A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.

We are approaching the close of the twentieth century. It has been the most
bloodstained century in history. Fifty-eight million perished in two world wars.
Forty million more have died in other conflicts. In the last nine decades, the
ravenous machines of war have devoured nearly one hundred million people. The
appetite of these monstrous machines grows on what they feed. Nuclear war will
not mean the death of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It
will mean the extinction of four thousand million the end of life as we know it on
our Plant Earth. We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek
your support to put a stop to his madness. Humanity is at a crossroads. One road
will take us like lemmings to our own suicide. That is the path indicated by
doctrines of nuclear deterrence, deriving from traditional concepts of the balance
of power. The other road will give us another chance. That is the path signposted
by the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, deriving from the imperative values of
nonviolence, tolerance and compassion. It is a dangerous delusion to believe that
nuclear weapons have brought us peace. It is true that in the past four decades,
of the world have experienced an absence of war. But a mere absence of war is
not a durable peace. The balance of nuclear terror rests on the retention and
augmentation of nuclear armouries. There can be ironclad guarantee against the
use of weapons of mass destruction. They have been used in the past. They could
be used in the future. And, in this nuclear age, the insane logic of mutually
assured destruction will ensure that nothing survives, that none lives to tell the
tale, that there is no one left to understand what went wrong and why. There are
those who argue that since the consequences of nuclear war are widely known
and well understood, nuclear war just cannot happen. Neither experience nor
logic can sustain such dangerous complacency. History is full of miscalculations.
Perceptions are often totally at variance with reality. A madman's fantasy could
unleash the end. An accident could trigger a chain reaction, which inexorably
leads to doom. Indeed, the advance of technology has so reduced the time for
decisions that, once activated, computers programmed for Armageddon pre-
empt human intervention and all hope of survival. There is, therefore, no comfort
in the claim of the proponents of nuclear deterrence that everyone can be saved
by ensuring that in the event of conflict, everyone will surely die. The champions
of nuclear deterrence argue that nuclear weapons have been invented and
therefore, cannot be eliminated. We do not agree. We have an international
convention eliminating biological weapons by prohibiting their use in war. We are
working on similarly eliminating chemical weapons. There is no reason on
principle why nuclear weapons too cannot be so eliminated. All it requires is the
affirmation of certain basic moral values and the assertion of the required political
will, underpinned by treaties and institutions, which insure against nuclear
delinquency. The past few years have seen the emergence of a new danger: the
extension of the nuclear arms race into outer space. The ambition of creating
impenetrable defences against nuclear weapons has merely escalated the arms
race and complicated the process of disarmament. This has happened in spite of
the grave doubts expressed by leading scientists about its very feasibility. The
new weapons being developed for defence against nuclear weapons are part of a
much wider qualitative arms race. The development of the so-called "third
generation nuclear weapons" has opened up ominous prospects of their being
used for selective and discriminate military operations. There is nothing more
dangerous than the illusion of limited nuclear war" It desensitizes inhibitions
about the use of nuclear weapons. That could lead, in next to no time, to the
outbreak of full--fledged nuclear war. There are no technological solutions to the
problems of world security. Security can only come from our asserting effective
political control over this self-propelled technological arms race. We cannot
accept the logic that a few nations have the right to pursue their security by
threatening the survival of humankind. It is not only those who live by the nuclear
sword who, by design or default, shall one day perish by it. All humanity will
perish. Nor is it acceptable that those who possess nuclear weapons are freed of
all controls while those without nuclear weapons are policed against their
production. History is full of such prejudices paraded as iron laws: that men are
superior to women; that the white races are superior to the coloured; that
colonialism is a civilizing mission; that those who possess nuclear weapons are
responsible powers and those who do not are not. Alas, nuclear weapons are not
the only weapons of mass destruction. New knowledge is being generated in the
life sciences. Military applications of these developments could rapidly undermine
the existing convention against the military use of biological weapons. The ambit
of our concern must extend to all means of mass annihilation. New technologies
have also dramatically expanded the scope and intensity of conventional warfare.
The physical destruction, which can be carried out by full-scale conventional war,
would be enormous, far exceeding anything known in the past. Those of us who
do not belong to the military blocs would much rather stay out of the race. We do
not want to accumulate arms. We do not want to augment our capacity to kill.
But the system, like a whirlpool, sucks us into its vortex. We are compelled to
divert resources from development to defence to respond to the arsenals, which
are constructed as a sideshow to great power rivalries. As the nature and
sophistication of threat to our security increase, we are forced to incur huge
expenditure on raising the threshold of our defences. Even the mightiest military
powers realize that they cannot continue the present arms race without inviting
economic calamity. The continuing arms race has imposed a great burden on
national economies and the global economy. It is no longer only the developing
countries who are using disarmament to channel resources to development. Even
the richest are beginning to realize that they cannot afford the current levels of
the military burden they have imposed upon themselves. A genuine process of
disarmament, leading to a substantial reduction in military expenditure, is bound
to promote the prosperity of all nations of the globe. Disarmament accompanied
by coexistence will open up opportunities for all countries, whatever their socio-
economic systems, whatever their levels of development. The technological
revolutions of our century have created unparalleled wealth. They have endowed
the fortunate with high levels of mass consumption and widespread social
welfare. In fact, there is plenty for everyone, provided distribution is made more
equitable. Yet, the possibility of fulfilling the basic needs of nutrition and shelter,
education and health remains beyond the reach of vast millions of people in the
developing world because resources which could give fulfilment in life are pre-
empted for death. The root causes of global insecurity reach far below the
calculus of military parity. They are related to the instability spawned by
widespread poverty, squalor, hunger, disease and illiteracy. They are connected
to the degradation of the environment. They are enmeshed in the inequity and
injustice of the present world order. The effort to promote security for all must be
underpinned by the effort to promote opportunity for all the equitable access to
achievement. Comprehensive global security must rest on a new, more just, more
honourable world order. We have all welcomed the ratification of the INF Treaty
concluded between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. It is an
important step in the right direction. Its great value lies in its bold departure from
nuclear arms limitation to nuclear disarmament. We hope there will be
agreement soon to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals by 50 per cent. The process
should be carried forward to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Only then
will we be able to look back and say that the NF Treaty was a truly historic
beginning. India believes it is possible for the human race to survive the second
millennium. India believes it is also possible to ensure peace, security and survival
into the third millennium and beyond. The way lies through concerted action. We
urge the international community to immediately undertake negotiations with a
view to adopting a time-bound Action Plan to usher in a world order free of
nuclear weapons and rooted in non-violence. We have submitted such an Action
Plan to this Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General
Assembly. The essential features of the Action Plan are:  First, there should be a
binding commitment by all nations to eliminating nuclear weapons in stages, by
the year 2010 at the latest.  Second, all nuclear weapon States must participate
in the process of nuclear disarmament. All other countries must also be part of
the process.  Third, to demonstrate good faith and build the required
confidence, there must be tangible progress at each stage towards the common
goal.  Fourth, changes are required in doctrines, policies and institutions to
sustain a world free of nuclear weapons. Negotiations should be undertaken to
establish a Comprehensive Global Security System under the aegis of the United
Nations. We propose simultaneous negotiations on a series of integrally related
measures, But we do recognize the need for flexibility in the staging of some of
these measures. In Stage-1, the INF Treaty must be followed by a fifty per cent cut
in Soviet and U.S. strategic arsenals. All production of nuclear weapons and
weapons grade fissionable material must cease immediately. A moratorium on
the testing of nuclear weapons must be undertaken with immediate effect to set
the stage for negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We propose that
negotiations must commence in the first stage itself for a new Treaty to replace
the NPI which expires in 1995. This new Treaty should give legal effect to the
binding commitment of Nuclear Weapons States to eliminate all nuclear weapons
by the year 2010 and of all the Non-Nuclear Weapon States to not cross the
nuclear weapons threshold. The Plan for radical and comprehensive disarmament
must be pursued along with efforts to create a new system of comprehensive
global security. The components of such a system must be mutually supportive.
Participation in it must be universal. The structure of such a system should be
firmly based on non-violence. When we eliminate nuclear weapons and reduce
conventional forces to minimum defensive levels, the establishment of a non-
violent world order is the only way of not relapsing into the irrationalities of the
past. It is the only way of precluding the recommencement of an armaments
spiral. Nonviolence in international relations cannot be considered a Utopian goal.
It is the only available basis for civilised survival, for the maintenance of peace
through peaceful coexistence, for a new, just, equitable and democratic world
order. As Mahatma Gandhi said in the aftermath of the first use of nuclear
weapons: "The moral to be legitimately drawn from the supreme tragedy of the
bomb is that it will not be destroyed by counter bombs, even as, violence cannot
be destroyed by counter- violence. Mankind has to get out of violence only
through non-violence. " The new structure of international relations must be
based on respect for various ideologies, on the right to pursue different socio-
economic systems, and the celebration of diversity. Happily, this is already
beginning to happen. Post-war bipolarity is giving way to a growing realisation of
the need for coexistence. As Jawaharlal Nehru said: “The alternative to co-
existence is co-destruction." Therefore, the new structure of international
relations to sustain a world beyond nuclear weapons will have to be based on the
principles of coexistence, the non-use of force, nonintervention in the internal
affairs on other countries, and the right of every state to pursue its own path of
development. These principles are enshrined in the Chapter of the United
Nations. The battle for peace, disarmament and development must be waged
both within this Assembly and outside by the peoples of the world. This battle
should be waged in cooperation with scientists, strategic thinkers and leaders of
peace movements who have repeatedly demonstrated their commitment to
those ideals. We, therefore, seek their cooperation in securing the commitment
of all nations and all peoples to the goal of a nonviolent world order free of
nuclear weapons.
An international treaty banning nuclear weapons tests is important, but a no-first-
use agreement would be just as useful. The Non-proliferation regimes have double standards. The
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) relies heavily on nuclear weapons and lacks progress towards disarmament.

