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00 THE ItMFPCT OF TECHNOLOGY

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MAR 1 3 19870

ANTHONY j OI
BYCOLONEL

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ALABAMA

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 AIR WAR COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY

The Impact of Technology

on

Fl ight Simulation

by
Anthony J. Tol in
Colonel , USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY 9;.

IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH

REQUI REMENT

RESEARCH ADVISOR: Colonel Cecil C. Robins

For
Acce~To 7-Tc

NTIS CRA&I
DTIC TAB LI
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA Unannourjt ;cod

MAY 1986
By

Availab.1ity Codes

Dilst IAvaip a'dl or

Dist Sp~C'dI
Nspecia

x Lk
 'p,

DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER

This research report represents the views of the author

and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the

Air War College or the Department of the Air Force.

This document is the property of the United States

Government and is not to be reproduced in whole or in part

without permission of the Commandant, Air War College,

Maxwell Air Force, Alabama.

4W

;,",,p

am

iiI
 AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: The Impact of Technology on

Flight Simulation

AUTHOR: Anthony J. Tol in, Colonel, USAF

Remarks on the debate of flying time versus simulator

time introduce a discussion on the impact of technology in

flight simulation. A brief look at the history of flight

simulators is followed by a more detailed analysis of where

the Air Force is today with regard to flight simulation.

AThis analysis looks at the advantages of simulators, the

choice between motion and visual systems, and addresses

several problems and issues. After a discussion of the

future in flight simulation, the conclusion that simulation

is here to stay as a complement, not a replacement for,

actual flying hours is developed.

I i
 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Anthony J. Tolin (M.A., LaVerne University) is

a command pilot with nearly ten years and 2500 hours

• ,involved directly in the training of new pilots and new

fighter pilots. He has instructed in numerous simulators

over his 19 years in the USAF. Additionally, he

participated in the OT&E of the Simulator for Air-to-Air

Combat (SAAC) at Luke AFB. Arizona. He is a graduate of

Squadron Officers School, Air Command and Staff College, arid

the Air War College, class of 1986.

-0

=ii

4\..

*mm

iv
4
Table of Contents

CHAPTER PAGE

DISCLAIMER - ABSTAINER .................... ii

ABSTRACT .................................. iii

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ........................... iv

I INTRODUCTION .............................. I

II HISTORY ................................... 3

Ill FLIGHT SIMULATORS TODAY ...................... 5

Advantages ........................... 7
Motion and Visual Systems .............. 9
Problems and Issues .................. 11

IV THE FUTURE ................................ 14

V CONCLUSIONS ............................... 17

LIST OF REFERENCES ........................ 19

7,

-4, . . . ., .- - - +,- - -,, . - - - . • p + . ,. % % % - %

 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTI ON

Websters defines a simulator as "a device or apparatus

that generates conditions approximating actual performance

or operational conditions." The USAF dictionary further

defines many different types of simulators and training

devices to include: part task trainer; cockpit procedures

trainer; operational flight trainer; and weapons system

trainer. For the purposes of this paper, I will use the

generic term "flight simulator" to refer to those devices

which both simulate flight and are designed to provide an

environment in which aircrews learn, develop, and improve

the techniques associated with their c ew position in a

specific aircraft.

The simulation of aircraft characteristics has been

going on for more than 50 years. During those years it

seemed logical to speculate that someday the simulators

might become so sophisticated that the use of the airplane

for training might become unnecessary. Parallel with this

apparent logical thought process has been the much-debated

question of the actual relation between flying the aircraft

and "flying" the simulator. The real question boils down

to, Can simulator time replace flying time?

One school of thought insists that the dramatic growth

in flight simulation technology has made zero aircraft time

for training a reality under some circumstances.(1:49) The

other school of thought is emphatic that any simulation time

must be in addition to flight training. To an extreme, this

IN
S.W
 WINi V 75.
i

group contends that replacement of flying time with

simulator time " ... moves us toward the position where our

wartime mission capability will approximate our peacetime

flying program and you can't kill the enemy with a

simul ator."(2:10)

The official Air Force position is that flight

simulators are needed and they should complement the flying

training program. The Air Force has successfully used

different levels of flight simulation over the years. The

training associated has been broken down into two distinct

types. The first is safety-of-flight training which

consists of procedures training and coordination. The

second is warfighting training for those combat tasks that

can be trained effectively in a simulator. The second type

* adds directly to combat readiness.

