MENA

GENERATION 2030
Investing in children and youth
today to secure a prosperous
region tomorrow
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report represents Core report team Acknowledgements Economic Affairs Officer, United Nations Economic
a significant creative Veera Mendonca, Momo Duehring, and In addition to the collaboration between and Social Commission for Western Asia; Catriona
and technical Arthur van Diesen from UNICEF, Middle UNICEF Headquarters and the MENA Regional Purfield, Assistant Director, Middle East and
collaboration East North Africa Regional Office; and Office, this report has benefited from valuable Central Asia Department, International Monetary
between colleagues Jan Beise, Sinae Lee, Bin Lian, Anastasia contributions made by many colleagues Fund; Rabah Arezki, Chief Economist, Middle
from UNICEF Mshvidobadze, and Danzhen You from throughout UNICEF. Particular thanks to East and North Africa, The World Bank Group;
Headquarters and the UNICEF Headquarters. Geert Cappelaere, Bertrand Bainvel, Roumiana Tariq A.Haq, Senior Employment Specialist &
Regional Office for Gantcheva, Adriana Vogelaar, Ider Dungerdorj, Coordinator, International Labor Organization,
the Middle East and The report was co-authored by Elizabeth Buthaina Al-Iryani, Esmaeil Ibrahim, Anirban Regional Office for Arab States/DWT-Beirut; Ghada
North Africa. Dalling, in close collaboration with the core Chatterjee, Catherine Barnett, Juliette Touma, Barsoum, Associate Professor, The American
team.
Tamara Kummer and Salim Oweis. University in Cairo.

Design
The authors are also thankful for the support The authors are grateful to the United Nations
Razan Al Sheikh.
and expertise provided by the following experts Population Division for providing the estimates and
in refining the recommendations and strategic projections that form the basis of the population
priorities for action: Niranjan Sarangi, First analysis in this report.

All reasonable precautions have been taken by UNICEF to verify the information contained in this publication. For corrigenda subsequent to publication,
please see www. unicef. org/publications.
Cover photo:
© United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
A Syrian refugee girl Division of Data, Research and Policy
in an informal tented April 2019
settlement in Jordan.
https://www.unicef.org/mena/reports/mena-generation-2030

The designations employed in this publication and the presentation of the material do not imply on the part of the United Nations Children’s Fund
© UNICEF/UN0229230/ (UNICEF) the expression of any opinion whatsoever concerning the legal status of any country or territory, or of its authorities or the delimitations of its
Herwig frontiers.
 2 8 12 28 38 66 76
EXECUTIVE INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 3 CHAPTER 4 ANNEXES
SUMMARY Demographic The prospect of a Barriers to the Reaping the Annex 1: Implications for
projections for demographic dividend in dividend in MENA: education service provision
MENA dividend in MENA MENA and priority policy Annex 2: Implications for
implications for actions school-to-work transition
service provision Annex 3: Additional
country-specific data

GENERATION 2030
MENA
 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive summary
The opportunity The problem
During the first half of the twenty-first century, an A favourable age structure is essential. But other prerequisites for realising a demographic dividend such as
unprecedentedly large proportion of the population political and social stability; inclusive and equitable economic and social policies; and expanded employment
in the Middle East and North Africa will transition opportunities all face significant challenges in the region.1:
into their most productive years, opening up the
potential for a demographic dividend - economic
growth spurred by demographic changes. The most Political and
favourable period for the region as a whole will be social instability
between 2018 and 2040, when the dependency
ratio is predicted to be lowest. This temporary The cost of conflict and violence in the Middle East and North Africa is enormous and exposes children,
lowering of the dependency ratio of the population adolescents and youth to the risk of death and injury; violence at home and school; lack of access to
has the potential to increase shared wealth and education; uncertainty and loss of investment, especially in human capital. These and other factors
facilitate an expansion of opportunities for all - but contribute to the region achieving the world’s lowest level of youth civic engagement – a key driver of
only under certain conditions. instability in its own right.

Children and young people (0-24 year olds) in the Inequitable economic and
Middle East and North Africa currently account for social policies
nearly half of the region’s population and have the
potential to become agents of change, acting for a
more prosperous and stable future for themselves Most countries in the region continue to marginalise adolescents and youth, particularly young women, the
and their communities, and playing their part in poor, refugees and those living with disabilities. Overlapping deprivations in the areas of health, protection
reaping the demographic dividend. But unleashing and education severely compromise the ability of adolescents and youth to reach their full potential and
this potential requires urgent and significant become productive members of society and the economy.
investment to create opportunities for meaningful
learning, social engagement and work, all of which Limited employment
are currently limited, particularly for young women opportunities
and the most vulnerable.

The time to act is now. Due to a rapidly growing Youth unemployment in the region is currently the highest in the world. Education systems are failing to
elderly population across the region, the window prepare adolescents and youth for the workplace, and markets are not generating urgently needed jobs.
of opportunity to benefit from the demographic
dividend will begin to close in the second half of
the century.

1
See also: UNFPA, 2016. Shaping the Future: How Changing Demographics Can Power Human Development; World Bank Group. 2016. Global Monitoring Report 2015/2016: Development Goals in an Era of Demographic Change. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3

The solution
The adolescents and youth of the Middle East and North Africa have the potential to become
changemakers, by actively contributing to addressing the region’s most pressing issues and
to reaping the demographic dividend. But to unleash this potential, urgent policy actions
are needed. Priorities will be determined by each country’s age structure, depending on
whether they are at the pre-dividend, early-dividend or late-dividend stage. But whatever
their demography, all countries have an obligation to ensure the health, protection, education,
transition to employment and civic engagement of their adolescents and youth, particularly the
most vulnerable.

The time to act is now

Adolescents and youth across the Middle East and North Africa feel a sense of disillusionment,
and frustration at the many barriers they face to effective learning and engagement with their
communities and the workplace. According to the 2017 Arab Youth Survey, 55 per cent of
youth feel that life in the region has deteriorated over the last decade.2 Yet participatory
research reveals that these same adolescents and youth remain hopeful that their reality will
change and are keen to engage positively in changing that reality.3

It is vital that all governments, donors, practitioners, United Nations agencies and those with
an interest in the future of the region play their part in fulfilling these hopes - both for the sake
of the adolescents and youth themselves, and for their communities and countries to benefit
from the demographic changes to come.

The opportunity of a demographic dividend is an extra incentive for countries in the Middle
East and North Africa to invest in a new generation of adolescents and youth that is strong,
rejects violence and discrimination, and is prepared for positive engagement in lifelong
learning and work.4 Transforming frustration and disengagement among adolescents and
youth into active involvement in problem-solving in their families, communities, workplaces
and beyond is possible.
A young boy in the
But it will not happen without intentional action. The time to act is now. village of Tamarout,
High Atlas Mountains,
2
ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, 2017. Arab Youth Survey.
Morocco.
3
UNICEF, 2017. Participatory Action Research.
4
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Evidence © UNICEF/UN0210232/
Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA (summary report). Noorani
4 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Contents
Executive summary ................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 2
Figures and tables .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Acronyms and abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8
Purpose and structure of the report ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 8
Who we are talking about: children, adolescents and youth ................................................................................................................................................ 9
Why demographic projections matter: the demographic dividend ..................................................................................................................................... 9
What we know so far: data sources and reliability ................................................................................................................................................................ 10
1. Demographic projections for MENA 12
Total population ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 16
Women of reproductive age and fertility ................................................................................................................................................................................ 19
Mortality (including child mortality) and life expectancy ..................................................................................................................................................... 20
Children and youth ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 22
Density and urbanisation ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 25
Migration and forced displacement ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 26
2. The prospect of a demographic dividend in MENA 28
The demographic dividend: a window of opportunity .......................................................................................................................................................... 30
Working age and dependent populations ............................................................................................................................................................................... 31
Youth and gender in the labour market .................................................................................................................................................................................. 35
3. Barriers to the dividend in MENA and implications for service provision 38
Barriers related to political and social stability ...................................................................................................................................................................... 40
Barriers related to inclusive and equitable economic and social policy .............................................................................................................................. 43
Barriers related to expanded employment opportunities ..................................................................................................................................................... 48
Implications for basic service provision ................................................................................................................................................................................. 50
4. Reaping the dividend in MENA: priority policy actions 66
Different countries, different challenges and opportunities ................................................................................................................................................. 68
Boosting the demographic dividend by investing in basic services .................................................................................................................................... 69
Facilitating the school-to-work transition for all .................................................................................................................................................................... 70
A double dividend? The economic benefits of peace ............................................................................................................................................................ 72
A triple dividend? Unlocking the potential of girls and women ........................................................................................................................................... 73
Annexes: Barriers to the dividend in MENA and implications for service provision 76
Annex 1: Implications for education service provision ......................................................................................................................................................... 78
Annex 2: Implications for school-to-work transition ............................................................................................................................................................. 82
Annex 3: Additional country-specific data ............................................................................................................................................................................. 84
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 5

Figures
Figure 1 Number of children (0-17 years), adolescents (10- 19 years), and youth (15-24 years) by country, 2015, 2030 and 2050 (in millions) ................. 11
Figure 2 Changes in total population from 2015 to 2030 and 2050 ........................................................................................................................................... 17
Figure 3 Total fertility rate in MENA region by country, 2015, 2030 and 2050 ....................................................................................................................... 20
Figure 4 Estimated under-five mortality rates in MENA region by country, 1990 and 2015 ................................................................................................. 21
Figure 5 Estimated and projected life expectancy at birth in MENA region by country, 2015, 2030 and 2050 .................................................................... 22
Figure 6 Percentage of total population represented by children, adolescents and youth (0-24 years), by country 2000-2050 ......................................... 23
Figure 7 Changes in youth population (15-24 years) from 2015 to 2030 and 2050 ................................................................................................................. 24
Figure 8 Composition of the total dependency ratio (child dependency ratio and old-age dependency ratio) for the MENA region, 1950-2100 ............ 32
Figure 9 Population of MENA by age and sex, 2015 (darker) and 2050 (lighter) .................................................................................................................... 32
Figure 10 Countries in Middle East and North Africa by demographic type (1990-2085) .................................................................................................... 33
Figure 11 Population by age and sex for selected countries in MENA in different demographic stages, 2015 (darker) and 2050 (lighter) ....................... 34
Figure 12 Annual increase of youth population (15-24 years) in MENA region, 2015-2050 ..................................................................................................... 35
Figure 13 Youth labour force participation rate and demographic type by country, 2015 ....................................................................................................... 36
Figure 14 Female to male labour force participation ratio and demographic type by country, 2015 ................................................................................... 36
Figure 15 Youth not in education, employment or training (NEET) in selected countries (per cent) ...................................................................................... 37
Figure 16 Percentage of women aged 20 to 24 years who were first married or in union before age 15 and before age 18, by country ........................... 45
Figure 17 Number of health service providers (doctors, nurses and midwives) for each scenario (in thousands) .............................................................. 51
Figure 18 Proportional increase in school-age population between 2015 and 2030, by education level and country demographic stage ........................ 53
Figure 19 Quantitative increase in school-age population between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by education level and country demographic stage 54
Figure 20 Quantitative increase in school-age population between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by country.................................................................... 55
Figure 21 Proportional increase in out-of-school children between 2015 and 2030, by education level and country demographic stage ......................... 56
Figure 22 Quantitative increase in out-of-school children between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by education level and country demographic stage 57
Figure 23 Quantitative increase in out-of-school children between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by country ................................................................... 58
Figure 24 Quantitative increase in the youth labour force between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by country demographic stage ................................. 60
Figure 25 Quantitative increase in the youth labour force between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by country ................................................................... 61
Figure 26 Quantitative increase in the youth labour force between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), while reducing / closing the gender gap in labour
force participation, by country ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 62
Figure 27 Quantitative increase in unemployed youth between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by country demographic stage ....................................... 63
Figure 28 Quantitative increase in unemployed youth between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by country ......................................................................... 64
6 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Tables
Table 1 MENA countries and their population (in thousands) in 2018 ................................................................................................................................... 14
Table 2 Total population in absolute terms, 2000 - 2050, by country (thousands) ................................................................................................................ 18
Table 3 Estimated number of health service providers (doctors, nurses and midwives) for each scenario by country ................................................... 52

Acronyms and abbreviations

ILO International Labour Organization
IMAGES International Men and Gender Equality Survey
LSCE Life Skills and Citizenship Education
MENA Middle East and North Africa
NCD Non-Communicable Diseases
NEET Not in Education, Employment, or Training
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PCBS Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
TFR Total Fertility Rate
TVET Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNPD United Nations Population Division
WHO World Health Organization
YLD Years of Life with a Disability
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 7

An adolescent girl, in
the innovations lab in
the UNICEF - support-
ed Makani center in
Jerash, Jordan.

© UNICEF/UN0218778/
Shennawi
8 INTRODUCTION

Introduction
Purpose and structure of report
The purpose of this report is to provide an in-depth analysis of demographic projections for children, adolescents and youth in the countries of the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) region,5 highlighting the significant changes and exploring their implications for policy-making and programming in the areas of health,
protection, education, transition to employment, civic engagement and the empowerment of girls and women in the region.

A clear understanding of the projected demographic trends is essential if policy-making, programming and decision-making in the region are to be evidence-
based. The report therefore examines projected estimates of population size, age structure and population density in the MENA region during the first half of
the twenty-first century.6 The significance of these projections for the possibility of a demographic dividend in MENA is then highlighted.

Barriers to the key prerequisites for experiencing the benefits of a demographic dividend – for example, political and social stability, inclusive and
equitable economic and social policy and expanded employment opportunities – are then outlined. These barriers include the impact of conflict
and violence, lack of youth engagement, the marginalisation of MENA’s young women, the poor quality of education, and the lack of available jobs.
Implications for service provision in health, education and facilitating school-to-work transition are then explored.

Finally, the policy actions most likely to enable adolescents and youth in MENA and their communities and countries to realise their potential and
benefit from a demographic dividend are outlined. The report is therefore structured as follows:

8 12 28 38 66
Introduction Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Demographic projections The prospect of a Barriers to the dividend in Reaping the dividend in MENA:
for MENA demographic dividend MENA and implications for priority policy actions
in MENA service provision

explains the purpose provides projections for the includes the prerequisites outlines the obstacles to makes recommendations for
and structure of the region to 2030 and 2050, for realising the benefits achieving the dividend policy action in the areas of
report, the significance of including: total population; of a dividend, the nature prerequisites, including: education, health, school-to-work
demographic projections women of reproductive age of the dividend-related conflict and violence; lack of transition and protection to enable
for the possibility of a and fertility; mortality and stages and the projections engagement; poverty and all the adolescents and youth of
demographic dividend life expectancy; proportion of for dependency ratios, and gender-based exclusion; poor the region – including young
and the nature of the data children and youth; density the proportion of youth and quality education and lack of women and the most vulnerable
sources. and urbanisation; migration women in the labour market available jobs. Implications - to make an effective transition
and forced displacement. in MENA. for service provision in health, to the workplace and active civic
education and school-to-work engagement, contributing to the
transition are explored. reaping of the dividend.
5
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA ) as defined by UNICEF includes the following 20 countries and areas: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the State of Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen.
6
Initial projections were presented at the Evidence Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA in November 2017. See: No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Evidence Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA (summary report).
 INTRODUCTION 9

huge social and economic benefits for them, economic growth which can be attributed
Who we are talking about: to changes in the demographic composition
for their communities and for their countries.
children and adolescents of a population, resulting in a working age
population that is increasing as a proportion
and youth Children and young people (0-24 of the whole population and a dependent
year olds) account for nearly half population – for example, children and the
The focus group for this report is children, of the region’s population elderly – that is decreasing (see Chapter 3
adolescents and youth (0-24 years old). for details). The main advantage of such
However, many challenges remain in a dividend for the prospects for MENA’s
Categorisation of these groups follows UN
translating awareness of the issues faced by children and youth is increased shared
definitions7 as follows:
children, adolescents and youth in MENA10 wealth and the resulting fiscal space that
into scaled up and effective action with respect can be used to further the realisation of their
Children: 0-17 years
to their health, education, protection and rights.
Adolescents: 10-19 years
Youth: 15-24 years participation (social, civic and economic).11
The pre-condition for an economy to
The current numbers of these three groups As a result, many adolescents and youth, experience a demographic dividend is
in each MENA8 country and their projected especially young women, refugees and entering a period of demographic transition,
numbers for 2030 and 2050 are shown in those with disabilities, continue to remain involving a decline in mortality and fertility,
Figure 1. socially, economically and politically and the subsequent change in age structure
excluded. The region has both the highest of the population (see Box 1: Demographic
Children and young people (0-24 year youth unemployment rate in the world12 transition in Chapter 2 for details). With
olds) in the Middle East and North Africa and the lowest level of civic engagement by fewer births each year, a country’s young
currently account for nearly half of the young people. Conflicts, political instability dependent population decreases in relation
region’s population. Adolescents and and climate change have further increased to its working age population and with fewer
youth (10-24 years olds) currently represent the vulnerabilities of adolescents and youth, people to support, the country has a window
approximately 26 per cent of the total exposing them to violence, exploitation and of opportunity for rapid economic growth.
population of MENA9 and have recently been abuse.13 & 14
the focus of discussions concerning global, A low dependency ratio (see Figure 8 in
social, economic and political developments Why demographic projections Chapter 3) should be seen as a window
in the region. Investing in these adolescents of opportunity for accelerated economic
matter: the demographic growth, which may – or may not – be realised.
and youth and the children who will reach
this age by 2030, and expanding their dividend The window of economic opportunity
opportunities for meaningful learning, social closes when increasing longevity leads to
engagement and work could potentially reap rapid growth of the elderly population and
A demographic dividend is the element of a persistently low fertility rate results in a

7
UNICEF, 2017. Adolescent and Youth Engagement Strategy Framework.
8
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Evidence Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA (summary report).
9
UNDESA Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2017 update (medium variant).
10
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Evidence Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA (summary report).
11
UNDP, 2016. Arab Human Development Report 2016: Youth and the prospects for human development in a changing reality.
12
ILO Stat, 2017.
13
World Bank, 2017. Harmonized List of Fragile Situations. http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized-list-of-fragile-situations.
14
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Evidence Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA (summary report).
10 INTRODUCTION

working age population that decreases as a to actual demographic developments which

proportion of the whole population. diverge from them. This is particularly
relevant for policies relating to fertility or
Though a favourable age structure is urbanisation. The rising frequency and
essential, additional prerequisites for reaping intensity of conflicts in the region may
a demographic dividend include: political also reverse development-related gains
and social stability; inclusive and equitable and affect mortality, fertility and migration
economic and social policies (ensuring rates to varying degrees.
labour market entrants are healthy, well-
nourished and well-equipped in terms of Projections covering shorter periods of time
skills and competencies) and expanded – the next 15 to 35 years – for example,
employment opportunities. are acknowledged as being fairly accurate
depictions of the future situation, though
projections for smaller populations, young
What we know so far: populations and those experiencing large-
data sources and reliability scale and protracted crisis tend to have a
larger margin of uncertainty.
The demographic projections and indicators
included in this report are mainly based on Nevertheless, taking account of the
the median variants of fertility projected demographic challenges and opportunities
by the United Nations Population Division anticipated over the next few decades is
(UNPD) in its 2017 revision of World crucial for designing effective regional and
Population Prospects.15 These projections country-level interventions aimed at realising
take into account trends in fertility, mortality the rights and potential of children and
and migration, as well as the current age adolescents and youth and thus contributing
structure of a population. to inclusive and sustainable development in
MENA.
It is important to note that policy changes
may influence the underlying assumptions
of these projections to some extent, leading

Three young girls laughing

at a UNICEF-supported
center in Sahab, Jordan.
15
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2017. World
© UNICEF/UN0250044/Rich Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision.
 INTRODUCTION 11

FIG. 1 Number of children (0-17 years), adolescents (10-19 years), and youth (15-24 years) by country, 2015, 2030 and 2050 (in millions)

250 120 120

100 100
200

150
in millions

in millions

in millions
100

50

0
2015 2030 2050 2015 2030 2050 2015 2030 2050
Number of children (0-17 years old) by country Number of adolescents (10-19 years old) by country Number of youth (15-24 years old) by country
12 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Chapter 1
DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS FOR MENA

An adolescent boy smiles

while his photo is being
taken at his house in
Sahab, Jordan.

© UNICEF/UN0249983/Rich
M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 13
14 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

1. DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS FOR MENA

MENA is a diverse region, including 20 countries and territories from North Africa and the Middle East (as defined by UNICEF). Table 1 below shows these 20
countries and their total population in 2018. These countries vary widely, in terms of Gross National Income (GNI), demographic trends and dynamics. While
the majority of the countries are still in a phase of medium to high fertility and population growth, others are already at an advanced stage of demographic
transition (See Box 1 next page), with low to very low fertility rates. The report highlights these important demographic differences and provides a brief analysis
of associated policy issues.

TABLE 1 MENA countries and their population (in thousands) in 2018

2018
Algeria 42,008
Bahrain 1,567
Djibouti 971
Egypt 99,376
Iran 82,012
Iraq 39,340
Jordan 9,904
Kuwait 4,197
Lebanon 6,094
Libya 6,471
Morocco 36,192
Oman 4,830
State of Palestine 5,053
Qatar 2,695
Saudi Arabia 33,554
Sudan 41,512
Syria 18,284
Tunisia 11,659
UAE 9,542
Yemen 28,915 Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
Total 484,175 Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision (UN
WPP), United Nations, New York, 2017.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 15

Box 1: DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION16

During demographic transition, the population moves from one demographic structure to another. Typically, following the initial stage, four
stages are involved in the demographic transition process that describes how shifts in fertility and mortality levels change the age structure
of a population from many children and few elderly to few children and many elderly. In the transitional period, countries can experience
unprecedented levels of population growth.

Stage 1: Pre-dividend Stage 2: Early-dividend Stage 3: Mid-dividend Stage 4: Late-dividend Stage 5: Post-dividend
Birth Rate High High Rapid fall Low Very low
Death Rate High Rapid fall Slow fall Low Low
Population Growth Slow Rapid increase Slower increase Slow increase Slow decrease

Birth Rate
Demographic transition

Death Rate

Demographic
Dividend: A large labour
force with few dependent
children leading to accel-
erated economic growth

Population Growth
Demographic dividend

Many children, few elderly Many children per worker Fewer children per worker Few children, many elderly Fewer people
The 5 stages (shown in the graph above) can be summarised as follows:
Fertility and mortality Mortality starts to Fertility also starts to Fertility and mortality are Fertility levels fall below
are high (population decline, especially decline (population both low (low population replacement levels
increases very slowly) among children and growth slows down) growth) (population will decline
young adults (population over the long term).
increases) Also called the second
demographic transition.
16
UNICEF Division of Data, Research and Policy, 2014. Generation 2030 Africa.
16 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Total population17 be added over the following 15 years until another. Over the fifteen years between 2015
2030, requiring a substantial scale-up of and 2030 the populations of Iraq, Bahrain and
Despite slowing growth rates, MENA’s resources and a shift in investment priorities the State of Palestine have been projected to
population will double in size during the first to implement the sustainable development grow by almost 50 per cent. Other countries,
half of the twenty-first century agenda and fulfil the pledge of leaving no such as Sudan, Syria and Oman are expected
one behind. to see an increase of their population by
approximately 40 per cent – although the
In 2000, the MENA region comprised 338 Despite decreasing population growth rates current crisis situation in the region may
million inhabitants, accounting for 5.5 in the region, all MENA countries – with the change this picture in an unpredictable way.
per cent of the world’s population. The exception of Lebanon – will see a substantial Lebanon, on the other hand, is the only
region experienced an average population increase of their population in the coming country expected to experience a shrinking
growth of 2.0 per cent per year, well above decades population, decreasing by around 8 per cent
the world`s annual average of 1.3 per cent. by 2030. Other countries with relatively
MENA’s population is currently growing at minor population growth of less than 20 per
a rate of around 1.7 per cent per year. This Rapid population growth across the region cent are Iran, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya.
growth is projected to slow down to 1.3 per is driven mostly by natural increase (births
cent per year around 2030, reaching 0.8 per outnumbering deaths). Positive net migration By 2050, half of the countries in MENA will
cent per year by mid-century. (immigration exceeding emigration) is a see an increase in population of at least 50 per
minor factor and only relevant in a few cent from their 2015 level, with Iraq, Sudan,
Despite slowing growth rates, the region’s countries. All MENA countries – with the and the State of Palestine experiencing
population is expected to more than double exception of Lebanon - will see increases in approximately a doubling of their population
in size during the first half of the twenty- their total population during the first half of in the 30 years between 2015 and 2050.
first century, from 338 million in 2000 to the century (See Figure 2 on next page).
724 million in 2050. About 121 million Population in all MENA countries – with the
people were added between 2000 and 2015 The rate at which the population grows exception of Lebanon - will increase during
and about the same number of people will varies considerably from one country to the first half of the century

MENA’s population
and is currently
growing Lebanon
1.7 per cent
per year 338 m X2 is the only country
In 2000 724 m expected to experience
in 2000 a shrinking population
accounted for 5.5 per cent in 2050
of the world’s population
Will double in size decreasing by 8 per cent
during the first half of the 21st century by 2030

17
All analysis in this section is based on: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2017. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. Projections are using the medium fertility variant.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 17

FIG. 2 Changes in total population from 2015 to 2030 and 2050

Population 2050 compared to 2015

220 %
Population 2030 compared to 2015
200 %

180 %
Source: UNICEF analysis based on United
Nations, Department of Economic and
160 %
Social Affairs, Population Division, World
Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision
140 % (UN WPP), United Nations, New York, 2017.
Note: Countries are ranked from highest
120 % to lowest increase in population size from
2015 to 2050

2015=100 %

80 %
State of Palestine

Sudan

Syria

Yemen

Bahrain

Egypt

Oman

Jordan

Qatar

Algeria

UAE

Kuwait

Saudi Arabia

Djibouti

Morocco

Libya

Tunisia

Lebanon
Iran
Iraq

The largest population increase in absolute terms (see Table 2) will be seen in Egypt, with 26 million people between 2015 and 2030 (60 million by
2050), followed by Iraq with 17 million (45 million by 2050) and Sudan with 16 million (42 million by 2050). Together, these three countries alone
will contribute almost 50 per cent of the total population growth by 2030 and 2050. Overall, countries that are fragile or in conflict and poorer
countries tend to have faster growing populations. The population of Lebanon, by contrast, will decrease by 480,000 by 2030, with hardly any
more changes between 2030 and 2050.

