UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (UNHRC)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction History of the Committee
Topic Area A: Organization of Humanitarian & Voluntary Work Act
Statement of the Problem History of the Problem Current Situation Past UN Actions Proposed Solutions Questions A Resolution Must Answer Bloc Positions 5 6 9 13 15 15 15

4 4
Topic Area B: Human Rights of Terror Suspects
Statement of the Problem History of the Problem Current Situation Past UN Actions Proposed Solutions Questions A Resolution Must Answer Bloc Positions 17 18 23 25 26 26 26

Position Paper Requirements Closing Remarks

28 28

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United Nations Human Rights Council

HARVARD MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2006

Dear HMUN Delegates, It is with pleasure and excitement that I welcome you to the Economic and Social Council! My name is Denise Delaney, and I have the distinct pleasure of serving this years conference as the Under-Secretary-General for EcoSoc. I hail from central Massachusetts and nd myself studying social anthropology with a focus on Latin America and social conict. I have had the great fortune of traveling, doing volunteer work and interning throughout Central and South America. Whether it was researching human rights with the UNs Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean in Chile, teaching English in rural Bolivia or helping to build houses in Honduras, I have loved it all. Just two years ago, I attended HMUN for the very rst time. In fact, it was my rst Model UN experience of any kind. As an Assistant Director for an EcoSoc committee, I was amazed and impressed with the conference as a whole. Most of all, however, I was struck by the dedication and intense interest that delegates demonstrated in committee. I expect no less of each you. Listen to your fellow delegates. Speak out. Exhibit your intelligence. Negotiate and use diplomacy. Take on the issues proposed in this study guide as if it were the real thing. I have had the privilege to work over the last several months with some of the most passionate and brightest minds at Harvard University: the nine EcoSoc Directors. Yours is one of them. Beyond the intelligence that shines through in this study guide, you will come to nd warmth, friendliness and sincerity within this Director. And they just might be the only person more excited than me to be part of this remarkable experience. Please read the interesting study guide that follows, do research on your own countrys policy, and develop ideas about the topics at hand. First and foremost, put thought into the intellectual experience you will embark on in December at conference. What kind of HMUN 2006 are you imagining? Make your time in committee substantively excellent and extraordinarily fun! Sincerely Yours,

Benjamin D. Zimmer SECRETARY-GENERAL

Jonathan V. Brewer DIRECTOR-GENERAL Patricia Rincon UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL ADMINISTRATION Vincent J. R UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL BUSINESS Gokul Madhavan UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY Denise L. Delaney UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL Brian J. Rosenberg UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL SPECIALIZED AGENCIES Sereen Massoud UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL SUBSTANTIVE SUPPORT Patrick G. Mauro II COMPTROLLER

Denise Delaney 119 Lowell Mail Center Cambridge, MA 02138 ddelaney@[Link]

P.O. BOX 380226 Cambridge, MA 02238-0226 Voice: (617) 495-5828 Fax: (617) 496-4472 Email: info@[Link] [Link]

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HARVARD MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2006

Dear Delegates, Welcome to HMUN 2006, and welcome to the Human Rights Council! My name is Sally Rinehart, and I will be directing the HRC at this years conference. Firstly, let me take a minute to introduce myself. I am a Sophomore at Harvard, and I am originally from New York City (pretty much the coolest place in the world). I am pursuing a Major in Visual and Environmental Studies (thats a fancy way of saying studio art), a Minor in Art History, and a Language Citation in French. I spend most of my free time doing layout design and graphics for the Harvard Independent, a weekly student-run campus newspaper, and doing set design for student theater productions whenever I get a chance. Ill admit to my largely arts-and-crafts background but in addition to being oppressively artsy, Ive been involved in (and healthily obsessed with) Model UN since my Sophomore year of High School. I attended 10 conferences as a high school delegate, including HMUN (twice!), and its been really exciting to experience HMUN on the other side of the fence stafng and organizing the conference for high school students. I was an Assistant Director of the Commission on Human Rights at last years conference, and I cant wait to take over as Director of the HRC this year. Im really looking forward to hearing your ideas once we open debate in December. I think the two topic areas you will read about in this guide should stimulate some great proposals and creative solutions, and I cant wait to hear what you guys have to say. If you have any questions or concerns as you prepare for conference, please feel free to contact me at any time. Id be glad to answer any questions about the topic areas, position papers, or about the conference in general. Shoot me an email at the address listed below I promise I will get back to you as quickly as possible. Good luck with your research! Im sure that you will be able to come up with some great ideas for the situations we will be debating. Again, drop me a line with any questions or concerns and I cant wait to meet all of you in December! Sincerely,

Benjamin D. Zimmer SECRETARY-GENERAL

Jonathan V. Brewer DIRECTOR-GENERAL Patricia Rincon UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL ADMINISTRATION Vincent J. R UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL BUSINESS Gokul Madhavan UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY Denise L. Delaney UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL Brian J. Rosenberg UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL SPECIALIZED AGENCIES Sereen Massoud UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL SUBSTANTIVE SUPPORT Patrick G. Mauro II COMPTROLLER

P.O. BOX 380226 Cambridge, MA 02238-0226 Voice: (617) 495-5828 Fax: (617) 496-4472 Email: info@[Link] [Link]

Sally Rinehart Director, Human Rights Council rinehart@[Link] (917) 940-9410 355 Quincy Mail Center 58 Plympton Street Cambridge, MA 02138

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Social Council (EcoSoc) in 1946.2 The UN decided The topics you will read about in this guide Topic to replace the CHR because of growing international Area A, The Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary concern regarding its ability to truly promote human Work Act, and Topic Area B, The Human Rights of Terror rights standards. The international community had Suspects are quite dierent from one another and yet are begun to realize that the CHRs membership and rules both of pressing interest to the Human Rights Council. of procedure together created a relatively inecient body, Topic Area A deals with the growing humanitarian crisis and the UN decided to start from scratch with an entirely in Darfur, Sudan, and with a piece of Sudanese legislation new committee. that has placed stringent restrictions on the volunteer The former CHR consisted of 53 member states,3 groups attempting to provide medical and humanitarian which were elected by the 54 EcoSoc member states aid across the Darfur region. Topic Area B deals with though a majority of those present and voting.4 It met the United States Navys base at Guantnamo Bay, yearly in Geneva for one six-week session, yet held special Cuba, where those accused of terrorist crimes are held sessions to discuss emergency situations as necessary.5 in conditions that many Its work was aided by feel deprive them of their the input of working essential human rights. group representatives, The individual topics special rapporteurs, and you will be reading about independent experts on dier in many ways but, dierent humanitarian 6 in a sense, they are also issues. Its earliest quite similar. Both deal contribution to the with specic issues, but international community also raise questions about was its adoption of the larger global humanitarian International Bill of Human themes. While Topic Area Rights this document A specically addresses consisted of the Universal the situation of volunteer Declaration of Human workers in Darfur, it also Rights, passed in 1948, the deals more broadly with International Convention the role of volunteer groups on Economic, Social, and said that this will give within the international Annan welcomed the elections results and of their commitment to Cultural Rights, passed in its members the chance to show the depth community. Similarly, while promote human rights both at home and abroad. 1966, and the International Topic Area B deals with the Covenant on Civil and conditions at Guantnamo Bay, it also addresses the Political Rights (ICCPR), also passed in 1966.7 The CHR scope of humanitarian protections that terror suspects, in debated both specic human rights crises and global general, deserve. Do not let these larger issues cause you humanitarian phenomena. to loose sight of the crises at hand rst and foremost, However, the international community recently we are dealing with specic situations that desperately became concerned that the CHR was not as eective as an need to be addressed but do keep them in mind during international human rights body should be. Many nations debate. The most eective solutions will address both criticized its membership, citing the fact that a number the immediate issues specied as well as their long-term, of member states were known to violate international often broader, implications. human rights law themselves. Other nations believed that the Commission was simply ineective, meeting too infrequently and causing too few changes in the HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE world. Eventually, the UN decided to create a whole new The Human Rights Council is one of the UNs newest bodies. It was established by the General Assembly (GA) body one that would be more eective in upholding international humanitarian standards. On 16 March in March 20061 to replace the Commission on Human 2006, this new body the HRC became a reality.8 Rights (CHR), which was formed by the Economic and

INTRODUCTION

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The HRC improves upon the CHR in a number of ways. It has fewer member states, which will help reserve seats for nations that truly uphold humanitarian standards. Additionally, member states must be elected by majority vote in the entire GA, not just by those present and voting within EcoSoc.9 This means that a much larger body of countries will have to approve of the HRCs members. When nations submit their candidacy for HRC membership, they will also have to submit a human rights record. Voters will be asked to consider the nations human rights standards and will need to analyze whether the nation has perpetually violated international humanitarian law. no such standards existed for the CHRs election procedures.10 Even after electing member states, the GA will be permitted to suspend the membership of any nation accused of gross human rights violations.11 Each member state will be reviewed regularly by the HRC in order to ensure that the Commission consists of truly humanitarian nations only. These new standards will ensure that perpetual violators of human rights laws will not be elected to the HRC, and will most likely deter these violators from applying in the rst place. Many nations have pointed out that the former CHR was a reactive body, addressing former and current humanitarian crises only. The goal of the new HRC is to be a preventative body as well it will attempt to stop human rights crises before they even start. In order to do this, the HRC will carry out regular human rights reviews on every UN member state, analyzing their humanitarian records in hopes of preventing any larger human rights crises from emerging. The HRC will start by examining its own member states, to ensure that it, as a body, is able to uphold humanitarian standards as eectively as possible.12 The HRC will also meet more regularly than the CHR did. Instead of holding one yearly six-week session, the HRC will hold three 10-week sessions per year. Its procedures for establishing emergency sessions will also be much simpler, allowing such sessions to take place with less delay.13 Overall, the HRC is more ecient than the former CHR. Its member states are held to higher humanitarian standards and its goals are proactive and preventative to eradicate human rights issues before they become international crises. The UN has high hopes for this new committee and is looking forward to the higher human rights standards that it will bring to the international community.

TOPIC AREA A: THE ORGANIZATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND VOLUNTARY WORK ACT

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The nation of Sudan has been plagued by violence ever since it became an independent state in 1956. Over the course of Sudans short history, violent clashes between politically powerful Arab Muslims in the North and marginalized non-Arab (mainly black Christian) agricultural communities in the South have contributed to an unstable government, a disunited population, and a desperate humanitarian situation among poorer Southern communities. But a few years ago, after decades of futile attempts among Sudanese government ocials, Southern rebel leaders, and United Nations representatives to resolve the North-South conict, some signs of progress nally occurred. Peace talks between the Sudanese government and the leading rebel groups gained momentum, and, by 2005, a power-sharing government that united North with South was established. After nearly 50 years of uncertainty, stability nally seemed imminent. Yet simultaneous to these long-awaited strides toward peace, a separate conict emerged. In early 2003, rebels in the Western Darfur region of Sudan took up arms against the government. They claimed that Darfurs poor, black, Christian communities had been systematically marginalized by Sudans Arab-dominated government. While the Sudanese army moved to quiet the rebels, an Arab militia group known as the Janjaweed (guns on horseback14) also appeared, launching a terror campaign across the Darfur region against rebels and civilians alike. The Janjaweed militia has since carried out what has become recognized as an ethnic cleansing campaign against the black Christians in Darfur attacking entire communities at a time, killing, raping, and abducting innocent civilians, and destroying homes, villages, and resources. Links between the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed have become obvious, not only because the two militias seem to have coordinated multiple attacks, but because the Janjaweed now wear uniforms provided by the army.15 Despite urgent demands from the African Union (AU), the United Nations Security Council, and countless humanitarian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the Sudanese government has made no eorts to disarm the Janjaweed or curb the desperate humanitarian crisis that has emerged in Darfur.

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There are approximately 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in refugee camps across Darfur, more than 200,000 Sudanese civilians have ed to neighboring Chad, and over 180,000 have been killed as a result of the violence.16 The UN has named the situation in Darfur the worlds worst humanitarian crisis,17 and the need for aid is growing. But delivering humanitarian aid to such a vast community of people is dicult, even with the countless number of NGOs that stand ready and willing to help. Their task is particularly challenging because, in addition to the desperate nature of the situation, the Sudanese government has adopted an open policy of hostility toward NGO workers in the region. Concerned primarily with maintaining control of the situation and resentful that NGO reports tend to portray Sudan in a rather unattering light, the Sudanese government has done its best to limit NGO involvement in Darfur. NGO workers have been harassed, robbed, and arrested; their property and funds have been conscated; their stations have been closed; and their ability to provide any sort of aid has been severely restricted. These acts of hostility were cemented in national legislation with the Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act, passed by the Sudanese Parliament on 20 February 2006.18 The Act places harsh restrictions on all volunteer organizations, both national and international, attempting to work in Sudan. It imposes strict standards for registration and gives the Sudanese government an unprecedented degree of control over NGOs activities and nances. The adoption of the Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act has made an already desperate situation nearly impossible to solve and although countless NGOs have lobbied for its revocation, little progress has been made in increasing humanitarian access to the Darfur region. It is now up to the Human Rights Council to address this conict. The Council must determine to what degree the Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act is a legitimate document, and to what extent the Sudanese government or, for that matter, any government may control and monitor the activities of NGOs working within its borders. This issue is a conict between the governments right to national sovereignty and the peoples right to adequate humanitarian aid, and it is up to the Council to strike a balance between the two.

HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

FORMATION OF THE STATE The territory now known as Sudan was shared by joint Ottoman-Egyptian rule until an 1881 popular revolt brought Sudan under shared British and Egyptian rule. Northern and Southern Sudan were kept separate until 1947 and, although they were technically united after that point, political power was given to the Northern elite shortly before Sudan gained independence in January 1956.19 The emergence of the independent Sudanese state brought with it the emergence of factions within its population, and the growing rift between wealthy Arab Muslims in the North and poor Black Christians in the South made Sudans rst government a shaky one. Fearing marginalization, Southern army ocers mutinied in 1956 and formed the Anya-Nya guerilla movement.20 Simultaneously, an Islamic leader from the North known as General Abboud led a military coup against Sudans elected civilian government, seizing power in Khartoum (the nations capital) and instituting a policy of Islamisation.21 Already, the nation was severely disunited, and its two opposing factions had taken up arms against each other. In an attempt to reverse Abbouds Islamisation of the state, Anya-Nya led a civil war known as the October Revolution beginning in 1962. The October Revolution ultimately forced Abboud out of power and established a new national government.22 Yet despite Anya-Nyas attempts to diminish the political power of Arab Muslims in Khartoum, a series of Arabdominated governments followed Abbouds removal.23 Seeking national peace, General Jafar Numayri led another military coup, known as the May Revolution, in 1969.24 Violence subsided temporarily as Numayri began his time in oce by seeking peace with Southern rebels. EARLY TURBULENCE Numayris eorts at uniting Sudan were initially successful. After the Sudanese Communist Partys (SCP) failed coup in 1971, which led to the execution of the SCPs leaders,25 Numayri found himself politically isolated within Khartoum and began actively seeking peace with neighboring Ethiopia and Uganda, as well as with Southern rebel groups.26 As a result of Numayris eorts, the Sudanese government signed the Addis-Abba Peace Agreement (named for the capital of Ethiopia, where negotiations took place) with Anya-Nya in March

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1972. The agreement integrated the Anya-Nya forces into the national army and granted Southern Sudan political autonomy.27 However, the Addis-Abba Peace Agreement did not end Sudans troubles. The government violated the agreement repeatedly and revised it unconstitutionally in 1977, contributing to a signicant Islamic shift that grew throughout the late 1970s.28 To make matters worse, oil was discovered in the Southern region of Beniu, Sudan, in 1978.29 As soon as the Sudanese government sent Northern troops into Southern oilelds, Southern rebels rose up in protest once again. The Sudanese Popular Liberation Movement (SPLM), an armed rebel group led by John Garang, took shape, and mutinied in 1983.30 In a desperate attempt to quickly suppress the SPLM, Numayri revoked the Addis-Abba Peace Agreement, dissolved the Souths constitutional guarantees, declared Arabic the ocial language of Sudan, and imposed Sharia law (Islamic law) throughout the country.31 Unsurprisingly, Numayris actions were met with popular uprising in 1985. Numayri was ultimately deposed, and a transnational military council was established to rule in his place.32 Democratic elections were held in 1986, establishing a coalition government led by Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi.33 Once Sudans new government took shape, it began once again to seek peace with the SPLM. In an eort to appease Southern citizens, the government of Sudan drafted a bill to eliminate Sharia law in June 1989. However, the day before the bill was scheduled to be passed, an Islamic group called the National MSF workers conduct consultations and perform crucial medical procedures Islamic Front, led at a clinic in Zam Zam, Darfur. by General Omer al-Bashir, led a coup against the Sudanese government. In an attempt to undo Prime Minister al-Mahdis eorts at de-Islamisation, al-Bashir revoked the constitution, banned opposition parties, Islamised the entire Sudanese justice system, and declared jihad against the non-Muslim South.34 Although al-Bashir was appointed President of Sudan in 1993,35 growing international concern for the war-torn nation undermined his control over the region. Eritrea became a stronghold for Sudanese opposition movements after its government openly accused Khartoum of harboring Islamic jihad insurgents, and the SPLM began to gain additional regional support from other neighboring countries.36 GROWING CONFLICT Sudans political isolation grew over the course of the 1990s, as the larger international community became aware of its history of violence and discord. In June 1995, Sudan was blamed for the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.37 It also became widely known that Khartoum harbored Islamic fundamentalist groups throughout the 1990s, prompting the UN to impose sanctions on Sudan.38 When the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-esSalaam, Tanzania, were bombed in 1998, the U.S. held Sudan responsible and launched a cruise missile attack on a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant it believed was being used to prepare materials for chemical weapons.39 Although a new Sudanese constitution was eventually drafted and endorsed by over 96% of voters in a referendum,40 a power struggle between al-Bashir and parliamentary speaker Hassan al-Turabi emerged in 1999, undermining this achievement. In panic, al-Bashir dissolved Sudans National Assembly and declared a state of emergency throughout the nation.41 Although al-Bashir was reelected for another ve years in December 2000, the elections were boycotted by Sudans main opposition parties.42 Meanwhile, members of al-Turabis Popular National Congress Party (PNC) began negotiations with the SPLM, and the two bodies signed a memorandum of understanding in February 2001. However, these negotiations led to al-Turabis arrest, and members of the PNC continued to be arrested though May 2001.43 At a funeral held for PNC leader Ali Ahmed al-Bashir, who died from wounds sustained while being arrested, thousands of demonstrators attended to protest and were forcibly dispersed with tear gas.44

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Animosity between the North and South grew when Sudan began exporting oil in 1999. In April 2001, international oil workers were sent to the oil-rich regions of Southern Sudan. In response, the SPLM accused the government of attempting to distance Southern civilians and rebels from the oilelds and threatened to attack.45 As international concern for the situation in Sudan grew, some signs of progress seemed to emerge. Although peace talks between al-Bashir and Garang, held in Nairobi in June 2001, ultimately failed, the government of Sudan did accept a Libyan-Egyptian eort to end the civil war between North and South in July 2001. This eort included a future national reconciliation conference and a series of reforms.46 The UN lifted its sanctions on Sudan in September 2001, and U.S. President George W. Bush named Senator John Danforth a special envoy to Sudan a month later.47 By December 2001, more than 14,500 Sudanese political prisoners, mostly Southern blacks, had been freed.48 Some setbacks, however, continued. Even after the UN had lifted its sanctions, the U.S. imposed its own in October 2001, citing Sudans terrorism record and chronic human rights violations.49 The SPLM continued to gain strength, joining the Sudan Peoples Defense Force, another Southern rebel group, in a campaign against the government in January 2002.50 But despite these diculties, eective eorts toward peace between North and South soon began to take shape. SIGNS OF PROGRESS After nearly 50 years of turmoil, negotiations between Southern rebel groups and the Sudanese government nally began to pay o. The SPLM and the government signed a 6-month renewable ceasere agreement in January 2002. The ceasere applied to a region within Sudans Nuba Mountains, widely known as a rebel stronghold.51 The two bodies also signed the Machakos Protocol on 20 July 2002, a result of on-and-o peace talks mediated by a Kenyan branch of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development. It granted Southern Sudan self-determination after a six-month interim period and implemented Sharia law only in the North.52 On 27 July 2002, al-Bashir and Garang met face-to-face for the rst time, in negotiations mediated by Ugandan President Yoweri Mseveni. They agreed to a ceasere for the duration of their negotiations, but this ceasere was not strictly obeyed.53 Still, negotiations continued, and the government and the SPLM agreed on a series of powersharing protocols in May 2004, including a division of both oil and non-oil wealth.54 On 9 January 2005, the two bodies signed the Naivasha Accords, establishing a denitive peace deal and a permanent ceasere.55 Meanwhile, al-Turabi was released from jail in February 2003 and the nation-wide ban on the PNC was lifted. Although the Sudanese government announced in

A severely malnourished girl ghts to survive at an MSF feeding clinic in al-Jeneina, West Darfur. Juvenile malnourishment rates are beginning to rise as humanitarian access to Darfurs refugee camps becomes increasingly limited.

September 2004 that it had foiled a coup by al-Turabis supporters, leading again to al-Turaibis arrest, he was released in June 2005.56 But despite this lingering hostility toward the PNC, the Sudanese government continued to work toward peace with Southern Sudan. International involvement aided Sudans progress. By April, international donors had pledged U.S. $4.5 billion to aid Southern civilians impoverished by Sudans civil war.57 The Sudanese government signed a reconciliation deal with the National Democratic Alliance, another

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leading Southern resistance group, in June, and Garang was sworn in as Vice President on 9 July 2005.58 A new constitution was nally passed, giving signicant political autonomy to the South. Although Garang died in an air crash on 1 August 2005, sparking some violence between Northerners and Southerners in Khartoum, hostility ended by September as a power-sharing government was denitively established in the South.59 By October, an autonomous government was formed in the South, dominated by former members of the SPLM and PNC.60 After 50 years of civil war, Northern and Southern Sudan were nally peacefully united. CRISIS IN DARFUR Sudans troubles, however, did not end there. Simultaneous to the resolution of Sudans civil war, a separate conict emerged in the West. Rebels in the Darfur region of Sudan an area populated by impoverished black Christian communities rose up against the government in February 2003,61 claiming that the region had been consistently neglected by Khartoum. A number of new rebel groups formed, led by the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).62 As the national army moved to quiet the rebels, a separate Arab militia known as the Janjaweed also took up arms in Darfur. Targeting rebels and civilians alike, the Janjaweed began a scorched-earth terror campaign against black Christian communities in Darfur, attacking entire villages, killing and kidnapping innocent civilians, and destroying vital resources such as clean water supplies and farmland. It has since become obvious that the Janjaweed is a government-backed operation. Although the AU intervened and peace talks began in August 2004, the UN announced in September 2004 that Sudan had not yet fullled the international communitys calls to disarm the Janjaweed militias and demanded that the government accept outside help to protect its civilians.63 Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State at the time, went as far as to label the situation genocide. Although the UN continues to report on the abuses in Darfur, it has not yet categorized them as such. Nevertheless, the UN has acknowledged that serious war crimes have been committed in Darfur, and the Security Council voted in March 2005 to refer those accused of war crimes to the International Criminal Court (ICC).64 Although the Sudanese government signed a peace accord with the SLA on 5 May 2006, other rebel groups rejected the deal. Violence between rebels and the Janjaweed continues, and the AU has not been able to provide sucient peacekeeping forces. The UN Security Council did pledge on 16 May 2006 to send UN peacekeeping forces into Darfur, and some progress has since been made in controlling the violence. But although the armed conict itself has subsided somewhat, it has left in its wake an impoverished region one in which disease and hunger are chronic, and where forcibly displaced citizens struggle desperately to nd the resources they need to survive.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN DARFUR The UN has named the situation in Darfur the worlds worst humanitarian crisis. Beyond the lingering threat of armed conict, diseases such as pneumonia, malaria, diarrhea, dehydration, and malnutrition plague the two million citizens now living in makeshift refugee camps along the Western border. 65 Volunteer organizations are doing their best to alleviate the suering of Sudans IDPs. while NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders/ Mdecins sans Frontires (MSF), the Red Cross, and the Sudanese Red Crescent have set up relief camps that provide medical help, food, and clean water to refugees in Darfur, groups including Amnesty International, the Sudan Social Development Organization (SUDO) and the Sudan Organization Against Torture (SOAT) have investigated and publicized the conditions in Darfur, soliciting aid and raising money in an attempt to lift the region out of poverty. But their task is dicult not only because of the rising number of those in need, but because a recent piece of Sudanese legislation has severely limited their access to the region. THE ORGANIZATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND VOLUNTARY WORK ACT The Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act was adopted on 20 February 2006. Although it was rst presented before the Sudanese Parliament on 13 February, it was rejected, amended, and passed in second reading later that month.66 The Act gives the government of Sudan an unprecedented degree of control over the NGOs working within Sudanese borders. It places all volunteer organizations under the supervision of a government body, establishes dicult registration policies,

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limits nancial options, and allows the government to or foreign registered in Sudan with the aim of investigate and monitor all NGO activities. This has led providing relief, social service or raising the many in the international community to conclude that economic and social standards of the beneciaries, Sudanese leaders are more concerned with maintaining including any civil society organization which their own power than with providing much-needed renders humanitarian voluntary work in relevant humanitarian aid to Sudans citizens. Although the elds.68 Sudanese government, like any national government, In order to work within Sudanese borders, all groups is entitled to some degree of involvement with NGOs belonging to this category essentially, all humanitarian operating in its borders, the Organization of Humanitarian organizations must apply for registration before the and Voluntary Work Act has been received by the Registrar-General. The NGOs already working in Sudan international community as an extreme piece of legislation. when the Act Countless NGOs was adopted have lobbied for were required its revocation to register and the UN has within 90 repeatedly called days. for increased The Act humanitarian states that access to the no NGOs Darfur region, consisting of but the Sudanese fewer than 30 government has members may made no eort be registered; to compromise however, it its control of the also explains situation. that the T h e Minister or Organization of his Council Hu m a n i t a r i a n may choose to and Voluntary A village in Darfur burned and looted by Sudans national army or by the Janjaweed militia. The two militaries have coordinated a scorched-earth campaign against black Christian commu- register such Work Act nities across the Darfur region, leaving countless villages, like this one, completely destroyed. organizations establishes the if he so desires. Sudanese Ministry of Humanitarian Aairs. The Ministry is run by the The Registrar may request any information from an NGO while processing its registration application. No time Minister of Humanitarian Aairs (appointed by the frame is given for the registration process, and, although President), the Commissioner-General (appointed by the Act states that NGOs are required to pay registration the President on the recommendation of the Minister), fees, it does not specify what these fees are. Many NGOs and the Registrar-General (appointed by the Minister).67 have commented that the cost of registration may deter Because the Ministrys chief ocers are direct government certain groups from applying to work in Sudan. After an employees, the Ministry lacks independence from the NGO is granted registration within Sudan, it must still executive branch of the Sudanese government. A number apply to renew its license on a yearly basis.69 of NGOs have voiced their concern that the Ministry Certain special regulations apply to foreign NGOs. may function as a branch of the executive power, and not They must comply with the Acts policy of nonas an independent, unbiased organization. interference of foreign organizations in the internal aairs The Act denes the term humanitarian and of the Sudan.70 It is dicult to determine the scope of voluntary work as any voluntary humanitarian Sudans policy of non-interference and the extent to which not-for-prot activity carried out by an NGO it may limit the activities of foreign volunteer groups. In or charitable organization whether national addition, foreign NGOs must sign a country agreement

