OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

AL QAIM 33/11KV ELECTRICAL

MOBILE SUBSTATION
AL QAIM, IRAQ

SUSTAINMENT ASSESSMENT

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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED

2. REPORT TYPE
12 APR 2010 00-00-2010 to 00-00-2010
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Al Qaim 33/11KV Electrical Mobile Substation Al Qaim, Iraq. 5b. GRANT NUMBER
Sustainment Assessment
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Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
(SIGIR),400 Army-Navy Drive,Arlington,VA,22202-4704
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 April 12, 2010

SIGIR
Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction
Al Qaim 33/11kV Electrical Mobile Substation

Summary of Report: PA-09-191 What SIGIR Found

Why SIGIR Did this Study The project’s objective was to manufacture, transport, and install six trailer
mounted 33/11kV mobile substation units to various locations within the Al
SIGIR is charged to conduct assessments of Anbar province. Further, the contractor was to construct a concrete pad,
Iraq reconstruction projects funded with
amounts appropriated or made available by service buildings, and perimeter wall and gates for each substation. This $10
the U.S. Congress. SIGIR assessed this project million Economic Support Fund project was awarded on 29 April 2007 and
to provide real-time information on relief and terminated due to the non-responsiveness of the contractor on 10 December
reconstruction to interested parties to enable 2008 after almost $6.5 million was spent.
appropriate action, when warranted.

The objective of this sustainment assessment At the time of contract termination, the contractor had delivered four of the
was to determine whether the project is six contract-required mobile substations and five trailers to the Ministry of
operating at the capacity stated in the Electricity’s outdoor warehouse facility, and installed one trailer at the
original contract. To accomplish the Haditha project site. The contractor also provided a 3-day operations and
objective, the assessment team determined maintenance training course and manuals to 23 mobile substation operators.
whether the project was at full capability or
capacity when accepted by the U.S.
government, when transferred to Iraqi On 1 November 2009, SIGIR performed a limited on-site assessment. SIGIR
operators, and during the site inspection. identified four mobile substations that had been sitting idle at the warehouse
facility for at least seven months that were factory-equipped/ installed/
What SIGIR Recommends assembled and mounted on trailers approximately 50 feet long by 11 feet
To protect the U.S. government’s investment wide. They were complete and adequately assembled with the required
of approximately $6.5 million, SIGIR cables, transformer, power management units, and circuit components. Since
recommends that the Iraq Transition the substations were not connected to the national grid, SIGIR could not
Assistance Office (ITAO) Director continue determine their operational status.
communication with Iraqi officials in an effort
to utilize the mobile substations.
SIGIR identified five trailers at the warehouse facility which were to serve as
the service buildings. Each trailer was in poor condition with wheels either
Management Comments missing or having flat tires, interior lights broken, circuit panels not
SIGIR received official comments on a draft of connected, and debris scattered throughout. Since no file documentation or
this report from the United States Forces-Iraq photographs existed, SIGIR could not conclude whether the contractor
(USF-I) and the Gulf Region District (GRD) of
the US Army Corps of Engineers and unofficial delivered poorly constructed trailers or that they were damaged/ vandalized
comments from an ITAO representative. since their delivery.

The USF-I and GRD generally agreed with the Considering the significant financial investment of the U.S. government, SIGIR
facts as presented in the report but clarified inquired into the planned use of the four mobile substations and found that
that an additional contract modification
provided to SIGIR on 14 March 2010 resulted U. S. government officials have been in communication with Iraqi officials as
in a cost savings of $193,878. This final to the use of the substations but Iraqi officials have not yet come to a
report was changed to reflect that fact. decision. Until this situation is remedied, $6.5 million in U.S. Economic
Support Funds can be considered wasted.
ITAO also generally agreed with the facts as
presented in the draft report, but asserted
that two additional mobile substations were
to be delivered in April and noted that ITAO
was working with the Iraqi Ministry of
Electricity to utilize the mobile substations.
This final report was changed to reflect the
ITAO comments.

Evaluation of Comments
The management comments addressed our
recommendations and provided additional
clarifying information for this final report.

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs

at (703) 428-1100 or PublicAffairs@[Link]

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GE NERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

April 12, 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES CENTRAL

COMMAND
COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES FORCES-
IRAQ
COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING
COMMAND-IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN
DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE

SUBJECT: Report on the Al Qaim 33/11kV Electrical Mobile Substation, Al Qaim, Iraq
(SIGIR Report Number PA-09-191)

We are providing this report for your information and use. It addresses the current status
of the Al Qaim 33/11kV Electrical Mobile Substation, Al Qaim, Iraq. This assessment
was made to provide you and other interested parties with real-time information on a
relief and reconstruction project underway and in order to enable appropriate action to be
taken, if warranted.

