Cross Border Terrorism: Irritants

in Indo-Pakistan Relations

Manan Dwivedi*

The South Asian region has an immense geopolitical and

economic significance for the global polity. In the regional
firmament, India and Pakistan can play a positive role in an age of
global interdependence. But the relationship between these two
"estranged neighbours" has been bedeviled by three full-fledged
military confrontations in a brief time period of 22 years since
1948. As is well known, the Kashmir situation and the attendant
human rights charges being leveled against each other in the
nineties, along with the post September 11 contours of the terror
debate, have contributed to the beleaguered relationship
between India and Pakistan. The US proclivity to side with
Pakistan as a given necessity, since the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan along with the festooning of Pakistan as a "Frontline
State" have made for interesting and painful debates, discussions
and diplomacy. Let's briefly concentrate on how the trouble
erupted in Kashmir, as Kashmir happens to be a bone of
contention and a source of much acrimony, which has foiled
efforts at normalcy between the two neighbours.

* Teaches at Gujarat National Law University, Ahmedabad, India

32 Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, June-December 2008

The Web of Kashmir and Terror in India

"If there is any heaven on earth, it is here in Kashmir and in

Kashmir only." Kashmir, the Paradise on Earth, (Switzerland of
Asia) nature's grand finale of beauty, is a masterpiece of earth's
creation of charm and loveliness.1 It is followed universally for its
beauty and natural scenery throughout the world and for its high
snow-clad mountains, scenic spots, beautiful valleys, rivers with
ice-cold water, attractive lakes, springs and ever-green fields,
dense forests and beautiful health resorts. They all enhance its
grandeur and are a source of great attraction for tourists. Apart
from natural beauty, Jammu and Kashmir has a unique cultural
blend which makes it different from the rest of the country. It is
not only distinct in cultural forms and heritage, but in
geographical, demographical, ethnical, social entities, forming a
distinct spectrum of diversity. The people of Kashmir, Jammu and
Ladakh, all cherish diverse religions; languages and culture, but
continuously intermingle with each other, which symbolize Indian
unity amidst diversity. It is the tourist hot spot status which
rankled with the Pakistani establishment which they intended to
break with the pitchfork of terrorism. Then, another of their
avowed intentions was to puncture the conjoined cultural rubric
of Jammu, (predominantly Hindu), Kashmir (predominantly
Muslim) and Ladakh, which boasts of a Buddhist lineage and
ancestry.
The din of trouble and strife erupted in the moored valley of
Kashmir, with the incursion of Pakistan's tribal forces into the
Kashmir valley. On January 1, 1948, India took up the issue of the
Pakistani aggression in Jammu and Kashmir to the United Nations,
under Article 35 of its Charter.2
After long debates, a cease-fire came into operation on the ill-
fated midnight of January 1, 1949. Eventually, India filed a
complaint with the United Nations Security Council, which
established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
(UNCIP). Pakistan was accused of invading the region, and was
Manan Dwivedi: Cross Border Terrorism: Indo-Pakistan Relations 33

asked to withdraw its forces from Jammu and Kashmir. The UNCIP
also passed a resolution stating that the question of accession of
the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be
decided through the democratic method of free and impartial
plebiscite. However, this could not take place because Pakistan
did not comply with the UN resolution and refused to withdraw
from the State. The international community failed to play a
decisive role in the matter saying that Jammu and Kashmir is a
"disputed territory". In the words of Wajahat Ahmed, during the
course of its engagement with the Kashmir conflict, spanning 23
years (1948-1971), the United Nations passed a number of
resolutions, which were aimed at mediation and resolution of the
conflict. Between 1948 and 1971, the U.N Security Council passed
23 resolutions on the Kashmir Conflict.3 The UN resolutions
regarding the Kashmir issue are not self-enforceable.4 In other
words, the resolutions are recommendatory in nature and can be
enforced only if the parties to the dispute, i.e. India and Pakistan,
consent to their application.5
Thus, a war like situation was initiated coupled with an ever
seething cauldron in the princely state of Kashmir, which has seen
the two nation states sharing embittered borders besmirched
with the blood and entrails of the militaries of both the sides in
two brutally fought wars- 1965 and 1971. The Indian Operation
Brass-tacks, in the eighties, along with the Indian occupation of
Siachen and the consequent the Kargil misadventure by the
Pakistani army in May, 1999, were significant watersheds in the
realm of the bilateral relationship. The Kargil War was soon
followed by the Jaish-e-Mohammed-led dastardly terror attack on
the Indian Parliament, which was a stab right in the heart of a
resilient Indian democracy. The Defence establishment in India as
an aftermath of the Pakistani overture in the freezing the
Himalayan heights, was desirous of crossing the line of control
but it was prevented from doing so by the Indian political
establishment after "Operation Vijay" in Kargil. The December
34 Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, June-December 2008

