the properties of his Maria, however, maintains that "she acquired
deceased father adjudicated and partitioned these two parcels of land in 1925 (cornland) and
among themselves 1926 (riceland) from the deceased spouses
Placido Bidaya and Margarita Bose and since
ISSUE: then until the present, had been in open, public,
Whether or not Respondent can recover his share peaceful, continuous, adverse possession and
on the estate of his deceased father Antonio C. enjoyment and in the concept of absolute owner
Alberto thereof. Maria further claims that Cristina, her
niece, never shared or contributed to the payment
RULING: of taxes of said two parcels of land; and, finally,
Conclusion: that Cristina Bicarme was presumed already
Respondent cannot recover. The appeal is granted dead" (p. 35, Record on Appeal).

Application: a) Petitioner’s Arguments

In this case, this Court has invariably ruled that (Maria Bicarme – Lost)
insolvency proceedings and settlement of a -Argued that she is the sole owner of the land for
decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem she had been in open, public, peaceful,
which are binding against the whole world. All continuous, adverse possession and enjoyment
persons having interest in the subject matter and in the concept of absolute owner thereof.
involved, whether they were notified or not, are Moreover, Respondent never shared or
equally bound (Philippine Savings Bank vs. contributed to the payment of taxes of said land

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

Pangan vs. Court of Appeals

b) Respondent’s Arguments GR No. L – 39299
(CA and Cristina Bicarme – Win)
- Filed a case against Petitioner for partition of Facts:
their co-owned property The property in question is a 635 sq.meters of
-Argued that Petitioner, her aunt, is her co-owner land situated in Obando, Bulacan, which is
of a certain land but Petitioner refused to share originally owned by Leon Hilario and is now
with her the yearly fruits thereof being disputed between the petitioners the private
respondent, who are his great grandchildren. In
ISSUE: 1964, the petitioners filed an application for the
Whether or not Respondent can recover her share registration of the land in their names by virtue of
over the land their continuous and exclusive possession thereof
since 1895. After proper notice and publication,
RULING: the trial court issued an order of default because
Conclusion: there was no opposition to the registration
Respondent can recover her share over the land. proceeding, and the application was approved on
The appeal is dismissed. March 31, 1966. However, in June 8, 1966, the
private respondent, Teodora Garcia, who is also a
Rule: great granddaughter of the original owner of the
In order that a possession may be deemed adverse subject property, filed a petition to set aside the
to the cestui que trust, or the other co-owner the decision in which the trial court grated. On
following must concur: September 13, 1968, the trial judge issued an
". . . (1) that he has performed order dismissing and reinstating his original order
unequivocal acts of repudiation on March 31, 1966 in favor of the petitioners, the
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que reason is that whatever rights the private
trust or other co-owner, (2) that such respondent might had over the property have
positive acts of repudiation have been been forfeited by extinctive prescription. On
made known to the cestui que trust or appeal to the respondent court, the decision was
other co-owners, and (3) that the reversed because the appellees had not clearly
evidence thereon must be clear and proved that they had acquired the property by
convincing." (A. Tolentino, Civil Code prescription. Petitioners filed motion for
of the Phils., Ann., Vol. II, p. 193) reconsideration but was denied and then filed a
petition for review by certiorari, contending that
Application: the respondent court erred in holding that the
In this case, Maria Bicarme disclaims the co- private respondent was entitled to one-half of the
ownership by denying that subject properties are land, which she had not lost by extinctive
the inherited properties. Other than the tax prescription because it was held by them in trust
declarations in her name, there is no written for her, and they insist that the appealed decision
evidence that these were acquired/purchased disregarded the factual findings of the trial court
from Sps. Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose. that they acquired the land by virtue of their long,
Payment of land taxes does not constitute continued, and adverse possession thereof, which
sufficient repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is should bar any claim by the private respondent to
not an act adverse to Cristina's rights. Moreover, her supposed part ownership.
Cristina, being a minor, until she claimed her
rights, was not even aware thereof. Neither did ISSUE:
Maria make known her repudiation to Cristina, Whether or not Respondent can recover her share
because all along, Maria presumed her to be dead. over the land
Her refusal to share with Cristina the yearly
profits stemmed from Cristina's failure to share in RULING:
the yearly taxes. Acquisitive prescription cannot Conclusion:
therefore apply in this case Respondent can recover her share over the land.
The appeal is dismissed.