Highly-enriched Uranium and Plutonium can also be used in the nuclear fuel reactor to generate
electricity

While the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), who are outside of the nuclear umbrella, believes the acquisition of
nuclear weapons is a sure path to security, power and prestige. History reveals that the policies of isolation and sanctions
have stimulated a country’s sense of national pride and, in some cases, have accelerated the nuclear programs, taken as a
matter of national priority. The lack of dialogue, policies of isolation and sanctions and western inability to uphold their
part of the bargain has always deteriorated the situation. Proliferation begets proliferation, so the only solution is “multi-
nationalisation of the fuel cycle and complete universal disarmament.”

Instead of keeping the NNWS and ‘rogue’ states out of the system, the issue of proliferation can only be curbed by
strengthening the institution of IAEA. The agency shall be provided with the legal authority, which it lacks, to be able to
detect and pursue clandestine nuclear weapon operations.

Based on the principles of inclusiveness and fairness, “nuclear diplomacy” and “nuclear non-proliferation regimes” are
means to achieve enduring peace.

Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament

The present international security environment seems less favorable to nuclear
disarmament. All the existing mechanisms directed to promote disarmament and arms
control are in despair. For example, the dismantlement of the existing arms control
treaties between Russia and the West, arrival of newer technologies and renewed arms
racing problems between US and Russia, US and China, China and India, India and
Pakistan, turmoil in the Middle East and nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
introduced renewed stability challenges for broader non-proliferation mechanisms.
Currently, states’ reliance on modernization of deterrent force has increased while their
emphasis on disarmament has decreased. Against this backdrop, the US has
introduced a new initiative on creating an environment for nuclear disarmament (CEND)
which aims at initiating dialogue among states to comprehend the global security
context, states’ underlying security concerns, their bilateral threat perceptions and
space to gauge a degree of trust in order to create an environment favorable to nuclear
disarmament. Instead of focusing on numerical arms reduction and instantaneous
elimination of nuclear weapons, the US-led CEND adopts an incremental approach on
easing global tensions to promote security environment for nuclear disarmament. The
contention is that the CEND can play a lead role in plugging gaps in the existing nuclear
non-proliferation regime thereby making it relevant to twenty-first century realities.
Further argument is that the broader arms control culture will lead to a stabilized
security environment for a renewed consensus on disarmament.

Underlying Causes for CEND

Skeptics’ View

The skeptics[1] may believe that the US-led CEND is backed-up in the run-up of the 2020
NPT Review Conference (RevCon) in order to create some momentum for its success and
perhaps to accommodate non-nuclear weapons states’ grievance on non- fulfillment of
disarmament commitments as per the NPT article VI. Indeed, the discussions on CEND
would provide a platform for states to justify their current deterrent force
modernizations, halted progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and
nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. More so, the US will be better
placed to justify the abrogation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)
treaty which prohibits it from acquiring and fielding more missiles and weapon systems.
Finally, the CEND may lead to justify and reinforce the voices within the circles of the
Trump administration that are not in favor of the extension of the New START treaty.
What Makes CEND Plausible?

The disarmament mandate is already enshrined in the preamble of the NPT that refers to
the easing of international tensions and strengthening of trust among states in order to
facilitate nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, the evolving challenges highlighted below
have undermined such a mandate underpinned by the NPT that makes the dialogue on
CEND more relevant and plausible.

First of all, from the outset, the NPT has been an inflexible treaty that has failed to
address states’ four underlying concerns (a) bridging divide between nuclear and non-
nuclear weapon states (b) creating balance between non-proliferation and peaceful uses
of nuclear technologies (c) the status of new nuclear weapons states that are outside the
NPT (d) stabilizing deterrence at the regional level through restraint in order to connect
regional states to the global disarmament endeavor.

In addition, the contemporary global political system is entering a multipolar

order thereby shifting large and small powers’ focus away from the Atlantic and Europe
to Asia, thereby challenging the relevance of the western-centric non-proliferation
treaties. For example, territorial conflicts have created intense security-dilemma driven
arms competition between states such as the US and China (South and East China Sea),
border issues between China and India, India and Pakistan that in turn has created an
arms control crisis between Russia and the West. For example, the existing arms control
mechanisms prohibit the US from accumulating power and stationing more batteries in
Asia against growing China. More so, states in broader Asia such as the US, China, India
and Pakistan have undergone an increasing up-gradation of existing asymmetries in
conventional forces, inducting new non-nuclear technologies such as missile defense,
anti-satellite weapons and conventional counterforce modernization. The modernization
of nuclear platforms: up-gradation in weapon grade fissile material stockpile, high-
technology hardware induction, ballistic missile and force structure, induction of
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM)
and Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) technologies and surveillance means
such as ISR satellites, SU 30 aircraft, maritime based Unmanned Air vehicle (UAVs),
Cruise Missile, aircraft carriers and Global Prompt Strikes (GPS) are disturbing
developments in Asia. These arms racing trends have created dangerous risks of
accidental war, miscalculation, problems of strategic instability and disarmament crisis.