2001, attack on the Indian Parliament was, however, successfully

neutralized by the Indian Army, much by the bravado of the
Delhi-based security personnel.
Kashmir and the spectre of terrorism need to be underlined by
Indian government since both are interconnected with each
other. Some strategic analysts argue that unemployment and the
worsening economic conditions of Kashmiri people, exploited by
Pakistan under the garb of religion, gave birth to jihadis, mostly
belonging to the educated, angry middle-class Muslims. One of
the clean-shaven boys who attacked CST railway station, now
named by the Indian media as Mohammad Ajmal Mohammad
Amin Kasab, from Faridkot in the Pakistani Punjab, was wearing a
Versace T-shirt"6 This might seem like a one sided perspective of
the scenario in a "no-doubt, embattled state", of Jammu and
Kashmir. The question of Kashmir cannot be settled by the
promise of a plebiscite given by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru
as back as 1948. One of the doctrines of international law
contends that promises given under one time period cannot b
binding on the promissory nation state (India, in this situation
international relations and the geopolitics have transformed i
the intervening years.
The theme of self-determination in the Kashmir Valley als
warrants greater detail.7 An academic understanding of Univer
Declaration of Human Rights cannot be implemented in toto,
"a ready to cut and paste solution", with the notion of
sovereignty and ethnic nationalism in the age of globalization
interdependence and transnationalism. Nevertheless, one cann
rule out the contention that organized crime and terrorism res
from ineffective governance. It is essential to differentiate the
The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, one of think tanks
New Delhi, opines, "In Kashmir, the linkages between terroris
and organized crime exist at a different level. Unlike th
northeast, reliance on funds from extortion and other related
means is minimal. There is no parallel government in Kashmir a
Manan Dwivedi: Cross Border Terrorism: Indo-Pakistan Relations 35

government resources do not reach militant hands. However,

external funds compensate for inadequate internal mobilization.
External funds reach the militant organizations fighting in Kashmir
thorough various means."8
The foreign hand is very much discernible in the Mumbai
terror attacks as is evident by the perpetrators of the order of
Dawood Ibrahim and Chota Shakeel in the Mumbai bomb blasts in
1993 and now the initially suspected connivance of the
underworld in the Mumbai terror attacks. Thus, Kashmir and the
menace of state sponsored terrorism are hand in gloves with each
other. The list of terror culprits handed over by the Indian
Government to the Pakistani establishment is a case in point,
which includes names like the arms swindler, Kim Davy and
Mafiosi of the order of Chota Shakeel.9
Willaim Dalrymple maintains that Kashmir continues to divide
the establishment of Pakistan more than any other issue.
President Zardari might publicly announce that he does not want
to let Kashmir get in the way of improved relations between India
and Pakistan. But Lashkar-e-Taiba, which is officially banned,
continues to function under the name of Jamaat al-Dawa, and
Hafiz Muhammad Sayeed continues openly to incite strikes
against Indian and Western targets. At a recent meeting, he
proclaimed that the former princely state of what he calls
"Hyderabad Deccan" is also a part of Pakistan, which may explain
the claim of responsibility for the attacks by a previously
unknown group named the Deccan Mujahideen.10
In the recent past, ameliorative measures were announced by
India and Pakistan in April 2005, to further the peace process over
the divided Himalayan region of Kashmir. Such diplomatic
overtures raised some hope towards ending over a half century of
hostility between New Delhi and Islamabad. While analysts
warned against unrealistic expectations, they surreptitiously
contended that the current approach is a signal shift in the
Kashmir debate. Political experts of all hues and colours hailed
36 Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, June-December 2008

the meeting between President Pervez Musharraf, and Indian

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, as a potential turning point in
Pakistan's relations with India.
The two leaders announced a series of measures to improve
cross-border ties in Kashmir. The new bus route connecting the
divided territory was found to be expanded. New business and
development projects were also planned. The Pakistani media too
focused on broader ramifications of the rapprochement process.
Both the leaders called the peace process "irreversible." Former
Pakistani General Talat Masood, strategically opined that, more
than any specific deal, such negotiations are a cause for mutual
hope. He went on to add in idealistic terms. He said, "I think the
borders are becoming borders of cooperation instead of borders
of hostility."11 Such is the tenor of occasional jamborees which
attempt to hold aloft the torch of good brotherly relations and a
much feigned camaraderie amongst the twin embattled
neighbours of the Indian subcontinent, striving for an ever
withering opportunity for peace and cooperative engagement.
These homilies are often commonly exchanged between
diplomats in order to create a pathway for the civil societal
framework to take over the guidelines of the staid track-l
diplomacy. The much touted track-l diplomatic parleys have faded
from public and foreign policy memories after every Pakistani
overture in the violent language of a low intensity war was
heaped upon a much wounded Indian republic. Public opinion is
known to have a short memory. It takes yet another border
violation in order to flummox the political will and the diplomatic
czars to seek out a yet another pathway to subdue the popular
angst and disdain against the foibles of Indian foreign policy think
tanks.
The Kashmir imbroglio is a festering wound in the psyche of
South Asia. India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan being the
two recalcitrant neighbours, never say no to an opportunity to
confabulate and negotiate amidst a lot of homebound
Manan Dwivedi: Cross Border Terrorism: Indo-Pakistan Relations 37

