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1988

Gramsci and International Relations Theory

John Robert Dedrick
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

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GRAMSCI AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department o f Government

The College of W illiam and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillm ent

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

by

John R. Dedrick

1988
 APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is subm itted in partial fulfillm ent of

the requirem ents for the degree of

Maste of Arts

‘ John R. Dedrick

Approved, May 1988

David Dessler

Chris Kelly

ii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................ iv

ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................... v

CHAPTER I. HEGEMONY: FROM POLITICAL REALISM

TO HISTORICAL MATERIALISM.................................. 2

CHAPTER II. HEGEMONY: A GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE........................... 27

CHAPTER HI. HEGEMONY: THE LIMITATIONS

AND POSSIBILITIES FOR A CONCEPT............................... 56

BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................................................................... 71

iii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank all my teachers at the College o f William and

Mary. W ithout their compassion, and occasional prodding, I would
never have finished this essay. Also, I would like to express my
gratitude to the Graduate School at W illiam and Mary for providing me
with a generous graduate assistantship. Particular thanks go to David
D essler whose academic guidance and friendship helped me write this
paper; Joel Schwartz who has been my teacher o f political philosophy;
Berhanu Abegaz and Bruce Roberts who taught me economics; and
Chris Kelly for his insightful conversations. I would also like to express
gratitude to Bruce Campell, Kristen Robertson, and Tina Papamicheal.
Each of these people contributed in a significant way to the completion
of this essay.
 ABSTRACT

Orthodox international relations literature uses the word

hegemony to describe a situation in which one nation state is able to
dominate the global ordering of nation states due to its preponderance
o f material resources. By contrast Antonio Gramsci develops a theory of
hegem ony, frequently called "ideological hegem ony," which situates
the possibilities for hegemonic power in the ability of a dominant class
to universalize its particular point o f view. Although Gramsci applies
the theory of hegemony to explain political pow er configurations
within post World W ar I Italy, that theory provides a backdrop for a
theory of hegemony in the intemationjfl arena. Not only does a
Gram scian theory o f international hegemony allows for an
understanding o f pow er which incorporates both m aterial resources
and belief systems, but also the Gramscian approach implies particular
strategies for international politics with or without hegemonic pow er
co n figurations.

v
GRAMSCI AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
 Chapter I

Hegemony: From Political Realism to Historical Materialism

Expressed through a variety of guises orthodox international

relations theorists use the word hegemony to mean the ability o f one

nation-state to dominate the international state system because o f its

preponderance of material resources. Robert O. Keohane expands the

orthodox construct to incorporate the notion that mere m aterial

preponderance must be accompanied by an "ability and willingnes" to

assert national power. Further, Robert Cox develops a theory of

hegemony within the parameters o f historical materialism. Below, the

orthodox frameworks are outlined with an emphasis on hegemony as an

expression of national power. By way o f contrast and criticism both

Keohane's and Cox's contributions to an analysis o f hegemony in the

international system are addressed. As the argument dem onstrates, all

schools involved consider hegemony to be a system-wide concept.

However, the component parts o f that international system are

constrained by theoretical building blocks. These approaches

converge where m aterial resources are emphasized, but they differ

where power is defined in more than material terms.

Like all fram eworks for interpreting the world, international

relations theory is historically laden. One may argue that Neorealism

developed as a response to perceived weaknesses in older Realist

international relations thought. A rchetypal spokesmen o f the R ealist

2
 3

camp would include E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. However, the ideas

of Neorealism are fundamentally rooted in Realism. And, in a sense,

Neorealism represents a micro adjustment to a well established Realist

paradigm.

In a succinct passage of The Twenty Years Crisis E. H. Carr

outlines the main tenets of the Realist approach. First, the process of

history is understood as a sequence o f cause and effect relationships

that exist beyond, and cannot be changed by, mind processes . Second,

practice creates theory, and not visa versa . And, third, "morality is the

product of power" (1946/ 1964: 64). Carr's emphasis on the re a lp o litik

of power as the underlying historical reality, and motivating force in

the historic process, remains central to the world view o f modem

R ealists and N eorealists.

Although Carr presents M achiavelli as the "first important

realist," the tradition of political Realism dates to antiquity. Frequently

Thucydides' The Peloponnesian W ar is cited as a founding textual

expression. In the orthodox texts one finds references to Thucydides--

e.g., that " The strong do what they can. The weak suffer what they

must" (Thucydides, Book V, paragraph 90 [Chapter XVII, M odem Library

ed. p. 311] ).* And, from the ancients to modernity the application of

this tradition to international affairs rests its analysis on three

assumptions that determine a point of entry to the world as well as

possible outcomes in the international world. These assumptions may

be summarized as follows (Keohane, 1986a: 7):

1. States (or city states) are the key units o f action.

1 Cited (Keohane, 1986b: 177).

 4

2. States seek power, either as an end in itself or as a

means to other ends.
3. States behave in ways that are, by and large, rational,
and therefore com prehensible to outsiders in rational
terms.

In brief, Realism posits nation-states as primary actors in the

international field. Such states behave with nearly universal

rationality to maximize their pow er positions in the international

arena. Here the maximization of power is a key attribute of

international politics. As Carr states in The Twenty Years C risis: "in the

international order, the role of power is greater and that o f morality

less" (1946: 168). 2 And, indeed, power is a key concern o f historical

international relations theorists and practitioners. For instance in

Politics Among N ations (1948/1967) M orgenthau portrays international

politics as a struggle for power where agents of the nation state "think

and act in terms of power"(1948/1967: 5).3

Realism applied to international affairs has em phasized the

importance o f a balance of power within the nation-state system. In

M orgenthau's writings the balance of power becomes a key concept for

understanding stability and change in the nation-state system .^ In one

of the senses in which M orgenthau expresses the balance o f power, it is

a natural growth which follows from the reality of power politics and

the struggle for power among nations (Keohane, 1986a: 13). However,

2 Cited (Keohane, 1986a: 8).

3 Cited (Keohane, 1986a: 10).

4 In Politics Among Nations balance of powers possesses two

referents. First, it is a "universal concept" which refers to
international power balance equilibrium s (Keohane, 1986a: 13). And,
second, it is a "necessary outgrowth" o f power politics and describes the
situation of any power struggle (Keohane, 1986a: 13).
 5

within M orgenthau1s own work the idea of power remains an elusive

phenomenon. Keohane aptly points out that "his definition o f power

was murky, since he failed to distinguish between power as a resource . .

. and power as the ability to influence others behavior" (1986a: 11).

Both Realists and Neorealists tend to view the international

political arena in terms of a structural analysis. In a sense, rationally

behaving nation-states seek power within the param eters of an over­

arching international system which is subject to structural constraints.

This system simultaneously acts to constrain the possibilities of

rationally behaving states and lays the field upon which interstate

action occurs. Structure both limits and makes possible specific

possibilities in international political struggles. It is this notion o f an

international system which leads Kenneth N. W altz to comment that :

"The enduring anarchic character o f international politics accounts for

the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the

millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent" (1986: 53).

In an effort to revamp and fine tune the Realist model Kenneth

N. W altz has developed a theory of "structural realism." He describes the

nature of his systems theory, and systems theories in general, in the

follow ing way:

[SJystems theories, whether political or economic, are

theories that explain how the organization o f the realm
acts as a constraining and disposing force on the
interacting units within it. Such theories tell us about the
forces the units are subject to. From them, we can infer
some things about the expected behavior and fate o f the
units: namely, how they will have to compete with and
adjust to one another if they are to survive and flourish
(1986: 60).

From the outset it should be noted that W altz's structural realism

examines the structure as a whole, leaving aside the internal attributes

 6

of the nation-states composing that structure (1986). He defines

structure in three dimensions. First, the "ordering principle" of the

international system is self-help within anarchy (1986: 81). Second,

"the character of the units," or nation states, is "like units" (1986: 87).

The sim ilarity o f nation states in the international system is determined

by the condition o f international anarchy which precludes any

hierarchial ordering of states. And, third, "the distribution of

capabilities across units" in the international system is a balance-of-

power (1986: 93). Waltz uses power as the determinate system variable :

"Power is is estimated by comparing the capabilities across units . . . .

The distribution of capabilities is not a unit attribute, but rather a

system-wide concept" (1986: 93). Like Morgenthau's classical Realism

which assum es rationally behaving states which seek pow er within

situation of power politics and an historical balance of power, W altz's

structural realism ends in a balance o f power theory. Ashe clearly

states: "Balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two,

requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be

populated by units wishing to survive" (1986: 121).

Another attempt to modify the Realist program while

sim ultaneously m aintaining an em phasis on international structure is

Koehane's Neorealism. Keohane's proposed model is a "modified

structuralist research program , which relaxes some o f the assumptions

of Structural Realism but retains enough o f the hard core to generate a

priori predictions on the basis o f inform ation about the international

environment" (1986b: 191). And, to encourage this project he calls for

better theories of "domestic politics, decision making, and

com m unication" to "narrow the gap" between international and

domestic understandings o f politics (1986b: 191).

Keohane em phasizes the importance o f understanding the

"context of action before understanding the action i ts e lf (i.e.,

structural analysis emphasizes the role o f structure as both

constraining and creating possibilities for action), and he notes that

structuralism adds a "irreplaceable c o m p o n e n t for a thorough analysis

of action" (1986b: 193). It is from this basis that he restructures the

R ealist research program. Re-examining the assumptions o f Realism he

calls for modification o f all three assumptions. First, although states

will be considered primary actors, the new program also includes

nonstate, intergovernm ental organizations, and tran sn atio n al actors

(1986b: 193). Each was ignored in the classical paradigm, but these

organizations are real actors in the modern international arena.

Second, although a rationality assumption is granted to allow for a link

betw een structure and behavior it will not assume "perfect inform ation,

consideration o f all possible alternatives, or unchanging actor

preferences" (1986b: 194).^ And, third, the assumption that "states seek

power, and calculate their interests accordingly, would be qualified

severely"(1986b: 194). Keohane contends that states do other things

than attem pt to maximize international power. In particular during

situations o f domestic crisis states may act to merely maintain

5 Koehane criticizes Realist constructs of rationality, at least in

part, for their affinity for m icro-econom ic understandings o f
rationality. He notes that "to say that governments act rationally in this
sense means that they have consistent, ordered preferences, and that
they calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order
to maximize their utility in light o f both o f those preferences and their
perceptions of the nature o f reality" (1986a: 11).
 8

sovereignty w ithout attem pting to maximize their global position

(1986b: 194).

By challenging the limits o f structural Realism Keohane hopes to

broaden the focus of debate to bring Realist theory in closer proximity

to "reality." Regarding the Realist power seeking assumption, not only

does he reject claims that states always seek to maximize power, but also

he rejects the claim that power is systemically fungible. Rather he

assumes a differentiation of "power resources" to achieve differing

goals: "[P] ower resources are differentially effective across issue areas,

and the usability of a given set of power resources depends upon the

’policy-contingent fram ew orks’ w ithin which it m ust be employed"

(1986b: 194). His emphasis on "policy contingent frameworks" opens the

possibility that beyond m aterial structure "institutions" and "rules"

ought be included in structural analysis (1986b: 194). Further, this

approach broadens the parameters o f what may be included as a power

resource. In the Realist paradigm power is a material asset. Power can

be quantitatively measured (for the most part), and it is fungible. By

contrast Keohane imposes organizational and issue area dimensions to

determ ining national power.

K eohane’s Neorealism broadens the horizons o f R ealist thought

by incorporating a generation's worth o f research into econom ic

reasoning, the developm ent o f m ulti-national corporations, the global

recognition o f international institutions, and the weight o f case

evidence. N evertheless Keohane's approach is deeply embedded in the

R ealist tradition. Although the two schools part at certain points, they

share common categorical assumptions. Keohane does not reject the

 9

Realist framework, he merely adjusts the assumptions to fit his

perception of "reality” more closely.

* * *

Above a fram ework for understanding the underlying prem ises

of Realism and Neorealism was outlined. At this point I would like

interject the notion of hegemony into the discussed literature. Put

simply, hegemony, as it is used in the orthodox literature, refers to a

condition under which one nation is able to achieve a position of

international dom inance because o f its m aterial preponderance. A look

at Gilpin's theory of hegemonic decline and war causation, and

K eohane's analysis of hegemony and cooperation in international

political economy demonstrate the point sufficiently.