Proponents 'of more simulator time and less flying time

continually refer to the rapidly escalating costs associated

.3[. with the purchase and operation of military aircraft. At

the same time they point to the relatively cheap "flying

hours" in a simulator.

This paper will first take a discuss the history of

simulation. Next will be a discussion of where we are

today, the advantages/disadvantages of simulation, and

VIN.,. problems within the current simulator program. Finally,, I

will look at the future of simulation with specific

reference to the impact of technology.

''
% ,' ' , . .' 4 " , " , ' : .. .. - '. ' , - . . ' % -, . -. .. , - . . . . .. ' - " .,
0 4b 2
 CHAPTER II

HISTORY

Simulators and simulation techniques have been employed

both by military and civilian agencies for many years.

Flight simulation can be traced back to the late 1800s; with

the first flight trainer originating in England in 1910.

That first trainer was a replica of early aircraft and was

mounted on a base which allowed limited movement in pitch!

roll, and yaw.(3:3)

Common to the vocabulary of all aircrews is the name

"Link." Link simulators have been "flown" by literally

millions of people. As early as 1931, the U.S. Navy

purchased Link trainers for pilot training at Pensacola

Naval Air Station, Florida.(3:38)

The need for "mass-producing" pilots during world War

II gave simulation a real boost. Thousands of pilots were

trained in the C-8 type trainer during and after the war.

Both training time and training aircraft were in short

supply. The conclusion was that programmed practice in the

C-8 could significantly reduce the time needed and cost

required for basic flying skills. One study concluded that

five to seven hours of trainer time equated to approximately

three hours of actual flight instruction time.(3:67)

To this point in time, training devices were

characterized by a generic, open cockpit device, mounted on

a pedestal for movement (pitch, yaw, bank), and having

standard light aircraft instrumentation.(4:29) However!

progress in analog computer technology made possible a new

3
V, %
 generation of flight simulation. In 1949, the first trainer-

.!! to simulate a jet-powered aircraft was built. This trainer

~was the early version of the T-4 and T-7 trainers still in

. use for undergraduate pilot training in the T-37 and T-38

,

9-. i, jJ aircraft, respect ively.(3:79)

. jBut most of the major advances in simulation technolog>,

iihave taken place in the last 25 years. In the sixties, the

.- first attempts were made to develop visual simulation and

.-. sensor simulation. This period also saw the introduction of

.. the photo-transparency approach for radar land mass

~simulation. Later versions of this development are still in,

• use today. Motion systems also came into being in the late

. .- sixties. By 1970, helped by the rapid growth in digital

. .- ,computers, we had refined motion systems and computer-image

c,..%.4
..-. generation capabil ities.(5:14-15)

"S- By the mid seventies, we saw the introduction of

. simulators where the pilot could fly an air-to-air scenario

., againist the computer or against another pilot located in a

.. second simulator. Additionally, simulators were introduced

to tec frato flying inundergraduate pilot training

. . .and to practice weapons delivery techniques for fighter

.'-'.crews. All these simulators have wide fields of view (from

-if . near 110 degrees in the weapons del ivery simulator to rnear-

,'"."360 degrees in the air-to-air simulator).(4'18-23)

.,,".'"Today we have a whole new generation of simulation

~available, and the future is indeed promisingi.

4,4
h
CHAPTER I I I

FLIGHT SIMULATORS TODAY

Flight simulators are used widely for purposes of

training and evaluation, limited at one time largely to

undergraduate pilot training, their use extends now to

advanced training for high performance fighter aircraft in

both the air-to-air and the air-to-surface mission areas.

Additionally, they are used to complement training in areas

such as aerial refueling, formation flying, and procedures

training. The well-known reasons for their use include

lower operating costs; safety; independence of weather, air

traffic, and geography; and their excellent amenability to

performance measurement.