expectancy. The Lahore Bus diplomacy and the Agra talks

culminated during the NDA government under the leadership of
Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Both the diplomatic occasions being two
cases in point when even after the Kargil episode the Indian
establishment did not abandon its political dialogue with
Pakistan, which has been a persistent threat to India's national
security through its incessant and often proven aid and
abatement to homespun cartridges of terror mongers in PoK,
(Pakistani Occupied Kashmir) and in places like Muridke in
Pakistan's Punjab.12 During the Agra talks with Pervez Musharraf,
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee kept on refusing to ink the
agreement with the estranged neighbour as the agreement paper
was repeatedly being thrust in the face of the Indian Premier.13
Pakistan's persistent pestering was to include the Kashmir
problem as part of the dialogue process which did not go down
well with the Indian delegation.14

The Dynamics of the Political Contest Model

Terrorism has been a bone of contention between India and
Pakistan. Both the countries have laboured under its dark shadow
since the 1980's after the election of the National Conference
regime in Jammu & Kashmir in the second half of the nineties.
One out of a myriad Political Contest Models developed by the
popular media theorists, the present one, posits a sanguine
comprehension of the notion of a state actor pitted against the
non-state actor in a gladiatorial contest of gargantuan
proportions. The model delineates a blitzkrieg scenario, where-in,
the non-state actors in a given nation state strives to assess the
degree of success of their chances taken with chicanery against
the stately apparatus of "The Regime".15 A designated state
sponsored apparatus does not need to indulge in out-of-the-
ordinary societal, political and military ministrations in order to
justify its stand vis-à-vis, the tenets of armed rebellion in the
scorched and tarred land of Kashmir. Juxtaposed against this
38 Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, June-December 2008

"Statist" commandeering of its Goebellesian propaganda

apparatus, the non-state antagonists living in the acts of the likes
of Hafiz Mohammed Sayyed, Azhar Mehmmud, Kim Devy,
Dawood Ibraham, Chotta Shakeel, all the way to the likes of
Ramzi Benalsibh and Osama Bin Laden, are exhausted in their
single minded devotion to extricate the hoi polloi out of the so-
called morass of state ordained democracy and praxis.
The human rights perception would be that Kashmiri terrorists
lead a rightly vilified and tainted existence, smudged betwixt the
multitude of "ma nicheistic portrayals"16 and mundane media
renderings, which is completely uncalled for. The State on the
other hand has no other modus operandi but to strike out at the
terrorists and the multitude of hidden insurgents who tend to
spread the vitriolic propaganda against a hard pressed Indian
nation state. The New Delhi government is now faced with a
much harder task at hand, if it needs to successfully counter the
rising incidents of terror bombings, fiyadeen (those who choose
to die for the cause) and suicidal attacks on the infrastructure of
the country. The current terror attacks on Mumbai, the financial
capital of the country should serve as a wake up call for the Indian
establishment and its national security and intelligence agencies.
The Mumbai attacks happen to be an instance of, "super
terrorism".17
The several rounds of diplomatic negotiations between India
and Pakistan appeared to be correct steps in the direction of
normalizing relations between them before the Mumbai terror
attacks. A commentator in Outlook magazine has commented in
the aftermath of the Mumbai siege, that, "it happens to be the
Indian responsibility that we maintain and sustain the democratic
system in Pakistan but our neighbours can go ahead with
impunity to destroy our nation".18 B Raman, a senior strategic
expert in India has, commented, "The terrorist strike in Mumbai
from the night of November 26, 2008 to the morning of
November 29, 2008, has sent a shiver right across the world not
Manan Dwivedi: Cross Border Terrorism: Indo-Pakistan Relations 39

just because it was spectacular, but because there was a

fearsome brain, which had conceptualized the entire operation,
planned it to the minutest details and had it carried out through
remote control from Pakistan with the help of not more than 10
terrorists."19 He elaborated upon another notion which has
created revulsion against the Pakistani state as it is for the first
time in India that human casualties have been very large. B.
Raman went on to contend that, "Targeting of capabilities does
not create the same kind of public revulsion against the terrorists
as the targeting of human beings does. Whereas, the after-effects
of the targeting of human beings remain localized in the area
where they were targeted, the impact of the targeting of
capabilities has a ripple effect far beyond the area where the act
of terrorism was carried out."20
The Media coverage of the Mumbai terror catastrophe or as
stylistically called by the Indian Media as, 26/11, has led to the
people of both the countries being informed about the day -to -
day diplomacy undertaken by both India and Pakistan. The
network channels in one of their reports in CNN/IBM have
captured "the changed and transformed sentiment" of Indian
government. According to Neeraj Singh and Shishir gupta,
correspondents in CNN/IBM, "The Indian Prime Minister has
referred to a three pronged mechanism to counter terrorism all
across the length and breadth of the country. The two
correspondents have quoted Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as
saying that, "Barring aside all procedures and systems, I want to
apologize to the people of India for having failed to prevent the
attacks on Mumbai".21 In a related newscast, he went on to detail
the international community that India will galvanize the same in
the need of the hour. The security of the sea coast will be now
left to one central agency for better coordination purposes. He
further related in the news report that air surveillance will be
kept at an utmost readiness and National Security Guards (NSG)
will be operationalised in all major cities in the country. The
40 Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, June-December 2008