W ithin the orthodox camp Robert O. Keohane has argued that

across tim e the m ajor concerns o f international relations are "the

sources of discord and of war and the conditions of o f cooperation and

peace" (1986a: 3). In particular his research focuses on the possibilities

for international cooperation. In A fter hegemony: Cooperation and

Discord in the W orld Political Economy (1984) Keohane argues for the

possibility o f cooperation in international political economy after the

collapse of hegemonic regimes. As given he suggests that "even where

where common interests exist cooperation often fails" (1984: 6). But he

does not address the problems o f why common interests exist in the first

place, or how they can be created. In this work common interests are

assumed, and he consciously leaves out economic and ideological

mechanism s which may generate the perception common interests. As

he tells the reader: "I neither explore how economic conditions affect

patterns o f interests, nor do I investigate the effects of ideas and ideals

 10

on state behavior" (1984: 6). It is from this perspective that he precedes

to argue that hegemony is not necessary for cooperation in the sphere

o f international political economy.

Keohane's argument that cooperation is possible without

hegemony is, at least in part, a criticism of the orthodox "theory of

hegemonic stability." Put simply, the theory of hegemonic stability

defines the condition of international hegemony as one nation-state's

ability to m aintain an order in the international arena because of that

dom inant nation-state (hegem on) commands a preponderance of

material resources (Keohane, 1984: 12). :

The theory o f hegemonic stability, as applied to the world

political econom y, defines hegemony as preponderance o f
m aterial resources. Four sets o f resources are especially
important. Hegemonic powers must have control over raw
m aterials, control over sources o f capital, control over
m arkets, and com petitive advantages in the production of
highly valued goods (1984: 32).

U nderlying the theory o f hegemonic stability Keohane finds two

general propositions. First, hegemonic stability im plies that "order in

world politics is typically created by a single dominant actor (1984: 31).

And, second, the theory suggests that the maintenance o f a particular

world order requires a perpetual hegemon (1984: 31). Or, as

Kindleberger states: "for the world economy to be stabilized, there has

to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer" (1973: 305).^ Hegemony in

international politics depends upon one nation-state asserting its

m aterial preponderance. In a hegem onic international system the

rules o f international behavior are enforced by the hegem onic nation-

6 Charles Kindleberger, The W orld in Depression. 1929-1939

(Berkley: University o f California Press, 1973). Cited in (Keohane,
1984: 31)
 11

state over the whole nation-state system. Thus, hegemony is understood

as the ability of one nation-state to dominate the system as a whole due

to its material preponderance. If the dominant state, or hegemon, loses

its superior command of material resources (perhaps symbolized by loss

of a competitive edge in the global political economy) then the order it

created and stability it exported are undermined.

Like K oehane's abstention from exploring the possible cultural

and ideological sources of cooperation, this theory entirely ignores

non-quantifiable variables in determ ining hegem onic power. The

theory assumes a common understanding of which raw m aterials are

valuable, power structures that enable one nation to control sources of

capital, and a common understanding o f economic com petitiveness.

Further, it leaves out any ideological conditions that would allow for this

commonality of interests.

One application of the theory o f hegemonic stability can be found

in G ilpin's argument that war is likely under conditions of declining

international hegemony. Using essentially R ealist prem ises he argues

that "the distribution of power among states constitutes the principal

form of control in every international system"(1981: 29 ) J Changes in

the international system are reflected in rising and declining nation­

state hegemony where "the conclusion of one hegemonic war is the

beginning o f another cycle o f growth expansion and eventual decline"

(1981: 210).8 He suggests that the sources o f hegemonic decline are

rooted in economic processes that lead the form erly perponderent

7 Cited in (Keohane, 1986b: 177).

8 Cited in (Keohane, 1986b: 177).

 12

nation-state to lose its hegemonic position (1981: 115, 159).^ The result

of a nation-state's declining hegemonic position is a less than peaceful

transform ation of the global political structure, or, in other words, a

hegemonic war. Gilpin's use o f a theory of hegemonic stability

ultim ately relies on a "basic force" model o f international power

(Keohane, 1986b). And his use of hegemony is easily reducible to the

m aterial force model Keohane identifies with the orthodox theory of

hegem onic stab ility .

D issatisfied with past expositions o f theory o f hegemonic

stability, Keohane tackles the problem o f the formation and subsequent

collapse of the post W orld W ar II international monetary regime which

was formulated through the Bretton Woods Agreements. He finds the old

theory of hegemonic stability utterly inadequate. Instead o f finding

that the collapse o f the Bretton Woods system lead to an end of

international cooperation, which the theory o f hegem onic stability

would predict, international cooperation continues in the post-

hegemonic age. In particular he offers three criticisms o f the model.

First, the model focuses only on tangible resources to calculate change

and leaves out the role o f "confidence" in international affairs. Second,

the model ignores the possibility of a "dual" nature o f power relations.

And, third, the model "overpredicts" the effects of a regime collapse

(1984: 207).

Given these weaknesses in the theory o f hegemonic stability

Keohane sets out to reform ulate the model along the lines of his

Neorealism. Unfortunately, Keohane's exposition o f his own position is

9 Cited in (Keohane, 1986b: 178).

 13

foggier than his criticisms of the Realist model. 10 To Keohane

hegemony is a derivative concept which incorporates facets o f political

Realism and Marxism. From the Realists he inherits the concept of

hegemony as a "preponderance of material resources" (1984: 32). To

this he adds Imm anuel W allerstein's definition of economic hegemony:

a situation wherein the products o f a given core state are

produced so efficiently that they are by and large
com petitive even in the core areas, and therefore the
given core state will be the primary beneficiary of a
maximally free world market (1980: 38).H

Keohane presents a sketch o f M arxist understanding o f hegemony based

on a generic theory o f Marxism which supposes that a M arxist critique

of the world political economy begins with an analysis of class and

uneven developm ent w ithin the capitalist global economy. He

m aintains that w ithin the M arxist fram ework "theories of hegemony

are necessarily partial, since they do not explain changes in the

contradictions facing capitalism" (1984: 42).

Citing the influence o f Marxists, Realists, and Institutionalists

on his theory, Keohane provides a definition o f hegemony that

10 K eohane’s analysis ultim ately concerns the possibilities of

cooperation in the global political economy where cooperation is
understood in contrast to discord. "[C]ooperation takes place when one
policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its
partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result
of a process of policy coordination. . . (1984: 52). From the Realsit
appoach Keohane notes that cooperation is merely the logical extention
of a grand power struggle (1984: 7). From the Institutionalist
framework Keohane notes that ”[c]ooperation is essential in in a world
o f interdependence," and institutions foster cooperation (1984: 7).

1 1 Immanuel W allerstein, The M odem W orld System II:

M ercantilism and the Consolidation o f the European W orld-Economv.
1600-1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980). Cited in Keohane, 1984.
 14

transcends the basic force model. Referring to work done by Keohane

and Nye he redefines hegemony in the following way:

Hegemony is defined as a situation in which 'one state is

pow erful enough to m aintain the essential rules
governing interstate relations and w illing to do so'
(Keohane and Nye, 1977: 44).

This revised use of hegemony differs in two basic respects from the

Realist construct. First, unlike the theory o f hegemonic stability

Keohane does not assume "an automatic link" between the possession of

power and leadership (1984: 34). Second, this revamped use of

hegemony not only emphasizes power, but also it considers the

"internal characteristics of the strong state" (1984: 35). In summary,

"[i]t does not assume that strength automatically creates incentives to

project one's power abroad. Domestic attitudes, political structures, and

decision making processes are also important" (1984: 35). By

reform ulating an understanding o f hegemony, and the role this fosters

in international cooperation, he proposes a distinction betw een

hegem onic leadership and im perialism .

Successful hegem onic leadership itself depends on a

certain asymm etrical cooperation. The hegemon plays a
distinctive role, providing its partners with with
leadership in tern for deference; but unlike imperial
power, it cannot make and enforce rules without acertain
degree of of consent from other sovereign states (1984:
46).

The emphasis on "asymmetrical cooperation" is essential to

K eohane's point. Instead o f overtly dominating the affairs o f other

nations, the hegemonic pow er must cooperate with the subjects o f its

domination to the extent that the subjected nation is willing to "defer"

pow er to the hegemon. Hegemonic rule is differentiated from

im perialism because under the latter form o f international power

assertion the subjected nation is overtly dominated. By contrast

hegemonic rule implies conditions under which, for one reason or

another, the dominant nation is "willing and able" to extract

"deference" from the group o f nation-states.

K eohane's reform ulation of hegemony fits neatly into a "modified,

research program." By relaxing the state as actor assumption he is able

to include domestic structure. By relaxing the power seeking

assumption he is able to assert that the possession o f power does not

necessarily lead to its articulation. And, by emphasizing the

possibilities for cooperation he is able to set hegemony aside as a unique

form of international domination. His refinements to the Realist use of

hegemony separates out brute, or overt, domination from sophisticated,

or sublime, control. In the former case one nation dominates the

international arena because it has the material power to do so. In the

latter case, mere possession o f power is not enough, the powerful state

m ust also possess sufficient intranational consensus and international

deference to assert its power. A ccepting Keohane's contributions

towards a theory of international hegemony it is still useful to note the

ability o f one nation to make and m aintain rules in the international

arena is still rooted in material abundance. Although Keohane allows

space for "w illingness" and "deference," m aterial abundance remains at

the base of the theory. As I suggested earlier, Keohane's Neorealism is

merely a micro adjustment to the Realist paradigm. His language and

concerns remain the same as ardent realists.

In addition to Realist and N eorealist theories o f international

hegemony, Robert Cox has developed a theory o f hegemony in the

international system that, in large part, is derived from Antonio

Gramsci's ideological hegemony. Cox's approach is that of an historicist

 16

M arxist (Cox, 1986). Cox's contributions are extremely significant

because he successfully bridges the concerns o f orthodoxy and the

insights of Gramsci's exploration of ideology as a power resource.

Cox's approach to understanding the workings o f power in the

international system is rooted in the tradition o f historical materialism .

To Cox historical materialism is a form of Marxism which "reasons

historically and seeks to explain, as well as promote, changes in social

relations" (1986: 214). He contrasts this mode of analysis with

"structural" M arxism which is essentially static in historical

perspective and focuses prim arily on the capitalist mode of production.

Cox sees an analogy between Realism versus Neorealism as compared to

historical m aterialism versus "structuralism ." W hile both Realism and

historical m aterialism are rooted in historical modes o f thought, there

derivative spin-offs, structuralism and N eorealism , share an a-

historical approaches and essentialist epistem ologies (1986: 215).

Cox suggests that a historical m aterialist approach provides

several useful insights for international analysis. First, historical

m aterialism argues from the standpoint o f dialectics. This affects the

theory at both "logical" and "real history" levels. At the level o f "logic"

the dialectic approach seeks to understand phenomenon through a

m ethod o f dialogic contradicition—"a dialogue seeking truth through

the exploration of contradictions" (Cox, 1986: 215). And, at the level of

"real history" the dialectic method explores the "potential for

alternative forms of developm ent arising from the confrontations of

opposed social forces in any concrete social formation" (Cox, 1986: 215).

W ith dialectical reasoning historical m aterialism approaches conflict

through different lenses than either Realism or Neorealism. In both of

 17

the latter approaches conflict is understood as either rooted in a fixed

human nature (M orgenthau, 1948) or a recurring phenom enon in all

international orders (Koehane, 1986a). The historical m aterialist

approach roots conflict as part of a historical process through which

human nature is reconstituted. Conflict both occurs in history with the

remaking of human nature and, concurrently, in "the creation of new

patterns of social relations which change the rules o f the game out o f

which. . . new forms of conflict may be expected ultimately to arise"

(Cox, 1986: 215). The recurrence of conflict is historically rooted in

changing patterns of social relationships and a m alleable human

nature.

A second difference between Noerealism and and historical

m aterialism is the latter's emphasis on imperialism as adding a

"vertical" dimension to international power, or, in M arxist term s, the

domination o f the center over the periphery (Cox, 1986: 216). This

approach violates the N eorealist assumption that the international

arena is contained by a situation of self-help anarchy. By contrast a

historical m aterialist approach would postulate a hierarchy of states,

and/or regions over other states and regions; thus, the theory allows

for an em phasis on core-periphery tensions.

Third, historical m aterialism focuses upon the relationship

between the state and civil society (Cox, 1986: 216). While the Realist

perspective views the State as the primary actor in international

affairs, leaving out the internal attributes and ordering of the State,

the historical m aterialist approach pays close attention to the

interrelatedness, or lack there of, o f civil institutions—the degree of

there developm ent and articulation—and state power. Not only is the
 18

state as primary actor axiomatic in the Realist approach, but also,

relationships w ithin the state and interstate relations that are not

articulated through state channels—such as dictums by the Holy Roman

Catholic Church--are excluded from consideration.

And, fourth, historical m aterialism focuses on "the production

process as a critical element in the explanation o f the particular

historical form taken by a state/society complex" (Cox, 1986: 216).

W hile the N eorealist, or Realist counterpart, argues from the

perspective of the State, the historical m aterialist argues from the point

o f the c a p ita lis t state. W ithin this tradition it is argued that the

capitalist state is not a generic state. The capitalist state is particular

state with particular interests that arise, at least in part, from the

nature capitalist production techniques. Cox emphasizes: "Historical

m aterialism exam ines the connections between pow er in production,

power in the state, and power in international relations" (1986: 216).

