PRIVATE NUISANCE CASE LIST

ENGLISH LAW CASES

1. De Keyser’s Royal Hotel v Spicer Bros Ltd (1914) 30 TLR 257

Private Nuisance – Injunction – Building Work – Continuing State of Affairs

Facts
The defendants were constructing a building nearby to the claimant’s hotel. This involved the
excavation of the foundations and pile-driving operations to be carried out as a result. The
excavation work was carried on between 7:30 pm and 6:40am, with pile-driving operations being
carried on mostly during the daytime. However, on one occasion the pile-driving continued
throughout the night. The claimant’s brought a claim in private nuisance alleging that the
ongoing activity prevented guests from sleeping and from guests being able to hear the speaker
after dinner. The claimants sought an injunction to prevent the work being carried out at these
times.

Issues
Whether the defendant’s temporary building works could constitute a nuisance. Whether or not
the temporary work was of a consistent enough nature to constitute a continuous interference
with the claimant’s amenities and the enjoyment of their land.

Decision/Outcome
The claim was successful. The defendants had not operated their excavation and building in a
reasonable manner, and the interference with the claimant’s land was capable of constituting a
continuous interference with their enjoyment of their land. This was the case even though the
building works were temporary in nature and would eventually cease, because the works had
continued throughout the evening for a matter of months and because they had been carried out
at unreasonable times in the evening and through the night. This had resulted in the guests being
unable to sleep. Private nuisance did not require that the nuisance be completely permanent in
nature, but it was required that it was continuous. This was so in this case, and as such the
injunction could be granted.

2. Andrea v Selfridge [1937] All ER 255 CA

Excessive noise due to demolition works was considered a nuisance.

3. Thompson Schwab v Costake [1956] 1 All ER 652

Using adjoining premises for prostitution.

4. St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping (1865)

Private Nuisance – Physical Damage to Property – Character of Locality

Facts
The claimant was the owner of a large country house with over a thousand acres of land. This
land was close to a copper smelting factory which had long been in operation. The smelting
factory discharged noxious gasses as a result of its operation, which were considered to be a
normal part of the smelting operation. As a result, trees on the claimant’s land were damaged by
the fumes and noxious gasses. The claimant sued in nuisance.

Issues
Whether the defendant had acquired the right to carry on with the discharge of their fumes as a
result of the smelting through acquisition and long usage. Whether it was a defense that the
claimant ‘came to the nuisance’.

Decision/Outcome
The claim was allowed. It was no defence to say that the claimant ‘came to the nuisance’ and the
defendant could not be said to have acquired a right through prescription to continue to discharge
noxious fumes. Whilst smelting and the discharge of these fumes was not in itself unlawful, and
in a locality in which this was to be expected there could be no nuisance. However, in nuisance
cases like this, it is necessary to distinguish between nuisance alleged to have caused loss of
amenities and comfort, and nuisance which is said to have caused physical damage to property.
Where there had been physical damage to the claimant’s property as had occurred in this case the
question of the character of the locality itself was irrelevant, where it may have been relevant if
the alleged nuisance was only in the form of discomfort.

5. Crown River Cruises v Kimbolton Fireworks [1996] 2 Llyod’s Rep 533

Nuisance – Fireworks – Physical Damage to Property

Facts
The defendants, Kimbolton Fireworks, carried out a short firework display that lasted for some
twenty minutes or so. As a result of the fireworks display, some burning debris landed on the
claimant’s river barge which had been moored on the river on their property, and set fire to it
causing it damage. The area was rural, and the river boat was moored permanently in place. The
claimants sued in private nuisance and the defendants alleged, firstly, that a nuisance could not
be constituted in law by an action lasting only twenty minutes, and secondly that as it was a boat
that was damaged and not their ‘land’ itself, this was not actionable in nuisance.

Issues
Whether or not a nuisance could be constituted by even an act that was short in duration. If so,
whether or not the claimant’s had a cause of action considering that it was the defendant’s river
boat which was damaged rather than the underlying land itself as a result of the nuisance.