The largest population increase since 2015 will be seen in

Egypt Iraq Sudan The population of

60 m 45 m 42 m Lebanon
by 2050 by 2050 by 2050 will decrease by 480,000
by 2030
18 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

TABLE 2 Total population in absolute terms 2000-2050 by country (thousands)

2000 2015 2018 2030 2050

Algeria 31,184 39,872 42,008 48,822 57,437
Bahrain 665 1,372 1,567 2,013 2,327
Djibouti 718 927 971 1,133 1,308
Egypt 69,906 93,778 99,376 119,746 153,433
Iran 66,132 79,360 82,012 88,863 93,553
Iraq 23,565 36,116 39,340 53,298 81,490
Jordan 5,103 9,159 9,904 11,122 14,188
Kuwait 2,051 3,936 4,197 4,874 5,644
Lebanon 3,235 5,851 6,094 5,369 5,412
Libya 5,356 6,235 6,471 7,342 8,124
Morocco 28,850 34,803 36,192 40,874 45,660
Oman 2,268 4,200 4,830 5,897 6,757
State of Palestine 3,223 4,663 5,053 6,739 9,704
Qatar 592 2,482 2,695 3,232 3,773
Saudi Arabia 20,764 31,557 33,554 39,480 45,056
Sudan 27,251 38,648 41,512 54,842 80,386
Syria 16,411 18,735 18,284 26,608 34,021
Tunisia 9,699 11,274 11,659 12,842 13,884
UAE 3,155 9,154 9,542 11,055 13,164
Yemen 17,875 26,916 28,915 36,815 48,304
Total 338,002 459,038 484,175 580,966 723,624
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 19

Women of reproductive age number of births in the region in 2050 in the region as a whole and to or below
compared to 2000, even though the average replacement level in six countries: Bahrain
and fertility18 number of births per woman is declining. (2.1 children per woman), Kuwait (2.0), Qatar
(1.9), UAE (1.8), Lebanon (1.7) and Iran (1.7).
Despite falling fertility rates, the number of Overall, the region will see over half a billion
births in the region will remain relatively births during the first half of the century. The The decreasing trend in fertility will continue
stable until 2050 because of the growing annual number of births was 9 million in 2000; for all countries over the next decades. By
number of women of reproductive age it reached 11 million in 2015 and is expected to 2030, fertility in three more countries –
remain relatively stable until 2050. Libya, Tunisia and Oman – is expected to
Once among the highest in the world, MENA’s have fallen below replacement level and
fertility rate has been declining for decades, By 2030, half of the MENA countries will have only three countries will have fertility levels
largely because of delayed marriages and total fertility rates at or below replacement of more than 3 children per woman (but
the use of contraception. However, a history level below 4). Yemen, which with 6.3 children
of high fertility has resulted in a growing per woman had the highest fertility rate in
number of women of reproductive age (15- Both the onset and pace of fertility decline is the region in 2000, is expected to halve this
49 years). This number (for the region as projected to vary widely across the region (see rate to 2.9 by 2030.
a whole) increased from 84 million in 2000 Figure 3). In 2000, fertility in the MENA region
to 119 million in 2015, and is projected to averaged around 3.3 children per woman and By 2050, 14 of the 20 countries in the region
increase further, reaching 147 million in 2030 none of the countries had fertility rates below (70 per cent) are expected to have fertility
and 169 million in 2050. the replacement level of 2.1 children per rates below replacement level. The highest
woman (though Tunisia, Iran and Lebanon fertility rates are projected for Sudan and
This demographic process, known as were close). By 2015 however, fertility had Iraq (3.0 children per woman in each).
population momentum, will lead to a larger fallen to just below three children per woman

The region will see over By 2050, fertility will be below

MENA’s
replacement level of 2.1 children
fertility rate
has been
500,000,000 3.0
in most countries, while still
declining, largely births during the first half of the births per woman in Iraq
because of century. and Sudan
Delayed The use of
marriages contraception

18
All analysis in this section is based on: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2017. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. Projections are using the medium fertility variant.
20 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Mortality (including child FIG. 3 Total fertility rate in MENA region by country, 2015, FIG. 4 Estimated under-five mortality rates in MENA
2030 and 2050 region by country, 1990 and 2015
mortality) and life expectancy
The number of under-five deaths in the
region will continue to decline over the
coming decades
State of Palestine

Life expectancy at birth in the MENA region

has risen sharply since the 1950s and is
projected to rise further over the coming
decades, though at a slower rate. The gains
observed in life expectancy are encouraging
and are likely in large part the result of
effective child survival interventions.

Between 1990 and 2015, national under-five

mortality rates19 in the region decreased by
between just under 50 per cent in Algeria,
Djibouti, and Iraq to approximately 75 per
cent in Tunisia, Lebanon, Egypt, Iran, and
Oman, and are currently (as of 2016) ranging
from around 65 deaths per 1,000 live births
in Sudan and Djibouti to under 10 deaths in
Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, UAE and Bahrain
(See Figure 4).
Children per woman Deaths per 1,000 live births
In 2015, there were approximately 330,000
under-five deaths in the region, down
from 440,000 fifteen years earlier (2000). If Source: UNICEF analysis based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Source: United Nations Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UN IGME), Levels
Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision (UN WPP), United Nations, and Trends in Child Mortality: Report 2017, Estimates developed by the UN Inter-agency Group
the current trend of mortality reduction New York, 2017. for Child Mortality Estimation, United Nations Children’s Fund, New York, 2017.
continues, the annual number of under-five Note: Countries are ranked from highest to lowest total fertility in 2015. Note: Countries are ranked from highest to lowest U5MR in 2015.

deaths will drop further, to 210,000 by 2030

and to 120,000 by 2050. However, even under
this scenario of continuing decline, a total of
7.4 million children in the region are likely
to die before reaching their fifth birthday
between 2015 and the middle of the century.

19
United Nations Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UN IGME), 2017. Levels and Trends in Child Mortality: Report 2017. Estimates developed by the UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation, United Nations Children’s Fund, New York, 2017.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 21

By 2050, life expectancy at birth will still be FIG. 5 Estimated and projected life expectancy at birth in MENA region by country, 2015, 2030 and 2050
around 15 years longer in Lebanon (at 85,
the highest in the region) than in Djibouti (at
approximately 70, the lowest in the region) Lebanon 79.4

Qatar 78

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, UAE 77.1

mortality rates differed considerably Oman 76.8
across the region. All MENA countries Bahrain 76.8
saw improvements in child survival and
Algeria 75.9
life expectancy between 2000 and 2015,
except for Syria where the situation has Iran 75.7
deteriorated dramatically in the last few Morocco 75.6
years due to the ongoing conflict. Life Tunisia 75.5
expectancy in Syria decreased by more
Kuwait 74.6
than 4 years between 2006 (74.4 years) and
2014 (69.8 years). Saudi Arabia 74.4

Jordan 74.2
The future pace of increase in life expectancy State of Palestine 73.3
is likely to vary between countries, with
Libya 71.8
strong disparities being expected to persist
until mid-century (See Figure 5). The best Egypt 71.3
scenario is projected for Lebanon, where Syria 69.9
life expectancy at birth is expected to reach Iraq 69.7
85 years by 2050, followed by Oman, Qatar,
Yemen 64.7
Morocco, UAE, Algeria, Iran, Tunisia, and
Bahrain, all of which have projected life Sudan 64.3
expectancies of more than 80 years. Even Djibouti 62.3
Syria would join this group, if it were to follow
0 20 40 60 80
pre-conflict trends.20 At the other end of the
spectrum, the projected life expectancy at Years
birth in 2050 will be only around 70 years in
2015 2030 2050
Djibouti, Yemen and Sudan.
Source:UNICEF analysis based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects:
The 2017 Revision (UN WPP), United Nations, New York, 2017.
Note: Countries are ranked from highest to lowest life expectancy in 2015.

20
Note that population projections are a complex process, based mostly on census and administrative data, relying on general assumptions regarding different demographic components (fertility, mortality and international migration) and heavily influenced by long-term trends. Past mortality crises due to conflict or natural
disasters are considered in the estimation process and factored into the projections, but no assumptions regarding the effect of future crises is made. For more detailed information on estimation and projection methodology see: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2017). World
Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Methodology of the United Nations Population Estimates and Projections, Working Paper No. ESA/P/WP. 250. United Nations, New York.
22 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Abdulkadir blows bubbles

as he goes blue for World
Children’s Day in his local
UNICEF-supported Makani
centre in Mafraq, Jordan.
Children and youth
© UNICEF/UN0253286/Herwig The overall proportion of children and youth
(0-24 years) in the population is projected to
continue to fall in all countries in the region
and by 2050 will be well below 50 per cent
(with the exception of Iraq and Sudan)

At the beginning of the century, children

and adolescents and youth (0-24 years)
accounted for 50 per cent or more of the
population in all MENA countries except
Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Lebanon,
where they accounted for more than 40
per cent (see Figure 6). Their share of the
population will decline in all countries
during the first half of the century, albeit at
different rates.

In 2050, the proportion of children and

adolescents and youth in the population is
projected to be as low as 21 per cent for Qatar
and UAE, and below 25 per cent in Bahrain
and Iran. By contrast, the highest share of
children and adolescents and youth by 2050 is
projected to be in Iraq and Sudan, at around
50 per cent, followed by the State of Palestine,
Yemen and Egypt, where their share is
expected to remain above 40 per cent.

In 2050, children and youth

24 years and younger will account for

21 per cent of the compared to 50 per cent

population of the population
in Qatar and UAE in Iraq and Sudan
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 23

FIG. 6 Percentage of total population represented by children, adolescents and youth (0-24 years), by country 2000-2050

Pre-dividend Early-dividend

Early-dividend Late-dividend

Source: UNICEF analysis based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision (UN WPP), United Nations, New York, 2017.

The number of youth will continue to grow In 2000, MENA’s youth (15-24 years) were youth between 15 and 24 will be added to
during the first half of the century in 12 out 72 million in total. Due to falling fertility, the population.
of 20 MENA countries, but falling fertility their numbers will grow more slowly
will lead to a decreasing share of the overall compared to the rest of the population. Almost all countries in MENA will see an
population As of 2015, around 80 million youth were increase of their youth population during
living in the region, with their total number the years to 2030 (see Figure 7 on next
projected to reach 100 million in 2030 page). The youth population of both Kuwait
The first half of the century will be marked by and 104 million in 2050. This means that and Iraq will increase by almost 50 per cent
major changes in population age structure. between 2015 and 2030 around 24 million within only fifteen years, for example, adding
24 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

200,000 youth in Kuwait and over 3.2 million cent, Djibouti and Qatar, both countries with
in Iraq. In Egypt, the youth population will population of less than 6 million, whose
increase by 33 per cent or 5.5 million. Other youth populations will hardly change. Between 2015 and 2030
countries that will see the addition of large
numbers of youth up to 2030 are Sudan (3.1 Though the growth in youth population 24m
million, a 39 per cent increase), Algeria (1.8 is projected to slow down towards mid- youth
million, a 27 per cent increase), Yemen (1.5 century, five countries will see an increase
million, a 25 per cent increase) and Syria (1.4 in youth population of 40 per cent or higher + will be added to the population
million, a 37 per cent increase).21 compared to the current level, including Iraq,
for example, where the number of youth
The exceptions are Lebanon, whose youth between 15 and 24 years will almost double.
population is expected to drop by 50 per

FIG. 7 Changes in youth population (15-24 years) from 2015 to 2030 and 2050

220%
Population 2050 compared to 2015
200% Population 2030 compared to 2015

180%
Source: UNICEF analysis based on United
160% Nations, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, Population Division, World Population
Prospects: The 2017 Revision (UN WPP), United
140%
Nations, New York, 2017.
Note: Countries are ranked from highest to
120% lowest relative change between 2015 and 2030.

2015=100%

80%

60%
Sudan

State of Palestine

Egypt

Kuwait

Yemen

Bahrain

Syria

UAE

Jordan

Oman

Algeria

Saudi Arabia

Djibouti

Qatar

Morocco

Libya

Tunisia

Lebanon
Iran
Iraq

21
The protracted violent crises in Syria and Yemen may lead to an outcome that differs from this projection. See footnote 19 (page 20) for more details on how projections incorporate crises.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 25

2030 and 527 million in 2050, representing an which are projected to be over 90 per cent
increase of 38 per cent between each period. urban in 2050. Conversely, approximately
The decreasing share of the younger
population groups, combined with This rate of urban population growth is half of Sudan’s population will still live in
increasing numbers of the youth faster in relative terms than that of the total rural areas, followed by Yemen and Egypt,
population, presents a historic population in the MENA region, which is which are projected to remain 43 and 44 per
opportunity to invest in human capital projected to increase by 36 per cent, 27 per cent rural respectively by 2050.
by improving access to education, cent and 25 per cent over the same periods.
health and protection and enhancing the
prospects for productive employment.
Overcrowding is likely to cause serious Population of
As elaborated below, MENA countries
should actively pursue this opportunity challenges, including scarce water supply, Qatar and Kuwait
to reap the demographic dividend, both land degradation and air pollution. However, will be nearly 100 per cent urban
for the intrinsic value of realising the urbanisation can also contribute to
rights of children, adolescents and youth in 2050
and as an investment in future economic development, as cities offer economies of
growth and stability. scale, enabling the delivery of social services
at much lower cost than would be required to
reach the same number of people dispersed
over rural areas.
Almost
Density and urbanisation In 2000, urbanisation was particularly advanced
in Kuwait and Qatar. All MENA countries 50% 43% 44%
Population density will more than double
were already predominately urban, with
during the first half of the century
the exception of Egypt, Sudan and Yemen. of Yemen’s
of Sudan’s of Egypt’s
Between 2000 and 2015, countries saw varying population population population
In 2000, the MENA region had an average paces of increase in the percentage of their
population density of 26 persons per square population residing in cities. Urbanisation
kilometre. Population density is projected trends will continue over the coming decades,
to more than double by 2050, reaching an with differences between countries persisting Will still
average of 56 persons per square kilometre.22 up to 2050 and beyond. live in rural areas
According to the 2018 Revision of the United
Nations World Urbanisation Prospects,23 With urban dwellers accounting for nearly
the total number of urban dwellers in the 100 per cent of the population, Kuwait
region was 188 million in 2000. This number and Qatar will remain the most urbanised
increased by 49 per cent to 281 million by countries in the region, followed by Jordan,
2015 and is projected to reach 381 million in Oman, Lebanon, Bahrain, and UAE, all of

22
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2017. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision - Special Aggregates, DVD Edition.
23
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2018. World Urbanisation Prospects: The 2018 Revision. United Nations, New York.
26 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Migration and forced experience conflict-induced displacement and MENA is the world’s most water scarce region,
work- and climate-related migration in the near due to climate change and other factors.
displacement future. Enabling access to social services, social Climate-induced migration will therefore be
protection and decent work for migrants and a future concern in the MENA region, as the
The region is likely to continue to see conflict- forcibly displaced persons is an integral part of projected increase in population will strain
induced displacements as well as work and sustainable development and can help promote an already scarce resource.29 Six per cent
climate-related migration in the near future regional stability. of the world’s population (500 million) live
in the region, with access to only 2 per cent
Conflict and fragility continue to undermine At the regional level, international migration of the world’s renewable fresh water.30 The
human rights and social and economic is a much smaller component of population region includes 12 of the world’s 43 most
progress in a number of MENA countries. change than births and deaths. However, water scarce countries.
Eight of the 20 MENA countries were in some MENA countries the impact of
classified by the World Bank as being fragile migration on population size and structure If current conditions persist, two-thirds
or conflict-affected contexts in 2018,24 and is substantial and will continue to be so in of MENA countries could have less than
two additional countries (Iran and Jordan) the coming years. 200 cubic metres of renewable water
are hosting significant numbers of refugees resources per person per year (a situation
from neighbouring countries. In the UAE, for example, international of absolute water scarcity) by 2050. The
migrants accounted for roughly 80 per cent of situation is compounded by the fact that
According to the 2017 Revision of the United residents in 2000 and 88 per cent in 2017. The over 60 per cent of MENA’s water resources
Nations Trends in International Migrant other oil-producing Gulf countries – Qatar, are generated outside the region. This is
Stock,25 the number of international migrants Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Oman – currently giving rise to state-induced water
in the MENA region surged from roughly also received proportionally large numbers scarcity, whereby upstream states constrict
18 million in 2000 to 41 million in 2017. The of economic migrants, predominantly men, water flows to downstream riparian states.
region is also hosting an estimated almost 10 at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
million refugees.26 In addition, over 14 million In 2017, between 37 and 76 per cent of the
people in MENA were internally displaced as resident populations in these countries The impact of economic migrants
a result of conflict in 2017; more than in any consisted of people born abroad. The on population size and structure is
other region of the world.27 large proportion of migrants in Jordan and significant in the oil-producing Gulf
Lebanon, accounting for 33 and 32 per cent countries, as is the impact of refugees
Although population movements are the most of their resident populations respectively in in Jordan, Iran, Lebanon and Sudan.
difficult demographic processes to predict, 2017, are mainly Palestinian refugees and
it is likely that the region will continue to refugees from Syria and Iraq.28

24
Djibouti, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, the State of Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Yemen. Fragile and conflicted-affected States refer to the World Bank ‘Harmonised List of Fragile Situations FY19’. Fragile Situations have: either (a) a harmonised average country. Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) country rating of 3. 2 or less, or (b)
the presence of a UN and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the past three years. For further details of this classification please see: http://pubdocs. worldbank.org/en/892921532529834051/FCSList-FY19-Final.pdf
25
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2017. Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2017 Revisions.
26
This number includes 4. 5 million international refugees under UNHCR mandate (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017, UNHCR, Geneva, 2018) and 5.3 million Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East). UNRWA, 2018, Annual Operational Report 2017.
27
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2018. Global Report on Internal Displacement 2018.
28
UNICEF analysis based on: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2017. Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2017 Revisions; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2017; and World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision - Special
Aggregates, DVD Edition.
29
Foresight, 2011. Migration and Global Environmental Change in: World Bank (2014) Climate Change and Migration in the MENA region.
30
World Resources Institute, 2015. World Resources Report: Creating a Sustainable Food Future.
M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 27

A young girl solves a math

equation on blackboard at
Umbatah Kadulgi, South
Kordofan State, Sudan

© UNICEF/UN0211119/Noorani
28 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Chapter 2
THE PROSPECT OF A DEMOGRAPHIC
DIVIDEND IN MENA

Young school children

stand outside their primary
school in the village of
Tamarout, High Atlas
Mountains, Morocco.

© UNICEF/UN0210355/Noorani
M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 29
30 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

2. THE PROSPECT OF A DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND IN MENA

The demographic dividend: There are no distinct criteria defining the beginning and end of the window, but it begins to open
when the proportion of working age population begins to increase and reduction in the fertility
a window of opportunity31 rate progresses far enough to reduce the dependent child population. The window begins to
close when the share of the working age population starts to decrease again, due to continued
A demographic dividend is catalysed by low fertility and an increasing proportion of the elderly in the population.
the demographic transition of a country’s
population (see Box 1: Demographic This section uses a typology which categorises countries according to their potential for reaping
transition in Chapter 2 above). As mortality a demographic dividend based on two demographic indicators: the share of the working age
and fertility rates decline, the population’s population and fertility levels; see Box 2 below.
age structure changes. With fewer births
each year, a country’s young, dependent
population grows smaller in relation to the
working age population. Box 2:
DIVIDEND-RELATED COUNTRY CATEGORISATIONS AND EXAMPLES FROM MENA33
This is the period when the dividend can
Pre-dividend countries
materialise: the increasing share of working
Countries whose share of working age population will increase between 2015 and 2030 have an
age population compared to other age opportunity to reap a demographic dividend. Among them, those that had comparatively high
groups – for example, children and the total fertility (four or more births per woman) in 2015, are classified as ‘pre-dividend’ countries,
elderly – leaves each working age person since the window of the opportunity for accelerated economic growth has not yet opened, due
with fewer dependents to support, and thus to ongoing rapid population growth resulting in a high child dependency ratio. Only four MENA
countries - Iraq, Sudan, Yemen and the State of Palestine - are in this phase.
more disposable income, which can in turn
spur greater consumption, production and Early-dividend countries
investment, thereby accelerating growth and Countries showing a relative increase in the working age population and a total fertility of less
shared wealth. The window of opportunity than four births per woman in 2015 are further along the path toward reduced fertility, and thus
for a demographic dividend is closely linked experiencing lower child dependency ratios and a higher proportion of working age population.
These countries are classified as ‘early-dividend’ countries and 50 per cent of MENA countries
with such demographic transitions.
(10 of them) fall into this category: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Oman,
Saudi Arabia and Syria.
The prerequisites for ensuring that the Late-dividend countries
window of opportunity for accelerated Countries with a declining share of working age population between 2015 and 2030 face a
economic growth offered by a closing window for their first demographic dividend. Countries that in 1985 – roughly one
demographic dividend is realised, all of generation ago – had a total fertility rate above replacement level are classified as ‘late-dividend’
which will be explored further in Chapter countries. Most late-dividend countries have a large share of working age population and are
4, include:32 in a position to continue harvesting the benefits of the first demographic dividend, but will
→ Political and social stability face fundamental changes in coming years. Six MENA countries – Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco,
→ Inclusive and equitable economic and Tunisia, Qatar and UAE – are at this stage.
social policies
→ Expanded employment opportunities, Post-dividend countries
for example, the ability of the ‘Post-dividend’ countries have experienced below-replacement level fertility since 1985, and will
economy to absorb new entrants into face a rapidly increasing elderly population, further decreasing the already diminishing share of
the labour market working age population. No MENA countries have such characteristics yet.