United Nations Security Council has also blacklisted Lashkar-e-

Toiba (LET) and as a result, the Pakistani government has placed
LET chief, Hafiz Mohammed Sayyed, under house arrest along
with the same being done to Jaish-e-Mohammad chief, Azhar
Mahmood, which has been observed by the Indian establishment
to be a cosmetic diplomatic overture by Pakistan in order to
appease an the American establishment.22 This made an
nonchalant Islamic Republic of Pakistan, crack down on the
Muridke, Lahore (Punjab) and Shehjanobad (Sindh) centred
headquarters of LET, which operate on Saudi money,
masquerading as a social service NGO, all across the length and
breadth of Pakistan.
Realistically enough, the Mumbai terror attacks after the
Operation Vijay and attack on the Indian Parliament in December,
2001, have opened a pandora's box. The terror attacks have to be
inculcated as a self preparedness exercise by the Indian internal
security apparatus and it remains to be seen that how can the
Indian evidence make Pakistan react with diplomatic promptness
and strategic alacrity. There is always a silver lining to
international relations even after allegedly, ten Pakistani citizens
have been implicated in the mayhem in Mumbai on December 26,
2008. It would not be a fruitful exercise to delve inside the details
and the chronology of the terror attacks, as they have been
already well documented by the defense experts, strategic
observers and by the domestic and international Media.
In one of the reports, which appeared in The Hindu, it came to
the fore that both India and Pakistan intended to keep the
quietitude in the region despite an uproarious public sentiment
among common people. It reported a very positive development,
that, "Demands for action are being heard across India amid the
anger over last week's rampage in Mumbai, by militants accused
of coming from Pakistan, but leaders of the two nuclear-armed
neighbours are striving to keep tensions in check."23 Thus, sanity
prevailed in the corridors of power in the two countries to let the
Manan Dwivedi: Cross Border Terrorism: Indo-Pakistan Relations 41

status quo prevail in the region which American strategic

observers love to call as "a South Asia on a short fuse".24 The
Indian government called on Pakistani authorities to take strong
action against those responsible for the attacks and to hand over
suspected terrorists believed to be living in Pakistan. India
stopped short of accusing Pakistan's government of any
involvement, a charge it has not hesitated to make in the past.
Condoleezza Rice said, "This is a time for absolute transparency
and for letting the evidence lead where it may."25 The Indian
regime has to comprehend the logistics of the Pakistani support,
aid and abetment to the cause of the Mujahideens who border on
to the tricky terrain of Islamic Fundamentalism.

Diplomacy in the Aftermath of the Mumbai Terror

The latest response to the demarche by India to hand over the 20
most wanted men suggests exactly that, the Pakistani
government will surely not hand over those who are likely to
expose the ISI's culpability in all the past attacks which means
that absolutely nothing substantial will emerge out of the Indian
demand.

One notion can be that India may score a few political points
in the diplomatic world, but it will effectively change nothing on
the ground. The LeT will continue to go about its murderous
business as usual with at best a few token arrests and detention
of their top leadership for a few days till the storm abates. As a
veteran strategic and counter terrorist expert, Ajai Sahni pointed
out that Pakistan has weathered many a storm of this kind and
there is absolutely no reason to think that the current round will
be any different from the past ones.
The only other option to this utterly ineffective and useless
line of action is war. Apart from the huge cost and the dangerous
consequences of a war between two nuclear powers, one
consequence might be a weakening of the civilian dispensation in
Pakistan, which is still struggling for its survival. But the question
42 Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, June-December 2008

is whether Indian inaction is going to strengthen the civilian

leadership in Islamabad. There is little reason to believe so. It is
needless to say that India's inability to impose any cost for these
ever more provocative attacks is simply to invite more of them.
However, war cannot be an immediate step for the solution to
the problem. India will need to pursue cautious diplomacy.
External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, has already ruled out
war.