SIGIR received comments on a draft of this report from the United States Forces-Iraq and
the Gulf Region District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and unofficial comments
from the Iraq Transition Assistance Office. The United States Forces-Iraq and Gulf
Region District generally agreed with the facts as presented in the report and provided
additional clarifying information. The unofficial comments from the Iraq Transition
Assistance Office also generally agreed with the facts as presented in the draft report, but
asserted that two additional mobile substations were to be delivered in April and noted
that ITAO was working with the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity to utilize the mobile
electrical substations.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff by the United States Forces-Iraq, Gulf
Region District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Iraq Transition Assistance
Office. If you have any questions please contact Brian Flynn at [Link]@[Link] or
at 240-553-0581, extension 2485. For public queries concerning this report, please
contact SIGIR Public Affairs at publicaffairs@[Link] or at 703-428-1100.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.

Inspector General
Table of Contents
Introduction
Background 1
Objective of the Project Assessment 2
Pre-site Assessment Background 2
Contract, Costs and Payments 2
Project Objective 4
Pre-construction Description 4
Statement of Work 5
Project Design and Specifications 6

Site Progress During Construction 8

Condition at Acceptance and Turnover 10

Site Assessment 10

ITAO Efforts to Utilize the Mobile Substations 14

Conclusions 15

Recommendation 17

Management Comments 17

Evaluation of Management Comments 17

Appendices
A. Scope and Methodology 18
B. Acronyms 19
C. United States Forces – Iraq Provided Comments by
the Gulf Region District on the Draft Report 20
D. Report Distribution 22
E. Project Assessment Team Members 24
Introduction
Background
Electrical power is normally generated in power stations at voltages from 11 to 25 kilo-
volts (kV). In order to most efficiently transmit this power over long distances, it is
stepped-up from 132 to 400kV. Power is then carried over long distances by the high
voltage 132 to 400kV transmission lines. Substations step-down electrical power for
eventual distribution to homes and business as shown below (Figure 1).

Power Stations Transformers Transmission

generate 11 to 25 step-up voltage over long
kV electrical for transmission distance high
power from 132 to voltage lines
400 kV

Substations Distribution Use

step down lines move by homes
power for power from and
distribution to substations to businesses
homes and homes and
businesses businesses

Figure 1. Diagram of the electrical generation, transmission and distribution process.

Iraq’s Power System

Prior to the first Gulf War, Iraq’s power system was considered the best in the Middle
East with a total installed generating capacity of 9,295 megawatts (MW) and
approximately 87% of the population having access to electricity. However, a
combination of wars, sanctions, looting, and vandalism over the past 20 years has
significantly affected Iraq’s entire power system infrastructure. For example, during the
first Gulf War, several electrical transmission lines were destroyed and substations
damaged, which significantly affected the entire electrical system. In addition, power
generation equipment was severely damaged, which resulted in a capacity reduction to
2,325MW, power cuts up to 15 hours a day, and, in some areas, no power supply at all1.
For example, three 132kV interconnections to the three northern governorates2 were
removed; thereby isolating the three governorates from the national grid3.

1
United Nations/World Bank, Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, Electricity Working Paper, October 2003.
2
The three northern governorates were Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dahuk.
3
Erbil and Sulaymaniyah had to rely on power from the hydro power stations at Dokan and Derbandikhan;
while Dahuk obtained limited power from Mosul.

1
While Iraq was able to repair some of the electrical damage sustained in the first Gulf
War (with approximately 4,500MW of generating capacity available in 2002), the power
supply remained unreliable throughout the 1990s with load shedding4 and unplanned
power outages frequent occurrences.

The entire power system currently suffers from a significant backlog of required
maintenance, a lack of spare parts, and very little capital investment in new plants during
the rule of Saddam Hussein. Since the early 1980s, the application of optimum
preventative maintenance practices and the construction of new lines were severely
limited. Today, the most recently constructed line is approximately 15 years old with the
average age between 25 to 30 years old.

