Supreme Court E-Library

386 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Chua, et al. vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 165863. April 10, 2013]

ALBERT CHUA, JIMMY CHUA CHI LEONG and SPOUSES

EDUARDO SOLIS and GLORIA VICTA, petitioners,
vs. B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC., respondent.

[G.R. No. 165875. April 10, 2013]

LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. B.E.

SAN DIEGO, INC., respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY;

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, REQUIRED TO BE
ESTABLISHED IN CIVIL CASES; CONSTRUED.— In civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence. “Preponderance of
evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence”
or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” It is a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
2. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; LAND REGISTRATION;
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529 (PROPERTY
REGISTRATION DECREE); AMENDMENT AND
ALTERATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; AN
AMENDMENT/ALTERATION EFFECTED WITHOUT
NOTICE TO THE AFFECTED OWNERS WOULD NOT
BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW OR THE
REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS.— Section 108 of P.D.
No. 1529, requires that all interested parties must be duly
notified of the petitioner’s application for amendment or
alteration of the certificate of title. Relief under the said legal
provision can only be granted if there is unanimity among the
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parties, or that there is no adverse claim or serious objection

on the part of any party in interest. Without doubt, San Diego,
a party-in-interest with an adverse claim, was not duly notified
of the said petition. The records reveal that despite their
knowledge about its adverse claim over the subject properties,
Jimmy and Albert never notified San Diego about their
application or petition for amendment or alteration of title.
This Court agrees with the CA that the lack of notice to San
Diego placed in serious question the validity of the CFI judgment
or its enforceability against it. An amendment/alteration
effected without notice to the affected owners would not be
in compliance with law or the requirements of due process.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; A PERSON CLAIMING A BETTER RIGHT TO
THE PROPERTY MUST PROVE HIS ASSERTION BY
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND IS DUTY
BOUND TO IDENTIFY SUFFICIENTLY AND
SATISFACTORILY THE PROPERTY; NOT PRESENT
IN CASE AT BAR.— Considering the critically defective
certificates of title, there can be no clear evidence of
overlapping. As the petitioners themselves judicially admitted,
their respective certificates of title were defective because
1] the mother title, indicated therein, was OCT No. 1898,
containing descriptions lifted from OCT No. (1020) RO-9, a
reconstituted title; 2] the location of the properties as indicated
in their titles was Barrio Talaba; and 3] the technical descriptions
contained in their TCTs pertain to properties specified in OCT
No. (1020) RO-9. These defects are very material that it cannot
be argued that they are just clerical in nature. The flaws in
their titles are major defects that cannot just be dismissed as
typographical and innocuous. The defects pertain to the essential
core of a title and definitely affect their integrity. Being
significantly defective, these cannot serve as indubitable and
valid bases for a clear and convincing delineation of the metes
and bounds of the properties. x x x The apparent defects in the
certificates of title prove that the petitioners are claiming the
wrong property, as evidenced by the Certification of the Office
of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator,
Bacoor, Cavite. In other words, the petitioners are claiming
ownership of parcels of land not in the location stated in their
respective titles. x x x Basic is the rule that a person, who
claims that he has a better right to the property or prays for
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its recovery, must prove his assertion by clear and convincing

evidence and is duty bound to identify sufficiently and
satisfactorily the property.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Andres Marcelo Padernal Guerrero and Paras for petitioner
in G.R. No. 165875.
Ismael R. Baterina for petitioners in G.R. No. 165863.
Serafin V. Cuevas for B.E. San Diego, Inc.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

These cases were already disposed of with finality by the

Court on April 22, 1994, but were reconsidered, remanded to
the Court of Appeals (CA) for reevaluation and elevated to this
Court again for another review.
It appears from the records that on April 22, 1994, G.R.
No. 105027, a case for annulment of title, entitled Lorenzana
Food Corporation, Jimmy Chua Chi Leong, Albert Chua, and
Spouses Eduardo Solis and Gloria Victa v. Court of Appeals
and B.E. San Diego, Inc., was dismissed by the Court.1 On
June 20, 1994, the Court stood by its April 22, 1994 Decision
by denying the motion for reconsideration filed by Lorenzana
Food Corporation (LFC) and Spouses Eduardo Solis and Gloria
Victa (Spouses Solis). On November 16, 1994, the Court issued
a resolution ordering the entry of judgment.
Insistent, LFC filed its Petition to Re-open Case while
Jimmy Chua Chi Leong (Jimmy) and Albert Chua (Albert) filed
their Second Motion for Reconsideration, both seeking to set
aside the April 22, 1994 Decision and the June 20, 1994 and
November 16, 1994 Resolutions of the Court.

1
231 SCRA 713. (Penned by then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno and
concurred in by Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Associate Justice Teodoro
R. Padilla, and Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado.)
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On March 18, 1996, the Court issued its Resolution2 favorably

granting both pleadings stating that the “petitioners alleged new
facts and submitted pertinent documents putting in doubt the
correctness of our factual findings and legal conclusions,”3 and
ordering the remand of the case to the CA for another round of
evaluation.
B.E. San Diego, Inc. (San Diego) filed an Omnibus Motion
1) to Recall the Resolution of March 18, 1996; and 2) to Refer
the Case to the Court En Banc; and 3) to Set Case for Oral
Argument; but the Court denied it on March 3, 1997.
On July 14, 2004, after considering all the evidence presented
by the parties, the CA rendered another decision,4 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, after a detailed consideration of the totality of
evidence presented by both parties, this Court hereby holds, as
follows:
a) The complaints of plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 80-17
and BCV 81-18 are hereby DISMISSED.
b) The Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of plaintiffs,
that is, TCT Nos. 88467, 88468, 104248 and 104249,
as well as the title of Spouses Solis, TCT No. 94389, are
hereby CANCELLED on account of their spurious nature.
c) The validity of the title of defendant B.E. San Diego is
hereby UPHELD.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5

2
Rollo (G.R. No. 165875), pp. 414-423.
3
Id. at 421.
4
Rollo (G.R. No. 165863), pp. 10-25. (Penned by Associate Justice Eloy
R. Bello, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong
and Associate Justice Lucenito N. Tagle)
5
Id. at 24-25.
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Again, not in conformity, the petitioners come to this Court

with two separate petitions, challenging the July 14, 2004
Decision 6 of the CA and the October 29, 2004 Resolution, 7
denying their motion for reconsideration. The first petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 165863 was filed by Albert, Jimmy and
Spouses Solis. The other one, docketed as G.R. No. 165875,
was filed by LFC.
The Facts
Records show that three (3) civil cases for Quieting of Title
involving tracts of land located in Bacoor, Cavite, were filed
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX, Bacoor, Cavite
and docketed as
1. Civil Case BCV-80-17 entitled “Lorenzana Food
Corporation vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc., et al.”
2. Civil Case BCV-81-18 entitled “Jimmy Chua Chi Leong
and Albert Chua vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc.”
3. Civil Case BCV-83-79 entitled “B.E. San Diego, Inc.
vs. Eduardo Solis.”
The factual and procedural antecedents of this long-drawn
controversy were succinctly summarized by the Court in its
April 22, 1994 Decision in G.R. No. 105027, entitled Lorenzana
Food Corporation v. Court of Appeals, as follows:
The objects of the controversy are several portions of a large
tract of land located in the municipality of Bacoor, Cavite. The large
tract of land is claimed to be originally owned by one Juan Cuenca
y Francisco, who had it surveyed way back in 1911. The land itself
is traversed by railroad tracks dividing the land into two (2) parcels.
On February 21, 1922, Juan Cuenca was issued Original Certificate
of Title No. 1020 (Exhibit “H”) covering the two parcels, designated
as Lots 1 and 2. Original Certificate of Title No. 1020 was later
reconstituted as O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9, containing the technical
descriptions of Lots 1 and 2.

6
Id. at 10-25.
7
Id. at 27-28.
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On April 14, 1928, a separate original certificate of title for Lot 1,