Furthermore, states alliance politics, broken channels of communication, conventional

force disparity and frequent border skirmishes in the regions (case in point is South
Asia) can aggravate negative threat perceptions of one against the other. Threat
perceptions usually are a function of power asymmetries that in turn trigger intergroup
conflicts. Employment of hybrid warfare, states’ interference of others’ territories through
proxies, insurgencies and non-states actors, political rhetoric like propaganda, hate
speech, and competing or irreconcilable narratives breed heightened threat perceptions,
driving a vicious cycle of dangerous conditions under which misunderstandings could
escalate to unprecedented levels of confrontation between the nuclear powers (case in
point is India and Pakistan in South Asia).

Moreover, a lack of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and the absence of regional
arms control arrangements have curtailed space for arms restraint. This in turn has
pushed regional states such as India and Pakistan in South Asia towards the adoption of
offensive war-fighting strategies and counter-force postures. More so, the CBMs between
states have been largely influenced by the insurgence movements, particularly in the
Middle East and South Asia.

Finally, the US political decision on a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver, offering a
non-NPT state such as India an outreach to global fuels and reactors without having it to
freeze production of weapon grade fissile material, sign the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), follow the IAEA’s full scope safeguards or adhere to a meaningful restraint
regime has damaged the rule-based broader non-proliferation order. Such special
arrangements within the regime have: a) aggravated regional asymmetries; b) minimized
space for talks on arms control between regional rivals; c) destabilized regional centric-
nuclear deterrence. Thus, the CEND’s mandate should focus on resolving these
challenges highlighted above on the framework suggested below. For example, a
renewed political commitment based on the suggested guidelines below can be made to
normalize political relations among states by initiating a multipronged dialogue process
among states. The CEND should seek to preserve arms control culture, get states to
manage bilateral conflicts, foster pace for CBMs, and resolve problems of bilateral threat
perceptions by mitigating growing asymmetries.

Multilateral/Global Approaches

Preserve Arms Control Mechanisms: CEND should not impede the existing arms control
and risks reduction dialogue between the US and Russia. The arms control talks will
mitigate mistrust and moderate arms racing problems between the two countries.
Notably, arms control talks during the peak of the Cold War led to a stable and
predictable geo-strategic environment. The negotiations on Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT) and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaties took place in the midst of severe
tensions between the US and the Soviet Union during 1969-1972 that slowed down arms
racing trends, thereby creating a window of opportunity for détente between the two
rivals. Initiated in 1987, the INF treaty restrained both the US and Russia from
developing nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with
ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The treaty resulted in strategic stability
between the two states, thereby becoming a pillar of European security architecture.
Signed in 1991, the START-I was the first treaty to provide for deep reductions between
the US and Russia. The treaty played an indispensable role in ensuring the predictability
and stability of the strategic balance which was eventually replaced with a new START
treaty in 2010. These treaties need to be preserved so that they can act as a catalyst to
initiate bilateral arms reduction mechanism between rival states at a regional level.

Universalization of the NPT: In a time of geopolitical transition, it is pertinent to

reevaluate how nuclear order will be sustained during the twenty-first century.
Sustainability of the NPT is indispensable to the stability of the future security
environment. The NPT has to become relevant to endure the deep divide between
nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states over nuclear disarmament and
strike a balance between nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear energy in an evolving
world. A discriminatory nuclear supplier group waiver needs to be withdrawn by the NSG
members in order to devise a fresh criterion. The problem of states’ nuclear status
outside the NPT can be addressed through the NSG membership under a revised
mechanism suggested here.

Bilateral/ Regional Approaches

Regional Conflict Management: CEND should call upon regional states open CBMs
between the highest levels of military and political leaderships on the settlement of the
bilateral disputes at a bilateral level or through third party mediation. These steps should
be undertaken by the rival states in order to achieve deterrent stability and avoid risks pf
accidental wars: a) demilitarizing their shared borders, thereby reducing the frequent
ceasefire violations; b) promote shared identities through the flow of cross-border
trade and economic cooperation to mitigate mistrust; c) promote shared
mechanism that focuses on irritants to address the insurgences and cross-border
movement of non-state actors. These steps may encourage the rival states in the
direction to reach a compromise on the settlement of their bilateral disputes.

Promote Dialogue to Understand Threat perceptions by mitigating asymmetries: CEND

dialogue should encourage states to pursue a strategic dialogue between military
leaderships towards policies of nuclear restraint and mitigating asymmetries by adopting
budgetary constraints. Shared identities can mitigate negative threat perceptions
through promoting a culture of harmony at a regional level.

Promote Nuclear Confidence Building Measures (NCBMs): NCBMs should be made more
effective through civilized discourse between political-to-political and military-to-military
leadership in order to mitigate the nuclear risks that new technologies continue to pose.

Risk Reductions: It is essential that CEND opens a series of dialogues on measures to

avoid accidents and enhances military predictability. These measures should further
include: a) effective implementation of the bilateral hotlines to make military-to-military
communication effective; b) transparency and agreements on non-deployment of nuclear-
capable ballistic missile systems and missile defense systems in all the regions, thereby
making states to build training centers to reduce the risks of nuclear escalation; c)
conclude agreements on the non-deployment of weapon systems in outer space, sea and
land; d) promote restraints on increased readiness of arsenals; e) avoid measures that
lower down the nuclear threshold and increase crisis instability.

Nuclear Transparency

All nuclear weapon states’ (specially the US, India and Pakistan) nuclear doctrines are
deliberately kept ambiguous; perhaps this helps them achieve nuclear efficiency and
sufficiency. Revisions in nuclear doctrine should be consistent with a policy of minimum
deterrence. Other transparency measures may involve adopting and sharing of a list of
targeting plans or even declaring the quantity of warheads in their arsenals. Enhanced
transparency in nuclear doctrine and posture would simultaneously further stabilize
deterrence and build upon other improvements in bridging the trust deficit through
dialogue.

Bilateral Nonproliferation Agreement

Oblige regional states sign a comprehensive bilateral nonproliferation agreement

agreeing to: a) establish a bilateral moratorium on the non-testing of nuclear weapons; b)
work together to slow down their fissile material production; c) initiate discussions for a
bilateral agreement on a separation plan for all nuclear facilities, which would include
opening up all civilian nuclear facilities to the IAEA verification; d) link the terms of this
non-proliferation agreement to membership to the NSG for non-NPT states.