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to perform [their] programs in coordination with the participation of one or more national organizations.71 Both national and foreign NGOs may have their registration or re-registration refused or cancelled if the Ministry determines that the organization violated the provisions of this Act or of any law in force,72 or if an organization has ceased its activities for one year. Although the Act further states that any NGOs registration may be refused or cancelled due to its failure to comply with any other conditions to be laid down by the Minister,73 it also explains that the specic reason for rejection may be withheld due to security concerns.74 If an NGO is suspected of activities that are incompatible with the Act, the Registrar may form Investigation Committees to determine the legitimacy of the organization. Once an NGOs registration is refused or cancelled by the Registrar, it may appeal to the Minister and further to a competent court to challenge the Registrars decision. If the organization is ultimately refused registration, its funds and property are absorbed by the Ministry.75 Unregistered NGOs attempting to work in Sudan are subject to a ne. National NGO workers found guilty of violating the Act or of working without a legal permit may be dismissed, while foreign workers found guilty may be expelled from Sudan. The Registrar may suspend the activities of any NGO found guilty of violating the Act for any period of time, after which the accused NGO may appeal to the Minister and further to a competent court. The Registrar may also prohibit an NGO from working in Sudan for up to one year or initiate criminal proceedings against any volunteer organization.76 Once an NGO is granted a license to work within Sudan, the Registrar may keep and examine all of the its documents, records, and reports to ensure that it does not violate the Act. The Commissioner, if he deems it necessary, may carry out preliminary investigations with any organization to ascertain whether or not there is any contravention to the law.77 The Commissioner is also responsible for settling disputes within and among NGOs, while the Registrar supervises the elections of national groups. No organization working within Sudan may receive funding from a foreign source, whether that source is ultimately located in Sudan or abroad, unless the source is veried and approved by the Minister. NGOs must submit half-yearly reports on their work, annual progress reports, and annual budgetary summaries to the Commissioner, in addition to reporting on any major changes in their proposed activities.78 As a result of these stringent regulations, it is dicult to determine whether the Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act is consistent with the protections guaranteed by the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1998.79 Article 1 of the Declaration states that everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to promote and to strive for the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels,80 while article 12.2 states that the State shall take all necessary measures to ensure the protection by the competent authorities of everyone, individually and in association with others, against any violence, threats, retaliation, de facto or de jure adverse discrimination, pressure or any other arbitrary action as a consequence of his or her legitimate exercise of the rights referred to in the present Declaration.81 The Declaration guarantees the right of individuals and groups to advocate and protect human rights and ensures that the State will defend those who seek to do so, yet the stringent limitations imposed by the Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act infringe upon these guarantees. A POLICY OF HOSTILITY The Sudanese government has not applied the Acts provisions sparingly. The new laws have been enforced rigorously and have given legal authorization to a policy of violent hostility toward NGO workers that has led to a series of arrests, threats, assaults, and even killings. Tight legal restrictions are not the only thing making it dicult for volunteer workers to do their job they are also haunted by the fear of harassment by intimidating and abusive Sudanese security forces, and are becoming increasingly wary of entering the Darfur region in the rst place. Some earlier incidents signaled Sudans hostility toward NGO workers even before the Act was formally introduced. On 12 December 2004, an aid convoy belonging to Save the Children was attacked by Sudanese security forces. Although Save the Children is a British NGO, the group consisted of local Sudanese volunteers. Nevertheless, two employees Abbaker al-Tayed and Yaloub Adel Nabi Ahmed were killed during the attack.

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As a result of these unexplained killings, Save the Children On 29 September 2005, three more members of 82 immediately withdrew from the Darfur region. SUDO manager Salah Idris, eld monitor Salim On 8 May 2005, three members of the Sudan Social Mohamed, and accountant Ahmed Musa Nahar, were Development Organization (SUDO) were arrested and kidnapped from their clinic at the Zam Zam IDP camp. charged with espionage, a capital oense under Sudanese Their vehicle, containing a signicant portion of their law. The three men included Madawi Ibrahim Adam, the salaries, was stolen as well. The three men were held organizations president, Yasir Saleem, a photographer, temporarily by Sudanese security forces and released and Abdullah Taha, Adams chaueur. Taha was released unharmed on 6 October 2005.85 on 8 May with no ocial charges, and, although Adam On 1 October 2005, human rights lawyer Mohamed and Saleem were released the next day, the charges held Ahmed Alarbad was arrested in Khartoum. Alarbad had against them have not yet been ocially dropped.83 been working on the cases of those arrested in a series A subsequent event involving Doctors Without of riots that had erupted on 18 May in Khartoum. The Borders/Mdecins sans Frontires (MSF) shed some light riots, which resulted in the deaths of 14 civilians and on Sudans reasons for targeting NGO workers. In May policemen, were a response to the governments attempt 2005, MSF issued a report detailing the approximately to relocate a number of IDPs as part of an area-replanning 500 cases of rape that had occurred over just four and a program. Although Alarbad did not participate in the half months in Darfur. As a result, two MSF employees riots, he was detained and charged with participating in Paul Foreman, director of MSF/Holland, and Vincent the commitment of a criminal act, crimes against the Hoedt, MSF regional coordinator for Darfur were state, public disturbance, sheltering a criminal, and arrested on 30 May. They were charged with publication murder. He has since been denied both regular visits of false news, omission to produce document or deliver and access to legal advice.86 statement, and espionage against the country. The A case involving the Sudan Organization Against Ministry of Humanitarian Aairs delivered a government Torture (SOAT) resembles the earlier incident with request that MSF withhold the report and demanded MSF. On 6 October 2005, the Sudanese government that Foreman and Hoedt hand over the medical reports announced that it had begun legal proceedings against and evidence that their employees had gathered to write SOAT in late August. SOAT had recently published it. However, Foreman and Hoedt refused to hand over a press release describing a number of arrests that had their evidence, citing doctor-patient condentiality. The taken place during riots in early August, and, as a result, charges against them were dropped on 19 June 2005, the organization was charged with disclosure of military but the event served as a warning to any organization information, propagation of false news, breach of seeking to report on the public peace, and public The area of territory along Sudans Western border is considered conditions in Darfur. It nuisance. Because of these the Darfur region. It borders the nation of Chad, where many is clear that these arrests refugees have ed since violence erupted in 2003, resulting in charges, many SOAT volunteers were prompted by the multiple camps like this one. could face up to ve years in bad publicity that prison.87 MSF had generated A much larger regarding Sudan disturbance aected a and were carried number of NGOs in early out in an attempt to 2006. On 22 January, an stie such publicity NGO forum was held in before it reached Khartoum. The meeting the international was entirely transparent, community.84 Any and was held in parallel organization that to a simultaneous AU sought to report on session called to discuss the abuses in Darfur, the situation in Darfur. therefore, was in Approximately 40 delegates danger. attended the meeting, including national and

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Sudanese men unload sacks of sorghum during a delivery of aid from the World Food Program in Kalma Camp, near Nyala town, Darfur.

international NGO representatives, two UN ocers, and two representatives from the European Commission. However, during the meeting, a group of plainclothes Sudanese security ocers entered the forum room and claimed that the conference was unauthorized. The ocers, numbering six to 15 over the course of the incident, demanded the names of all the participants and photographed them with still cameras and video recorders. The delegates were ordered to shut o their cell phones while the security ocers seized their documents and laptops. Many of the delegates were pushed and threatened, and some small scues broke out. The ocers attempted to separate international representatives from Sudanese ones and men from women, but the delegates did not cooperate. The ocers then agreed to release only the international workers, but they refused to leave the forum room without the rest of the delegates. Finally, after three hours, all of the participants were released. Since this incident, nearly all of the participants in the NGO forum have been followed or monitored by Sudanese security forces. Soon after the event, two delegates Faisal al-Baqir, a member of Reporters sans Frontires and a SOAT aliate, and Dr. Nagid Najmedin, the Chair and Director of local NGOs at the Amal Center and Khartoum Center for Human Rights and Environmental Development were contacted by the Political Section of Sudanese National Security. They were taken from their residences to meet the head of the Political Section, Saleh al-Obeid. At this meeting, they were informed that, although nothing had been legally wrong with the NGO forum, it was timed badly given the sensitivities surrounding its corresponding AU meeting.88 This was not the rst time that either of the two men had been involved with the Sudanese police. From 13 January to 21 January 2001, al-Baqir was held incommunicado by the Political Section of Sudanese National Security, who also stole his motor bike and

many of his documents. He has been questioned and detained many times by Sudanese security forces. Najmedin was also held in Khartoum from December 1989 to May 1991.89 Since the adoption of the Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act, many NGO camps and facilities have been closed, both temporarily and permanently. The Ministry of Humanitarian Aairs shut down SUDOs oces in both al-Jeneina and Zalingei, both located in West Darfur, on 13 May 2006. The Ministry claimed that SUDO had violated the Act, but did not specify how. The Ministry ordered SUDO to cease all operations and hand over the keys to their oces, medical centers, feeding centers, and vehicles. SUDOs bank accounts were frozen immediately. Although the Zalingei oce has since been reopened, the al-Jeneina oce remains closed.90 The Ministry also refused to renew the Norwegian Refugee Councils (NRC) Cooperation Agreement on 2 April 2006. It ordered the NRC to withdraw all sta from Sudan, but gave no reason for its order. The NRC had been in charge of coordinating relief activities at Kalma Camp in South Darfur and had served approximately 95,000 IDPS.91 This policy of hostility has left NGOs with very few options they are forced to juggle unavoidable legal obligations while avoiding the relentless security forces that pursue them. The Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act has placed countless barriers between Sudans needy IDPs and those who are able to bring them aid, making the desperate humanitarian situation in Darfur irreparably worse.

RELEVANT UN ACTIONS
Although the international community has done its best to end the suering in Darfur, Sudans unwillingness to cooperate has made these eorts dicult. A series of relief missions have been established to end the violence in Sudan and some agreements have even been written but the government of Sudan has repeatedly ignored its obligations and has failed to take action in a meaningful way. The UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) was established on 11 June 2004 by Security Council Resolution 1547. UNAMISs goals were to monitor the situation in Darfur, facilitate communication between Sudanese ocials and UN representatives, and lay the groundwork for a future Comprehensive Peace

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Agreement, which the resolution also urged.92 With Security Council Resolution 1590, adopted on 24 March 2005, UNAMIS became known as the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and began to coordinate its activities with the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS).93 Although a number of subsequent resolutions urged the transition of AMIS to an entirely UN-coordinated operation, the two bodies remain separate. They have succeeded in controlling some of the violence in Darfur, but they have been unable to pressure the Sudanese government to cooperate further. Progress regarding the issue of humanitarian access to Darfur seemed imminent when the Sudanese government issued its Joint Communiqu with the UN Secretary-General on 3 July 2004. In the Joint Communiqu, the UN pledged humanitarian aid, monitoring bodies, and peacekeeping forces to assist the AU troops already in place.94 In return, the Sudanese government agreed to implement a moratorium on restrictions for all humanitarian work in Darfur, and remove any other obstacles to humanitarian work.95 It pledged to suspend visa restrictions for NGO workers in order to allow them freedom of movement,96 simplify the registration process by implementing immediate temporary NGO registration through a simple notication process,97 and eliminate restrictions on the importation of aid materials, resources, and vehicles. The government also agreed to end the violence in Darfur by taking steps to disarm the Janjaweed, investigate human rights abuses, dispatch trained police forces throughout the region, and resume peace talks with Western rebels.98 The government of Sudan and the UN agreed to form a Joint Implementation Mechanism (JIM) in order to ensure that the provisions of the Joint Communiqu were carried out eectively. The JIM, led by the Sudanese Minister of Foreign Aairs and a Special Representative from the UN, would monitor the implementation of the agreement and deliver progress reports to Sudanese government and to the UN.99 Despite the promises made in the Joint Communiqu, the Sudanese government has done little to hold up its end of the deal. Security Council Resolution 1556, adopted on 30 July 2004, rst urged Sudan to fulll immediately all of the commitments it made in the 3 July 2004 Communiqu.100 Subsequent Security Resolution 1564, adopted on 18 September 2004, announced

that the government of Sudan had not fully met its obligations noted in resolution 1556 (2004) and the 3 July Joint Communiqu with the Secretary-General to improve, as expected by the Council, the security of the civilian population of Darfur.101 The resolution urged Sudan to cooperate with the peacekeeping forces at work in the Darfur region and threatened to impose sanctions such as actions to aect Sudans petroleum sector and the Government of Sudan102 if the government continued to ignore its promises. Finally, Security Council Resolution 1591, adopted on 29 March 2005, announced that the international community deplores strongly that the Government of Sudan and rebel forces and all other armed groups in Darfur have failed to comply fully with their commitments and the demands of the Council.103 It condemned Sudans failure to live up to its obligations and created yet another monitoring body a Committee of the Security Council aided by a Panel of Experts to