31
This section is adapted from the Generation 2030: Africa 2. 0 Report (UNICEF 2017), which includes the demographic projections on which the dividend-related categorisations of MENA countries given here are based.
32
See also: UNFPA, 2016. Shaping the Future: How Changing Demographics Can Power Human Development; World Bank Group. 2016. Global Monitoring Report 2015/2016: Development Goals in an Era of Demographic Change. Washington, DC: World Bank.
33
This categorisation follows the typology developed by the World Bank Group in their Global Monitoring Report 2015/2016 (World Bank Group. 2016. Global Monitoring Report 2015/2016: Development Goals in an Era of Demographic Change. Washington, DC: World Bank). Differences to the World Bank’s
classification come from slight differences in the adaptation of the criteria: this analysis here uses the total fertility rate for the exact years 2015 and 1985, respectively, while the World Bank used the period values 2015-2020 and 1985-1990.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 31

Working age and This temporary age structure can boost

economic growth, as long as appropriate
dependent populations policies allow for both continued investment
in the human capital of children, adolescents
The region as a whole has just entered a and youth (ensuring they are healthy, well-
period of exceptionally low dependency nourished and well-educated) and productive
ratios. This economically beneficial situation absorption of the growing working age
will last until around mid-century, after population by the labour market, reinforcing
which the dependency ratio will rise again the positive cycle of advancing health,
as a consequence of the ageing of the education and employment opportunities.
population. Lower dependency ratios can also facilitate
progress towards gender equity, as one
obstacle to female labour force participation
In the coming decades, an unprecedentedly – the role of women and girls in the care
large proportion of MENA’s population will economy – is much reduced.
move into their most productive years,
opening up the potential for a demographic The dependency ratio will rise again in the
dividend as described above. The most second half of the century, due to a rapidly
favourable period for the region as a whole growing share of elderly in the population, and
will be between now and 2040, when the the window of opportunity for benefitting from
dependency ratio will drop as low as 50 the demographic dividend will begin to close.
dependents (children under 15 years and
older people aged 65 and over) for every
100 persons of working age (15-64 years);
see Figure 8 and Annex 3, Figure B1 for A working age population that is
composition of total dependency ratio proportionately large compared to
(child and old-age) for each country in the dependent population will open
Middle East and North Africa, 1950-2100.34 up the potential for a demographic
dividend.
The most favourable period
for the region will be between
now and 2040 when the
dependency ratio is
50 dependents
A young girl child at
for every 100 persons an Early Education
of working age community center
of PK2, Ecole des
Tout-Petits, Djibouti.

© UNICEF/UN0198955/
Noorani
34
UNDESA Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2017 update (medium variant).
32 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

FIG. 8 Composition of the total dependency ratio (child Rapid growth of the proportion of the elderly population will increase the median age in the
dependency ratio and old-age dependency ratio) for the MENA region by almost three months per year, from 26 years in 2015 to 34 years in 2050
region, 1950-2100

All MENA countries are experiencing a shift from a younger to an older population
age structure (see Figure 9 below) and will have the opportunity of benefitting from a
demographic dividend, as long as appropriate policies are in place. However, this window
100
2018 2050 of opportunity differs from one country to another, depending on the pace of their fertility
0−14 years decline and increase in life expectancy (see Figure 10 on next page).
2030
65+ years
80 FIG. 9 Population of MENA by age and sex, 2015 (darker) and 2050 (lighter)

100+
Dependency ratio

95–99 2015 2050

60 90–94 Female
85–89
Male
80–84
75–79

40 70–74
65–69
60–64
55–59
50–54
20 45–49
40–44
35–39
30–34
0 25–29
20–24
1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100 15–19
10–14
5–9
Source: UNICEF analysis based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
0–4
Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision (UN WPP), United Nations,
New York, 2017. 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25
Note: Total dependency refers to the number of dependents (children under 15 years and older persons
aged 65 and over) for 100 persons of working-age (15-64 years).
Population (in millions)

Source: UNICEF analysis based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision (UN WPP), United Nations,
New York, 2017.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 33

FIG. 10 Countries in the Middle East and North Africa by demographic type35 (1990-2085) Figure 10 displays countries in MENA by
demographic type in the years 1990 to
Countries sorted from top to bottom by type (from post- to pre-dividend) and Total Fertility Rate
2085. Countries are categorised based on
(increasing) in 2018
the methodology developed by the World
Bank Group in their Global Monitoring
Report 2015/201636 but adapted to cover a
larger period. The demographic type of
a country is determined by two factors:
1) whether the working age population
is growing or shrinking; and 2) the total
fertility rate. As both can be projected into
the future, countries’ progression through a
demographic types can be predicted. Note,
this representation is smoothed for short-
term reversals and should be taken only
as an approximate but nevertheless useful
indication for the window of opportunity for
a demographic dividend.

In 2015, the median age of the region’s

population was 26 years. Four countries
had a median age of under 20 years: Sudan
(18.9 years), Yemen (19.2 years), the State of
Palestine and Iraq (both 19.4 years). Although
all countries will see some population ageing,
these four countries will still be relatively
youthful in 2050, with median ages between
25 and 29 years. In contrast, more than half
of the population in Tunisia, Bahrain, Qatar,
Kuwait, and the UAE was already over 30
years by 2015. By 2050, the median age of
their population will be approximately 40
years.37 See Figure 11 for country examples
Source: UNICEF analysis based on World Bank 2016 (GMR 2015/2016) and United Nations (UNPD WPP 2017) and Annex 3, Figure B2 for graphs for each
country in Middle East and North Africa,
1950-2050.38

35
For more details on the demographic typology see Box 2 in this report.
36
World Bank Group. 2016. Global Monitoring Report 2015/2016: Development Goals in an Era of Demographic Change. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
37
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2017. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision.
38
UNDESA Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2017 update (medium variant).
34 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

FIG. 11 Population by age and sex for selected countries in MENA in different demographic stages, 2015 (darker) and 2050 (lighter)

Sudan, 2015 and 2050 (pre-dividend) Jordan, 2015 and 2050 (early-dividend)

100+ 100+
95-99 95-99
90-94 2015 2050 90-94 2015 2050
85-89 85-89
Female Female
80-84 80-84
75-79 Male 75-79 Male
70-74 70-74
65-69 65-69
60-64 60-64
55-59 55-59
50-54 50-54
45-49 45-49
40-44 40-44
35-39 35-39
30-34 30-34
25-29 25-29
20-24 20-24
15-19 15-19
10-14 10-14
5-9 5-9
0-4 0-4

Libya, 2015 and 2050 (early-dividend) Tunisia, 2015 and 2050 (late-dividend)

100+ 100+
95-99 95-99
90-94 90-94
2015 2050 2015 2050
85-89 85-89
80-84 Female 80-84 Female
75-79 Male 75-79 Male
70-74 70-74
65-69 65-69
60-64 60-64
55-59 55-59
50-54 50-54
45-49 45-49
40-44 40-44
35-39 35-39
30-34 30-34
25-29 25-29
20-24 20-24
15-19 15-19
10-14 10-14
5-9 5-9
0-4 0-4
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 35

Youth and gender

in the labour market
FIG. 12 Annual increase of youth population (15-24 years) in MENA region, 2015-2050
Between now and approximately 2030, the
MENA region will see an increasing number
of youth (15-24 years) added to its population 3.0
each year (see Figure 12)

2.5
2018 will see an increase of approximately
120,000 youth on the previous year, 2021
an increase of approximately 1 million and 2.0

Change of population 15-24 years (millions)

2025 an increase of approximately 2 million
from previous years. The highest annual
increases are projected for 2027 and 2028, 1.5
when the youth population will increase by
2.4 million each year. The number of youth
in MENA will continue to increase until 1.0
2036, though the rate of increase will slow
down after 2028.
0.5
Accommodating this increasing number
of adolescents and youth in the education
systems and integrating them into the 0.0
labour market will present significant
challenges to the countries of the region.
The creation of new jobs – new skilled jobs -0.5
in particular – and the nurture of a skilled
labour force for those jobs therefore need
to be high priorities for decision makers. -1.0
2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2036 2038 2040 2042 2044 2046 2048 2050

Source: UNICEF analysis based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision (UN WPP), United Nations, New York, 2017.
36 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

In all but three of the MENA countries the FIG. 13 Youth labour force participation rate and FIG. 14 Female to male labour force participation ratio and
labour force participation rate of young demographic type by country, 2015 demographic type by country, 2015
women is less than half that of young men

Qatar Late Djibouti Early

Even if adolescents and youth in MENA finish Late Kuwait Late
UAE
higher levels of education, many economies Bahrain
Oman Early Early
in the region are currently unable to provide
UAE Late
enough opportunities for them in the labour Bahrain Early
market. Seventeen of the 20 MENA countries Djibouti Early Tunisia Late
(for example, 85 per cent) have youth (age Yemen Pre Oman Early
15-24) labour force participation rates lower Lebanon Late
Kuwait Late
than the global average of 45 per cent (see
Early Libya Early
Figure 13). Libya
Morocco Late Yemen Pre
In more than half of the countries only 1 in 3 Tunisia Late Sudan Pre
or fewer are actively engaged in the labour Qatar Late
Egypt Early
market; in Jordan it is only 1 in 4 and in Saudi Egypt
Early Early
Arabia only 1 in 5. Iran
Morocco Late
State of Palestine Pre
As explained above, though a favourable age Lebanon Late
Saudi Arabia Early
structure, for example, increasing work age Iran Early
Sudan Pre
population as a proportion of the whole – is
Syria Early Jordan Early
one prerequisite for reaping a demographic
Algeria Early
dividend, it is insufficient if a sizable part Iraq Pre
of that population – youth in general and Algeria Early State of Palestine Pre
women in particular (see Figure 14) – is Jordan Early Iraq Pre
excluded from the work force. Participation World World
Syria Early
Saudi Arabia Early
of these groups in the labour force is essential
if the economic dividend is to be realised. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0. 0 0. 1 0. 2 0. 3 0. 4 0. 5 0. 6 0. 7 0. 8 0. 9

Source: UNICEF analysis based on labour force participation rate by sex and age - ILO modelled estimates, 2015.
For young women the situation is even Note: Demographic type refers to the categorisation of countries as pre-, early-, late- or post-dividend, according to their dependency ratio and fertility rates (see Box 2 above).
worse; in all but three MENA countries
their labour force participation rate
is less than half that of young men
(see Figure 14). Only Kuwait and
Djibouti show a female to male labour
force participation ratio at or above
the global average, with 0.7 and 0. 8
respectively.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 37

The high proportion of youth not in education, FIG. 15 Youth not in education, employment or training (NEET) in selected countries (per cent)
employment or training (NEET) in MENA is
another serious concern

80
Young women in particular are at much
greater risk of being unemployed or NEET 70
than young men. While on average it takes
young men in the region two to three years 60
to transition successfully from school to
work, young women are increasingly not 50
making the transition at all. As shown in
Figure 15, the proportion of youth NEET 40
varies across the region, from 16.1 per cent
in Saudi Arabia to 44.8 per cent in Yemen,
30
for example. The number of young women
NEET is typically close to 30 per cent across 20
the region, but is as high as 69.7 per cent in
Yemen.
10

0
Egypt 2016 State of Palestine 2016 Algeria 2015 Saudi Arabia 2015 Yemen 2014
in Yemen are not
70 per cent in employment, Source: UNICEF analysis based on Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM), ILOSTAT, 2018 Total Male Female
of young education or training.
females
38 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Chapter 3
BARRIERS TO THE DIVIDEND IN MENA AND
I M P L I C AT I O N S F O R S E R V I C E P R O V I S I O N

A group of young boys

play in an old sacred
building in the village
of Tamarout, High Atlas
Mountains, Morocco.

© UNICEF/UN0210242/Noorani
M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 39
40 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

3 . B A R R I E R S T O T H E D I V I D E N D I N M E N A A N D I M P L I C AT I O N S
FOR SERVICE PROVISION
By mid-century, 271 million children and enormous, evidenced by the region accounting Africa, 70 per cent of adolescents who died in
adolescents and youth (0-24 years) will for 57.5 per cent of the world’s refugees, 47 2015 due to collective violence44 were living
live in the MENA region. Along with their per cent of the world’s internally displaced in this region – with mortality rates having
descendants, they have the potential to people and 68.5 per cent of the world’s conflict- risen dramatically since 2011.45 For adolescent
transform the region, breaking longstanding related deaths.39 The region is one of the most boys, Syria and Iraq were among the top ten
cycles of poverty and inequality. But such dangerous places in the world for adolescents most deadly places in 2015, having the world’s
transformation requires investment in and youth to live; with huge numbers highest mortality rates for collective violence
essential services including education, health experiencing violence, often by those entrusted and homicide.46 Gender-based violence
and protection, in addition to addressing with taking care of them. This includes violence is exacerbated by conflict, such as that in
obstacles to civic engagement and the at school, both in the classroom and in the Iraq, where the targeting of young women
transition to employment. playground.40 with rape, enslavement and other forms of
violence was regularly documented by the
This section explores the barriers to meeting Levels of collective violence have grown Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
the pre-conditions for taking advantage of a exponentially in countries affected by Affairs OCHA in 2017.
demographic dividend in MENA, including conflict. The middle and high-middle income
barriers related to political and social stability, countries in the region also have some of Violence at home and school – Adolescent
inclusive and equitable economic and the highest rates of violence in homes and girls and boys report the use of physical and
social policies, and expanded employment schools in the world.41 Conflict results in a psychological violence at home by caregivers
opportunities. Key barriers in each category number of intersecting vulnerabilities and and other relatives. Girls report both feeling
are outlined below, followed by implications violations of rights for many adolescents and trapped at home, for the sake of their
for scaling up service provision in the areas youth in MENA,42 limiting their opportunities reputation, and experiencing physical and
of health, education and school-to-work and undermining social stability. psychological violence perpetrated by male
transition. relatives.47 In 13 of the 16 MENA countries
Some of the most significant conflict and with data available on bullying, more than
Barriers related to political and violence-related barriers to the empowerment 1 in 4 adolescents aged 13 to 15 reported
and meaningful engagement of adolescents being bullied at school at least once in the
social stability and youth in MENA include: past two months (rising to more than 50
per cent in Egypt, the State of Palestine and
Vulnerability to death and injury – Almost Algeria). Corporal punishment by teachers
Conflict
37 per cent of MENA’s youth (15-24 years) in school remains legal in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon,
and violence live in fragile and conflict-affected states.43 Morocco, Qatar and Syria, with only partial
While only about 6 per cent of the world’s prohibitions in the State of Palestine.48
The cost of conflict in the MENA region is adolescents live in the Middle East and North

39
UNDP, 2016. Arab Human Development Report 2016.
40
Ibid.
41
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Evidence Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA (summary report).
42
Ibid.
43
Fragile and conflicted-affected States refer to the World Bank ‘Harmonised List of Fragile Situations FY18’.
44
Collective violence and legal intervention: Injuries to civilians and military personnel caused by war and civil insurrection, or injuries inflicted by the police, other law-enforcement agents and on-duty military personnel in the course of arresting or attempting to arrest lawbreakers, suppressing disturbances,
maintaining order and other legal action. Because deaths due to legal intervention are rare in most countries/regions, this cause of death is frequently referred to as ‘collective violence’ in this report for readability.
45
UNICEF, 2017. A Familiar Face: Violence in the Lives of Children and Adolescents.
46
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Ibid.
47
Save the Children, 2017. Adolescents and conflict in four countries in MENA.
48
UNICEF, 2017. A Familiar Face: Violence in the Lives of Children and Adolescents.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 41

Psychosocial effects of violence – Adolescents increased with the increase in poverty rates
whose lives have been disrupted by war or in the region, as a result of the loss of assets
political conflict face additional challenges to and livelihoods experienced by those affected
mental health and psychosocial well-being. This by the Syrian conflict. Consequently, 70 per
37 per cent
applies to millions of children across the region, cent of participants in a Participatory Action of MENA’s youth
live in fragile and conflict-affected states
from the children of unemployed refugee Research project with young people explained
parents in Lebanon or Jordan, to migrant that they feel increasingly responsible for
children in transit in Sudan or Djibouti, to improving their family’s economic situation.52
those affected by the long-term conflict in Gaza Child labour in Jordan has doubled since 2007, In 13 of the 16 MENA countries
and brutal conflicts in Yemen, Iraq and Syria. now reaching 70,000, while in Lebanon an more than
Witnessing daily acts of violence has left many estimated 180,000 children are engaged in child
adolescents in the region fearing for their own labour, including its worst forms.53 Across the
1 in 4 adolescents
aged 13 to 15 reported being
lives. 78 per cent of adolescents surveyed in a rest of the region, child labour continues to exist
study by Save the Children say they remain in a to varying degrees, ranging from a quarter of bullied at school
at least once in the last two months
state of shock after witnessing and experiencing Yemeni children aged 5-14 being engaged in
violence perpetrated by ISIL.49 The situation is child labour, to 7 per cent in Egypt, 5 per cent in
compounded by a lack of space for adolescents Iraq and 2 per cent in Tunisia.54
and youth to talk about the issues.50 In Jordan, child labor
Access to education and out of school has doubled since 2007, reaching
Negative coping strategies – Recent studies51 children – At the end of 2016, an estimated 15 70,000, while in
have also documented adolescents and million school-aged children (5-14) were out Lebanon an estimated
youth in MENA growing increasingly of school in MENA, as a direct consequence
frustrated, due to ongoing lack of action on of the ongoing armed conflicts in Iraq, Syria 180,000
children are engaged in child labour,
their key concerns. These include: safety and and Yemen, and reversing earlier gains. Of
including its worst forms.
security; lack of quality education; rising the 23.5 million children of lower-secondary
unemployment; a sense of disempowerment; school-age (12-14) in the region, at least 3.5
and lack of opportunities for positive million are out of school, and an additional 2.9
engagement with and contribution to million are at risk of dropping out of school.
decision-making in their communities. As Both the proportion of out of school children
a result of this chronic frustration, many of (15 per cent) and the proportion of children
15 million
them adopt risky coping strategies, including at risk of dropping out of lower-secondary school-aged children
irregular migration, exploitative labour, risky education (13 per cent) are much higher than in out of school in MENA
sexual activity and drug use. primary education (10 per cent and 9 per cent
respectively)55. Access to tertiary education is
Child labour and child recruitment – The significantly more restricted for refugee youth
prevalence of child labour in MENA has greatly in MENA, often due to lack of legal status.56
49
Save the Children. Ibid.
50
No Lost Generation and partners, 2018. No Lost Generation Evidence Brief: Hear the Voices of Syria’s Adolescents and Youth.
51
UNICEF, 2017. Participatory Action Research and No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Evidence Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA (summary report).
52
No Lost Generation and partners, 2018. Ibid.
53
No Lost Generation and partners, 2018. Ibid.
54
International Labour Organization, 2017. World Employment Social Outlook Youth: Trends for Youth 2017.
55
OOSCI, 2017. Out of School Children Initiative – Middle East and North Africa: regional Fact Sheet 2017.
56
No Lost Generation and partners, 2018. No Lost Generation Evidence Brief: Hear the Voices of Syria’s Adolescents and Youth.
42 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Lack of There are limited opportunities for them to Some progress has been made, with 1 million
engagement collaborate and develop a sense of shared adolescents and youth being involved in
responsibility62 and few spaces where they civic engagement programmes.66 Examples
can create and enjoy their own world. of good practice have demonstrated that
Adolescent and youth engagement is defined when adolescent and youth engagement is
as the rights-based inclusion of adolescents As a result, adolescents and youth in MENA facilitated well, it has lasting effects on social
and youth in areas that affect their lives feel disillusioned, with girls and young and political participation throughout the life
and their communities, including dialogue, women, refugees, those with disabilities and cycle.67
decision-making processes and programmes.57 the poor being particularly marginalised and
Adolescent- and youth-led civic engagement underrepresented.63 Disenfranchisement is But adolescent and youth engagement in
interventions are those that support a recurring theme among young Syrians, MENA is still very limited, particularly among
adolescents and youth to make a difference for example, who feel disempowered and girls and young women, and there are few
in their communities.58 Such engagement unable to control their situation or to end the long-term programmes in the region.68
and participation at individual, household and war and violence that surrounds them.64 Sustained efforts on the part of national,
community level can have a positive impact local and international organisations and
on trust, accountability, job opportunities adolescents themselves are required to
and attitudes towards domestic violence.59 Specific barriers to youth engagement create safe spaces for expression.
Engagement with parents, teachers and the in the MENA context include:65
community helps to change the perception Overall, a significant shift is needed towards
→ Patriarchal systems which hinder an approach that pays attention to adolescents’
of adolescents and youth as troublesome to engagement and participation
valuing them as an asset to the community.60 and youth’s voices and encourages their
→ Lack of attention paid to the voices participation, nurturing their potential as
However, civic engagement levels among of youth at a household, community agents of change and society’s most promising
and local governance level asset for peacebuilding, social cohesion and
the adolescents and youth of the region
are the lowest in the world, with only 9 → Inequities and challenges within economic growth.69
per cent of youth across Arab countries school systems
volunteering with a civic organisation in → Intersecting vulnerabilities and
any given month, compared with 14 per violations of rights
cent in the next lowest region (sub-Saharan
Africa). Adolescents’ and youth’s sense of → Lack of safe spaces for expression
citizenship is compromised by violence, and recreation
social norms and other factors.61

57
UNICEF, 2017. Adolescent and Youth Engagement Strategic Framework.
58
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Evidence Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA (summary report).
59
Mercy Corps, 2012. Civic Engagement of Youth in the Middle East and North Africa: An Analysis of Key Drivers and Outcomes.
60
UNICEF EMS data (Jordan, the State of Palestine and Syria).
61
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Adolescent and Youth Engagement in MENA.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
No Lost Generation and partners, 2018. Ibid.
65
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Adolescent and Youth Engagement in MENA.
66
UNICEF mapping of adolescent and youth civic and economic engagement.
67
UNICEF, 2016. Good Practices in Adolescent and Youth Programming, UNICEF, AUB on behalf of the UN Inter Agency Adolescent and Youth Group.
68
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Evidence Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA (summary report).
69
UNICEF, 2018. Child Poverty in the Arab States: Analytical Report of Eleven countries.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 43

Barriers related to inclusive Of those 118 million under-18-year-olds, approximately 53 million (nearly half) experience
moderate poverty, while 29. 3 million (1 in 4 on average) experience acute poverty. Many families
and equitable economic and face overlapping deprivations, hindering the ability of their children and adolescents and youth to
social policy reach their full potential; in Sudan, for example, 1 in 2 children experience moderate deprivation
in 4 or more dimensions simultaneously. There are significant inequalities in child deprivation
Most countries in MENA continue to between and within countries, with the most significant influencing factors being: the area in
marginalise the most vulnerable adolescents which children and adolescents and youth live (those in rural areas being 5 times more likely to
and youth, particularly those who are young be acutely deprived of sanitation, for example), the education level of the household and wealth.
women, poor, refugees70 or who have
disabilities, impacting their ability to realise
their full potential. This inequity prevails
across the region and is at the heart of many Poverty-related deprivations include:
of the challenges encountered by adolescents
and youth.71 Key aspects of the current Health and nutrition – Findings included both widespread malnutrition and 44 per cent of
exclusion and inequity in the region include: children experiencing some form of health deprivation.

Protection – Several of the deprivations experienced by children and adolescents

Poverty-based and youth point to lack of access to social protection systems. These systems should
exclusion and inequity guarantee access to a full range of services, protecting families, children and adolescents
and youth from material poverty and deprivation in multiple dimensions.

Multidimensional poverty, both at the Education – The poorest children are at least 3.6 times less likely to attend school and 5
individual and household level, is a reality in the times less likely to complete primary school than the richest children. This uneven access
MENA region as it is worldwide.72 The recent to education is reflected across the MENA region as a whole, with deficits in rural areas
Child Poverty in the Arab States report, though and marginalised communities.74
based on 11 countries73 and not representative Employment – Youth from the poorest households generally have little access to adequate
of the region as a whole, took into account education and skills development opportunities. In addition, young people increasingly
78 per cent of the under -18 population in the find themselves with casual work or work in an informal sector where protections are
relevant countries (approximately 118 million). limited and low productivity jobs offer few opportunities to build new skills. One in every
It considered seven dimensions of the well- four (25 per cent) working youth in North Africa and 28 per cent of working youth in the
being of children and adolescents and youth, Arab states is living in moderate or extreme poverty.
including: water, sanitation, housing, nutrition,
health, education and information.