B. Raman, the noted Indian strategic expert, has furthe

commented that India has three main expectations from Pakist
before it could agree to a military de-escalation along the
international border and the Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir
(J &K) and the resumption of the bilateral dialogue on all
contentious issues, including the future of J&K To begin with,
there needs to be a permanent discontinuation of cross-border
infiltration.26 Secondly, a trustworthy end to the terrorist
superstructure in Pakistan directed against India has to be
initiated. Last but not the least, there ought to be a permanent
abandonment by Pakistan of state-sponsored terrorism as a
strategic instrument against India to render possible, the
dismemberment of Jammu and Kashmir from the Indian Union. In
the past negotiations, too, Pakistan has always been
diplomatically and politically correct but when the push must
come to a shove; it has prevaricated and desisted from a
complete cleaning up exercise of terror outfits from its soil. As
against this, Pakistan has two expectations from India: first,
military de-escalation; and second, the resumption of the bilateral
dialogue on the future of J&K and other issues, with the main
focus being on J&K.
B. Raman, contends that, "through American interlocutors,
General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military dictator, tentatively
advanced an assurance that he had arranged for an annihilation
of terrorist activities at the border and the often sighted, LoC
infiltrations. The Indian standpoint varies. The Indian Government
Manan Dwivedi: Cross Border Terrorism: Indo-Pakistan Relations 43

contends that the infiltration only ebbed a bit, but did not fizzl
out completely and that the Pakistani restraint happened to be
more tactical in nature and function, in response to American arm
twisting, rather than meaningful and due to any change of its
policy."27 Pakistan, in the year, 2002, while Kargil was a moo
issue, was averse to respond positively to India's other two
demands. The American interlocutors had been reminding India
that they would pressurize on Musharraf in order to curtail th
terrorist apparatus and the training camps, too, but it was
uncertain as to what extent Musharraf would be responsive t
their pressure on this issue.
In the immediate aftermath of the Pakistani intrusion into
Kargil, Dras, Batalik, and Leh sector with the objective of
separating and threatening the National Highway number 1, from
the Indian north, diplomacy was still not abandoned. In the
perception of C. Raja Mohan, the gains in the diplomatic parleys
have amounted to something which the both the governments
cannot be proud of. In the words of the same author, "Over the
last decade and a half, a dialogue, on-again and off-again, has
indeed taken place between the two nations. But the results have
been pitiful. They can be summarized easily as an agreement to
start a bus service between Lahore and New Delhi, three nuclear
and military confidence-building measures, intent to negotiate
more, and a general declaration on bilateral relations."
The problem arises when it comes to deciding about the
central themes of a meaningful dialogue. C. Raja Mohan observes,
"What are the "core" issues? This question has generally been a
dialogue-buster. India and Pakistan have each often argued, with
some vehemence, that precedence must be given to what it calls
the "core issue". They, of course, do not agree on what that core
issue is. For Pakistan, the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir is the
core signpost in the overall process of bilateral diplomacy. For
India, it is cross-border terrorism that keeps awake its strategic
experts."29 India lived up to its state role of not accepting any
44 Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, June-December 2008

dialogue on the status of Jammu and Kashmir as being true to its

core concerns of not compromising on its national security and
integrity in the face of a belligerent and untrustworthy neighbour.
Any proposal by the Indian government to negotiate the Kashmiri
imbroglio with a Pakistani involvement would be tantamount to a
compromise on national security and integrity as tons of papers
and minds have devoted their expertise and thousands of lives
have been lost in the sustenance of Jammu and Kashmir as part of
the inviolable Indian Union. This is a nationalist and common men
rendering of the situation and the government's standpoint need
not be much different in the aftermath of the November 2008
Mumbai attacks.
As part of the recent counter terror-diplomacy between the
twin besieged countries, Pakistan's doublespeak has surfaced in a
very poignant manner. In a recent statement with Prime Minister,
Gordon Brown of Great Britain, the Pakistani premier spoke that,
"I am myself a victim of terrorism, so I will have a look at all the
evidence furnished by the Indian Government. But, as far as my
knowledge goes, India has not completed its investigation."30 The
aforesaid statement reflects disinclination of Pakistan to oblige
India when it comes to help end terrorism from the Pak soil. The
statement of the Pakistani premier has to be perceived and
evaluated in the light of the discussions in a recently published
work, titled as, "The Man from Pakistan", which has been co-
authored by Douglas Franktz and Catherine Collins.31 The work
relates the notorious incident that two nuclear scientists from the
Pakistani nuclear establishment, Abdur Masid and Ustad Sultan,
went to Kandhar in the recent past and had a rendezvous with
the AI Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden in order to share
information about nuclear bomb making. This expose poses many
questions in the light of the recent diplomatic statement by Asif
Ali Zardari, that, "We do not want war".32
Diplomacy cannot be ruled out even if the intransigence of
one of the nation state actors makes the process a very difficult
Manan Dwivedi: Cross Border Terrorism: Indo-Pakistan Relations 45