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oversee the implementation of the UNs demands and to report on Sudans progress.104 Despite the Security Councils condemnation of Sudans actions and its attempts to implement monitoring and peacekeeping forces within the Darfur region, the Sudanese government has made little eort to comply with the demands of the international community. On 31 March 2005, Security Council Resolution 1593 referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC. However, the United States added a clause to the resolution reiterating the fact that states not party to the Rome Statute of the ICC were not bound by its jurisdiction. This clause applies to Sudan, as it is not party to the ICC. Nevertheless, the resolution urged that states not party to the Rome Statute cooperate fully with the ICC.105 The Security Councils repeated attempts to pressure Sudan have been largely unsuccessful, and little progress has been made in increasing humanitarian access to the Darfur region. NGO workers are gradually nding themselves unable to provide meaningful services in Darfur they must cope with the many legal complications established by the Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act while remaining wary of the relentless pattern of arrest and assault that has put all volunteer workers at risk. So far, international pressure has not been forceful enough. It is now in the hands of the HRC to develop a dierent approach to the humanitarian situation in Darfur. standards of governmental control shift according to a nations humanitarian need. The Council may decide that the Act is an entirely illegitimate document, and that no state government may become at all involved in the activities of NGOs. In this case, the Council will have to call upon the government of Sudan to repeal the Act entirely. In this case, the Council may nd that negotiation is not an option, and may instead choose to put pressure on Sudan by recommending the imposition of sanctions, trade embargoes, or any other punitive measure that might sway the Sudanese government to comply with the UNs demands. On the other hand, the HRC may decide that, while some of the Acts provisions are indeed harmful, some are entirely legitimate. The Council may nd that national governments have the right to become involved with the NGOs that serve their citizens. If the HRC decides that the Act is, in fact, negotiable, then it may turn its attention to resuming the UNs negotiations with Sudan. The HRC will have to decide who will take part in these negotiations the Council may choose to send a member of an existing organization, such as UNMIS or AMIS, or may instead decide to appoint a special representative to handle the situation. Finally, the HRC may accept the Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary work act entirely. In the interest of national sovereignty, the Council may decide that the government of Sudan has the right to control what goes on within Sudanese borders. In this case, the Council would take a laissez-faire approach to the situation and acknowledge Sudans ability to determine what is best for its own people.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The HRC must, as a committee, decide to what extent the Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act is a legitimate document. The Council must determine how much power any national government may wield over the volunteer groups operating within its borders, and whether

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER

To what extent is the Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act legitimate? Must it be entirely repealed, or are some sections appropriate? Which sections should stay and which should go? Is the Act in its entirety acceptable?

UN ocial dismayed at expulsion of Norwegian NGO from Darfur.

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If revision or nullication of the Act is deemed necessary, how should the UN enforce it? Should the UN authorize a new series of negotiations with the Sudanese government? Who should take part in these negotiations? Should the HRC take a harsher approach and suggest punitive measures such as sanctions or trade embargoes to the Security Council? Which approach would be more eective in achieving the HRCs goal? Is any state action that controls NGO activities legitimate? In general, to what extent should national governments involve themselves with the NGOs that operate within their borders? of corrupt government structures like Sudan will most likely not welcome the involvement of outside groups. Nations that are not in desperate need of aid may also welcome NGOs. States such as the developed nations of North America and Europe have traditionally voiced their concern for human rights and tend to have many humanitarian groups operating within their borders. This is the ocial position of the Council of Europe, which limits government involvement with NGOs to regular balance sheets and yearly activity reports.106

NATIONS THAT DO NOT WELCOME NGOS On the other hand, some states might hesitate to accept an NGO presence within their borders. These nations both developed states and those facing humanitarian situations How much decision nd that foreign intervention making power is too risky because it poses a should national threat to their own national governments be sovereignty. They may fear given regarding that foreign inuence dissolves NGOs? Does the the integrity of their national humanitarian need values or corrupts their nations of a nation change policies, leading them to reject these standards? the involvement of third-party groups such as international What specic humanitarian organizations. rights are NGOs For example, this is the guaranteed? How national policy of the Russian can the UN protect Federation. The Russian these rights? Federation passed a new piece of legislation entitled Carrying food distribution , part of a UN World Food Programme On Amendment of Selected project. BLOC Legislative Acts of the Russian POSITIONS Federation on 10 January 107 2006. This legislation was adopted in response to NATIONS THAT WELCOME NGOS a series of allegations that foreign NGOs had helped The nations that welcome NGO involvement promote democratic revolutions in Georgia, the Ukraine, may be split into two separate groups: those that need and Kyrgyzstan. Explaining his reasons for supporting humanitarian aid and those that do not. NGO-friendly the bill, Russian President Vladimir Putin voiced the nations in need of humanitarian aid include nations governments concern that politically active foreign facing poverty, disease, natural disasters, or any other NGOs might use foreign funding to promote a popular humanitarian crisis caused by an uncontrollable outside uprising in Russia. The new bill requires all NGOs source. Nations in need of aid because of the negligence

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working in Russia to re-register with a state commission within a year. The state commission may examine the organizations work, activities, and funding in order to determine the groups legitimacy. In addition, foreign NGOs will not be allowed to hold representative oces in Russia instead, a council of trustees composed of Russian nationals (or foreigners permanently living in Russia) will be established. Although this new legislation conicts with the ocial position of the Council of Europe, it reects Russias concern that foreign involvement in state aairs might undermine national unity and harm the country as a whole. of print and online news sources, such as the New York Times, the BBC, CNN, and the Washington Post. Although the Act itself hasnt gotten much press (barely any newspapers have mentioned it by name!), you can still use these journals and resources to get a better idea of the conditions in Sudan. You might also take a look at some of the documents I mentioned earlier, such as the Joint Communiqu, the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, and some of the more signicant Security Council resolutions. Some of these documents are included in your study guide, and I will post some more helpful links on our committee website as well. Of course, if you have trouble nding anything or are in need of some extra guidance, feel free to contact me at any time Id be happy to help you nd what you are looking for. Good luck!

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In order to get a good idea of where your country stands on NGO involvement, try to nd out which organizations have been most active in your country and how closely your government has regulated their activities. Try to assess the humanitarian concerns your country faces, and what sort of NGO help your citizens might be receiving. This should help you determine how sympathetic your government has been to active NGO involvement and allow you to place your country somewhere among the broader categories I outlined above. In order to learn more about the situation in Sudan, you should begin by browsing some NGO websites. Amnesty International has done some especially thorough reporting on the diculties faced by NGO workers in Darfur you can read some of their press releases by visiting their document library at [Link]/library/engindex and searching by country for documents regarding Sudan. You can also read a number of MSF press releases and annual reports by visiting [Link]/news/sudan. cfm. There are many other international advocacy groups that have published reports on the Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act Im sure there are enough press releases out there to give you a good idea of the Acts content and impact. But NGOs are not the only organizations that have reported on the humanitarian situation in Darfur; try looking at a variety

Clockwise: Camera shot of train passengers and suspects; train damage post-2005 bombings; London security.

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TOPIC AREA B: THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF TERROR SUSPECTS
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM After the World Trade Center attacks of 11 September 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush pledged to aggressively seek out those responsible for the tragedy that took place on that day. He turned the administrations eorts to eliminating Islamic fundamentalist organizations such as al-Qaida and the Taliban, declaring a war on terror and pledging to make it tougher than any other war in history. He created a new U.S. Department of Homeland Security, called the nations attention to the urgency of todays ever-changing terrorist threat, and turned his own focus to a new initiative bringing those responsible for the attacks to justice. As the Bush administrations plan of action began to take shape, it became quite clear that Americas war on terror would certainly be tougher than any other war. Early on, the administration determined that, because covert terrorist warfare lay outside the customs and expectations of traditional international conict, those detained in the war on terror could not be considered conventional prisoners of war (POWs). President Bush announced that individuals considered guilty of terrorist acts would instead be considered enemy combatants, a classication coined by the administration to avoid providing the prisoners a number of international protections guaranteed to POWs. The administration also created a special judiciary procedure to try those accused of terrorist crimes. Instead of simply trying them in civilian courts, or through the court-martial procedure typically used to try members of the armed forces, the administration outlined a system of trial by military commission and adopted this new policy without Congressional approval. The goal of this system was to enable the government to put potentially dangerous suspects on trial without releasing classied information relevant to matters of national security, yet some critics of the administration have argued that the only result was a judicial procedure that severely curbed defendants rights and abandoned the due process protections applicable to criminal trials under the U.S. Constitution. Lastly, the administration decided to hold suspected members of al-Qaida or the Taliban at a special detention facility constructed at Guantnamo Bay, Cuba. The administration made the decision to hold these detainees at a facility outside U.S. borders so that the prison would lie outside the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, allowing the government to use more forceful interrogation tactics than would typically be permitted within the U.S. Government ocials claimed that these tactics would be necessary for obtaining information relevant to issues of national security and international peace, and that they could legitimately be used on enemy combatants because such detainees were not POWs. The administrations policies have been heavily criticized by human rights advocates worldwide. NGOs other than the International Covenant of the Red Cross (ICRC) have not even been allowed to tour the facility at Guantnamo Bay, and a number of reports have been issued detailing the inhumane living conditions and harsh interrogation tactics used at the facility. Nevertheless, President Bush has defended his policies, asserting that matters of international security take precedence over certain humanitarian concerns. He has argued that his tough treatment of terror suspects has been necessary in order to obtain important information in the war on terror, and that the ends justify the means when international peace is at stake. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently begun to reject the Bush administrations policies in the war on terror. A series of Supreme Court cases related to former Guantnamo Bay detainees have raised questions about a number of President Bushs decisions, and have begun to overturn some of his policies. The most signicant of these cases, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, was decided in July 2006. The question before the court was whether trial by military commission was constitutional. The court ruled not only that these trials were not, but that the enemy combatant status aorded to supposed terrorists was also illegal under international law. This decision sparked a sudden change in U.S. policy, as President Bush announced that the administration would work with Congress to devise a new trial system and would grant suspected terrorists POW status after all. However, the Presidents announcement did not indicate a total reversal of U.S. policy. President Bush still insists that the detainees at Guantnamo Bay will not be moved to a facility on U.S. soil, and members of the administration have urged Congress to curb detainees rights as much as possible when devising the new trial system. The administration released its rst proposal in July 2006, yet this plan made very few changes to the current conditions at Guantnamo Bay and was a disappointment to human rights advocates worldwide. Now, it is dicult to determine where the detainees at

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Guantnamo Bay stand the U.S. Supreme Court and many members of Congress have spoken out on behalf of the prisoners, but the administration is unwilling to compromise its original plan. The U.S. is working toward a solution to this problem, but it is hard to say where Congresss deliberations will lead. The situation at Guantnamo Bay is no longer a is hard to say who is in the right and it is dicult to determine whether the U.S. is fullling its obligations to the global community. Now, it is up to the Human Rights Council to decide whether the U.S. must make a better eort to remedy the problem at Guantnamo Bay, or even whether the administration is on the right track. The HRC must determine if and how the UN should be involved in Congresss deliberations and what solutions would best end the continuing humanitarian crisis at Guantnamo Bay.

HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

A QUESTION OF STATUS The rights and protections aorded to POWs are outlined in international humanitarian legislation known as the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. This document is one of four Geneva Conventions: the First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, the Second Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Camp X-Ray at Guantanmo Bay, Cuba, where detainees are shackled and forced to and the Fourth Geneva Convention kneel for discipline by the U.S. military. Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Passed in 1949, matter of national U.S. policy. Human rights activists the Geneva Conventions together form a comprehensive worldwide have accused the Bush administration of set of human rights laws that set the global standard for disregarding humanitarian standards, and have brought the status and treatment of both military personnel and the issue to the attention of the entire global community. civilians during times of war. Now, human rights advocates are accusing the U.S. POWs are dened under Article 4 of the Third of threatening the humanitarian standards that the Geneva Convention as follows: members of the armed international community strives to uphold. In the past, forces of a Party to the conict or members of militias the U.S. has been regarded as an arbiter of international or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces; human rights standards, yet critics of the administration members of other militias and members of other now argue that the U.S is currently setting a very poor volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance example. A nation as powerful as the U.S. has an obligation movements, belonging to a Party to the conict and to positively inuence the international community, yet, operating in or outside their own territory provided that with the Bush administration at odds with its critics, it they obey certain laws and customs of war, such as being

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commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, having a xed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, and carrying arms openly; members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or authority not recognized by the Detaining Power; persons who accompany the armed forces but are not
This map shows the location of Guantnamo Bay on the island of Cuba, which lies just South of Florida and the Bahamas.

actually members thereof, such as civilian pilots, supply contractors, and war correspondents; members of crews of the Parties to the conict; and inhabitants of a nonoccupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided that they carry arms openly and obey the laws and customs of war.108 In short, if a nation detains anyone belonging to or associated with an armed militia that obeys the laws of war regardless of whether the militia ghts for a third-party resistance movement or for a government that is not formally recognized by the detaining nation the detaining power must consider the detainees POWs. Groups that do not obey the customs of war are not granted POW status. Article 3 of the Convention addresses armed conict that is not of an international character that is, a war involving one or more parties that do not associate with a specic nation. It states that even those detained in these conicts deserve certain protections: it outlaws violence

to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, taking of hostages, outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment, and the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court aording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people.109 Essentially, Article 3 states that even those who do not participate in traditional international warfare deserve certain humanitarian protections as well. The rest of the Third Geneva Convention outlines the rights that must be aorded to POWs. It states that they shall retain the full civil capacity which they enjoyed at the time of their capture for example, they must at all times be treated humanely and be protected from physical mutilation, acts of violence or intimidation, and physical and mental torture; they must enjoy every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness in a favorable climate; they must be granted regular medical inspections and be given proper nourishment in order to ensure that they remain healthy; they must not be required to provide any information other than their name and identication and must not be coerced by any means to provide more information; they must retain their personal possessions and nances; they must enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of their religious duties and participate in intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits if they so choose; they must be informed of their exact location; and they must be permitted to notify friends and family of their whereabouts and send and receive letters and cards during their detention.110 On 18 January 2002, President Bush announced that suspected terrorists did not fall into any of the categories outlined in the Third Geneva Convention. Citing the fact that those detained in the war on terror did not obey the laws and customs of war and did not ght for a state, he argued that they did not qualify to be granted POW status and should instead be considered enemy combatants.111 This decision was armed by members of the administrations Working Group on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terror,112 and accepted by the administration as a legitimate classication of terror suspects. As U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney explained in November 2001, The basic proposition here is that somebody that comes into the United States of America illegally, who conducts a terrorist operation killing thousands of innocent Americans, men, women, and children, is not

