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Article

"The Lesson of the Quebec Bridge"

Wilfred G. Lockett
Scientia Canadensis: Canadian Journal of the History of Science, Technology and Medicine / Scientia
Canadensis : revue canadienne d'histoire des sciences, des techniques et de la médecine , vol. 11, n°
2, (33) 1987, p. 63-89.

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 63
THE LESSON OF THE QUEBEC BRIDGE
Wilfred G. Lockett[l]
'Where no precedent exists the successful engineer is he who
makes the fewest mistakes.'[21
INTRODUCTION

For most of history technological man has conceived, designed and

built his pyramids, aqueducts, temples, cathedrals and bridges on
the basis of divine inspiration, common sense and a considerable
reliance on experience and precedent. The materials of
construction have been generally those found in nature—stone,
timber and vegetable fibre, supplemented by man-made bricks and
mortar and fastenings of iron. Learning has been largely by trial
and error and the transmission of accumulated knowledge has been
through imitation and apprenticeship. Occasional texts have
appeared, of which Vitruvius's De Architectura and Vlllard de
Honnecourt's Sketchbook are notable examples.

The completion in 1779 of a cast-iron bridge across the river

Severn at Coalbrooke Dale in England heralded a new era. Cast
iron soon gave way to wrought iron with its greater and more
predictable tensile strength, and by the latter half of the 19th
century the inventions of Bessemer and Siemens had made steel
available in quantity to the construction industry, facilitating
such engineering feats as the Brooklyn bridge in New York and the
Forth bridge in Scotland. But progress was not confined to the
introduction of a radically new building material. A parallel
advancement took place in the methodology of engineering design.
The adoption of a scientific approach gave rise to new technical
subjects such as Strength and Elasticity of Materials and Theory
of Structures. A quantitative notion of 'factor of safety'
emerged. One might think that, with this new reliance on
mathematical analysis, the element of 'trial and error' would
lose prominence in engineering design.

That such has not been the case is all too evident as recent
events in the space and nuclear industries have shown. Indeed
there have been so many 'cases' that to attempt an in-depth
examination of how engineers learn from their mistakes would be a
daunting task, not least because the value of the lesson learnt
is not necessarily proportional to the magnitude of the error or
the publicity it receives. But the study of one or two isolated

1 7206 Cambridge Street, Niagara Falls, Ont. L2J 1G6

2 Benjamin Baker, speaking in Montreal on the Forth Bridge,

quoted in W. Westhofen, The Forth Bridge (London, 1890).
64
incidents might be expected to indicate areas for further
investigation.
Perhaps the most notorious failure in Canadian engineering
history was the collapse during construction of the bridge over
the St Lawrence near Quebec City (see Figure 1 ) . In the calamity,
which occurred on 29 August 1907, 74 of the 85 men working on the
bridge at the time lost their lives. The Engineering Hevs
commented 'The fall of this bridge ranks with the greatest
engineering disasters in history.'[3]

Within two days of the accident the Government of Canada had

appointed a Commission of Inquiry. After six months of intensive
investigation the Commission presented its report.[41 In the
most forthright and uncompromising terms the Commission laid the
blame firmly on the principal engineers involved, naming names,
and effectively ruling out any question that an 'act of God'
might have contributed to the accident. Nevertheless the story
of the Quebec bridge is reminiscent of a Greek tragedy. Let us
discover its moral.

THE CANTILEVER PRINCIPLE

The original Quebec bridge and the one which replaced it are
both, like the Forth bridge in Scotland, cantilever bridges.
Their outlines are shown on Figure 2.
The fundamental elements of the cantilever structure are shown on
Figure 3, and comprise essentially a bracket, jutting out from a
tower which is prevented from overturning by a similar bracket
firmly anchored to a solid foundation. A pair of these structures
support between them the suspended span which completes the
crossing of the river. We will later have to consider some of the
basic engineering involved in the design of the structure, but in
the meantime we should note that the upper members of the
cantilever are in tension, while the lower members act as struts
and are in compression.

Cantilever bridges, by their very nature, lend themselves to

being constructed outwards from the sides, without the neces-
sity of temporary falsework to support the central sections.

HISTORY OF THE QUEBEC BRIDGE

The idea of a crossing of the St Lawrence River in the

neighbourhood of Quebec goes back to 1852 when General E.W.