Unilateral Measures / Great Powers Actions

The US should adopt a policy of discouraging smaller states from pursuing missile
defense capabilities; avoid aggravating power imbalances at a regional level by
incentivizing one state against the other. The US as a mediator should play a lead role in
initiating an official dialogue process between regional nuclear rivals to manage their
conflicts, mitigate the nuclear risks and preserve global peace and stability. The above
incremental approaches may construct a surface for realization of CEND.

Conclusion

The contemporary global environment has created a disarmament crisis thereby

challenging the relevance of the existing nuclear non-proliferation mechanisms. The arms
control crisis between US and Russia, security competition among states in Asia, the
nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, security challenges in the Middle East and
emerging technologies have made nuclear disarmament difficult to achieve. In this
context, the US-led CEND could play a leading role in order to comprehend states’
rivalries and conflicts, their security concerns, bilateral asymmetries and threat
perceptions that compel them to achieve technological efficiency and sufficiency.
Adopting multipronged global, regional and national approaches the CEND can play a
leading role by initiating dialogue on managing states’ bilateral conflicts, fostering pace
for CBMs, and mitigating growing asymmetries and managing their threat perceptions
that in turn would preserve arms control culture. Thereby the CEND could make non-
proliferation regimes consistent to current realities and create an environment for global
nuclear disarmament.

The right time horizon for seriously pushing a new nuclear accord is when most of the world’s half-
dozen or so major territorial and existential issues involving major powers are resolved—and this cannot
be set to a calendar as precisely as the Global Zero movement would like. Those issues include the
status of Taiwan, the territorial status of Kashmir, political relations between Russia and key “near
abroad” states of Georgia and Ukraine in particular, and friction between Israel and its neighbors.
Nuclear crises involving Iran and North Korea also need to be resolved, though the beginnings of a move
toward nuclear disarmament might not have to await their complete resolution.

an mankind uninvent the nuclear bomb, and rid the world of the greatest military threat to the human
species and the survival of the planet ever created?

Logic might seem to say of course not. But the president of the United States and a number of key
foreign-policy dignitaries are now on record saying yes. They acknowledge that a nuclear-weapons-free
world remains a vision, not immediately attainable and perhaps not achievable within the lifetimes of
most contemporary policy makers. But they believe that the vision needs to be shared, in a vibrant,
powerful way.

A movement known as Global Zero has gained in strength to attempt just that. It was established in the
wake of a January 2007 newspaper column by George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam
Nunn advocating a nuclear-free world. A group of 100 signatories (not including the above four)
established Global Zero in Paris in December 2008. The organization’s goal is to rid the world of nuclear
weapons by 2030 through a multilateral, universal, verifiable process, with negotiations on the Global
Zero treaty beginning by 2019.
Ideas about eliminating the bomb are as old as the bomb itself. But Global Zero draws inspiration from
the recent grass-roots effort to craft a land-mine treaty, and from the work of several influential
philanthropists in global antipoverty campaigns. Of course, it also evolved from earlier nonproliferation
efforts, including the 1996 report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.
But the pace of the nonproliferation movement has accelerated in recent years. The current movement is
notable too in that it has a serious strategy for moving forward—not at some distant time when
miraculous new inventions might make nukes obsolete, but by later this decade, even if it would take at
least another decade to put a treaty into effect.

A World without Nuclear Weapons: End-State Issues

Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby

I. Introduction As of April 2009, a nuclear-free world has become a commitment,

not just an aspiration, undertaken jointly by the presidents of the United States and
Russia. It has become a subject to be taken seriously by policy makers and, as
such, it deserves meticulous analysis and a thorough-going debate. During his
campaign, Barack Obama announced, “This is the moment to begin the work of
seeking the peace of a world without nuclear weapons.”1 Shortly after his
inauguration, President Obama, on the White House website, made the
commitment that his administration “will set a goal of a world without nuclear
weapons, and pursue it.”2 In March, President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian
Federation asserted that “Russia is fully committed to reaching the goal of a world
free from these most deadly weapons.”3 After the first meeting of the two
presidents, on April 1,

1. Barack Obama, “A World That Stands as One” (As prepared for delivery,
Berlin, Germany, July 24, 2008). 2. Barack Obama: Administration willing to talk
to Iran ‘without preconditions’ (January 21, 2009). Available from: [Link]
at [Link]/world/2009/jan/21/barack-obama-iran-negotiations (May
1, 2009). 3. Sergei Lavrov, “Statement on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev”
(Address to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switzerland, March 6,
2009).

2 sidney d. drell and james e. goodby

2009, they announced that they would immediately begin an effort to reduce
nuclear weapons beyond existing agreements: As leaders of the two largest nuclear
weapons states, we agreed to work together to fulfill our obligations under Article
VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and demonstrate
leadership in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world. We committed
our two countries to achieving a nuclear free world, while recognizing that this
long-term goal will require a new emphasis on arms control and conflict resolution
measures, and their full implementation by all concerned nations. We agreed to
pursue new and verifiable reductions in our strategic offensive arsenals in a step-
by-step process, beginning by replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with
a new, legally binding treaty. We are instructing our negotiators to start talks
immediately on this new treaty and to report on resultsachieved in working out the
new agreement by July.4 President Obama followed up on this commitment with a
major speech in Prague on April 5 in which he spelled out more of the details of
his administration’s nuclear polcies (see Appendix 3). It was fitting that he should
do so for nothing less than bold and persistent leadership by the United States and
Russia, the two nations that currently possess more than 90 percent of existing
nuclear warheads, will be required to reach their stated goal of a world free of
nuclear weapons. As global nuclear arsenals are reduced to very small numbers,
policy makers will have to confront daunting new challenges. Until these are
thoroughly examined and resolved by all concerned nations, they will present
barriers to further progress on the

4. Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, “Statement from Obama,

Medvedev” (Leaders discuss global economic crisis, nuclear arms control and
reductions, London, England, April 1, 2009). Senator John McCain spoke
eloquently of President Reagan’s “dream of a nuclear-free world” in an important
speech on June 3, 2009. See Appendix 4.

3 a world without nuclear weapons: end-state issues

journey to zero. In fact, all parties should, for the following three reasons, now
begin a serious consideration of theseissues. One, a genuine policy commitment to
a world without nuclear weapons should be based on a good, even if incomplete,
understanding of national security challenges as the numbers of weapons decline
from hundreds all the way to zero, a condition we call the end state. Two, a
persuasive case for national and international commitments to zero must be based
on reasoned answers to questions about feasibility and risk. Three, there must be a
clear and shared understanding of what zero means, particularly since it will
remain true that nuclear weapons cannot be “disinvented.” This study discusses
such issues within a conceptual framework rooted in analyses in Reykjavik
Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Shultz, Andreasen,
Drell, and Goodby, editors.5 Our purpose is to stimulate further discussion and
analysis, at both the conceptual and practical levels. We will not repeat the
arguments presented at two groundbreaking conferences at Stanford University’s
Hoover Institution and the consensus that emerged regarding the desirability of a
world free of nuclear weapons. Those arguments were summarized in two Wall
Street Journal articles in 2007 and 2008 written by George Shultz, Henry
Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn. Subsequent publications expanded on
these ideas. The starting point for their analysis was that Nuclear weapons today
present tremendous dangers, butalso a historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be
required to take the world to the next stage—to a solid consensus for reversing
reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital con

5. George P. Shultz et al., ed., Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of
Nuclear Weapons: Complete Report of 2007 Hoover Institution Conference
(Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Press, 2008).