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a lawful combatant. They dont deserve to be treated as a prisoner of war. They dont deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen going through the normal judicial process We think it guarantees that well have the kind of treatment of these individuals that we believe they deserve.113 advocates worldwide have called for its closure, yet the U.S. maintains that the facility is humane, and few of these demands have been met. For example, the wire-mesh cages of Camp X-Ray measure 2.4 meters by 2.4 meters and are unprotected from the elements. The cells at Camp Delta are two meters by 2.4 meters.116 Within Camp Delta is the medium-security Camp Four, in which prisoners live communally and are allowed more privileges.117 Many of the cell complexes throughout the facility are exposed to 24-hour lighting and loud music, and some detainees are contained within their cells for days at a time.118 They are given limited time for outdoor exercise 30 minutes a day and three to seven days a week, contained within a wire-fenced concrete area that measures 7.6 meters by 9.1 meters.119 Prisoners at Guantnamo Bay are often shackled, restrained, hooded, or blindfolded during interrogations or while being transported around the facility. Detainees

GUANTNAMO BAY In addition to coining a new term for the status of terror suspects, the Bush administration also constructed a new detention facility for these detainees at Guantnamo Bay, Cuba. The site was chosen because it lay outside U.S. borders, leading U.S. ocials to assert that it also lay outside the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. This would allow the facilitys guards and interrogators to use forceful and coercive techniques that would come under re if used within the U.S. Detainees would not be allowed to challenge the legality of their detention or of the techniques used to question them.114 Many global humanitarian advocacy groups have asserted that these policies come into conict with accepted human rights standards, yet the administration continues to argue that it must be allowed to work in the interest of national security, and that its actions are justied because international peace and freedom are at stake. The rst 20 detainees arrived at Guantnamo Bay on 11 January 2002.115 Since then, although only the ICRC has been allowed inside the facility, countless reports of inhumane living conditions have been released to the public. The conditions at Guantnamo Bay have been met with international criticism and human rights Detainees being transported to prison on GITMO.

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are restrained heavily and subjected to sensory deprivation during the 20-hour ights to the facility.120 Guards and interrogators at Guantnamo Bay have used harsh punitive measures against detainees such as humiliating them, beating them, threatening them, and restraining them in painful positions for hours or days at a time.121 Although minors and senior citizens are among the prisoners at Guantnamo Bay, they have been given no special treatment and are subject to the same punishments as the other detainees.122 The exact number of prisoners being held at Guantnamo Bay is unknown. It has been estimated that there are between 400 and 600 individuals currently held at the facility, but their identications and nationalities are largely kept condential. Detainees are not allowed visits from friends or family under any circumstances, and are often prevented from writing to their families to inform them of their location. Oftentimes, the prisoners do not even know exactly where they are.123 They are sometimes relocated to unidentied locations, and even to countries that are known to use torture. It is estimated that former Guantnamo Bay detainees have been transported to over 100 nations, including Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and Afghanistan.124 U.S. Army ocials and Guantnamo Bay prison guards continue to report that the detainees are treated humanely at all times, and have insisted that no prisoners have been harmed or tortured at Guantnamo Bay. The U.S. Department of Defense has acknowledged that the less cooperative detainees are sometimes punished for their actions, in the interest of minimizing disturbances and allowing the facility to operate smoothly, no interrogators or guards have acknowledges the excessive punitive measures that human rights advocates report. But aside from the poor living conditions and human rights abuses that have been reported by humanitarian groups, the trial system that President Bush created for terror suspects has been criticized just as heavily by human rights advocates worldwide. Humanitarian NGOs have complained that the interrogation policies at Guantnamo Bay have eliminated many of the protections typically granted to defendants, and that the USs proposed system of trial by military commission has placed matters of national security before humanitarian concerns, showing blatant disregard for global humanitarian standards and posing a serious threat to those who work to uphold them. DUE PROCESS IN QUESTION On 13 November 2001, President Bush issued his Military Order on the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (the Military Order).125 The Military Order was released without Congressional approval under the pretext that the President, as Commander in Chief, is empowered to issue military directives during a time of war. It details the procedures for trying and convicting terror suspects and establishes standards for their interrogation. The Military Order states that it is applicable only to non-US citizens.126 This standard violates Article 14.1 of the1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states that all persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals,127 and

The second plane commanded by terrorists on September 11th, 2001, aims for the World Trade Center, New York.

Article 5(a) of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, which establishes the right to equal treatment before the tribunals and organizations administering justice.128 When any individual subject to the Military Order that is, any foreign national apprehended in the war on terror is detained, he is placed under the control of the U.S. Secretary of Defense and treated according to the standards created by the Department of Defense. Individuals subject to treatment under the Military Order may be detained without trial but if, after interrogations, it is determined that a detainee must go on trial for terrorist crimes, he is tried by a military commission established exclusively for his trial.129 The Secretary of Defense, with the input of the President, monitors and controls the military

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commissions. He determines who is eligible to go on trial and is responsible for selecting a group of U.S. military ocers to serve as jurors, judges, prosecuting attorneys and defense lawyers. Because the trials involve classied material, only U.S. military ocers may participate in the trials even the detainees defense lawyers must belong to the U.S. military. The Defense Secretary must approve the charges brought upon the defendant and approve his plea agreement. The Defense Secretary is also responsible for determining the source, scope, and type of evidence that may be used by the prosecuting attorney and the defense lawyer. He decides which parts of the trial may be lmed and which must be held in secret, selects the military ocers who will review the courts ndings, and approves the nal decision and sentence. He may amend these rules at any time.130 Because some of the evidence used during the trial may contain sensitive military or national security information, the defendant himself may be excluded from parts of his own trial in order to protect this classied information. Although the defendant is given a U.S. military lawyer, he may choose to meet with his own civilian lawyer as well. However, the civilian lawyer will not be given access to certain classied information and will not be allowed to meet with his client in private. The defendant will still retain his military lawyer in addition to the civilian lawyer.131 These rules violate Article 14.3(d) of the ICCPR, which establishes every persons right to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through the legal assistance of his own choosing,132 and Article 18 of the 1988 Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons Under Any Form of Detention o r
A tortured detainee at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Imprisonment, which states that a detained or imprisoned person shall be entitled to communicate and consult with his legal counsel, that a detained or imprisoned person shall be allowed adequate time and facilities to consult with his legal counsel, that the right of a detained or imprisoned person to be visited by and to consult and communicate, without delay or censorship and in full condentiality, with his legal counsel may not be suspended or restricted save in exceptional circumstances, to be specied by law or lawful regulations, when it is considered indispensable by a judicial or other authority in order to maintain security and good order, and that interviews between a detained or imprisoned person and his legal counsel may be within sight, but not within the hearing, of a law enforcement ocial.133 The Military Order places no restriction on the types of evidence that may be used during a trial by military commission even hearsay evidence or evidence gained through coercive measures, such as torture, is allowed. But despite the fact that such questionable evidence is considered legitimate, the Military Order states that the military commissions may hand down any sentence this includes life imprisonment and the death penalty.134 Even after administering the death penalty, the military commissions do not provide a right of appeal. Detainees tried by military commission shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individuals behalf, in any court of the United States, or any State thereof, any court of any foreign national, or any international tribunal.135 This violates Article 14.5 of the ICCPR, which establishes that everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law,136 and Article 6.4 of the ICCPR, which establishes that anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence, and that amnesty, pardon, or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases.137 The administration issued the Detainee Treatment Act in December 2005, preventing all U.S. courts and judges from hearing habeas corpus petitions from detainees.138 This act established that no prisoner could challenge the legality of his detention before a U.S. court. Ever since the U.S. announced these new laws, human rights advocates have accused the administration of disregarding international due process protections, thereby threatening the legal standards that the

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international community strives to uphold. However, the Bush administration has argued that its counterterrorism eorts are vital to preserving international peace. President Bush has rmly rejected his critics, insisting that nothing will deter him from protecting the American people and arguing that any means are justied when national security is at risk. DETAINEES FIGHT BACK As early as 2002, detainees at Guantnamo Bay began protesting against their treatment. After a series of incidents involving guards handling of the Koran one accidentally dropped a detainees Koran during an inspection and another threw a prisoners copy on the ground a number of detainees went on hunger strike for short periods of time in early 2002. These hunger strikes ended when a formal apology was issued over the facilitys loudspeaker system.139 A larger hunger strike took place from 27 February 2002 to 10 May 2002. After a guard forcibly removed one detainees makeshift turban during prayer time, nearly 200 prisoners went on hunger strike to protest the guards actions. Although the Defense Department downplayed the severity of the strike, three detainees had to be forcibly administered intravenous uids in midMarch after having fasted for 14 days. The hunger strike eventually died down, and the last two participants were force-fed and returned to their camps in May.140 FBI investigations of the facility from October to December 2002 revealed a number of other hunger strikes and demonstrations all attempts to protest the inhumane conditions at Guantnamo Bay and the U.S.s policy of detention without trial for suspected terrorists. The investigations revealed that 18 individuals had been involved in 28 suicide demonstrations (hanging gestures that are not necessarily serious suicide attempts) since the opening of the facility, and that additional hunger strikes had taken place in December 2002 in response to soldiers handling of the Koran.141 In August 2003, a new group of security guards began working at Guantnamo Bay. In order to challenge and threaten these new guards, a number of detainees performed hanging gestures with nooses constructed out of clothing and sheets. There were 23 hanging attempts in 8 days, including 10 simultaneous attempts on 10 August, but none of these attempts were successful. They are among the 350 self-harm demonstrations and 120 hanging gestures reported by the military in 2003.142 From June to July 2005, another hunger strike took place across the entire facility at Guantnamo Bay. Two f o r m e r detainees described it as a peaceful, nonviolent p r o t e s t against the conditions at the facility. Participants were to s t a r v e A security watchtower at Guantnamo Bay guards themselves, the facility. Few individuals besides US military until death personnel are allowed inside the prison. if necessary, boycott showers and recreation time, and refuse clothing. They were to demand basic human rights such as respect for their religion, fair trials, proper food and clean water, adequate exercise, adequate medical treatment, and communication with their families. They were to ght for the right to be informed of the reason for their detention and for the right to be monitored by a neutral body in order to ensure that their rights were not violated. The hunger strike began on 21 June, with the participants rejecting only one meal per day. By 28 June they were rejecting two meals per day, and by 2 July they refused food altogether. Although the Defense Department only reported 52 participants, the strike peaked at 200 prisoners. 50 detainees became seriously ill and were

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placed on IVs. The strike ended when camp ocials promised to improve prison conditions according to the Geneva Conventions. They began distributing clean, bottled water and announced that they would allow the detainees to form a representative committee of six prisoners.143 At this point, the detainees believed that their situation would improve. However, the representative committee was disbanded after a few days.144 When the prisoners realized that the Defense Department had not kept its promises, they began a new hunger strike in August 2005. The Defense Department reported only 76 participants and claimed to be monitoring the situation closely, but the strike involved more than 210 prisoners.145 In February 2006, the military publicly acknowledged its use of force-feeding tactics during long-term hunger strikes. Military ocials described the force-feeding process: the detainees are held in restraint chairs to prevent resistance or purging and force-feeding tubes are inserted in their nose and down their throat. The tubes are inserted forcefully, without any anaesthetic, and are removed and re-inserted at every feeding. The prisoners are fed large amounts of food very quickly, and the procedure is very painful.146 The World Medical Associations Tokyo Declaration of 1975, which addresses medical doctors participation in torture, stipulates that prisoners on hunger strike may not be force-fed.147 On 10 June 2006, three detainees committed suicide. The prisoners two Saudis and one Yemeni hanged themselves in their cells with makeshift nooses and died before the guards discovered them. These were the rst suicides at Guantnamo Bay.148 THE COURTS REACT As early as 2002, the U.S. courts began to hear cases from detainees and former prisoners at Guantnamo Bay. Four cases reached the Supreme Court, and their decisions aected many of the USs policies in the war on terror. In April 2002, it was discovered that Yassir Esam Hamdi, a prisoner captured in Afghanistan and held at Guantnamo Bay since early 2002, had U.S. citizenship. At this point, he was moved to a detention facility in Virginia. In June 2002, a federal court ruled the he was entitled to a lawyer. An appellate court overturned that decision in July 2002, and a number of subsequent appellate hearings debated whether Hamdi could be held as an enemy combatant and denied access to a lawyer. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in January 2004. At issue was whether an American citizen captured overseas could be denied access to legal counsel and to the U.S. courts; the court ruled 8-1 that Hamdi had been deprived of his due process rights. He was own to Saudi Arabia and released.149 In another case, an American citizen named Jose Padilla was arrested in Chicago in May 2002 for plotting to explode a dirty bomb (an improvised weapon constructed from nuclear waste and conventional explosives). He was declared an enemy combatant in June 2002 and held at a facility in South Carolina. A federal judge ruled in December 2002 that Padilla had the right to see a lawyer, and an appellate panel ruled in December 2003 that the U.S. could not hold a U.S. citizen arrested on U.S. soil as an enemy combatant. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in February 2004, yet after a number of additional appellate court decisions debated whether a U.S. citizen could be held indenitely as an enemy combatant, the Bush administration dropped Padillas enemy combatant status and brought him before a civilian criminal court.150 The administrations actions rearmed the U.S.s policy that only foreign nationals could be considered enemy combatants. In the fall of 2001, a British citizen named Shaq Rasul was captured in Afghanistan. He arrived at Guantnamo Bay in January 2002. In February 2002, a group of lawyers led a case on behalf of several detainees, including Rasul, to challenge the legitimacy of their detention. A federal judge ruled in July 2002 that the detainees could not le habeas corpus petitions because they were not U.S. citizens and because the facility lay outside U.S. borders, and a federal appeals panel ruled in March 2003 that U.S. federal courts did not have jurisdiction over Guantnamo Bay. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in November 2003, and, although Rasul was released from Guantnamo Bay in March 2004, the case continued for the other detainees. At issue was whether the U.S. courts had jurisdiction over Guantnamo Bay, and therefore whether the prisoners at Guantnamo Bay could le habeas corpus petitions in the U.S. to challenge the legality of their detention. In June 2004, the Court ruled 6-3 that Guantnamo Bay did lie within the jurisdiction of the U.S., and that the detainees deserved the right to challenge their detention. In response, the U.S. created a series of new procedures that would determine the status of prisoners and regularly review the legitimacy of their detention. The administration unveiled the Combatant Status Review