By contrast in W altz’s structural realist model the dominant relations of

production within a society are o f a lower order than the state, and,

consequently, these relationships are excluded from rigorous structural

analysis.

Cox’s historical m aterialism utilizes a notion o f "historical

structures." These structures are "a picture of a particular

configuration of forces" which "impose pressures and constraints" on

human actions (Cox, 1986: 217). Three categories of force are of

interest in this m odel--"m aterial capabilities," "ideas," and

"institutions" (1986: 218). Put simply, material capabilities are the

"productive and destructive potentials" of a society (1986: 218). They

would include factors o f production—land, labor, techniques of

 19

production—as well as tools of destruction. Ideas are both

intersubjective m eanings, and cross-cultural "images" o f a specific

historic structure (1986: 218). In this sense ideas are the sets of beliefs

shared within a group and across groups. For instance, the notion of

natural or human rights is shared both within many nation-states

(particular groups) across many national borders. And, institutions are

"the means of stabilizing and perpetuating a particular order" (1986:

219). This institutional component would include, but not be limited to,

state apparatuses, financial m arkets, educational systems, and religious

organizations. Regarding the relationship o f these forces Cox states:

No one-way determinism need be assumed among these

three; the relationships can be assumed to be reciprocal.
The question of which way the lines o f force run is always
a historical question to be answered by a study o f the
particular case (1986: 218).

Taken individually and collectively the elements of a historic

structure can be used to describe the level, or degree, of hegemony

within a society. That is, one can distinguish between hegemonic and

nonhegemonic social structures. Or as Cox states, "between those in

which the power basis tends to recede into the background of

consciousness, and those in which the management o f pow er relations

is always in the forefront"(1986: 219). Although no single element of

the historic strucure causes the rise or decline o f hegemonic power, the

role of institutions is emphasized because it is through institutions that

hegemonic power is articulated (Cox, 1986: 218).

Here hegemony is used in a sense which radically differs from

R ealist or N eorealist understandings. Cox has defined hegemony as "the

tem porary universalization in thought o f a particular pow er structure,

conceived not as domination but as the necessary order of nature" (1982:

 20

38). In this sense hegemony is not understood as material

preponderance. R ather hegemony is the result o f a particular power

structure being legitimized to the point o f universality in the eyes of

historic subjects.

A pplying the notion o f historic structure to the international

context, Cox delimits three analogous forces. First, the relationship of

the prevailing organization o f production and social forces (1986: 220).

Second, the "forms of state" as understood from the perspective o f

historical materialism as civil society-state complexes (1986: 220). And,

third, "world orders," or "the particular configurations o f forces which

successively define problematic o f war and peace for the ensemble o f

states" (1986: 220). It is at the level of world order that hegemonic

power configurations occur. But hegemony at the level of the system

does not mean the domination o f one state over other states merely

through "aggressive m ilitary and economic policies" (1982: 45).

Hegemony at the system level requires that the social order articulated

by the dominant nation appears as a natural global order. And, it should

be noted that the global system does not necessarily possess hegemonic

characteristics at all times. Global power structures can shift from

hegem onic to nonhegem onic forms depending on the unity or disunity

o f international forces. The hegemonic global order could be

characterized by a globally dominant form o f production and nation­

state civil society/state complexes which support the dominant mode o f

production. This would be the case for hegemony formed around a

"world order" based on nation-states.

In summary the conditions for a global hegemony would include:

1. a globally dominant mode of production;

2. a dominant state (or conceivably dominant group of
states acting in concert);
 21

3. a normative and institutional component that lays down

general rules of behavior for states and the forces o f civil
society that act across state boundaries. . . (Cox, 1982: 45).

These conditions are prerequisite for global hegemony. It should be

remembered that Cox does not lim it the concept of hegemony to the

global system. It is also possible to discuss hegemony in "the social

relations of production" and "social formation" (1982: 42-43). 12

Further, it is interesting to note that Cox’s preconditions for global

hegemony are not at odds with Keohane's infusion of "ability and

willingness" into the orthodox use. However, where Keohane extends

the basic force model to allow for the role of consent and deference, his

model does not articulate the necessary relationships o f mediation that

allow global domination to become hegemony. Keohane argues that the

possession of an abundance o f material resources does not necessarily

translate into hegemony, and he does not specify the location of, or

relationship betw een, institutional forces and econom ic forces that

create a hegemonic global order. Cox’s argument for historical

structures offers a useful heuristic for grappling with the nature of

mediated power relationships.

Following the orthodox literature Cox argues that two historic

"global orders" based in hegemony within the nation-state system were

pax b ritannica and pax am erican a. In each of these instances the

12 At the level of "relations of production" hegemony occurs

where both the existing mode o f production and relations o f production
support a power structure that appears as natural, or at least, necessary.
And, at the level o f "social formation" hegemony occurs where two
conditions are met. First, the existence of a ” abroad coalition of classes
under the leadership o f one class that is able to make to make
concessions adequate to m aintain support, or acquiescence from
subordinate classes in the coalition;" and, second, the existence o f "a
state that acts to consolidate this class coalition and to promote the mode
o f social relations o f production consistent with the continuing
dominance of the leading class" (Cox, 1982: 43).
 22

global system was directed by a nation-state that was able to

universalize its conception of the world order. Under pax b ritan n ica

the working o f the nation-state system were directed from the dominant

n a tio n -sta te center.

In the m id-nineteenth century, B ritian's world suprem acy

was founded on its sea power, which remained free from
challenge by a continental state as a result o f Britian's
ability to play the role of balancer in a relatively fluid
balance of power in Europe. The norms of liberal
economics . . . gained widespread acceptance with the
spread of British prestige, providing a universalistic
ideology which presented these norms as the harmony of
interests. W hile there were no formal institutions, the
ideological separation of economics from politics meant
that the City could appear as adm inistrator and regulator
according to these universal rules, with British sea power
rem aining in the background as potential enforcer (1986:
223).

The decline of British hegemony and the eventual ascendance o f

Am erican hegemony w itnessed not only a transform ation o f which

particular nation articulated and supported a global order, but also that

transform ation witnessed a change in the very structure o f the world

order.

The decline o f British hegemony may be viewed from the

perspective o f changes in the interrelation of forces. In particular, the

division of the world into ideologically opposed power blocks may have

facilitated the rise o f American hegemony. By contrast to British

hegem ony, American hegemony was considerably more masked. That

is, although America certainly possessed the economic and m ilitary

m ight to enforce a particular world order in the post W orld W ar II era,

the period between the late nineteenth century through world war II

provided vast structural changes in the global economy and make up of

nation-states that encouraged Europe and Japan to follow an American

 23

lead. Describing the hiddenness of American might during the p a x

a m e ric a n a era Cox suggests:

The United States rarely needed to intervene directly in

support of specific national economic interests; by
m aintaining the rules o f an international econom ic order
according to the revised liberalism o f Bretton Woods, the
strength of U.S. corporations involved in the pursuit of
profits was sufficient to ensure continuing national
power. The pax am ericana produced a greater number o f
form al international institutions than the earlier
hegemony. The nineteenth century separation o f
economic and politics had been blurred by the Great
Depression and the rise o f Keynesian doctrines. Since
states now had a legitimate and necessary overt role in
national economic m anagem ent, it became necessary both
to m ultilateralize the adm inistrative m anagem ent o f the
international economy and to give it an
intergovernm ental quality (1896: 224).

W hile the form er British hegemony had been relatively lacking in

international institutions, the post-w orld war II A m erican hegemony

utilized international institutions to legitim ize its view o f a proper

global economic order. Further, the formation o f this order was

facilitated by the perceived Soviet threat, the relative economic

deprivation of Europe after World W ar II, and growing economic

interdependence betw een nation-states.

Not only did the center o f international power change hands

from Britian to the United States, but also the global order itself

changed. On the one hand British hegemony depended on Britian's

w illingness and ability to articulate, export, and enforce through policy

a specifically liberal world view. On the other hand, American

hegemony depended not only on the ability and willingness to export a

world view, but also it required the formation o f coalitions to enforce

that view. The United States could not by itself, universalize its

perception of a natural world order. That perception o f the proper

world order required the active consent of potential partners. One

 24

example of the give and take process occurring in the establishm ent o f

American hegemony is the talks between W hite and Keynes, spokesmen

for the United States and Britian respectively, at Bretton Woods. The

program for a world economic order that emerged from the talks was

neither pure W hite nor pure Keynes. Rather the Bretton Woods system

reflects interest of both parties.

Cox's understanding of hegemony is a "particular fit between

power, ideology, and institutions" (1986: 230). An assessment of the

orthodox theory of hegemonic stability would not assume recurring

cycles o f one nation-state forming and m aintaining the rules o f the

international arena. R ather this approach would incorporate the idea

of historical structure, and for any particular global order two

questions would be asked regarding hegemonic stability.

1. W hat are the mechanisms for m aintaining hegemony

in this particular historical structure?
2. What social forces and/or forms of state have been
generated w ithin it which could oppose and ultim ately
bring about a transform ation o f the structure? (Cox, 1986:
230).

Although these questions provide only a rough set o f guidelines for

where to begin analyzing hegemony in the international system, they

do set the researcher on a divergent path from the orthodox approach.

By way of critique of the orthodox theory o f hegemonic stability, Cox

argues that the method o f historical m aterialism calls for a

reconsideration o f what is to be explained—the problematic itself. His

approach would call for an examination of the "relative stability of

successive world orders" (1986: 222). And, his use of hegemony, as

contrasted with the orthodox use, would provide an alternative basis for

understanding hegem onic world orders as stable world orders (1986:

223). In this case state power is not a given: it is part of what needs
 25

explanation. The explanation of why states become powerful is

connected with the idea of an interplay between three levels o f force at

the national level and corresponding international forces.

W ith this model the orthodox problematic o f explaining "the

sources of discord and war and the conditions o f cooperation and of

peace" is transformed. *3 First, instead of studying recurring cycles of

hegem ony w ithin a relatively fixed understanding o f historical

structure, the revised theory o f hegemony allows for transform ation of

the global structure (e.g., history is a succession of "global orders"

rather than one am orphous unchanging structure). And,

consequently, a condition o f hegemony is not necessarily part of all

stable global orders. Second, since the model examines the levels o f

production techniques and class form ations, understandings o f global

politics are not bound by state as actor assumptions. And, third, the

m odel suggests that nation-state centricity is historically bound. A

future (perhaps already emerging) global order may be based on

transnational class relations under the guidance o f an international

"managerial class."

At the apex o f an emerging global class structure is the

transnational m anagerial class. Having its own ideology,
strategy and institutions o f collective action, it is a class
both in itself and for itself. Its focal points o f organization,
the Trilateral Commission, World Bank, IMF and OECD,
develop both a framework of thought and guidelines for
policies. From these points, class action penetrates
countries through a process o f internationalization o f the
state (Cox, 1986: 234).

13 In an introduction to Neorealism and its Critics Robert O.

Keohane suggests that across history the sources o f war and peace are
the fundam ental questions for international relations theory (1986: 3).
 26

Above I examined three approaches to understanding hegemony:

Realism , Neorealism, and historical materialism . The movement from

orthodox international relations theory to Cox's historical m aterialism

allows for a greatly enriched notion o f global hegemony. The condition

o f international hegemony does not reflect the mere m aterial

preponderance o f the state among nation-states. Instead hegemonic

global orders reflect a recognized degree o f uniform ity in international

production, and an institutional com ponent which articulates and

supports the dom inant production techniques, exchange relations, and

underlying belief system, or ideology, which supports these relations.

At minimum the break between the orthodox international relations

theory and Cox's historical m aterialism represents a shift from studying

the structural lim itations o f nation-state behavior within a relatively

static international system to studying changes in the production and

exchange processes which create and transform particular global

orders. However, despite this fundam ental differences these

approaches all share an emphasis on m aterial m anifestations o f power.

Even in Cox's careful analysis of hegemony in the world order, the

"positional picture" one arrives at is filtered through the production

process. Cox's work goes a long way towards developing a m ulti­

dim ensional m odel for understanding international power. However,

much o f his work has focused on the the level o f the production process

and relations o f production.

 C hapter II

Hegemony: a Gramscian Perspective

Since the 1971 publication o f Antonio Gramsci's Selections From

Prison W ritings the theory o f "ideological" hegemony has penetrated

scholastic as well as activist literature in the English speaking world.