70
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Adolescent and Youth Engagement in MENA.
71
Ibid.
72
UNICEF, 2018. Child Poverty in the Arab States: Analytical Report of Eleven countries.
73
Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, the State of Palestine, Tunisia, Iraq, Morocco, Comoros, Mauritania, Sudan and Yemen.
74
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Adolescent and Youth Engagement in MENA.
44 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

For the demographic transition to result in a There is evidence that the negative impact of Specific barriers to the empowerment of girls
dividend in these countries, investments must these norms is worsening: and young women in the region include:
be made to ensure that children, adolescents
and youth have access to a full range of health → Girls are more likely than boys never to Gender-based violence – Gender-based
services, adequate nutrition, education and enter school; and the higher the level violence, including intimate partner violence,
social protection benefits to alleviate the impact of education the more likely girls are to is a harsh reality of life for many young
of material deprivation. Between 2000 and be excluded. The out-of-school rate for women in MENA. 18 per cent of girls in the
2015 there have been improvements in the primary education is 11 per cent for girls, region are married before the age of 1879 and
basic level of child well-being in most countries, compared to 9 per cent for boys; and in among girls who have ever been married in
especially Jordan, Egypt and the State of lower-secondary education, it is 18 per cent Jordan, for example, more than 1 in 10 report
Palestine, but ongoing challenges remain.75 for girls, compared to 12 per cent for boys. having experienced forced sex by a partner
or husband.80 Across the region as a whole,
An integrated approach is needed, focusing → Girls who take initiatives regarding their adolescent girls report violence, both physical
on meeting the needs of children who face own empowerment often face a backlash, and psychological, as being consistently
multiple deprivations as its first priority. This or in extreme cases, honour killing.77 perpetrated against them by male relatives.81
will enable children and adolescents and Almost half of female homicide victims (47 per
youth to grow up into adults who are fully In 2017, 90 per cent of young women and 73 cent) are killed by family members or intimate
equipped to make an optimal contribution per cent of young men responding to the Arab partners, compared to about 6 per cent of
to society and the economy, accelerating Youth Survey suggested that their leaders males.82 The crisis in Syria has increased the
poverty reduction and progress towards the should do more to improve the personal vulnerability of adolescent girls to gender-
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). freedoms and human rights of women.78 based violence.83

Gender-based Child marriage – The high prevalence of

exclusion and inequity child marriage remains an obstacle to girls’
Primary education 9% development in a number of countries in
11%
Though gender norms and beliefs are Out-of-school rate for girls for boys the region. Though the overall rate of child
dynamic over the individual’s life course, marriage in MENA has been decreasing for
their influences peak during adolescence.76 decades, currently one in five girls in the region
Gender-based barriers to engagement affect are married before the age of 18 and the rate
girls and young women in MENA negatively, is increasing in conflict-affected settings as a
as conservative norms and the associated response to instability.84 The crisis in Syria, for
Secondary education 18% 12% example, has led to child marriage being used
discrimination in homes, educational
Out-of-school rate for girls for boys as a coping mechanism by families facing
institutions and the workplace result in their
being barred from full participation in civic, economic pressure and also as a protection
social and economic platforms. measure for girls in the face of insecurity.85
The practice is also particularly prevalent in
UNICEF, 2018. Child Poverty in the Arab States: Analytical Report of Eleven countries.
Sudan and Yemen, where one in three girls are
75

76
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Evidence Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA (summary report).
77
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Evidence Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA (summary report). married before the age of 18 (see Figure 16).
78
ASDA’A Bursan-Marsteller, 2017. Arab Youth Survey.
79
UNICEF, 2017. Child Marriage Study in Middle East & North Africa.
80
UNICEF, 2017. A Familiar Face: Violence in the Lives of Children and Adolescents.
81
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Evidence Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA (summary report).
82
Ibid.
83
No Lost Generation and partners, 2018. No Lost Generation Evidence Brief: Hear the Voices of Syria’s Adolescents and Youth.
84
Ibid.
85
No Lost Generation and partners, 2018. We Made a Promise: Ensuring Learning Pathways and Protection for Syrian Children and Youth.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 45

FIG. 16 Percentage of women aged 20 to 24 years who were first married or in union before age 15 and before age 18, by country Gender-related obstacles to engagement
and employment – Young women’s
opportunities in MENA’s labour market
Sudan
and in domestic and public decision-
making are often constrained by social and
Yemen cultural expectations regarding domestic
responsibilities and caring for siblings and
Iraq other family members. The International
Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES)
Egypt by UN Women in four MENA countries86 in
2017 found that between two thirds and
Iran three quarters of men consider a woman’s
most important role as being to care for the
Morocco
household, with three-quarters or more of
men (and women at nearly the same rate)
State of Palestine
supporting the priority of men’s access to
Syria
jobs over women’s.87

Jordan Restricted mobility for young women in the

region also limits their ability to socialise,
Lebanon network and identify work opportunities.
Hence, engagement and female labour
Djibouti force participation is extremely low.
According to the PCBS (2015) Youth Survey,
Qatar
conducted in Gaza, the State of Palestine,
while 12 per cent of young men reported
Algeria
volunteering, less than 2 per cent of young
Tunisia women did so. In addition, once married,
older adolescents and young women
0 10% 20% 30% 40% in Gaza are far less likely to influence
decision-making in their marriages than
Women 20-24 married by age 18 Women 20-24 married by age 15 men. Though nearly 60 per cent of young
women reported sharing some decision-
Sources: Algeria MICS 2012-13, Djibouti MICS 2006, Egypt DHS 2014, Iran MIDHS 2010, Iraq MICS 2011, Jordan DHS making responsibility with their husbands,
2012, Lebanon MICS 2009, Morocco DHS 2003-04, Qatar MICS 2012, the State of Palestine MICS 2014, Sudan MICS
2014, Syria MICS 2006, Tunisia MICS 2011-12, Yemen DHS 2013. No data available for Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman,
only 17 per cent of husbands agreed with
Saudi Arabia and UAE. this perception of mutual authority.88

86
Egypt, the State of Palestine, Morocco and Lebanon.
87
Promundo and UN Women, 2017. Understanding Masculinities: Results from the International Men And Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES) – MENA Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, and Palestine.
88
PCBS. Palestine in Figures, 2015. March 2016. http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2188.pdf; PCBS. Palestinian Youth Survey, 2016: Main Findings. http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2179.pdf.
46 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Gender-related obstacles in the workplace, removing barriers to access, about 35 per cent limited for MENA’s children, adolescents
including discriminatory work practices and of school-aged Syrian refugees in neighbouring and youth living with disabilities. They face
remuneration, sexual harassment and lack of host countries are still out of school. In addition, discrimination both inside Syria, for example,
policies supporting working mothers are all refugee children are suffering from cumulative (see Box 3), where their number has increased
further disincentives to workplace engagement psychosocial distress resulting from individual significantly in recent years due to the conflict,
for the region’s young women.89 These and collective experiences of war, violence, and across the region as a whole.
obstacles have serious consequences for the family separation and displacement, combined
young women themselves and the region with new sources of stress in their countries
as a whole; a 2015 study by McKinsey and of refuge, all of which have an impact on their Box 3:
Company calculated that if women in MENA ability to learn. After years in exile and with Children with disabilities in Syria
enjoyed the same economic opportunities as savings depleted, there is growing evidence of
men, the region would gain US$2.7 trillion by an increased recourse to both child labour and The experience of children with
2025, boosting GDP by 47 per cent.90 child marriage as negative coping strategies disabilities (both conflict-related and
amongst refugees from Syria.93 non-conflict-related) is often one of
marginalisation and disempowerment.
Marginalisation of refugee Many live isolated lives and struggle
The impact of refugees on host country labour against stigma, discrimination
children, adolescents and youth markets and wages are difficult to ascertain. and an environment that does not
Economies in the host countries were grappling accommodate their needs and excludes
with high unemployment rates, even prior them from social participation.
MENA’s refugee children, adolescents and
youth are also particularly at risk of exclusion, to the influx of refugees. About 50 per cent → An estimated 3.3 million children
for a wide range of reasons. These include of Syrian refugees are of working age, with inside Syria are exposed to explosive
discrimination and violence in schools, issues many of them working in the informal sector, hazards
of quality and certification of their schools, due to lower education levels and/or lack of → Lack of access to proper medical and
decimation of family assets and livelihoods, work permits. Youth are much more likely to psychological care has prolonged
limited freedom of movement, restrictive labour compete occupationally with Syrian refugees or worsened injuries and disabling
laws, a higher incidence of disability and lack in the labour market and to be concentrated in conditions among children
of documentation.91 Refugee families are also the sectors (tourism and trade) whose growth → Children with disabilities are exposed
exposed to high levels of psychosocial distress is most impacted by the crisis.94 to higher risks of violence and face
and, as one example of this, poor conditions difficulties accessing basic services
in camps are often cited as demoralising by including education
Marginalisation of children
children and adolescents alike.92 → Families of children with disabilities
and youth with disabilities in a conflict or crisis often lack
Although host countries continue to make a the means or ability to provide
significant contribution by opening their national Access to health, protection, education, civic their children with the assistive
equipment they need
education systems to refugee children and participation and employment are even more

89
Promundo and UN Women, 2017. Understanding Masculinities: Results from the International Men And Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES) – MENA Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, and Palestine.
90
Mckinsey Global Institute report : The Power of Parity ,How Advancing Women’s Equality can add $12 Trillion to Global Growth -Sep 2015.
91
No Lost Generation and partners, 2018. We made a Promise – Ensuring Learning Pathways and Protection for Syrian Children and Youth; Supporting the Future of Syria and the region – Brussels II Conference April 2018.
92
UNICEF, 2017. Participatory Action Research.
93
No Lost Generation and partners, 2018. Ibid.
94
The World Bank (2017): MENA Economic Monitor – Refugee Crisis in MENA Meeting the Development Challenge.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 47

An adolescent girl at a
“Lifeskills” event at the Union
Development & Culture
Community Centre in Djibouti.
The dimensions of exclusion faced by those disabled girl to be hidden by her family.
with disabilities include: On the other hand, girls with disabilities © UNICEF/UN0199033/Noorani

from middle and upper-class families not

Health – Overall, years of life with a disability only are more likely to attend school than
(YLD) rates among adolescents and youth in those from poor families, but also may
MENA have seen little improvement since have greater access to both educational
1990. In 2015, non-communicable diseases and vocational opportunities than their non-
(NCDs) – including mental health disorders disabled counterparts. Assumed unfit to
– emerged as major contributors to YLDs for fulfil the traditional female roles of wife and
both sexes. Also in 2015, major depression mother, some girls with disabilities appear
emerged as the leading cause of morbidity to have greater freedom to explore other life
(ill health) among young men aged 15-19 options.97
and 20-24 and young women aged 20-24.95
Unintentional injury, mental health, sexual Employment – People with disabilities,
health, substance use and self-harm are especially youth with disabilities, face
increasingly important health issues for numerous barriers to entering the labour
adolescents in the region. However, religious market, including negative preconceptions
and cultural sensitivities in the MENA region about their work capacities and lower
result in many of these issues being ignored educational achievements due to
and access to health services denied, with exclusionary training practices. In common
serious consequences for the adolescents with families and society, employers often
and youth concerned.96 assume that disabled people are less
productive and need costly adaptations.
Education – Because of social norms Internships and apprenticeships which
regarding the role of women in the MENA include people with disabilities provide an
region, disabled girls and women are often opportunity for both employer and intern
viewed negatively. While disabled sons or apprentice to learn about each other, and
may well marry, disabled daughters are reflect on such misconceptions. This can
more likely to be regarded as permanent provide an important bridge between this
family members unlikely to marry or achieve disadvantaged social group and productive
social mobility; a drain on already stretched employment, beneficial for trainees and
resources. It is therefore common for a employers alike.98

95
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Evidence Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA (summary report).
96
Ibid.
97
UNESCO, 2003. Education for All – A Gender and Disability Perspective; background paper prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2003/2004 ‘Gender and Education for All – The Leap
to Equality’.
98
Ibid.
48 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Barriers related to expanded Poor quality outdated curricula are failing to facilitate
education the skills development that characterises
employment opportunities quality education and is essential for
lifelong learning, employability, personal
Youth unemployment (15-24 years) in the Supply side barriers to the provision of the
empowerment and active citizenship.105
region is currently the highest in the world kind of education and learning outcomes
Consequently, the Arab Youth Survey in 2017,
and is a challenge both for those unable to needed to empower MENA’s children and
for example, found that 66 per cent of youth
complete formal education and for those with youth as personally empowered, active
in the Levant feel that the education system
relevant secondary or tertiary qualifications.99 and effective lifelong learners, workers and
is not preparing them for the future.106
citizens - as per the vision set out in the
Some MENA countries, including Tunisia
As of 2018, an estimated 29.3 per cent of region’s Life Skills and Citizenship Education
and Egypt, have adopted reforms aimed at
adolescents and youth in North Africa and 22.2 (LSCE) initiative104 - include:
introducing more student-centred learning
per cent in the Arab states are unemployed.
and competency-based curricula, but there is
For female youth, the unemployment rate Centralised systems – Centralised education
little evidence of a significant shift away from
is even higher, being 40.3 per cent in North systems with poor governance still prevail
traditional models of teaching and learning
Africa and 36.5 per cent in the Arab States.100 across MENA. Current reform programmes
in the region as a whole.
Unemployment is also particularly high fall short of addressing structural challenges
among Syrian refugees in host countries, at related to teacher status, professional
60.8 per cent in Jordan, for example.101 development and qualifications, as well Poor learning outcomes – In international
as approaches to teaching, learning and assessments107 of learning outcomes,
Unemployment puts many adolescents and assessment, school governance and participating countries in MENA perform
youth at risk of exploitation and makes them accountability. In addition, spending on at the bottom; in some countries more
more likely to engage in risky behaviour, in education (15 per cent of national budgets than half of the children in school do not
an attempt to achieve financial independence on average) is not focused on enabling meet the lowest benchmark. With a few
or contribute much needed cash to their the equity of access and efficient use of exceptions,108 learning achievements in the
families.102 Yet in 2017 only half of the youth resources required for MENA’s learners to region have actually declined during the
who responded to the Arab Youth Survey make significant progress. Most expenditure past 12 years. Most of the MENA countries
were confident that their government was goes on salaries (more than 90 per cent), participating in global competitiveness
dealing with this issue.103 Specific barriers which are managed centrally. rankings are also listed quite low, with
to employment opportunities in MENA regard to quality of primary education and
include: Outdated methodology and curricula – the education system as a whole, both of
Traditional teacher-centred and knowledge- which are regarded as key indicators of
based approaches to learning and economic competitiveness.109

99
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Ibid.
100
International Labour Organization – Department of Statistics (ILO-STAT), 2017. Modelled Estimates, November 2017 http://www.ilo.org/ilostat.
101
No Lost Generation and partners, 2018. No Lost Generation Evidence Brief: Hear the Voices of Syria’s Adolescents and Youth.
102
Save the Children and UNICEF, 2018. Evidence Brief: Violence Against Adolescents and Youth in MENA.
103
ASDA’A Bursan-Marsteller, 2017. Arab Youth Survey.
104
UNICEF, 2017.Reimagining Life Skills and Citizenship Education in the Middle East and North Africa: a Four-Dimensional and Systems Approach to 21st Century Skills, available at www.lsce-MENA.org.
105
UNICEF, 2017.Ibid.
106
ASDA’A Bursan-Marsteller, 2017. Ibid.
107
IEA (2015): TIMSS International Results in Mathematics 2015; IEA (2015): TIMSS International Results in Science 2015; IEA (2016): PIRLS Progress in International Reading Literacy Study 2016.
108
TIMSS 2003 to 2015 – Mathematics test scores: Jordan -38 points, Egypt -14 points, Morocco -3 points; TIMSS 2003 to 2015 – Science test scores: Egypt -50 points, Jordan -49 points, Morocco -3 points, Saudi Arabia -2 points.
109
World Economic Forum, 2017. The Global Competitiveness Repot 2017-2018 – Economic Profiles.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 49

On 13 October 2016, at the UNICEF child

friendly space, Lebanon, 11-year-old Fati-
ma Al-loz, a refugee from Syria, plays a
traditional drum.
Mismatch between skills and
labour market requirements © UNICEF/UN043565/Lister

The mismatch between the skills required by

the labour market and those of the learners in
MENA’s current education systems is a major
contributing factor to unemployment, and is
as much a problem in higher education as in
primary and secondary.110 Those learners in
the region who do make it into the marketplace
are often ill-equipped for its demands, with
employers reporting a widespread shortage
of crucial life skills such as creativity,
critical thinking, problem-solving and
communication.111 One reason for this is the
lack of social support for, or opportunities to
gain, work experience before leaving school.112
There is also a high degree of dissatisfaction
among employers concerning the level of
preparedness of Technical and Vocational
Education and Training (TVET) graduates.113

Lack of
available jobs

While MENA’s adolescents and youth are

finding that their skills do not match those
demanded by the market, the market is
in turn failing to generate enough jobs to
accommodate school leavers. Jobs in the
formal private sector are particularly difficult

110
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action:
Evidence Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA (summary report).
111
UNICEF, 2017. Reimagining Life Skills and Citizenship Education in the Middle East and
North Africa: a Four-Dimensional and Systems Approach to 21st Century Skills. Conceptual and
Programmatic Framework.
112
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action:
Adolescent and Youth Engagement in MENA.
113
ETF, 2015. The Challenge of Youth Employability in Arab Mediterranean countries: The Role of
Active Labour Markets Programmes.
50 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

for adolescents and youth to access.114 An the health system, particularly in relation to The number of projected health service
inverse correlation between educational international standards. providers in 2030 is then compared with the
attainment and employment exists in many number of health service providers needed
MENA countries. Overall, each additional The World Health Organization (WHO) has in 2030 to meet the WHO minimum standard
year of schooling adds only around 5.4 per identified a ‘Sustainable Development based on the projected population in 2030, to
cent to earnings, compared to the world Goals index threshold’ of 4.45 doctors, quantify the gap in health service provision
average of 7 per cent. The corresponding nurses and midwives per 1000 people, expected by 2030 (see Figure 17).
‘graduation unemployment’ is eroding both to ensure a health workforce of sufficient
perceptions of, and the incentive to participate density to attain the targets of the SDGs.116 There is considerable divergence between
in, secondary and post-secondary education, This standard enables focused assessment MENA countries in terms of the strength
particularly for girls in the region.115 of the extent to which a health system of their health systems. Eleven out of 19
is robust enough to withstand shocks countries (the State of Palestine is excluded
and deliver results. The gap analysis of from the analysis due to the lack of available
Implications for basic service health systems to follow compares current data) had met the minimum WHO standard
provision numbers of the health workforce in MENA for health service provision outlined above
with the numbers needed in 2030 in light of by 2015, with the highest density of health
Implications for the scaling up of essential both the projected changes in population service providers being in Qatar (9.4 per
service provision in MENA, in light of the size and the WHO SDG index threshold. 1,000 inhabitants) and Libya (8.0).
demographic projections and current barriers
to benefiting from the demographic dividend The trend in the number of health service However, in 2015 only 27.5 per cent of the
highlighted above, include the following providers is projected on the basis of the region’s population lived in countries which
(illustrative examples only): data available for the years 2000-2015, using met the WHO standard, and the population
fixed effects linear regression. Fixed effects weighted average number of health service
estimation allows us to estimate the trend providers per 1000 people in the region as a
Example – Health in health service providers for each country whole was only 3.7, for example, well below
service provision until 2030, assuming that the country- the recommended level of 4.45 skilled health
specific effects correlate with the population personnel per 1,000 inhabitants.
The gap analysis of health service provision size. However, it is important to note that
aims to clarify the extent of investment in these projections are based solely on past In absolute terms, across the MENA region
human capital required in the health sector trends, and that situations of war and conflict as a whole, about 1.7 million health service
to catalyse a demographic dividend for will alter the eventual reality on the ground providers (doctors, nurses and midwives)
all of MENA, in light of the demographic significantly. This is particularly relevant for were available for a total population of
projections outlined in chapters 2 and 3. The countries such as Libya, Iraq and Syria, all of around 450 million in 2015. If growth trends
data provides insights into the strength of which are experiencing protracted crises. in health personnel from the period 2000-2015

114
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Ibid.
115
Tzannatos, Z. et al, 2014. Labour Demand and Social Dialogue: Two Binding Constraints for Decent Work for Youth in the Arab region. Employment Working Paper no. 164. International Labour Office, Employment and Labour Market Policies Branch, ILO in UNICEF 2017 Reimagining Life Skills and Citizenship
Education in the Middle East and North Africa: A Four-Dimensional and Systems Approach to 21st Century Skills, available at www. lsce-MENA.org.
116
World Health Organization, 2016. Health Workforce Requirements for Universal Health Coverage and the Sustainable Development Goals.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 51

continue, the region will have an additional FIG. 17 Number of health service providers (doctors, nurses and midwives) for each scenario (in thousands)
1.3 million skilled health professionals at its
disposal by 2030, making a total of 3 million.

In this scenario, four countries - Djibouti,

Egypt, Iran and Morocco - will have a health
service provider density lower than the
minimum WHO standard by 2030. Given the 1,700
expected gap in health service provision in
those four countries, an additional 100,000
professionals will be needed to reach the
recommended level of 4.45 skilled health

MENA
professionals per 1,000 population in each 3,000
country – bringing the total number of
professionals in the region to 3.1 million –
by 2030.

The divergence between MENA countries is 3,100

significant, both in terms of the proportion of
overall health providers in each country and
the size of the gap between the 2015 number
and 2030 WHO minimum standard values.
For example, both Djibouti and Iraq need
to triple their number of providers between 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 Thousands

2015 and 2030 to meet the WHO minimum

standard, but in absolute numbers, Djibouti
needs to add only 3,300 health professionals, Health service providers 2015 (Estimated using 2000-2015 trend)
whereas Iraq needs almost 190,000. Egypt, Health service providers 2030 if trend maintained
for example, had the comparatively low Health service providers in 2030 to meet WHO Standard
density of 2.4 health service providers per
1,000 people in 2015. In order to meet the Source: UNICEF analysis based on World Health Organization, The 2017 update, Global Health Workforce Statistics, WHO, Geneva, 2017 and United Nations, Department of Economic and Social
minimum WHO standard by 2030, it needs Affairs, Population Division (2017), World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, DVD Edition.
Note: Data from 2000 to 2015 was used for estimation. The number of required health service providers in 2030 is calculated as the sum of projected providers in each country plus the gaps in
to add more than 300,000 health service countries whose projected density is below the WHO standard. If density is higher than the WHO minimum standard in 2030, the forecasted number of health service providers is reported.
providers.
52 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

TABLE 3 Estimated number of health service providers (doctors, nurses and midwives) for each scenario by country

Country or Area Health service providers WHO threshold met, 2015 Health service providers Health service providers in
in 2015 (estimated using 2030 if trend maintained 2030 if all countries meet
2000-2015 trend) WHO Standard
Algeria 179,600 Yes 277,643 277,643
Bahrain 7,405 Yes 14,430 14,430
Djibouti 1,722 No 3,971 5,041
Egypt 222,877 No 507,323 532,868
Iran 256,562 No 360,656 395,442
Iraq 106,135 No 294,346 294,346
Jordan 65,596 Yes 87,096 87,096
Kuwait 30,192 Yes 40,465 40,465
Lebanon 37,375 Yes 32,085 32,085
Libya 49,893 Yes 62,023 62,023
Morocco 76,005 No 142,498 181,888
Oman 31,137 Yes 49,733 49,733
State of Palestine*
Qatar 23,313 No 31,532 31,532
Saudi Arabia 224,889 No 311,679 311,679
Sudan 129,660 Yes 307,055 307,055
Syria 63,368 Yes 149,614 149,614
Tunisia 53,114 No 70,289 70,289
UAE 55,789 No 76,605 76,605
Yemen 65,686 Yes 174,120 174,120
MENA 1,680,318 No 2,993,163 3,093,952
* The State of Palestine is excluded from the analysis due to the lack of available data.
Source: UNICEF analysis based on World Health Organization, The 2017 update, Global Health Workforce Statistics, WHO, Geneva, 2017 and United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017), World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, DVD Edition.
Note: Data from 2000 to 2015 was used for estimation. If density is higher than the WHO minimum standard in 2030, the forecasted number of health service providers is reported.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 53

Example – Education FIG. 18 Proportional increase in school-age population between 2015 and 2030, by education level and country demographic stage
service provision

Increase in and composition of the school

40
-age population (aged 5-17)

By 2030, the countries in MENA will face a 23

30
per cent increase in school-age population
(children aged 5-17),117 resulting in the need for
approximately 25 million additional students 20
to be accommodated in the education
systems. This will put an additional burden
on providing quality education for all: new 10
schools and classrooms need to be built, new
teachers trained and recruited, and teaching
0
and learning (including curriculum content
and methods) need to respond to the needs
of a fast-changing world. -10

However, while the school-age population in Pre-Primary Primary Lower-secondary Upper-secondary

Education Education Education Education
the region is increasing overall, this increase
is happening at different speeds for different
age groups, affecting the level of investment Pre-dividend Countries Early-dividend Countries
needed for each education level. For Late-dividend Countries MENA Region
example, during the period 2015 to 2030, the
projected increase in school-age population The pre-primary school-age population is projected to increase by approximately 6 per cent for
is higher for adolescents at lower- and upper- the MENA region as a whole, while the primary school-age population is projected to increase
secondary education level than for children at by about 15 per cent. The projected increases in the lower-secondary and upper-secondary
pre-primary or primary level118 (see Figure 18). school-age populations are significantly higher, at 29 per cent and 35 per cent respectively.