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

Rule: to Oribello and Estacion, respectively. It was

Adverse possession requires the concurrence of petitioner who repurchased and redeemed these
the following circumstances: properties in 1956 and 1959. In 1995, six of the
1. That the trustee has performed seven children, excluding petitioner, filed a
unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster petition for judicial partition of the seven parcels
of the cestui que trust; of land. Petitioner opposed claiming exclusive
2. That such positive acts of repudiation ownership over parcels six and seven, and that the
had been made known to the cestui que right to claim by the respondents had long
trust; and prescribed as a result of their inaction.
3. That the evidence thereon should be ISSUE:
clear and conclusive. Whether or not Petitioner is the sole owner of
parcel 6 and 7
Application: RULING:
In this case, we affirm the finding of the Conclusion:
respondent court that there was no adequate Petitioner is not the sole owner of parcel 6 and 7.
notice by the petitioners to the private respondent The appeal is dismissed
of the rejection of her claim to her share in the
subject property. Noticeably absent here is a Application:
categorical assertion by the petitioners of their In this case, the fact that it was petitioner's money
exclusive right to the entire property that barred that was used for the repurchase of the properties
her own claim of ownership of one-half thereof does not make her the owner thereof, in the
nor is there any explanation as to why they said absence of convincing proof that would indicate
she had no right to a share. If this trusting woman such. At most, Petitioner can only be considered
did not immediately take legal action to protect as a creditor of the owners of parcel 6 and 7.
her rights, it was simply because of forbearance
toward her nephews and nieces, let alone the fact As to the issue of prescription, petitioner's
that there was really no casus belli as yet that possession of parcels 6 and 7 did not ripen into
required her to act decisively. That legal sole and exclusive ownership thereof. First,
provocation arose only when the petitioners prescription applies to adverse, open, continuous,
commenced the registration proceedings in 1965, and exclusive possession. In order that a co-
and it was from that time she was required to act, owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the
as she did, to protect her interests. other co-owners, the following elements must
concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal
However, Justice Gancayco dissented and argued acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
that as private respondent admitted that other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of
petitioners verbally repudiated her claims as co- repudiation have been made known to the other
owner of the property it was effectively an co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must
unequivocal notice amounting to an ouster of the be clear and convincing.
cestui que trust and the period of prescription
began to run since then. It is not required that such Mere silent possession by a co-owner; his receipt
a repudiation should be through a formal legal of rents, fruits or profits from the property; his
action. erection of buildings and fences and the planting
of trees thereon; and the payment of land taxes
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil cannot serve as proofs of exclusive ownership, if
GR No. 169356 it is not borne out by clear and convincing
evidence that he exercised acts of possession
FACTS: which unequivocably constituted an ouster or
Petitioner and respondents are children of the late deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.
Fabian and Maria Lloren Fangonil. The spouses
died intestate, leaving an estate consisting of In this case, we find that petitioner effected no
seven parcels of land. Prior to their death, clear and evident repudiation of the co-
transactions involving parcels number six and ownership. Petitioner's only act of repudiation of
seven took place. A portion of the sixth land and the co-ownership was when she refused to honor
parcel seven were sold with a right to repurchase the extrajudicial settlement in 1994.

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

Vda. De Arceo vs. CA Application:

GR No. 81401 In this case, the evidence for Virginia et al. do not
persuade us that they (through Jose) have
FACTS: acquired the lots by lapse of time. The fact that in
Spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo 1941, Jose wrested possession thereof, so we
had one son, Esteban. Spouses were also the hold, does not amount to adverse possession
owners of 4 parcels of unregistered land located because as a co-owner, he had the right of
in Pulilan, Bulacan. Abdon died in 1953, enjoyment, and his use thereof can not by itself
Escolastica in 16 sept 1942 and Esteban in 2 Sept prejudice the light of his fellow co-owners. The
1941. Esteban sired Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, fact that he paid taxes thereon is not controlling
Antonio and Sotera. Jose married Virginia Franco either because payment of real estate taxes does
with whom he fathered 6 children and are the not necessarily confer title upon a claimant. The
petitioners of this case against Jose’s siblings. fact finally that Virginia, et al. had sought to
extrajudicially divide the property is nothing
On October (or Sept) 27 1941, the spouses Arceo conclusive because there is no showing that they,
executed a deed of donation on the said parcels of Virginia, et al. had made this known to Pedro, et
land in favor of Jose, presented in court as al. Under these circumstances, we cannot validly
“exhibit J”. On 2 August 1950, the spouses Arceo say that the lands had devolved on Virginia, et al.
executed another deed of donation to Jose on the by way of prescription
same parcels of land, presented in court as
“exhibit T”. Exhibit J and T were executed inter Heirs of J. Reyes vs. Reyes
vivos. On the other hand, on October 3(or 30) GR No. 158377
1941 which was, “exhibit 1”, the spouses Arceo
executed a deed of donation to ALL FACTS:
GRANDCHILDREN including Jose, thereby Antonio Reyes and his wife, Leoncia Reyes
revoking “exhibit J”. (Leoncia) were owners of a parcel residential land
with an area of 442 square meters in Pulilan,
On 12 January 1972, Petitioners filed with the Bulacan, where they constructed their dwelling.
Cadastral Court (CC) an application for the 4 lots The couple had four children: Jose, Sr., Teofilo,
under the strength of exhibits J and T. Jose, Jr., and Potenciana. Antonio Reyes died
Respondents contested the petition on the intestate, and was survived by Leoncia and their
strength of exhibit 1. CC dismissed the petition three sons and Potenciana. Potenciana having
and distributed the land based on intestate predeceased her father also died intestate,
succession, CA affirmed the decision CC, hence survived by her children.
this petition.
On July 9, 1955, Leoncia and her three sons
ISSUE: executed a deed denominated Kasulatan ng
Whether or not Petitioners are the sole owners of Biling Mabibiling Muli, whereby they sold the
the land to the exclusion of Respondent land and its existing improvements to the Sps.
Francia for the amount of P500.00, subject to the
RULING: vendor’s right to repurchase for the same amount
Conclusion: oras na silay makinabang. Potenciana’s heirs did
Petitioners are not the sole owners of the land. not assent to that deed, and Teofilo and Jose, Jr.
The appeal is dismissed and their respective families remained in
Rule: possession of the property and paid real property
In order for prescription to set in, the following taxes thereon.
requisites must concur: (1) there is a clear
showing that the claimant has repudiated the co- The Sps. Francia both died intestate, without
ownership; (2) he has made known to the rest of Leoncia and her children paying the amount of
the co-owners that he is assuming exclusive P500.00. Alejandro, son of Jose, Sr., paid said
ownership over the property; (3) there is clear and amount to Sps. Francia. The heirs of Sps. Francia
convincing evidence thereof; and (4) his then, transferred and conveyed to Alejandro all
possession is open, continuous, exclusive, and the rights and interests to Alejandro.
notorious.