4 sidney d. drell and james e. goodby

tribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and

ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.6

Recognizing the gravity of this danger as well as the difficulty of the challenge, the
2006 conference called for a global effort to rekindle the vision of a world without
nuclear weapons that President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev brought to their remarkable summit at Reykjavik in 1986. Those two
statesmen understood that unparalleled diplomatic cooperation on a global scale
would be required, starting with a number of specific steps to contain the nuclear
danger. Taking these steps now is essential if the world is to realize the Reykjavik
vision, because time may be running out. That vision must also serve as a compass
if the steps toward it are to be broadly accepted as fair and urgent and if the world
is to stay on course through a long and difficult journey. For purposes of this study,
we assume that the end state will be reached through successive stages of nuclear
reductions that resemble the following:

1. The United States and Russia reduce to low numbers (200– 500) operationally
deployed warheads and bombs of all types; France, China, and the United
Kingdom accept ceilings at less than 200; and India, Pakistan, and Israel freeze at
then-current levels (assumed not to exceed approximately 100). 2. Each nuclear-
armed state reduces deployed warheads to zero and non-deployed warheads to no
more than 200, after which each nuclear-armed state might reduce the latter

6. “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007. This
article and “Toward a Nuclear Free World,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008,
are included in an appendix (see Appendix 1 and 2).

5 a world without nuclear weapons: end-state issues

category to an interim number of 50–100 apiece. A variant could have a mix of
50–100 operationally deployed or declared reserve warheads retained by each state
while all other warheads are eliminated. 3. Finally, each nuclear-armed state
reduces warheads to zero while retaining monitored reconstitution capabilities
within agreed parameters and for a period of agreed duration. Although those
numbers are hypothetical, they provide a framework for examining key security
issues that the United States and other nations will face as they approach and enter
the end state. We are not going to predict what other nations might be prepared to
do to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. Although we will identify in
Section III the specific steps needed to support progress toward such a world, and
measures that should be in place by the time the nations enter the end state, we will
not explore them in detail. They are discussed in Reykjavik Revisited.7 One point
that needs to be stressed right away is that at the warhead levels being discussed in
this study, no distinction can be made between so-called strategic and so-called
tactical nuclear weapons. Both David Holloway and RoseGottemoeller explain in
Reykjavik Revisited that at some point in the reductions process, “strategic and
short-range weapons should be placed in the same basket for negotiating the actual
elimination process.”8 They are certainly correct.

II. Virtual Deterrence Jonathan Schell and others have contributed very valuable
insights into the nature of deterrence in a post-nuclear-weapons world. Like those
analysts, we believe it is possible to change the concept of nuclear deterrence as it
was understood and implemented by earlier generations of political, diplomatic,
and military leaders. Major changes in international conditions have taken place in
recent years, including the accelerating spread of technology and the rise of
suicidal terrorist organizations and national and sub-national rogue entities. As a
result, we believe there is a need to reconsider the theory and practice of nuclear
deterrence, and to do so in concrete terms. In particular, rather than deploying
nuclear-armedmissilesconfigured for prompt launch under procedures that allot no
more than minutes for a decision, it should be possible to move to a posture in
which the nations are, of necessity, months away from being able to take such a
fateful action. In his 1984 book, The Abolition, Schell describes a condition that
we think of as the end state: As reductions continued, the capacity for retaliation
would consist less and less of the possession of weapons and more and more of the
capacity for rebuilding them, until, at the level of zero, that capacity would be all.
Indeed, the more closely we look at the zero point the less of a watershed it seems
to be. Examined in detail, it reveals a wide range of alternatives, in which the key
issue is no longer the number of weapons in existence but the extent of the capacity
and the level of readiness for building more.9 Although it will not be easy to make
the political, technical,

and military changes necessary to alter the current nuclear-deterrence paradigm,

we believe it is possible to make them. These changes would result in a huge
improvement over the conditions under which humanity has lived for many
decades. The nuclear sword of Damocles would be leashed more firmly than ever.
As Schell suggested, nuclear deterrence would still exist, but it would be latent or
virtual rather than made manifest through the deployment of nuclear forces
readyforprompt launch. There can be no final escape from the catastrophic
consequences of initiating nuclear conflict. But there couldbemuch more time for
careful consideration of the consequences and time to devise less apocalyptic
alternatives. Leaders would have time to reflect on Ronald Reagan’s conclusion
that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” In his 2007 book,
The Seventh Decade: The New Shape of Nuclear Danger, Schell revisited the
concept that previously nuclear-armed nations might remain in a condition of
“virtual,” “latent,” or “reconstitutable” deterrence.10 That idea has also been
explored in some detail in a 1997 study by the National Academy of Sciences, The
Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, and in essays and books written or edited
by Ivo Daalder, Jan Lodal, Christopher Ford, Michael Mazarr,George Perkovich,
and James Acton.11 One critical decision involves where, in the end state, the line
should be drawn between per

missible activities and those that would be restrained or prohibited. The amount of
time required to reconstitute a limited nuclear deterrent can vary considerably. It
could be as short as a number of months in the case of a former nuclear-weapons
state that had dismantled and disassembled its entire nuclear force but had retained
a nuclear enterprise—including the facilities, spare components, and technical
expertise needed to support a shrinking nuclear stockpile during the reduction
process. Or it could be a number of years for a country that had no pre-existing
nuclear weapons infrastructure, or had one but had gotten rid of it. Schell wrote
that “Defining the permissible states of readiness for building the bombs and for
building delivery vehicles of various sorts would be the first task of negotiations.”
He was right to emphasize the centrality of this issue. The nuclear genie can never
be stuffed back in the bottle or its capacity for death and destruction eradicated
from Earth [Link] will have to live with the potential of its
reappearance in the form of bombs. But minimizing the dangers is entirely
possible. We will discuss this idea more fully following an analysis of practical
steps that would help to establish the conditions that we believe would be a
prerequisite for entering the end state.
III. Challenges en Route to the End State No one should have any illusions: the
United States and Russia will have to engage in negotiations far broader, more
difficult, and more detailed than they conducted during the Cold War years and
thereafter. They, and other nations, will needtoagree on several restraining
measures affecting nuclear weapons and

settle on the methods for implementing them. The following discussion outlines
the contours of the challenge.

A. Building the Foundations of a World without Nuclear Weapons. The structure

of a nuclear arms-reduction program must be erected on a foundation strong
enough to support it, one that provides evidence that its builders are serious and
dedicated. Several of the building blocks were analyzed in detail in Reykjavik
Revisited and summarized in the Wall Street Journal’s op-ed of January 15, 2008.
We assume that progress toward the end state will be accompanied by
implementation of at least the following actions:

1. Limits on national nuclear forces imposed on all nations possessing nuclear

arms; here, “forces” includes warheads and delivery systems, tactical and strategic,
both in a deployed and a reserve (non-deployed) status. 2. A strengthened Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, including universal adherence to the Additional
Protocols. 3. Putting into effect a fissile material cut-off treaty to prevent
production of more special nuclear material and requiring that existing supplies be
safeguarded until rendered unusable for weapons purposes. 4. Universal
acceptance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 5. Establishing an international
control regime for the complete fuel cycle for civil nuclear power.