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Tribunal and the Detainee Administrative Review in September 2004, yet a federal district court ruled in November 2004 that these new panels were not sucient and still did not satisfy the Geneva Conventions.151 But the most signicant case by far was Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Ladens former chaueur, was captured in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 and moved to Guantnamo Bay in 2002. He became one of six detainees deemed eligible for trial by military commission in July 2003. The trials began in August 2004, yet a federal judge stopped the trials in November 2004, ruling that they violated customary military law and the Geneva Conventions. Although an appellate panel overturned that ruling in July 2005, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in November 2005. On 29 June 2006, the court ruled 5-3 that the military
U.S. President George W. Bush.

war on terror, and that their enemy combatant status was therefore illegitimate.152 The Supreme Courts ruling came as a major blow to the Bush administration. The Court had overruled both the trial system and the special legal classication that President Bush had created for suspected terrorists. Now, the administration must address the situation at Guantnamo Bay and must attempt to work with Congress in order to compromise its original policies with the Supreme Courts demands.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES OF HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD After the Supreme Court issued its decision, U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England issued a memo to the rest of the Defense Department. The memo announced the Courts ndings that Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies as a matter of law to the conict with al-Qaeda and that the military commissions as constituted by the Department of Defense are not consistent with Common Article 3.153 However, it is hard to say whether the memo was meant to be read as a simple announcement of the Courts decision or as an indication of sweeping policy changes within the administration while it insists that all Defense Department personnel comply with the standards of Common Article 3, it also asserts that aside from the military commission procedures, existing Department of Defense orders, policies, directives, execute orders, and doctrine comply with the standards of Common Article 3.154 Englands memo captures the vagueness and uncertainty surrounding the administrations reaction to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Congress began its hearings to remedy the situation at Guantnamo Bay in July 2006, but the debate is heated, with strong opinions on both sides. The Republican party is split in two while some lawmakers believe that Congress should simply approve President Bushs military commissions, in order to protect the classied information they involve, some want to create a new system based on the court-martial procedure used for members of the U.S. armed forces, in order to grant detainees broader due process rights. The Democratic party, although not entirely united, mostly sees the hearings as an opportunity to criticize President Bush for his misuse of expanded presidential power.155 Constitutional and military lawyers speaking

commissions violated both U.S. military law and the Geneva Conventions. The courts decision stated that the military commissions were unconstitutional because they had been established without Congressional approval and did not operate under the judiciary branch of the U.S. government they were a function of the executive, controlled by the Department of Defense. Finally, the court ruled that Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions the article pertaining to armed combat not of an international nature did apply to those detained in the

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before Congress have vehemently protested the military tribunals,156 yet administration lawyers have urged Congress to curb detainees rights as much as possible either by signing o on the military tribunal system, by asserting once again that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to terrorist suspects, or by dening the rights of supposed terrorists as narrowly as possible.157 So far, despite urgent demands from congressmen, lawyers, and even members of the military, the Bush administration has revealed an unwillingness to compromise its original policies. THE FIRST PROPOSAL The administration released its rst proposed solution to the situation at Guantnamo Bay on 26 July 2006.160 The proposed bill was drafted by members of the administration and distributed for consideration in order to be formally discussed on the oor of Congress, it would have to be introduced by a congressman. Essentially, the proposal outlines a slightly modied version of the existing military commission procedure. It does include some expanded protections for detainees on trial, yet many of the administrations original guidelines remain intact. The proposed trial system would place no time constraints on a defendants trial he could be punished or tried at any time, or held indenitely, even if found innocent. Hearsay evidence would be permitted unless deemed unreliable by the judge, and, while evidence gained through torture would be banned, evidence gained through other coercive measures would also be permitted at the judges discretion. Defendants would sometimes be excluded from their own trial, on the grounds that members of al-Qaida cannot be trusted with our nations secrets however, they would be given a declassied summary of the information used during their trial.161 The proposal also states that the Geneva Conventions are not a source of judicially enforceable individual rights. This means that, in the future, a detainee would not be allowed to le suit claiming that their Geneva Convention rights had been violated.162 This stipulation would prevent any cases similar to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld from being led in the future. This proposal reveals the Bush administrations uncompromising stance on the status of the detainees at Guantnamo Bay. Although the administration has asserted that it will work with Congress to devise a solution to the problem raised by Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, little progress has been made. With strong opinions on both sides of Congresss deliberations, it is hard to determine who is in the right, and it is hard to say when, or how, the debate will end.

HOLDING PATTERN The Bush administration has also refused to move the detainees at Guantnamo Bay to a facility on U.S. soil. White House Press Secretary Tony Snow explained in early July that there are no plans at this point to move them into another facility except to the extent to which we are able to NGOs, like the International Committee of the Red Cross, have tried to enter U.S. repatriate detention centers. those who might, in fact, be tried and 158 cared for elsewhere. He stated that the detainees at Guantnamo Bay were in a holding pattern, and that those who are not being repatriated are going to be staying there.159 This announcement indicates that, although previous Supreme Court rulings have established that U.S. law applies to Guantnamo Bay and that President Bushs exclusive military commissions are illegal, the detainees at Guantnamo Bay will not be tried within the civil justice system. The Bush administration has claimed that, because none of the Supreme Court decisions related to Guantnamo Bay explicitly rejected the facility itself, the prison may continue to operate.

RELEVANT UN ACTIONS
Aside from a handful of NGO publications detailing the humanitarian conditions at Guantnamo Bay, little international action has been taken to remedy the detainees situation. The U.S. has barred all NGOs other than the ICRC from touring the facility, making any

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third-party intervention practically impossible. Countless humanitarian advocacy groups have called upon the U.S. to improve the conditions at Guantnamo Bay, but the administration has paid even less attention to these demands than it has to those of its own Supreme Court. A number of special rapporteurs, working group representatives, and independent researchers have led requests to inspect the facility at Guantnamo Bay. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) sent a request in January 2002, yet the U.S. denied their request, asserting that WGAD lacked the authority to deal with the law of armed conict.163 The Special Rapporteur on Torture and the Special Rapporteur on Health sent a joint request in January 2004, but the U.S. rejected that as well.164 At the 11th Annual Meeting of Special Rapporteurs, Representatives, Independent Experts and Chairpersons of the Working Groups of the Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights, which took place on 25 June 2004, the delegates to the conference issued a request that four individuals the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, the Special Rapporteur on Torture, the Special Rapporteur on Health, and a representative from WGAD be permitted to visit the detention facility at Guantnamo Bay. The U.S. replied that it would compromise with the representatives by allowing them to instead attend a brieng in Washington, D.C. The representatives rejected this proposal and continued to negotiate with the US, though their request to visit Guantnamo Bay has not been granted.165 But although most NGO workers and representatives have been denied access to Guantnamo Bay, they have been able to compile reports by interviewing lawyers and former detainees, collecting public and declassied documents, analyzing media reports, and surveying U.S. government ocials. This is how The UNs Economic and Social Council (EcoSoc) collected the information presented in its report on Guantnamo Bay, published on 15 February 2006.166 The information was compiled by WGAD, the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, and the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, who have monitored the prisoners situation since June 2004 despite having been denied access to the facility. The report stated that international human rights law applied to those detained in the war on terror, and that the military commissions established by the Bush administration were illegal because they functioned solely as a subset of the executive branch of the U.S. government. It asserted that the detainees held at Guantnamo Bay deserved the right to le habeas corpus petitions in order to challenge the legitimacy of their detention, that the U.S. militarys interrogation techniques as well as the soldiers forcefeeding tactics constituted torture, that the U.S. had acted illegally in transporting detainees to nations that support torture, that the detainees freedom of belief had been violated, that the facilitys poor living conditions violated health standards, and that an impartial monitor was needed to ensure that the conditions at Guantnamo Bay remained humane at all times.167 The report called for the immediate closure of the facility and demanded that the prisoners be moved to U.S. soil and tried in civilian courts. It called upon the U.S. to cease its cruel interrogation techniques, to ban
Detainees at Guantnamo Bay are shackled almost always even when being transported around the facility or undergoing medical care.

force-feeding, to stop transferring detainees to nations known to use torture, and to allow detainees to le complaints regarding their treatment at the facility. It requested that the U.S. fully investigate the allegations of torture and cruelty that have been brought against its soldiers, to train future prison guards according to standard human rights law, to compensate victims of abuse, and to allow increased third-party access to the facility and its prisoners.168

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UN Secretary-General Ko Annan voiced support for EcoSocs report. He stated that, although he did not necessarily agree with everything in the report, he did believe that the facility at Guantnamo Bay should be closed as soon as possible.169 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour similarly stated that, although she did not fully agree with the report, she did agree that the facility needed to be closed.170 The U.S. rejected EcoSocs report. White House spokesmen dismissed its ndings as unreliable because its writers had never actually visited the prison at Guantnamo Bay171 of course, this is because the U.S. had repeatedly rejected their requests to tour the facility. Nevertheless, subsequent requests from other representatives have not been granted. international pressure is needed to improve the situation at Guantnamo Bay. The Council may decide to intervene more directly in Congresss hearings and make a list of recommendations for changes in U.S. policy. National blocs that favor international cooperation, such as the European Union (EU), would probably urge this type of intervention. The HRCs recommendations could address a number of issues living conditions, the trial system, the possibility of compensation for victims of abuse, or the closure of the facility (and what to do with the detainees if the facility is closed). The HRC may nd that some coercive measures, such as sanctions or trade embargoes, would be necessary in order to encourage the U.S. to comply with its suggestions.

PROPOSED SOLTUTIONS
It is clear that changes are taking place in the U.S., but it is dicult to foresee their outcome or to predict the ultimate impact they will have on the situation at Guantnamo Bay. It is up to the HRC to decide whether the U.S. is making enough progress on its own, or whether some international pressure is needed to steer the administration in the right direction. The HRC may nd that the U.S.s actions so far have been satisfactory. The Council may nd that, because the administration is already working with Congress to meet the Supreme Courts demands, no further pressure is needed and the U.S. may be left to devise a solution on its own. Nations that value national sovereignty such as members of the African Union (AU), an organization that has voiced its belief in each nations ability to function individually might be more likely to propose this laissez-faire approach. If the HRC takes this position, the Council may either allow the U.S. to continue deliberating completely independently or may choose to become somewhat involved as an observer to the situation. The HRC may decide that, even though the U.S. is making good progress, some international monitoring of the hearings may be helpful. The HRC may decide to send representatives, such as special rapporteurs, working group members, or independent experts, to the Congressional hearings in order to make recommendations and attempt to shape the U.S.s progress. On the other hand, the HRC may decide that the U.S. is not progressing well on its own and that increased

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER Is the U.S. making enough progress to be allowed to continue working independently? Was the administrations rst proposal legitimate? Must the U.S. be allowed to work on its own in the interest of national sovereignty? How involved should the UN be in shaping the U.S.s progress? Should the UN make recommendations? Send representatives to Congresss hearings? Apply coercive measures? Criticize the U.S.s actions? How can the situation at Guantnamo Bay be remedied? Should the facility be closed? What should be done with its prisoners if it is closed? Should a new trial system be created? How should it operate? How can unfavorable living conditions and human rights abuses be avoided in the future? Should the detainees be compensated?