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

On August 21, 1970, Alejandro executed a In order that a co-owner's possession may be
Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari declaring that he had deemed adverse to that of the cestui que trust or
acquired all the rights and interests of the heirs of the other co-owners, the following elements must
the Sps. Francia after the vendors failed to concur:
repurchase within the given period, and paid 1.The co-owner has performed
realty property taxes from then on. unequivocal acts of repudiation of the co-
ownership amounting to an ouster of the
On October 17, 1970, Alejandro, Leoncia and cestui que trust or the other co-owners;
Jose, Sr. executed a Magkalakip na Salaysay, 2.Such positive acts of repudiation have
acknowledging the right of Leoncia, Jose, Jr. and been made known to the cestui que trust
Jose, Sr. to repurchase the property at any time or the other co-owners;
for the same amount. Leoncia died intestate and 3.The evidence on the repudiation is
was survived by Jose, Sr., Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and clear and conclusive; and
the heirs of Potenciana. Alejandro likewise died 4.His possession is open, continuous,
intestate survived by his wife, Amanda Reyes and exclusive, and notorious.
her children.
The concurrence of the foregoing elements was
ISSUE: not established herein. For one, Alejandro did not
Whether or not Respondents are the sole owners have adverse and exclusive possession of the
of the land property, as, in fact, the other co-owners had
continued to possess it, with Alejandro and his
RULING: heirs occupying only a portion of it. Neither did
Conclusion: the cancellation of the previous tax declarations
Respondents are not the sole owners of the land. in the name of Leoncia, the previous co-owner,
The land is co-owned by them with Petitioner. and the issuance of a new one in Alejandro's
name, and Alejandro's payment of the realty taxes
Application: constitute repudiation of the co-ownership. The
In this case, the CA correctly concluded that the sole fact of a co-owner declaring the land in
true agreement of the parties vis-Ã -vis the question in his name for taxation purposes and
Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was an paying the land taxes did not constitute an
equitable mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale. unequivocal act of repudiation amounting to an
There was no dispute that the purported vendors ouster of the other co-owner and could not
had continued in the possession of the property constitute adverse possession as basis for title by
even after the execution of the agreement; and prescription
that the property had remained declared for
taxation purposes under Leoncia's name, with the Heirs of F. Restar vs. Heirs of D.R. Cichon
realty taxes due being paid by Leoncia, despite GR No. 161720
the execution of the agreement.
FACTS:
When Alejandro redeemed the property on - In 1935, Emilio Restar died intestate leaving 8
August 11, 1970, he did not thereby become a co- children-compulsory heirs. In 1960, Emilio’s
owner thereof. Alejandro merely became the eldest child, Flores caused the cancellation of a
assignee of the mortgage, and the property tax declration under Restar’s name covering a lot
continued to be co-owned by Leoncia and her located at Brgy Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan and a new
sons Jose, Sr., Jose Jr., and Teofilo. As an tax declaration issued under his name. Flores died
assignee of the mortgage and the mortgage credit, in 1989. The co-heirs of Flores discovered the
Alejandro acquired only the rights of his acts of Flores.
assignors, nothing more - The heirs of Flores’ sisters together with Flores’
surviving issters filed a complaint against Flores’
Yet, the respondents except to the general rule, heirs for partition of the said lot and declaration
asserting that Alejandro, having earlier of nullity of documents, ownership before the
repudiated the co-ownership, acquired ownership RTC.
of the property through prescription. The Court
cannot accept the respondents' posture.

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

- Flores’ brothers Policarpio and Adolfo were Application:

impleaded as defendants but they were unwilling In this case, Contrary to the findings of the
co-plaintiffs. appellate court, the records of the case amply
-The respondents alleged that during the lifetime support petitioners' claim that the requirements
of FLores, they were given their shares of Palay for extraordinary prescription had been duly met.
from the lot eand even after the death of Flores. When Restar died in 1935, his eight children
Flores’ widow Esmenia appealed to them to became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by
allow her to hold on to the lot to finance the intestate succession. Respondents never
education of her childreen to which the possessed the lot, however, much less asserted
respondents agreed on the condition that when their claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when
they finish their education, the lot would be they filed the complaint for partition subject of
divided into 8 equal parts. Upon demand for the the present petition.
partition, the Heirs of Flores refused claiming that
they were the lawful owners of the land which In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after
they inherited from Flores. Restar's death and exercised acts of dominion
-The Heirs of Flores claimed that they had been thereon — tilling and cultivating the land,
in possession of the lot in the concept of owner introducing improvements, and enjoying the
for more than 30 years and been paying the realty produce thereof.
taxes ever since. They denied the claims of the
respondents. They further claimed that after The statutory period of prescription, however,
WW2, Flores caused the transfer of parcels of commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores,
ricelands in Aklan to his siblings as their shares who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax
from the estate of their father Emilio and that an declaration in his name and may, therefore, be
extra-judicial partition took place in 1973 which said to have adversely claimed ownership of the
was notarized by an Atty. Jose Igtanloc and lot. And respondents were also deemed to have
appointing among themselves 4 parcels of land. been on said date become aware of the adverse
-Adolfo interposed no objection to the partition of claim.
the lot while Policarpio acknowledged Flores as
the owner of the lot but part of it was sold to him From the foregoing evidence, it can be seen that
which he prayed for the exclusion in the partition. the adverse possession of Flores started in 1960,
-The RTC of Aklan stated that Flores and his the time when the tax declaration was transferred
heirs had performed acts sufficient to constitute in his name. The period of acquisitive
repudiation of the co-ownership, and have prescription started to run from this date. Hence,
aquired the lot by prescription. The RTC the adverse possession of Flores Restar from
dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed the 1960 vested in him exclusive ownership of the
decision of the RTC. land considering the lapse of more than 38 years.
Acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and
ISSUE: prescription of the action for partition should be
Whether or not Petitioners are the sole owners of considered in favor of Flores Restar and his heirs.
the land
While tax declarations and receipts are not
RULING: conclusive evidence of ownership and do not
Conclusion: prove title to the land, nevertheless, when
Petitioners are the sole owners of the land. The coupled with actual possession, they constitute
appeal is granted evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a
claim of ownership through prescription.
Rule:
While the action to demand partition of a co- Delima vs. Court of Appeals
owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner GR No. 46296
may acquire ownership thereof by prescription
where there exists a clear repudiation of the co- FACTS:
ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the Lino Delima acquired Lot. No. 7758 of the
claim of adverse and exclusive ownership. Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu
by sale on installments from the government.