However, sustaining access to secondary education will require a continued focus on basic
education, including paying attention to early childhood learning and pre-primary education, as
many of the underlying problems adolescents and youth face find their roots in the early years.

117
School-age population is usually defined as being from age of 5 to 17 for primary, lower-secondary and upper-secondary school level (excluding pre-primary school-age). However, these population data are calculated based on each country-specific definition of entrance age
and duration and hence vary between countries.
118
Please note that the education level specific age group is calculated by country, based on the country-specific definition of entrance age and duration, and hence varies between countries. Please see Annex 1, Tables 1-4.
54 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Due to the shift in the age structure of the population associated with demographic change,
Depending on the demographic stage the overall population increase in MENA is higher among adolescents than younger children,
of the different countries, the projected and therefore the demand for education service provision is shifting towards lower- and upper-
increase in school-age populations in secondary education (+7.0 million / +8.6 million adolescents between 2015-2030). However,
MENA is as follows: since the primary education phase has the longest duration (4-6 years), the demand for primary
education remains high (+7.9 million children between 2015-2030). See Figures 19 and 20.
In pre-dividend countries, the increase
is still rapid throughout all age-groups
FIG. 19 Quantitative increase in school-age population between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by education level and country
and education levels – with +22 per
demographic stage
cent for pre-primary age, +28 per cent
for primary age, +34 per cent for lower-
secondary age, and +35 per cent for
upper-secondary age [Iraq, Sudan,
Yemen, the State of Palestine] 10,000

In early-dividend countries, the 8,000

increase is shifting towards the older
age-groups and upper-education levels
– with -1 per cent for pre-primary age, 6,000
+10 per cent for primary age, +31per
cent for lower-secondary age, and 4,000
+38 for upper-secondary age [Algeria,
Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Jordan,
Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria] 2,000

In late-dividend countries, the increase 0

is more concentrated in the older age-
groups and upper-education levels –
with -6 per cent for pre-primary age, +4 -2,000
per cent for primary age, +13 per cent Pre-dividend Early-dividend Late-dividend MENA
for lower-secondary age, and +16 per Countries Countries Countries Region
cent for upper-secondary age [Kuwait,
Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar, UAE]
Pre-Primary Education Lower-secondary Education
Primary Education Upper-secondary Education
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 55

FIG. 20 Quantitative increase in school-age population between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by country Increase in out-of-school
children (5-17 years)119
Pre-dividend Countries:
Iraq While progress has been made in providing
State of Palestine education for all at primary level, the
Sudan
proportion and number of children (5-17
years) out-of-school or not attending lower-
Yemen and upper-secondary school in MENA is
Early-dividend Countries: still quite high. In 2015 about 17 per cent
Algeria
of lower-secondary age children were out
of school in the MENA region, and up to 35
Bahrain
per cent of upper-secondary age children
Djibouti were not attending school. In addition,
Egypt more than half of pre-primary age children
still do not have access to pre-primary
Iran
schools, nurseries or kindergartens. This is
Jordan of particular importance, as early stimulation
Libya and learning lay the cognitive foundation for
Oman
a child’s future learning and development.120
Saudi Arabia
2015 If the countries in the MENA region do not
Syria
2030 Pre-Primary Education
address this enormous influx of children
Late-dividend Countries: and adolescents into the education systems
2030 Primary Education
effectively, the number of children aged 5-17
Kuwait 2030 Lower-Secondary Education
out of school may increase by about 27 per
Lebanon 2030 Upper-Secondary Education
cent by 2030121 (see Figure 21). Overall, this
Morocco adds up to 5 million additional children being
Tunisia
out of school in the region. Due to the rapid
increase in school-age population, especially
Qatar
among lower- and upper-secondary age
UAE adolescents, the progress made so far
-5,000 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 towards education for all may be reversed.

The overall increase in school-age population will be highest in Egypt (+7.6 million), Iraq (+4.9 million),
Sudan (+3.5 million), Algeria (+2.7 million) and Yemen (+2.1 million).
The overall size of the school-age population in 2030 will then be highest in Egypt (33 million), followed by Iraq
(17 million), Sudan (16 million), Iran (15 million) and Yemen (12 million).
For country-specific data, see Annex 1, Tables A1 to A4.

119
Data used below are calculated assuming that the out-of-school children rates remain the same in 2030 as in 2015, or the latest available data before 2015, except UAE where only the 2016 data for lower- and upper-secondary education is available. Note that the term out-of-school is applied to upper-secondary
school-age children to echo the Sustainable Development Goal 4 that encourages school attendance for youth. However, it is acknowledged that in the short term other learning pathways should also be encouraged, given that for many countries upper-secondary schooling is not compulsory and upper
-secondary school-age children are allowed to work legally.
120
These rates have been calculated based on the number of school-age population and the number of out-of-school children available through UIS. However, they might not conform to the official out-of-school children rates reported by UIS, due to different ways of calculating or adjusting the data.
121
School-age population is usually defined as from age 5 to 17 for primary, lower-secondary and upper-secondary school level (excluding pre-primary school-age) – however, these population data are calculated based on each country-specific definition of entrance age and duration, and hence vary between countries.
56 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

FIG. 21 Proportional increase in out-of-school children between 2015 and 2030, by education level and country demographic stage

Depending on the demographic

stage of the different countries, the
40 projected increase in out-of-school
children and adolescents is as
follows:
30
In pre-dividend countries, the
increase is still rapid throughout all
20 age groups and education levels –
with +12 per cent for pre-primary
age, +26 per cent for primary age,
10
+33 per cent for lower-secondary
age, and +36 per cent for upper-
secondary age [Iraq, Sudan, Yemen,
the State of Palestine]
0
In early-dividend countries, the
increase is shifting towards the older
-10 age groups and upper education
Pre-primary Primary Lower-secondary Upper-secondary levels – with -2.5 per cent for pre-
Education Education Education Education primary age, +6.5 per cent for
primary age, +20 per cent for lower-
Pre-dividend Countries Early-dividend Countries secondary age, and +35 per cent
Late-dividend Countries MENA Region
for upper-secondary age [Algeria,
Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran,
Jordan, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia,
Assuming that the out-of-school children rate – defined as, the percentage of the total school- Syria]
age population out of school, by education level/ age-group – from 2015 remains the same until
2030, the projected increase in the number of out-of-school children is highest among adoles- In late-dividend countries, the
increase concentrates further in
cents and therefore the lower- and upper-secondary education levels will continue to be most
the older age-groups and upper
affected. education levels – with -3.5 per cent
for pre-primary age, -2.9 per cent for
While the number of out-of-school children of pre-primary age will remain more or less the primary age, +4.5 per cent for lower-
same for the MENA region, those of primary age will increase by approximately 19 per cent. The secondary age, and +14 per cent
increase is even higher for adolescents who are out of lower-secondary school, at 25 per cent, for upper-secondary age [Kuwait,
with the number of adolescents not attending upper-secondary school increasing by as much as Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar,
32 per cent. UAE]
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 57

Due to the shift in the age structure of the population associated with demographic change,
including a significant overall increase in adolescents, education service provision may not be able
to meet the demand for lower- and upper-secondary education, leading to a significant increase
in out-of-school adolescents (+1.0 million / +2.8 million adolescents between 2015 and 2030).
However, with the primary education phase having the longest duration (4-6 years), the demand
for primary education remains high, leading to an increase in the number of primary age out-of-
school children (+1.1 million children between 2015 and 2030). See Figures 22 and 23.

FIG. 22 Quantitative increase in out-of-school children between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by education level and country
demographic stage

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

-500
Pre-dividend Early-dividend Late-dividend MENA
Countries Countries Countries Region

Pre-Primary Education Lower-secondary Education

Primary Education Upper-secondary Education

On 21 August 2018 in rural

Idlib, Syria, an internally
displaced boy stands near
his temporary shelter.

© UNICEF/UN0233870/Al Shami
58 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

FIG. 23 Quantitative increase in out-of-school children between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by country Summary of implications for education
service provision
Pre-dividend Countries:
Iraq By 2030, the countries in the MENA region
State of Palestine will face an increase of 25 million (+23
Sudan per cent) additional students to be
accommodated in the education system.
Yemen

Early-dividend Countries:
This will put an additional burden on providing
Algeria
quality education for all. The projected increase
Bahrain is highest among the adolescent population, at
Djibouti lower- and upper-secondary education level.
Egypt
However, sustaining access to secondary
education will require a continuous focus on
Iran
basic education, including due attention for
Jordan early childhood learning and pre-primary
Libya education, as many of the underlying problems
adolescents and youth are facing find their
Oman
roots in the early years.
Saudi Arabia
2015
Syria If the countries in the MENA region do not
2030 Pre-Primary Education
Late-dividend Countries: 2030 Primary Education
address this enormous influx of children
Kuwait and adolescents into the education system
2030 Lower-secondary Education
in an adequate manner, an additional 5
Lebanon 2030 Upper-secondary Education
million children (+27 per cent) may be out
Morocco of school. Assuming that the out-of-school
Tunisia children rate remains the same throughout
the period till 2030, the projected increase
Qatar
in the number of out-of-school children will
UAE
be highest among adolescents at lower-
-500 0 500 1,500 2,500 3,500 4,500 5,500 and upper-secondary level. Many of the
accomplishments towards education for all
achieved so far may be reversed.
The increase in out-of-school children is projected to be highest in Sudan (+1.1 million), Egypt (+1.0 million),
Iraq (+1.0 million), Yemen (+0.7 million) and Algeria (+0.3 million).
The overall number of out-of-school children in 2030 will then be highest in Sudan (5.4 million), Egypt
(4.4 million), Yemen (3.7 million), Iraq (3.3 million), and Syria (3.0 million).
For country-specific data, see Annex 1, Tables A5 to A8.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 59

However, while this analysis focuses on the men and women follows the trend projected
Depending on the demographic stage increasing pressure on existing education by the International Labour Organization
of the different countries in the region, systems from the demand side, investment (ILO). This will put an additional burden on
the increase in school-age population in education needs to take into account the the region’s economies to create new jobs;
and potential increase in out-of-school current education service provision and about 2.6 million per year.
children is as follows: supply side factors.
In pre-dividend countries, the Many of the jobs of the future do not yet exist,
increase is still rapid throughout all Example – School- due to the rapid evolution of technology and
age groups and education levels. to-work transition its impact on social and economic life. Some
Ensuring both access to education will be lost to automation and others, many
and the good quality of pre-primary of which we cannot yet imagine, will emerge
and primary education is crucial for
Increase in and composition of the youth
in their place. According to projections, 50
meeting the learning needs of the labour force (15-24 years) per cent to 85 per cent of the jobs today’s
increasing number of young children, learners will be doing in 2030 have not yet
as well as building the foundation for To realise the window of opportunity for been created, meaning adolescents and
the transition to lower- and upper-
accelerated economic growth and development, youth need to acquire a different skill set
secondary education. [Iraq, Sudan,
expanded employment opportunities are to secure them.122 While specific technical
Yemen, the State of Palestine]
required. As the school-age population skills can be learned in the workplace,
In early-dividend countries, the increases, especially among the older age groups MENA’s national systems increasingly need
increase is highest among older age of adolescents, the need for the economy to to invest in a broader set of life skills to
groups and hence upper education create jobs for those entering the labour market provide the foundation for life-long learning,
levels, while slowing down for younger increases. At the same time, it is crucial for making youth employable in the context of
age groups and lower education education systems to nurture the skills required the fourth industrial revolution.
levels. The focus needs to shift beyond
by the changing economy, if student transition to
primary education towards addressing
the labour market is to be successful. Assuming the youth labour force participation
gaps and weaknesses in lower- and
upper-secondary education. [Algeria, rate follows ILO’s projection, the youth labour
Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, By 2030, the countries in MENA face a 27 per force (15-24 years) will increase by about 12
Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria] cent increase in the labour force (15-64 years) per cent by 2030 (compared to 2015), leading
compared to 2015, and hence 39 million new to an additional 2.8 million youth in the labour
In late-dividend countries, the increase entrants into the labour market, assuming force.123 (See Figures 24 and 25).
is comparably low throughout all the labour force participation rate for both
age-groups and education levels.
Countries could usefully focus on
school-to-work transition mechanisms
and youth labour policies, to take
advantage of the demographic
dividend. [Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco,
Tunisia, Qatar, UAE]

122
Education Commission, 2017: The Learning Generation – Investing in Education for a changing World; Institute for the Future for Dell Technologies, 2017: The Next Era of Human / Machine Partnership – Emerging Technologies’ Impact on Society and Work in 2030.
123
Note that the reason for the much smaller number of 2. 8 million additional youth labour force, compared to the 39 million additional jobs needed as mentioned above, is that the first number refers to the age group 15-24 years only, while the latter refers to the entire labour force aged 15-64 and is largely the
result of successive young cohorts entering the labour force over the 15 year period between 2015 and 2030 and moving through the age groups.
60 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

FIG. 24 Quantitative increase in the youth labour force between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by country demographic stage

Depending on the demographic

phase of the different countries,
the projected increase in the youth
labour force is as follows: Pre-dividend
Countries
In pre-dividend countries, the
increase is rapid at +31 per cent
reflecting an additional 2.1 million Early-dividend
youth in the labour force by 2030 Countries
compared to 2015 [Iraq, Sudan,
Yemen, the State of Palestine] Late-dividend
Countries
In early-dividend countries, the
increase is slower at +8 per cent
reflecting an additional 1.1 million MENA
Region
youth in the labour force by 2030
compared to 2015 [Algeria, Bahrain,
Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Libya,
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria]

In late-dividend countries, the 2015

increase is reversed at -7 per cent
2030 Increase
reflecting a 0.3 million reduction in
youth in the labour force by 2030
compared to 2015 [Kuwait, Lebanon,
Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar, UAE]
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 61

FIG. 25 Quantitative increase in the youth labour force between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by country

Pre-dividend Countries:
Iraq

State of Palestine
Sudan

Yemen

Early-dividend Countries:
Algeria
Bahrain

Djibouti

Egypt

Iran

Jordan

Libya

Oman

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Late-dividend Countries:
Kuwait

Lebanon
2015
Morocco
2030 Increase
Tunisia

Qatar

UAE
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000

The increase in the youth labour force will be highest in Egypt (+1.3 million), Iraq (+1.3 million), Sudan (+0.6
million), Syria (+0.3 million), and the State of Palestine (+0.1 million). Syrian refugee boy playing
The overall number of youth in the workforce in 2030 will then be highest in Egypt (6.5 million), Iraq (3.7 soccer in Azraq refugee
million), Sudan (2.7 million), Iran (2.7 million), and Morocco (1.9 million). camp in Jordan.
However, in some countries the youth labour force is projected to decrease, such as Iran (-0.6 million),
Morocco (-0.2 million), and Lebanon (-0.2 million).
© UNICEF/Jordan/2017/Rich
For country-specific data, see Annex 2, Tables A9 to A11.
62 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

FIG. 26 Quantitative increase in the youth labour force between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), while reducing / closing the
gender gap in labour force participation, by country
Box 4:
Female youth labour force
Pre-dividend Countries:
participation: three scenarios
Iraq

State of Palestine The low labour force participation

Sudan of women is a major concern in
MENA. Three scenarios are outlined
Yemen below on reducing or closing the
Early-dividend Countries: gender gap in youth labour force
participation (see also Figure 26)
Algeria
Bahrain Scenario 1: assumes the youth
labour force participation rate for
Djibouti
both men and women follows ILO’s
Egypt projection for 2030
Iran
Scenario 2: assumes the youth
Jordan labour force participation rate for
men is as in Scenario 1, while the
Libya
rate for women increases to close
Oman the gap with the rate for men by 50
Saudi Arabia per cent
Syria Scenario 3: assumes the youth
Late-dividend Countries: labour force participation rate for
men is as in Scenario 1, while the
Kuwait rate for women reaches the same
Lebanon level as the rate for men
2015
Morocco
2030 Scenario 1
Tunisia 2030 Scenario 2
Qatar 2030 Scenario 3
UAE

0 2,500 5,000 7,500 10,000

Closing the gender gap in the youth labour force (15-24) would unleash human capital to contribute to
economic and social development, with the proportional increase in the youth labour force being highest
in Syria (+74 per cent), Algeria (+68 per cent), and Iran (+67 per cent).
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 63

Increase in unemployed youth (15-24 years)124 FIG. 27 Quantitative increase in unemployed youth between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by country demographic stage

Youth unemployment rates (15-24 years) in

MENA are currently the highest in the world.
In three countries youth unemployment is
40 per cent or higher, and in a further three Pre-dividend
above 30 per cent.125 The situation is even Countries

worse among women, with female youth

unemployment reaching more than 60 per Early-dividend
cent in three countries and more than 50 per Countries
cent in another three.126
Late-dividend
The projected increase in numbers of Countries
adolescents and youth in MENA by 2030 will
lead to an increasing number of students MENA
hoping to make the transition from school region
to work. This increases the pressure on the
economy to absorb these aspiring labour 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000
market entrants and means it is crucial that
education systems in the region nurture the 2015
skills required to enter employment or self- 2030 Increase
employment and contribute to a rapidly
changing economy.

If the countries of MENA fail to address both

the supply of a qualified workforce, through
education systems adjusting to labour
market requirements, and the demand of the
economy, by creating new jobs for these new
labour force entrants, unemployment among
the region’s youth will increase even further.
Assuming that the youth unemployment
rates of 2015 remain the same until 2030, the
total number of unemployed youth aged 15-
24 may increase by 11 per cent by 2030. See
Figures 27 and 28.

124
Data used below are calculated assuming that the youth unemployment rates remain the same in 2030 as in 2015. Total youth unemployed have been calculated by adding up male unemployed and female unemployed.
125
Oman (47 per cent), Libya (45 per cent), the State of Palestine (40 per cent), Tunisia (35 per cent), Egypt (35 per cent), Jordan (33 per cent).
126
Syria (83 per cent), Oman (78 per cent), and Libya (63 per cent), the State of Palestine (60 per cent), Saudi Arabia (57 per cent), Jordan (56 per cent). Note that these high unemployment rates are independent from the already low female labour force participation in the MENA region, since the unemployment rate relates
the number of unemployed to the labour force (employed and unemployed) and not to the total population.
64 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

FIG. 28 Quantitative increase in unemployed youth between 2015 and 2030 (in thousands), by country

Depending on the demographic

Pre-dividend Countries: phase of the different countries,
Iraq the projected increase in youth
unemployment is as follows:
State of Palestine

Sudan
In pre-dividend countries, the increase
is rapid at +30 per cent reflecting an
Yemen additional 450,000 unemployed youth.
Early-dividend Countries: In Iraq, for example, the increase in
unemployed youth may reach +59 per
Algeria
cent and in the State of Palestine +35
Bahrain per cent [Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, the State
Djibouti of Palestine]
Egypt In early-dividend countries, the
Iran increase is slower at +8 per cent
reflecting an additional 350,000
Jordan
unemployed youth. In Bahrain, for
Libya example, the increase in unemployed
youth may reach +30 per cent and in
Oman
Egypt +22 per cent. However, in Iran
Saudi Arabia youth unemployment may decrease
Syria by -20 per cent [Algeria, Bahrain,
Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Libya,
Late-dividend Countries:
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria]
Kuwait
In late-dividend countries, the
Lebanon
increase is reversed with -8 per cent
Morocco reflecting 60,000 fewer unemployed
Tunisia
youth. However, in Kuwait youth
2015 unemployment may increase by +47
Qatar 2030 Increase per cent, in Qatar by +44 per cent
UAE and in Lebanon -51 per cent [Kuwait,
Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar,
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
UAE]

The increase in unemployed youth is projected to be highest in Egypt (+0.4 million), Iraq (+0.3 million),
Sudan (+0.1 million), Syria (+0.07 million), and the State of Palestine (+0.05 million).
The overall number of unemployed youth is projected to be highest in Egypt (2.2 million), Sudan (0.7
million), Iran (0.7 million), Iraq (0.7 million), and Algeria (0.5 million).
However, in some countries the number of unemployed youth is projected to decrease, such as Iran (-0.2
million), Morocco (-0.04 million) and Lebanon (-0.03 million).
For country-specific data, see Annex 2, Table A12.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 65

Summary of implications for school-to-work economic challenges, rapid technological

transition change and their impact on economies, by conflict, or affected by a significant
the labour force and skills, unemployment influx of refugees and migrants. In a
By 2030, the countries in the MENA region among youth is projected to increase even few countries, good education systems
will face an increase of 39 million (+27 per further, by 735,000 (+11 per cent) between providing the skills demanded by a
cent) new entrants to the labour force, to be changing labour market may work as
2015 and 2030. Countries in the MENA an economic push strategy. [Algeria,
accommodated in the national and regional region need to address both the supply of Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Jordan,
economy. a qualified work force, through education Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria]
systems adjusting to labour market needs,
In late-dividend countries, the increase
In addition, half of the jobs of the future do not and the demand on the part of the economy is quite slow or already in reverse; while
yet exist, due to rapid technological change for these new entrants, by creating new jobs. the labour force is still growing, most
and its impact on economic and social life. graduates are projected to be absorbed
by the labour market. However, to take
Jobs that today’s learners will be doing in full advantage of this demographic
2030 have not been created yet, meaning dividend, labour policies should foster
children, adolescents and youth need to Depending on the demographic decent jobs for all adolescents and
acquire a different set of skills to secure those stage of the different countries in youth. [Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco,
the region, the increase in the labour Tunisia, Qatar, UAE]
jobs. Education systems therefore need to force and potential increase in youth
nurture the skills demanded by the changing unemployment is as follows:
economy, to enable successful transition to
In pre-dividend countries, the increase
the labour market. is extremely rapid for both the labour This analysis does not take into account the
force and youth unemployment rates disastrous impact of conflict, fragility and the
Assuming the youth labour force participation that are already very high. Good quality high number of refugees in MENA. As such,
follows ILO’s projection, the youth labour education, anticipating the rapidly future labour market and social developments
force (15-24 years) will increase by 2.8 million changing skills demanded by the labour will depend on these countries’ ability to
(+12 per cent) to 26.6 million between 2015 to market may function as a push strategy
to foster economic development and integrate refugees into society.127 While the
2030. Increasing the labour force participation prosperity. However, all four countries region still lacks political stability, economic
rate of young women by reducing the are currently in a devastating stage revival beyond natural resources and equal
gender gap by half by 2030 would lead to an of fragility and conflict and therefore opportunities for all, education needs to go
additional 7.1 million youth in the labour force economic slowdown. [Iraq, Sudan, beyond a focus on income generation and
(33.7 million in total). Closing the gender gap Yemen, the State of Palestine]
simultaneously foster respect, empathy,
completely by 2030 and assuming the same In early-dividend countries, the overall resilience and trust.
labour force participation rate for young increase is already slower; while
women as for young men, the youth labour the labour force is still increasing,
force would increase to a total of 40.7 million the projected increase in youth
by 2030 – from 23.7 million in 2015.
unemployment is not as high, due to the +12% Youth labour force
variation in youth unemployment rates
will increase by
between countries. However, most of
Youth unemployment rates (15-24 years) in the these countries are either at war, split 2.8 million to 26.6 million
MENA region are currently the highest globally. between 2015 and 2030.
Even without taking into account existing
127
ILO, 2017. World Employment and Social Outlook – Trends 2017.
66 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Chapter 4
REAPING THE DIVIDEND IN MENA:
PRIORITY POLICY ACTIONS

An adolescent boy
with his brother (left)
and their mother in
their house in Sahab,
Jordan.