Decision/Outcome
The claim was allowed. There was a nuisance in this particular case even though the firework
display only lasted for such as short period of time. The claimant’s barge was moored
permanently in place, and as such it could be considered to be an extension of the claimant’s
land. As this was physically damaged by the defendant’s actions, following St Helen’s Smelting
Co v Tippings [1865] 11 HL Cas 642 it could not be said that the locality of the area was a
defense to the harm caused.
 6. Williams v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd [2018] 3 WLR
7. Fearn v Trustees of the Tate Gallery [2020] 2 WLR 1081
8. Tetley v Chitty [1986]
The local authority granted planning permission to run a go-kart track which residents, complaint
of noise which could be heard in their houses.

⮚ Local authority had leased it to a go kart club and argued that having leased the land they

were no longer in occupation.

⮚ Ct held that local authority liable as the excessive noise was a predictable consequence
for which the land is let.

Test to be applied: Who authorized the activity and whether the interference is foreseeable
from the activity.

9. Southport Corporation v Esso Petroleum Ltd[1953]

10. Hunter v Canary Wharf (1997)

Television signal, actionable nuisance, property right requirement for claimants

Facts
A large tower was constructed in the Docklands area of East London which now goes by the
name of One Canada Square. It was constructed by Canary Wharf Ltd. The tower was 250
metres tall and was completed near the end of 1990. Its location was very close (less then 10
kilometres away) to the primary television transmitter of the BBC, which is located in Crystal
Palace. As a result, the tower interfered with the television reception of a group of residents of
the Isle of Dogs. This interference was fixed by April 1991 through the installation of a
broadcast relay in Balfron Tower. The claim in the case argued private nuisance for the period
during which interference was felt. 690 claims were made against Canary Wharf Ltd on those
grounds. Further, 513 claims were started against London Docklands Development Corporation
for damages suffered from excessive dust emanating from the construction site. Some of the
claimants were either owners or tenants, but others did not have any property interests.
Issue
The issue in this case was whether interference with one’s television reception amounted to
actionable nuisance and further, whether it was necessary for the claimant to have a property
interest before a claim could be launched.

Decision/Outcome
It was held that interference with one’s television reception through the construction of a
neighbouring structure could not and does not amount to an actionable nuisance. Further, it was
held that only claimants with property rights can launch actions for private nuisance.
Khorasanjian v Bush [1993] 3 WLR 476 was overruled in the parts holding that a mere licensee
can start a private nuisance action.

It was observed by the court that:

“In this case, however, the defendants say that the type of interference alleged, namely by the
erection of a building between the plaintiffs’ homes and the Crystal Palace transmitter, cannot as
a matter of law constitute an actionable nuisance. This is not by virtue of anything peculiar to
television. It applies equally to interference with the passage of light or air or radio signals or to
the obstruction of a view. The general principle is that at common law anyone may build
whatever he likes upon his land. If the effect is to interfere with the light, air or view of his
neighbour, that is his misfortune. The owner’s right to build can be restrained only by covenant
or the acquisition (by grant or prescription) of an easement of light or air for the benefit of
windows or apertures on adjoining land.”
- (Lord Hoffman).
 11. Malone v Laskey (1907)

Tort Law – Interest – Standing – Nuisance

Facts
The claimant lived in a house belonging to her husband’s employer. The claimant’s husband was
a tenant, and she had a license to live at the property. Whilst using the lavatory, the cistern was
dislodged by vibrations caused by the next-door neighbour’s electricity generator, which fell on
her causing her injuries. She sued her neighbour in nuisance. It was alleged that the claimant
could not bring the suit because nuisance required the claimant to have an ‘interest’ in the land
subjected to the nuisance.

Issues
Whether the claimant could claim in nuisance despite not owning the property? Whether a mere
license was enough to claim an ‘interest’ in land in order to be able to sue. Whether the claimant
had a proper cause of action. Whether a mere licensee could sue in nuisance.