At present, the development of flight simulator

training devices for the Air Force concentrates heavily on

high-realism, full-mission systems. The B-52 mission crew

trainer is illustrative of one weapon system's minimum

requirement for a training device. It is capable of

operating as a trainer for individual crew stations as well

as providing a complete crew with the opportunity to improve

total crew coordination by training as a unit. Its

sophistication allows it to duplicate every aircraft

function from start-up to shutdown.(6:54-55)

Fighter simulators, while usually configured around

only a single seat, represent an even higher state of the

art. At the upper end of the spectrum is possibly the

McDonnel Douglas simulator center. Principally designed for

use in the development of new fighter concepts, it can

5
U.4

axit
AOLWATh I~
 .

simulate a complete air-to-air, multi-aircraft, combat

secnario. Up to 12 aircraft can engage in air combat, and

A'- up to 32 missiles can be tracked ard scored simultaneously.

Surface-to-air missiles streak past the fighters, air-to-air

missiles fill the sky, and "killed" fighters blow up. The

entire event is monitored by instructors and is complete

•"- with such features as "freeze" and "replay."' :17-l:S,

Today's flight simulators and simulator programs

continue to be controversial , are plagued wAi th problems, and

. are strongly supported by some while being strongly retected

by others. But, it is perfectly clear that :n one form or

another, flight simulators are here to stay. Current

<--'-. Department of Defense pol icy is "... to maintain or increase

combat readiness to the extent possible through the use o'

simulation, miniaturization, and substitution."(8:23)

. With
l the great amounts of control that the U.S.

LON Congress can exercise over DoD budgets, it is interesting to

note Georgia Congressman Newt Gingrich's views on flight

'. simul ators:

As technology collapses the time and distance of

combat while expanding the complexi ty and capabi 1 i ty of
the systems used to fight, it becomes more and more
difficult to practice to the point of proficiency with
the systems and even more difficult to recreate the
i . interaction of these systems with meaningfful
maneuvers. To avoid the costly mistakes of the past,
and to better prepare for the inevitable high speed.
7.. high technology, real time decision-making type of
warfare, it is vital that we turn to simulators.
Simulation was or-icinal >' developed in the mi I i tar" and
was only later taken up by civilians, mostly airlines.
who are primary users today. Among the three [Link]
services the U.S. Army retains its historic lead in :he
use of simulation. The Army"s intensive use of
simulators, particularly at Ft. Pucker with the
development of hel icopter training programs, is a majcr

- . . -.- .-
 breakthrough. The objective of simulation is to elevate
the competence of the trainee -- not just familiarize
him with the system, but also to enable him to dominate
it. We have focused too long on the hardware element
in our security equation, ignoring the vital element
that only capable people make the equipment work
effectively. Simulation gives us the means to achieve
the goal of operational preeminence over our
enemies. (8:29)

Advantages

The effective use of simulators gains its maximum

advantage in training by demonstrations which are

impossible, or at least unacceptably expensive to

demonstrate in an actual aircraft or other weapon system.

Thus, for example, flight simulators are used to teach

emergency procedures, flight through dangerously bad

weather, devastating enemy attacks, very low-level and

high-speed flight and other potentially hazardous conditions

without risking aircraft, lives or property.

Among the many other advantages of simulators is their

ability to substitute simulated for actual firing of

missiles and other armaments. Very large cost savings in

both missiles and targets are achieved through simulations.

Simulators can be effectively used for tactics

development. Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM) simulators form a

unique complement to aircraft flight testing. Aircrews can

assess methods for defeating enemy-fired missiles and then

train using these concepts. Since it is impossible to

visually simulate a deployed missile in an operational

environment, the tactics development and subsequent training

of this task are best handled in ACM simulators.(9:11-12)

7
 Simulators can provide many economics. They are great

energy savers since the fuel used in the aircraft and all

s support functions (maintenance vehicles, fuel trucks,

starting units, etc.) is saved. Safety advantages are

obvious. Simulators can't crash into one another or into

the ground. Their armaments can't explode because of

defects, hangfires, and the like (unless you want them to'.).

The extensive costs of manpower and materials needed to keep

the actual equipment up for safe and effective training are

real factors as well.

With respect to operating cost, the Institute for

Defense Analyses (IDA) published a study just two years ago

•" concluding that:

1. The average variable operating costs of 39

simulators in operation in the FY 1980-1981 time period
-fall within a narrow range ($116 to $170 per operating
N.: hour), despite the diversity of simulator type and
*. associated aircraft missions (e.g., bomber, fighter,
cargo), sizes, or types (i.e., fixed-wing or
rotary-wing).

2. The median ratio of the 39 military

simulator-to-aircraft operating costs is eight percent
in FY 1980-1981.