Given the growing mass of Gramscian literature in English it should be

of no surprise that Gramscian theory has been assimilated into the

corpus o f international relations literature. W ork by Robert Cox offers

provocative insights into the possibilities for expanding the

understanding o f pow er in the international sphere by incorporating

Gramscian ideas. Borrowing from the wealth o f Gramsci's ideas Cox

develops a theory o f "hegemony and production." His presentation was

discussed in the first chapter of this essay. The explication of Gramsci's

theory of hegemony which follows is an attempted reexamination of

the meaning of, and possibilities for, hegemonic power in the

international world. In particular, I argue that Gramsci develops an

understanding of hegemony which is applicable at both the levels of

theory and practice. As a theory, Gramscian hegemony adds to an

understanding of how power is articulated in international politics. As

a strategy for global transform ation the idea of hegemony is a central

concept, which pulls together broader programs for societal change. It

is not a plea for immediacy, or the catastrophic collapse of international

capitalism. Instead, Gramsci's theory of "praxis" (Marxism) calls for

27
 28

root criticism , careful planning, and gradual transform ation. In light

of the potentially genocidal powers o f the modem nation-state system,

these theory attributes should be amenable to everyone.

W riting in the wake of the Russian Revolution, World War I,

Italy's transition to capitalism, and the rise o f Italian Fascism, Gramsci

offers insights into the problems faced by revolutionaries of his age,

and, perhaps most im portantly, he develops fundamental criticism s of

the revolutionary orthodoxy o f his age—Marxism. Gramsci's approach

to understanding the possibilities o f social transform ation differs

m arkedly from his contem poraries o f the Second International. His

approach takes the form of a ruthless critique of "economism," which is

the term Gramsci uses to describe various forms o f reductionist

M arxism. In particular, Gram sci's attack against reductionism takes the

form o f prison notes written against Bukarin's historical m aterialism .

W ithin the pale o f M arxist thought the methodology o f historical

m aterialism has taken on a variety o f meanings. In the first chapter of

the present essay, Robert Cox's historical m aterialist method was

addressed. Here I step back in history and outline a reading of the

theory of historical materialism expressed in Karl M arx’s "Preface" to A,

Contribution to the Critique o f Political Economy (1859/1968). The

paragraphs composing the 1859 "Preface" offer a doctrine which

divides the human world into spheres o f production and relations of

production (economic base) and the legal, political, artistic, moral

norms, and etc (ideological superstructure). In this theory changes in

the ideological, or superstnictural, elements of society are social

responses to contradictions existing between the mode o f production

and the relations of production. One senses a one-way determinism in

 29

the theory as institutional and political changes are presented as

reflections of changes in the economic base.

In the social production o f their life, men enter into

definite relations that are indispensable and independent
o f their will, relations of production which correspond to a
definite stage o f the development of their material
productive forces. The sum total of these relations of
roduction constitutes the economic structure o f society, the
real foundations, on which rises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of
social consciousness. . . . It is not the consciousness o f men
that determ ines their being, but, on the contrary, their
social being that determ ines their consciousness (1968:
181).

In this doctrine it is understood that at certain conjunctural points in

history the superstructure "comes into conflict with" developm ents in

the economic base (Marx, 1968: 181). Changes in the economic base

cause a rapid transform ation o f the superstructure. And during this

process o f change, or as Marx calls it, "epochal revolution,"

superstructural elem ents either decay o r becom e historically

progressive. Thus, in times o f revolution the one-way determinism o f

production processes generating social consciousness gives way to the

possibility of a two-way causality. In other words, during periods of

societal transform ation, changes in the economic base effect changes

in the superstructure, which in turn affect further changes in the

base. At these conjunctural periods consciousness becomes a

d e term in in g facto r.

In considering such transform ations a distinction should

always be made between the material transform ation o f
the economic conditions o f production, which can be
determ ined with the precision o f natural science, and the
legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic—in
short ideological forms in which men become conscious of
this conflict and fight it out (1968: 182).

H ow ever in assessing revolutionary consciousness Marx insists that one

must explain it "from the the contradictions o f material life, from the
 30

existing conflict between the social productive forces (mode of

production) and the relations of production" (1968: 182). Although

ideology becomes a weapon, or tool, for revolutionary forces, ideology is

intimately connected with contradictions in the economic base.

In light of the primacy o f the economic base Marx offers two

propositions that reem phasize the econom ically determ ined nature of

societal change.

No social order ever perishes before all the productive

forces for which there is room in it for development have
developed; and new higher relations o f production never
appear before the m aterial conditions for their existence
have matured in the room o f the old society itself.
Therefore mankind always sets itself such tasks as it can
solve. . . (1968: 182).

Underlying this theory is a teleological view o f society. The

transform ation which Marx addresses here is the transform ation from

Capitalism to Socialism. And, in the history o f mankind, socialist

transform ation appears as a final human realization (1968: 182). Despite

the ability o f superstructural elements to act as a force in themselves,

they cannot be a force for themselves. In the final analysis economic

structure determ ines, although dialectically, form s o f consciousness.

It was, at least in part, M arx’s emphasis on economic structure

that propelled a wave of M arxist thinkers and practitioners to view

social change in almost mechanical terms. In a generic sense, changes

in the economic base exacerbate contradictions between economic

structure and ideological superstructure. These contradictions come to a

head in revolution through which the base and superstructure are

reharm onized. However, such a generic form ulation o f historical

materialism overlooks M arx’s claim that it is through ideological

structures that "men become conscious o f this conflict and fight it out"
 3 1

(1968: 182). We may use this general problem as a point of entry into

G ram sci's M arxiam.

By the conclusion of World W ar I, Marxism, as a theory and

strategy for societal transform ation, had entered a period o f protracted

crisis. It seemed as if capitalism was infinitely malleable, able to

overcome periods of crisis and regenerate itself in new cancerous

form s—especially fascism. The old Marxism which emphasized the

primacy of economic conditions failed to grasp the seemingly

regenerative powers of capitalism . W ithin M arxist circles this problem

became a central concern. However the 1920's and 1930’s witnessed a

response to this weakness in the Marxist approach . New neo-Hegelian

form of Marxism, articulated by Lukacs, Korsch, and Gramsci (to name a

few), em phasized the need for better understandings o f proletariat

consciousness (Boggs, 1984: 153). Carl Boggs notes that the new

M arxists "sought to demonstrate that the stabilization o f capitalism could

not be understood without looking closely at the unfolding o f working

class existence" (1984: 155). This examination o f proletarian

consciousness calls for a reconsideration o f the traditional form ulation

of M arxist analysis of levels o f societal integration, or spheres o f

existence. As already discussed the old Marxism breaks society into

spheres o f base and superstructure. In this basic model o f historical

m aterialism society is formed at three levels—economic structure, civil

society, and state. The economic structure is the base upon which civil

society and the state are built. These latter superstructural societal

elem em ts emerge as reflections o f underlying econom ic relationships

and technologies.
 32

Gramsci's critique o f the basic model of historical m aterialism

involves at least three movements. The first movement is a critique of

"econom ism "--a euphemism for Bukarin's sociology in particular, and

reductionistic Marxism in general. The second movement is a thorough

revamping o f "ideology." And, the third movement is reconsideration

of the roles of the state and civil society in Marxist theory. By rejecting

strict economic determinism as well as integrating civil society into the

realm of determinate forces, Gramsci's Marxism calls for a thorough

reexam ination o f not only our intellectual understandings o f how

society works, but also this approach redresses the role of activism in

affecting social change.

Gramsci's critique of economism is spelled out most clearly in the

essays "The M odem Prince" and "Problems in Marxism". Here he

attacks past form ulations of historical economism for utilizing

essentially structural econom ic m echanism s to predict and understand

social change. * In particular Gramsci sites three characteristic

weaknesses o f the approach. First, "in the search for historical

connections it makes no distinction between what is 'relatively

permanent' and what is a passing fluctuation. . . ." (1971: 163). He

attacks "historical economism" for failing to pay adequate attention to

the complexity of economic class formations. Second, historical

economism reduces economic developm ent to the "course o f technical

change in the instruments of work" (1971: 163). And, third, historical

econom ism proposes that both "economic and historical developm ent

* G ram sci distinguishes betw een historical "econom ism "—crude

reductionistic M arxism —and h istorical m aterialism —which is a more
complex understanding of the interplay of material forces found in
M arx's own writings.
 33

are made to depend directly on the changes in some important element

of production . . . which necessitate the new application of methods in

the construction and design o f machines” (1971: 163). With each of

these ideas of historical economism Gramsci finds an array of problems.

Summing up the essentially weak position o f historical economism

G ram sci proclaim s:

In its most widespread form as economistic superstition,

the philosophy o f praxis loses a great part o f its capacity
for cultural expansion among the top layer o f intellectuals,
however much it may gain among the popular masses and
second-rate intellectuals. . . . They forget the thesis that
which asserts that men become conscious o f fundamental
conflicts on the level o f ideology is not psychological or
m oralistic in character, but structural and epistem ological;
and they form the habit of considering history as a
continuous marche de dupes, a competition in conjuring
and sleight of hand (1971: 164).

In this passage Gramsci highlights unw illingness o f econom istic

M arxism to grapple with superstructural elem ents—especially p o litics—

and its consequent ignorance of the role of ideology in affecting

societal change. W ith economism politics becomes a "marche o f dupes"

guided by illusions. By contrast, Gramsci suggests that although

economism has been presented as an "objective principle of

interpretation (objective scientific)," it too is a product o f history (1971:

165). Against the objective laws o f history proposed in economistic

Marxism Gramsci claims that all knowledge is rooted in history: all

know ledge is only understandable within a historic framework.

R egarding the economistic discovery of "regularity," "law," and "

'autom atism ' in history" Gramsci states:

It is not a question of 'discovering' a metaphysical law of

'determ inism ', or even o f establishing a 'general' law of
causality. It is a question o f bringing out how in historical
evolution relatively perm anent forces are constituted
 34

which operate with a certain regularity and automatism

(1971: 412).

The notion of "bringing out" the historical interplay of "forces" in the

historical process suggests that instead of rigid laws existing in an

extra-historical sense, the very workings of interactive forces occurs

within the plane of history. Another essential point here is the notion

of "how in historical evolution relatively perm anent forces are

constituted . . . ." In the Gramscian force model economic forces are

only one set of forces interacting with "political" and "military" forces.

Again, Gramsci attempts to avoid reductionism, especially in the

direction of economic determinism. One essential aspect o f Gramsci's

anti-reductionism is the invigoration o f "ideology" w ithin M arxism.

A second movement in Gramsci's Marxism consists of a

reworking of the role of ideology in Marxist analysis. W ithout doubt the

question of ideology may be considered a problematic within Marxist

frameworks. And, it is a problematic to which Gramsci was particularly

sensitive. In a section of the essay "The Study of Philosophy" Gramsci

outlines the econom istic interpretation of ideology as "pure

appearance" which is "distinct from" underlying econom ic structures

and incapable o f changing basic structural tendencies (1971: 376). By

contrast Gramsci's use of ideology suggest that ideological views o f the

world are neither epiphenom enal nor false consciousness (M ouffe,

1979: 185). Instead ideology is the ground "on which men move,

acquire consciousness o f their position, [and] struggle" (1971: 377).

Gramsci reminds the reader that the study of ideology ought to begin

with M arx's 1859 "Preface."

The proposition contained in the "Prefacef"]. . . to the

effect that men acquire consciousness of structural
conflicts on the level of ideologies should be considered as
 35

an affirm ation o f epistem ological and not simply

psychological or moral value. From this, it follows that the
theoretical-practical principle o f hegem ony has also
epistemological significance. . . . The realisation o f a
hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates a new
ideological terrain, determ ines a reform in consciousness
and of methods o f knowledge: it is a fact of knowledge, a
philosophical fact (1971: 365-366)

By contrast to variations of Marxism which considered ideology

as an illusory m irror reflecting upon the real economic substructure,

Gramsci's Marxism attempts to remove ideology from the realm o f

illusion. He defines ideology in a broad sense.

One might say "ideology" here, but on the condition that

the word is used in the highest sense o f the conception of
the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in
economic activity and all m anifestations of individual and
collective life (1971: 372).

W ithin this Gramscian analysis all world views are necessarily

ideological. Ideology consists of conceptions o f the world found in all

social products. If all world-views are ideological then all forms of

consciousness contain ideology. And, it follows that if all forms o f

consciousness contain ideology then all forms of politics are essentially

ideological (Mouffe, 1979: 186). Thus, there is no way out of ideology.

However, Gramsci does distinguish between critically reflective and

uncritical, or unreflective, forms o f ideology. W ith predictable

Gramscian wit, he calls uncritical ideologies, or ideologies o f every day

life, "common sense," and critical historically based ideologies "good

sense." Beyond distinguishing between critical and uncritical w orld

views, Gramsci also discusses the degree o f uniformity of ideology

within a social formation. Gramsci uses the notion of an "organic

ideology," or the ideologies "necessary to a given structure," to describe

the socially prevalent mode of thinking (1971: 376).