A 2003 United Nations study of Iraq’s electrical network concluded the following:

“the [existing] 33/11kV substations and 33kV lines are all relatively old. There
has been minimal capital investment for a number of years. The design life of the
11KV [sic] circuit breaker mechanisms has in most cases been exceeded due to
repeated load shedding operations…the majority of the distribution networks are
in a highly deteriorated condition. The system needs immediate rehabilitation or
replacement.”

In an effort to combat this problem, the U.S. government purchased mobile electrical
substations to take advantage of available higher voltage electricity and to reduce the
voltage or step it down for individual customers.

Objective of the Project Assessment

The objective of this project assessment was to provide real-time information on relief
and reconstruction to interested parties to enable appropriate action to be taken, when
warranted. Specifically, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR)
determined whether the project was operating at the capacity stated in the original
contract. To accomplish this, SIGIR determined if the project was at full capability or
capacity when accepted by the U.S. government, when it was transferred to Iraqi
operators, and when SIGIR inspected the site.

Pre-site Assessment Background

Contract, Costs and Payments

Firm-fixed-price contact number W917BG-07-C-0063, funded under the Economic

Support Fund in the amount of $9,960,000, to supply all equipment, machines, and
labor necessary to complete the installation of six mobile electrical substations in the
cities of Al Qaim, Anah, Bahdadi, Haditha, Hit, and Ramadi in Anbar province, Iraq
was awarded to a local Iraqi company on 29 April 2007 by the U.S. Army Corps

4
When an electrical supplier receives more demand for electrical power than its generating or transmission
or installed capacity can deliver, the supplier has to resort to rationing of the available electricity to its
customers. This act is called load shedding.

2
 of Engineers, Gulf Region Central District (GRC).5 The period of performance for
this project was 270 calendar days from the date of the contract. Consequently, the
project was to be completed by 24 January 2008. This contract had one
modification.

Modification P0001, undated, changed the location of all six mobile electrical
substations6 and required an additional 11kV output for each substation (for a total of
three outputs per substation). This modification increased the total cost of the
contract by $440,580 to $10,400,580 and extended the completion date by
210 calendar days.7

On 10 December 2008, the GRC contracting officer issued a termination for default
to the contractor “due to the result of your non-responsiveness in providing
resolution to non-performance, non-responsiveness and failure to submit the
required submittals.”

An April 2009 memorandum for record documented a different GRC contracting

officer’s belief that the previous contracting officer’s termination for default letter to
the contractor resulted in “confusion and potential liability to the [U.S.]
Government.” This contracting officer organized a meeting with Gulf Region
Division’s Acting Chief of Contracting and Office of Counsel representative, which
concluded the following:
“…we agreed that the issued letter (Attachment A)8 was inadequate and
confusing. A review of the circumstances of the contract showed that the
contractors [sic] overall performance was marginal at best and he was
substantially late in delivery. On the positive side, somehow, the contractor had
actually purchased and delivered four of the mobile substations. Also, a review of
the contract itself showed that War Risks (War Risks – Iraq and the Middle East –
Firm Fixed Price Contracts) clause was in the contract9…It was discussed and

5
Formerly, the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) organization in Iraq consisted of the Gulf Region
Division under which were the Gulf Region North District (GRN), Gulf Region Central District (GRC),
and Gulf Region South District (GRS). Each of the Districts had local area, resident and project offices.
The designation of a local office as an area, resident or project office depended on the number of
reconstruction projects that it was responsible for overseeing.
Since July 2009, the USACE in Iraq has been undergoing reorganization to downsize as the number of
reconstruction projects has diminished. The Gulf Region Division was disestablished. GRN, GRC, and
GRS were combined to form the Gulf Region District. The reduced number of reconstruction projects has
also resulted in the closing or reduction in size of many of the local area, resident and project offices. The
local offices that have been reduced in size have had their designations changed from area offices to
resident or project offices.
In the body of this report, the names of USACE organizations at the time of the actions cited are used.
Recommendations are directed to the current designations of the organizations able to take corrective
action.
6
The Provincial Director General for Electricity requested the site location changes due to the security
situation in the original locations.
7
A Memorandum for Record, dated 19 November 2007, detailed the rationale for the additional
210 calendars days to complete the project. The contracting officer originally negotiated an additional
135 calendar days; however, “due to the length of time required to obtain funding” for the modification, an
additional 75 calendar days were included.
8
GRC’s 10 December 2008 termination for default letter issued to the contractor.
9
According to the memorandum for record, the “presence of the War Risk clause in the contract would
give the contractor ample opportunities to provide a rebuttal of a termination for default and make it
difficult to defend on appeal.”