3. The simulator-to-aircraft operating costs ratios in

*the FY 1975-1976 and FY 1980-1981 time periods are
essentially the same.(10:4-15)

All of these important considerations are worthwhile,

but none are as important as the realistic training that can

be provided by simulators. For example, Space Shuttle

astronauts Truly, Engle, Young, and Crippen experienced

nothing new when they completed their first two

S-. history-making flights in 1981. The only difference between

the actual flight and their shuttle simulation, noted the

N-
 astronauts, was a longitudinal vibration that was less than

expected. That minor discrepancy was quickly corrected on

the simulator.(11:24-25)
While the Space Shuttle simulator may be a special

case, other examples are readily available. A 1981 study by

the USAF Human Resources Laboratory compared a "control"

group of A-10 pilots who had been through simulator training.

with one which had not. The simulator pilots scored

dramatically better on all fronts, an advantage they

retained through all phases of A-10 training.(12:13)

Motion and Visual Systems

The current U.S. Air Force position was stated in a

Tactical Air Command message, dated 20 May 1982, indicating

the decision "to pursue acquisition of current

state-of-the-art limited-field-of-view visual systems for

A-10, F-15, and F-16 simulators."(13:72) The Air Force

defines a limited-field-of-view as anything less than a full

360 degee continuous visual image. The decision was

reinforced in July 1984 at the completion of an Air Force

evaluation of limited-field-of-view visual system training

effectiveness. The evaluation concluded that the visual

system was capable of substantially enhancing training and

that l imted-field-of-view visual systems would continue for

fighter training in simulators.(14:87-91)

6 9
 This decision was an economical one in that full visual

systems were deemed t

oo expensive for the relatively small

amount of gain in realism and training effectiveness.

Controversy has surrounded motion ever since its

introduction. In 1968, Air Force Systems Command studied

the presence versus the absence of motion for simulators and

concluded that the Air Force should not purchase

sophisticated flight trainers unless they had adequate

S motion systems.(15:8)

In the 1970s, some simulators had really sophisticated

motion systems. The Simulator for Air-to-Air Combat,

mentioned earlier in this paper, was mounted on six-post

hydraulic, synergistic motion bases.(5:18) Motion was hotly

debated throughout industry, not knowing where the users

were headed. But the answer to the motion or no motion

question was found in visual systems and the creation of

other motion cues such as g-suits and g-seats.

-. The visual display is now the dominant element in any

simulator system and full motion functions are beginning to

disappear as their cost is displaced by the visual system.

"Pilots
4- have discovered that a good visual system, combined

-' with the motion cues of g-suits and g-seats, make it

virtually impossible to tell when the motion is, or is not

a, operative.(13:74-75)

In a recent vanguard analysis performed by the Air

Force, visual systems were established clearly as the number

one priority for future development. Interestingly, some of

the most advanced simulators, such as General Electric's

10

01 , 4 -~~*a - 4 ~ .~.N .** ~ . % ' h' 5.

F-5E system for Thailand, delete motion entirely based on

the perception that acceleration cues through g-suits and

g-seats are more useful; but their visual systems are the

most advanced available for their cost.(6:56)

Problems and Issues

The Air Force faces a number of problems, whose

continuing nature and increasing effect tend to further

emphasize the need for cost effective training devices.

These problems include: the increasing complexity of

weapons and other equipment; increasing enemy capabilities,

non-technical trainees; increasing dependency on automatic

and computer controlled devices; and rising costs. High

fuel costs have been of sufficient importance to interest

Congress in backing an accelerated acquisition program for

flight simulators for the military.(16:15)

The 1982 Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study on

Training and Training Technology had some interesting

findings. In their report to the Secretary of Defense, the

following problems pertaining specifically to simulators

were identified:

1. Many training devices and simulators are over

designed and over engineered. They are required to
meet standards and specifications intended more for
field and combat conditions than for the instructional
environment in which they will be used. Substantial
time and money can be saved by eliminating excessive
design/manufacturing requirements.

2. A chronic complaint from the training and user

community alike is that training packages/devices
arrive too late for effective use, often months or even
years after the weapon system has been fielded.(17:8)
 Overspecification has been, and continues to be, a

problem in the acquisition process. This is true despite

high level emphasis on readiness and sustainability. The

extra "bells and whistles" push cost and schedule to the

right. With respect to specifications, program baselining

and discipline are a must.