The first of these actions would focus on limiting and reducing U.S. and Russian
nuclear-weapons stockpiles, and would extend those restrictions to other nuclear-
armed states. The other four measures would require initiatives on well-iden

tified, well-understood diplomatic and technological pathways. They would be

aimed at preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons capabilities while those
currently possessing the weapons would be shrinking their stockpiles. All of these
actions would be necessary to improve global security. All would provide useful
test beds to discern whether cooperation in this sensitive area is possible. Each
would require strong, patient, and visionary leadership and levels of worldwide
trust and cooperation exceeding previous efforts. The challenges these steps
present, though daunting, are not fundamentally conceptual nor beyond the reach
of inspired leadership.
B. Disarmament Mechanics. A distinguished British analyst, Michael Quinlan, has
aptly called the practical methods and details of arms reductions “disarmament
mechanics.”12 These will become more complex once the number of U.S.- and
Russian-deployed strategic warheads approaches levels closer to 1,000 than the
1,700–2,200 numbers prescribed in the 2002 Treaty of Moscow. After that,
negotiations on reducing nuclear forces will have to include other nations that
possess nuclear weapons capabilities. In fact, from the beginning of this renewed
effort, other states will have to be involved in some way so that a world without
nuclear weapons becomes truly an international enterprise, not the task of only two
countries. From the outset of U.S.–Russian efforts to reduce their nuclear forces,
other nations should be heavily engaged in negotiating and implementing a range
of clearly identified nuclear restraints that lie on the path to the end state. Among
those: a comprehensive test ban treaty, a fissile material cut-off treaty, and
international control of the nuclear fuel cycle.

As the number of nuclear weapons decreases, more demanding requirements for

verifying compliance with limitations on deployed nuclear warheads and delivery
systems will become necessary in order to instill confidence that errors and
uncertainties in the numbers of weapons also are decreasing— preferably even
more rapidly. There will be similar requirements for non-deployed (reserve)
nuclear forces, as well as for dismantled and disassembled components, and for
such dualuse delivery systems as missiles and aircraft. More transparency will be
required than is now considered possible, including, for example, direct access to
nuclear test sites and information exchanges on R&D programs, experiments, and
other such nuclear weapons activities as fissile material production and the
stockpiling of fissile materials. As experience shows, a very effective way to
increase transparency and mutual trust is to organize programs involving scientific
collaboration in inter-laboratory exchanges. In the past, this has provided a way to
promote understanding between the nuclear communities of the United States,
Russia, and China to a greater degree than short inspection visits could achieve.
The United States, Russia, and other interested parties have already started to
discuss some of the more ambitious measures. For example, in preliminary talks
during the 1990s,those two great powers discussed transparency and irreversibility
of warhead dismantlement. Although the talks did not produce agreed solutions,
they did lay the basis for constructive, ongoing work should the issue be re-
engaged.13 Also on the positive side, there has been a signal success in the
conversion of Russia’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) from its dismantled nuclear
warheads into low-enriched uranium for use in civil
nuclear-power reactors. And the United States has worked with Russia, using the
Nunn-Lugar program, on the construction of facilities for the secure and monitored
storage of dismantled nuclear warheads.14

IV. The End State: New Conceptual Issues Once the end state is entered, policy
makers will face new conceptual issues that lie beyond the realm of disarmament
mechanics. We list here three new challenges that will have to be addressed en
route to achieving the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons:

1. Valid reasons will remain for a number of nations or alliances to maintain active
programs in nuclear science and technology, as well as an infrastructure to support
them. The programs include civilian nuclear power and industrial and medical
applications. They also include increasingly broad national-security challenges,
such as verification of compliance with restrictions on nuclear activities and
counter-proliferation programs. Inherent in these activities will be the potential to
surreptitiously fabricate or rebuild nuclear forces. The basic starting point for a
reconstituted nuclear-weapons program in a former nuclear-weapons state will be
far more advanced than it was at the dawn of the nuclear age, when the intense
program at Los Alamos took only two and a half years to build and test an atomic
bomb.

The existence of such a program with a supporting infrastructure constitutes a

virtual or latent nuclear-weapons capability. Establishing conditions of strategic
stability in a world free of nuclear weapons will require defining and agreeing on
parameters for limiting a virtual or latent nuclear weapons capability that will be
acceptable to both the most and least advanced nuclear nations. These parameters
entail potential prohibitions and limits on the scale of nuclear activities and the
supporting infrastructure, and their impact on the length of time that would be
required to reconstitute or create a small nuclear-weapons force. Difficult
judgments will have to be made about these parameters, but relevant experience
will be gained as the end state is approached. The nations involved will be required
to make detailed analyses and negotiate precise, verifiable agreements.

2. As the numerical levels of permitted nuclear weapons—deployed, reserve, or in

the process of disassembly—approach zero, they will no longer pose the threat of
destroyingentire societies in short order. But the terror and devastation even
limited numbers could cause will still be far beyond the destructive potential of any
other type of weapon, save perhaps some relying on biological agents. Under such
conditions, the nations should pursue cooperative efforts to provide protection
against cheating during the final stages of draw-down. Those efforts could include
research on systems for detecting and tracking nuclear components, as well as
cooperatively deployed early-warning systems and defenses against all forms of
nuclear attack. Until now, cooperation on those two elements has proved
impossible to achieve in any serious way. That must change. In guiding
deployment decisions regarding defensive systems, there

must be a clear understanding that the purpose is to enhance a stable passage

through the final stages of the offensive nuclear weapons draw-down and to guard
against breakout after zero is reached. 3. Nuclear disarmament would not imply the
end of international disputes and military conflict, and a latent or reconstitutable
nuclear force would still remain as a formidable deterrent. But there is a concern
that by significantly extending the time for nuclear responses to serious hostile
non-nuclear military actions or threats, one restraint against the initiation of large-
scale conventional wars might be removed. Therefore, intense diplomatic efforts to
resolve regional crises and to establish norms for limiting and balancing
conventional force levels will be required as part of the process of achieving a
world free of nuclear weapons. This will have to be accomplished at the regional
level with the support of the international community in all parts of the world. That
has already occurred in Europe, and to a greater or lesser degree, discussions have
begun elsewhere. Nuclear weapons and conventional force levels in Korea have
been the subject of serious talks; confidence-building measures have been
discussed in the Middle East; and India and Pakistan already have put such
measures in place regarding each side’s nuclear posture. Nobody should expect
that all the world’s problems will be solved before eliminating all nuclear weapons.
Nor do nations need to wait until then to proceedwith deepreductions. The
challenge will be to contain the remaining disputes while continuing to work to
resolve them. We will have more to say about this later in this study.