3
 unanimously agreed upon that it would be appropriate to terminate this contract
for convenience rather than default.”

On 22 April 2009, the GRC issued a letter to the contractor to “clarify the earlier
correspondence…dated 10 December, 2008.” GRC advised the contractor that
contract W917BG-07-C-0063 was now “terminated for the Government’s
convenience.”

At the time of termination, the contractor had delivered four of the six contract-
required mobile substations10 to unsecured sites throughout Anbar province11. GRC
was concerned that the four substations were at risk for theft and/or vandalism. GRC
debated the idea of awarding another contract to complete the remaining unfinished
tasks by the original contractor. However, the Iraq Transition Assistance Office
(ITAO), the official “customer” for this project, decided that the termination of this
contract was in the best interests of the U.S. government.

Modification P00003, issued 5 March 2010, changed the contract requirements from
masonry perimeter fences to chain link fences at the six mobile substation locations.
This modification decreased the total contract amount by $193,878 – from
$10,400,580 to $10,206,702.

Project Objective

The overall objective of this project was to increase the availability of electricity to
local users throughout the Anbar province using multiple mobile electrical
substations. In order to accomplish this, six strategic locations were identified to
place the mobile electrical substations to receive 33kV power from the national grid
and transform it to 11kV for local distribution as needed.

The contract required the manufacture, transport, and installation of six trailer-
mounted 33/11kV 16 mega-volt ampere (MVA) mobile substations in the cities of
Al Qaim, Anah, Bahdadi, Haditha, Hit, and Ramadi in Anbar province, Iraq.

Pre-construction Description

Covering almost all of western Iraq, Anbar is geographically the largest province in
Iraq; yet it is also the most sparsely populated with approximately 3 million citizens.
Anbar shares its borders with Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Anbar’s landscape is
dominated by desert land, particularly in the Rutba district. Anbar is divided into
seven districts – Ramadi, Al Qaim, Falluja, Ana, Rutba, Hit, and Haditha – with
Ramadi serving as the capital.

The name of the province is Persian and means the “warehouse,” since this region
was the warehouse of the Persian Sassanid troops. Most of Anbar’s citizens are
Sunni Muslims from the Dulaim tribe. This province was referred to as Dulaim
until 1962 when the name was changed to Ramadi. In 1976, the province became
officially known as Anbar.

10
According to ITAO representatives, the remaining two mobile substations are scheduled for delivery in
April 2010.
11
The contractor was paid $6,460,630.14 for the delivery of the four mobile substations and miscellaneous
construction activities.

4
 By April 2007, Anbar suffered from some of the highest concentrations of poverty
within Iraq as well as poor electrical power availability. Specifically, electric power
supply was erratic, with over half of all households experiencing daily outages
(Figure 2). In approximately 25% of all households, the power was off more than it
was on. This requires citizens to supplement power from the national grid with
power from diesel-powered generators, which are shared with neighbors, operated by
a neighborhood cooperative, or run by a private local company.

Electrical Availability

Figure 2. Percentage of households per district with more than 11 hours of power cuts or not
connected to the electricity network (as of 2007) (Courtesy of the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)

The district of Al Qaim is situated along the Euphrates River; about 400 kilometer
(km) northwest of Baghdad near the Syrian border, and has a population of
approximately 138,000. This area of Anbar province has some of the richest soil in
the entire Middle East. The Euphrates River water at this point carries less salt and
minerals, which results in significantly less water needed to sustain crops.

According to a 2007 United Nations study, 50-63% of Al Qaim’s households either

suffered from more than 11 hours of power cuts per day or were not connected to the
electricity network (Figure 2).

Statement of Work

The Statement of Work (SOW) required the following:

manufacture, transport, and install six trailer-mounted 33/11kV, 16 MVA
mobile substations, including SCADA12 and communication equipment
construction of service buildings, perimeter wall, and gates

12
SCADA stands for supervisory control and data acquisition. It refers to an industrial control system: a
computer system monitoring and controlling a process.

5
 connection to national power grid, existing substation, and city distribution
system

The contract required that each mobile substation be factory assembled, wired,
tested, and transported to the previously identified sites throughout Anbar province.
After connecting to the national grid and earthings (groundings) are completed, the
substation units will be energized, tested, and commissioned.

The SOW required the contractor to furnish design manuals and operations and
maintenance (O&M) manuals for all systems, equipment, and components. In
addition, the contract required the contractor to provide training to Iraqi Ministry of
Electricity (MOE) personnel on the O&M of the mobile substation.