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

After his demise in 1921 he had his three brothers the evidence thereon should be clear and
and a sister listed as his heirs. The heirs were conclusive
Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima,
and Vicente Delima. A new Transfer Certificate We have held that when a co-owner of the
of Title was issued in the name of the Legal Heirs property in question executed a deed of partition
of Lino Delima represented by Galileo Delima. and on the strength thereof obtained the
On September 22, 1953, Galileo executed an cancellation of the title in the name of their
affidavit of Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs predecessor and the issuance of a new one
adjudicating to himself the subject property wherein he appears as the new owner of the
excluding the other heirs. He declared the lot to property, thereby in effect denying or repudiating
be of his own and paid for its taxes. On February the ownership of the other co-owners over their
29, 1968, the surviving heirs of Eulalio and shares, the statute of limitations started to run for
Juanita Delima, filed with the Court of First the purposes of the action instituted by the latter
Instance of Cebu an action for reconveyance and seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-
partition of property and for the annulment of the ownership and of their rights thereunder (Castillo
certificate of title issued plus damages against v. Court of Appeals, No. L-18046, March 31,
their Uncle Galileo. Vicente Delima was also 1964, 10 SCRA 549). Since an action for
later included as party defendant for his refusal to reconveyance of land based on implied or
help in the action. constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years,
it is from the date of the issuance of such title that
The trial court decided in favor of the the effective assertion of adverse title for
petitioners rendering the TCT No. 3009 null and purposes of the statute of limitations is counted
void and declaring Vicente, the Heirs of Juanita, (Jaramil v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31858,
the Heirs of Eulalio and the Heirs of Galileo to be August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 420)
owners of the property, each sharing a pro-
indiviso share of one-fourth of the whole. The Application:
respondents, Heirs of Galileo Delima, appealed to In this case, evidence shows that TCT No. 2744
the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima,
in their favor. It upheld the claim of Galileo that represented by Galileo Delima, was cancelled by
the other brothers and sisters have already waived virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo Delima
their rights to the property being that it was and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima
Galileo alone that paid for the balance of the obtained the issuance of a new title in his name
purchase price and the realty taxes for the numbered TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion of his
property. co-heirs. The issuance of this new title constituted
an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-
ISSUE: ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of
Whether or not Respondents are the sole owners adverse possession by Galileo Delima from
of the land February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in
him by prescription. As the certificate of title was
RULING: notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to
Conclusion: the land, such rejection was binding on the other
Respondents are the sole owners of the land. The heirs and started as against them the period of
appeal is dismissed. prescription. Hence, when petitioners filed their
action for reconveyance and/or to compel
Rule: partition on February 29, 1963, such action was
It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co- already barred by prescription. Whatever claims
heir is that of a trustee. In order that such the other co-heirs could have validly asserted
possession is considered adverse to the cestui que before can no longer be invoked by them at this
trust amounting to a repudiation of the co- time.
ownership, the following elements must concur:
1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; 2)
that such positive acts of repudiation had been
made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

GR No. 150707 That at the time the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos
was presented for registration and when a TCT
FACTS: was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito,
The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of both the donor and donees were notoriously
the spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander- aware that said properties were owned by the
Ocampo, they begot ten (10) children. 2 of them, Ocampo brothers and sisters, and that the donor
Fidela, and Felicidad are respondents herein. Fidela was not the exclusive owner thereof.