3 Engineering News, 5 September 1907.

4 Royal Commission, Quebec Bridge Inquiry Report (Ottawa,
1908), 3 vols. This is the prime source for this article.
 ^^_ V II ^ /

LOCATION OF QUEBEC BRIDGE FIGURE

 (a)_FORTH B R I D G E (COMPLEIED laae)

1|Ea^pnmgB?rgr^^

(b) FIRST QUEBEC BRIDGE (COLLAPSED UNDER CONSTRUCTION 1907)

Cc)-ESESENT QUE.BEC BRIDGE'(COMPLETED 1317)

SCALE 0«= FSET

■ FIGURE Z

10
Anchor Post AB in tension
Upper Chord BC, CD in tension
Central Tower CE in compression
Lower Chord BE, ED in compression

THE CANTILEVER PRINCIPLE Figure 3

68
Serell, the engineer of the Lewlston and Queenston suspension
bridge, acting for the City of Quebec, identified the present
site. However, it was not until 1887 that the Quebec Bridge
Company was formed to build and operate a combined rail and
highway bridge. Further legislation followed in 1891, 1897 and
1900 and in 1903 the name was changed to the Quebec Bridge and
Railway Company (referred to hereafter as 'the Company').
In the meantime the Company had appointed as Chief Engineer
Edward A. Hoare, who had some 35 years of experience in railway
work in Canada, not, however, involving bridges with spans
greater than about 300 feet. Hoare conducted surveys of the site
during the 1890s, and recommended three possible locations from
which was selected an alignment very close to the present one.
In mid-1897 Hoare made contact at an engineering conference in
Quebec with John S. Deans, Chief Engineer of the Phoenix Bridge
Company of Phoenlxvllle, Pennsylvania, and subsequently sent him
a profile of the crossing. The Phoenix Bridge Company took an
enthusiastic Interest in the project and by the end of 1897 had
sent a preliminary cantilever design to Hoare. In the meantime
Deans had recommended to Hoare a well-reputed New York
consultant, Theodore Cooper, who would be prepared to give the
Company the benefit of his experience.

During 1898 the Department of Railways and Canals approved the

Company's preliminary plans—which were Identical with the
Phoenix drafts—as a basis for calling tenders. The accompanying
specifications, mainly copied from the those of the Department of
Railways and Canals, were approved for tender purposes provided
that more detailed specifications were drawn up for the actual
construction of the bridge.
Tenders were called and in March, 1899, bids were received for
the following types of superstructure:[5]

Bidder Type and Span of Bridge

Cantilever Stiffened
Suspension
Dominion Bridge Co. 1600 ft 2000 ft
Keystone Bridge Co. 1600 ft
Phoenix Bridge Co. 1600 ft 1800 ft
Union Bridge Co. 1800 ft
Tenders were also received for the construction of the
substructures.
The Company engaged Theodore Cooper to examine and report on the
tenders. In his report, dated 23 June 1899, he recommended

5 See Cooper's 'Report on Tenders,' ibid., Ill, 439-40.

 69
acceptance of the Phoenix bid for the cantilever bridge as being
'the "best and cheapest" plan and proposal submitted...*.
Phoenix's tender price, adjusted by Cooper for purposes of fair
comparison, was $2,439,000, to which Bust be added $1,144,000 for
the substructures.[6]
At the same time Cooper made two important recommendations:
(a) that a program of subsurface exploration be
undertaken to determine foundation conditions
(b) that provision be made for modifying the
specifications and design of the bridge, within
reasonable limits, with a view to Improvement or
economy
The results of the site investigations were sent to Cooper in
January, 1900, and in the following Hay he recommended to the
company that the span of the bridge be increased from 1600 feet
to 1800 feet. The relocation of the main piers away from the
river's edge would, he claimed, result in a reduced risk of
potentially costly problems during construction. Cooper also
estimated that the cost of this change would amount to $200,000,
provided that 'desirable and justifiable' modifications were made
to the specifications.[7]
The Company accepted Cooper's report in May 1900, and at the same
time appointed him consulting engineer—initially for the
examination of plans, but subsequently the scope of the
engagement was enlarged to cover the whole period of the design
and construction of the bridge.
By the end of 1900 the Company had entered into contracts with W.
Davis & Sons for the substructure works and with the Phoenix
Bridge Company for the approach spans. Construction commenced at
the site in October, 1900. Then there was a hiatus. And this
gives us the opportunity to summarise events so far:
(a) A company was founded to build and operate a major
rail and highway bridge, which would be an important
link in Canada's trans-continental communications
system
(b) The Company engaged as its Chief Engineer a person
(Hoare) well experienced in general railway work but
in no way a specialist in large bridges

6 Inquiry Report, III, 444-5.

7 Ibid., 446-7.
70
(c) All the preliminary designs of the bridge were
prepared by a contractor (Phoenix Bridge Company)
at its own expense, clearly in the hope that by so
doing it would stand a good chance of being awarded
the job in due course

(d) Tenders were called on the basis of a preliminary

design essentially the same as that of the Phoenix
Bridge Company, and the standard specification of
the Department of Railways and Canals
(e) The Company retained as its Consulting Engineer a
specialist in bridge design (Cooper), well-reputed
in North America
(f) In his report on the bids Cooper favoured the
Phoenix Bridge Company
(g) Following subsurface exploration Cooper recommended
that the span of the bridge be increased from 1600
to 1800 feet. This was accepted.

(h) Contracts for the substructures and approach spans

were awarded and work commenced at the site.