Further, the SOW required the construction of a concrete pad, service buildings, and
perimeter wall and gates for each substation (Figure 3).

Figure 3. SOW requirement for concrete foundation pad, fence, and guard house (Courtesy of GRC)

Project Design and Specifications

The contractor provided technical specifications for the mobile substations. The
mobile substations are factory assembled units, made in Turkey, consisting of the
following:
trailer
16MVA, 33/11kV power transformer
50kVA, 11/0, 4kV auxiliary
33kV switchgears
11kV switchgears

6
 control and protection panel
AC/DC13 auxiliary system
SCADA and communication equipment
cables and accessories

The trailer features are the following:

semitrailer with 4 axles
15.5 meters (m) in length
3.0 m in width
4.5 m in height
total weight of 57,000 kilograms
maximum speed of 40 km per hour

The contractor provided the following design drawings:

general plan (site layout)
mobile substation on trailer (Figures 4 and 5)
medium voltage and low voltage switchgears
perimeter lighting
guard/operator house

Figure 4. Top view of mobile substation on trailer (Courtesy of GRC)

13
The designation AC/DC refers to equipment that may be operated using either alternating current (AC) or
direct current (DC) power.

7
 Figure 5. Front view of mobile substation on trailer (Courtesy of GRC)

SIGIR reviewed the contractor’s specifications and design drawings and found them
to be in accordance with the requirements of the contract. The mobile substations, as
designed, will provide the necessary mechanism to transfer and distribute electrical
power from the national grid to local communities within Anbar province.

Site Progress During Construction

Aside from the procurement of the mobile substations, GRC documentation indicated that
the contractor performed construction work at the six sites prior to the termination of the
contract. For example, at the Haditha site, the contractor poured the concrete foundation
for the substation, installed a service building, and erected the perimeter fence and gate.

During the course of this project, the contractor provided limited quality control
oversight, which consisted of daily reports documenting the number of workers on site,
schedules, and on occasion, photographs. The GRC documented construction progress
via quality assurance (QA) reports and photographs taken during site visits. SIGIR
reviewed and subsequently relied on selected photographs to document examples of
construction performance before GRC terminated the project in December 2008.

The daily QA reports documented numerous construction deficiencies on the part of the
contractor, such as the following:
“the quality of the concrete used to make the fence posts is poor”
“the fence posts were able to be shaken and broken by hand”
“barbed wire secured poorly”
“water supply to guard house not buried at the appropriate depth”
“sanitary sewer pipe is pitching the wrong way”
“hot water tank installed outside of trailer”
“excessive cable from electrical panel is unsecured and not in conduit”

Site Photos 1-3 document various construction deficiencies the daily QA reports
identified. After reviewing the daily QA reports and photographs, SIGIR agreed with
GRC’s concerns regarding the construction practices, which led directly to the
deficiencies identified.

8
Site Photo 1. Cables unsecure and not in conduit Site Photo 2. Water supply to guard house not buried
(Courtesy of GRC) (Courtesy of GRC)

Site Photo 3. A rock used to improperly pitch the sanitary line

(Courtesy of GRC)

9
 Condition at Acceptance and Turnover
At the time of contract termination, the contractor had delivered four mobile substations
and five trailers (to be used as service buildings) to the MOE’s outdoor warehouse
facility, and installed one trailer at the Haditha project site.

SIGIR reviewed project file documentation to determine the condition/status of the

equipment at the time of the contractor’s termination. The Iraqi Director of Anbar
Electrical Distribution organized a committee of four engineers to receive and inspect the
contractor-provided mobile substations. The project file included the receipt of all four
mobile substations and inspection reports documenting that each mobile substation was
tested and successfully passed. Site Photo 4 shows testing performed on the mobile
substations.

In addition, project file documentation included a MOE memorandum, dated

17 November 2009, stating that the contractor had provided three days of training to
23 MOE operators on the O&M of the mobile substations. Site Photo 5 documents
contractor training on the use of specific mobile substation equipment. Further, this
memorandum confirmed that the contractor provided the mobile substation O&M
manuals to the MOE.

Site Photo 4. Testing of mobile substations after delivery Site Photo 5. Contractor-provided training of MOE operators
(Courtesy of GRC) (Courtesy of GRC)

Site Assessment
On 1 November 2009, SIGIR performed a limited (1 hour) on-site assessment of the
Al Qaim 33/11kV project. In April 2009, GRC terminated the contractor for convenience
and required the four delivered mobile substations be moved to a secure facility to avoid
looting and/or damage. The contractor delivered the four mobile substations to the
MOE’s outdoor warehouse facility, located in Ramadi, Iraq. Consequently, SIGIR’s site
assessment of this project did not occur in Al Qaim, but rather in Ramadi where the
mobile substations were located.