referring to the parcel north of the railroad tracks, was issued to
Juan Cuenca as O.C.T. No. (1898) RO-58 (Exhibit “Z”). Lot 1 itself
was divided into thirteen (13) parcels, eleven (11) of which were
described therein as situated in the barrios of Talaba, Zapote, and
Malicsi, while two (2) parcels were situated in the poblacion of
Bacoor, Cavite.
Upon the demise of Juan Cuenca, an action for partition of his
properties was filed by Jose Cuenca, one of the surviving heirs. On
February 21, 1969, a project of partition was approved by the Land
Registration Commission (Exhibit “EEE”), and on April 10, 1969,
the court ordered the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite
to issue individual titles for twelve (12) parcels of Lot 2 (Exhibit
“GG”). Three (3) parcels thereof: Lot 2-A, 2-K, and 2- L, were titled
(T.C.T. Nos. 35963, 35973 and 35974, respectively) and registered
in the name of Juan Cuenca (Exhibits “K”, “TTT-1” and “TTT-2”) on
April 21, 1969. All three titles stated that the lands covered therein
were originally registered as O.C.T. No. RO-9 on February 21, 1922
(Exhibits “K”, “G” and “H”).
Lot 2-A of Juan Cuenca was later subdivided into seven (7) lots
in 1969. Of these seven subdivided parcels, one parcel (Lot 2-A-3)
was adjudicated to his heir, Pura Cuenca, who was issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 41505 on February 24, 1970 (Exhibit “L”).
The said T.C.T. No. 41505 stated that the land covered therein was
originally registered as Original Certificate of Title No. 1898 on
April 14, 1928, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. RO-58-I was
cancelled by virtue thereof. One other parcel (Lot 2-A-4) was
adjudicated to another heir, Ladislaw Cuenca, who was issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 41506 (Annex “M”) on February 24, 1970.
Likewise, T.C.T. No. 41506 stated that the land covered therein was
originally registered as Original Certificate of Title No. 1898 on
April 14, 1928, and that T.C.T. No. RO-58-I was cancelled by virtue
thereof.
We interpose at this point the observation that although the transfer
certificates of title issued to Pura and Ladislaw Cuenca stated that
the lands covered therein were originally registered as O.C.T. No.
1898, hence, referring to Lot 1 located at the northern portion of
Juan Cuenca’s large tract of land, the technical description appearing
in said transfer certificates of title were taken or lifted from O.C.T.
No. (1020) RO-9 covering Lot 2, referring to the southern portion
of the original tract of land.
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In the meantime, Lots 2-K and 2-L (T.C.T. Nos. 35973 and 35974)
in the name of Juan Cuenca, were consolidated and, in turn, were
subdivided into eight (8) lots. Lot 4 was adjudicated to Pura Cuenca,
who was issued T.C.T. No. 41498 (Exhibit “TTT-5”) on February 24,
1970. Lot 3 was adjudicated to Ladislaw Cuenca, who was issued
T.C.T. No. 41497 (Exhibit “TTT-4”) on the same date. Lot 6 was
adjudicated to Jose Cuenca, who was issued T.C.T. No. 41501 with
the inscription therein that the land covered by said titles were
originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898 on April 14, 1928, and
that T.C.T. No. RO-58-I was cancelled thereby, referring to Lot 1
of the original tract. However, the technical descriptions inscribed
therein were lifted from O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9 covering Lot 2 of
the original tract of land.
Upon the deaths of Pura and Ladislaw Cuenca, the administrators
of their respective testate estates were given authority by the court
to dispose of some parcels of land. Lot 2-A-3 of Pura Cuenca covered
by T.C.T. No. 41505, and Lot 2-A-4 of Ladislaw[a] Cuenca covered
by T.C.T. No. 41506, were eventually sold to herein appellee
Lorenzana Food Corporation on February 4, 1977 (Annexes, “OOO”,
“CCC” and “UU-1”). Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41505 was
cancelled by T.C.T. No. 88468 issued to, and registered in favor of,
Lorenzana Food Corporation (Annex “D”). Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 41506 was cancelled by T.C.T. No. 88467 (Exhibit “2”)
on February 18, 1977. Both T.C.T. Nos. 88467 and 88468 also stated
that the lands covered therein were originally registered as O.C.T.
No. 1898, but contained portions of the technical description
appearing in O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9.
On the other hand, Lot 3 of the consolidated Lots 2-K and 2-L,
as part of the testate estate of Ladislaw Cuenca, was sold to herein
appellee Jimmy Chua Chi Leong. Transfer Certificate of Title No.
104248 (Exhibit “A”) was issued to and registered in his name on
May 9, 1979, cancelling T.C.T. No. 41497. Lot 4, being part of the
testate estate of Pura Cuenca, was sold to Albert Chua, who was
issued T.C.T. No. T-104249 on May 9, 1979 (Exhibit “B”), cancelling
T.C.T. No. 41498. Lot 6 was sold by Jose Cuenca to Eduardo Solis,
who was issued T.C.T. No. T-94389, cancelling T.C.T. No. T-41501.
Common to the titles of Jimmy Chua Ching Leong, Albert Chua and
Eduardo Solis is the inscription that the lands covered therein were
originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898 on April 14, 1928.
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Another common feature of all these succeeding titles is the

description that the property therein described is situated in the
barrio of Talaba, Bacoor, Cavite. Looking back, the records show
that the original tract of land owned by Juan Cuenca was bounded
on the north by Calle Real de Talaba, on the south and southeast by
Sapa Niog, and on the west, by Calle Niog. As mentioned earlier,
the land was divided into two (2) by the railroad tracks running from
and going to east and west. The area located north of the railroad
tracks, bordering Calle Real de Talaba was later titled as O.C.T. (1898)
50-58, said parcel straddling the barrios of Talaba, Zapote and Milicsi,
as well as the poblacion proper.
On the other hand, the portion located south of the railroad tracks
was designated as Lot 2. Traversing this land is what used to be a
national road, now called the Aguinaldo Highway, linking Tagaytay
City to Metro Manila. This parcel was later titled as O.C.T. No.
(1020) RO-9. The sub-divided parcels aforementioned, by their
technical descriptions are located at the south to southeast portions
of Lot 2, bounded on the south, by Sapa Niog and Calle Niog on the
west. Nevertheless, the said parcels were described as situated in
the barrio of Talaba.
The controversy arose when herein appellees learned that the
same parcels were being claimed by herein appellant, B.E. San Diego,
Incorporated. B.E. San Diego’s claim was based on two (2) titles
registered in its name. The first parcel was covered under T.C.T.
No. T-17621 (Annex “C”) issued on March 2, 1966, which originated
from O.C.T. No. 0-490 registered on December 22, 1965. The said
title described “a parcel of land Plan Psu-211245, pursuant to L.R.C.
Case No. N-467, (LRC) Record No. N-27923, situated in the Barrio
of Niog, Municipality of Bacoor.” The second parcel was titled
under O.C.T. No. 0-644, registered on January 5, 1967, pursuant to
LRC Case No. N-557, (LRC) Record No. N-30647, describing “a
parcel of land (Lot 1, Plan Psu-223920), situated in Barrio of Niog”
(Exhibit “9”).
All parties resolutely seeking to enforce their respective claims
over the subject properties, three (3) civil suits for quieting of title
were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Branch
XIX. The first case, docketed as BCV-80-17 was filed by Lorenzana
Food Corporation versus B.E. San Diego, Incorporated, and other
defendants. The second civil case, BCV-81-18, was filed by Jimmy
Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua, also against B.E. San Diego, Inc.,
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Chua, et al. vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc.

et al., as defendants. The last case, BCV-83-79 was filed by B.E.

San Diego, Inc., against spouses Eduardo and Gloria Solis, as
defendants.
In Civil Case No. BCV-80-17, Lorenzana Food Corporation
claimed exclusive ownership over the two (2) parcels covered by
T.C.T. Nos. 88467 and 88468, issued to it on February 18, 1977.
Lorenzana Food Corporation alleged that it took immediate possession
of the said property and even contracted to prepare the land for
development. It is alleged that it was only years later that Lorenzana
Food Corporation learned that B.E. San Diego, Inc. was claiming
ownership over portions of the said parcels by virtue of O.C.T. No.
0-644. It is Lorenzana Food Corporation’s contention that the O.C.T.
No. 0-644, in B.E. San Diego’s name is null and void because
Lorenzana Food Corporation’s title emanated from an O.C.T. issued
more than thirty-nine (39) years prior to the issuance of B.E. San
Diego’s original certificate of title.
In answer, B.E. San Diego countered that it and its predecessors-
in-interest have been in the open continuous and adverse possession
in concept of owner of the subject property for more than fifty (50)
years prior to Lorenzana Food Corporation’s purchase of the two (2)
parcels. It also argued that Original Certificate of Title No. 0-644
was not null and void since it was issued upon application and proper
proceedings in (LRC) Case No. N-557 and N-30647, before the
then Court of First Instance of Cavite. Pursuant to its issuance, the
said property was declared by B.E. San Diego for tax purposes
(Exhibits “Q” and “5-F”) since June 22, 1966.
B.E. San Diego claims it bought the subject property from Teodora
Dominguez on February 6, 1966 (Exhibit “5-D”) and the absolute
deed of sale was submitted in (LRC) Case No. N-577. It was further
argued that Lorenzana Food Corporation was erroneously claiming
the subject property because Lorenzana’s titled property is described
to be located in Barrio Talaba, while B.E. San Diego’s property is
situated in Barrio Niog. Denying that Lorenzana Food Corporation’s
predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the subject
property, B.E. San Diego claimed that in 1979, by force, intimidation,
threat, stealth, and strategy, Lorenzana Food Corporation entered
and occupied the subject property, despite barbed wire fencing with
warning signs, and security guards posted by B.E. San Diego.
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In Civil Case No. BCV-81-18, plaintiffs Jimmy Chua Chi Leong

and Albert Chua claim ownership over the parcels they respectively
purchased from the heirs of Juan Cuenca, as evidenced by Transfer
Certificates of Titles Nos. T-104248 and T-104249, issued on January
20 and 30, 1979, respectively. B.E. San Diego, for its part, claimed
the property by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-17621
issued on March 2, 1966, which cancelled Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-490 originally issued to Teodora Dominguez, who sold
the same property to B.E. San Diego. Again, B.E. San Diego argued
that, as appearing in their respective titles, Jimmy Chua Chi Leong’s
and Albert Chua’s properties were located in Barrio Talaba while
that of B.E. San Diego was located in Barrio Niog.
The last case, BCV-83-79 was initiated by B.E. San Diego against
the Solis spouses who, according to the former, unlawfully entered
a portion of its property titled under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-17621. The Solis spouses, meanwhile, claim the said portion
by virtue of their Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-94389, issued
pursuant to their purchase of said portion from Jose Cuenca.8

The Ruling of the RTC

On July 15, 1986, after a long trial, the RTC handed down
its Joint Decision9 in favor of LFC, Jimmy, Albert, and Spouses
Solis, and declared the titles of San Diego null and void. The
pertinent portions of the RTC decision reads:
Proceeding in the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court finds
that the three lots of San Diego which are presently covered by O.C.T.
No. 0-644 and TCT No. T-17621, are within Lot 2, Psu-2075 and
overlapped the lots in question of Lorenzana, Chua and Solis. The
fact that it appears in the titles of San Diego that its lots are situated
in Niog, and not in Talaba, cannot prevail over the findings in the
verification surveys conducted by the Bureau of Lands. Aside from
this, these two barrios are adjoining and that the land described in
plan Psu-2075 of Cuenca is bounded by Calle Real de Talaba and
Calle Niog and Sapa Niog.