Decision / Outcome
Her claim in nuisance failed. As her husband was only a tenant of the property, he did not have
an ‘interest’ in the land, and as such could not sue in nuisance. The claimant herself could not
sue in nuisance because she was only a licensee and as such could not have an ‘interest’ in the
land affected by the alleged nuisance and so had no cause of action in this case. No principle of
law could be formulated to the effect that a person who has no interest in property, nor any right
of occupation in the proper sense of the term, can maintain an action for a nuisance. Therefore,
the claimant’s claim failed and she had no cause of action at all. No mere licensee could sue in
nuisance.

12. Khorasandjian v Bush [1993]

 13. Bolton v Stone

TORT OF NEGLIGENCE – FACTORS RELEVANT TO BREACH OF DUTY

Facts
The claimant was injured after a ball from a neighbouring cricket pitch flew into her outside her
home. The cricket field was arranged such that it was protected by a 17-foot gap between the
ground and the top of the surrounding fence. Balls had been known to get over the fence and
land in people’s yards, but this was rare, making the strike which hit the claimant exceptional.
The claimant sued the cricket club in the tort of negligence for her injuries.

Issue
Establishing the tort of negligence involves establishing that the defendant owed the claimant a
duty of care, which they breached in a manner which caused the claimant recoverable harm. To
establish a breach of any duty owed, the claimant must establish that the defendant failed to act
as a reasonable person would in their position.

The issue in this case was what factors were relevant to determining how the reasonable person
would behave, and therefore when the defendant would be in breach of their duty of care.

Decision / Outcome
The House of Lords held that the cricket club was not in breach of their duty. The following
factors were held to be relevant to whether a defendant is in breach of their duty of care:

● The likelihood of harm;

● What precautions were practical for a defendant to take in terms of cost and effort;
● Whether the defendant provides a socially-useful service.

In this case, the likelihood of the harm was very low, and erecting a fence any higher than the
defendant had already done would be impractical. The cricket club was also providing a socially
useful service to the community. A reasonable cricket club would have, therefore, not behaved
any differently.
 14. Miller v Jackson [1977]

Introduction
The case of Miller v Jackson1 is a case of nuisance. The tort of nuisance provides that there will
be a remedy where an indirect and unreasonable interference to land has occurred.2 Where a
nuisance is found to have occurred the court may grant an injunction restricting the nuisance
from occurring in the future. Alternatively, the court may determine that the appropriate remedy
is an award of damages.

Prior to Miller v Jackson3 it had previously been held that there was no defence of ‘coming to the
nuisance’.4 For example, in Sturges v Bridgman5 the defendant was a confectioner who had
operated in the premises for more than 20 years. A doctor moved in next door and found that the
noise and vibrations from the confectioner’s work interfered with his practice. The court upheld
the doctor’s request for an injunction even though the doctor had known about the confectioner’s
work. However, public policy may have a role to play. In Bolton v Stone6 the pursuit of cricket
was held to have benefit to society which negated negligence where the damage only arose
exceptionally.

In relation to the grant of an injunction, the prior case law indicated that damages would only be
granted in lieu of injunction in exceptional circumstances.7 These circumstances were that the
injury was small and capable of being estimated in money, the injury could be adequately
compensated by a small money payment and the case is one in which it would be oppressive to
the defendant to grant an injunction.8

Issues
The issues for the Court of Appeal in Miller v Jackson9 were whether the defendants were guilty
of negligence and/or nuisance; whether there was a defence of ‘coming to the nuisance’; whether
policy reasoning should impact the granting of an injunction.

Facts
The defendants had played cricket on a particular area of land for around 70 years. The
neighbouring land was then sold for development and houses built on it. The plaintiffs bought
one of the houses and then complained of negligence and nuisance from cricket balls landing on
the property. The plaintiffs suffered damage to property and also complained that the activities of
the cricketers prevented the enjoyment of their land and caused nervous damage. The first
instance judge granted the injunction sought.

