GAME THEORY 088976 -
Exam: January 29, 2024
SURNAME NAME PERSON CODE SIGNATURE
Prof. Giovanni Valente
INSTRUCTIONS
• Write down the solutions in the blank spaces below the exercises.
• Use only a blue or black pen.
• The use of calculators or notes is not allowed.
• Available time: i hour and 30 minutes
• WRITE CLEARLY: if your answer cannot be read, it will not be ac
cepted!
Space reserved to the instructor
r~sercise i Esercise 2 . Esercise 3 Esercise 4 Esercise 5 Total
i
EXERCISE 1. Consider the following bimatrix game
((1,1) (3,2) ~
((2,2) (0,1) ),
\~ (0,0) (1,2) J
1. (2 pt) Determine the Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
2. (9 pt) Find a Nash equilibrium such that (p, 1 — p, 0) is an equilibrium
strategy for the first player for some p.
3. (2 pt) Calculate the expected utility provided by such equilibrium to
the first player.
?u~E 21L\~~~ (2~~ ~ (~~a)
~t
T~-~ ! Jt~JC~ ~
‘3 J
‘53
a
EXERCISE 2. Let a game with N = {1, 2, 3} players be such that
v({i}) = O for all i, v({1, 2}) v({1, 3}) = 1, v({2, 3}) = 4, and v(N) = 4.
1. (2 pt) Find the core of the game.
2. (3 pt) Find the nucleolus.
3. (2 pt) Compute the Shapley values.
~≤Xz~ X~3; #~
~ ~J~JCL~OLOS
~ (o~2~2~
V,~t.4Q~ ~—.— i
EXERCISE 3. Given the following game between two players in exten
sive form:
A B
I’
(1,1)
D
(0,1) (2,2)
1. (2 pt) Use backward induetion to solve the game.
S~cò t~~t:~ 7~L4ys
IS Cz,
EXERCISE 4. Given the zero sum game described by the following
matrix:
(4 i. a~
2 5 a)’
1. (2 pt) Find the conservative values for both players with respect to real
values of a.
2. (1 pt) Determine for which values of a there are equilibria in pure
strategies.
3. (3 pt) Find the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for a> 3.
q~2
CcL
?~R~ EQcjlLi~~jA
~ co~~ ~
A c~\ff)( C~~oN ~
~ ~AS~ E~OIL\~UM (c~~~) (~ ~ ) o))
EXERCISE 5. THEORY QUESTIONS
1. Cooperative games: (a) State the definition of simple games and ex
plain its content (4 pt). (b) Write down the conditions under which a
coalition is a minimal winning coalition in a simple game (2 pt).
2. Nash model: (a) Formulate the definition of Best Response Multi
funetion BR(x, y) for a two-player game and provide a necessary and
sufficient condition for (E, ~) to be a Nash equilibrium (~ pt).