The Involvement of a contractor to assist with preliminary

designs in the very early stages of a project is noteworthy. In a
comparison of six major bridges (Including the Forth bridge) the
Royal Commission observed that 'all the bridges ...were designed
by independent engineers except the Quebec bridge.'[8] The
implications of not obtaining an independent design will be
discussed later.
It had been public knowledge from the start that the Company was
seriously under-funded.[9] Attempts by Deans to Interest US
bankers failed, and, not surprisingly, the Phoenix Bridge Company
was reluctant to incur the high cost of the detailed design, let
alone the fabrication, of the superstructure steelwork without
some assurance it would be paid. Work on the main bridge was thus
delayed and it was not until June, 1903, that an agreement was
signed with the Phoenix Bridge Company, which incorporated the
changed span of the bridge and a set of specifications amended by
Cooper. Even then work was not started until October, 1903, when
the government's Guarantee Act put the Company on a firm
financial footing.
The agreement of June, 1903, was a unit-price contract, as
opposed to the 1899 lump-sum tender. The specified date for

8 Ibid., I, 146.
9 Ibid., 35.
 71
completion was 31 December 1906, but in an attached letter D.
Reeves, President of the Phoenix Bridge Company, refused to
accept responsibility for damages due to delayed completion prior
to 31 December 1908.[101 Clearly it was felt that three years,
including three summer construction seasons, was a very short
time for the design, fabrication of component members, shipping
to site and erection of what would be a record-breaking
cantilever bridge.
The organization which evolved to carry out the design and
construction of the bridge is illustrated in the diagram on
Figure 4.[111. The Company's Chief Engineer, E.A. Hoare, was in
principle the senior man on the whole project, responsible to the
Company for final decision-making, at least in technical matters.
But his lack of experience in major bridges led him to defer
greatly to the Consulting Engineer, Cooper, who effectively
assumed the reins of Chief Engineer.

For the important function of detailed checking of the work in

progress, the Company engaged three inspectors: N.R. McLure, E.L.
Edwards (both selected by Cooper) and E.R. Kinloch. Edwards was
inspector of shop work, assisted initially by McLure. After
erection started HcLure moved to the site, where he and Kinloch
were the only full-time representatives of the Company, Hoare
being located in Quebec City, across the river some 10 miles
away. It should be noted that McLure was a recent graduate (1904)
while Kinloch was not a graduate engineer but had considerable
experience in bridge construction from the practical standpoint.

In the Phoenix Bridge Company, the detailed design of the bridge

was the responsibility of P.L. Szlapka, Design Engineer, who
reported to J.S. Deans, the Chief Engineer. A.B. Milliken was
Superintendant of Erection and had the responsibility of
appointing and generally supervising the field staff on all the
firm's projects. He spent much time visiting the Quebec bridge
site but while there acted in an advisory capacity so as not to
undermine the authority of his senior site man, B.A. Yenser.
Working under Yenser, who was classified as General Foreman, were
two qualified engineers, A.H. Birks and F.A. Cudworth.

The Organization Chart shows the formal procedure for approval of

plans: Szlapka -> Cooper -> Szlapka -> Hoare -> Deputy Minister.
In practice, as indicated in a table of dates at which various
operations were performed,(12] when approved drawings were

10 Ibid., 31.

11 Adapted from ibid., 55.

12 Ibid., 61.
FIRST QUEBEC 6RIDÇE - ORÇAMiZATlON CHART

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ÎEyTKA^^CONT^ACToALCOMMtjK IC*-T|ÛN •„ .. •

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FIGURE 4
 73
received In Phoenlxvllle from Cooper, they were passed on to the
shops for fabrication.
We turn now to those design aspects which featured most
prominently In the ultimate failure of the bridge. The three
main categories of loading for which a bridge has to be designed
are (1) the 'live load,' which includes the traffic the bridge is
required to carry, as well as the wind load, (2) the 'dead load,'
which is the self-weight of the bridge, and (3) special loading
conditions which can occur during construction.

The structure itself must have adequate strength to carry the

combined effect of these loads safely. Tension members may be and
often are made up of flat bars connected by steel 'pins.' Such an
arrangement would not work in the case of compression members
('columns' and 'struts') since the bars would have insufficient
stiffness by themselves to resist buckling. Subsidiary bracing
members ('latticing') must be provided to increase the stiffness
or the struts must be made in such a form (e.g. cylindrical) as
to be inherently resistant to buckling.

Fundamentally, the design process involves the following steps:

(a) The 'live loads': the intended traffic and the

wind load are given in the specification
(b) The maximum working stresses are also laid down in
the specification
(c) The designer estimates the self-weight of the
structure (the 'dead load') from a previously-
conceived, approximate configuration
(d) The total load is the combination of (a) and (c)
(e) The 'scantlings' (essentially the cross-sections
of the individual members) are determined by
recognized methods of structural analysis, taking
into account the total load (d) and the specified
stress limits (b)

(f) The self-weight is recalculated based on the

scantlings arrived at in step (e), and compared
with the assumed weight (c)

(g) There follows a series of successive approximations

in which the analysis is repeated, using the
adjusted values of self-weight, until the values of
(c) and (f) are equal

We should note first that the working stresses specified by

Cooper were somewhat higher than in normal usage. It is evident
74
from his testimony[13] that this decision vas taken after careful
consideration and appeared, at the time, reasonable. It vas only
in combination vith other factors that the higher stresses used
as a basis for design became critical.