Outcome/Decision
By a majority, the Court of Appeal found that the cricket club was guilty of both negligence and
nuisance (Lord Denning dissenting). However, in relation to the injunction the majority
considered that no injunction should be awarded (Geoffrey Lane LJ dissenting).

Lord Denning took the view that cricket was an important public interest which ought to be
balanced against the private interest of the plaintiffs. He stated that “The houses ought to have
been so sited as not to interfere with the cricket”.10 Lord Denning considered that the plaintiffs
were newcomers who had come to the nuisance and that this provided a defence to nuisance and
stated that: “The building of the house does not convert the playing of cricket into a nuisance
when it was not so before.”11 Furthermore, Lord Denning viewed cricket as a reasonable use of
the land.

However, Geoffrey Lane LJ and Cumming-Bruce LJ considered the Court of Appeal to be bound
by the decision in Sturges v Bridgman12 that it is no defence that the plaintiff came to the
nuisance.

On the injunction point Geoffrey Lane LJ considered that the continuation of the nuisance could
not be adequately remedied by damages. However, Lord Denning and Cumming-Bruce LJ took
the view that public policy considerations outweighed the private rights of the plaintiffs and
therefore a remedy of damages was sufficient in the circumstances. Lord Denning stressed that
an injunction is a discretionary remedy and stated that: “I am of the opinion that the public
interest should prevail over the private interest”.13

The final result was therefore that the defendant cricket club was able to continue playing cricket
on the ground and only had to pay damages to the plaintiffs for any loss they incurred.14
Impact
Miller v Jackson15 confirmed that there is no defence that the plaintiff came to the negligence.
However, the Court of Appeal appeared to depart from earlier case law on the injunction point,
viewing an injunction as a discretionary remedy rather than a remedy for nuisance to be departed
from only in exceptional circumstances. Public policy was not able to negate a finding of
negligence or nuisance but it was able to militate against the grant of an injunction.16 The case
therefore paved the way for a balancing of interests between the parties.17

Further cases have followed Miller v Jackson18 in finding that there will be no defence that the
claimant came to the nuisance. For example, in Kennaway v Thompson19 the claimant was able
to sue for an injunction after building her house next to a lake which was used by a water-skiing
and motorboat club. More recently, in Coventry v Lawrence20 the Supreme Court restored an
injunction originally granted at first instance after the claimants had moved in to a bungalow
near to a speedway track on which motorbikes and stock cars had raced since 1975. As the
majority had done in Miller v Jackson21 the court considered that the character of a
neighbourhood could not be defined by the nuisance, and no defence existed merely because the
nuisance had occurred prior to the claimant coming to it.22 However, the judgment of the court
also followed Miller v Jackson23, not only on the injunction point, but also on applying a more
relaxed approach to the granting of an injunction. Unlike cases prior to Miller v Jackson24 it was
considered that the court does have an unfettered discretion to award damages in lieu of an
injunction.25

Ultimately therefore, the case of Miller v Jackson26 did not change the law by providing a new
defence to nuisance, as this was rejected by the majority.27 However, it did provide for more
flexibility in the law when considering whether to grant an injunction and allowed public policy
to play a greater role in this regard.

● Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd (1961)

15. Murdoch v Glacier Metal Co Ltd (1998)
16. Gillingham Council v Medway Dock Co (1993)
17. Wheeler v Saunders Ltd [1994]
18. Coventry v Lawrence [2014]
 19. Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd v Emmett [1936]
20. Christy v Davey (1893)
21. Robinson V Kilvert (1888)

Nuisance – Sensitivity of the Claimant

Facts
The defendants operated a factory which made paper boxes. This required the factory to be
continually warm and dry to ensure that the paper boxes were in good condition. The claimant
rented the ground floor and used this area to store special brown paper. The heat from the
defendant’s factory damaged this brown paper, which was unusually sensitive to heat, and the
claimant sued in nuisance.