 36

Gramsci's insistence on the reality o f ideology follows from his

general epistemological approach. As a heart felt M arxist, with slightly

H egelian leanings, Gramsci views hum anity as strictly a historical

product. In a letter from Prison to his wife, Gulia, he writes, "I . . . think

that man is formed completely by history, through coercion (though

this should not be understood only as external violence or brutality) and

I believe only that."^ However his view o f humanity as strictly a

historical product varies from economistic Marxism in as much as

humanity is understood as the the product o f the "ensemble o f

relations." That is the totality o f human relations—not ju st economic

production relations. It is in this sense that Gramsci speaks of ideology

as a "material force"(1971: 165). Carl Boggs emphasizes this point in

The T w o R evolu tion s:

For Gramsci, ideas, beliefs, cultural preferences, and even

myths and superstitions possess a certain m aterial reality
of their own since in their power to inspire people towards
action they interact with economic conditions, which
otherw ise would be nothing more than empty abstractions.
In other words, the contradictions o f capitalist society do
not 'explode' but are actualized and even manipulated by
human will power (1984: 158).

A third move in Gramsci's reformulation o f Marxism is the

categorical movement o f civil society from the economic base to the

superstructure. This movem ent necessitates a thorough reexam ination

o f the superstructure as an integral and essential element in Marxism.

A fter all, in the Gramscian perspective, it is the institutions of civil

society—the church, fam ily structure, political parties, trade unions,

the m edia—that articulate a world view that either supports or critically

challenges State apparatuses. A statem ent of Gramsci's reinterpretation

2 Letter to Gulia, December 1929. Cited in Davidson (1977: 248).

 37

of the placement of civil society in Marxist analysis can be found in the

essay "The Intellectuals."

What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major

superstructural "levels": the one that can be called "civil
society", that is the ensemble o f organisms commonly
called "private", and that of "political society" or "the
state". These two levels correspond on the on hand to the
function of "hegemony" which the dom inant group
exercises throughout society and on the other hand that of
"direct domination" or command exercised through
through the State and juridical government (1971: 12).

Gramsci distinguishes between the overt domination at the level of the

State and the "hegemony" exercised by dominant groups through

mechanisms working at the level of civil society. More than

distinguishing betw een varieties o f pow er articulated in

superstructural form ations, Gramsci's inclusion of civil society as a

layer in the superstructure allows for the possibility o f developing a

dialectic logic betw een the levels o f superstructural power

relationships. In this approach civil society provides the "private"

basis for consent, and the State reinforces that consent with the force of

prisons and law. However, the notion that the private institutions of

civil society and the State can share the same interests supposes that

they share common world view. The formation o f that common world

view is accounted for by Gramsci's theory o f hegemony.

The theory o f hegemony found in Gramsci's writings appears to

have passed through two phases. In the first phase Gramsci's use of

hegemony is similar to the Leninist conception o f a class alliance. In

this sense one class acts in the interest of another class for political

purposes (Mouffe and Laclau: 1985, Adamson: 1980). In the essay "The

Southern Question" Gramsci refers to an alliance between classes which

 38

is similar to the Leninist use o f hegemony (Paggi, 1979; Mouffe, 1979).

G ram sci claims:

But the important thing to note here is that the

fundamental concept of the Turin communists was not the
'magical formula' of dividing the big estates, but rather the
political alliance between Northern w orkers and Southern
peasants to oust the bourgeoise from State power (1978:
442).

The class alliance use o f hegemony is incorporated into the

second phase of Gramsci's theory. In the Prison N otebooks Gramsci

outlines a schem atic understanding of hegemony as articulated through

the dialectic of State and civil society relations. In the second use,

hegemony refers not only to a unity of perceived interests, but also it

refers to a unity of perceptions. Thus, hegemony refers simultaneously

to class, moral, and intellectual alliances. In "Hegemony and Ideology

in Gramsci" Mouffe rem arks that hegemony "becomes the indissoluble

union o f political leadership and intellectual and moral leadership,

which clearly goes beyond a class alliance" (1979: 179). This second

use suggests that hegemony is not overt domination by the ruling

classes. Instead, hegemony is a universalization the dominant class'

world views. Jacque Texier describes the world view o f a hegemonic

class in terms o f internalization of regime norms: "[I]n all domains of

human activity—w hether it be educational theory or politics--a type of

conduct which is initially imposed by force, may subsequently be freely

accepted by the subject himself. Discipline becomes self-discipline,

coercion becomes self-governm ent" (1979: 73).

One cannot overly stress the distinction between dom ination and

hegemony in Gramsci's writings. Hegemony is a function o f a unity of

world views articulated through civil institutions. By contrast

domination is pow er asserted directly by State apparatuses. In one

 39

telling passage Gramsci states: "the general notion o f the State includes

elements which need to be referred back to civil society (in the sense

that one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other

words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion)" (1971: 263). On

the one hand the legal political society provides force, and , on the

other hand, civil society provides the consensual basis for legitim izing

State power. And, although hegemonic power presupposes the

universalization o f the dom inant group's w orld view, the m aintenance

o f hegem ony requires a continuing limited consensual "give and take"

relationship between the rulers and the ruled. That is the dominant

groups must take into account the interests o f the dominated groups to

m aintain power. But the concessions the ruling group makes to the

ruled groups can only be of a lim ited "economic-corporate" kind.

Concessions that actually changed the real power position of the

dom inated groups would undermine the existing power o f the dominant

g ro u p .

Undoubtedly the fact o f hegemony presupposes that

account be taken o f the interests and the tendencies of the
groups over which hegemony is exercised, and that a
certain com prom ise equilibrium should be form ed--in
other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices
of an economic-corporate kind (Gramsci, 1971: 161).

Gramsci notes that such compromises cannot be o f an "essential kind"

(1971: 161). That is, the "give and take" process between the dominant

group and the subordinate groups cannot sacrifice the basic interests o f

the dominant group. The notion here is that a hegemonic power

configuration must be flexible enough to allow for m inor "sacrifices"

by pow er holders to m aintain the basic support of subordinate groups.

If such concessions are made within the confines o f the hegemonic

 40

belief system —the values of the dominant groups—then ideological

support for the dominant group is not undermined.

The process whereby the world view of the ruling groups

becomes the universal world view involves an interplay o f forces at

three levels of society: production, civil society, and the State. Gramsci

explains the interrelation of these societal levels in terms o f "relations

of force" existing in various "moments or levels." Like any ardent

M arxist, Gramsci’s analysis of the relations of force begins with

production. Thus, the first level of force is the relation o f "social

forces" which, "is closely linked to the structure, objective, independent

of human will, and can be measured with the systems of the exact

physical sciences" (1971: 180). These "social forces" represent the

cornerstone o f the econom istic Marxism Gramsci criticizes at length.

And, although Gramsci sees even the physical sciences as rooted in

history, they exist independent of "human will." That is "social forces"

are part of an underlying objective reality. And, as in most Marxist

analysis "social forces" exist at the level of the economic base.

The second level of forces in the Gramscian analysis are "political

forces." Political forces represent the "evaluation o f the degree of

hom ogeneity, self-aw areness, and organisation attained by the various

social classes" (1971: 181). At this level of force the analysis enters the

superstructure. Here one should note that Gramsci locates political

parties at the level o f civil society, and, consequently, in the

superstructure. In the Gramscian analysis political forces appear to be

key in understanding the hegemony or lack thereof within a nation­

state. A fter all, Gramsci discusses political forces in terms o f the

"hom ogeneity," "self-aw areness," and organization o f social classes.

 41

Thus, it is through political channels that persons develop class

consciousness and social solidarity.

The third level of forces which Gramsci discusses are m ilitary

forces. Like political forces, military forces are located in the

superstructure. But unlike political forces which are located in the

sphere of civil society, military forces are located with the state

apparatus. If, on the one hand, political forces in civil society generate

social "self-aw areness" and varying degrees o f societal "hom ogeneity"--

the bases for social consent--, then, on the other hand, the State's

control o f military forces provide the tools to enforce the perceived

societal consensus. Although the role of military forces appear less

central in the Gramscian analysis than political forces, his analysis

suggests that the "relation of military forces . . . [is] from time to time . . .

directly decisive" (1971: 183).

"Social forces" are given by history and "military forces" are

controlled by the State apparatus. In between these forces rest

"political forces." It is with political forces that Gramsci attempts to

explain the possibility for hegemony within a society. As mentioned

above political forces represent the degree of "homogeneity" and "self-

awareness" within a nation-state. Corresponding to three levels o f

force, Gramsci posits three levels of articulation of political force. The

first level of political force is found in the relationships among

members o f a social class. Here members of one class identify with

other members of the same class but feel no solidarity with the other

social classes. Gramsci calls this level o f political force the "economic-

corporate" phase (1971: 181). He describes consciousness at this level in

the following way:

 42

The first and most elementary o f these is the economic-

corporate level: a tradesman feels o b lig e d to stand by
another tradesm an, a m anufacturer by another
m anufacturer, etc., but the tradesman does not yet feel
solidarity with the manufacturer; in other words, the
members of the professional group are conscious o f its
unity and homogeneity, and the need to organise it, but in
the case of the wider social group this is not yet so (1971:
181).

The second moment o f political consciousness occurs where the

sense of intraclass "obligation" gives way to a sensation o f interclass

solidarity for members of all social classes. At this moment in the

development of class consciousness the sense o f solidarity is still an

economic solidarity. But the realization o f interclass generalized

solidarity allows for movement within a class towards achieving lim ited

political goals. In particular, subordinate classes may begin to seek

"juridical" or legal equality with the dominant class.

Already at this juncture the problem o f the State is posed—

but only in terms o f winning politico-juridical equality
with the ruling groups: the right is claimed to participate
in legislation and adm inistration, even to reform these—
but w ithin the existing fundam ental structures
(Gramsci, 1971: 181).

Three points are worthy o f note regarding the second phase of

political consciousness. First, Gramsci refers to this phase as a

"juncture," hence, he isimplying that this phase is transitional. It does

not reflect a permanent or, in Gramscian language, "organic" level of

political consciousness. Second, although procedural reform is possible

at this level, such reform occurs within "existing fundamental

structures." This suggests that the inclusion o f subordinate classes in

the political process occurs on the tu rf o f the ruling class—using their

legal code, their State mechanism. And, third, Gramsci notes that the

"problem of the State is posed" at this level. Here the solidarity achieved

within subordinate classes comes into contact with the State apparatus;
 43

hence, at this level one sees a link between developing class

consciousness and the ability to confront the State, even where such

conflict occurs within the State's "politico-legal" system.

The third level of political consciousness represents the

hegemonic moment o f political consciousness. At this level the limits o f

interclass economic solidarity is transcended by the "awarefness] that

one's own corporate interests, in their present and future developm ent,

transcend the limits of the purely economic class and can and must

become the interests of other subordinate groups too" (1971: 181). At

this level of political class consciousness the entire set o f interests of

various subordinate groups are fused into a set o f common interests. It

is the formation of a complete set (e.g., not just economic interests) of

interclass common interests that rest as a precondition for hegemonic

power. More than a sense of transclass solidarity o f interests the

notion of hegemonic political consciousness suggests a universalization

o f perception o f interest.

[I]t is the phase in which previously germinated ideologies

become "party", comes into confrontation and conflict,
until only one of them, or at least a single combination of
them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to
propagate itse lf throughout so c ie ty -b rin g in g about not
only a unison of economic and political aims, but also
intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions
around which the struggle rages not on a corporate level
but on a "universal" plane, and thus creating the
hegemony o f a fundamental social group over a series of
subordinate social groups (Gramsci, 1971: 181-182).

In this passage Gramsci spells out the workings o f hegemony at the

level o f political consciousness. It is worthy of note that he emphasizes

a perception o f the attainment o f a " 'universal' plane" for hegemonic

authority. The notion o f universality implies that particular class

interests have been superseded by "universal" understanding o f the

 44

world. Further, he remarks that hegemony is held by a " 'fundamental'

social group over a series of subordinate groups."

The ability of a class to assert hegemonic authority depends on a

combination of forces which make possible the supersession of

"econom ic-corporative" interests by "universal" interests. The

articulation of the dom inant class’ interests as universal interests is

made possible through the institutions of civil society. In a sense the

education system, family structure, exchange norms, media, and (of

special interest to Gramsci) political parties act as cultural mediation

mechanisms between the dominant social class and the other groups it

dominates. Thus, in the Gramscian perspective control of the

institutions civil society becomes central to understanding State power.

It is through these institutions, especially political parties, that groups

gain the know ledge and organizational structures that either m aintain

or challenge State power.

Gramsci's interest in the role o f politics in general, and political

parties in particular, for affecting social transform ation should not be

underestim ated. His emphasis on the role o f the relationship between

civil society and the state suggests that political activity channelled

through civil institutions offers a powerful point o f entry for

su p e rstru c tu ra l a n aly sis.