one. Recourse to a full fledged war cannot be an ideal and

pragmatic solution to the problem of Jammu and Kashmir's issue
of self determination and the interconnected aspect of terrorism.
In fact, the back channel diplomacy was utilized even in the
immediate shadow of the Kargil crisis. A conference in June, 2001,
over the weekend, in the poetic words of C. Raja Mohan, goes on
to relate that, "Wilton Park in the English country side brought
together experts from Europe and the subcontinent to consider
whether the European experience in managing the Cold War and
had some lessons for the efforts in the subcontinent to defuse
tensions between India and Pakistan. The South Asian
participants generally wary of being "educated" by the West a
ended up acknowledging the value of distilling Europea
experience in preparing for the talks between Mr. Vajpayee a
Gen. Musharraf."33
One contradictory perception can be that frequent change
regimes on both sides of the border over the last decade, has l
to a want of continuity in the track two diplomacy between In
and Pakistan. C. Raja Mohan further comments that, "I
celebrated instance, Mr. Abdul Sattar, present Foreign Minister
Pakistan, was called away from a track two conference
Washington, after the military coup of 1999 by General Perv
Musharraf to take charge of Islamabad's external relations. M
Javed Jabbar, who participated in the Neemrana dialog
between India and Pakistan, became an influential adviser
General Musharraf. Having quit the government after a while,
was back into the Neemrana negotiations. On the Indian side, M
K. Subrahmanyam who was active on the track two front beca
the convener of the National Security Advisory Board that was
up after the Pokhran tests of May, 1998."34 Few of the politic
on the Indian side are active on the track two fronts. As origin
conceived by Joe Montville, the term "track two diplomac
refers to private citizens negotiating topics that are usua
reserved for official negotiations, that is, the formal resolution
46 Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, June-December 2008

an ongoing conflict or arms reductions, for example.35 Still, track

two diplomacy happens to be an effective modicum to counter
the Pakistani military and intelligence nexus that renders the
democratic forces, benumbed and posits them as sacrificial lambs
in the larger framework of the relationship between the twin
neighbours. Also, the track two diplomacy can serve as a civil
societal mechanism to smoothen the uneven ride of the
relationship but that seems an uphill task with such mechanisms
not being in place in Pakistan.36
As a consequence of the Mumbai terror attacks, several
scholars have voiced their concern over the current predicament.
Ali Ahmed, of Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, has
provided Indian government with a blinder. He contends that,
"India's demarche has required Pakistan to act and be seen as
acting against terrorist groups within its territory. India is in a
strong position to press the issue since it has been at the
receiving end of a proxy war for about two decades in Jammu &
Kashmir. Terrorism sponsored by the ISI has been witnessed since
the Mumbai bombings of March 1993. Lately these have
increased in number and spatial spread to various parts of the
country as well as the Indian embassy in Kabul. There is a case for
all these attacks being taken cumulatively as amounting to an
'armed attack'. India is thus in a position to legitimately
undertake appropriate actions in self-defense to include military
measures."37 However, one needs to take notice of the concern
that Pakistan is a "failed state" in many ways. The war effort by
India, even in the form of covert operations would render the Asif
Ali Zardari as the head of an unstable and dangerous coalition as
the government in Pakistan which does not seem to be in control
of the security and defence policy vis-à-vis India. This matter
should be a cause of concern for any Indian military response
towards the state sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.
The American diplomat, John Negroponte has stressed that there
is enough evidence implicating Pakistan in the Mumbai terror
Manan Dwivediģ. Cross Border Terrorism: Indo-Pakistan Relations 47

attacks.38 The US Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte, has

brought with him (in his recent visit to India) a list of terror
groups, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba and its front organization
Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Al Rashid Trust, against
whom the US wanted action to be taken.39 Still, this cannot
become a cause celebre for declaring military action against
Pakistan where the authority over the nuclear command and
control is still unknown, if one believes a U.S. Congress
Commission Report, as to who owns the "nuclear switch" in
Pakistan.
This much talked about disclosure could have serious
ramifications for the practitioners of nuclear diplomacy in India
vis-à-vis its Draft Nuclear Doctrine.40 India stands by a few
signposts which include suggestions in the Objectives section of
the Nuclear doctrine, that, "In the absence of global nuclear
disarmament India's strategic interests require effective, credible
nuclear deterrence and an adequate retaliatory capability, should
deterrence fail. This is consistent with the UN Charter, which
sanctions the right of self-defence. Other suggestions include,
that, "India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear
deterrence. In this policy of "retaliation only, the survivability of
our arsenal is critical."41 Thus, India has the capacity to retaliate
and a commensurate self proclaimed right to do so abiding by the
provisions of the United Nations Charter. Still, the unpredictability
of the nukes falling in the hands of the Jihadi elements in Pakistan
renders Indian calculations to be premised upon speculations that
are not about the Pakistani first strike capability, but the actual
probability of one keeping in view the recent US Congress
mandated commission. The commission represented by, Senator.
Bob Graham (Democrat-Florida) and Jim Talent, the Republican
Senator from Montgomery, said that "unless the world
community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely
than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a
terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013."
48 Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, June-December 2008