Issues
Whether it was a defence to say that the claimants brown paper was unusually sensitive to heat.
Whether or not there was a nuisance because of the damage to the brown paper, when ordinary
paper would not have been damaged by the conditions. Whether the fact that the defendant’s
acts would not have harmed anything other than special brown paper was relevant.

Decision / Outcome
The claim was dismissed as there was no nuisance. The conditions in the factory were not
particularly unusual, and the claimant’s operation of the factory in these conditions was not
unlawful. The defendants had acted as reasonable tenants of their property. It had been shown
that the heat from the factory would not have damaged ordinary paper. Instead the defendant’s
brown paper happened to be unusually sensitive to the heat, and it was this which caused the
damage rather than anything that the defendants had done wrong. Accordingly, this could not be
considered a nuisance caused by the defendants. Where one carries on an unusually delicate
trade, they cannot then complain because they are injured by the defendant’s carrying on their
lawful business on their property if this would not have injured anything but an unusually
delicate trade.
MALAYSIAN CASES
1. Tunku Norella Suriana Bt Tunku Yusoff & Anor v Kumpulan
Sierramas (M) Sdn Bhd [2011] MLJU 409
2. Raja Paramalingam & Anor v Bangsar Park Residents Association
[2019] AMEJ 0546
3. Dato Dr’ Harnam Singh v Renal Link (KL) Sdn Bhd [1997]
4. Hotel Continental Sdn Bhd v Cheong Fatt Tze Mansion Sdn Bhd [2002]
5. Au Kean Hoe v Persatuan Penduduk D’villa Equestrian [2015] MLJ
205 FC
Tort — Nuisance — Interference with personal comfort — Construction of guard house and
boom gates on public road — Whether presence of structures interfered with appellant's right of
access to and from house — Whether inconvenience constituted nuisance — Whether nuisance
proven

Held, dismissing the appeal with costs of RM15,000:

(1) As the appellant had abandoned his claim for the demolition of the boom gates and guard
house during the trial before the High Court, the illegality of the boom gates and guard house
was a non-issue in this appeal (see para 34).

(2) The two cases cited and relied upon by the appellant would be of no assistance to him in the
present case. Unlike those cases, the appellant in the present appeal was not in any way
prevented or obstructed from leaving or entering the housing estate except that he had to
manually operate the boom gates and could not rely on the services of the guard on duty.
Although the appellant had to operate the boom gates himself, that act, as rightly recognised by
the trial judge, had only constituted an inconvenience and had not prevented or hindered him
from entering or leaving his housing estate. The respondent had not acted unreasonably in
directing the security guard not to assist residents who had not paid the security charges. Further,
it could not be denied that the presence of the boom gates and the guard house had given the
appellant and other residents of the housing estate a sense of security. In the circumstances of the
present case, the respondent had not committed any act of nuisance by maintaining the boom
gates and the guard house on the only road at the entrance to the housing estate (see paras 41 &
43–45).

(3) The appellant's argument that the respondent had operated the boom gates and the guard
house without due regard to the conditions imposed by the local authority had no merit (see para
42).