Although the design procedure summarized above vas accepted

practice at the time, the Phoenix Bridge Company failed to carry
out steps (f) and (g), vith the following result:[141

Weight Qt Half Bridge Lb.

Weight assumed for design 31,364,800
Actual veight 40,539,941
Excess not designed for 29.3%

The error vas not drawn to the attention of Cooper until

February, 1906, by vhich time the anchor arm, tover and tvo
panels of the cantilever arm had been fabricated, and six panels
of the anchor arm had been erected at the site. In the Quebec
bridge the shore side of the cantilever vas referred to as the
'anchor arm,' the river side as the 'cantilever arm,' and the

13 Ibid., II, 409-10.

14 The derivation of these crucial figures is as follows
(from the Inquiry Report, I, 57):
Weights assumed for design lfe

half suspended span 4,842,000

cantilever arm 13,205,200
anchor arm 13,307-600

Total assumed for design 31,354,800

corresponding total veigh recalculated

from drawings 25 June 1907 38,816,000
of this, steelvork veight 25,316.000
[Thus veight of non-steel members 3,500,000]
(from Report, I, 64):
Actual veight of steelvork (revised
from records, 25 September 1907) 37,039,941
[Thus actual total veight 40,539,941]
 75
central support as the 'tover;' each approximately 50-foot
section of the bridge vas referred to as a 'panel.* Cooper
estimated that the resulting increase in stress would be from 7
to 10 per cent, and, feeling that there vas at this stage no
remedy, permitted the vork to continue.[15]
We have nov to consider the design of the compression members and
in particular those of the lover chord, that part of the
cantilever incorporating the distinct curve shovn in Figure 2(b).
As noted above, the strength of a compression member or strut
depends principally on its resistance to buckling. In the case of
the Forth bridge this vas neatly accomplished by giving the
members a cylindrical form, vhich during the erection stage
Involved the building up of the member curved plate by curved
plate, a procedure veil suited to the skills of Scottish
shipwrights. But in North America the accepted practice vas to
use standard rolled steel sections (angles, flats, I-beams, etc.)
in the fabrication of structural members. In the Quebec bridge
the struts vere built up from an array of parallel flat plates.
Figure 5 shovs a comparison of the compression members of the
Forth and Quebec bridges. The bracing introduced for stiffening
the latter may be clearly seen. The active cross-sectional area
vas about 800 square Inches in Forth bridge and 842 square inches
in the Quebec bridge.

The design of such members vas at the time a mixture of theory

and practice vith empirical formulae playing an important part.
In particular there vas no rigorous vay of determining the amount
of latticing. These subjects vere addressed at length in Appendix
16 of the QBI Report, vhich concluded:

The foregoing discussion shovs that even at the present

time theories of lattice design are in serious conflict
and the strength of any lattice system vill vary
materially according to the formula adopted. Mr. Szlapka
used, vith his ovn modifications, the only system of
lattice computation generally knovn to American
engineers.... [He] selected the column formula adopted
by his ovn company, and used the constants for it that,
in his judgment, vere most in keeping vith the
conditions of the case and in the best accord vith the
spirit of the specification. He made vhat he considered a
liberal increase in his adopted sections over vhat his
computations called for. The result has shovn that his
judgment vas faulty, but ve are not prepared at this date to
define the minimum safe sections for the latticing of these
chords.[16]

15 Inquiry Report, I, 58. See also Cooper's testimony,

ibid., II, 411.
16 Ibid., I, 137.
76
It is often remarked that engineering disasters are rarely due to
a single fault but are caused rather by a combination of more
than one unfavorable condition. In the case of the Quebec bridge
ve have the following concatenation of circumstances:
The load on the structure vas significantly greater
than that for vhich it vas designed
This led to the stresses in the members being more
than the specified vorking stresses, vhich vere
already higher than normal
Key members vere under-designed

It should be mentioned here that inferiority of materials—often

a contributing cause of structural failure—vas not a factor in
the case of the Quebec bridge. The large quantity of steel
required vas obtained from four mills: the Phoenix Iron Company
(a subsidiary of the main contractor), the Central Iron and Steel
Company, the Carnegie Steel Company and the Bethlehem Steel
Company. Normal structural steel vas specified for the bridge,
except in the case of the eyebars for the tension members, for
vhich Cooper specified a slightly higher grade. In its
investigations the Commission of Inquiry found that 'the disaster
could not be traced to the furnaces or rolling mills.'[17]

By August, 1907, construction had reached the stage vhere the

south cantilever had been completed and erection of the suspended
span, jutting out from the end of the cantilever, vas in hand.
The 'big traveller,' a movable gantry used in the handling of
components, vas being dismantled in anticipation of transferring
it to the north bank, and a 'little traveller' vas in use for the
vork on the suspended span (see Figure 6 ) .