BLOC POSITIONS
The international response to Guantnamo Bay has been, for the most part, negative, but some distinctions can be made if we consider dierent aspects of the current conict. Right now, dierent nations may have dierent opinions about the level of UN involvement that should inuence Congresss hearings. Countries that favor international involvement in national aairs such as members of the European Union (EU), a regional body that has voiced its commitment to international

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cooperation, communication, and globalization may SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER want the UN to be very involved in the U.S.s progress. RESEARCH In fact, the EU recently voted almost unanimously in The rst document I read when researching this topic favor of a resolution urging the U.S. to close the facility 172 was an essay by Gerard P. Fogarty entitled Guantnamo at Guantnamo Bay, and has been quite vocal in its Bay: Undermining the Global War on Terror. First opposition to the prison. On the other hand, nations published in Joint Force Quarterly, a professional that value national sovereignty over international military journal, in late 2005, Fogartys essay discusses cooperation such as African Union member states, who many dierent aspects of the problem at Guantnamo are committed to preserving every nations independence Bay. For me, it served as a very good introduction to despite being joined together in a regional organization the dierent facets of the issue, and I would highly may believe that the U.S. has the right to solve this recommend it as a starting point for your research. Of problem on its own. Recall the fact that the AU attempted to limit the peace-keeping mission Gratti art on wall in New York City of a hooded detainee held by the U.S. in Guantanamo in Darfur to African forces only, Bay. rejecting UN troops until such outside intervention was absolutely necessary. Nations can also be categorized according to their attentiveness to human rights standards. Although there are few nations that are vocal about human rights abuses or about the use of torture within their own borders, there are many nations that have not signed or ratied certain international humanitarian legislation. One may assess a nations humanitarian priorities and interests by investigating any supposed human rights abuses and by keeping track of which human rights documents it has adopted. Few nations are particularly candid about their negligence regarding human rights, but certain policies may contribute to a sympathy or tolerance for the U.S., course, being an essay, it takes a certain opinion that your nation might not agree with but it does provide a lot or may at lease provide a sense of the nations priorities of helpful information about the dierent key problems and values. surrounding Guantnamo Bay. It can be accessed on Furthermore, although many nations have voiced Joint Force Quarterlys website, at [Link] their opposition to the U.S.s treatment of terror suspects, doctrine/jef/jfq_pubs/[Link]. dierent countries may do this for dierent reasons. There In addition, you can nd a lot of lengthy reports and are many facets to this issue, and dierent nations may take particular oence to specic aspects of the problem. press releases from the Amnesty International library at [Link]/library/engindex. These reports should For example, Arab nations may be particularly concerned that the Military Order only applies to foreign nationals, give you a good idea of the humanitarian situation at making it a seemingly racist or xenophobic document. the facility and of the dierent types of abuses that have taken place there. To follow the dierent Supreme Court Every nation has dierent priorities and values, and cases and their impact on the Bush administration, search looking into these values may provide a more complex the archives at any major newspaper I used the New view of their opinions toward Guantnamo Bay.

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York Times and found that it provided excellent coverage of the U.S.s progress, but any national or international newspaper that has covered the evolving conict at Guantnamo Bay will do. The New York Times provides links to relevant documents along with its articles, and I would recommend that you take a look at these documents as well. Of course, I am not asking you to read entire Supreme Court decisions but you can start by looking at the humanitarian legislation that has been violated by the conditions at Guantnamo Bay. Try glancing over the ICCPR, the Convention on Torture and Other Cruel, Unusual, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, and, of course, the Third Geneva Convention. Dont worry some of these documents are quite short and straightforward! You should also try to read some of the laws and memos the U.S. has issued in response to the situation at Guantnamo Bay. The Military Order, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Gordon Englands memo can all give you a better sense of the U.S.s policies in the war on terror. I will include some of these documents with your study guide, but I will also post a full listing of helpful links on the HRC website. Be sure to take a look at these links they can help you locate the documents you are looking for and guide you to new resources as well. As always, you can also feel free to contact me if you are having trouble nding the information you need I would be glad to help point you in the right direction. Good luck! assigned the exclusive task of drafting an entire resolution for each of the issues. Your position paper should express the solutions that would go into this ideal solution. You should submit one position paper for each topic area. Each position paper should be one to two pages in length, and should be broken into three sections an introduction, a discussion of your nations suggestions, and a discussion of the opposition you expect to face. The introduction should briey summarize the issue at hand and should explain any previous involvement your nation has had either with the conict or with similar situations. This section should explain what your nations priorities are when dealing with the given conict, and should discuss which elements of the issue are most, and least, troublesome to your country. If your country has had any experience with situations similar to the issue at hand, discuss it in your introduction. The second section should list your nations suggestions. It should provide a clear and comprehensive outline of the solutions your country would consider ideal. Do not simply repeat everything I have written in the Proposed Solutions section of the study guide I want to hear your nations opinion, not a list of every possible solution to the issue! Be sure to include whatever implementation measures will be necessary for your proposed solutions. Dont forget to discuss the dierent aspects of the issue at hand; to remind yourself of all the dierent questions being asked of you, you may refer to the Questions A Resolution Must Answer section of the study guide. Your position papers should answer all these questions as well. The third section should address the counterarguments to your position. There will, of course, be nations (or entire blocs) that disagree with your suggestions; try to gure out which nations or blocs these will be and why. Explain how you will address their counterarguments and how you will deal with opposing suggestions during debate. This section will prepare you to argue your case during committee, and will help you anticipate the opposition that you like every nation will undoubtedly face during your negotiations. If you have any questions about the format or content of your position papers, do not hesitate to contact me as I would be more than happy to give you a few pointers or help you out in any way I can. I will encourage you to put a lot of eort into researching your countrys position and developing a concrete argument in your position papers. Although the position papers are intended to give the HRC sta an idea of the dialogue we will see during debate, they are also a perfect opportunity for

POSITION PAPERS
Before the conference, you will be required to submit a set of position papers. Position papers will allow me, and the rest of the HRC sta, to get some idea of your countrys opinions on the two topic areas we will be debating as a committee. After reading the study guide and doing some additional research on your own, you should be able to determine what sort of thoughts a representative of your country would have regarding the two issues at hand, and what kinds of suggestions he or she would propose to the rest of the HRC. You can think of position papers as your countrys idea of a perfect resolution. Imagine that your nation was

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you to ne-tune your nations argument and anticipate the conversations you will be having with your fellow delegates. Dont let this opportunity go to waste the more eort you put into your position papers, the more prepared you will be for the conference!

BIBLIOGRAPHY
HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE The Commission on Human Rights Commission on Human Rights. Oce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. < h t t p : // [Link]/html/menu2/2/[Link]> 18 August 2006. Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), The International Bill of Human Rights. Oce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. <[Link] menu6/2/[Link]> 18 August 2006. The Human Rights Council Annan, Ko A. Wise Council. Wall Street Journal. 20 March 2006. Press Articles by the Secretary General. The United Nations. < h t t p : / / w w w. [Link]/News/ossg/sg/stories> 18 August 2006. Public Statement: UN Human Rights Council: A New Beginning for Human Rights. Amnesty International. 10 May 2006. <[Link] [Link]/news> 18 August 2006. Questions and Answers on the Human Rights Council. The United Nations. <[Link] w w. u n . o r g/ News/dh/infocus/hr_council/hr_q_and_a.htm> 18 August 2006. Topic Area A: The Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act Background Information Conict History: Sudan. International Crisis Group. <[Link]> 2 June 2006. International Activity Report 2005: Sudan. Mdecins sans Frontires. <[Link] publications/ar/i2005/sudan/cfm. 2 June 2006. Lydia Polgreen. As Darfur War Rages On, Disease and Hunger Kill. New York Times. 31 May 2006. Sudan. Amnesty International. <[Link] org> 31 May 2006. Sudan Crisis: Background. Amnesty International. <[Link]/web/pages/sdn- background-eng> Last visited 31 May 2006.

CLOSING REMARKS
Thats all from me the rest of your research and preparation are up to you. Be sure to research these topics thoroughly, both in general and as they relate to your country. Develop a strong position and try to anticipate the opposition you will face during debate. Be aware of points of possible compromise as well. I would encourage you to put a lot of eort into ne-tuning your nations position instead of coming up with a broad list of possible suggestions; develop a concrete solution that you think will work and gure out how to best implement it. The best solutions are fully thought out and comprehensive in their scope. Of course, you should expect to face delegates who disagree with you, and you should expect to compromise your ideas in order to write a resolution that is acceptable to the entire committee but the more concrete your ideas are when you enter the conference room, the more impact they will have on the outcome of our debate. Dont worry if all this preparation seems daunting attending the conference will be a challenge for everyone. But the more you prepare for it, the more comfortable you will be both during debate and while negotiating with other delegates. I am here to help you out in any way I can while you prepare for the conference, and I would be glad to answer any questions you have as you begin your research. If you have any concerns or are in need of any guidance (or if youd just like to introduce yourself and say hi!), please feel free to contact me I want you to feel comfortable and well-prepared when it comes time to open debate. I know you are all capable of developing some great ideas and creative solutions to the issues we will be discussing, and I cant wait to hear them in December. Good luck!

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Timeline: Sudan. BBC News. <[Link]> 2 June 2006. The Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act Memorandum on The Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act. A m n e s t y International. 17 February 2006. <[Link]. com> 9 May 2006. Open Letter to Omer Hassan Ahmed Elbashir, President of the Republic of Sudan. The O b s e r v a t o r y for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. 7 November 2005. <[Link]> 2 June 2006. Press Release: Human Rights and Humanitarian Organizations at Risk in Sudan. The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and the Sudan Organization Against Torture. Paris-Geneva-London, 7 March 2006. <[Link]> 31 May 2006. Hostility Toward NGO Workers Press Release: Aid Workers Killed in Darfur. Save the Children. Toronto, 13 December 2004. <www. [Link]> 7 July 2006. Press Release: Sudan: Aid Workers Kidnapped in Darfur. Amnesty International. 30 September 2005. <web. [Link]/library> 31 May 2006. Press Release: Sudan: Amnesty International Representatives Detained and Human Rights Activists Harassed. Amnesty International. 23 January 2006. Press Release: Sudan: Continuing Blockade of Humanitarian Aid. Amnesty International. 4 April 2006. <[Link]/library> 31 May 2006. Press Release: Continued Harassment of Sudanese NGO and Curtailment to Freedom of Expression and Association in Sudan. Amnesty International. 16 March 2006. <[Link]/library> 31 May 2006. Press Release: Sudan: Leading Sudanese human Rights Group Targeted by Government. Amnesty International. 6 October 2005. < we b. a m n e s t y. org/library> 31 May 2006. Rejection by the Parliament of the 2005 Humanitarian Aid Bill. The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. 16 February 2006. <[Link] 2 June 1006. Sudan: Ongoing Harassment of Human Rights Defenders. Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. 31 January 2006. <http:// [Link]> 2 June 1006. UN Actions General Assembly Resolution 53/144. 9 December 1998. <[Link]> 7 July 2006. Joint Communiqu Between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on the Occasion of the Visit of UN SG to Sudan, 29 June 3 July 2004. 3 July 2004. <[Link]> 12 June 2006. Security Council Resolution 1547. 11 June 2004. <www. [Link]/docs/sc> 8 June 2006. Security Council Resolution 1556. 30 July 2004. <www. [Link]/docs/sc> 8 June 2006. Security Council Resolution 1564. 18 September 2004. <[Link]/docs/sc> 8 June 2006. Security Council Resolution 1590. 24 March 2005. <[Link]/docs/sc> 8 June 2006. Security Council Resolution 1591. 29 March 2005. <[Link]/docs/sc> 8 June 2006. Security Council Resolution 1593. 31 March 2005. <[Link]/docs/sc> 8 June 2006. Global Actions Head-to-Head: Russian NGOs Bill. BBC News. 23 November 2005. <[Link]> 14 June 2006. New Restrictive NGO Law. Human Rights First. <[Link]/pdf/06104-hrd-ngo_ [Link]> 7 July 2006. Simpson, Emma. Russia Considers NGO Restrictions. BBC News. 9 November 2005. < n e w s . b b c. [Link]> 14 June 2006.

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TOPIC AREA B: THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF TERROR SUSPECTS The War on Terror de Nevers, Renee. Modernizing the Geneva Conventions. Provocations. Vol. 29, Issue 2. Spring 2006. Isiko, Michael. Detainees Rights: Scalia Speaks his Mind. Newsweek. Vol. 147, Issue 14. 3 April 2006. Ullman, Harlan. Needed: A Code of Conduct for the War on Terror. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 132, Issue 1. January 2006. War on Terror Timeline. United States Department of Homeland Security. <[Link] les/timeline> 20 June 2006. Wilson, Richard Ashby. Human Rights in the War on Terror. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2005. Relevant International Humanitarian Legislation Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. 9 December 1988. <[Link] 20 June 2006. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 10 December 1984. <[Link] 20 June 2006. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. 21 December 1965. <[Link] 20 June 2006. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 16 December 1966. <[Link] 20 June 2006. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. 18 May 1977. <[Link] 20 June 2006. Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. <[Link] 20 June 2006. Guantnamo Bay A Guantnamo Timeline. The Washington Post. <http:// [Link]> 20 June 2006. Detaining Enemy Combatants: A Timeline. National Public Radio. <[Link] 20 June 2006. Fogarty, Gerard P. Guantnamo Bay: Undermining the Global War on Terror. Joint Force Quarterly No. 39. October 2005. Press Release: USA: Detainees in Guantnamo Bay Should not be Beyond the Protection of the Law. Amnesty International. 13 December 2002. <[Link] 17 June 2006. United States of America: Holding Human Rights Hostage. Amnesty International. 24 December 2003. <[Link] 17 June 2006. United States of America: Memorandum to the U.S. Government on the Rights of People i n Custody in Afghanistan and Guantnamo Bay. Amnesty International. <[Link] org> 17 June 2006. United States of America: The Threat of a Bad Example: Undermining International Standards as War on Terror Detentions Continue. Amnesty International. <[Link] 17 June 2006. USA: AI Calls on the USA to End Legal Limbo of Guantnamo Prisoners. Amnesty I n t e r n a t i o n a l . <[Link] 17 June 2006. USA: Post 11 September Detainees Deprived of their Basic Rights. Amnesty International. <http:// [Link]/library> 17 June 2006. Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations on the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations. U.S. Department of Defense. 4 April 2003. Hunger Strikes and Protests The Guantnamo Hunger Strikes and Protests: February 2002 August 2005. The Center for Constitutional Rights: Guantnamo Global Justice Initiative. 2005. <[Link] 24 July 2006. Lewis, Neil A. Widespread Hunger Strike at Guantnamo. New York Times. 18 September 2005. <http:// [Link]> 24 July 2006.