8
231 SCRA 713, 715-719. Quoting from the December 24, 1991 CA Decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 13540.
9
Rollo (G.R. No. 165875), pp. 164-193.
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Since the titles of Lorenzana, Chua and Solis emanated from the
title of Juan Cuenca y Francisco issued on February 21, 1922, these
titles should prevail over O.C.T. No. 0-644 issued on January 5,
1967 and O.C.T. No. 0-490 allegedly issued on December 22, 1965,
not to mention the fact that the authenticity of O.C.T. No. 0-490 of
Teodora Dominguez predecessor-in-interest of San Diego, is
questionable, for the original thereof appears to be registered under
the name of Antonio Sentero. The rule is well-settled that a decree
ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to a
future application for registration covering or affecting said lot
(Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). Thus, where two certificates of
title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole
or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between original parties
and in case of successive registration where more than one certificate
is issued over the land, the person holding under the prior certificate
is entitled to the land against the person who rely on the second
certificate (De Villa vs. Trinidad, L-24918, March 20, 1968, 22
SCRA 1167, Gatioon vs. Gaffud, L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA
769). 10
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, San Diego filed an appeal with the CA, which
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 13540, based on the following
assignments of error:
I The trial court erred in finding that the three lots of the
appellant are within and overlapped the lots in question
of the appellees.
II The trial court erred in declaring “null and void” and
ordering the cancellation of appellant’s titles and ordering
to pay appellees sums of money, attorney’s fees and
costs.
III The trial court erred in not ordering judgment for the
appellant.11

10
Id. at 189-191.
11
Id. at 92-93.
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First Ruling of the CA

On December 24, 1991, the CA rendered its Decision12 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 13540, reversing the RTC Decision. The CA
ruled that the titles held by LFC, Jimmy, Albert, and Spouses
Solis were defective while those of San Diego showed no defects.
Hence, it ordered the nullification and cancellation of the TCTs
in the names of LFC (TCT Nos. T-88467 13 and T-8846814),
Jimmy and Albert (TCT Nos. T-10424815 and T-10424916) and
Spouses Solis (TCT No. T-94389); and dismissed Civil Case
No. BCV-80-17 and Civil Case [Link]-81-18 ordering Spouses
Solis to vacate the subject premises. The relevant portions of
the CA decision read:
First – In this case, where there is a so-called “overlapping” or
“overlaying” of titles, the best evidence are the certificates of title
themselves. While the titles of all the contending parties, at first
blush, seem to have been regularly issued, a closer examination bares
the peculiar common defects in the titles of the appellees. These
defects are:
a. The appellees’ titles are annotated with the inscription that
the land described therein was originally registered under OCT No.
1898, but the technical descriptions found therein were lifted from
OCT No. (1020) RO-9.
b. The appellees’ titles state that the properties are located in
the barrio of Talaba when the properties described therein are situated
in the Barrio of Niog.
On the other hand, the appellant’s titles show no defect. x x x
xxx xxx xxx

12
Id. at 194-208; penned by Associate Justice Venancio D. Aldecoa and
concurred in by Associate Justice Jose C. Campos and Associate Justice
Filemon H. Mendoza.
13
Rollo (G.R. No. 165863), pp. 205-206.
14
Id. at 199-200.
15
Id. at 185-186.
16
Id. at 191-192.
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Thus, even though the appellees can trace their titles as having
been originally registered on February 21, 1922, the succeeding
titles, issued on February 24, 1970, were all defective. Why no effort
was exerted to correct the alleged “clerical errors” on the part of the
appellees’ predecessors-in-interest, has not been explained. x x x
Second – Not only were the appellants’ titles not blemished by
any defect and were regularly issued, its valid title was coupled with
open, adverse and continuous possession of the subject property.
xxx
Besides, the land possessed by the appellant is, as described in
its titles, in the barrio of Niog. On the other hand, the appellees’
titles describe their properties as located in the barrio of Talaba,
but the land they claim is located in Barrio Niog. The appellant is
where it should be, as decreed in its titles. The appellees are claiming
properties that are not in the location stated in their respective titles.
xxx xxx xxx
Third – the lower court largely relied on the testimony and
recommendation of the Bureau of Lands surveyor who was ordered
to conduct a verification survey. The surveyor’s report declared that
the appellant’s property overlapped those of the appellees. Upon
questioning, however, the same surveyor admitted that his verification
survey was just based on the technical descriptions appearing in the
opposing parties’ titles. x x x
The Bureau of Lands’ verification and recommendation, therefore,
does not prove that only the appellees have the right to claim the
property, to the exclusion of others. The survey did not even pretend
to resolve the issue of whether or not the titles issued to the appellees
were perfect or defective. x x x 17

Not in conformity, LFC, Jimmy, Albert and Spouses Solis

moved for reconsideration but their motions were denied by
the CA.
First Petition to the Court
On June 5, 1992, LFC, Jimmy, Albert and Spouses Solis filed
a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 105027, raising the following issues:

17
Rollo (G.R. No. 165875), pp. 203-206.
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I The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible

error of law and grave abuse of discretion in reversing
the decision of the lower court to uphold the validity of
the land titles of private respondent in spite of the fact
that these were issued some forty-six (46) years later
than the titles of petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interest.
II The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible
error of law and grave abuse of discretion in giving
more significance to the annotation than the technical
description in identifying the lots in dispute.
III The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible
erroneous conclusion of facts, amounting to reversible
error of law and grave abuse of discretion in holding
in its resolution denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration that petitioners failed to make proper
correction of their titles.
IV The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse
of discretion when it failed to pass judgment on the
liabilities of the estates of Pura Cuenca and Ladislao
Cuenca, predecessors-in-interest (sellers) of the
petitioners.
On April 22, 1994, the Court dismissed the petition and
subsequently issued Resolutions, dated June 20, 1994 and
November 16, 1994, denying with finality the petitioners’
motions for reconsideration.
On March 18, 1996, however, the Court issued a Resolution18
granting 1) LFC’s Petition to Re-open Case; and 2) Jimmy and
Albert’s Second Motion for Reconsideration and setting aside
the Decision, dated April 22, 1994, and the Resolutions dated
June 20, 1994 and November 16, 1994. The Court, thus, declared:
Petitioners now assail the correctness of the factual bases of
our Decision, i.e., that their titles facially contain irregularities while

18
Rollo (G.R. No. 165875), pp. 414-423.
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400 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Chua, et al. vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc.

the titles of private respondent are unblemished. They also deny

that Barrios Talaba and Niog are one and a half kilometers away
from each other.
To prove their claim, petitioners have attached the following
documents:
(1) certified true copies of the titles of Juan Cuenca,
petitioners and private respondents;
(2) a historical study of how San Diego acquired its titles
(OCT No. 0-490 and OCT No. 0-644) and a certification
dated August 29, 1994 from the Register of Deeds that
the original of OCT No. 0-490 in the name of Teodora
Dominguez, San Diego’s predecessor, did not exist in
the Registry file and did not form part of their records;
(3) a statement that OCT No. 0-491 (not OCT No. 490) in
the name of Teodora Dominguez now exists in the records
of the Register of Deeds of Cavite with a true copy of
said OCT No. 0-491 certified on February 24, 1995;
(4) a certification and sketch from the Land Registration
Authority that the lot described in the alleged OCT No.
0-490 of Teodora Dominguez sits upon and encroaches
on the National Highway (Aguinaldo Highway);
(5) survey, sketch plans and certifications from the Land
Registration Authority indicating that the land in OCT
No. 0-644 of San Diego overlaps with the land covered
by OCT No. 1020 (RO-9) of Juan Cuenca;
(6) flow charts tracing the subdivision and partition of
Cuenca’s land into the present parcels of land purchased
by petitioners from the heirs of Cuenca himself; the
partitions were made with approval of the court;
(7) a historical outline and graphic study of the transactions
over Cuenca’s land which shows how petitioners came
to purchase their lots;
(8) a factual representation that OCT No. 1020 (RO-9),
Cuenca’s title, and OCT No. 1898 (RO-58) inscribed in
petitioners’ titles cover different parcels of land; and
that OCT No. 1898 is not the same as OCT Nos. 0-644
and 0-490 of San Diego;
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(9) a certification by the Municipal Planning and Development