The problem will therefore be that o f establishing the

dialectical position o f political activity and of the
corresponding science) as a particular level of
superstructure. One might say, as a first approximation,
that political activity is precisely the first moment or first
level. . . (Gramsci, 1971: 137).

At the level of politics the role o f political parties becomes a key concept

in Gramsci's work. After all it should be remembered that Gramsci was

not only a complex Marxist philosopher, but also he was an activist.

 45

Prior to being imprisoned by M ussolini Gramsci's life effort had been

concentrated into the form ation and running o f the Italian Communist

Party. As a party strategist, Gramsci recognized two distinct paths

political parties might follow for attaining national power. The first

path is that of a "war of position." The second path is a "war of

manoeuvre." These two paths correspond to the relative developm ent o f

civil institutions within the nation-state. The strategy of a "war o f

position" is applicable to the W estern nations with well developed civil

institutions with deeply embedded bourgeoise values. In these nations

an open frontal assault against the State is impossible; thus, revolution

is affected by means of a "tactical and informal penetration" o f civil

society (Adamson, 1980: 10).^ Adamson describes the logic o f the "war

of position" as follows:

Such a revolution would be an extended campaign for

hegemonic influence among the population at large; once
this was attained, political power would be essentially at
hand and many o f the conditions of the socialism would
already have been realized. In this sense, the tragectory
of war of position can be plotted as a single unified
m ovem ent spanning pre-dom ination, dom ination, and
post-domination stages (1980: 225).

In the situation o f highly developed civil institutions which support the

State, the other strategy, a "war o f manoeuvre" becomes impossible. By

contrast to the "war o f position" and its gradual infiltration and

subversion of of the old institutions o f civil society, the "war of

3 Regarding the entrenched nature of the power structures in

the industrial democracies Gramsci remarks: "The massive structures of
the m odem democracies, both as state organizations and as complexes of
association in civil society, constitute the art of politics as it were the
'trenches' and their permament fortifications o f the front in a war of
position, they render merely 'partial' the elem ent o f movement which
before used to be the 'whole' of war, etc" (1971: 243).
 46

manoeuvre" represents a frontal assault on the State—a condition o f

overt warfare (Gramsci, 1971: 238-238; Adamson, 1980 : 225-228). This

approach is suitable in countries with only partially developed civil

institutions and a lack of value consensus between the State apparatus

and the limited civil institutions (Adamson, 1980; Girling, 1982; Gramsci,

1971: 243).

Throughout Gram sci's prison w ritings the notion o f hegemony

recurs. It is both an analytical as well as strategic concept. Beyond

strategic concerns, G ram scian hegemony suggests a unique

understanding o f power. It is an understanding o f power which draws

on both subjective and objective conditions. B elief systems articulated

and reified through the web o f social relations not only support but also

create understandings o f power. These culturally centric

understandings of power are expressed in terms o f levels o f hegemonic

development within a society, and they are enforced with the legal and

military apparatuses of the State. Together the economic substructure,

civil society and the State form a "historic bloc"—"i.e., unity between

nature and spirit (structure and superstructure) unity o f opposites and

distincts" (1971: 137).^ Again, it should be stressed that Gramsci

proposes that only a "fundamental class" can become hegemonic (1971:

161). Thus in the search for understanding the possibilities of

4 Gramsci also addresses the idea of "historic bloc" in the

follow ing way: "Structure and superstructure form an ’historic bloc.'
That is to say the complex, contradictory and discordant e n se m b le of the
superstructures is the reflection of the e n s e m b le of the social relations
of production" (1971: 366). Further it is worthy of emphasis that
Gramsci uses the word "ensemble" to stress the multiplicity and
complexity of varied social relations.
 47

hegemony within a nation-state, or even among the community o f

nation-states, the possible forms o f hegemony are limited. ^

Gramsci's discussions of the possibilities of a class becoming

hegemonic are, for the most part, limited to nation-state examples. In

particular he writes extensively about the possibilities o f forming a

potentially hegemonic communist party in Italy. The whole thrust of

"The M odem Prince" is an examination of the history of Italian politics,

the particular problem s within Italy—e.g., the rise of Italian fascism

and the lack of a "national popular will"—, and the development o f a

particular form of Italian Communist party capable o f not only creating

class interests but also o f universalizing its ideology. Further in the

essay "Americanism and Fordism" Gramsci writes of an emerging "cult

of efficiency" in the United States where "Fordism" is perceived to have

ushered in a whole new era of values, beliefs, and political strategies to

facilitate "rationalised" production. However, there are other passages

in Gramsci's writings that show quite clearly that he perceived the

possibility of international hegemony. The possibilities for the

form ation o f an international hegemony are sketched, but not spelled

out, in the Prison N otebooks.

Entering a discussion o f international relations and Gramsci it is

wise to reem phasize the distinction between Gram scian

5 It is essential to consider the problem that across nation-state

d iffem t classes are fundam ental—e.g. m anagerial, capitalist, landlord,
peasant—according to the level o f economic formation. W hat are the
im plications o f this for forming an international hegemony. Cox
argues that the transnational m anagerial class could become hegemonic
in a Western bloc (Cox, 1985), but could such a class universalize its
point-of-view in agricultural economies? Here it seems that domination
is possible but not hegemony. Hegemony would require a unity of
outlooks across cultures.
 48

hegem ony,"ideological" hegemony, and other traditional uses o f the

word. As spelled out in the first chapter o f this essay, traditional

international relations theory uses the word hegemony to mean the

ability o f one nation-state to dominate the international system due to

its preponderance of m aterial resources. These traditional theories

examine interstate relations at the level o f State interaction (State as

actor assumption) as confined by an international structure. Such

assumptions are incom patible with the Gramscian approach. First,

Gramscian hegemony is generalized consent protected by the ability to

use force. In the Gramscian approach hegemony is, by definition, a

product o f civil society. It is the institutions of civil society that

articulate the dominant class' world view. Second, since hegemony

resides at the level of civil society, any discussion o f international

politics that excludes the interw orkings of a nation-state cannot discuss

Gramscian hegemony. To discuss Gramscian hegemony the "State as

actor" assumption would have to be violated. Further, traditional

analysis does not distinguish between State and civil society. One may

recall that Gramsci ascribes the function o f overt domination to the

State, and he places the function o f hegemony within civil society.

Thus, any discussion of "ideological" hegemony in international

relations requires that the "State as actor" assumption is either

abandoned or,at least, severely qualified. (In terms of qualifying the

"State as actor" assum ption Robert Keohane's "modified research

program" offers one possible starting point.) And, third, one essential

aspect o f Gramscian hegemony is the notion that understandings of

pow er change with degrees o f hegemonic developm ent and varieties of

fully articulated hegemony. If one works from the position that

 49

understandings of power changes across time and through varied social

form ations, then the traditional assumption that "States seek power"

becomes foggy. We can no longer impose the problems o f the Athenian

pow er directly onto modern social structures.

Given these grand incom patibilities between Gramsci's use o f

hegemony and the way hegemony has been used in traditional

literature, perhaps the clearest way o f interjecting an understanding of

"ideological" hegemony into international relations theory, is an

exam ination o f G ram sci's understanding o f international politics. In

contrast to orthodox approaches, especially W altz's "structural realism ,"

that view State action as constrained within an international system —

an "outside-in" approach—G ram sci's analysis follows an "inside-out"

method.

Gramsci introduces the way in which one could develop a theory

o f international hegemony in "The M odem Prince.” Here he draws on

the "relations o f force" model and asserts that "[tjhese levels range from

the relations between international forces . . . to the objective relations

within society. . ." (1971: 176). Although Gramsci does not define

international forces, he remarks that the discussion o f international

forces would include definitions of a "great power," remarks on the

"combination of States in a hegemonic system," and "the concept of

independence and sovereignty as far as small and medium powers are

concerned" (1971: 176). And, he raises the question: "Do international

relations precede or follow (logically) fundam ental social relations?"

(1971: 176). He answers this question in the following passage:

There can be no doubt that they [i.e., international

relations] follow. Any organic innovation in the social
structure, through its tech n ical-m ilitary expressions,
m odifies organically absolute and relative relations in the
 50

international field too. Even the geographical position of a

national State does not precede but follows (logically)
structural changes, although it also reacts back upon them
to a certain extent. . . . However, international relations
react both passively and actively on political relations (of
hegemony among the parties). The more the immediate
economic life o f a nation is subordinated to international
relations, the more a particular party will come to
represent this situation and to exploit it, with the aim of
preventing rival parties gaining the upper hand. . . (1971:
176).

This passage is particularly insightful into Gramsci's perceptions of

international relations. First, social changes o f a "m ilitary-technical”

expression occurring w ithin a nation-state changes the relations

among states. Thus, the "organic" or "relative" relations among states

are effected by changes internal to a State. Second, the relationship

between international relations and national politics is two-fold. On the

one hand, the greater the degree o f dependence between a national

economy and the international economy, or a dominant sector in it, the

more a political party is encouraged to "represent" this fact as a means

of attaining power. And, on the other hand, by claiming to represent

the international interests o f the nation such a party represents "not so

much the vital forces of its own country, as that countries

subordination and economic enslavem ent to the hegemonic nations. . .

"(1971:177). The link drawn between national party politics and

international politics involves appeals to both the "popular will" of a

nation and the reality of that nation's "economic enslavement." The

party seeking pow er utilizes the nation's international position to

encourage mass support for itself, yet, sim ultaneously, the support

generated by such a party fosters the interests o f other dominant

nations. This is the fashion in which Gramsci outlines the possibilities

for international hegemony. And, in a sense, he enters through an

economic window.

In another section of the Prison N otebooks Gramsci discusses

"Hegemony of W estern culture over the Whole World" (in "Problems in

Marxism"). Here Gramsci depicts the W estern world as gaining

w orldwide ideological hegem ony through the universalization o f a

belief system which "culminated in Hegel and the critique o f

Hegeliansim" (1971: 416). He claims that both intellectuals and activists

have become absorbed in a cultural process that concludes with

historical m aterialism and the "philosophy o f praxis" [Marxism]. From

these movements arose "a new way of conceiving the world. . . [which]

tends. . . to become a popular, mass phenomenon, with a concretely

w orld-wide character, capable o f m odifying (even if the result includes

hybrid com binations) popular thought and m um m ified popular

consciousness" (1971: 417). This modem consciousness which arose

from the popularization of German philosophy gives rise, as "the

crowning point of all previous history," to thoroughly historical modes

o f thinking—especially M arxism and humanism (1971: 417-418). ^

Perhaps Gram sci’s most telling passage in regards to his belief in

the possibilities of international hegemony is found in "The Study of

Philosophy." In a section entitled " ’Language', Languages and Common

Sense" he tackles the problem o f "educational doctrine and practice"

6 The degree to which Hegelianism, in one form or another, had

perm eated the "popular consciousness" of W estern Europe in the 1920's
remains an open question. Certainly among academic circles Hegel and
his disciples had become well known. However, academics are only
one elem ent of the civil complex which articulates hegemonic power. It
is doubtful that a Hegelian world view was assimilated into the belief
systems of all social classes manipulating civil society in Gramsci's Italy.
 52

(1971: 350). He proposes that our understandings of education should go

well beyond "scholastic" concerns to the level o f any social relation

where there are leaders and lead (1971: 350). He then suggests that

education is inherently encom passed within the workings o f

hegem onic relatio n s:

Every relationship o f 'hegemony' is necessarily an

educational relationship and occurs not only within a
nation, between the various forces o f which the nation is
composed, but in their international and world-wide field,
betw een com plexes o f national and continental
civilisations (1971: 350).

Gramsci appears to be asserting that international ideological

hegemony is not only a possibility, but also it is a real factor in

international affairs. The notion o f hegemonic relationships as

educational relationships follows from position that hegemony is a

situation o f consent which is popularized through civil institutions.

Throughout the above discussion on Gramscian hegemony it was

stressed that hegemonic power is expressed through civil institutions.

At the level of the nation-state these institutions educate national

populations. Moving to the level o f international relations one can

envision the civil society o f one nation learning from the civil societies

of other nations. From recent history one may consider: the

transference o f business m anagem ent techniques form the U nited

States to Japan and the Newly Industialized Nations; or the fusion o f

Am erican jazz music into American rock-and-roll music which was

 53

then transported to Britian and the European Continent.^ Each of these

m ovem ents represents in tern atio n al phenom enon o rig in atin g w ithin

the civil society of one nation which has grown to international

proportion. In no sense did these movements stem from the juridical

and legal apparatuses o f ’the State.

In the introduction to this chapter I suggested that Gramsci's

exposition of hegemony differs radically from its use in orthodox

international relations theory. H opefully the above paragraphs have

made this point clear enough. In the orthodox international relations

literature hegemony means one nation's ability to m aintain

international order due to its material preponderance. In Gramsci's

w ritings hegem ony is "national-popular" consent which is articulated

through civil institutions and protected by the state apparatus.