10
The MOE’s outdoor warehouse facility is secured by a perimeter block fence with
concertina wire and protected by several guards to ensure the security of the mobile
substation equipment.

Mobile Substations
SIGIR identified four mobile substations within the MOE’s outdoor warehouse facility
(Site Photo 6). Each 33/11kV 16 MVA mobile substation was factory-
equipped/installed/assembled and mounted on trailers approximately 50 feet long by
11 feet wide. It appeared that the mobile substations were complete and adequately
assembled with the required cables, transformer, power management units, and circuit
components (Site Photo 7).

However, since the contractor did not connect any of the substations to the national grid,
SIGIR could not determine the current operational status of the substations.

Site Photo 6. Four mobile electrical substations at the MOE’s Ramadi outdoor warehouse facility

11
 Outgoing 11kV MV
power distribution cables
Transformer (to convert
HV 33kV to MV 11kV)

Incoming HV
power (33kV)
cables
MV power
management unit
HV power
management unit

Site Photo 7. Fully assembled mobile electrical substation

Housing Units for Mobile Substations

The SOW required the contractor to provide “service buildings” for each mobile
substation. The intent of the service buildings is to provide living accommodations for
guards protecting the mobile substations from vandalism and/or theft. The contractor’s
service building design consisted of a bedroom, bathroom (water closet), and kitchen,
including an air-conditioning unit and lights (Figure 6).

12
 Figure 6. Design of the service buildings/trailers (Courtesy of GRC)

SIGIR identified five trailers within the MOE’s outdoor warehouse facility, which were
to serve as the service buildings for the substations (Site Photo 8). SIGIR found each
trailer in poor condition. Specifically, trailer wheels either missing or having flat tires,
interior lights broken, circuit panels not connected, and debris scattered throughout (Site
Photos 9 and 10). It appeared the trailers had been vandalized; however, the project file
documentation lacked photographs of the condition of each trailer upon arrival at the
MOE’s warehouse facility. Consequently, SIGIR could not conclude whether the
contractor delivered poorly constructed trailers or that they were damaged/ vandalized
since their delivery.

Missing tire

Flat tire

Site Photo 8. Exterior condition of trailers at the MOE’s Ramadi outdoor warehouse facility

13
Site Photos 9 and 10. Examples of interior condition of trailers, including disconnected circuit boards, debris, and broken lights

ITAO Efforts to Utilize the Mobile Substations

The MOE representatives from the outdoor warehouse facility did not know the long-
term plan for the four mobile substations. Therefore, SIGIR contacted ITAO
representatives who interact with the MOE daily on various electrical issues, such as
generation, transmission, and distribution. At the time of the site visit, the four mobile
substations had been sitting idle at the warehouse facility for at least seven months14.
Considering the significant financial investment on the part of the U.S. government to
deliver four mobile substations, SIGIR asked ITAO if the MOE planned to utilize them.
ITAO representatives have engaged the local MOE regarding the use of the four
delivered mobile substations. According to ITAO representatives, MOE officials have
expressed frustration with efforts to have the Anbar Governor efficiently utilize the
mobile substations. ITAO representatives are concerned that the Anbar Governor’s
desire is to use the mobile substation to connect new load to the system and not shed the
new load in the normal rotation (as is done with the existing permanent substations).

In addition, ITAO requested at least one of the delivered mobile substations for a
substation project in the Missan province. According to ITAO representatives, the
decision on the use of the mobile substations is the responsibility of the Anbar Governor,
who refused to release any of the four mobile substations for use outside of Anbar
province.

ITAO representatives stated that they are still in constant contact with the local and
national MOE representatives in an effort to seek the most equitable and efficient
utilization of the four delivered mobile substations.

14
At the time of the issuance of this draft report, the four mobile substations had been sitting idle for at
least eleven months.

14
Conclusions
The contract required the manufacture, transport, and installation of six units of trailer-
mounted 33/11kV 16MVA mobile substations to various locations within the Anbar
province. The contract required the contractor to complete the project within
270 calendar days; however, a contract modification changed the original locations for
the mobile substations and extended the period of performance by an additional
210 calendar days.