Air Force Regulation 50-11 states that we will field

simulators concurrently with the aircraft. Air Force

% Regulation 57-4 states that simulator mods will be

accomplished simultaneously with aircraft mods. Despite

improvements in this area, simulators continue to be

late-to-need and modifications are either late or not made

at all. The following examples were briefed to the Air

Force Council during the annual Simulator Program Review in

1984:

1. A-10 -- Tried to build the simulator with full

tactical visual system. When the visual system became
too tough and expensive ($500m) to build, the Air Force
salvaged a "cockpit trainer" two to three years
late-to-need.

2. F-16 -- Tried building block approach (cockpit,

radar, EW, visual). This approach resulted in the
basic simulator two to three years late-to-need and
safety of flight updates two to four years lagging.

3. KC-10 -- Turned to industry for a training program.

The result was an on-time product because industry had
an existing DC-10 program with simulators and
instructors. (18:11-12)
It is interesting to note that the Strategic Air

Commmand is in fact buying three KC-10 simulators, the first

of which became operational in February of this Year.K19:68)

Negative training is a direct impact of simulators

being late-to-need and late-to-mod. It is not unusual for

12
------- . C
." . . r.•" .
 an aircrew to "fly" the simulator having to make allowances

for differences between it and the aircraft sitting on the

ramp. Differences typically include switches in different

cockpit locations, different types of gauges (i.e., dial

versus digital), and the absence of newly added equipment.

Another problem has haunted the flight simulation

equation since the beginning. That problem has to do with

pilot/aircrew acceptance. Simulators have often been viewed

as a threat to flying time and sorties. Aircrew experiences

(4 with inferior simulators, simulators not in good repair, and

simulators late-to-need don't help the cause for simulation

at all. The type of opposition I am referring to was

typified in a 1974 Air War College paper, later published in

the Air University Review, which concluded that increased

simulation would result in "... a potentially serious

dilution of airpower" and that simulation was "... a per!.

to tactical airpower."(2:1,6)

N1
 CHAPTER IV

THE FUTURE

While the simulation of aircraft characteristics has

-taken place for more than 50 years, it was not until the

advent of computers that they reached their present

sophistication. Technological advances in computers,

electronics, [Link] systems have made it possible to

virtually duplicate an aircraft's performance and that of

its weapon systems through sight, sound, and feel. And the

growth in computer science is passing on the type of

economics seen in pocket calculators. In all l ikelihood,

the technology revolution will continue its self-sustaining

momentum into the forseeable future.

Key developments contributing to improved simulation

and simulation effectiveness in the near future fall into

three primary areas: visual technology; distributed

processing techniques; and artificial intelligence

technology.

The simulation of visual information is the most

rapidly advancing area of flight simulation, and with good

reason. The human visual sense is by far the most rich in

information. There are more cues available from the visual

sense than from taste, smell, hearing or touch. At the same

time, the military requirement for advanced visual systems

grows stronger. Needs include better resolution for

air-to-air type scenarios and the effecti'je simulation of

low-level nao-of-the earth missions. And just down the road

in visuals is holography, the science of producing

.4 14
S.%
three-dimensional images through the use of lasers.

General Electric, for example, is concentrating on

improving resolution without reducing the field of view.

This has been a fundamental limitation of most image

presentation. Through the use of very large-scale

integration, General Electric expects to shrink the system,

resulting in reduced costs and increased training

capabiities. Initial work in this area will be seen in

visual imagery for West Germany's Panavia Tornado

strike-reconnaissance aircraft simulators.(20:239)

Link, the household name in flight simulators, is

concentrating on visual and software development. The

company is moving toward application of distributed

microprocessor technology to the overall simulator, not just

the visual portion of the system.