Coordinator of Bacoor, Cavite that Barrio Niog and Barrio
Talaba are actually adjacent to each other;
(10) order dated January 26, 1981 of the Court of First
Instance, Branch 5, Bacoor, Cavite, decreeing the
correction of the Chuas’ transfer certificates of title.
The court declared that the certification in the face of
the Chuas’ titles was an error and, therefore, ordered its
amendment to reflect the true fact that the titles were
derived from OCT No. 1020 (RO-9) of Cuenca “originally
registered on the 21st day of February, in the year nineteen
hundred and twenty two x x x” not OCT 1898 as originally
inscribed therein. Per annotation in the second page of
the Chuas’ titles, the order of the Court was recorded
and the correction duly made on January 29, 1981 prior
to the institution by the Chuas of Civil Case No. BCV-
81-18 against San Diego.
The general rule is that no party is allowed a second motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment. After the promulgation
of our Decision, however, petitioners alleged new facts and submitted
pertinent documents putting in doubt the correctness of our factual
findings and legal conclusions. We cannot be insensitive to these
allegations for this Court is committed to render justice on the basis
of the truth.
Pursuant to this postulate, this Court has held time and again that
rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. They are not the end in themselves. Under
extreme circumstances, we have suspended the rules and excepted
a particular case from their operation to respond to the higher interests
of justice. In the cases at bar, the location of the contested lots, the
number of people affected and the impact of the litigation on the
peace of the community justify its reopening to give all the parties
full opportunity to prove their claims. 19

On March 3, 1997, the Court issued another resolution denying

San Diego’s Omnibus Motion 1) to Recall the Resolution of
March 18, 1996; 2) to Refer the Case to the Court En Banc;
and 3) to Set Case for Oral Argument.

19
Id. at 419-422.
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402 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Chua, et al. vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc.

Back to the Court of Appeals

In accordance with this Court’s Resolutions, dated March 18,
1996 and March 3, 1997, the CA was tasked to receive evidence
and resolve the following issues:
I Whether or not there is overlapping of titles of the
petitioners with those of the private respondent; and
II Whether or not the apparent defective transfer certificates
of title of the petitioners, allegedly coming from Original
Certificate of Title No. 1020, can withstand the rigors of
legal scrutiny.
Second Ruling of the CA
On July 14, 2004, after considering all the evidence presented
by the parties, the CA rendered another decision again in favor
of San Diego, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, after a detailed consideration of the totality of
evidence presented by both parties, this Court hereby holds, as
follows:
a. The complaints of plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 80-17
and BCV 81-18 are hereby DISMISSED.
b) The Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of plaintiffs,
that is, TCT Nos. 88467, 88468, 104248 and 104249,
as well as the title of Spouses Solis, TCT No. 94389, are
hereby CANCELLED on account of their spurious nature.
c) The validity of the title of defendant B.E. San Diego is
hereby UPHELD.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.20
The CA composed of a new set of Justices,21 again found
that first, there was no overlapping of titles between those of

20
Rollo (G.R. No. 165863), pp. 24-25.
21
Id. at 10-25. (Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and concurred
in by Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong and Associate Justice Lucenito
N. Tagle)
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the petitioners’ and those of the respondent because the subject

properties described in the separate titles were located in separate
and different barrios. The certificates of title of the petitioners
indicated that the properties covered therein were located in
Barrio Talaba, Bacoor, Cavite, while those of the respondent
showed that its properties were located in Barrio Niog. Barrio
Talaba and Barrio Niog were two separate and distinct localities
whose boundaries were clearly defined and delineated.
Moreover, copies of the application for registration and
confirmation of title filed by Juan Cuenca (Juan) before the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of the Province of Cavite
specifically indicated that the properties applied for were located
in Barrios Talaba, Zapote, Malicsi, and Poblacion in Bacoor,
Cavite. The notices of hearing for his application likewise
identified the subject lots as located in the aforementioned
barrios, without any mention of a property in Barrio Niog.
Second, the CA stated that, except for TCT Nos. 104248
and 104249, the titles relied upon by the petitioners all indicated
that they came from OCT No. 1898.22 It appeared, however,
that the technical descriptions of the properties therein referred
to the parcels of land previously covered by OCT No. (1020)
RO-9. On the other hand, the survey plans presented by San
Diego consistently showed that its property was located in Barrio
Niog and these survey plans appeared to be regular and in order.
Third, the CA noted that TCT Nos. 104248 and 104249 of
Jimmy and Albert, respectively, contained alterations, in
violation of Section 108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529,
considering that the number 1898 in the OCT was altered to
reflect R0-9. Additionally, Jimmy and Albert failed to notify
San Diego, as a party-in-interest, when they filed a petition for
correction of entries in their respective titles before the then
CFI of Cavite, despite their knowledge of its claim over the
subject property.

22
Rollo (G.R. No. 165863), pp. 209-216.
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404 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Chua, et al. vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc.

Fourth, the CA ruled that the documents presented by the

petitioners were not exactly “newly discovered evidence”
because all of them could have been previously obtained and
presented at the hearing before the lower court. The petitioners
failed to exert their best efforts to obtain these already available
documents to buttress their claim.
Back to the Court
Obviously not satisfied with the July 14, 2004 CA Decision,
the petitioners again filed separate petitions before this Court.
The first petition, entitled Albert Chua, Jimmy Chua Chi Leong
and Spouses Eduardo Solis and Gloria Victa v. B.E. San
Diego, Inc., was docketed as G.R. No. 165863. The second,
entitled Lorenzana Food Corporation v. B.E. San Diego, Inc.,
was docketed as G.R. No. 165875.
On March 9, 2005, upon motion of the parties, the Court
issued a Resolution 23 directing the consolidation of G.R. No.
165875 with G.R. No. 165863.
On June 6, 2007, the Court issued the Resolution24 denying
due course to the petitions.
On March 5, 2008, acting on the separate motions for
reconsideration of the petitioners and other supplemental
pleadings, the Court resolved to grant the motions, reinstate
the petitions and require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. 25
In effect, this disposition is a review of the Court’s April 22,
1994 Decision in G.R. No. 105027. 26
In their respective petitions, LFC, Jimmy, Albert, and Spouses
Solis anchored their prayer for the reversal of the CA decision
on the following:

23
Rollo (G.R. No. 165875), p. 243.
24
Rollo (G.R. No. 165863), p. 317.
25
Id. at 428.
26
Lorenzana Food Corp. v. CA, 231 SCRA 713.
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For Albert Chua, Jimmy Chua and Spouses Solis (G.R. No. 165863):
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error
of law, erroneous conclusion of facts and grave abuse of
discretion when it upheld the validity of the titles of San Diego
considering that the said titles cover tracts of land that ha[ve]
been previously registered and titled under the name Juan Cuenca
y Francisco.
II
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error
of law and grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the two titles
of San Diego are unblemished by any defect.
III
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible erroneous
conclusion of facts amounting to grave abuse of discretion in
holding [that] OCT 1898 RO-58 is a separate title for Lot-1 of
OCT 1020 RO-9 that was issued on April 14, 1928.
IV
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible erroneous
conclusion of facts, amounting to reversible error of law and
grave abuse of discretion, in holding that the titles of the
petitioners originated from O.C.T. 1898 RO-58.
V
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error
of law and grave abuse of discretion in holding that the titles
of the petitioners are defective because the technical description
of the land stated therein came from OCT 1020 RO-9 and not
from OCT 1898 RO-58.
VI
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error
of law and grave abuse of discretion in holding that the correction
made on the titles of Jimmy Chua and Albert Chua are null and
void.
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406 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Chua, et al. vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc.

For LFC (G.R. No. 165875):

GROUNDS
A
The Court of Appeals grievously committed a reversible error
in ruling that petitioner failed to establish a better right to
the subject properties even after petitioner was able to trace
its title from one issued prior to the title relied upon by
respondent.
1. Petitioner established the identity of the Subject
Properties and that they are overlapped by the
property described in respondent’s OCT No. O-644.
2. Petitioner clearly established its ownership of the
Subject Properties.
B
The Court of Appeals grievously committed a reversible error
in ruling that respondent’s title rests on solid support despite
the latter’s failure to establish how it acquired ownership over
the property covered by OCT No. O-644.
C
The Court of Appeals grievously committed a reversible error
when it relied upon a superficial comparison of the respective
certificates of title of the parties in concluding that respondent
had superior title to the subject properties.
1. The presence or absence of errors on the face of the
certificates of title is irrelevant in an action for quieting
of title.
2. In ruling that there was no overlapping of titles in
this case, the Court of Appeals disregarded the principle
that it is the description of the boundaries of a property
that is essential for its identification.
3. The errors in petitioner’s certificates of title that
were highlighted in the Assailed Decision were adequately
explained.
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D
Petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value entitled to
protection under the law.