On 10 December 2008, after 591 calendar days, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers GRC
issued a termination for default to the contractor “due to the result of your non-
responsiveness in providing resolution to non-performance, non-responsiveness and
failure to submit the required submittals.” On 22 April 2009, the GRC issued a letter to
the contractor to “clarify the earlier correspondence…dated 10 December, 2008.” GRC
advised the contractor that contract W917BG-07-C-0063 was now “terminated for the
Government’s convenience.”15
At the time of termination, the contractor had delivered four of the six contract-required
mobile substations16 to unsecured sites throughout Anbar province. In an effort to protect
the delivered mobile substations from potential vandalism and theft, GRC had the
contractor relocate them to an outdoor warehouse facility in Ramadi belonging to the
MOE. GRC then debated the idea of awarding another contract to complete the
remaining unfinished tasks by the original contractor. However, ITAO, the official
“customer” for this project, decided that the termination of this contract was in the best
interests of the U.S. government.

Aside from the procurement of the mobile substations, the contractor performed limited
construction work at one of the six sites prior to the termination of the contract. At the
Haditha site, the contractor poured the concrete foundation for the substation, installed a
service building, and erected the perimeter fence and gate. However, GRC documented
numerous construction deficiencies on the part of the contractor, such as the following:
“the quality of the concrete used to make the fence posts is poor”
“the fence posts were able to be shaken and broken by hand”
“barbed wire secured poorly”
“water supply to guard house not buried at the appropriate depth”
“sanitary sewer pipe is pitching the wrong way”
“hot water tank installed outside of trailer”
“excessive cable from electrical panel is unsecured and not in conduit”

After reviewing the daily QA reports and photographs, SIGIR agreed with GRC’s
concerns regarding the construction practices, which led directly to the deficiencies
identified.

SIGIR reviewed project file documentation to determine the condition/status of the

equipment at the time of the contractor’s termination. The Iraqi Director of Anbar
Electrical Distribution organized a committee of four engineers to receive and inspect the
15
An April 2009 memorandum for record documented a different GRC contracting officer’s belief that the
original contracting officer’s termination for default letter to the contractor resulted in “confusion and
potential liability to the [U.S.] Government…It was discussed and unanimously agreed upon that it would
be appropriate to terminate this contract for convenience rather than default.”
16
According to ITAO representatives, the remaining two mobile substations are scheduled for delivery in
April 2010.

15
contractor-provided mobile substations. The project file included the receipt of all four
mobile substations and inspection reports that documented each mobile substation was
tested and successfully passed. In addition, project file documentation included a MOE
memorandum, dated 17 November 2009, stating that the contractor had provided three
days of training to 23 MOE operators on the O&M of the mobile substations. Further,
this memorandum confirmed that the contractor provided the mobile substation O&M
manuals to the MOE.

On 1 November 2009, SIGIR performed an on-site assessment of the Al Qaim 33/11kV

project at the MOE’s outdoor warehouse facility in Ramadi. SIGIR identified four
mobile substations within the MOE’s outdoor warehouse facility. Each 33/11kV 16MVA
mobile substation was factory-equipped/installed/assembled and mounted on trailers
approximately 50 feet long by 11 feet wide. It appeared that the mobile substations were
complete and correctly assembled with the required cables, transformers, power
management units, and circuit components. However, since the contractor did not
connect any of the substations to the national grid, SIGIR could not determine the current
operational status of the substations.

SIGIR identified five trailers within the MOE’s outdoor warehouse facility, which were
to serve as the service buildings for the substations17. SIGIR found each trailer in poor
condition. Specifically, trailer wheels either missing or had flat tires, interior lights
broken, circuit panels not connected, and debris scattered throughout. It appeared that the
trailers had been vandalized; however, the project file documentation lacked photographs
of the condition of each trailer upon arrival at the MOE’s warehouse facility.
Consequently, SIGIR could not conclude whether the contractor delivered poorly
constructed trailers or that they were damaged/ vandalized since their delivery.

At the time of the site visit, the four mobile substations had been sitting idle at the
warehouse facility for at least seven months18. Considering the significant financial
investment on the part of the U.S. government to deliver four mobile substations, SIGIR
asked ITAO if the MOE planned to use them. ITAO representatives have engaged the
local MOE representative regarding the use of the four delivered mobile substations.
ITAO representatives are concerned that the Anbar Governor’s desire is to use the mobile
substation to connect new load to the system and not shed the new load in the normal
rotation (as is done with the existing permanent substations). ITAO representatives
stated that they are still in constant contact with the local and national MOE
representatives in an effort to seek the most equitable and efficient utilization of the four
delivered mobile substations.