Summary: The appellant was the resident-owner of a house in the D'Villa Equestrian Housing
Estate ('the housing estate'), while the respondent was the resident association of the housing
estate. The appellant filed a claim against the respondent for nuisance and obstruction. It was the
appellant's case that the two boom gates and guard house guarding the entrance and exit to the
housing estate were constructed on a public road, contrary to the rules and regulations of the
local council and constituted an obstruction. It was an undisputed fact that the residents of the
housing estate had unanimously agreed to pay RM200 per month as security and maintenance
charges and that they would cease to be a member of the respondent when they stopped making
the said payments. The consequences of not being a member of the respondent included the
resident of the housing estate being unable to avail himself of the services provided to members
of the respondent. When the appellant ceased to be a member of the respondent he suffered the
consequences of this decision ie having to open the boom gate himself without the assistance of
the security guard on duty and picking up his visitors at the guard house. The plaintiff argued
that the presence of the boom gates and guard house interfered with his right to enjoy freedom of
access to and from his housing estate. Although the respondent conceded that the boom gates and
guard house were constructed on a public road, it was the respondent's contention that both these
structures, which had been lawfully erected by the developer, were necessary for the security of
the residents in the housing estate. The respondent also submitted that when the appellant
purchased the house in the housing estate it was deemed to have accepted the existence of the
boom gates and guard house. The trial judge acknowledged that although the appellant had been
inconvenienced he was not obstructed or hindered from entering his housing estate. This was the
appellant's appeal against that decision on the grounds, inter alia, that the trial judge had erred in
deciding that the operation of the boom gates and guard house was reasonable and not a nuisance
and in failing to recognise that the operation of the boom gates and guard house was in
contravention of the terms and conditions imposed by the local authority.

6. Lew Cher Phow @ Lew Cha Pow & 11 Ors v Pua Yong Yong Pua Keng Siang (2007)
7. Projek Lebuh Raya Utara Selatan s/b v Kim Seng Enterprise (Kedah) S/B [2013] 5
MLJ 360 CA

Contract— Breach— Agreement— Terms— Appeal against decision of High Court — Land
slide — Remedial works on land — Temporary occupation of land agreement — Whether
agreement breached — Whether land entered and occupied more than prescribed time without
approval — Whether 'as-built' drawing for works provided — Whether joint final inspection
carried out — Whether excavated earth removed — Compensation — Claim for alleged
potential and present losses

Held, allowing the appeal with costs: — (1) it was crystal clear that the contention by the
respondent that the appellant had breached the toa by remaining on lot 2391 exceeding the six
months without the written authority of the respondent was untrue. When the appellant remained
on lot 2391 to complete the rectification works, it was done within the ambit and scope of the toa
(see para 24). — (2) it was wrong to say that the appellant failed to provide the 'as-built' drawing
for the works to be done on lot 2391. in fact, the appellant complied with the toa by providing
the 'as-built' drawing which was endorsed by a licensed surveyor and, in this context; there was
no breach of contract by the appellant (see para 26). — (3) the high court judge erred in law and
in fact when he concluded that there was an act of negligence by he and the appellant was
vicariously liable for what he did without taking into account that all acts of dumping of the
excavated earth were done on the instructions of the respondent based on the june agreement. it
must be borne in mind that the obligation to remove the excavated earth under the toa was on the
respondent (see para 72). — (4) the high court judge also erred in law and in fact when he ruled
that the respondent had proved negligence on the part of the appellant on the balance of
probability without considering the salient fact that it was the intervening act of the respondent in
instructing he to dump the excavated earth that caused the negligence (see para 73). — (5) in
regard to the issue of dumping, the learned high court judge erred in law and in fact when he
accepted the evidence of witnesses who had testified that they had not seen the toa and the june
agreement. that being the case, these witnesses had no knowledge and were not privy to the
issues of earth excavation and dumping (see para 89). — (6) this was a fit case for appellate
intervention. the advantage enjoyed by the high court judge by reason of having seen and heard
the witnesses could not sufficiently explain or justify his lordship's conclusion. the high court
judge had not taken proper advantage of his enviable position of having seen and heard the
witnesses and such failure had put the matter at large for this court to peruse and dissect the facts
and the law based on the appeal records. a non-direction of this magnitude constituted a
fundamental misdirection and it invited appellate intervention (see para 133).