During the month signs of distress vere observed in the lover

chord members. The veb plates (i.e. the main load-carrying
elements) of tvo members of the cantilever arm and one member
(A9L) of the anchor arm vere bent, and measurements vere taken.
On Tuesday, 27 August, the misalignment of A9L had increased from
3/4 inch (measured the previous veek) to 2 1/4 inches. After
discussions vith Birks, McLure and Kinloch, Yenser decided he
vould not increase the load on the bridge, by moving the
traveller out, until he received Instructions as to vhat remedial
action should be taken. While there vas definite concern at this
time regarding the problem of straightening the bent chords, it
appears that none of the site staff thought the bridge vas in any
immediate danger. Hovever, the attitude of the engineers on the
project is vorth noting. Both Kinloch and Yenser considered the
matter serious enough to varrant a special visit by HcLure and

17 Ibid., 55-6.
 ô'-om ô'-o'

La) FORTH BRIDGE COMPRESSION MEMBER "SECTION AN D'ELEVATION

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CONDITIONS ON AUGUST 29, 1907 -FIGURE é

00
 79
Blrks to Cooper and Phoenixville for advice. This suggestion vas
not welcomed by the two engineers who felt they would be
ridiculed. In particular Birks felt that the bend must have
occurred prior to construction and was not due to the gradually
increasing erection load.
[Birks] knew better than anyone else on the work the
care with which the calculations and designs had been
made, he was familiar with the experience and abilities
of the designers, and could calculate that the stresses
were then far below the expected maximum. To engineers
the force of such reasoning is very great, and we do not
consider that the confidence Mr. Blrks placed in his
superiors was in any way unusual or unreasonable. There
was no misunderstanding, however, on his part; he
realized that if the bends had not been in the chord
before it was erected the bridge was doomed, and
although Mr. McLure had I evidence that the bends had
increased more than one inch in the course of a week,
although Mr. Kinloch was positive that the bends had
very recently greatly increased, and although Mr. Clark
[storage yard foreman] stubbornly maintained that the
chord was absolutely straight when it left [the] yard,
Mr. Birks still strove to convince himself that they
must have been mistaken.[18]

Hoare visited the site on Wednesday, 28 August, and 'appeared

very anxious that [Kinloch] should abandon [his] position that
the bend had occurred since the erection of the cantilever arm.'
Nevertheless he authorised McLure to visit Cooper and wire back
if the latter took a serious view of the situation.
On the same day, 26 August, Yenser, rather than have an idle
workforce on his hands, changed his mind and decided to continue
with erection. McLure objected that he thought this was 'poor
policy,' but Hoare confirmed the decision 'as the moral effect of
holding up the work would be very bad on all concerned...'[19]

McLure proceeded to New York, arriving there on the morning of 29

August. Cooper, who had just received by mail McLure's sketches
showing the bends in chord A9L, decided that no further weight
should be added to the bridge. But he was concerned as to whether
the contractor's general foreman (Yenser) would take his direct
order to stop work and wired the Phoenix Bridge Company 'to add
no more load to the bridge until after due consideration of the
facts.' This was felt to be the surest way of communicating with
the site, since the Bridge company had a direct telephone line.

18 Ibid., 87.

19 Hoare to Cooper, 28 August, ibid., I, 88.

80
Cooper instructed McLure to discuss the problem vith Deans.
McLure's arrival in Phoenixville, at about 5.00 pm on Thursday,
29 August, coincided vith the collapse into a tangled heap of the
whole superstructure, taking the lives of 74 men, including
Yenser and Birks. (Figures 7)

THE ROYAL COMMISSION

The Canadian Government lost no time in reacting to the disaster.

By Order of Council dated 31 August 1907, a Commission of Inquiry
was appointed comprising the following members:

Henry Holgate (Chairman), a partner in the firm of Ross

and Holgate, with considerable experience in railway
and electrical engineering, and as an arbitrator
John Galbraith, President of the Canadian Society of
Civil Engineers, and for 30 years Professor of
Engineering at the University of Toronto

John G.G. Kerry, a partner in the firm of Smith, Kerry

and Chase, and (part-time) Associate Professor at
McGill College

It was generally felt that these three eminent engineers

constituted a broad and well-balanced commission, well qualified
to carry out the detailed investigation so obviously required. To
provide an independent opinion of the design of the bridge the
Department of Railways and Canals appointed C.C. Schneider,
Consulting Engineer of Philadelphia, whose report is attached to
that of the Commission.[20]