A lthough Gramsci speaks of hegemony prim arily in the national

context, he hints at international possibilities. The movement from the

national level to the international level is, at best, problematic. (The

possibilities for incorporating a Gramscian theory o f hegemony into

International relations literature, and the lim itations o f that inclusion,

constitute the thrust o f the final chapter o f this essay.) Regardless of

the problematic at hand, the Gramscian perspective is suggestive o f an

alternative model for understanding international power. First, this

model would look inside the nation-state at the "relations of force"

7 The emphasis on education as the vehicle for transporting

hegem onic belief system s between nations offers a provocative point-
of-entry for both the activist and the analyst. For the analyist, the
eduactional approach would begin with cross exam ination o f "national-
popular" beliefs articulated in different national civil institutions. For
the activist, the notion o f gaining hegemony in the international
system would begin with an infiltration o f civil institutions that clearly
possess transnational links. Here academia and the arts are possible
starting places.
among the social spheres. Hegemony would be found within the nation­

state where the beliefs and values o f the dominant class transcend class

boundaries and appear universal in nature. Second, this model would

examine the relations of force across nation-states. Here the analysis

would focus on the homogeneity of practices, beliefs, and values in

exchanges between nations. Third, the model would look for a tendency

to w ards,or away from, international hegemony in terms o f the degree

o f development o f an international "ethical-political" plane. Of course,

this model would pay attention to economic and military capabilities of

nation-states. A fter all hegemony is consent protected by the "armour

of coercion." Such a model of international power would, in a sense,

focus on the interplay of objective and subjective international forces.

On the objective side one could count guns and butter. On the subjective

side one could attempt to articulate an intercultural theory o f belief

components o f power relationships.

I have also suggested that hegemony is not only an analytical

concept, but also it implies a strategy. In this essay, I have not probed

deeply into the strategic im plications for the attainm ent o f hegemony.

How ever such a strategy would include the conscious recognition of the

following points: First, Gramsci emphasizes the role o f political parties

as key elem ents in the developm ent of "counter hegemonic" belief

systems. The way in which the party is structured and its membership

are of great importance. Second, the attainment of hegemony within a

State depends, at least in part, on the relative development of civil

institutions. In some nations a frontal assualt—"war o f m anouevre"— is

necessary. W hile in other countries the gradual transform ation o f

"popular beliefs" through infiltration into the civil sphere—"war o f

position"—is the only plausible path to hegemony. Third, hegemony is

only attainable by a fundamental class. Fourth, the attainment of

hegemony depends upon an alliance o f forces; that is the attainment o f

a hegemonic position requires the consent o f military, social, and

political forces. And, fifth, Gramsci’s work provides only an outline.

The details of strategy for attaining hegemony depend not only upon

the developm ent of civil society within the nation, or between nations,

but also it depends upon the currently exiting levels of homogeneity o f

belief and value systems. In this sense, an Gramscian type strategy

calls for very careful planning and analysis prior to action.

 Chapter III

Hegemony: The Limitations and Possibilities for a Concept

W ithin the pale of orthodox international relations theory the

word hegemony is used to describe one nation's ability to dominate the

international system because o f its abundance of m aterial resources. By

contrast the writings of Antonio Gramsci provide a theory o f hegemony

which locates hegemonic power within a dominant class' ability to

universalize its point of view. Through the universalization o f a belief

system what may have appeared as domination appears as natural, or at

least consensual, under hegemonic leadership. W ith Gramsci hegemony

becomes a linking concept that not only allows for an explanation o f

the ability o f capitalist social order to continually regenerate itself, but

also the theory o f ideological hegemony suggests certain strategies for

action. As argued in the first two sections o f this essay, there are points

o f convergence as well as divergence between Gramsci's theory o f

ideological hegemony and other theories of hegemonic rule. Most

im portantly, Gram sci's emphasis on the potential power o f ideas adds an

irreplaceable elem ent o f subjectivity to political pow er relationships.

However, the inclusion of ideas as a force in international politics may

appear a naive idea to readers who look at the world through traditional

international relations lenses. In the paragraphs that follow I outline

some, but certainly not all, o f the problems and potentials for enriching

56
 57

our understandings o f international power with a theory o f ideological

hegemony.

Turning to questions o f strategy two problematics come to mind.

First, what are the connections between Gramsci's ideological

hegemony and more traditional theories o f hegemony that could make

G ram sic's work appealing to Am erican international relations

specialists? Given the axiomatic differences of Gramsci's "theory o f

praxis" and orthodox analysis the incorporation o f a theory o f

ideological hegemony necessitates a w illingness to suspend theory

axioms. And, second, beyond academic considerations, what would the

application o f a theory of ideological hegemony strategically suggest

for international actors. For both of these problems its is useful to

think in terms of a "war of position." In Gramsci’s writings the term

"war of position" is used to describe a strategy of a gradual infiltration

into the institutions of civil society wherein an em ergent "counter

hegemonic" belief system may be articulated. Once expressed through

civil institutions this "counter hegemonic" belief system may

undermine support for the dominant belief system. At this level the

"war of position" for changing the mainstream use of the word

hegemony from dom ination to "consent protected by the armour of

coercion" might begin, as does this essay, with an examination of the

various ways hegemony has been used.

Examining literature on hegemony one is struck by two distinct

uses of the word. The use of hegemony to mean a preponderance of

m aterial resources is little more than one way of defining domination.

In comparison to this use, hegemony also has a history on the political

left which appears richer in content. In H egem ony and Socialist

 58

S trateg y Ernesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe develop a "genealogy" of

hegemony which suggests that the the concept o f hegemony develops

in response to gaps in historical models o f power.

Even in its humble origins in Russian Social Democracy,

where it is called upon to cover alimited area of political
effects, the concept of 'hegemony' already alludes to a kind
of c o n tin g e n t intervention required by the crisis or
collapse of what would have been a 'normal' historical
development. Later, with Leninism, it is a keystone in the
new form of political calculation required by the
contingent 'concrete situations' in which class struggle
occurs in an age of imperialism. Finally, with Gramsci, the
term acquires a new type o f centrality that transcends its
tactical or strategic uses: 'hegemony' becomes a key
concept in understanding the very unity existing in a
concrete social formation" (1985: 7).

The understanding o f hegemony as an organic concept

developing w ithin a field o f historical struggle inspires the American

social critics Murray Bookchin (The M odem Crisis. 1986) and Carl Boggs

(Social M ovements and Political Pow er. 1986) to incorporate a Gramscian

use of hegemony into their strategic analysis. W ithin these current

works by Bookchin and Boggs, not only is the word hegemony used to

describe the embedded nature o f particular pow er configurations, but

also the word hegemony is used to describe the method by which social

pow er can be transformed. In particular, both o f these authors discuss

the possibilities o f the development of a "counter hegemony" to

confront existing power structures. In a sim ilar vein Stanley

Aronowitz's The Crisis in Historical M aterialism (1981) draws upon

Gram sci’s theory o f hegemony to explain the possibilities o f

incorporating "New Forces for Liberation," movements arising from

outside historical M arxism —fem inism and ecology politics in particular-

-, into a broader re-examination o f the logic of capitalism (1981: 133-

135). And, work by John Hargreaves (Sport Power and Culture. 1986)
 59

utilizes Gramsci's theory of hegemony to explain the ways in which the

English bourgeoise class uses sports to m itigate class tensions within

Britian. Although this is only a partial list of current applications of

Gramscian hegemony to social analysis, the point is clear enough: a

theory Gramsican hegemony has come of age to a variety of social

critics.

Robert Cox's model of "hegemony and production," Richard K.

A shly's model of "dialectical competence,"and Robert Keohane's

N eorealist research program offer three exam ples in international

relations theory where scholars have commenced an exam ination of

G ram scian theory. * Cox's uses a theory hegemony to explain one set of

links between institutions, forms o f state, and production processes.

Koehane calls for an examination of domestic politics, and he

em phasizes the im portance o f rules and institutions in international

politics. Gramsci's theory o f ideological hegemony shares a great deal

with the "hegemony and production" approach. Like Keohane's

N eorealism ideological hegemony emphasizes rules and institutions in

international politics. Although I doubt that Keohane envisages his

research as one moment in a war of position, his micro-adjustm ents to

an established approach represent the type of positioning that may

facilitate a closer look at institutions and rules in international affairs.

Sim ilarly, Cox and Ashly directly apply Gramsci in their international

relations theories. It should be stressed that the articulation of an

expanded theory o f hegem ony w ithin international relations literature

1 Interestingly enough, Ashley's model o f "dialectic competence"

incorporates Gram scian hegemony as well as specific nuances of
G ram sci’s general theory—especially the role o f "organic intellectuals"
(1986: 294-296).
 60

is only one moment of a process of reexamining understandings of

international politics. The theory o f "ideological" hegemony is useful

not only because it provides a broader, and perhaps more "realistic,"

understanding o f the logic o f power, but also Gramscian hegemony

suggests certain strategies for transform ing global politics. This

strategy begins with civil in stitu tio n s—including u n iversities.

As suggested in the first chapter of this essay orthodox

international relations theory begins with the follow ing assum ptions.

First, nation-states are the prim ary international actors. Second, such

nation-states act to maximize power. And, third, nation-states act with

nearly universal rationality. In the context o f W altz's "structural

realism " the assum ptions o f international anarchy and nation-state self

help are added.

A Gramscian analysis of international relations would diverge

from the orthodox approach at several key points. First, although a

Gramscian analysis would consider the State as a primary unit in

international affairs, this approach would pay close attention to the

internal workings o f the State, the degree o f development o f civil

institutions, and the degree of alignment of the "relations o f force."

Thus, the Gramscian approach seeks to expand the concept o f the State.

W hile the traditional models would exclude, or give only secondary

consideration to, these intrastate factors, the Gramscian analysis would

depend, at least in part, on understandings of relations within the state.

K eohane's "modified research program" relaxes the "state as actor"

assum ption to allow for an exam ination of interstate and intrastate

 61

o rg a n iz a tio n s .2 Furthermore, the Gramscian analysis would emphasize

the developm ent of transnational institutions.

Second, the orthodox assumption of States as power seeking units

has become widely contested in contemporary literature. Following a

movem ent in orthodox economic reasoning from the language of

"utility maximization" to "utility satisfaction" the works of both W altz

and Keohane recognize that states do not necessarily at all times in

history attempt to maximize global power (Waltz, 1986: 127; Keohane,

1986b: 194). Within the Gramscian perspective whether or not States

strive for maximal global power becomes a complex question involving

the alignm ent o f forces within the state, the alignment o f forces

between states, and a particular understanding o f power m aximization-

-hegemdnic or otherwise. Gramsci does not articulate a thorough

theory of im perialism nor a complete model o f international relations;

hence, any remarks regarding G ram sci’s views on w hether or not

State's seek maximum global power are pure extrapolation.

And,third, a Gramscian analysis would reject any assumption of

universal "rationality" prior to analysis. Instead o f viewing rationality

as a given, "rational" behavior in international politics becomes part of

2 W altz's sympathetic critic, John Gerard Ruggie, contests the

exclusion o f all domestic considerations from structural analysis
because the "functional scope o f the international system will also vary,
depending upon the the hegemonic form o f state/society relations that
prevails internationally at any given time. Therefore, the hegemonic
form o f state/society relations, or lack thereof, constitutes an attibute o f
the international system and can be used as a systems-level explanatory
variable" (1986: 147). Ruggie’s use of hegemony in terms o f
"state/society" relations incorporates, to some degree, a version of
"ideological" hegemony. That is, while Ruggie does not want to violate a
"state as actor" assumption, he recognizes that the capabilities o f the
actors in the international system change depending upon the degree
o f consensus w ithin the "state/society" complex.
 62

what needs to be explained. Universal rationality would be one

possibility under a globally hegemonic social order. That is, his theory

of ideology would allow for a universal ideology with a universal sense

of rationality within a fully developed form o f global "ideological"

hegemony. Gramsci’s work points in the direction o f a historically

conditioned understanding of"rationality." R ationality does not exist

prior to, or outside of, social relationships. Instead rationality, and

rational behavior, derive meaning through a web of social

relationships. Since rationality exist within this web o f historical

social relationships, the question o f what constitutes nation-state

rational behavior must confront the ways in which historical subjects

perceive rationality.