Petitioners’ consolidated arguments

The petitioners argue that their land titles should prevail
over those of the respondent because the lands covered by
their titles were previously registered under the name of their
predecessor-in-interest, Juan, as early as February 1922.
Specifically, OCT No. (1020)-RO-9, from which they derived
their titles, was originally registered on February 21, 1922 in
the name of Juan while those of the respondent were registered
only in 1965 and 1967, respectively.
The subject properties are Lots 2-A-3 (TCT No. T-88468)
and 2-A-4 (TCT No. T-88467) of plan Psd-110980. The technical
descriptions found in TCT Nos. T-88468 and T-88467, which
were transferred from TCT Nos. 4150527 and 41506, 28 identify
the lots they cover as Lots 2-A-3 and 2-A-4, respectively, of
plan Psd-110980 and define the metes and bounds thereof.
The petitioners insist that the titles of the respondent overlap
their titles. The evidence admitted in the RTC showed the
respondent’s properties, covered by OCT No. O-644 issued in
1967; and TCT No. 1762129 from OCT No. O-490 30 issued in
1965 to Teodora Dominguez, overlapping the National Highway
and Sapang Niog and the properties covered by the titles of the
petitioners which were traced to have originated from Lot-2 of
OCT No. 1020 RO-9 issued to Juan in 1922. The overlapping
was admitted by the respondent’s own counsel. The Bureau of
Lands, through Engr. Felipe Venezuela (Engr. Venezuela), the
Chief of Technical Services Section, identified the subject
properties with the use of the technical descriptions in TCT

27
Rollo (G.R. No. 165863), p. 195.
28
Id. at 201.
29
Rollo (G.R. No. 165875), pp. 663-664.
30
Id. at 662.
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408 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Chua, et al. vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc.

Nos. T-88467 and T-88468 in a verification survey conducted

in compliance with the RTC order. The Report of the Bureau
of Lands on the verification survey, dated July 1, 1980, disclosed
that there was an overlapping between the subject properties
and the property described in the respondent’s OCT No. O-644.
The same report showed that of the 9,287 square meters of
land comprising Lot 2-A-3 of Psd-110980 (TCT No. T-88468),
5,628 square meters were overlapped by the respondent’s OCT
No. O-644; while 7,489 square meters of the 9,288 square meter
area of Lot 2-A-4 (TCT No. T-88467) were overlapped by
OCT No. O-644. This overlapping was confirmed by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) through its Certification, 31 dated
February 14, 1995.
The petitioners further argue that what defines the land is
the technical description as plotted on the ground and that the
location should be based on the technical description and not
on the basis of the barrio indicated therein.
They claim that the errors in their certificates of title were
adequately explained in the sense that the property of Juan
covered by OCT No. 1020 was principally located in Barrio
Talaba, which was adjacent to Barrio Niog, as shown by the
Certification, dated May 22, 1995, issued by the Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator of Bacoor, Cavite. The
subject properties once formed part of a large tract of land
covered by OCT No. 1020, and when Juan’s land was partitioned
or subdivided through the years, the resulting lots were
mistakenly described as being located in Barrio Talaba, although
they were actually situated in the adjacent Barrrio Niog.
At any rate, petitioner LFC argues that it is an innocent
purchaser for value entitled to protection under the law considering
that the subject properties were purchased with the approval of
the court in the course of the probate proceedings and were not
in possession of anyone. It was justified in relying upon TCT
Nos. T-41505 and T-41506 since it was not under any obligation
to go beyond what appeared on the face of these titles.

31
Rollo (G.R. No. 165863), p. 112.
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Respondent’s argument
Respondent San Diego counters that the petitioners’ claim
of ownership over the subject properties was not sufficiently
proven. They were not able to prove the superiority of their
titles over their titles. It gave the following reasons:
First, the petitioners’ titles have defects, as follows:
1. They were annotated with the inscription that the
land described therein was originally registered under
OCT No. 1898, but the technical descriptions found
therein were lifted from OCT No. (1020) RO-9;
2. The inscriptions on the petitioners’ titles state that
the properties are located in Barrio Talaba when the
properties described therein are situated in Barrio Niog;
Second, TCT Nos. 104248 and 104249 of Jimmy and Albert,
respectively, were altered. The number 1898 in the OCT space
was changed to reflect RO-9 instead. Their petitions for
correction of entries in their titles filed before the CFI of Cavite
failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of Section
108 of P.D. No. 1529, one of which was to give notice to a
party in interest of one’s application or petition for amendment
or alteration to a title.
Third, even assuming that the petitioners’ titles originated
from OCT No. 1020, the petitions would still not prosper
because OCT No. 1020 was never offered as evidence in court.
Likewise, the petition for reconstitution filed by Ladislaw Cuenca
(Ladislaw), dated January 26, 1959, was void on its face because
it did not contain all the essential data required by law such as
the location, area and boundaries of the properties; the nature
and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which
did not belong to the owners of the land, the names and addresses
of the owners of such buildings and improvements; the names
and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of
the property; the names of the owners of the adjoining properties;
and the names of all persons who might have any interest in
the property.
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410 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

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Fourth, the alleged “new evidence” presented by the

petitioners before the CA cannot support their claim of ownership
because said “new evidence” were not new because the same
could have been easily presented and produced during the
trial. Even if the same were newly discovered, they did not
affect, much less impinge on, the indefeasibility of the
respondent’s titles.
Fifth, the respondent’s titles were legally issued. OCT No.
O-644 was issued pursuant to Decree No. N-112239 in LRC
No. 557 of the then CFI of Cavite, LRC Record No. N-30647,
and TCT No. 17621 was derived from OCT No. O-490 in the
name of Dominguez which was issued pursuant to Decree No.
N-106480, LRC Case No. N-467, LRC Record No. N-27923.
Additionally, the respondent contends that LFC cannot raise
for the first time on appeal the argument that it is an innocent
purchaser for value.
The Court’s Ruling
A person, who seeks registration of title to a piece of land,
who claims that he has a better right to the property, or who
prays for its recovery, must prove his assertion by clear and
convincing evidence, and is duty bound to identify sufficiently
and satisfactorily the property. 32
After cautiously going over the voluminous records of these
consolidated cases and applying the pertinent law and jurisprudence
on the matter, the Court holds that the respondent’s claim over
the disputed properties prevails over those of the petitioners.
The consolidated records reveal that the subject properties
undeniably come from a large land area consisting of 271,264
square meters (PSU-2075) located in the Municipality of Bacoor,
Cavite, which was originally owned by and registered in the

32
Datu Kiram Sampaco v. Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud, G.R. No. 163551,
July 18, 2011,654 SCRA 36, 51; Republic v. Spouses Enriquez, G.R. No.
160990, September 11, 2006, 501 SCRA 436, 447; and Spouses Divinagracia
v. Leonidisa N. Cometa, G.R. No. 159660, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA
628, 658-659.
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name of Juan. PSU-2075 was traversed by a railroad track

dividing it into two lots: Lot 1 covering the northern portion
and Lot 2 covering the southern portion.
On February 15, 1922, upon application for registration,
OCT No. 1020 which covered Lots 1 and 2 of PSU-2075 was
issued to Juan. Later, on June 7, 1959, OCT No. 1020 was
administratively reconstituted after a fire gutted the Cavite
Provincial Hall, and Juan was issued OCT No. (1020) RO-9 33
which also contained the technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 2
of PSU-2075.
On April 14, 1928, a separate OCT – OCT No. 1898 - was
issued to Juan covering Lot 1, North of the railroad track.
Similarly, in June 1959, OCT No. 1898 was administratively
reconstituted due to the fire that gutted the Cavite Municipal
Hall and Juan was issued OCT No. (1898) RO-58. OCT No.
(1898)RO-58 was divided into 13 lots. Eleven (11) were located
in the barrios of Talaba, Zapote, and Malicsi, and two (2) in
the Poblacion of Bacoor, Cavite.
On April 16, 1969, after Juan’s death, Lot 2 of OCT No.
(1020) RO-9 was subdivided into 12 lots as approved by the
CFI of Cavite, in an action for partition filed by Jose Cuenca
(Jose), a surviving heir. Thereafter, 12 new titles were issued
to each of these lots which included TCT No. 3596334 for Lot
2-A; TCT No. 35973 35 for Lot 2-K; and TCT No. 35974 36 for
Lot 2-L. These 3 lots – Lot 2-A, Lot 2-K and Lot 2-L – were
titled and registered in the name of Juan. All these titles were
inscribed as originally registered as OCT No. (1020) RO-9.
On September 9, 1969, Lot 2-A was subdivided into 7 lots
and new individual titles were issued to each lot including
TCT No. 41505 37 for Lot 2-A-3, which was adjudicated to

33
Rollo (G.R. No. 165863), pp. 145-147.
34
Id. at 163.
35
Id. at 175.
36
Id. at 176.
37
Id. at 195.
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Pura Cuenca (Pura), another heir; and TCT No.41506 for Lot
2-A-4, which was adjudicated to Ladislaw, also another heir.
All these titles were inscribed as originally registered as OCT
No. (1898) RO-58, and not as T-35963, originally registered as
OCT No. (1020) RO-9.
Although the titles issued to Pura and Ladislaw stated that
the lands covered therein were originally registered as OCT
No. 1898, which was Lot 1 of the northern portion of Juan’s
large tract of land, the technical descriptions in the said TCTs
were taken or lifted from OCT No. (1020) RO-9, which was
Lot 2 or the southern portion of Juan’s large tract of land.
Likewise, Lot 2-K and Lot 2-L were consolidated and further
subdivided into 8 lots. These 8 lots were issued new individual
titles which included TCT No. 4149738 for Lot 3, which was
adjudicated to Ladislaw; TCT No. 4149839 for Lot 4, which
was adjudicated to Pura; and TCT No. 41500 for Lot 6, which
was adjudicated to Jose. All these new titles were inscribed as
originally registered as OCT No. (1898) RO-58, not as T-35973
and T-35974, originally registered as OCT No. (1020) RO-9.
On October 21, 1976, after the death of Pura and Ladislaw,
the CFI of Cavite approved the sale of Lot 2-A-3 with TCT
No. 41505 and Lot 2-A-4 with TCT No. 41506 to LFC. The
new titles were eventually issued in the name of LFC. TCT
No. 88468 and TCT No. 88467, which were also inscribed as
originally issued as OCT No. (1898) RO-58.
On May 9, 1979, the CFI of Cavite approved the sale of
Lot 3 with TCT No. 41497 and Lot 4 with TCT No. 41498 to
Jimmy and Albert, respectively, and new titles were issued,
TCT No.104248 for Jimmy and TCT No. 104249 for Albert.
The new titles were inscribed as originally issued as OCT No.
(1898)RO-58. Lot 6 with TCT No. 41500 was sold by Jose to
Spouses Solis and a new title, TCT No. 94389, was issued to
them.