The investigation lasted for six months, and included the

intensive questioning of some 44 witnesses. As might be expected
the examination was particularly relentless of the key figures in
the drama: Hoare, Cooper, Deans, Szlapka, McLure and Kinloch. But
there is no indication of reluctance on the part of the
witnesses. On the contrary, considering how many of them must
have been feeling, their apparent willingness to cooperate to the
full is noteworthy.
It is not the intention here to rehearse in any detail the
progress of the Commission's comprehensive investigations.
However, an examination of the behaviour of compression members
was carried out, the results of which, having to do with the mode
of failure of the bridge, are particularly relevant.
The Phoenix Bridge Company possessed the largest compression
testing machine in existence. After the collapse of the bridge
the Bridge Company, at its own cost and on its own initiative,

20 Ibid., 152-206.
 81
built and tested a model of the A9 chords, scaled dovn to 1/3
full size to bring It within the capacity of the machine.
Subsequently other models vere made and tested at the request of
the Commission. The tests clearly demonstrated hov, for the
load-bearing vebs to buckle, the latticing mustfall first.
(Figure 8)
Appendix 16 of the Commission's Report, vhlch Is devoted to a
discussion of the theory of built-up compression members, takes
Into account the results of these tests. Its comments Included
the remarks quoted above.
The somevhat Indecisive conclusion reached by the Commission In
the matter of compression member design did not deter them from
pointing an unvaverlng finger at Szlapka and Cooper as being
primarily responsible for the shortcomings in the design of the
bridge as a vhole. At the same time the Company vas criticized
for its selection of Hoare as its Chief Engineer and for the very
veak field organization, vhlch lacked anyone having the
experience to identify a critical situation vhen it arose
combined vith the authority to call a halt to construction vhen
lives vere in danger.

The Commission's report, vith 19 Appendices, comprises three

volumes including a folio of 37 drawings. The report itself
consists of 5-page letter in volume 1 and is a masterpiece of
economy.

THE REACTION OF THE TECHNICAL PRESS

Nevs of the collapse of the Quebec bridge vas received by the
technical press vith the sympathy one would expect, not only for
the victims, but also for the engineers vho vere involved. There
vas a clear recognition that a detailed investigation vas needed
to identify the cause of the disaster and particularly to
determine vhat lessons might be learned from it.

The reporting by the Engineering News (the predecessor of the

current Engineering Nevs-Record vas outstanding. Within days they
had a team at the site and vere publishing detailed accounts,
illustrated vith several photographs, of the events before and
after the collapse. The progress of the Commission's
investigation vas regularly reported on. But the important
contribution of the technical press came after the issue of the
Commission's Report in February, 1908. The British journal
Engineering contained some critical editorial comment:
The moral of the disaster is that very Important changes
are necessary in American methods of bridge-building
vhen applied to structures of exceptional size. The
evidence shovs that there has unquestionably been in the
32
Figure 7(a) Wreckage, looking south [top]; 7(b) looking north
 83
Figure 8: Test of «odel chord
84
past too great a gulf between the drawing office and
shops of American bridge-works.
and again:

Another characteristic of the ultra school of American

bridge design is the reliance placed on formulae, which
appear to be used as a substitute for judgment rather
than as an aid to it.[21]
The Canadian Engineer of 13 March 1908 included a summary of the
Commission's Report with little comment, but saw fit to print in
a later issue a letter from a certain A.6. Midford, which
concluded with chauvinistic fervour:

The Yankee has had his opportunity and failed. Now that the
Quebec Bridge is to be nationalized and—Including its
failure—paid for by Canadians, it is high time that
Canadian engineers should design and erect it, for with them
the habit of dropping into the river half erected or
completed bridges has not become chronic.[22]

But, once again, it was the The Engineering Neva which published
in its issue of 19 March, the most comprehensive account of the
Commission's report. And its editorial in the same issue,
endorsing and at the same time going beyond the Commission's
conclusions, should be required reading for all latter-day
technocrats. The following brief extracts present the American
version of the transatlantic criticism quoted above:
And the lesson is the contrast between the practical man
— t h e man whose only training was the training of the
shop and the field—and the engineer with a thorough
technical education.
When the inspectors of the bridge found a bottom-chord
member bent—not merely kinked but bent alike in every
component part and on its entire length—who was it that
perceived the seriousness of the situation? Not the
scientifically-trained engineering directors of the
work. Birks laughed down all fears. He set his belief
that the chord could not be crippling because, forsooth,
it was not yet loaded to anything like what it was
designed to carry...
Kinloch, the bridge inspector, a 'practical' man, saw
more clearly than any other man the fast coming

21 Engineering, 27 March 1908.

22 The Canadian Engineer, 24 April 1908.

 85
disaster, and he made a two-days fight to bring all the
others to see the danger.
McLure also, vho had the advantage of a college
training, sav the danger, but, as the man of least
experience among those on the ground, he appears to have
been least ready to assert his vievs strongly.[23]
The editorial vent on to assert that it vas of course in favour
of college training for engineers, but stressed that such
graduates had an obligation to be 'even more practical than the
vorkman,' there being lessons to be learned on the shop floor
vhich cannot be taught in the classroom.
It is of course true that things like this have been
said many times before; but the trouble is, ve have not
taken them to heart. We have supposed that they referred
to the men vho try to do professional vork vith nothing
but theoretical knowledge. It has not occurred to us
that the men in the top ranks of the profession, vho
have been building great engineering vorks for nearly a
lifetime, needed such admonitions. And yet that is vhat the
event shovs. We all of us, juniors and seniors alike, need
to knov more, -to test our theories constantly in the light
of nev knowledge vhen it comes, veil attested, from any
source. Yes, surely, the great lesson from this greatest
disaster is the lesson of humility.[24]