G ram sci’s analysis o f the relations o f domestic forces within

international politics, and his emphasis on the subjective elem ents o f

power, offer two helpful insights for further developm ent o f a theory

of international relations. If, on the one hand, orthodox international

relations theory has emphasized the role of m aterial resources in

determ ining the relative power o f a nation, then, on the other hand, the

Gram scian analysis understands national power in term s o f the

interrelationship between subjective and objective forces. On the

objective pole a Gramscian analysis would look at relative national

pow er in term s o f m aterial resources—the quantifiable m aterial

resources emphasized in the orthodox approach. On the subjective side

this model would examine the degree o f alignment between ideological

understandings o f the world within a society and the perception o f a

degree unity of world views across nation-states. The greater the

degree of unity o f ideological perception within a society the closer that

 63

nation-state would be towards developing a national hegemonic social

formation. The closer an ideology becomes to being universally

accepted across the international system, the closer the international

system approaches a hegemonic order. This approach would examine

the degree o f homogeneity of world views across nations as articulated

through the degree to which a nation-state's world view had been

universalized throughout the nation-state system.

In the Gramscian approach the mere possession of a relative

preponderance of "guns and butter" at the nation-state level (the

objective forces of a nation) is insufficient to explain national power.

To explain the relative power of a nation-state this model would add

subjective dim ensions o f pow er—the degree o f ideological unity

expressed through the social levels o f production, civil society, and the

State. In turn, the degree of ideological unity within a State would

depend, at least in part, on the degree of unity of the levels of force

within the society. Instead o f understanding nation-state pow er as a

function o f the quantifiable m aterial resources possessed by the nation­

state, this model would account for these forces and then incorporate an

analysis of subjective power variables. The understanding o f national

 64

power arrived at through this model depends ultimately on the degree to

which subjective and objective forces are unified.^

In the orthodox literature a theory o f "hegemonic stability" is

used to argue that where one nation-state is powerful enough to

dominate the nation-state system cooperation is more likely. In this

instance the possibilities for international order depend, at least in part,

on one nation-state possessing enough material pow er to m aintain a

particular international order. Cox's analysis o f global hegemony as a

condition within the international system where "social forces," "forms

of state," and "world orders" exist with a high degree o f unity offers an

alternative point o f entry for articulating a theory o f hegemonic

stability (Cox, 1986: 220-221). While the orthodox model of hegemonic

stability focuses on m aterial pow er variables, Cox's approach examines

the relationship between m aterial forces ("social forces"), the

organization o f civil society and state complexes ("forms o f state"), and

the historic global "configuration o f forces" ("global orders") (1986:

220). His model calls for an examination of the internal ordering of the

states com posing the international nation-state system. However, he

does not emphasize the role o f subjective forces to the extent that

Gramsci does. Gramsci's emphasis on the degree o f homogeneity of

3 Keohane's critique of the theory o f hegemonic stability in A f te r

H e g e m o n y is one example o f an attempt to include subjective
dimensions o f power. He states: "Hegemony is defined as 'a situation in
which one nation is powerful enough to m aintain the essential rules
governing interstate relations and willing to do so* (Keohane and Nye,
1977, p. 44). This interpretive framework retains an emphasis on power
but looks more seriously than the crude power theory at the internal
characteristics of the stong state. It does not assume that strength
autom atically creates incentives to project one's pow er abroad.
Domestic attitudes, political structures, and decision making processes
are also important" (1984: 35).
 65

ideological perception, both within a nation-state and across the nation­

state system, provides a essential insight for theories of power. This is

not to say that Gramsci's approach discounts the importance o f material

forces. Rather, material forces represent merely one layer o f an

expanded force model which includes "ideas" as articulated through

civil institutions at both the national and international level.

If one approaches the question o f the possibilities for developing

hegem onic belief system through international civil society, then one

encounters the problem that an international civil society exists with

only weakly articulated institutions. C ertainly, an international civil

society is emerging. Its growth is fostered by the development o f

com m unications technology, m u ltin atio n al corporations, and

international organizations such as the W orld Bank, the International

M onetary Fund, and the United Nations. Nevertheless, one may question

to what extent the developm ent of international civil institutions has

encouraged the developm ent o f an international "political ethical"

plane. W ithin Gramsci's writings the ability of a class to universalize its

world view largely depends upon the degree of developm ent and

support for the national civil society. Thus, international institutions

would follow from highly developed national civil society. That is, the

support for international institutions is predicated on the existence of a

set of domestic civil institutions. For instance, Cox argues that a

uniquely international class-- an international business m anagem ent

class—is evolving through which the beliefs and values o f a class can

become universalized. Instead o f rooting the possibilities for

international hegem ony with form al international in stitu tio n s, he

emphasizes the development of an international class formation.

 66

The application of an "ideological" theory of hegemony could

enrich orthodox international relations analysis in several significant

respects. Robert Cox's work provides an excellent starting point for

developing a Gramscian theory o f international hegemony. Cox's

analysis filters hegem onic possibilities through the developm ent o f

hegemony in the technology and relations o f production (Cox, 1982).

Institutions serve to enforce or underm ine the com patibility o f these

relationships. As in Cox's analysis, the possibilities for "ideological"

hegemony depend only in part on hegemony in production. Further

determ inate factors include the level o f developm ent o f international

civil institutions, and the relationship between m ilitary forces and

these institutions. The ability o f an emergent international class to

universalize its belief system requires a give and take bargaining

position with the m ilitary capabilities o f nation-states.

Since G ram sci’s use of hegemony emphasizes the subjective

elements of power, this approach would require deep analysis into the

interplay betw een international structure and and social consciousness.

The extent to which social consciousness in general, and

understandings o f power in particular, depend upon the degree of

developm ent and alignm ent o f international forces necessarily becom es

a central concern. A fter all one aspect of a Gramscian analysis would

include a demonstration that ideas are, at least in part, molded by

institutional expressions. In particular the approach would call for

analyses o f the ideologies expressed w ithin the existing international

civil institutions.

This approach would suggest not only that international

structure changes across time, as in Cox's model, but also it would impose
 67

a developm ental understanding o f international consciousness. Like

social consciousness w ithin the nation-state, international

consciousness and international structures may pass through

historically developm ental phases culm inating with an international

"ethical political" plane. Here the notion o f global structure would be

used in Cox's sense of "world orders." In contrast to the W altzain

approach that views historical changes within the nation-state system

existing w ithin a relatively static structural container, the notion of

"world orders" allows for the possibility that different historical periods

actually possess different global structures. This is sense in which Cox

discusses the difference betw een pax britianicia and pax am ericana.

The world order during these two periods differs not only in terms of

which nations are dominant iri global politics, and the bi-polar or

m ulti-polar character of global politics, but also these periods differ

according to their "particular configuration of forces" (1986: 220).

Again, it should be stressed that although Cox’s work is useful for

structuring a Gramscian analysis, it relies more heavily on the role of

"social forces" than would a Gramscian model. Remarking on the

m aterially driven nature of transform ation o f "world orders" Cox tells

the reader: "Changes in the organization of production generate new

social forces which, in turn, bring about changes in the structure o f

states; and the generalization o f changes in the structure o f states alters

the problematic of world order" (1986: 220).

And, finally, the Gramscian approach would usher in a dualistic

research approach for understanding international relations. On the

one hand it would emphasize the identification o f levels o f force—the

ways in which they are m anifest and their degree o f developm ent—at
 68

both the national and international levels. On the one hand the

analysis would examine the varying degrees to which ideological

homogeneity is developed according to the alignment o f forces at the

national and international levels. Hegemonic global form ations could be

found where national forces are internally aligned with international

forces under the veil of a dominant global ideology.

The application of a model o f "ideological" hegemony to

international affairs im plies a greater degree of freedom for policy

m akers (at the international, national, and civil levels) to affect either

political change or stability. Instead of being constrained by the

current balance of powers, and relying on one nation's material

preponderance, to assure relative global tranquility, the notion of

ideological hegemony implies that "ideas are m aterial forces," and,

consequently, that peace can be fostered by the articulation o f a world

view that encourages cooperation. Although the inclusion o f ideas as a

force for understanding of international pow er was a central point in

Carr’s critique of "idealism", one may argue that ideas do affect nation­

state behavior. Further, as compared to the global political situation

surrounding Carr's The Twenty Years Crisis , one aught consider the

relatively greater degree o f international civil organization, the radical

transform ation of com m unications technology resulting in an

abundance o f inform ation, and the transform ation o f global economic

structures into a highly interdependent global economy as indicators

which further the pow er o f "ideas" in the current global situation.

D espite the actual transform ation o f the global economy, rapid

growth in com m unications technologies, and the developm ent o f a

lim ited international civil society, at least two problems hinder the
 69

pow er of policy m akers attem pting to m anipulate the international

system through applications of a model o f "ideological hegemony." In

an analytic sense nation-states are autonomous. However the

assumption of nation-state autonomy is countered by cultural and

economic nation-state interdependence. Second, the model of

"ideological" hegemony supposes a form o f historical relativism . That

the "ruling ideas in every age are the ideas o f the ruling class"(M arx,

The Germ an Ideology'} is an old adage that has fostered the interest of

pow er holders, does not assure, in any sense, that future developm ents

tow ards a global ideological hegemony will benefit poorer nations.

U nder a global hegemonic pow er form ation their oppression may

become hidden behind the veil o f the dominant ideology.^ Thus,

although "ideological" hegemony suggests a greater role for politics in

the international arena, those politics should be carefully scrutinized.

Despite these limitations, the inclusion o f a Gramscian model o f

hegem ony into the corpus o f international relations literature does

strengthen our understandings o f the logic o f pow er in international

affairs—power is more than guns and butter. Not only does it suggest

that ideas are a "force," but also it supposes ideology can be used as a

tool to stabilize or transform social structure.

An acceptance o f a theory o f "ideological" hegemony creates an

expanded understanding of pow er at both the national and

4 Gramsci would, of course, contest this point and want to argue

that the trend in history is towards a socialist world; that the
developm ent o f counter-hegem onic belief systems will foster the
interest o f the formerly dominated classes. If indeed hegemonic social
structures are more than false consciousness, as one o f Gramsci's
French critics contends, if they due usher in their own systems of
justice and m orality, then how are we to differentiate between them?
 70

international level. Cox's theory of "hegemony in production" as well as

K eohane’s emphasis on rules and institutions provide two examples of

work pointing in this direction. Even where the theory o f "ideological"

hegemony is examined, understood, and not actively applied, that

exercise involves a critical examination o f the way in which words are

used. W here the theory of "ideological" hegemony is actively applied it

stresses the .possibility of political solutions to global problem s.^

Strategically it calls for greater emphasis on the developm ent of, and

support for, international institutions. At present it seems unlikely that

the dominant nation-states would be w illing to transfer pow er from

their national bases to international organizations. However, structural

changes in the global economy may necessitate such a movement.

5 For relatively weak nation-states a strategy incorporating

"ideological" hegemony suggests that it may be in their interest to
actively support and participate in the institutions of the em erging
global civil society. In a sense, relatively weak nations could engage in
a "war o f position"—a struggle for an institutional say-- with relatively
stronger nations.
 71

B ib lio g ra p h y

Adamson, Walter. Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio

Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory. (Berkely: University of
California Press). 1980.

Aronowitz, Stanley. The Crisis in Historical M aterialism . (New

York: Praeger). 1981.

Ashly, Richard K. 'T he Poverty of Neorealism." Robert O.

Keohane, ed. Neorealism and its Critics . (New York: Columbia
university Press). 1986.

Boggs, Carl. G ram sci's M arxism (London: Pluto Press). 1976.

Boggs, Carl. The Two Revolutions: Gramsci and the Dillemas of

W estern M arxism . (Boston: South End Press). 1984.

Boggs, Carl. Social Movements and Political Pow er.

(Philadelphia: Temple University Press). 1986.

Bookchin, Murray. The M odem Crisis. (Philadelphia: New

Society Publishers). 1986.

Caraoy, Martin. The State and Politicial Theory. (Princeton:

Princeton University Press). 1984.

Carr, Edward Hallett. The Twenty Years Crisis. (London:

Macmillan and Co. Ltd.). 1946/64.

Cohen, Benjamin J. "A Brief History of International Monetary

relations." Freiden and Lake gen. ed. International P olitical Econom y.
(New York: St. Martin's Press), pp. 245-268.

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 VITA

John Robert Dedrick

John R. Dedrick was bom in Fairfax County, Virginia, September 12,

1963. He graduated from McLean High School in that county, June 1982. He
received his B.A. from the College o f William and Mary in Virgina , May 1986.
As an undergraduate student he also completed course work at George Mason
U niversity in Fairfax, V irginina and The U niversity o f Lancaster, Lancaster,
England. He was admitted to the M.A. program in government at The College of
W illiam and Mary in Virginina in 1986. In 1987 he finished course
requirem ents for the M.A. degree. His M.A. thesis—Gramsci and International
Relations Theory —was approved May 1988. In 1987 John Dedrick was admitted
to the graduate program in political science at Rutgers U niversity where he is
currently studying. Beyond academic work John Dedrick has been involved in
college radio (WCWM FM.) at The College of William and Mary in Virginia. His
projects at WCWM included the organization o f a music show entitled "Political
and Revolutionary Rock" and the co-production o f a m ulticontextual project
entitled "Radio Free W illiam sburg."