© UNICEF/UN0249977/
Rich
M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 67
68 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

4. REAPING THE DIVIDEND IN MENA: PRIORITY POLICY ACTIONS

Children, adolescents and youth in the MENA Different countries, different Early-dividend countries:
region have the potential to become agents Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran,
of change for a more prosperous future, by challenges and opportunities Jordan, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria
playing their part in reaping the demographic
dividend. But for this to happen, they must be The analysis in this report has shown that the As the demographic transition in these
perceived as a source of potential solutions.128 MENA region has significant potential to turn countries is already more advanced,
Decisive action by policy makers is essential the demographic transition that its countries policy options are more constrained. In
if adolescents and youth in the Middle are experiencing into increased prosperity these countries, policy measures aimed at
East and North Africa are to reach their full for its people. Countries are at different maximising the demographic dividend need
potential, contribute to problem-solving and stages of the demographic transition and to focus more on adolescents and youth
help the region benefit from the demographic immediate priorities for policy action vary. and their transition from school to work, as
dividend. well as on those of working age. This does
Pre-dividend countries: not negate the importance of investing in
Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, the State of Palestine early childhood and basic education in the
first decade of life, which remains critical
The most urgent policy priorities At this early stage of the transition, these from many perspectives. In this category,
for the MENA countries of each countries still have time to pursue a range two countries are experiencing conflict and
of the dividend categories can be of policy measures to ensure that the humanitarian crises (Syria and Libya) and
summarised as follows: adolescents and youth entering the labour two others face the consequences of a large-
Pre-dividend: ensuring that children, market over the next ten to fifteen years scale influx of refugees, to different extents
adolescents and youth are healthy and are healthy, well-nourished, protected (Jordan and Egypt). These circumstances
well-nourished, protected and well- and well-educated. This will enable them constrain these four countries in comparison
educated. to turn demographic change into shared with others in this group in taking the policy
wealth. Pre-dividend countries have time measures needed for their populations to
Early-dividend: equipping adolescents to make the required macro-economic, benefit from a demographic dividend.
and youth with the skills they need
fiscal, regulatory and labour-market policy
to make an effective transition from
changes that will maximise employment Late-dividend countries:
school to work.
opportunities. However, all four pre-dividend Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar,
Late-dividend: empowering those of countries in the region face fragility, UAE
working age via initiatives targeting conflict and humanitarian crises of varying
labour force participation and complexity and duration. Unless they find These countries already have a large share of
employment generation. a way to restore peace and stability, this will their population in the working age category and
restrict their opportunities for the potential are already well into the period in which they can
demographic dividend to materialise. reap the economic benefits of the demographic

128
No Lost Generation and partners, 2017. Translating Research into Scaled Up Action: Evidence Symposium on Adolescents and Youth in MENA (summary report).
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 69

transition. Therefore, policy measures aiming Health and nutrition diseases and the need for longer-term home
to boost the demographic dividend in late- for early development care for the elderly. This will also have
dividend countries need to focus mainly on implications for future financing needs for the
people already in the working-age category and A labour force cannot be effective unless it is health sectors in many countries, as the burden
address labour force participation; employment healthy and well-nourished, so investment of disease is likely to shift to those requiring
generation; the business environment; and in the provision of health services for all of longer-term and more expensive care.
productivity gains through enhancing human the region’s children, adolescents and youth
capital in the existing labour force. Investing is essential. According to projections, the Education for
in childhood remains an absolute priority, but increase of approximately 100,000 health
will have limited impact on these countries in lifelong learning
workers required in the region by 2030 – over
terms of boosting their economic gains from and above the projected growth based on
the demographic transition. the 2000-2015 trend – has major policy and In addition to being healthy and well-
financial implications for governments. nourished, a labour force that is well-
Boosting the demographic educated, with the right combination of
Some of the region’s countries with the highest technical and life skills required by the labour
dividend by investing in basic projected health workforce needs by 2030 are market, is an absolute requirement for any
services also those with high newborn mortality rates. country aiming to realise a demographic
They will require urgent action on health dividend. Investing in education is critical.
workforce management to reduce newborn The analysis in this report points out that
mortality. As part of health sector reforms in the region will see an addition of about 25
To ensure the current and future health the region, the training and deployment of million school-age children (+23 per cent) by
of MENA’s children, adolescents and health workers to geographic regions with 2030. But given concerns about the quality
youth, health policies are required that: the most significant gaps in service provision of education systems in the region, the
will become crucial if recent gains in mortality investment required is not simply to keep
All countries: aim to increase the reduction are to be sustained. pace with the rising numbers of school-age
number of health workers and children. Transformational investments in
decrease under-five mortality rates,
Future research to inform health-related both access to and quality of education are
especially among the most vulnerable
policy-making should explore the connections needed.
In addition, investments in quality between health sector needs and the
education - prioritising skills for a fast- epidemiological transition in the burden of The adolescents and youth of tomorrow
changing world - are required at all disease that will accompany the demographic (2030) are just entering pre-primary and
educational stages throughout MENA, changes across the region. An increase in the primary education today. Investing in early
giving particular attention to: elderly population, for example, is likely to childhood and basic education is therefore
Pre-dividend: investing in quality early increase the need for health workers who can important, as many problems children
childhood and basic education respond to new patterns of disease, including experience later in their learning trajectory
more old age-related ailments, cardiovascular are linked to a lack of early opportunities to
Early-dividend: investing in quality
secondary education and skills
development
70 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

learn. Over half of pre-primary age children produces effective labour market entrants, Taxation as a proportion of GDP is generally
in the region do not have access to pre- learning approaches prioritising life skills low in the region, with weak tax laws and poor
primary schools, nurseries or kindergartens, and citizenship education129 are critical. enforcement of existing laws, widespread tax
though this age category will experience the evasion and discretionary tax exemptions.
lowest growth of all school-age categories in National systems are therefore urged to There is scope for drastically increasing direct,
the region (6 per cent to 2030). Investment in invest increasingly in a broader set of life progressive taxation on income and wealth.
early childhood education remains essential skills that provide the foundation for further This will enable governments to play a more
across the region, but in terms of realising learning and training, so that youth are determined redistributive role, channelling
the demographic dividend, this area of employable. Investments in the quality of public resources towards those facing
investment is most relevant in the four pre- education are vital in all countries of the exclusion and being left behind.130
dividend countries. region, but in order to boost the chances
of an economic dividend, they are most
To ensure that young labour market entrants likely to pay off at secondary level in early- Facilitating the school-to-work
are equipped with relevant knowledge and dividend countries. transition for all
skills, the quality of education throughout
the pre-primary, primary and secondary
Financing the
stages needs to be improved. This is a
significant challenge, given the projected necessary investments A mix of policies increasing the
demand for labour and promoting
increase in students in primary (by 15 per
employment for all youth, including the
cent), lower-secondary (by 29 per cent) Equipping the region’s adolescents and most vulnerable, are needed in MENA,
and upper-secondary education (by 35 per youth for the roles they will play in realising including:
cent). Resources are needed, both for the the demographic dividend will require
expansion in access and for the improved significant investment in education, health Pre-dividend: investment in education
quality required. This may prompt a more and social protection. But many countries access and quality (as above), combined
fundamental re-assessment of the education in the region already run large budget with policies promoting youth
employment
system in some of the countries that will see deficits and have considerable levels of debt,
the most dramatic changes in their school- tightening the fiscal space for the policy Early-dividend: policies focusing on
age population. measures described in this chapter. skills development and vocational
training, internships, job placements
Successful performance in school, work and While further borrowing is risky and external and employer incentives
life depends on a wide range of skills, attitudes assistance to the region is dwindling, two
Late-dividend: policies focusing on the
and values that go beyond traditional literacy, ways of increasing fiscal space are open labour demand side
numeracy and vocational skills. The nature to all governments in the region. The first
of work is evolving fast, due to technological concerns reprioritising public expenditure All countries: social protection measures
change. Broader skills around learning, on children, adolescents and youth, making to support the most vulnerable
employment, personal empowerment and sure that the level of budget allocations is adolescents and youth, including
active citizenship are increasingly important. adequate and leads to the desired results, transformative measures to facilitate
To ensure that the education system particularly for the most vulnerable. their eventual transition to employment

129
www.lsce-MENA.org.
130
ESCWA (2017). Rethinking Fiscal Policy for the Arab region.
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 71

Employment and off, but will need to be combined with policy Therefore, policy measures that stimulate
measures that increase the demand for inclusive growth and result in high quality
decent jobs for all
labour and promote youth employment. jobs for the wider population are needed. Job
creation needs to be private sector-driven, as
The report highlights that by 2030, the MENA
In early-dividend countries, the emphasis the region has relied on the public sector to
region will have 40 million new labour
should be on facilitating the transition of absorb new labour market entrants for far too
market entrants - a 27 per cent increase. All
adolescents from school to the labour market, long; a situation that is no longer sustainable
these labour market entrants will need to be
for example, through skills development and or desirable. The countries of MENA need to
accommodated in the national economies if
vocational training; internship programmes; level the regulatory playing field, so private
the demographic dividend is to materialise. At
job placements; access to credit; and the firms and Small and Medium Enterprises
the current rates of labour force participation
establishment of incentives that make it (SMEs) can grow and create the jobs needed
(both male and female), the youth labour force
attractive for employers to hire adolescents by young labour market entrants.
will increase by 4.7 million (+20 per cent).
and youth. In late-dividend countries, policy
measures aimed at reaping the demographic The ease of doing business leaves a lot to be
Youth unemployment rates in the MENA
dividend need to be predominantly on the desired in many countries in the region,132
region are already the highest globally,
labour demand side. making it particularly difficult for young
so simply accommodating new labour
entrepreneurs to start up new initiatives.
market entrants is not enough to maximise
Inclusive Special attention needs to be given to rapid
the economic dividend. In addition, half
economic growth changes in technology and markets and to
of the jobs of the future do not yet exist,
the question of how the countries of the
due to rapid technological change and its
region can best position themselves to take
impact on economic and social lives in A demographic dividend will not materialise advantage of these changes, also known as
the future. Adolescents and youth need to without economic growth and this economic the fourth industrial revolution.
acquire a different skill set to secure those growth needs to be inclusive. That means
jobs. Therefore, education systems need to it needs to create decent quality jobs for
nurture the skills demanded by the changing millions of people. Regional growth has been Protection for
economy for a successful transition to the uneven since the global financial crisis due the most vulnerable
labour market. to a range of factors, resulting in inadequate
job opportunities for young people and
In addition, those currently unemployed or women.131 In addition, the jobs that have In addition to the measures outlined above,
outside the labour force need to be integrated been created by economic growth thus far social protection systems need to be scaled
into the economy. In order to achieve this, have predominantly been lower-skilled and up to ensure access to essential services
a mix of policy measures regarding labour lower-paying. These jobs have not been for MENA’s most vulnerable children,
force supply and demand is required. In pre- attractive to the majority of the many young adolescents and youth, including those from
dividend countries, investments in education people who are outside the labour force or the poorest families, refugees and those
access and quality still have a chance to pay unemployed. with disabilities, as a prerequisite for their
eventual transition to productive work.

131
IMF (2018). Opportunity for All; Promoting Growth and Inclusiveness in the Middle East and North Africa.
132
http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
72 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Social protection schemes can be categorised economic burden of population expansion has conflict-afflicted countries in the pre-dividend
as: protective (preventing destitution and the potential to undermine attempts to eradicate and early-dividend categories were to find a
ensuring access to basic services); preventive poverty through economic growth, possibly peace settlement, this would enable them to
(preventing poverty as a result of a shock); resulting in rising poverty and marginalisation. benefit twice: from a peace dividend as well
and promotive or transformative (providing Without equitable investment, prioritising the as a demographic dividend, for example, a
greater access to economic opportunities, poorest and most disadvantaged children, double dividend.
boosting livelihoods or bringing about adolescents and youth, MENA will continue
significant productivity gains). In the MENA to experience ever-widening disparities, with If, on top of this, these countries were to
region, the majority of current social protection serious implications for human rights and unlock the economic potential of women
programmes are protective or preventive. political stability, as well as employment and and girls, they could even experience a triple
However, transformative social protection economic growth. dividend (see following page).
measures can play a major role in facilitating
young people’s entry into the labour market.
A double dividend? The Engagement
Unless investment in MENA’s children, economic benefits of peace and participation
adolescents and youth is prioritised, the
Political and social stability is an essential In addition to working for peace at the
prerequisite if the countries in the region political level, it is crucial for all countries
Examples of transformative protection are to benefit from the potential window in the MENA region, and especially
measures MENA’s governments could of accelerated economic growth offered those afflicted by conflict, to invest in the
explore, in collaboration with their by the dividend. However, the early- participation of their adolescents and youth,
international partners, include: dividend countries in the region struggle ensuring their engagement in decision-
with fragility, conflict and humanitarian making, civic engagement opportunities,
Employment guarantee schemes – crises, which hamper their ability to take and access to citizenship and life skills
providing adolescents and youth with the policy measures required to reap the education. This will foster a new generation
the right to claim a set number of days
demographic dividend. This is particularly that shares the responsibility to reject
of paid employment from government
damaging as these are the countries where conflict, discrimination and violence. The
Access to microcredit – a powerful tool the demographic transition is still at a stage region currently has the lowest youth civic
to engage adolescents and youth in where the potential of policy measures is engagement level in the world, with young
micro, small and medium enterprises optimal. people’s lack of trust in their governments to
address their concerns and abuse of power
Tax incentives – for entrepreneurs It is well-known that wars and smaller-scale (among other factors) motivating people to
hiring adolescents and youth and for
conflicts are generally followed by a boom take to the streets.
adolescents and youth who establish
period of economic growth, spurred by post-
themselves as entrepreneurs
war reconstruction, the return of investment If the engagement of adolescents and youth
Negotiated preferential market access – and (often) the return of human capital. If the as potential problem-solvers and change-
for products made by adolescents and
youth
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 73

makers committed to peace, tolerance, labour force participation rate of women in introduction or expansion of parental leave
democracy and shared responsibility for the the region is remarkably low, and for those provisions; tax incentives; and provisions of
region’s disparities and deprivations is not young women who are in the labour force, affordable child care.
facilitated, instability will remain. the unemployment rate is high. This means
that the region is forgoing an important Protection for
share of its human capital and constraining
young women
A triple dividend? Unlocking the its economic growth. As the report indicates,
closing the gender gap in labour force
potential of girls and women participation would more than double the However, in addition to providing gender-
youth labour force in seven countries of sensitive education and employment
the region. The resulting economic growth services, unlocking the potential of the
The recommended policy priorities for potential is vast. region’s girls and young women requires
empowerment of women in MENA are: policy measures to protect them from
Countries in the pre-dividend and early- violence, exploitation and abuse and
Pre-dividend: ensuring full participation
of girls in education and the economic dividend stages can benefit greatly from help them access culturally sensitive
empowerment of women policy measures aimed at ensuring full reproductive health services. Urgent action
participation of girls in education and the to address gender-based violence and child
Early-dividend: ensuring full economic empowerment of women. In marriage - a determining factor in sustaining
participation of girls in education and this way, they will also realise a double elevated rates of adolescent pregnancy, high
the economic empowerment of women dividend, as increasing female labour fertility rates and exclusion from education
force participation and lowering female and the labour market - is therefore required
Late-dividend: increasing labour
unemployment will further reduce throughout the region.
force participation by women,
including equal pay and flexible work dependency ratios. In conflict-afflicted
arrangements countries that achieve peace, as discussed
above, as well as gender equity this would
All countries: ensuring protection from amount to a triple dividend.
gender-based violence, child marriage,
exploitation and abuse for all young
Even countries in the late-dividend stage can
women in MENA
still take active policy measures to increase
female labour force participation, such as
active employment generation initiatives
Fostering women’s and girls’ participation for women; flexible work arrangements;
lies at the heart of achieving a demographic promotion of financial inclusion and access
dividend, as it spurs productivity, diversity to finance for women; measures that
and growth. As noted in this report, the promote equal pay for men and women;
74 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

The time to
The potential for double or even triple act is now
dividends in the countries of MENA
can therefore be summarised as If the countries in the MENA region fail to
follows: invest in their children, adolescents and
youth to prepare them for productive adult
Pre/early-dividend: peace settlements
in conflict-affected countries would life, do not absorb young labour market
enable a double dividend entrants, do not restore peace and continue
to see high levels of gender inequality and
All countries: unlocking the economic marginalisation of the most vulnerable, the
potential of women and girls would unique opportunity of the demographic
enable a double dividend (in late or dividend will slip through their fingers. A
even post-dividend countries) or even large proportion of the region’s working-age
a triple dividend (in pre/ early-dividend
population will be either outside the labour
countries, if combined with achieving
peace, as described above)
force or unemployed. They are likely to be
dissillusioned and will put a considerable
In addition and to enable MENA’s demand on public resources.
adolescents and youth to play their
part in facilitating peace, tolerance and If this bleak prospect is to be avoided and
democracy in the region, policies are the demographic transition is to be turned
required that: into a boost for prosperity in the region, the
All countries: facilitate adolescents’ and time to act is now.
youth’s engagement and enable them
to become active problem-solvers and
changemakers
 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 75

Adolescent girls take a selfie

with their smartphone at a
“Lifeskills” event at the Union
Development & Culture
Community Centre in Djibouti.

© UNICEF/UN0199074/Noorani
76 M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0

Annexes
BARRIERS TO THE DIVIDEND IN MENA AND
I M P L I C AT I O N S F O R S E R V I C E P R O V I S I O N

On 9 May 2018 in Aden,

Yemen, a group of children
have just been vaccinated
against cholera. Several
children display their
vaccination cards.

© UNICEF/UN0209183/Bafaqeh
M E N A G E N E R AT I O N 2 0 3 0 77
78 ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: Implications for education service provision

TABLE A1. Projection of Pre-Primary School-Age Population in MENA, TABLE A2. Projection of Primary School-Age Population in MENA, 2015 and
2015 and 2030, number in thousands 2030, number in thousands.

Pre-Primary Education Country Specific Definition Primary Education Country Specific Definition

2015 2030 Increase % Increase Entrance Age Duration 2015 2030 Increase % Increase Entrance Age Duration
Algeria 852 772 -81 -9 5 1 Algeria 3,624 4,074 451 12 6 5
Bahrain 62 68 7 11 3 3 Bahrain 111 134 23 21 6 6
Djibouti 39 40 1 3 4 2 Djibouti 97 100 3 3 6 5
Egypt 4,277 4,619 342 8 4 2 Egypt 11,353 14,037 2,684 24 6 6
Iran 1,360 969 -392 -29 5 1 Iran 7,319 6,630 -689 -9 6 6
Iraq 2,094 2,742 648 31 4 2 Iraq 5,586 7,713 2,127 38 6 6
Jordan 462 444 -18 -4 4 2 Jordan 1,282 1,323 40 3 6 6
Kuwait 121 118 -3 -2 4 2 Kuwait 270 310 41 15 6 5
Lebanon 259 215 -44 -17 3 3 Lebanon 546 407 -140 -26 6 6
Libya 246 212 -34 -14 4 2 Libya 701 672 -29 -4 6 6
Morocco 1,304 1,244 -60 -5 4 2 Morocco 3,720 3,866 145 4 6 6
Oman 137 144 8 6 4 2 Oman 339 463 124 37 6 6
State of Palestine 264 328 64 24 4 2 State of Palestine 489 638 149 30 6 4
Qatar 76 85 8 11 3 3 Qatar 134 174 40 30 6 6
Saudi Arabia 1,749 1,677 -71 -4 3 3 Saudi Arabia 3,213 3,579 367 11 6 6
Sudan 2,236 2,792 556 25 4 2 Sudan 6,232 7,813 1,581 25 6 6
Syria 1,426 1,512 86 6 3 3 Syria 2,975 2,974 -1 0 6 6
Tunisia 565 522 -43 -8 3 3 Tunisia 993 1,133 140 14 6 6
UAE 189 177 -12 -6 4 2 UAE 422 434 12 3 6 5
Yemen 2,315 2,538 222 10 3 3 Yemen 4,219 5,008 789 19 6 6
Total 20,032 21,218 1,185 6 Total 53,625 61,482 7,857 15
Pre-dividend 6,909 8,399 1,490 22 Pre-dividend 16,526 21,172 4,646 28
Early-dividend 10,609 10,458 -152 -1 Early-dividend 31,013 33,987 2,973 10
Late-dividend 2,514 2,361 -153 -6 Late-dividend 6,085 6,323 238 4

Note: The total number of population change from 2015 to 2030 is calculated by adding up change in male population and change in female Note: The total number of population change from 2015 to 2030 is calculated by adding up change in male population and change in female population.
population. Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017) World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. United Nations,
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017) World Population Prospects: The 2017 New York. UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) <http://data. uis. unesco. org/> (accessed June 2018).
Revision. United Nations, New York. UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) <http://data. uis. unesco. org/> (accessed June 2018).
 ANNEXES 79

TABLE A3. Projection of Lower-secondary School-Age Population in MENA, TABLE A4. Projection of Upper-secondary School-Age Population in MENA,
2015 and 2030, number in thousands. 2015 and 2030, number in thousands.