‘The complaint further alleges that during the The RTC holds and declares that defendant
lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Luisa spouses are the true and lawful exclusive owners
Llander-Ocampo, they acquired 3parcels of land of the following properties. The CA affirmed
and, upon their death, left the following with modifications (for damages) the said ruling.
properties. Only one of them, lot a is the subject Hence this petition.
of this case, a parcel of residential/ commercial
land situated in the poblacion of Nabua, ISSUE:
Camarines Sur Whether or not Respondents are the sole owners
of the property.
‘that the 3 parcels of land are actually owned in
common by the children of the late spouses RULING:
although the land denominated as parcel (a) of the Conclusion:
complaint is ostensibly registered in the name of Respondents are the sole owners of the property.
Fidela Ocampo alone but acknowledged by her as The appeal is dismissed.
a property owned in common by all of them,
brothers and sisters; that plaintiffs desire to Application:
partition said properties but defendants Fidela In this case, since the original Complaint was an
Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and action for partition, this Court cannot order a
unreasonably refuse to do so; that the same division of the property, unless it first makes a
defendants have been receiving the fruits of the determination as to the existence of a co-
properties to the exclusion of their co-heirs ;and, ownership. The settlement of the issue of
that because of their relationship, they undertook ownership is the first stage in an action for
earnest efforts to amicably settle this controversy partition. This action will not lie if the claimant
but because of defendants’ utterly unreasonable has no rightful interest in the subject property.
and unjustified actuations, the same failed. Parties filing the action are in fact required by the
Rules of Court to set forth in their complaint the
‘In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment nature and the extent of their title to the property.
be rendered ordering the partition of the It would be premature to effect a partition thereof
properties; ordering defendants Fidela and until and unless the question of ownership is first
Felicidad to release or otherwise cancel any and definitely resolved.
all encumbrances which they had caused to be
annotated on the TCT; requiring Fidela and Petitioners failed to trace the successive transfers
Felicidad to refrain from further encumbering of ownership of the questioned property that
said properties; further ordering Fidela and eventually led to them. Allegedly, it was
Felicidad to indemnify plaintiffs . originally owned by their parents — Spouses
Ocampo — whose deaths passed it on to the
‘The Supplemental Complaint alleges that children. Petitioners, however, presented
defendants Helen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente absolutely no proof of ownership of their
Barrito are spouses; that in 1987, the TCT in the predecessors-in-interest. In insisting that it was so
name of defendant Fidela and covering the lot transferred and thus co-owned, the former rely on
described as parcel (a) was cancelled and, in lieu the Acknowledgment of Co-ownership executed
thereof aTCT was issued to defendant Belen by Fidela, their eldest sibling.
Ocampo-Barrito, on the strength of an allege[d]
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos ostensibly
executed by defendant Fidela in their favor.

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis same transactions and essential facts and
of her alleged sole ownership of the property and circumstances are involved in such case and the
presented preponderant proof of her claim. pending partition case of Respondent

First, she presented a Deed of Absolute Sale of ISSUE:

Residential Land, referring to the subject Whether or not Petitioner is guilty of forum-
property, executed between Adolfo Ocampo as shopping
seller and Felix Ocampo as buyer. The document
dated July 6, 1948, was signed in the presence of RULING:
two witnesses and acknowledged before Juan B. Conclusion:
Ballecer, a notary public. Petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping. Her case
for declaration of nullity of a deed of sale is
Second, Respondent Belen proved that on dismissed.
February 10, 1953, this property had been sold to
Fidela by Felix Ocampo for a valuable Rule:
consideration; and that Fidela had entered the Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits
property, actually occupied it, and exercised all in different courts, either simultaneously or
powers of dominion over it to the exclusion of successively, involving the same parties, to ask
petitioners. the courts to rule on the same or related causes
and/or to grant the same or substantially same
Third, Belen then presented a Deed of Donation reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other
Inter Vivos executed on January 13, 1984, court would make a favorable disposition.
between herself as donee and Fidela as donor.
This act shows the immediate source of the Application:
former’s claim of sole ownership of the property. In this case, the question of validity or nullity of
the deed of sale, as well as the claim for damages,
Finally, Belen presented Transfer Certificate of is necessarily and logically intertwined with the
Title No. 13654 31 as proof of her ownership of partition case. The issue of ownership or co-
the property. To be sure, the best proof of ownership, to be more precise, must first be
ownership of the land is the Certificate of Title resolved in order to effect a partition of
(TCT). properties. This should be done in the action for
partition itself and not on a separate case.
In addition to the TCT presented, Belen offered
as evidence the Tax Declaration indicating that To split the proceedings into declaration of
she, as owner, had been paying real estate taxes nullity of the deed of sale and trial for the
on the property, all to the exclusion of petitioners. partition case, or to hold in abeyance the partition
case pending resolution of the nullity case would
Reyes- De Leon vs. Del Rosario result in multiplicity of suits, duplicitous
GR No. 152862 procedure and unnecessary delay, as the lower
court observed. The conduct of separate trials of
FACTS: the parties' respective claims would entail a
a) Petitioner’s Arguments substantial duplication of effort and time not only
(Reyes-De Leon – Lost) of the parties but also of the courts concerned. On
-Filed a case for the declaration of nullity of a the other hand, it would be in the interest of
deed of sale wherein Petitioner purportedly sold justice if the partition court hears all the actions
to Respondent her share over their co-owned and incidents concerning the properties subject of
property the partition in a single and complete proceeding
-Argued that what she sold to Respondent was her
½ share in the Asinan Properties Maglucot- Aw vs. Maglucot
GR No. 132518
b) Respondent’s Arguments
(Del Rosario – Win) FACTS:
-Argued that the case should be dismissed for Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a
Petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping since the portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot).