38
Id. at 181.
39
Id. at 187.
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There were two common features present in the titles of

Jimmy, Albert and Spouses Solis: 1) the common inscription in
their titles was that the lands covered therein were originally
registered as OCT No.1898 on April 14, 1928; and 2) the common
description that the properties therein were located in the Barrio
of Talaba, Bacoor, Cavite.
The legal squabble in this case started when San Diego came
into the picture and claimed ownership of the subject parcels
of land for which titles were also registered in its name, based
on OCT No. O-644, issued upon application and proper
proceedings in LRC Case Nos. N-557 and N-30647 before the
then CFI of Cavite and TCT No.T-17621 which cancelled OCT
No. 0-490 which, in turn, was originally issued to Dominguez,
who sold the same property to it through an absolute deed of
sale,40 dated February 26, 1966.
To recapitulate, the parcels of land in dispute are those covered
by 1) TCT No. 88467 and TCT No. 88468 issued in favor of
LFC; 2) TCT No. T-104248 and TCT No. T-104249 issued in
favor of Jimmy and Albert; 3) TCT No. T-94389 issued in
favor of Spouses Solis; 4) TCT No. T-17621 which cancelled
OCT No. O-490 and issued in favor of San Diego; and 5) OCT
No. 0-644 issued in favor of San Diego.
Specifically, on the LFC claim of exclusive ownership over
the two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 88467 and
88468, issued on February 18, 1977, San Diego insists that it
has been in open, continuous and adverse possession in the
concept of an owner of these parcels of land for more than
fifty (50) years before they were purchased by LFC. San Diego
bought the subject property from Dominguez on February 6,
1966 and the absolute deed of sale was submitted in LRC Case
No. N-557. It has also been declaring said property for tax
purposes.
With respect to the claims of ownership by Jimmy and Albert
over the parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-104248 and

40
Rollo (G.R. No. 165875), pp. 666-668.
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TCT No. T-104249 issued on January 20 and 30, 1979,

respectively, San Diego argues that it acquired the same parcels
by virtue of TCT No. T-17621 issued on March 2, 1966 which
cancelled OCT No. O-490 originally issued to Dominguez, who
sold the same property to San Diego.
On their part, Spouses Solis claim that they purchased a portion
of the property titled under TCT No. T-17621 in favor of San
Diego from Jose for which TCT No. T-94389 was issued to
them.
Petitioners failed to prove
the superiority of their titles over
those of the respondent
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. “Preponderance
of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous
with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight
of the credible evidence.” It is a phrase which, in the last analysis,
means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto. 41
In the consolidated cases at bench, the petitioners failed to
discharge the burden of proving the superiority of their titles
over those of the respondent. Contrary to the petitioners’
arguments, the evidence on record unmistakably show that their
titles have common defects. These are 1] the petitioners’ titles
are annotated with the inscription that the land described therein
was originally registered under OCT No. 1898, but the technical
descriptions found therein were lifted from OCT No. (1020)
RO-9; and 2) the petitioners’ titles specifically state that the
subject properties are located in the Barrio of Talaba, Bacoor,
Cavite, when the properties described therein are actually situated
in the Barrio of Niog, which is a separate and distinct locality.

41
Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., 485 Phil. 683, 695(2004).
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These defects were carried over from the defective titles of

their predecessors-in-interest, namely, Pura and Ladislaw, which
contained technical descriptions which, however, did not
correspond with the recital of facts in the certification portion.
It may be recalled that when TCT NO. 41505 was adjudicated
to Pura, and TCT No. 41506 to Ladislaw on September 9,
1969, both titles were inscribed as originally registered as OCT
No. (1898) RO-58, and not as T-35963, originally registered as
OCT No. (1020)RO-9.
The defects of these titles are evident from the fact that
OCT No. (1020) RO-9 is different from OCT No. 1898. OCT
No. (1020) RO-9 was an administratively reconstituted title from
OCT No. 1020 issued to Juan on February 15, 1922. On the
other hand, OCT No. 1898 was a separate OCT issued to Juan
on April 14, 1928. OCT No. 1898 covered Lot 1, the northern
portion of Juan’s vast tract of land, while OCT No. (1020)
RO-9 covered its southern portion.
The same defects also showed in TCT No. 41497 issued in
favor of Ladislaw; TCT No. 41498 issued in favor of Pura;
and in TCT No. 41500 issued in favor of Jose. All these titles
were likewise inscribed as originally registered as OCT No.
(1898) RO-58, and not as T-35973 and T-35974, originally
registered as OCT No. (1020)RO-9.
Since TCT No. 41505 and TCT No. 41506 were defective
titles issued on September 9, 1969 to Pura and Ladislaw,
respectively, it necessarily follows that LFC’s TCT No. 88468
and TCT No. 88467, which cancelled said titles, were likewise
defective. The same is true with the title issued to Spouses
Solis, TCT No. 94389, which cancelled TCT No. 41500.
Clearly, the mismatch in the technical descriptions and the
recital of facts in the certification on the face of the petitioners’
titles creates a serious cloud of doubt on the integrity of the
said titles. The obvious disparities make it difficult to exactly
determine the subject parcels of land covered by the said titles
in the sense that the technical descriptions therein referred to
the area south of Juan’s tract of land while the recital of facts
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416 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

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in the certification therein refers to the area north of Juan’s

tract of land. It must be stressed that the northern and southern
portions of Juan’s tract of land have separate titles, OCT No.
1898 for the northern portion and OCT No. 1020 for the southern
portion. In effect, the petitioners’ alleged ownership rights over
the subject properties have not been satisfactorily and conclusively
proven due to such inconsistencies.
The petitioners, however, argue that the errors or disparities
in the inscriptions on the face of their respective titles were just
clerical and, therefore, cannot affect the integrity of their titles.
In this regard, the Court adopts the initial ruling of the CA on
the matter and other related points in its December 24, 1991
Decision in CA G.R. No. 13540, which reads:
The appellees (petitioners) argue, however, that the annotations
appearing in their respective titles are mere clerical errors and that
the technical descriptions contained therein should prevail. This
argument, however, cannot find application to the case at bar because
the opposing parties have in their possession titles referring to the
same property, and whose technical descriptions pertain to the said
property. The appellees’ claim that it is the annotations in their titles
that are erroneous is not supported by the evidence. On the contrary,
their admission that the original titles of their predecessors-in-interest
were reconstituted casts doubts on the appellees’ claim that the
technical description should prevail over the annotations.
Our conclusion that the appellees’ titles are defective is bolstered
by the fact that the titles of their predecessors-in-interest were already
defective, as a result of the partition of the property. As narrated in
the foregoing facts, pursuant to a partition of the estate of Juan
Cuenca, separate titles were issued to the heirs Pura, Ladislawa and
Jose Cuenca. One parcel adjudicated to Pura Cuenca covered by
TCT No. 41505 was issued on February 24, 1970 (Annex “L”). This
title was defective in the manner already mentioned, that is, the
annotation states that the origin of the said transfer certificate of
title was O.C.T. No. 1898, but the technical description was lifted
from O.C.T. (1020) RO-9. Another parcel, adjudicated to Ladislawa
Cuenca was covered by T.C.T. No. 41506 (Annex “M”). This, title,
likewise, contained the same defect. These two parcels were eventually
sold to appellee Lorenzana Food Corporation and the defect was
carried over to the new titles issued to it.
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Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41498 issued to Pura Cuenca

(Exhibit “TTT-5”) covering still another parcel also carried the same
defect. This parcel was later sold to appellee Albert Chua, and his
new title, in turn, continued to contain the same defect. Moreover,
TCT No. 41437 (Exhibit “TTT-4”), covering a parcel adjudicated to
Ladiswala Cuenca, was also defective. When sold to appellee Jimmy
Chua Chi Leong, the new title issued to him also carried the same
defect. The last subject parcel was adjudicated to Jose Cuenca, whose
TCT No. 41501 was also defective. Accordingly, the new title issued
to the appellee spouses Solis, who bought said parcel, was also
defective.
Thus, even though the appellees can trace their titles as having
been originally registered on February 21, 1922, the succeeding
titles, issued on February 24, 1970, were all defective. Why no effort
was exerted to correct the alleged “clerical errors” on the part of
the appellees’ predecessors-in-interest, has not been explained. The
uncorrected defects in the appellees’ titles have brought about this
present controversy.
Notwithstanding, the appellant’s (respondent) O.C.T. No. 0-644
and T.C.T. No. T-17621 were issued way before the defective titles
were issued to Pura, Ladislawa and Jose Cuenca. And more so, the
appellant’s titles were issued and registered long before the appellees
purchased the subject parcels from the Cuencas. As against the perfect
and regularly issued titles of the appellant, the appellees’ belated
and defective titles must give way. 42
Furthermore, the titles issued sometime in 1979, (TCT No.
104248, to Jimmy which cancelled TCT No. 41497, and TCT
No. 104249, to Albert which cancelled TCT No. 41498) are
likewise defective due to the apparent material alterations in
the certification portion of their respective titles. The certifications
were altered to make the number 1898 appear as RO-9 in the
OCT space of the titles. The CA was correct in saying that
material alterations affected the integrity of these titles.
Jimmy and Albert manifested that they filed a petition for
the correction of entries in their respective titles before the
then CFI of Cavite and that the said court granted their petition.