Lower-secondary Education Country Specific Definition Upper-secondary Education Country Specific Definition

2015 2030 Increase % Increase Entrance Age Duration 2015 2030 Increase % Increase Entrance Age Duration
Algeria 2,285 3,520 1,235 54 11 4 Algeria 1,752 2,819 1,067 61 15 3
Bahrain 49 65 16 33 12 3 Bahrain 43 62 19 44 15 3
Djibouti 79 79 0 0 11 4 Djibouti 59 59 0 1 15 3
Egypt 5,259 7,250 1,991 38 12 3 Egypt 4,917 7,530 2,613 53 15 3
Iran 2,127 2,529 402 19 12 2 Iran 4,224 5,423 1,199 28 14 4
Iraq 2,464 3,579 1,115 45 12 3 Iraq 2,338 3,397 1,060 45 15 3
Jordan 777 875 98 13 12 4 Jordan 373 436 64 17 16 2
Kuwait 182 263 81 44 11 4 Kuwait 132 190 57 43 15 3
Lebanon 311 186 -125 -40 12 3 Lebanon 329 188 -141 -43 15 3
Libya 330 358 28 8 12 3 Libya 323 375 52 16 15 3
Morocco 1,803 2,003 200 11 12 3 Morocco 1,765 2,047 282 16 15 3
Oman 141 241 99 70 12 3 Oman 133 238 105 78 15 3
State of Palestine 661 896 235 36 10 6 State of Palestine 214 277 63 30 16 2
Qatar 56 87 30 54 12 3 Qatar 50 84 34 68 15 3
Saudi Arabia 1,456 1,806 350 24 12 3 Saudi Arabia 1,396 1,689 293 21 15 3
Sudan 1,914 2,433 519 27 12 2 Sudan 2,690 3,501 812 30 14 3
Syria 1,438 1,485 46 3 12 3 Syria 1,359 1,530 170 13 15 3
Tunisia 473 604 131 28 12 3 Tunisia 655 824 169 26 15 4
UAE 276 358 81 30 11 4 UAE 185 283 98 53 15 3
Yemen 1,928 2,446 517 27 12 3 Yemen 1,828 2,377 549 30 15 3
Total 24,010 31,060 7,050 29 Total 24,762 33,328 8,566 35
Pre-dividend 6,967 9,353 2,386 34 Pre-dividend 7,069 9,552 2,484 35
Early-dividend 13,941 18,207 4,266 31 Early-dividend 14,578 20,161 5,582 38
Late-dividend 3,101 3,500 398 13 Late-dividend 3,115 3,615 500 16

Note: The total number of population change from 2015 to 2030 is calculated by adding up change in male population and change in female population. Note: The total number of population change from 2015 to 2030 is calculated by adding up change in male population and change in female population.
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017) World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. United Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017) World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. United
Nations, New York. UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) <http://data. uis. unesco. org/> (accessed June 2018). Nations, New York. UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) <http://data. uis. unesco. org/> (accessed June 2018).
80 ANNEXES

TABLE A5. Projection of Number of (the last year) Pre-Primary Out-of- TABLE A6. Projection of Number of Primary Out-of-School Children,
School Children, 2015 and 2030, number in thousands 2015 and 2030, number in thousands

Pre-Primary Education Primary Education

2015 2030 Change % Change 2015 2030 Change % Change

Algeria NA NA NA NA Algeria 27 30 3 12
Bahrain 4 4 0 13 Bahrain 2 3 0 21
Djibouti 18 19 1 4 Djibouti 43 44 1 3
Egypt 1,254 1,385 132 11 Egypt 372 460 88 24
Iran 722 514 -208 -29 Iran 43 39 -4 -9
Iraq NA NA NA NA Iraq 548 757 209 38
Jordan NA NA NA NA Jordan NA NA NA NA
Kuwait 10 10 0 -1 Kuwait 6 7 1 13
Lebanon 5 5 -1 -16 Lebanon 89 66 -23 -26
Libya NA NA NA NA Libya NA NA NA NA
Morocco 308 298 -10 -3 Morocco 242 252 9 4
Oman 12 14 1 9 Oman 8 10 3 37
State of Palestine 46 58 12 25 State of Palestine 38 49 11 30
Qatar 2 3 0 14 Qatar 5 6 1 30
Saudi Arabia 359 355 -4 -1 Saudi Arabia 82 91 9 11
Sudan NA NA NA NA Sudan 2,717 3,406 689 25
Syria 298 309 11 4 Syria 975 974 0 0
Tunisia NA NA NA NA Tunisia 4 4 1 14
UAE 11 10 -1 -6 UAE 17 17 0 3
Yemen 723 807 84 12 Yemen 634 752 119 19
Total 3772 3789 17 0 Total 5,851 6,969 1,118 19
Pre-dividend 769 865 96 12 Pre-dividend 3,936 4,964 1,028 26
Early-dividend 2,666 2,599 -67 -3 Early-dividend 1,551 1,652 101 6
Late-dividend 337 325 -12 -3 Late-dividend 363 353 -10 -3

Note: 1. Out-of-school children of last year of pre-primary school-age is calculated based on rate of out-of-school children, one Note: 1. Out-of-school children are calculated based on out-of-school rate for children of the respective educational level. For
year before the official primary entry age, and total number of school-aged children at the last year of official pre-primary school-age countries with no administrative data, household survey data are used as reported by UIS (values in italics).
(children age 5). 2. Numbers are calculated using out-of-school rate of 2015 or latest available data before 2015. We keep the 2015 out-of-school rate
2. Numbers are calculated using out-of-school rate of 2015 or latest available data before 2015. We keep the 2015 out-of-school rate constant for the 2030 calculation. UAE is an exception where only 2016 data for lower-secondary school-age is available.
constant for the 2030 calculation. Source: UNICEF calculation of school-age population in MENA , 2015 and 2030. UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) <http://data. uis.
Source: UNICEF calculation of school-age population in MENA , 2015 and 2030. UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) <http://data. unesco. org/> (accessed June 2018).
uis. unesco. org/> (accessed June 2018).
 ANNEXES 81

TABLE A7. Projection of Number of Lower-secondary Out-of-School TABLE A8. Projection of Number of Upper-secondary Out-of-School
Children, 2015 and 2030, number in thousands Children, 2015 and 2030, number in thousands

Lower-secondary Education Upper-secondary Education

2015 2030 Change % Change 2015 2030 Change % Change

Algeria 128 197 69 54 Algeria 445 716 271 61
Bahrain 1 2 0 35 Bahrain 4 5 2 43
Djibouti 41 41 0 0 Djibouti 40 40 0 1
Egypt 474 653 179 38 Egypt 1,242 1,902 660 53
Iran 52 62 10 19 Iran 1,476 1,896 420 28
Iraq 641 931 290 45 Iraq 1142 1660 518 45
Jordan 211 237 26 13 Jordan 118 139 20 17
Kuwait 12 17 5 42 Kuwait 24 35 10 43
Lebanon 74 44 -30 -41 Lebanon 111 63 -47 -43
Libya NA NA NA NA Libya NA NA NA NA
Morocco 260 289 29 11 Morocco 726 842 116 16
Oman 2 4 2 70 Oman 12 21 9 79
State of Palestine 78 106 28 36 State of Palestine 76 99 23 30
Qatar 4 6 2 52 Qatar 15 24 9 58
Saudi Arabia 48 60 12 24 Saudi Arabia 108 130 23 21
Sudan 677 860 183 27 Sudan 862 1,122 260 30
Syria 618 638 20 3 Syria 916 1,031 115 13
Tunisia 38 48 10 28 Tunisia 211 266 54 26
UAE 3 4 1 29 UAE 30 46 16 53
Yemen 625 793 168 27 Yemen 1,004 1,306 302 30
Total 3,987 4,991 1,004 25 Total 8,565 11,345 2,781 32
Pre-dividend 2,021 2,690 669 33 Pre-dividend 3,085 4,188 1,102 36
Early-dividend 1,575 1,893 318 20 Early-dividend 4,362 5,882 1,520 35
Late-dividend 391 408 17 4 Late-dividend 1,118 1,276 158 14

Note: 1. Out-of-school children are calculated based on out-of-school rate for children of the respective educational level. For countries with no Note: 1. Out-of-school children are calculated based on out-of-school rate for children of the respective educational level. For countries with no
administrative data, household survey data are used as reported by UIS (values in italics). administrative data, household survey data are used as reported by UIS (values in italics).
2. Numbers are calculated using out-of-school rate of 2015 or latest available data before 2015. We keep the 2015 out-of-school rate constant for 2. Numbers are calculated using out-of-school rate of 2015 or latest available data before 2015. We keep the 2015 out-of-school rate constant for
the 2030 calculation. UAE is an exception where only 2016 data for lower-secondary school-age is available. the 2030 calculation. UAE is an exception where only 2016 data for upper-secondary school-age is available.
Source: UNICEF calculation of school-age population in MENA , 2015 and 2030. UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) <http://data. uis. unesco. Source: UNICEF calculation of school-age population in MENA , 2015 and 2030. UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) <http://data. uis. unesco.
org/> (accessed June 2018). org/> (accessed June 2018).
82 ANNEXES

ANNEX 2: Implications for school-to-work transition

TABLE A9. Projections of the Size of the Youth Labour Force in MENA, TABLE A10. Projections of the Size of the Youth Labour Force in MENA,
2015 and 2030, in thousands – Scenario 1: Assuming the youth labour 2015 and 2030, in thousands – Scenario 2: Assuming for men as scenario
force participation rate for both, men and women, follows ILO’s 1, while women’s youth labour force participation rate is increased to
projection for 2030 halve the gap to men’s rate

Scenario 1 Scenario 2

2015 2030 Change % Change 2015 2030 Change % Change

Algeria 1,724 1,710 -15 -1 Algeria 1,724 2,290 565 33
Bahrain 79 95 16 20 Bahrain 79 103 24 30
Djibouti 74 67 -7 -10 Djibouti 74 67 -8 -10
Egypt 5,212 6,525 1,314 25 Egypt 5,212 8,080 2,868 55
Iran 3,286 2,667 -619 -19 Iran 3,286 3,565 278 8
Iraq 2,455 3,734 1,280 52 Iraq 2,455 4,588 2,133 87
Jordan 403 444 42 10 Jordan 403 563 160 40
Kuwait 151 231 80 53 Kuwait 151 257 105 70
Lebanon 340 169 -172 -50 Lebanon 340 202 -138 -41
Libya 361 407 46 13 Libya 361 489 128 35
Morocco 2,077 1,901 -176 -8 Morocco 2,077 2,385 308 15
Oman 273 313 39 14 Oman 273 363 89 33
State of Palestine 330 441 111 33 State of Palestine 330 571 241 73
Qatar 245 211 -34 -14 Qatar 245 223 -22 -9
Saudi Arabia 848 845 -4 0 Saudi Arabia 848 1,023 175 21
Sudan 2,160 2,731 572 26 Sudan 2,160 3,421 1,261 58
Syria 1,071 1,319 248 23 Syria 1,071 1,809 738 69
Tunisia 607 547 -61 -10 Tunisia 607 652 45 7
UAE 456 556 100 22 UAE 456 595 139 30
Yemen 1,581 1,669 89 6 Yemen 1,581 2,405 824 52
Total 23,736 26,585 2,848 12 Total 23,736 33,650 9,914 42
Pre-dividend 6,526 8,576 2,051 31 Pre-dividend 6,526 10,984 4,459 68
Early-dividend 13,334 14,394 1,060 8 Early-dividend 13,334 18,352 5,018 38
Late-dividend 3,877 3,615 -262 -7 Late-dividend 3,877 4,314 437 11

Source: UNICEF analysis based on United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017) World Population Source: UNICEF analysis based on United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017) World Population
Prospects: The 2017 Revision. United Nations, New York; and International Labour Organization, ILO modelled estimates, <http://www. ilo. org/ Prospects: The 2017 Revision. United Nations, New York; and International Labour Organization, ILO modelled estimates, <http://www.ilo.org/
ilostat>, accessed 1 June 2018. ilostat>, accessed 1 June 2018.
 ANNEXES 83

TABLE A11. Projections of the Size of the Youth Labour Force in MENA, TABLE A12. Youth unemployment rate and number unemployed, MENA,
2015 and 2030, in thousands – Scenario 3: Assuming for men as scenario 2015 and 2030, number in thousands
1, while women’s youth labour force participation rate reaches the same
level as men’s rate

2015 per cent 2015 % Male % Female 2030 Change % Change

Scenario 3
Algeria 515 30 27 45 504 -11 -2
Bahrain 4 5 3 12 5 1 30
2015 2030 Change % Change Djibouti 9 11 11 12 8 -1 -14
Algeria 1,724 2,870 1,146 66 Egypt 1,818 35 31 42 2,227 409 23
Bahrain 79 111 32 40 Iran 846 26 22 42 669 -177 -21
Djibouti 74 66 -8 -11 Iraq 412 17 14 29 658 246 60
Egypt 5,212 9,635 4,423 85 Jordan 134 33 28 56 152 18 13
Iran 3,286 4,462 1,175 36 Kuwait 28 18 13 27 41 13 48
Iraq 2,455 5,441 2,986 122 Lebanon 54 16 16 15 27 -27 -51
Jordan 403 682 279 69 Libya 161 45 38 63 182 21 13
Kuwait 151 282 131 87 Morocco 430 21 21 20 394 -36 -8
Lebanon 340 235 -105 -31 Oman 128 47 38 78 146 18 14
Libya 361 570 209 58 State of Palestine 133 40 36 60 180 47 35
Morocco 2,077 2,869 792 38 Qatar 1 1 0 2 1 0 44
Oman 273 413 139 51 Saudi Arabia 246 29 20 57 249 3 1
State of Palestine 330 701 371 112 Sudan 596 28 25 35 743 147 25
Qatar 245 234 -11 -4 Syria 371 35 27 83 436 65 17
Saudi Arabia 848 1,202 354 42 Tunisia 213 35 35 36 192 -21 -10
Sudan 2,160 4,110 1,950 90 UAE 29 6 5 11 38 9 31
Syria 1,071 2,299 1,228 115 Yemen 374 24 23 33 387 13 3
Tunisia 607 758 150 25 Total 6,502 7,239 737 11
UAE 456 634 178 39 Pre-dividend 1,515 1,967 452 30
Yemen 1,581 3,141 1,560 99 Early-dividend 4,232 4,579 347 8
Total 23,736 40,716 16,979 72 Late-dividend 755 693 -62 -8
Pre-dividend 6,526 13,393 6,867 105
Early-dividend 13,334 22,311 8,977 67
Note: Projections based on 2015 male and female unemployment rate being constant until 2030. Total unemployed calculated by adding up male
Late-dividend 3,877 5,012 1,136 29 unemployed and female unemployed.
Source: UNICEF analysis based on United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017) World Population Prospects:
The 2017 Revision. United Nations, New York; and International Labour Organization, ILO modelled estimates, <http://www. ilo. org/ilostat>, accessed
Source: UNICEF analysis based on United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017) World Population
27 June 2018.
Prospects: The 2017 Revision. United Nations, New York; and International Labour Organization, ILO modelled estimates, <http://www. ilo. org/
ilostat>, accessed 1 June 2018.
84 ANNEXES

ANNEX 3: Additional country-specific data

All numbers in Annex 3 based on United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017) World Population
Prospects: The 2017 Revision. United Nations, New York.

TABLE A13. Total population, thousands TABLE A14. Women of reproductive age (15-49 years), thousands

2000 2015 2018 2030 2050 2000 2015 2018 2030 2050
Algeria 31,184 39,872 42,008 48,822 57,437 Algeria 8,341 10,731 10,903 12,315 13,004
Bahrain 665 1,372 1,567 2,013 2,327 Bahrain 162 315 341 416 434
Djibouti 718 927 971 1,133 1,308 Djibouti 174 253 268 312 334
Egypt 69,906 93,778 99,376 119,746 153,433 Egypt 17,205 23,787 24,876 30,217 37,129
Iran 66,132 79,360 82,012 88,863 93,553 Iran 17,596 23,594 23,785 24,422 18,528
Iraq 23,565 36,116 39,340 53,298 81,490 Iraq 5,604 8,818 9,565 13,020 20,127
Jordan 5,103 9,159 9,904 11,122 14,188 Jordan 1,235 2,353 2,544 2,856 3,491
Kuwait 2,051 3,936 4,197 4,874 5,644 Kuwait 504 1,088 1,103 1,122 1,197
Lebanon 3,235 5,851 6,094 5,369 5,412 Lebanon 885 1,630 1,714 1,396 1,043
Libya 5,356 6,235 6,471 7,342 8,124 Libya 1,411 1,790 1,834 1,941 1,877
Morocco 28,850 34,803 36,192 40,874 45,660 Morocco 7,768 9,326 9,527 10,228 10,156
Oman 2,268 4,200 4,830 5,897 6,757 Oman 498 866 944 1,163 1,254
State of Palestine 3,223 4,663 5,053 6,739 9,704 State of Palestine 704 1,155 1,256 1,711 2,438
Qatar 592 2,482 2,695 3,232 3,773 Qatar 117 396 430 542 584
Saudi Arabia 20,764 31,557 33,554 39,480 45,056 Saudi Arabia 4,708 8,057 8,405 9,060 9,542
Sudan 27,251 38,648 41,512 54,842 80,386 Sudan 6,318 9,256 10,062 13,819 20,741
Syria 16,411 18,735 18,284 26,608 34,021 Syria 4,081 4,498 4,501 7,090 8,537
Tunisia 9,699 11,274 11,659 12,842 13,884 Tunisia 2,653 3,071 3,062 3,128 2,971
UAE 3,155 9,154 9,542 11,055 13,164 UAE 581 1,647 1,756 2,111 2,336
Yemen 17,875 26,916 28,915 36,815 48,304 Yemen 3 764 6,674 7,285 9,955 12,944
Total 338,002 459,038 484,175 580,966 723,624 Total 84,309 119,303 124,159 146,822 168,668
 ANNEXES 85

TABLE A15. Births, thousands TABLE A16. Under-five mortality (deaths under age 5 per 1,000 live births)

2000 2015 2018 2030 2050 2000 2015 2018 2030 2050
Algeria 610 949 898 730 783 Algeria 49 30 27 17 10
Bahrain 15 21 22 23 20 Bahrain 14 8 8 6 4
Djibouti 22 22 22 21 18 Djibouti 109 79 76 63 46
Egypt 1,773 2,541 2,467 2,422 2,598 Egypt 42 22 20 14 9
Iran 1,239 1,355 1,250 874 866 Iran 35 15 14 9 5
Iraq 839 1,212 1,271 1,517 1,933 Iraq 44 35 32 22 14
Jordan 159 243 247 228 223 Jordan 28 18 17 12 8
Kuwait 44 65 65 60 65 Kuwait 14 10 9 7 5
Lebanon 62 86 92 68 50 Lebanon 19 10 10 8 5
Libya 116 127 121 102 97 Libya 33 27 25 18 12
Morocco 642 709 688 610 555 Morocco 50 29 25 14 8
Oman 56 81 81 66 68 Oman 22 10 9 6 4
State of Palestine 121 150 157 173 194 State of Palestine 31 22 21 16 11
Qatar 12 25 26 26 29 Qatar 13 8 7 6 4
Saudi Arabia 554 626 629 526 513 Saudi Arabia 24 14 13 9 6
Sudan 1,083 1,290 1,339 1,577 1,841 Sudan 105 70 66 51 32
Syria 509 427 390 512 471 Syria 23 20 18 11 8
Tunisia 168 210 203 164 167 Tunisia 29 19 17 11 8
UAE 53 92 88 95 106 UAE 12 7 6 5 3
Yemen 707 867 880 884 815 Yemen 100 59 55 42 27
Total 8,784 11,098 10,934 10,678 11,434

Table A17. Children and youth (0-24 years) Table A18. Children (0-4years), thousands

2000 2015 2018 2030 2050 2000 2015 2018 2030 2050
Algeria 17,780 18,039 18,460 20,472 18,639 Algeria 3,088 4,664 4,579 3,684 3,930
Bahrain 310 467 502 581 561 Bahrain 74 106 108 114 100
Djibouti 441 487 491 493 465 Djibouti 103 101 102 101 89
Egypt 39,817 47,418 49,585 57,099 62,684 Egypt 8,273 12,374 12,642 11,686 12,994
Iran 38,802 31,365 30,589 29,108 22,577 Iran 6,409 6,899 6,582 4,488 4,592
Iraq 15,057 21,788 23,470 30,132 41,109 Iraq 3,841 5,603 5,944 7,148 9,316
Jordan 3,098 5,058 5,355 5,381 5,584 Jordan 747 1,202 1,240 1,117 1,119
Kuwait 915 1,269 1,411 1,580 1,610 Kuwait 227 311 324 297 326
Lebanon 1,543 2,543 2,478 1,616 1,369 Lebanon 305 461 479 348 245
Libya 3,022 2,864 2,875 2,864 2,475 Libya 569 630 610 515 488
Morocco 15,707 15,672 15,734 15,919 14,277 Morocco 3,079 3,457 3,454 3,056 2,793
Oman 1,327 1,548 1,728 1,929 1,698 Oman 283 384 408 340 340
State of Palestine 2,169 2,885 3,041 3,682 4,437 State of Palestine 585 699 738 837 952
Qatar 234 706 762 802 789 Qatar 55 127 134 137 144
Saudi Arabia 11,706 13,085 13,152 14,121 12,822 Saudi Arabia 2,702 2,960 3,024 2,702 2,560
Sudan 17,355 23,806 25,260 30,955 40,000 Sudan 4,665 5,859 6,105 7,306 8,799
Syria 10,389 10,849 10,458 12,587 12,540 Syria 2,432 2,238 1,887 2,527 2,387
Tunisia 4,834 4,424 4,454 4,616 4,087 Tunisia 840 1,024 1,036 839 839
UAE 1,320 2,196 2,432 2,627 2,782 UAE 267 471 451 457 529
Yemen 12,285 16,838 17,509 19,943 20,659 Yemen 3,151 4,017 4,139 4,254 4,055
Total 198,111 223,307 229,745 256,507 271,163 Total 41,695 53,587 53,986 51,951 56,598
86 ANNEXES

TABLE A19. Female children (0-4 years), thousands TABLE A20. Male children (0-4 years), thousands

2000 2015 2018 2030 2050 2000 2015 2018 2030 2050
Algeria 1,511 2,282 2,241 1,802 1,919 Algeria 1,577 2,381 2,338 1,881 2,011
Bahrain 36 52 53 56 49 Bahrain 38 55 55 58 51
Djibouti 51 50 50 50 44 Djibouti 52 51 52 51 45
Egypt 4,023 5,995 6,133 5,679 6,312 Egypt 4,250 6,379 6,509 6,007 6,681
Iran 3,146 3,390 3,214 2,190 2,239 Iran 3,264 3,509 3,368 2,298 2,353
Iraq 1,865 2,723 2,888 3,469 4,519 Iraq 1976 2,880 3,056 3,680 4,797
Jordan 364 589 606 544 546 Jordan 383 613 634 572 574
Kuwait 111 152 158 145 160 Kuwait 116 159 165 151 167
Lebanon 148 228 234 170 119 Lebanon 157 234 244 178 125
Libya 277 307 297 251 237 Libya 292 323 313 264 251
Morocco 1,500 1,682 1,680 1,486 1,358 Morocco 1,579 1,774 1,773 1,569 1,435
Oman 138 188 198 166 166 Oman 145 197 210 174 174
State of Palestine 286 342 361 409 464 State of Palestine 299 357 377 428 487
Qatar 27 62 66 67 70 Qatar 28 65 68 70 74
Saudi Arabia 1,333 1,459 1,487 1,332 1,262 Saudi Arabia 1,369 1,501 1,536 1,370 1,299
Sudan 2,299 2,880 3,001 3,596 4,329 Sudan 2,367 2,979 3,104 3,710 4,469
Syria 1,188 1,090 920 1,232 1,165 Syria 1,244 1,147 967 1,295 1,223
Tunisia 410 500 506 410 409 Tunisia 430 524 530 429 429
UAE 130 230 221 224 259 UAE 137 240 230 233 270
Yemen 1,545 1,965 2,025 2,081 1,982 Yemen 1,607 2,052 2,115 2,173 2,073
Total 20,386 26,166 26,339 25,357 27,609 Total 21,308 27,421 27,645 26,593 28,989

TABLE A21. Children (5-17 years), thousands TABLE A22. Female children (5-17 years), thousands

2000 2015 2018 2030 2050 2000 2015 2018 2030 2050
Algeria 9,906 8,513 9,497 11,184 9,644 Algeria 4,852 4,169 4,653 5,478 4,713
Bahrain 157 223 241 284 281 Bahrain 76 109 118 140 138
Djibouti 239 254 254 258 239 Djibouti 118 126 126 128 118
Egypt 22,107 23,617 25,714 31,126 33,470 Egypt 10,768 11,466 12,475 15,123 16,271
Iran 22,135 15,030 15,982 15,551 11,869 Iran 10,824 7,277 7,821 7,599 5,787
Iraq 7,888 11,420 12,353 16,049 21,739 Iraq 3,835 5,548 6,002 7,801 10,554
Jordan 1,621 2,661 2,838 2,856 2,936 Jordan 786 1,316 1,401 1,388 1,431
Kuwait 455 643 706 822 820 Kuwait 220 307 339 403 402
Lebanon 810 1,272 1,207 853 674 Lebanon 393 645 608 413 329
Libya 1,616 1,476 1,521 1,512 1,281 Libya 790 719 742 737 624
Morocco 8,598 7,934 8,160 8,540 7,435 Morocco 4,213 3,868 3,980 4,164 3,622
Oman 709 680 778 1,014 848 Oman 347 336 389 495 414
State of Palestine 1,169 1,494 1,574 1,974 2,327 State of Palestine 573 731 770 965 1,136
Qatar 123 265 305 373 369 Qatar 59 126 145 181 179
Saudi Arabia 6,457 6,640 6,695 7,643 6,510 Saudi Arabia 3,191 3,268 3,289 3,771 3,210
Sudan 9,070 12,790 13,505 16,259 21,124 Sudan 4,481 6,302 6,650 8,006 10,412
Syria 5,506 6,258 6,004 6,491 6,614 Syria 2,693 3,046 2,926 3,162 3,228
Tunisia 2,660 2,134 2,238 2,536 2,102 Tunisia 1,305 1,041 1,094 1,239 1,026
UAE 675 976 1,099 1,162 1,352 UAE 323 483 537 575 663
Yemen 6,808 8,731 9,210 10,675 10,819 Yemen 3,345 4,278 4,513 5,230 5,298
Total 108,709 113,012 119,881 137,163 142,454 Total 53,195 55,163 58,577 66,999 69,557
 ANNEXES 87

TABLE A23. Male children (5-17 years), thousands TABLE A24. Adolescents (10-19 years), thousands