V. Verification during the End State As postulated above, the path to the end state,
as we envisage it, passes through stages during which all operationally deployed
nuclear warheads have been reduced to several hundred globally and all nuclear-
armed states have begun the process of capping and reducing numbers of non-
deployed nuclear warheads. Several supporting agreements, such as a ban on all
nuclear-explosive testing, would already be in effect. Getting to zero and
monitoring the end state will require more comprehensive cooperation and
improvements in all types of verification tools: national technical means, data
exchanges, on-site inspections (both routine ones and those prompted by a
challenge), perimeter and portal continuous monitoring, tags and seals, sensors and
detection devices to monitor nuclear activity and the resulting effluents, remote
viewing as conducted already by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
and—no less important—human intelligence (humint), or good old-fashioned
spying. By the time the end state is reached, an accurate base of information about
arsenals that have been built and about material that will remain subject to
restraints and elimination should be in hand. During the time it will take to
negotiate and implement the steps toward the end state, we can anticipate a steady
accumulation of vital information. It can be acquired in various ways. Although
exchange of data is the most obvious of them, transparency also will be obtained
through the necessarily close working relationships among inspectors and among
technical personnel. Thus, to cite one example, the history of production of fissile
materials will become better understood as time goes on. This will provide a
baseline for judg

ing the amount of material—HEU and Pu 239—available for nuclear bombs. With
that information, the outer limits of warhead production can be predicted with
some accuracy. But there can be no doubt that verification of non-deployed nuclear
bombs and warheads will be very difficult.15

A. U.S.–Russian Verification Procedures. In the case of the United States and

Russia, some combination of declarations, confidence-building measures,
monitored warhead dismantlement, cooperative transparency, and challenge
inspections will be required. Previous agreements between the two countries offer
precedents. The procedure would most likely be managed by direct bilateral
cooperation, rather than by the IAEA or some other international organization.
International inspection would probably be brought in at a late stage of the
dismantlement process, partly to add credibility for other participants in nuclear
arms-reductions programs. Verifying compliance with limitations on reserve
forces, including dismantled and disassembled components, will remain a
demanding challenge, and Cold War experiencesprovidelittle guidance in helping
to meet it. The storage sites generally will be relatively small, dispersed, readily
disguised or hidden, and relatively easily incorporated into the industrial
infrastructure. However, as Edward Ifft has pointed out in his chapter in Reykjavik
Revisited: Counting warheads which are deployed, or considered to be deployed, is
straightforward and can be carried out with high confidence using techniques
which have previously been agreed between the U.S. and the Russian Federation.
Monitoring the numbers of non-deployed warheads has neverbeen attempted in an
arms control agreement. Since this was on

the agenda of the 1997 Helsinki Framework (START III), some work was done in
the U.S. on how one might approach the task. The appropriate level of
intrusiveness also became an issue in the Cooperative Threat Reduction
[Link] track of warheads removed from deployed status under agreed
procedures should be possible, but an agreed baseline should also be established.
Depending upon the degree of confidence required, rather intrusive inspections
might be necessary.16 As the numbers of permitted weapons decrease, it will
become increasingly important, in addition to monitoring and verifying the
deployed and reserve weapons, to determine how many are in the queue for
disassembly, and to assess the potential for their reconstitution and whether they
could pose a significant breakout potential. U.S.–Russian discussions
andnegotiations on the subject of the irreversible dismantlement of nuclear
weapons took place during the Clinton administration in 1994–95.17 From these
discussions emerged several techniques for verifiable dismantlement once the
possessors of weapons declare them. The United States and Russia, in cooperation
with the IAEA, made a subsequent tripartite effort. Having such procedures in
place would narrow the uncertainties inevitable in any agreement to eliminate all
nuclear weapons. It would be useful to undertake talks on dismantlement of
warheads and delivery systems with all nuclear countries, and in particular to
resume those talks between theUnited States and Russia at an early date. In
addition, efforts should

be made to exchange data regarding past production of fissile material. By

enforcing tight physical security and placing dismantled warheads in secure,
monitored storage, HEU and plutonium would be rendered unavailable for use in
weapons during the temporary period preceding their elimination. With the United
States and Russia, it would be necessary to monitor certain types of long-range
bombers and cruise and ballistic missiles. As is the case in the
StrategicArmsReductions Treaty (START), but not in the Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty, limits on deployed strategic (long-range) delivery vehicles
would be required. There are missile parts that serve as spares for testing and
training or for missile space launches. Verifying and monitoring limits on such
virtual or latent systems in the end state will require establishing very intrusive
verification procedures as well as detailed definitional clarifications, particularly
when it comes to dual-use technologies. Strategic delivery vehicles remaining after
the elimination of excess vehicles would be monitored to ensure that nuclear
weapons have not been surreptitiously deployed near missile or bomber bases. The
START treaty has extensive verification provisions for delivery vehicles. The
numbers of missiles eliminated under the terms of a U.S.-Russia agreement might
be fairly small. Such vehicles could be used for space-launch purposes, and
because of their precision and quick reaction time, there is growing interest in
retaining them as launchers for conventional warheads. Such a development would
probably prove contentious in future negotiations between the United States and
Russia—and most likely with other nuclear weapons nations—because
conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missiles could be confused with
nuclear-armed missiles and because of the breakout potential posed by large
numbers of strategic delivery vehicles.

B. Implications for Verification in Enlarging the Circle of Nations Engaged in

Nuclear Disarmament. The extensive record of arms control negotiations with the
Soviet Union/Russia provides valuable experience for assessing the monitoring and
verification of nuclear reductions. But the verification challenges will grow more
demanding as the geographical scope of nuclear reductions grows to global
dimensions. Special verification methods, tailored to the specific situation in each
nuclear-armed state, will be required in nearly every case. These matters should be
discussed with potential participants from the very beginning of any dialogue.
Among countries that have thus far not deployed or developed an advanced nuclear
weapons capability but have acquired the necessary technology to do so, a number
of programs have provided experience in multilateral verification; they include
monitoring functions of the IAEA and the European Union’s nuclear energy
component, Euratom. Also relevant are the activities in Iraq of the IAEA as well as
the United Nations Special Commission on Monitoring and the United Nations
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission. Where appropriate,
scientist-to-scientist collaborations can be uniquely valuable in understanding the
general thrust of national research and development efforts. This must have
nothing in common with “spying.” The objective is confident, open relationships
among collaborating scientists. Each step forward in a nuclear-restraint regime will
help to build a foundation of trust, transparency, and cooperation as well as to
foster improved technologies that will help meet high standards of monitoring and
verification. Nuclear-free zones should be considered a viable approach to
eliminating nuclear weaponry therein. Several already exist. As distinct from a
global, carefully coordinated agreement, such zones have the advantage of being
responsive to local con

ditions—for example, in determining the timing of reductions, adding linkages,

and creating regional verification machinery. It should be noted that, compared to
the United States and Russia, the numbers of warheads in all other countries and
regions where they exist are relatively small (only a few percent); and the numbers
of concealed warheads, if any, are likely to be correspondingly small. If some kind
of monitored warhead-dismantlement procedure is put into effect, thosenumbers
could be reduced to single digits. But even one or two concealed warheads would
pose a major threat to some of the small nuclear-weapons states, as well as being
potentially devastating for a large city anywhere. In the effort to eliminate all
nuclear weapons, a much greater burden will be placed on both humint and
cooperative verification (i.e., transparency and cooperation in the form of on-site
inspections). Enforcement will be a makeor-break issue. Considerable successful
experience with implementing agreements and very significant improvements in
political relationships will be required before zero nuclear weapons can become a
realistic goal everywhere in the world. The experience of the IAEA in monitoring
Iraq’s nuclearcapable facilities provides some relevant information. In his January
2003 report to the UN Security Councilonhisagency’s monitoring activities in Iraq,
the director general of the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, described the
inspection measures that had been taken and said that “no evidence that Iraq has
revived its nuclear weapons program” had been found. He concluded that, if
“sustained proactive cooperation by Iraq” were available, “we should be able
within the next few months to provide credible assurances that Iraq has no nuclear
weapons program.”18 ElBaradei was saying that proving a negative is

18. Mohammed ElBaradei, “The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq,” (Statement

to the United Nations Security Council, New York, January 27, 2003).