The contractor has been paid $6,460,630.14 for the delivery of the four mobile
substations, accompanying service buildings, and miscellaneous construction activities.
Until the mobile electrical substations and accompanying service buildings are available
for use, almost $6.5 million in U.S. Economic Support Funds can be considered wasted.

17
The intent of the service buildings/trailers is to provide living accommodations for guards protecting the
mobile substations from vandalism and/or theft.
18
At the time of the issuance of this draft report, the four mobile substations have been sitting idle for at
least eleven months.

16
Recommendations
To protect the U.S. government’s investment of approximately $6.5 million, SIGIR
recommends that the ITAO Director continue engagement with Iraqi officials in an effort
to utilize the mobile substations.

Management Comments
We received official comments on a draft of this report from the United States Forces-
Iraq and GRD and unofficial comments from an ITAO representative.

The official comments from the United States Forces-Iraq generally agreed with the facts
as presented in the report but clarified that an additional contract modification provided
to SIGIR on 14 March 2010 resulted in a cost savings of $193,878. This final report was
changed to reflect that fact.

The unofficial comments from an ITAO representative also generally agreed with the
facts as presented in the draft report, but asserted that two additional mobile substations
were to be delivered in April and noted that ITAO was working only with the MOE, not
the governor of Anbar, to utilize the mobile substations. This final report was changed to
reflect the ITAO comments.

Evaluation of Management Comments

SIGIR appreciates the concurrences by the United States Forces-Iraq and ITAO with the
draft report and its recommendation. Their comments addressed our recommendations
and provided additional clarifying information for this final report. As a result, no
additional comments are required.
.

17
Appendix A. Scope and Methodology
SIGIR performed this project assessment from September 2009 through March 2010 in
accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the Council of Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency. The assessment team included two
engineers/inspectors and two auditor/inspectors.
In performing this Project Assessment SIGIR:
Reviewed documentation that included the contract, contract modifications,
Statements of Work, and quality assurance/quality control reports;
Reviewed the design package (plans) and photographs documenting construction
progress;
Interviewed U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Central, Iraq Transition
Assistance Office, and Ministry of Electricity personnel; and
Conducted an on-site assessment and documented results at the Ministry of
Electricity’s Ramadi outdoor warehouse facility in Ramadi, Iraq.

Scope Limitation. Due to security concerns, the time allotted for the site visit was
approximately 1 hour. Consequently, SIGIR performed an expedited assessment of the
areas available; therefore, a complete review of all work completed was not possible.

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Appendix B. Acronyms
GRC Gulf Region Central
GRN Gulf Region North District
GRS Gulf Region South District
ITAO Iraq Transition Assistance Office
km kilometer
kV kilo-volt
m Meter
MOE Ministry of Electricity
MW Mega-watt
MVA Mega-volt ampere
O&M Operations and Maintenance
QA Quality Assurance
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SOW Statement of Work
USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

19
Appendix C. United States Forces-Iraq Provided
Comments by GRD to Draft Report

20
Appendix C. United States Forces-Iraq Provided
Comments by GRD to Draft Report

21
Appendix D. Report Distribution
Department of State
Secretary of State
Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq
Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance/Administrator, U.S. Agency for
International Development
Director, Office of Iraq Reconstruction
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management/Chief Financial Officer,
Bureau of Resource Management
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
Director, Iraq Transition Assistance Office
Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development
Inspector General, Department of State

Department of Defense
Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Middle East, Office of Policy/International
Security Affairs
Inspector General, Department of Defense
Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service
Director, Defense Contract Management Agency

Department of the Army

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement)
Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller
Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Commanding General, Gulf Region Division
Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Auditor General of the Army

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq
Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq
Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central

22
Other Federal Government Organizations
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Comptroller General of the United States
Inspector General, Department of the Treasury
Inspector General, Department of Commerce
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services
Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development
President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
President, U.S. Institute of Peace

Congressional Committees
U.S. Senate

Senate Committee on Appropriations

Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives

House Committee on Appropriations

House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House Committee on Foreign Affairs

23
Appendix E. Project Assessment Team Members
The Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Office of the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, prepared this report. The principal staff
members who contributed to the report were:

Angelina Johnston
Kevin O’Connor
Shawn Sassaman, P.E.
Yogin Rawal, P.E.

24