Conclusion

Negotiations being undertaken by the Indian Government need to

concentrate upon the notion of a probable Pakistani nuclear
strike which will render India open to a lot of carnage and
destruction, relegating "the expected outcome" of the war to the
backburner. India needs to adopt an unflinching stance as against
the diplomatic shadow boxing undertaken by the Pakistani
mandarins. India has to garner all resources at its disposal if the
image of a "Pakistan-in-the-wrong" has to be cemented in the
psyche of the international community along with the United
Nations Security Council. An ostracization of Pakistan, which has
been till now feebly attempted, has to be undertaken with a
renewed vigour and with result-oriented policies. The U.S. foreign
policy, though hegemonic in its outward contours, does not mince
much ado before they undertake retaliatory and punitive action
against anti-American countries to whom the Bush administration
had referred to as "rogue states" for both plausible and
implausible reasons. Relationships with Iran and Saudi Arabia
deserve a new analysis and a reorientation if Pakistan, has to be
contained "inside" India.
The opportunity to garner international support can be best
realized in the light of a few American and Israeli casualties in the
hostage situation in Taj Hotel in Mumbai. An Australian TV
actress, who was trapped inside Mumbai's Taj Hotel, when
terrorists went on a shooting spree, hid herself in a two-by-three
meter cupboard for an hour to escape death.43 The American
concern, which they expressed publicly in the light of the
casualties of their citizens in Mumbai, can be a pointer that US
support can be sought in unraveling terror modules in India. A
section of the US Media also warned its citizens against traveling
to Mumbai after the terror siege of 26 December, 2008.44 This
international disparagement at the Pakistan's involvement in
global terrorism needs to be lapped up by Indian strategists.
Manan Dwivedi: Cross Border Terrorism: Indo-Pakistan Relations 49

Evidence cannot be more glaring then a letter posted by Qasab,

the terrorist caught in Mumbai, which seeks legal help from the
Pakistani Embassy from confinement in the financial capital of the
country. According to reports, the letter has been forwarded to
the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi.45 A bilateral treaty
signed between India and Pakistan, contends that consular access
can be allowed to detainees but never in the case of terrorists
who belong to either of the nation states.46 This development,
along with Pakistan's proposal of a joint interrogation of some
terrorists in Pakistan needs to be considered with a grain of salt
as Pakistan has known to advance cosmetic and face saving
proposals to shy away from the final decision to completely bring
to the book, the terrorist outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-
Mohammad in its homeland. Also, a lasting and conducing
solution to separation in Kashmir needs to be arrived at by a show
of political will by Indian leadership as internal diplomacy once
again needs to be utilized in order to eke out the hyphenation
between Kashmir and the Indian-Pakistan relations. It cannot be
perceived as a mediocre success as part of the diplomatic war
waged by India against Pakistan that the international community
has responded handsomely to the Indian angst. The words of
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at Anantnag (in Kashmir) on
December 14, 2008, that, "Our patience with the Pakistan's lip
service is withering out", speaks well for the diplomatic track which
India is taking recourse to. In a reading of the contemporary
situation, the Indian defence and foreign policy establishment
needs to exhaust all its political and diplomatic resources before,
any stern manoeuvre can be undertaken by the India.

Notes

1. R. Soundarajan, "Impact of Terrorism on Jammu Kashmir Terrorism"

(New Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2006)
2. The Text of the United Nations Charter, Article 35, (Online: Web),
Accessed on 12th December, 2008, URL:
50 Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, June-December 2008

[Link] The excerpt of

the concerned Article: Any Member of the United Nations may bring
any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to
the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly
3. Wajahat Ahmed, " Kashmir and the United Nations," (Online: Web),
Accessed on 10 December, 2008, URL:
[Link]
4. United Nations, Text of the United Nations Security Council
Resolution No. 47, April 21, 1948. The Security Council having
considered the complaint of the Government of India concerning
the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir, having heard the
representative of India in support of that complaint and the reply
and counter complaints of the representative of Pakistan, Being
strongly of opinion that the early restoration of peace and order in
Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan should
do their utmost to bring about cessation of all fighting, Noting with
satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of
the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be
decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial
plebiscite, Considering that the continuation of the dispute is likely
to endanger international peace and security, Reaffirms its
resolution 38 (1948) of 17 January 1948.
5. Ibid.
6. William Dalrymple, Mumbai Atrocities highlight need for solution in
Kashmir, The Observer, 30 November, 2008.
7. Hendt De Vries, Samuel Weber, Violence, Identity and Self
Determination, (New York: Stanford University Press, 1997.
8. Suba Chandran, Terrorism and Organized Crime in India, (Online:
Web), Accessed on 12 December, 2008, URL:
[Link]
ue=925&issue=1012&status=article&mod=a
9. The Times of India Report, Pakistan will not hand over Terror
Suspects, The Times of India, 3 December, 2008.
10. Ibid .
11. Voice of America, (2005), "Experts Welcome New Era in Indo-
Pakistani Relations", (Online: Web), Accessed on 10 December,
2008, URL: [Link]
Manan Dwivedi: Cross Border Terrorism: Indo-Pakistan Relations 51