Summary : In the present appeal, the appellant appealed against the judgment entered by the
High Court in favor of the respondent. The respondent was the registered proprietor of three
pieces of land ('the lands') which were planted with oil palm trees and known as Lot 2391, Lot
4197 and Lot 2392. The lands were all located at Mukim Ayer Putih, Daerah Pendang, Kedah.
The appellant was the North-South Highway Concessionaires who built the highway just next to
the lands. Sometime in January 2000, a landslide occurred at a hill on the lands, known as Bukit
Jenun within the side of the appellant's right of the way. The appellant entered into the lands
belonging to the respondent to carry out remedial works as a result of the landslide.
Subsequently, the appellant sought to enter into a temporary occupation agreement ('TOA') with
the respondent and, consequently, breached the terms of the TOA and damaged the lands
belonging to the respondent, causing loss and damage. The respondent's complaints were: that
the appellant had entered and occupied Lot 2391 more than the authorized six months without
the approval of the respondent; that the appellant failed to provide an 'as-built' drawing for the
works which were done on Lot 2391; that the appellant failed to carry out a joint final inspection
which was to be done within seven days from the date of the completion of the works; that the
appellant failed to remove the excavated earth from Lot 2391 and the earth was also dumped all
over Lot 2391, Lot 4197 as well as Lot 2392; and that the appellant failed to provide
compensation to the respondent in accordance to the specified scale. Based on these breaches,
the respondent claimed for alleged potential and present losses. In the High Court, the claims
were allowed. In the present appeal, the appellant addressed each and every breach and argued
that the High Court judge erred in law and in fact in allowing the respondent's claim without
taking into consideration the totality of the evidence and the facts which clearly showed that the
entire claim of the respondent was not sustainable in law and the appeal ought to be allowed with
costs.
 8. Lai Kong Loke & Anor v Ting See Leng [2017]
9. Syarikat Perniagaan Selangor Sdn Bhd v Fahro Rozi, Mohdi & Ors [1981]

CAUSE ANNOYANCE

- Excessive noise

(1) Any person who –

​ (c)
​ operates or causes or suffers to be operated in or near any public road or public place or in any
shop, business premises, building or place which adjoins any public road or public place any
gramophone or wireless loud speaker or any other instrument whatsoever for the production of
noise or music in such a manner as to cause annoyance or inconvenience to occupants of any
premises in the vicinity, shall be liable to a fine not exceeding one hundred ringgit.

Lawton LJ said in Kennaway v Thompson [1981] QB 88 at 94 , [1980] 3 All ER 329 at 333 , [1980] 3 WLR 361 at 366 , CA
(Eng): ‘Now nearly all of us living in these islands have to put up with a certain amount of annoyance from our neighbours.
Those living in towns may be irritated by their neighbours’ noisy radios or incompetent playing of musical instruments and they
in turn may be inconvenienced by the noise created by our guests slamming car doors and chattering after a late party. Even in the
country the lowing of a sick cow or the early morning crowing of a farmyard cock may interfere with sleep and comfort.
Intervention by injunction is only justified when the irritating noise causes inconvenience beyond what other occupiers in the
neighbourhood can be expected to bear. The neighbour who is complaining must remember, too, that the other man can use his
property in a reasonable way and there must be a measure of give and take, live and let live’.

It may be relevant to note that conduct which proves to cause annoyance to the public is not necessarily conduct which is likely
to occasion a breach of the peace: Bryan v Robinson [1960] 2 All ER 173 , [1960] 1 WLR 506 . In Syarikat Perniagaan
Selangor Sdn Bhd v Fahro Rozi Mohdi & Ors [1981] 2 MLJ 16 , FC, the respondents had brought an action against the
appellant to prevent it from so using its land as to cause annoyance by noise to the neighbouring landowners. They applied for an
injunction to restrain the appellant or its servants from operating or permitting to operate (1) music bands with singers from open
air stages; and (2) the generator for the discotheque on its land until the trial of the action or until further order. The learned trial
judge granted the injunction and the appellant appealed. The court, in dismissing the appeal, held that the learned trial judge was
entitled on the evidence to find that the noise was excessive and intolerable and was an actionable nuisance and that the
respondents were entitled to the injunction.

Minor Offences Act 1955

CASES ON DEFENSES

• Sturges v Bridgman (1879)

• Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966

• Kennaway v Thompson [1980]3 WLR 361

• Robinson v Kilvert (1889)