CONSEQUENCE: THE SECOND BRIDGE

Before commenting on the disaster Itself and the manner in vhich

it vas treated on the technical press, let us look briefly at
vhat vas done in the case of the second Quebec bridge shovn in
outline on Figure 2(c).
The successful completion of this bridge in 1917 must be credited
primarily to the fresh administrative approach, vhich is in sharp
contrast to the veak organization vhich managed the first bridge.
The 'owner,1 vhich vas effectively the Government of Canada,
appointed a poverful Board of Engineers, including, until his
death in 1916, the consultant C.C. Schneider, vhich in turn vas
supported by a substantial staff of engineers, draftsmen,
calculators, as veil as shop, field and mill Inspectors. Prior to
going to tender the Board's engineers carried out extensive
preliminary studies, and followed these vith the detailed design
of a cantilever bridge. The bidders vere asked to tender on this

23 Engineering Nevs, 19 March 1908.

24 Ibid.
86
plus four modifications, and the final design is that of the
successful bidder, the St Lawrence Bridge Company Limited.
Details of the bridge are given in a 'completion report' prepared
by the Board of Engineers.[25] It will be seen from Figure 2(c)
that the cantilever structure still has a span of 1800 feet. The
framing also has the same 'K-truss' configuration as the old
bridge. But the specifications for the new bridge called for
greater live loads and lower working stresses. These factors,
combined with a greater degree of conservatism in the detailed
design of the structure, resulted in a much heavier bridge, as
the following comparison with the old bridge shows:

Second Bridge First Bridge

Total weight (tons) 66,480 40,500

Lower chord member
Height 7'-3 3/8" 4'-6 1/2"
Width 10'-3 1/4" 5'-7 1/2"
Area of steel (sq. in.) 1,941 842
The new bridge differed from its predecessor in one other
important feature: the method of erecting the central suspended
span. It will be recollected that in the first bridge this was
built outwards as a temporary extension of the cantilever, with
the intention of freeing the support when the connection was
finally made with the northern half of the bridge. In the case of
the new bridge both sides were built out only to the ends of the
cantilevers. The central span was completed separately and
floated out to the site on pontoons, from which it was hoisted
into position between the cantilevers. The first attempt, on 11
September 1916, ended in failure when a component of the hoisting
tackle fractured and the suspended span fell into the river (pace
Midford), unfortunately with some loss of life. But this accident
in no way reflected on the design of the bridge or the basic
method of construction.

COMMENTS

After a span of eighty years is there anything more that can be

said of the Quebec bridge experience? In view of Benjamin
Baker's comment quoted at the head of this article, we should ask
if the first Quebec bridge was precedent-setting. At first glance
the answer must be 'no,' for the Forth bridge itself, designed by
John Fowler and Benjamin Baker, was the first bridge to employ
the cantilever principle on such an large scale, and remains to
this day, with its three cantilevers having centre-to-centre

25 Government Board of Engineers, The Quebec Bridge over the

St Lawrence (Ottawa, 1918).
 87
spans over 100 feet longer than the Quebec bridge, a much more
impressive structure.[26] But there are important differences,
as remarked by Professor C E . Inglis in an address to the
Institution of Civil Engineers in 1944:
The [Forth] bridge was a hand-made production, being built
up plate by plate even as a ship is constructed. Cheap and
abundant labour could be obtained from the neighbouring
Clyde shipyards, and consequently it was possible and
legitimate to indulge in refinements of design which
nowadays would have to be ruled out because of their
prohibitive cost...
In [the] first Quebec bridge money was very tight and to
keep costs within certain prescribed limits the designer
adopted the hazardous expedient of putting his working
stresses up to a limit well beyond all previous practice...