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PROPERTY LAW | Atty. Bathan – Lasco | Lloyd Jeffrey Atillo | EH 405

Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot
surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of subject lot subdivided and have separate certificates of title.
in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the
rentals therefor. Said respondents built houses on parties in this case by themselves and/or through
their corresponding leased lots. They paid the their predecessors-in-interest occupied specific
rental amount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the
Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of sketch plan. Such possession remained so until
Roberto Maglucot, petitioner’s predecessor-in- this case arose, or about forty (40) years later.
interest. In December 1992, however, said
respondents stopped paying rentals claiming It would be safe to conclude, therefore, that the
ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners thus oral partition as well as the order of partition in
filed the complaint a quo .Petitioners maintain 1952 were the bases for the finding of actual
that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and partition among the parties. The legal
physically subdivided among the co-owners and consequences of the order of partition in 1952
that majority of them participated in the actual having been discussed separately, we now deal
execution of the subdivision. Further, the co- with oral partition in 1946. Given that the oral
owners accepted their designated shares in1946 partition was initially tentative, the actual
as averred by Tomas Maglucot in his petition for possession of specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in
partition. Petitioners opine that in1952, Tomas accordance with the oral partition and the
Maglucot himself initiated a court proceeding for continuation of such possession for a very long
a formal subdivision of Lot No. 1639. In said period indicate the permanency and ratification of
petition, he averred that only Hermogenes Olis such oral partition. The validity of an oral
and the heirs of Pascual Olis were not agreeable partition is already well-settled. In Espina vs.
to the partition. Petitioners further contend that Abaya, 49 we declared that an oral partition is
respondents admitted in their tax declarations valid. In Hernandez vs. Andal, 50 reiterated in
covering their respective houses that they are Tan vs. Lim, 51 this Court has ruled, thus:
"constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot. - On general principle, independent and
Simply put, petitioners vigorously assert that in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of
respondents are estopped from claiming to be co- equity have enforce oral partition when it
owners of the subject lot in view of the mutual has been completely or partly performed.
agreement in 1946, judicial confirmation in 1952, - A parol partition may also be sustained
and respondents acquiescence because they on the ground that the parties thereto
themselves exclusively exercised ownership over have acquiesced in and ratified the
Lot No.1639-A beginning 1952 up to the present. partition by taking possession in
severalty, exercising acts of ownership
ISSUE: with respect thereto, or otherwise
Whether or not Lot No. 1639 had already been recognizing the existence of the partition.
partitioned
It has been previously held that a co-owner, who,
RULING: though not a party to a partition accepts the
Conclusion: partition allotted to him, and holds and conveys
Lot No. 1639 had already been partitioned. the same in severalty, will not be subsequently
Petitioners are the sole owners of Lot No. 1639- permitted to avoid partition. It follows that a party
D. The appeal is granted to a partition is also barred from avoiding
partition when he has received and held a portion
Application: of the subdivided land especially in this case
In this case, the records of the case show that where respondents have enjoyed ownership
sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral rights over their share for a long time.
agreement to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639.
By virtue of this agreement, the original co-
owners occupied specific portions of Lot No.
1639. It was only in 1952 when the petition to
subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of
the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and

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