2000 2015 2018 2030 2050 2000 2015 2018 2030 2050
Algeria 5,054 4,344 4,844 5,705 4,931 Algeria 7,690 5,924 6,244 8,987 7,211
Bahrain 81 114 123 144 143 Bahrain 109 158 170 216 225
Djibouti 121 129 128 131 121 Djibouti 171 196 195 197 188
Egypt 11,339 12,151 13,238 16,002 17,199 Egypt 16,636 17,041 17,785 24,196 25,125
Iran 11,312 7,753 8,161 7,952 6,082 Iran 17,848 10,928 11,245 13,063 8,832
Iraq 4,053 5,872 6,351 8,248 11,185 Iraq 5,574 8,019 8,616 11,597 15,918
Jordan 835 1,345 1,437 1,467 1,505 Jordan 1,185 1,918 2,042 2,174 2,242
Kuwait 235 336 367 419 418 Kuwait 333 450 501 643 620
Lebanon 416 626 599 440 346 Lebanon 624 1,061 986 625 555
Libya 826 756 779 774 657 Libya 1,259 1,093 1,118 1,212 984
Morocco 4,384 4,066 4,180 4,376 3,813 Morocco 6,580 5,982 6,007 6,680 5,744
Oman 362 345 388 520 434 Oman 519 480 529 796 646
State of Palestine 596 763 804 1,009 1,191 State of Palestine 765 1,083 1,124 1,438 1,741
Qatar 64 140 159 192 190 Qatar 88 200 230 292 289
Saudi Arabia 3,266 3,371 3,405 3,872 3,299 Saudi Arabia 4,458 4,818 4,803 5,801 5,013
Sudan 4,588 6,488 6,855 8,253 10,712 Sudan 6,237 9,060 9,668 11,782 15,689
Syria 2,813 3,212 3,078 3,329 3,386 Syria 4,092 4,586 4,589 5,028 5,143
Tunisia 1,354 1,092 1,145 1,298 1,076 Tunisia 2,115 1,618 1,605 2,010 1,588
UAE 352 493 562 587 689 UAE 475 682 809 950 1,036
Yemen 3,463 4,453 4,697 5,445 5,521 Yemen 4,559 6,297 6,584 7,998 8,349
Total 55,514 57,849 61,301 70,164 72,897 Total 81,317 81,594 84,851 105,685 107,138

Table A25. Female adolescents (10-19 years), thousands Table A26. Male adolescents (10-19 years), thousands

2000 2015 2018 2030 2050 2000 2015 2018 2030 2050
Algeria 3,770 2,910 3,059 4,403 3,526 Algeria 3,920 3,032 3,185 4,584 3,685
Bahrain 53 76 83 106 110 Bahrain 56 82 87 110 115
Djibouti 85 97 97 97 93 Djibouti 86 99 99 99 95
Egypt 8,109 8,289 8,643 11,754 12,221 Egypt 8,528 8,752 9,142 12,443 12,904
Iran 8,724 5,210 5,432 6,399 4,307 Iran 9,124 5,718 5,813 6,665 4,525
Iraq 2,712 3,900 4,188 5,642 7,732 Iraq 2,862 4,119 4,428 5,955 8,187
Jordan 573 950 1,011 1,057 1,093 Jordan 612 969 1,031 1,117 1,149
Kuwait 162 214 236 314 304 Kuwait 171 236 265 328 317
Lebanon 303 543 501 301 271 Lebanon 321 518 485 324 285
Libya 616 533 546 591 480 Libya 643 560 572 620 504
Morocco 3,238 2,917 2,932 3,261 2,802 Morocco 3,341 3,065 3,075 3,419 2,942
Oman 255 235 264 384 315 Oman 264 245 264 413 331
State of Palestine 375 531 551 703 850 State of Palestine 390 553 574 734 891
Qatar 42 83 99 137 137 Qatar 47 117 131 155 152
Saudi Arabia 2,209 2,369 2,353 2,861 2,473 Saudi Arabia 2,249 2,449 2,450 2,941 2,540
Sudan 3,085 4,469 4,766 5,802 7,739 Sudan 3,153 4,591 4,902 5,980 7,950
Syria 2,003 2,222 2,234 2,449 2,510 Syria 2,089 2,364 2,355 2,579 2,632
Tunisia 1,043 789 784 982 775 Tunisia 1,071 829 822 1,028 813
UAE 222 333 380 465 503 UAE 253 349 429 485 533
Yemen 2,242 3,088 3,230 3,921 4,092 Yemen 2,317 3,210 3,354 4,077 4,256
Total 39,821 39,758 41,387 51,629 52,333 Total 41,497 41,857 43,462 54,056 54,806
88 ANNEXES

TABLE A27. Youth (15-24 years), thousands TABLE A28. Female youth (15-24 years), thousands

2000 2015 2018 2030 2050 2000 2015 2018 2030 2050
Algeria 7,093 6,615 6,071 8,423 7,195 Algeria 3,488 3,249 2,976 4,129 3,521
Bahrain 110 181 202 245 247 Bahrain 51 78 85 106 115
Djibouti 147 191 194 193 194 Djibouti 73 94 96 96 96
Egypt 14,263 16,343 16,466 21,817 23,637 Egypt 6,972 7,997 8,054 10,615 11,525
Iran 15,695 12,611 11,190 13,175 8,702 Iran 7,700 6,117 5,343 6,495 4,247
Iraq 4,936 7,103 7,637 10,331 14,724 Iraq 2,412 3,463 3,721 5,031 7,160
Jordan 1,085 1,758 1,870 2,064 2,197 Jordan 521 870 927 1,008 1,071
Kuwait 332 447 520 651 646 Kuwait 149 215 232 304 305
Lebanon 617 1,140 1,103 603 622 Lebanon 300 589 567 294 304
Libya 1,210 1,080 1,072 1,212 999 Libya 591 532 526 593 488
Morocco 6,033 6,045 5,904 6,370 5,774 Morocco 3,006 2,963 2,889 3,121 2,827
Oman 485 617 685 813 701 Oman 229 260 264 352 328
State of Palestine 627 1,014 1,053 1,291 1,675 State of Palestine 309 497 516 632 818
Qatar 82 363 388 376 360 Qatar 36 85 93 134 146
Saudi Arabia 3,774 4,881 4,810 5,465 5,255 Saudi Arabia 1,860 2,376 2,312 2,638 2,583
Sudan 5,418 7,772 8,461 10,834 14,713 Sudan 2,683 3,841 4,179 5,342 7,269
Syria 3,658 3,712 3,922 5,099 5,084 Syria 1,793 1,772 1,891 2,490 2,481
Tunisia 1,969 1,753 1,650 1,862 1,617 Tunisia 978 862 807 910 789
UAE 501 934 1,107 1,290 1,200 UAE 194 344 378 527 516
Yemen 3,597 5,917 6,070 7,392 8,291 Yemen 1,756 2,906 2,983 3,633 4,074
Total 71,631 80,476 80,374 99,506 103,834 Total 35,101 39,111 38,839 48,452 50,664

TABLE A29. Male youth (15-24 years), thousands TABLE A30. Working-age population (15-64 years), thousands

2000 2015 2018 2030 2050 2000 2015 2018 2030 2050
Algeria 3,605 3,366 3,095 4,294 3,674 Algeria 19,144 26,107 26,920 32,250 36,236
Bahrain 59 103 116 139 133 Bahrain 446 1,054 1,228 1,563 1,710
Djibouti 74 96 98 97 98 Djibouti 402 593 633 766 905
Egypt 7,292 8,346 8,412 11,202 12,112 Egypt 40,923 57,955 61,079 76,600 98,149
Iran 7,995 6,494 5,847 6,680 4,456 Iran 40,244 56,610 57,940 65,156 58,161
Iraq 2,523 3,641 3,916 5,300 7,563 Iraq 12,626 20,321 22,223 31,590 50,088
Jordan 564 888 943 1,055 1,126 Jordan 2,933 5,515 6,039 7,204 9,244
Kuwait 184 232 289 347 341 Kuwait 1,436 3,033 3,200 3,620 3,795
Lebanon 317 550 536 309 318 Lebanon 2,079 3,971 4,187 3,611 3,404
Libya 619 549 546 619 511 Libya 3,342 4,182 4,377 5,215 5,299
Morocco 3,026 3,082 3,015 3,249 2,947 Morocco 17,658 22,951 23,819 26,736 28,916
Oman 256 357 420 461 373 Oman 1,371 3,171 3,671 4,519 4,829
State of Palestine 319 517 537 659 856 State of Palestine 1,608 2,653 2,909 4,080 6,256
Qatar 46 277 294 242 215 Qatar 430 2,111 2,282 2,656 2,868
Saudi Arabia 1,914 2,505 2,497 2,827 2,672 Saudi Arabia 12,210 22,389 24,057 28,217 29,973
Sudan 2,734 3,930 4,282 5,492 7,444 Sudan 14,478 21,278 23,220 32,428 50,634
Syria 1,865 1,940 2,031 2,609 2,602 Syria 9,132 10,842 10,921 17,440 22,619
Tunisia 991 890 843 952 828 Tunisia 6,182 7,745 7,892 8,493 8,667
UAE 307 590 729 763 684 UAE 2,301 7,799 8,101 9,228 9,775
Yemen 1,841 3,011 3,087 3,759 4,217 Yemen 8,682 15,227 16,624 23,016 33,057
Total 36,530 41,365 41,534 51,054 53,169 Total 197,631 295,506 311,321 383,390 464,585
 ANNEXES 89

TABLE A31. Female working-age population (15-64 years), thousands TABLE A32. Male working-age population (15-64 years), thousands

2000 2015 2018 2030 2050 2000 2015 2018 2030 2050
Algeria 9,449 12,935 13,346 15,966 17,822 Algeria 9,695 13,172 13,574 16,284 18,414
Bahrain 178 371 409 518 612 Bahrain 268 683 819 1,045 1,098
Djibouti 200 295 315 383 454 Djibouti 202 298 318 383 451
Egypt 20,347 28,624 30,175 37,800 48,398 Egypt 20,576 29,331 30,904 38,801 49,751
Iran 19,936 28,339 28,964 32,058 28,805 Iran 20,308 28,272 28,976 32,098 29,356
Iraq 6,313 10,098 11,021 15,565 24,614 Iraq 6,313 10,222 11,201 16,025 25,473
Jordan 1,400 2,711 2,974 3,521 4,524 Jordan 1,534 2,804 3,065 3,683 4,720
Kuwait 555 1,244 1,314 1,526 1,630 Kuwait 881 1,788 1,887 2,095 2,165
Lebanon 1,060 1,968 2,080 1,810 1,710 Lebanon 1,019 2,003 2,107 1,802 1,694
Libya 1,589 2,073 2,173 2,592 2,639 Libya 1,753 2,110 2,205 2,623 2,661
Morocco 8,990 11,690 12,119 13,530 14,301 Morocco 8,668 11,261 11,701 13,206 14,615
Oman 554 970 1,062 1,401 1,703 Oman 817 2,202 2,611 3,118 3,126
State of Palestine 794 1,310 1,436 2,009 3,071 State of Palestine 814 1,343 1,474 2,071 3,185
Qatar 129 434 481 640 797 Qatar 301 1,678 1,801 2,017 2,070
Saudi Arabia 5,231 9,170 9,714 11,850 13,333 Saudi Arabia 6,979 13,220 14,344 16,368 16,640
Sudan 7,247 10,736 11,699 16,259 25,272 Sudan 7,231 10,542 11,521 16,169 25,362
Syria 4,527 5,368 5,415 8,688 11,129 Syria 4,605 5,474 5,506 8,752 11,490
Tunisia 3,107 3,927 3,999 4,278 4,270 Tunisia 3,075 3,818 3,893 4,215 4,397
UAE 618 1,812 1,977 2,673 3,151 UAE 1,683 5,986 6,125 6,555 6,624
Yemen 4,310 7,557 8,253 11,415 16,454 Yemen 4,372 7,670 8,371 11,601 16,603
Total 96,533 141,631 148,924 184,482 224,688 Total 101,097 153,875 162,401 198,908 239,896

TABLE A33. Elderly population (65+years), thousands TABLE A34. Female elderly population (65+ years), thousands

2000 2015 2018 2030 2050 2000 2015 2018 2030 2050
Algeria 1,352 2,340 2,699 4,523 9,756 Algeria 700 1,208 1,379 2,309 5,061
Bahrain 16 32 38 114 304 Bahrain 8 15 18 50 125
Djibouti 22 38 41 66 132 Djibouti 12 20 22 35 70
Egypt 3,430 4,748 5,179 7,863 16,237 Egypt 1,958 2,678 2,892 4,340 8,913
Iran 2,781 3,996 4,673 8,775 21,518 Iran 1,351 1,906 2,290 4,487 11,236
Iraq 817 1,110 1,284 1,907 5,018 Iraq 444 609 708 1,102 2,819
Jordan 156 345 380 601 1,558 Jordan 79 181 202 321 813
Kuwait 32 81 106 324 885 Kuwait 14 35 41 130 430
Lebanon 230 476 532 745 1,262 Lebanon 120 240 273 358 632
Libya 202 270 291 476 1,349 Libya 103 145 158 266 751
Morocco 1,517 2,226 2,543 4,588 8,241 Morocco 841 1,202 1,354 2,404 4,513
Oman 55 97 116 262 930 Oman 30 50 59 105 348
State of Palestine 73 139 155 268 685 State of Palestine 40 73 82 146 372
Qatar 10 27 39 149 477 Qatar 4 10 12 36 145
Saudi Arabia 623 964 1,155 2,607 7,516 Saudi Arabia 312 455 526 1,008 3,335
Sudan 835 1,336 1,492 2,292 4,465 Sudan 448 715 798 1,233 2,479
Syria 548 757 828 1,680 3,946 Syria 292 411 456 931 2,188
Tunisia 653 858 964 1,595 2,747 Tunisia 325 471 530 871 1,529
UAE 35 94 115 490 1,805 UAE 14 29 37 137 730
Yemen 505 769 853 1,248 2,880 Yemen 262 412 458 693 1,572
Total 13,892 20,701 23,483 40,576 91,710 Total 7,356 10,866 12,295 20,960 48,060
90 ANNEXES

TABLE A35. Male elderly population (65+ years), thousands TABLE A36. Population aged 20-24, thousands

2000 2015 2018 2030 2050 2000 2015 2018 2030 2050
Algeria 652 1,132 1,320 2,214 4,695 Algeria 3,316 3,596 3,233 3,799 3,647
Bahrain 8 17 20 64 179 Bahrain 58 106 122 139 132
Djibouti 10 18 19 32 62 Djibouti 71 94 95 95 98
Egypt 1,472 2,070 2,287 3,524 7,325 Egypt 6,482 8,206 7,951 9,593 11,445
Iran 1,430 2,089 2,383 4,289 10,282 Iran 6,905 7,120 5,937 6,332 4,412
Iraq 373 501 575 805 2,198 Iraq 2,318 3,299 3,603 4,801 7,061
Jordan 78 163 179 281 745 Jordan 505 836 896 984 1,087
Kuwait 18 47 64 195 455 Kuwait 167 229 281 335 340
Lebanon 110 237 259 387 629 Lebanon 304 583 575 293 327
Libya 99 124 133 210 598 Libya 593 544 531 588 507
Morocco 676 1,024 1,189 2,185 3,728 Morocco 2,762 3,087 2,960 3,003 2,898
Oman 25 47 56 158 582 Oman 238 382 430 416 378
State of Palestine 33 66 73 122 313 State of Palestine 287 484 515 607 821
Qatar 6 17 27 113 332 Qatar 40 261 268 228 213
Saudi Arabia 311 509 630 1,598 4,181 Saudi Arabia 1,799 2,542 2,522 2,689 2,727
Sudan 387 620 694 1,060 1,986 Sudan 2,501 3,545 3,902 5,186 7,086
Syria 256 346 372 749 1,758 Syria 1,691 1,553 1,718 2,539 2,515
Tunisia 327 386 434 725 1,218 Tunisia 928 925 859 846 829
UAE. 21 64 78 353 1,076 UAE 292 605 700 785 687
Yemen 244 357 395 555 1,308 Yemen 1,572 2,897 2,944 3,496 4,120
Total 6,536 9,836 11,188 19,616 43,650 Total 32,829 40,894 40,040 46,754 51,330

TABLE A37. Female population aged 20-24, thousands TABLE A38. Male population aged 20-24, thousands

2000 2015 2018 2030 2050 2000 2015 2018 2030 2050
Algeria 1,633 1,771 1,587 1,864 1,786 Algeria 1,682 1,825 1,647 1,936 1,861
Bahrain 26 42 47 55 58 Bahrain 33 64 75 84 74
Djibouti 35 46 47 47 49 Djibouti 35 47 48 48 49
Egypt 3,176 4,029 3,909 4,682 5,592 Egypt 3,306 4,177 4,042 4,911 5,853
Iran 3,405 3,520 2,848 3,132 2,154 Iran 3,501 3,600 3,088 3,200 2,258
Iraq 1,138 1,610 1,758 2,338 3,437 Iraq 1,181 1,689 1,845 2,463 3,624
Jordan 242 414 444 483 530 Jordan 264 422 452 501 557
Kuwait 72 111 121 150 155 Kuwait 95 118 160 185 185
Lebanon 148 303 297 145 160 Lebanon 156 279 278 148 167
Libya 289 269 261 289 248 Libya 304 274 269 300 259
Morocco 1,387 1,520 1,451 1,476 1,422 Morocco 1,375 1,567 1,509 1,527 1,476
Oman 107 146 140 163 170 Oman 130 236 290 252 207
State of Palestine 141 237 252 297 401 State of Palestine 146 246 262 309 420
Qatar 16 50 50 67 77 Qatar 24 211 218 161 136
Saudi Arabia 875 1,226 1,196 1,269 1,335 Saudi Arabia 925 1,316 1,326 1,420 1,391
Sudan 1,240 1,755 1,929 2,560 3,505 Sudan 1,261 1,791 1,973 2,626 3,582
Syria 830 733 820 1,243 1,228 Syria 861 820 897 1,297 1,288
Tunisia 462 459 421 414 405 Tunisia 466 466 438 433 424
UAE 98 185 199 280 269 UAE 194 420 502 505 418
Yemen 760 1,425 1,448 1,722 2,027 Yemen 813 1,473 1,496 1,774 2,093
Total 16,080 19,851 19,226 22,676 25,008 Total 16,752 21,041 20,814 24,080 26,322
 ANNEXES 91

FIG. B1 Composition of the total dependency ratio (child dependency ratio and old-age dependency ratio) for countries in the MENA region, 1950-2100

UAE Bahrain
92 ANNEXES

Djibouti Algeria
 ANNEXES 93

Egypt Iran
94 ANNEXES

Iraq Jordan
 ANNEXES 95

Kuwait Lebanon
96 ANNEXES

Libya Morocco
 ANNEXES 97

Oman State of Palestine

98 ANNEXES

Qatar Saudi Arabia

 ANNEXES 99

Sudan Syria
100 ANNEXES

Tunisia Yemen
 ANNEXES 101

FIG.B2 Population by age and sex of MENA countries, 2015 and 2050 (in millions)

100+ 100+
2015 2050 2015 2050
95-99 95-99
Female Female
90-94 90-94
Male Male
85-89 85-89
80-84 80-84
75-79 75-79
70-74 70-74
65-69 65-69
60-64 60-64
55-59 55-59
50-54 50-54
45-49 45-49
40-44 40-44
35-39 35-39
30-34 30-34
25-29 25-29
20-24 20-24
15-19 15-19
10-14 10-14
5-9 5-9
0-4 0-4
102 ANNEXES

100+ 2015 2050 100+ 2015 2050

95-99 95-99
Female Female
90-94 90-94
Male Male
85-89 85-89

80-84 80-84

75-79 75-79

70-74 70-74

65-69 65-69

60-64 60-64

55-59 55-59

50-54 50-54

45-49 45-49

40-44 40-44

35-39 35-39

30-34 30-34

25-29 25-29

20-24 20-24

15-19 15-19

10-14 10-14

5-9 5-9

0-4 0-4

0.1 0.1 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05

100+ 100+
95-99 2015 2050 95-99 2015 2050
90-94 Female 90-94 Female
85-89 Male 85-89 Male
80-84 80-84
75-79 75-79
70-74 70-74
65-69 65-69
60-64 60-64
55-59 55-59
50-54 50-54
45-49 45-49
40-44 40-44
35-39 35-39
30-34 30-34
25-29 25-29
20-24 20-24
15-19 15-19
10-14 10-14
5-9 5-9
0-4 0-4
 ANNEXES 103

100+ 2015 2050 100+ 2015 2050

95-99 Female 95-99 Female
90-94 Male 90-94 Male
85-89 85-89

80-84 80-84

75-79 75-79

70-74 70-74

65-69 65-69

60-64 60-64

55-59 55-59

50-54 50-54

45-49 45-49

40-44 40-44

35-39 35-39

30-34 30-34

25-29 25-29

20-24 20-24

15-19 15-19

10-14 10-14

5-9 5-9

0-4 0-4

100+ 100+
95-99 95-99
90-94 2015 2050 90-94
2015 2050
85-89 Female 85-89 Female
80-84 Male 80-84 Male
75-79 75-79
70-74 70-74
65-69 65-69
60-64 60-64
55-59 55-59
50-54 50-54
45-49 45-49
40-44 40-44
35-39 35-39
30-34 30-34
25-29 25-29
20-24 20-24
15-19 15-19
10-14 10-14
5-9 5-9
0-4 0-4

0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03

104 ANNEXES

100+ 100+
2015 2050 2015 2050
95-99 95-99
Female Female
90-94 90-94
Male Male
85-89 85-89

80-84 80-84

75-79 75-79

70-74 70-74

65-69 65-69

60-64 60-64

55-59 55-59

50-54 50-54

45-49 45-49

40-44 40-44

35-39 35-39

30-34 30-34

25-29 25-29

20-24 20-24

15-19 15-19

10-14 10-14

5-9 5-9

0-4 0-4

0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03

100+ 100+
95-99 95-99
90-94 2015 2050 90-94 2015 2050
85-89 Female 85-89 Female
80-84 Male 80-84 Male
75-79 75-79
70-74 70-74
65-69 65-69
60-64 60-64
55-59 55-59
50-54 50-54
45-49 45-49
40-44 40-44
35-39 35-39
30-34 30-34
25-29 25-29
20-24 20-24
15-19 15-19
10-14 10-14
5-9 5-9
0-4 0-4
 ANNEXES 105

100+ 100+
2015 2050 2015 2050
95-99 95-99
Female Female
90-94 90-94
Male Male
85-89 85-89
80-84 80-84
75-79 75-79
70-74 70-74
65-69 65-69
60-64 60-64
55-59 55-59
50-54 50-54
45-49 45-49
40-44 40-44
35-39 35-39
30-34 30-34
25-29 25-29
20-24 20-24
15-19 15-19
10-14 10-14
5-9 5-9
0-4 0-4

0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04

100+ 100+
95-99 95-99
90-94 2015 2050 90-94 2015 2050
85-89 Female 85-89 Female
80-84 Male 80-84 Male
75-79 75-79
70-74 70-74
65-69 65-69
60-64 60-64
55-59 55-59
50-54 50-54
45-49 45-49
40-44 40-44
35-39 35-39
30-34 30-34
25-29 25-29
20-24 20-24
15-19 15-19
10-14 10-14
5-9 5-9
0-4 0-4
106 ANNEXES

100+ 100+
2015 2050 2015 2050
95-99 95-99
Female Female
90-94 90-94
85-89 Male Male
85-89
80-84 80-84
75-79 75-79
70-74 70-74
65-69 65-69
60-64 60-64
55-59 55-59
50-54 50-54
45-49 45-49
40-44 40-44
35-39 35-39
30-34 30-34
25-29 25-29
20-24 20-24
15-19 15-19
10-14 10-14
5-9 5-9
0-4 0-4

100+
95-99
2015 2050
90-94
Female
85-89
80-84 Male
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
108 ANNEXES

This report represents a significant creative and

technical collaboration between colleagues from UNICEF
Headquarters and the Regional Office for the Middle East
and North Africa.

Cover photo: A Syrian refugee girl in an informal tented

settlement in Jordan.

© UNICEF/UN0229230/Herwig

Published by UNICEF
Division of Data, Research and Policy
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United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
New York,
Regional OfficeNY 10017,
for the MiddleUSA
East and North Africa
16 Abdel Qader Al-Abed Street
P. O. Box 1551
Amman 11821 Jordan

Tel:
www. +962-550-2400
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www.unicef.org/mena
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© United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
September 2017
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