The Quebec bridge, like all modern bridges, was machine

made. To reduce labour costs the work of erection was
cut down to the minimum. The various members were
brought to the site as far as possible in a completed
form, and the design was dominated by two main consider-
ations: ease of erection and the transportation of
ready-made parts.[27]

While the last paragraph of Inglis1s comments referred to the

second Quebec bridge, it could equally be applied to the first.
In the all-important matter of the compression members we have
noted (with Inglis) that the tubular struts of the Forth bridge
were tailor-made plate by plate. There was at least one precedent
for this: the massive elliptical tubes which formed the arch
elements in I.K. Brunei's Tamar bridge (opened 1859). It would
probably be fair to say that the prefabricated struts of the
Quebec bridge involved a far greater departure from previous
experience than in the British case. The minimum dimensional
tolerances which could be achieved in practice left room for

26 The eye of the observer is drawn to the centre-to-centre

spacing of the cantilevers. In the case of the Quebec bridge,
where the central towers comprise single trestle frames, this
dimension is also the clear span, which the Quebec bridge can
rightly claim to be the world's longest for the type of
structure. The towers of the Forth bridge comprise two trestles,
and the eye observes more readily the centre-to-centre spacing of
1912.5 feet than the clear span of 1700 feet (see figures 2 ) .
27 C.E. Inglis, 'The Aesthetic Aspect of Civil Engineering
Design,' in The Institution of Civil Engineers, The Aesthetic
Aspect of Civil Engineering Design—A Record of Six Lectures
Delivered at the Institution (London, 1945), 59-61.
88
misfits in the field assembly that could lead to eccentricity of
loading.[28] In the face of the imperfect methods available for
designing the latticing, the need for conservatism should have
been self-evident.
The most conspicuous error in design was, in my view, the
omission of the iterative process which equated the design dead
load to the weight of the structure. The result of this neglect
meant that the bridge was virtually doomed to failure before a
single piece of steel had been erected. As the load on the bridge
increased during construction, the growing stresses would
inevitably seek out the weakest elements of the bridge's fabric,
and it would only have been by the providential absence of any
unfavourable circumstances of an secondary nature that a very
weak bridge might have been completed. And then all traffic would
have been at risk. If, conversely, the bridge had been designed
for its actual dead weight, it is conceivable that the other
shortcomings would not have caused failure, but, again, a less
than ideal structure would have resulted.

The explanation for this appalling error would seem to be that,

once the Phoenix Bridge Company resumed active work on the
superstructure contract following the 1900-1903 hiatus,
insufficient time and money were budgetted for Szlapka's
department to carry out a critical review of the preliminary
studies and complete a thorough working design. When he
discovered the omission early in 1906 Szlapka must have realized
its implications. Clearly he decided to 'pass the buck' to
Cooper. Neither had the courage to 'blow the whistle.'
In the event, the weaknesses manifested themselves in the field
during August, 1907, and the failure on the part of the site
staff and Hoare to foresee the perilous consequences of the
increasing distortions in member A9L was responsible for the loss
of life when the bridge inevitably collapsed.

The technical press made much of the comparison between the

'practical1 man and the college-trained professional. This
oft-repeated argument must surely have arisen when, during the
nineteenth century, an increasing number of graduates from
technical schools entered the profession and started applying
analytical methods in engineering design. It is unfortunate that
an impression is sometimes given of a mistrust of calculation in
favour of 'judgement.' Nevertheless judgement is often called
for, never more obviously than in August, 1907. The point is not
that the 'practical man' (Kinloch) was right and the
college-trained engineers (Birk and McLure) were wrong, but that

28 Eccentricity of loading could, in turn, lead to

distortions such as were observed in chord member A9L.
 89
the latter failed to apply their technical knowledge in response
to Klnloch's concerns.
We have already noted one aspect of the first Quebec bridge which
was unusual, namely that all stages of the design were carried
out by the contractor. No separate charges were made for this
service, the cost of which would be absorbed in the billing rates
for the manufacture and construction of the bridge itself. Once
these rates were fixed, any cost saved by cutting corners in the
design would be reflected in an increase of the contractor's
profit.

The more normal practice was, and remains, that the early design
studies, as well as the basic final design, including the general
sizing of the members and preparation of technical
specifications, are carried out by a staff of engineers working
directly for the client. Whether this staff is directly employed
or a firm of consulting engineers is engaged, the important fact
is that the sezvice is paid for. The contractor may or may not be
invited to submit alternative designs at the tendering stage.
Certainly it is quite common for the contractor to prepare detail
drawings, subject to the approval of the client's engineers, of
such elements as the joints between members, and he will always
prepare his own shop drawings for the manufacture and fabrication
stages. Again, during the construction phase the client will
engage a competent supervisory staff to oversee the work of the
contractor in the field. A similar procedure was followed and
played an important role in the case of the second Quebec bridge.

But we must repeat that this procedure for the execution of a

major public works project was already established practice when
the Quebec bridge was first promoted. The initial blame for the
1907 disaster must rest with the Quebec Bridge Company for
failing to recognize that there is no such thing as free
engineering.

Whether this lesson has yet been learned is debatable.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This paper is based on an earlier version written at the

suggestion of Professor Bruce Sinclair of the Institute for the
History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of
Toronto. My thanks are due to Professor Sinclair for his guidance
and advice.
SOURCE OF FIGURES

Certain of the figures have been copied or adapted from the

following sources: Fig. 1 from Board of Engineers, The Quebec
Bridge ovez the St. Lavzence Rivez (Ottawa, 1918); Figs. 2-8 from
Royal Commission, Quebec Bridge Inquiry, Report (Ottawa, 1908).