A major problem with increasing the visual

field-of-view is resolution. One way to overcome this

problem is to concentrate on the fine detail in the area of

interest. Hin-Man Tong, Link's director for visual systems

reports that:

Link is developing a new visual system that

provides an area of high-resolution imagery, covering
about 20 degrees, that moves to wherever the subject's
eyes are directed within the overall visual
scene. (20:243)

The next generation of simulators will undoubtedly

feature the integration of more "smartness" through the

arrival of artificial intelligence. An example of the use

of artificial intelligence would be in performing emergency

procedures. If the trainee deals with a certain emergency

15
 very well, the computer might make the problem even more

difficult. On the other hand, if the trainee has difficulty

with the emergency, the computer would not compound the

problem. This can be appl ied across the spectrum of

training in the simulator. The computer will continuously

rate the trainee's performance and adjust the scenario in

order to optimize the learning. Taken to the next logical

step, the computer could manage individual training by

adapting future training based upon the "remembered" past

performances.(21:78-81)

Soon, the "flight" simulator will be joined by the

"in-flight" simulator. This is possible by "hard-wiring"

the real aircraft such that the cockpit can be turned into a

I simulator. For example, the simulation could present the

pilot with the appearance of attacking enemy aircraft or

other emergency procedures. Through pure simulation, the

problems would have to be dealt with in the world of actual

fl ight.(19:68)

To deal with the impact of technology on flight

simulation, the Air Force appears to be ready. The recently

'.
published Program Management Directive for Advanced

Simulator Technology states that:

Advanced Simulator Technology is a continuing

program to improve Air Force capabili ties through the
design, development, and fabrication of prototype
simulation systems that lead to improved,
Vcost-effective flight training simulators.
The objective of this program is ... to provide
advanced and enhanced visual system capabilities in the
4,9 1990s ... to select the most promis ng simulation
technology for continued development into demonstrable
V simulator subsystems ... recognizing that simulator
training can act as a force multiplier.(22:1-3)

@4 16

.1Nt
e 'r4~' Y~Y Y.")-47-u~~'v'~
*CHAPTER V

CONCLUSI ONS

Given the evidence, I don't believe there is any doubt

that flight simulators are here to stay. But their very

a" existence provokes a couple of questions. The first

question that might come to mind is, Are simulators needed?

I belie-ve that the answer is, emphatically, yes. The second

question, which is far more important and relevant, is, How

sophisticated should they be?

Today we still try to build a simulator that does

everything the aircraft can. This was our goal in the 1970s

when we tried to replace hands-on flying time with simulator

flying time. Unfortunately, the excitement of simulation

and rapid advances in technology have continued until

industry can produce far more simulator than the Air Force

can afford.

I believe that the Air Force (all the Services for that

matter) should make a concentrated effort to match the

simulator to the task(s) being trained and not buy the

* highest capability simulator industry has to offer. We need

to separate safety-of-flight type training. Simulators for

warfighting task training should do just that, and nothing

more. The Tactical Air Forces (TAF) decision £zr

limited-field-of-view visual systems for F-15, F-16, and

A-10 simulators is a step in the right direction. The ideal

flight simulator would enable a pilot or aircrew to debut in

combat feel ing they had been there before. But, in my mind,

the objective of a flight simulator is to provide sufficient

17
-. ",- -,
 Jig.

capability for realistic training at an affordable cost.

Something must be done to correct the problems of

-4.-

simulators arriving late-to-need and modifications lagging.

It is very important that aircrews have simulators when they

are needed (i.e., fielded along with the aircraft) and that

the simulator be as current as the aircraft (i.e., modified

whenever the aircraft is). Correcting these problems would

go a long wax toward aircrew acceptance of simulators -_

well as improving training capabilities.

The ultimate goal is increased combat capabi l i ty

through training. As Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. (USN

Retired), Chairman of the 1982 DSB Summer Study on Traiinicj

and Technology noted:

Training is the force multiplier most critical to

our combat capabilities that can now give us a very
large return in relatively shorter time than it takes
to introduce new systems. It is, in fact, one of the
soundest ways to get the fastest positive returns from
so many of the weapon systems and manpower investments
we have already made.(23:7)
%
I believe that flight simulators should continue to

complement Air Force flying hour programs. Simulation can

-,' add an extra dimension of realism to operational training.

Simulators don't substitute for flying hours, but they make

the actual hours flown count more. Simulators have the

potential, especially with rapid technological advances, to

yield even greater benefits as our training requirement

becomes more complex. The bottom line is that everyone

stands to lose if aircrews are not given the very best

training thac technology has to offer.

0.

18
*L.4'LC
 LIST OF REFERENCES

1. Seidenman, Paul and Spanovich, David J. "Advanced

Simulation." National Defense, November 1984, pp. 47-5,4.

2. Goodall, Lieutenant Colonel Harry A. Simulation: P-

Peril to Tactical Aviation. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air War
College, 1974.

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6

19

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