12. Laskar-e- Taiyyabba: Army of the Pure, (Online: Web), Accessed on

14 December, 2008, URL:
[Link]
ist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm
13. C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: Shaping of India's New
Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
14. Ibid.
15. Gadi Wolsfeld, Media and Political Conflict: News From The Middle
East ((New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp. 1-10
16. Manicheastic Portrayals refer to the heresy and admonition, spread
by the Media and the Propaganda machinations of a powerful State
actor or a group, which can make or mar favorable Public Opinion,
about a Political, Religious or any other genre of Adversary. The
stratagem involves the vilification of a Public personality which is
positioned in an adversarial manner vis-à-vis, the more powerful
actor in the power game. The vilification campaign launched by the
US Media against Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini as the
"Great Satan" or as the enemy in the form of a diabolical 'Them"
pitted against the West or the "Us" in a battle till one vanquishes
and obliterates the other in a divine and moral struggle for one-
upmanship. The Hitler like portrayal of Saddam Hussein in the
Persian Gulf War-I, in the year 1991, during Operation Desert Storm
and the demonisation of the Viet Kong, the National Liberation
Forces led by Ho Chi Minh as the "Communist Aggressors" during
the Vietnam War are some of the outstanding instances of
Manicheastic depiction of weaker adversaries, in an attempt to
sully and tarnish their reputation.
17. Ehud Prinzak, Foreign Policy: The Great Super Terrorism Scare,
Foreign Policy, Fall, 1998.
18. Outlook, December 2008 issue.
19. B. Raman, "Business as Usual" Outlook Magazine, December 11,
2008. (Online: Web), Accessed on 10 December, 2008, URL:
[Link]
=raman&sid=l
20. Ibid.
52 Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, June-December 2008

21. CNN/IBM, News Broadcast as part of the News Broadcast at 9.00.

p.m. on 11 December, 2008, News, covered by correspondents,
Neeraj Singh and Shishir Gupta.
22. Ibid.
23. Newspaper Correspondent, "India, Pakistan tread lightly after
Mumbai Attack" The Hindu, 5 December, 2008.
24. Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, South Asia and a Short Fuse:
Nuclear Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament, (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2002)
25. Mid Day Correspondent, "Qasab's Full Confession: My Life as a
Terrorist", Mid Day, 11 December, 2008.
26. B. Raman, India : Pakistan Need for Paradiplomacy, (Online: Web),
Accessed on 10 December, 2008, URL:
[Link]
27. Ibid.
28. C. Raja Mohan, Indo-Pakistan talks ten issues, The Hindu, 2 January,
2004
29. Ibid.
30. NDTV, News Report, 14 December, 2008.
31. Douglas Frantz, Catherine Collins, 'The Man from Pakistan: The
True Story of the World's most Dangerous Nuclear Smuggler", (New
York: Twelve, 2008)
32. Ibid.
33. C. Rajamohan, In Defense of Track Two Diplomacy, The Hindu, 4
June, 2001.
34. Ibid.
35. Unofficial Communication, Citizen Diplomacy and Multi Track
Diploaacy, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado,
USA.

36. Jayshree Bajoria, Pakistan's Institutions and Civil Society,

Washington Post, (Online: Web), Accessed on 15th December, 2008,
URL:[Link]
dyn/content/article/2007/ll/09/[Link]
37. Ali Ahmed, The Post 26/11 Regional Strategic Predicament, 3
December, 2008, (Online : Web), Accessed on 11 December, 2008,
URL: [Link]/publications/stratcomments/[Link]
Manan Dwivedi: Cross Border Terrorism: Indo-Pakistan Relations 53

38. The Indian Express Correspondent, Tackle Terror, We will Prevent

Military Action, US to Pak, The Indian Express, 12 December, 2008.
39. Ibid.
40. Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear
Doctrine, (Online: Web), Accessed on 12 December, 2008, URL:
[Link]
_17_1999.html
41. Ibid
42. Patrick Thibodeau, US Report: Major Terror Attack By 2003,
(Online: Web), Accessed on 12 December, 2008, URL:
[Link]
[Link]
43. Press Trust of India Report, Mumbai Attack : Aussie Actors Ordeal,
(Online: Web), Accesssed on 12 December, 2008, URL:
[Link]
[Link]?ID=NEWEN20080074311&type=News
44. "As it Happened: Mumbai Attacks", 27 December, (Online: Web),
Accessed on 12 December, 2008, URL:
[Link]
45. Srinjoy Choudhary, News Report, Times Now, 8.p.m. News
46. Ibid.