42
Rollo (G.R. No. 165875), pp. 203-205.
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Chua, et al. vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc.

The records, however, failed to show sufficient proof that Jimmy

and Albert faithfully complied with the basic notice requirement
under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, which provides as follows:
Sec. 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. — No erasure,
alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book
after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon
and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by
order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or
other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper
cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner
of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the
ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have
terminated and ceased; or that [a] new interest not appearing upon
the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or
error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum
thereon, or on any duplicate certificate; or that the name of any
person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered
owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage
has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors
will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered
land and has been dissolved has not conveyed the same within three
years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground;
and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to
all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of
a new certificate, x x x. [Emphases supplied]

The above provision requires that all interested parties must

be duly notified of the petitioner’s application for amendment
or alteration of the certificate of title. Relief under the said
legal provision can only be granted if there is unanimity among
the parties, or that there is no adverse claim or serious objection
on the part of any party in interest. 43
Without doubt, San Diego, a party-in-interest with an adverse
claim, was not duly notified of the said petition. The records
reveal that despite their knowledge about its adverse claim over

43
Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation v. CA, 339 Phil.
377, 389 (1997).
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the subject properties, Jimmy and Albert never notified San

Diego about their application or petition for amendment or
alteration of title. This Court agrees with the CA that the lack
of notice to San Diego placed in serious question the validity of
the CFI judgment or its enforceability against it. An amendment/
alteration effected without notice to the affected owners would
not be in compliance with law or the requirements of due process.44
The record shows that Albert was aware of San Diego’s
adverse claim on his property. Despite said knowledge, there
was still no due notice given to it. Thus:
Atty. Bernardo:
Q After you purchased this property did you take possession
thereof?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did any person disturb your property?
A Yes, sir.
By Atty. Bernardo (To the witness)
Q Did you come to know who is that person?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A The men of Bartolome San Diego, sir.
Q Did you come to know why they disturb your possession?
A Yes, sir.
Q What?
A Because they claimed that they are also the owner of the
lot, sir.
Q After knowing that Bartolome E. San Diego is claiming
to be the owner of your lot, what did you do?
A I went to my attorney and he instructed me also to locate
for the original title from where this lot came from. (TSN,
pp. 15-16, July 19, 1983) 45

44
Life Homes Realty Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 120827, February
15, 2007, 516 SCRA 6, 14.
45
Rollo (G.R. No. 165863), pp. 90-91.
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420 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

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There is no overlapping of the

properties covered by the titles
of the parties
The petitioners argue that an overlapping of titles was established
by their evidence. Surveys and sketch plans 46 were presented
showing the relative positions of the subject properties as well
as their history 47 which were traced all the way back to their
mother title, OCT No. 1020. Moreover, the Bureau of Lands,
through the Chief of its Technical Services Section, Engr.
Venezuela, identified the subject properties using the technical
descriptions in TCT Nos. T-88467 and T-88468 in a verification
survey conducted in compliance with the order of the trial
court. His Report, dated July 1, 1980, stated that there was an
overlapping between the subject properties and the property
described in the respondent’s OCT No. O-644. The report
showed that of the 9,287 square meters of land comprising Lot
2-A-3 Psd-110980 (TCT No. T-88468), 5,628 square meters
were overlapped by the respondent’s OCT No. O-644, while
7,489 square meters of the 9,288 square meter of Lot 2-A-4
(TCT No. T-88467) were overlapped by OCT No. O-644. This
report was the basis of the Certification, dated February 14,
1995, of the LRA, to the effect that Lots 1 and 2 situated in
Barrio Niog, Bacoor, Cavite, decreed in LRC Case No. N-557,
Record No. N-30647 under Decree No. N-112239 issued on
January 4, 1967 in favor of the respondent, were parcels of
land covered by OCT No. O-644, and when plotted in the
municipal index sheet through its tie line, would fall inside
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-99697, Lot-2-A, which included
the subject properties.
The respondent, however, asserts that overlapping is impossible
because the properties in question are located in different barrios;
the petitioners’ properties are in Barangay Talaba, while those
of the respondent are situated in Barangay Niog.

46
Id. at 104-118.
47
Id. at 141.
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Considering the critically defective certificates of title, there

can be no clear evidence of overlapping. As the petitioners
themselves judicially admitted, their respective certificates of
title were defective because 1] the mother title, indicated therein,
was OCT No. 1898, containing descriptions lifted from OCT
No. (1020) RO-9, a reconstituted title; 2] the location of the
properties as indicated in their titles was Barrio Talaba; and 3]
the technical descriptions contained in their TCTs pertain to
properties specified in OCT No. (1020) RO-9.
These defects are very material that it cannot be argued that
they are just clerical in nature. The flaws in their titles are
major defects that cannot just be dismissed as typographical
and innocuous. The defects pertain to the essential core of a
title and definitely affect their integrity. Being significantly
defective, these cannot serve as indubitable and valid bases for
a clear and convincing delineation of the metes and bounds of
the properties. The Court already debunked this argument in
its April 22, 1994 Decision in G.R. No. 105027. Thus:
Petitioners would minimize the import of the defects in their
titles by describing them as “clerical.” The plea does not persuade
for the self-contradictions in petitioners’ titles infract their integrity.
Errors that relate to the lots’ mother title, their technical descriptions
and their locations cannot be dismissed as clerical and harmless in
character. With these errors, the titles of the petitioners do not
deserve the sanctity given to torrens title. These errors precisely
created and cast the cloud of doubt over petitioners’ titles and
precipitated the case at bench. 48
The apparent defects in the certificates of title prove that the
petitioners are claiming the wrong property, as evidenced by
the Certification 49 of the Office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator, Bacoor, Cavite. In other words, the
petitioners are claiming ownership of parcels of land not in the
location stated in their respective titles.

48
Lorenzana Food Corp. v. CA, supra note 26 at 726.
49
Rollo (G.R. No. 165863), p. 103.
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Chua, et al. vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc.

The properties, presently in possession of San Diego, are

located in Barrio Niog, as described in their titles. Although
Barrio Talaba and Barrio Niog are adjacent to each other, their
respective boundaries are clearly defined and delineated from
the plans, maps and surveys on record. It has not been shown,
so far, that the said barrios were one and the same at some
point in time. Basic is the rule that a person, who claims that
he has a better right to the property or prays for its recovery,
must prove his assertion by clear and convincing evidence and
is duty bound to identify sufficiently and satisfactorily the
property. 50
Consistently, the notices of hearing of Juan’s applications for
registration and confirmation of title in Case No. 129, GLRO
Record No. 2921051 and Case No. 69, GLRO Record No. 18826,52
before the CFI of the Province of Cavite, specifically indicated
therein that the properties applied for were located in Barrios
Talaba, Zapote, Malicsi, and Poblacion, in Bacoor, Cavite.
There was no mention whatsoever of any property located in
Barrio Niog. It is for this reason that the Court finds difficulty
in accepting the petitioners’ theory that the property that they
have been claiming may have been erroneously classified as
situated in Barrio Talaba, when they are actually located in
Barrio Niog.
The verification survey is unreliable
Like the petitioners’ titles, the Court finds the verification
survey conducted by Engr. Venezuela of the Bureau of Lands
unreliable. It is so because Engr. Venezuela admitted that his
table survey was merely based on the technical description of the
defective titles. Naturally, an overlapping would be expected

50
Datu Kiram Sampaco v. Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud, G.R. No. 163551,
July 18, 2011,654 SCRA 36, 51; Republic v. Spouses Enriquez, G.R. No.
160990, September 11, 2006, 501 SCRA 436, 447; and Spouses Divinagracia
v. Leonidisa N. Cometa, G.R. No. 159660, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA
628, 658-659.
51
Rollo (G.R. No. 165863), p. 217.
52
Id. at 149.
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on this basis. Again, the Court reiterates its position in this

regard which appears in its April 22, 1994 Decision in G.R.
No. 105027. Thus:
To be sure, these defects were judicially admitted by the petitioners.
They attached their defective titles to their complaints in the trial
court. As aforestated, their titles showed on their very face that
they covered lots located in Barrio Talaba, municipality of Bacoor
whereas the lots of private respondent are in Barrio Niog of the
same municipality. The two barrios are one and a half kilometers
away from each other. Likewise, the face of their titles show that
they emanated from OCT No. 1898 or from Lot 1 constituting the
northern portion of Juan Cuenca’s property before its subdivision.
Nonetheless, the technical descriptions of the lots appearing in their
titles were lifted from OCT No. (1020) RO-9 or from Lot 2 forming
the southern portion of Juan Cuenca’s land. No less than petitioners’
witness, Eng. Venezuela, confirmed these blatant defects when he
testified, thus:
BY ATTY. VASQUEZ: (to the witness)
Q You said you referred to these titles in connection with
your verification?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, I presume you also saw the matters stated in the
second paragraph of the first page of the titles, I am referring
. . . particularly to the fact that as stated in both of these titles,
this land was originally registered on April 14, 1928 as Original
Certificate of Title 1898 pursuant to Decree No. 338259 LRC
Record No. 29214, did you notice those?
WITNESS:
A I noticed that, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
BY ATTY. VASQUEZ: (To the witness)
Q In the report that you submitted to this Court on your
verification survey, we find in paragraph 8, No, paragraph 4,
subparagraph f, the following statement which I read, “THAT
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424 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Chua, et al. vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc.