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Risen, James and Tim Golden. Three Prisoners Commit Suicide at Guantnamo. 11 June 2006. <[Link] 24 July 2006. Schmitt, Eric and Tim Golden. Force-Feeding at Guantnamo is Now Acknowledged. New York Times. 22 February 2006. <[Link] com> 24 July 2006. Trial by Military Commission Detainee Treatment Act. 30 December 2005. Council on Foreign Relations. <[Link] publication/9865> 15 July 2006. Military Order on the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism. 13 November 2001. <[Link] 20 June Supreme Court Cases and the Administrations Reaction Bush Pledges to Obey, Analyze Supreme Courts Ruling. National Public Radio. 25 July 2006. <http:// [Link]> 25 July 2006. Cloud, David S. and Sheryl Gay Stolberg. White House Bill Proposes System to Try Detainees. New York Times. 26 July 2006. <[Link] 26 July 2006. Froomkin, Dan. The Undoing Begins. Washington Post. 11 July 2006. <[Link] com> 25 July 2006. Greenhouse, Linda. The Ruling on Tribunals: The Overview; Justices, 5-3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try Detainees. New York Times. 30 June 2006. < h t t p : // [Link]> 21 July 2006. Guantnamo Prisoners Wont be Moved to U.S. Soil: United States. Reuters. New York Times. 10 July 2006. <[Link] 11 July 2006. Lewis, Neal A. and John ONeil. In Big Shift, U.S. to Follow Geneva Treaty for Detainees. New York Times. 11 July 2006. <[Link] 11 July 2006. Margulies, Joseph. Wiggle Room on Cruelty. Washington Post. 17 July 2006. <[Link] com> 25 July 2006. Memorandum: Application of Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions to the Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense. Oce of the Secretary of Defense. 7 July 2006. Reaction to the Supreme Courts Hamdan Decision. National Public Radio. 25 July 2006. <http:// [Link]> 25 July 2006. US Will Give Detainees Geneva Rights. The Associated Press. New York Times. 11 July 2006. <[Link] [Link]> 11 July 2006. Zernike, Kate. Military Lawyers Urge Protections for Detainees. New York Times. 14 July 2006. <[Link] 26 July 2006. Zernike, Kate. White House Prods Congress to Curb Detainee Rights. New York Times. 13 July 2006. <[Link] 26 July 2006. Zernike, Kate and Sheryl Gay Stolberg. Detainee Rights Create a Divide on Capitol Hill. New York Times. 10 July 2006. <[Link] 26 July 2006. UN Actions Annan: Shut Down Guantnamo Prison Camp. CNN. 17 February 2006. <[Link] 28 July 2006. Situation of Detainees at Guantnamo Bay. EcoSoc Report E/CN.4/2006/120. 15 February 2006. UN Calls for Guantnamo Closure. BBC News. <http:// [Link]> 28 July 2006. UN Press Release: UN Experts Address Concerns Regarding Guantnamo Bay Detainees. 23 June 2005. <[Link] 28 July 2006. International Actions Euro MPs Urge Guantnamo Closure. BBC News. 13 June 2006. <[Link] Guantnamo Clouds EU-US Meeting. BBC News. 21 June 2006. <[Link] 28 July 2006.

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Letter to Foreign Ministers Regarding the EU Call to Close Guantnamo Bay. Human Rights Watch. 14 July 2006. <[Link] docs/2006/07/14/[Link]> 28 July 2006. Press Release: Human Rights and Humanitarian Organizations at Risk in Sudan. The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and the Sudan Organization Against Torture. Paris-Geneva-London, 7 March 2006. <[Link]> 31 May 2006. 19 Conict History: Sudan. International Crisis Group. <[Link]> 2 June 2006. 20 Ibid. 21 Timeline: Sudan. BBC News. <[Link]> 2 June 2006. 22 Ibid. 23 Conict History: Sudan. 24 Timeline: Sudan. 25 Ibid. 26 Conict History: Sudan. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Timeline: Sudan. 31 Conict History: Sudan. 32 Timeline: Sudan. 33 Ibid. 34 Conict History: Sudan. 35 Timeline: Sudan. 36 Conict History: Sudan. 37 Timeline: Sudan. 38 Conict History: Sudan. 39 Ibid. 40 Timeline: Sudan. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Conict History: Sudan. 53 Timeline: Sudan. 54 Ibid. 55 Conict History: Sudan. 56 Timeline: Sudan. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Conict History: Sudan. 60 Ibid.
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ENDNOTES
Public Statement: UN Human Rights Council: A New Beginning for Human Rights. Amnesty International. 10 May 2006. <[Link] org/news> 18 August 2006. 2 Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), The International Bill of Human Rights. Oce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. <[Link] [Link]> 18 August 2006. 3 Commission on Human Rights. Oce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. <[Link] ch/html/menu2/2/[Link]> 18 August 2006. 4 Questions and Answers on the Human Rights Council. The United Nations. <[Link] News/dh/infocus/hr_council/hr_q_and_a.htm> 18 August 2006. 5 Commission on Human Rights. Oce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. <[Link] ch/html/menu2/2/[Link]> 18 August 2006. 6 Ibid. 7 Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), The International Bill of Human Rights. 8 Public Statement: UN Human Rights Council: A New Beginning for Human Rights. 9 Questions and Answers on the Human Rights Council. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Annan, Ko A. Wise Council. Wall Street Journal. 20 March 2006. Press Articles by the Secretary-General. The United Nations. <[Link] stories> 18 August 2006. 13 Questions and Answers on the Human Rights Council. 14 Sudan Crisis: Background. Amnesty International. <[Link]/web/pages/sdn-background-eng> Last visited 31 May 2006. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Lydia Polgreen. As Darfur War Rages On, Disease and Hunger Kill. New York Times. 31 May 2006.
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Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Security Council Resolution 1556. 30 July 2004. <[Link]/docs/sc> 8 June 2006. 64 Security Council Resolution 1593. 31 March 2005. <[Link]/docs/sc> 8 June 2006. 65 Polgreen. 66 Press Release: Human Rights and Humanitarian Organizations at Risk in Sudan. 67 Memorandum on The Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act. Amnesty International. 17 February 2006. <[Link]. com> 9 May 2006. 68 Open Letter to Omer Hassan Ahmed Elbashir, President of the Republic of Sudan. The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. 7 November 2005. <[Link]> 2 June 2006. 69 Press Release: Human Rights and Humanitarian Organizations at Risk in Sudan. 70 Memorandum on The Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act. 71 Press Release: Human Rights and Humanitarian Organizations at Risk in Sudan. 72 Memorandum on The Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act. 73 Press Release: Human Rights and Humanitarian Organizations at Risk in Sudan. 74 Memorandum on The Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act. 75 Open Letter to Omer Hassan Ahmed Elbashir, President of the Republic of Sudan. 76 Ibid. 77 Press Release: Human Rights and Humanitarian Organizations at Risk in Sudan. 78 Ibid. 79 General Assembly Resolution 53/144. 9 December 1998. <[Link]> 7 July 2006. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Press Release: Aid Workers Killed in Darfur. Save the Children. Toronto, 13 December 2004. <www. [Link]> 7 July 2006. 83 Open Letter to Omer Hassan Ahmed Elbashir, President of the Republic of Sudan. 84 Ibid. 85 Press Release: Sudan: Aid Workers Kidnapped in Darfur. Amnesty International. 30 September 2005. <[Link]/library> 31 May 2006.
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Open Letter to Omer Hassan Ahmed Elbashir, President of the Republic of Sudan. 87 Press Release: Sudan: Leading Sudanese human Rights Group Targeted by Government. Amnesty International. 6 October 2005. <[Link]/ library> 31 May 2006. 88 Press Release: Sudan: Amnesty International Representatives Detained and Human Rights Activists Harassed. Amnesty International. 23 January 2006. <[Link]/library> 31 May 2006. 89 Ibid. 90 Press Release: Sudan: Continuing Blockade of Humanitarian Aid. Amnesty International. 4 April 2006. <[Link]/library> 31 May 2006. 91 Ibid. 92 Security Council Resolution 1547. 11 June 2004. <[Link]/docs/sc> 8 June 2006. 93 Security Council Resolution 1590. 24 March 2005. <[Link]/docs/sc> 8 June 2006. 94 Joint Communiqu Between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on the Occasion of the Visit of UN SG to Sudan, 29 June 3 July 2004. 3 July 2004. <[Link]> 12 June 2006. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Security Council Resolution 1556. 30 July 2004. <[Link]/docs/sc> 8 June 2006. 101 Security Council Resolution 1564. 18 September 2004. <[Link]/docs/sc> 8 June 2006. 102 Ibid. 103 Security Council Resolution 1591. 29 March 2005. <[Link]/docs/sc> 8 June 2006. 104 Ibid. 105 Security Council Resolution 1593. 31 March 2005. <[Link]/docs/sc> 8 June 2006. 106 Simpson, Emma. [Link] Considers NGO Restrictions. BBC News. 9 November 2005. <[Link]. [Link]> 14 June 2006. 107 New Restrictive NGO Law. Human Rights First. <[Link]/pdf/06104-hrd-ngo_law. pdf> 7 July 2006. 108 Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 AugU.S.t 1949. <[Link] 20 June 2006. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid.
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A Guantnamo Timeline. The Washington Post. <[Link] 20 June 2006. 112 Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations on the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations. U.S. Department of Defense. 4 April 2003. 113 Fogarty, Gerard P. Guantnamo Bay: Undermining the Global War on Terror. Joint Force Quarterly No. 39. October 2005. 114 Ibid. 115 Detaining Enemy Combatants: A Timeline. National Public Radio. <[Link] 20 June 2006. 116 United States of America: Memorandum to the U.S. Government on the Rights of People in [Link] in Afghanistan and Guantnamo Bay. Amnesty International. <[Link] 17 June 2006. 117 United States of America: The Threat of a Bad Example: Undermining International Standards as War on Terror Detentions Continue. Amnesty International. <[Link] 17 June 2006. 118 Memorandum to the U.S. Government on the Right of People in Custody in Afghanistan and Guantnamo Bay. 119 The Threat of a Bad Example: Undermining International Standards as War on Terror Detentions Continue. 120 Memorandum to the U.S. Government on the Right of People in Custody in Afghanistan and Guantnamo Bay. 121 Ibid. 122 The Threat of a Bad Example: Undermining International Standards as War on Terror Detentions Continue. 123 Memorandum to the U.S. Government on the Right of People in Custody in Afghanistan and Guantnamo Bay. 124 The Threat of a Bad Example: Undermining International Standards as War on Terror Detentions Continue. 125 Military Order on the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism. 13 November 2001. <[Link] [Link]> 20 June 2006. 126 Ibid. 127 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 16 December 1966. <[Link] 20 June 2006.
111

International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. 21 December 1965. <[Link] 20 June 2006. 129 Military Order on the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism. 130 Ibid. 131 The Threat of a Bad Example: Undermining International Standards as War on Terror Detentions Continue. 132 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 133 Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. 9 December 1988. <[Link] 20 June 2006. 134 Military Order on the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism. 135 Ibid. 136 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 137 Ibid. 138 Detainee Treatment Act. 30 December 2005. Council on Foreign Relations. <[Link] publication/9865> 15 July 2006. 139 The Guantnamo Hunger Strikes and Protests: February 2002 August 2005. The Center for Constitutional Rights: Guantnamo Global Justice Initiative. 2005. <[Link] 24 July 2006. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid. 144 Lewis, Neil A. Widespread Hunger Strike at Guantnamo. New York Times. 18 September 2005. <[Link] 24 July 2006. 145 The Guantnamo Hunger Strikes and Protests: February 2002 August 2005. 146 Schmitt, Eric and Tim Golden. Force-Feeding at Guantnamo is Now Acknowledged. New York Times. 22 February 2006. <[Link] 24 July 2006. 147 The Guantnamo Hunger Strikes and Protests: February 2002 August 2005. 148 Risen, James and Tim Golden. Three Prisoners Commit Suicide at Guantnamo. 11 June 2006. <http:// [Link]> 24 July 2006. 149 Greenhouse, Linda. The Ruling on Tribunals: The Overview; Justices, 5-3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try
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Detainees. New York Times. 30 June 2006. <[Link] [Link]> 21 July 2006. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid. 153 Memorandum: Application of Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions to the Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense. Oce of the Secretary of Defense. 7 July 2006. 154 Ibid. 155 Zernike, Kate and Sheryl Gay Stolberg. Detainee Rights Create a Divide on Capitol Hill. New York Times. 10 July 2006. <[Link] 26 July 2006. 156 Zernike, Kate. Military Lawyers Urge Protections for Detainees. New York Times. 14 July 2006. <http:// [Link]> 26 July 2006. 157 Zernike, Kate. White HoU.S.e Prods Congress to Curb Detainee Rights. New York Times. 13 July 2006. <[Link] 26 July 2006. 158 Guantnamo Prisoners Wont be Moved to U.S. Soil: United States. Reuters. New York Times. 10 July 2006. <[Link] 11 July 2006. 159 Ibid. 160 Cloud, David S. and Sheryl Gay Stolberg. White HoU.S.e Bill Proposes System to Try Detainees. New York Times. 26 July 2006. <[Link] 26 July 2006. 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid. 163 UN Press Release: Un Experts Address Concerns Regarding Guantnamo Bay Detainees. 23 June 2005. <[Link] 28 July 2006. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 166 Situation of Detainees at Guantnamo Bay. EcoSoc Report E/CN.4/2006/120. 15 February 2006. 167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. 169 Annan: Shut Down Guantnamo Prison Camp. CNN. 17 February 2006. <[Link] 28 July 2006. 170 UN Calls for Guantnamo Closure. BBC News. <[Link] 28 July 2006. 171 Ibid. 172 Euro MPs Urge Guantnamo Closure. BBC News. 13 June 2006. <[Link] 28 July 2006.

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