AS PER TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS APPEARING ON TCT

NO. 88467 AND TCT NO. 88468 REGISTERED IN THE NAME
OF. . . . . . LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION, THE
PROPERTY FALLS IN THE BARRIO OF NIOG, BACOOR,
CAVITE,” CONTRADICTING TO THE LOCATION STATED
IN THE TITLE WHICH IS BARRIO TALABA, I READ
FURTHER, “IT MAY BE DUE TO THE FACT THAT SAID TITLE
ORIGINATED FROM ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE NO TITLE
NO. 1898 DECREED UNDER NO. 338259 WHICH IS
ACTUALLY LOCATED IN BARRIO TALABA, BACOOR,
CAVITE.
MY QUESTION IS, BARRIO TALABA AND BARRIO NIOG
ARE DIFFERENT BARRIOS?
WITNESS:
A YES, SIR.
Q And you have apparently noticed that the statement
contained in the second paragraph of the title of plaintiff stating
that the land supposed to be covered by said titles is derived
from OCT No. 1898?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are we to understand that the land covered by OCT No.
1898 is not the same land covered by the titles of the Lorenzana?
xxx xxx xxx
A In a sense it is not actually, the title OCT 1898 is located
on northern portion of OCT No. 1020, in fact I made here a
working sheet showing the titles, the one Original Certificate
of Title 1020 and Original Certificate .... of Title 1898 and I
have here a sketch plan of the positions. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
BY ATTY. VASQUEZ: (To the witness)
Q You [are] mentioned OCT No. 1898 and OCT No. 1020,
you will tell the Court of these two (2) titles cover different
parcels of land?
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WITNESS:
A As per my sketch sheet plan, Original Certificate of Title
No. 1020 is located at the southern portion of the Original of
Title No. 1898, meaning to say that they are far apart from
each other.
Q Now, this technical description that you utilized to plot
the land described in the title or titles of the plaintiff, which
title did you use, 1898 or 1020?
A I just followed the title as issued, as ordered by the Court.
I based my verification based on the title as required by the
Court.
Q THE QUESTION IS, ACCORDING TO YOU ....
VERIFICATION, THE LAND BEING CLAIMED BY THE
PLAINTIFF, IS IT COVERED BY 1898 OR 1020?
WITNESS:
A WELL, IT IS ALREADY CLEAR ON THE TITLE THAT
IT WAS TAKEN FROM OCT 1898.
Q I will not argue to that fact that the title of Lorenzana
was taken from 1898 but I am asking you the plotting of the
technical description as described on the title of the plaintiff
is referring to a land covered by original certificate of title
1898 or 1020?
A It is very clear on my plan that the two (2) titles of
Lorenzana happened to fall to Original Certificate of Title No.
1020.
Q IN OTHER WORDS, IF WE GO BY THE TITLE, IT
WOULD APPEAR THAT THIS TITLE OF THE LORENZANAS
WAS DERIVED FROM 1898 BUT THE TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION ..... WAS FROM ANOTHER TITLE
SPECIFICALLY 1020?
WITNESS:
A YES, SIR, BY USING THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION
(pp. 34-35, 37-40, 41-43, tsn, 12-9-80, bold letters supplied).
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426 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

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His attempt to reconcile the defects and inconsistencies appearing

on the faces of petitioners’ titles did not impress the respondent
court and neither are we. His opinion lacks authoritativeness for
his verification survey was not made on the land itself. It was
a mere table survey based on the defective titles themselves. 53
[Emphasis supplied]

San Diego’s titles have no marked

defect and accompanied by an open,
adverse and continuous possession
In contrast, San Diego was able to sufficiently prove their
claim of ownership of the subject properties. Its certificates of
title covering the subject properties have no marked defects
and the description of the properties therein coincides with the
annotations appearing thereon. Thus, its titles state that the
subject properties are located in Barrio Niog and the parcels of
land it claims are also located in the same barrio. There is
simply no discrepancy between its titles and the actual location
of the subject properties being claimed and possessed by it.
Moreover, San Diego has in its favor the fact that it has
been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the subject
properties since it purchased the same on February 6, 1966.
Their prior and lawful possession of their titled properties is
further bolstered by the fact that they have been paying the
property taxes thereon since their purchase in 1966. 54
The documents of petitioners are
not newly discovered evidence
The Court sustains the ruling of the CA that the alleged new
documents submitted by the petitioners cannot be considered
as newly discovered evidence. The documents attached by the
petitioners in their petition to re-open were the following: 1]
Certified true copies of notices of hearing pertaining to Juan’s
application for registration and confirmation of title; 2]

53
Lorenzana Food Corporation v. CA, supra note 26, at 724-726.
54
Rollo (G.R. No. 165863), pp. 135-136.
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Certification by the Municipal Planning and Development

Coordinator of Bacoor, Cavite, that Barrios Niog and Talaba
are adjacent; and 3) certification from the LRA regarding the
encroachment of San Diego’s property. These are not newly
discovered and they cannot affect the Court’s ruling in its
April 22, 1994 Decision in G.R. No. 105027. The Court quotes
with approval the ruling of the CA on this matter:
A common characteristic shared by all the foregoing documents
is that they are not exactly “newly discovered evidence” as plaintiffs’
claim they are. By their nature, all of them could have been previously
obtained and presented by plaintiffs at the hearings before the lower
court. For plaintiffs’ failure to present these documents there is no
one else to blame but themselves. It appears that they did not exert
their best efforts to get hold of evidence which was already available,
or at the very least, obtainable, to buttress their claim. To allow the
presentation of evidence on a piece-meal basis, thereby needlessly
causing a delay in the resolution of the case would be anathema to
the purpose of delivering justice. 55

In view of the foregoing, the Court can safely state that San
Diego’s OCT No. O-644 and TCT No. T-17621 (from OCT
No. O-490) are more reliable than LFC’s TCT No. 88467 and
TCT No. 88468; Jimmy and Albert’s TCT T-104248 and TCT
T-104249, respectively; and Spouses Solis’s TCT No. T-94389.
Finally, as to LFC’s assertion that it is an innocent purchaser
for value, suffice it to state that this doctrine is not applicable
as the contending titles do not refer to one and the same property.
The Court, once again, restates its position on any claim of
damages against its predecessors-in-interest. Thus:
In a last swing against the disputed Decision, petitioners contend
that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when
it failed to pass judgment on the liabilities of the estates of Pura
Cuenca and Ladislaw Cuenca, their predecessors-in-interest. The
contention deserves scant attention. The records show that the trial
court dismissed petitioners’ Complaint against the Estates of
Pura Cuenca and Ladislaw Cuenca in Civil Case Nos. BCV-80-17 and

55
Id. at 92.
 Supreme Court E-Library

428 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Heirs of Lazaro Gallardo vs. Soliman, et al.

BCV-81-18. They alleged that the said Estates breached their

warranties as sellers of the subject lots. Petitioners Lorenzana Food
Corporation as well as Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua did
not appeal the dismissal of their Complaints against these Estates.
The dismissal has become final and petitioners cannot resurrect the
Estates’ alleged liability in this petition for review on certiorari.56

Granting arguendo that they are so, the remedy of the

petitioners is to seek compensation from the Assurance Fund.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Leonen, JJ.,
concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 178952. April 10, 2013]

HEIRS OF LAZARO GALLARDO, namely: PROSPERIDAD

PANLAQUI-GALLARDO, MARIA CARMEN P.
GALLARDO-NUNAG, MARIO LAZARO P. GALLARDO,
JOY CATALINA P. GALLARDO, PINKY PERPETUA
P. GALLARDO and LAZARO P. GALLARDO, JR.,
petitioners, vs. PORFERIO SOLIMAN, VIVIAN
VALETE, and ANTONIO SOLIMAN, respondents. *

56
Lorenzana Food Corporation v. CA, supra note 26, at 727.
*
The Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer and the Register of Deeds of
Tarlac who were originally impleaded as respondents were no longer indicated
in the caption pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.