21 a world without nuclear weapons: end-state issues

possible, given the cooperation of the country being inspected. Lacking such
cooperation, the problem is more difficult, but recent, practical experience can help
in the search for surreptious programs.

C. Mutual Interests in Compliance. “Sustained proactive cooperation” should be

the goal of all nations that commit themselves seriously to eliminating nuclear
weapons. And it should be achievable even in a world where disputes and conflicts
continue to exist. The contemporary international environment is characterized by
the general expectation that nuclear proliferation will continue and that the current
nuclear-armed states will not surrender their nuclear weapons. In such an
environment, it is almost impossible to secure agreement to take action against
countries like Iran and North Korea. Joint coercive actions would be more easily
accepted in such cases if the expectation were that proliferation would not proceed
and that the nuclear-armed states were in the process of giving up their ready-to-
use nuclear weapons or had already done so. The incentive structure would change
completely. Intolerance for the infringement of global norms would replace the
present laxity, simply because each of the former nucleararmed states would have a
major stake in preventing breakout and hence in cooperating with other states in
quelling a threat to their mutual security. Self-interest, not idealism, would be the
principal motivator. But testing the degree of mutuality of interests will take time
and experience. We do not postulate an end to war, only a self-interested
realization that resorting to nuclear weapons is not compatible with any reasonable
definition of national interests.

their nuclear weapons, the nations involved would want to be confident of the
following:

● permissible activities that are part of a responsive nuclear infrastructure could be

monitored and verified, even after reaching zero; ● warheads scheduled for
elimination could be dismantled under conditions that would assure their actual
dismantling, with the nuclear components placed in secure and monitored storage
pending final disposition; ● procedures for challenge inspections to search for
concealed warheads had been established and satisfactorily exercised; ● delivery
vehicles scheduled for elimination had been verifiably destroyed, and procedures
were in place to confirm that dual-use systems were not armed with nuclear
warheads; ● cooperative defense systems against nuclear attack had been deployed
by the nations that wished to participate in joint defense; ● compliance
mechanisms had been established to enforce nuclear agreements.

Nuclear warheads could not be wholly and finally eliminated until the nations
involved were satisfied that sufficient progress had been made in at least those six
areas. Getting to the end state would be a practice run for a world without nuclear
weapons. How long a capacity to reconstitute a limited nuclear force would be
needed or desirable after nuclear weapons had been eliminated would depend on
judgments made during the process of arriving at the end state. That capacity
should not be excluded. In fact, it cannot be excluded because the technical ability
to build nuclear weapons cannot be both immediately and totally eliminated.

23 a world without nuclear weapons: end-state issues

At some point in the process of eliminating nuclear weapons, the nations that still
possessed nuclear weapons wouldfind themselves ready to take the final steps to
eliminate them. In his chapter in Reykjavik Revisited, David Holloway describes
an “interim option” of 50–100 deployed nuclear warheads as one of the last steps
before going to zero.19 He had in mind that Britain and France might prefer to
retain some deployed warheads until the very end of the elimination process. Our
thinking borrows from Holloway’s notion, but takes us in the direction of what we
would call a “pause” in the process of eliminating nuclear weapons. Having
already agreed to a program of reductions that would lead to total elimination of
nuclear weapons, it would be prudent and appropriate for all the nations that had
embarked on this journey to pause at some low level of nuclear weaponry to make
a final assessment as to whether the conditions cited above had in fact been met.
For the states identified by the NPT as possessing nuclear weapons, the relevant
number might be something like Holloway’s 50– 100 warheads. This number
could be either deployed or nondeployed, but should in either case be declared and
open to inspection. Other states possessing nuclear weapons would have accepted
limitations on their nuclear weapons program earlier in the process, and their
numbers of deployed weapons might be zero, their non-deployed weapons already
close to zero. After the nations involved had made so much progress, nothing less
than truly serious and convincing problems would stand in the way of continuing
the process of elimination all the way to zero. Nevertheless, we consider it
reasonable to plan for the contingency of a pause, although we do not think that

at this point it has to be specifically defined or built into a staged-reductions

process. For now, all that needs to be said is that the pause would be a brief period
during which the nations would assess whether the conditions cited above, and
perhaps others, had been achieved.

VI. Deterrence in the End State: Stability and Reconstitution During the final
approach to zero—say, from 50–100 to no nuclear weapons at all—the nations
possessing them very likely will continue to insist on maintaining a basic
nuclearinfrastructure on a scale that ensures the effectiveness of their shrinking
deterrent. It is also appropriate and reasonable to presume that every nation that
gave up its nuclear arsenal would for some time insist on maintaining a capacity to
reconstitute a nuclear strike force to hedge against changed strategic conditions.
That view has attracted criticism. Some observers who doubt that a nuclear-free
world is feasible or desirable consider that what we call reasonable would invite a
reconstitutionrace, a race that would create its own unstable and potentially
dangerous strategic environment. Whether that is a correct assessment would be
tested during the run-up to the end state, when responsive nuclear infrastructures
would be maintained on relatively small scales and under conditions of agreed
transparency. To minimize the risks of breakout from agreed constraints, the
nations involved will need to agree on answers to three important questions: (1)
What are the necessary elements of an adequate nuclear infrastructure, that is, one
with a capacity for limited and timely reconstitution of a deterrent? (2) What
activities, facilities, or weapons-related items should be prohibited? (3) What

can be done to assure early and reliable warning of a breakout attempt? Although
the United States at that stage would no longer be in the business of calling for new
weapons designed for new military missions, it would still rely on the expertise of
designers for two contributions: assessing and solving potential problems with the
remaining nuclear stockpile as, or if, such problems emerge over time; and
introducing necessary corrections that could be implemented without relying on
nuclear-explosive testing. Also required would be facilities, support, and resources
necessary to retain and hone the skills of the scientists, engineers, craftsmen, and
their support teams. Such an effort would include a strong, ongoing experimental
R&D program that provided data to challenge and deepen their understanding of
the basic science in weapons-related nuclear processes. In addition, there would be
a need to maintain facilities for handling high explosives and such dangerous
nuclear materials as the plutonium and highly enriched uranium that fuel the
bombs. Expert personnel with the requisite skills are the most important
components of a responsive infrastructure. Given the necessary resources, the
experts can be relied on to respond with confidence and at a timely pace to
unanticipated problems or changes in requirements. Without such talent, no
amount of resources will be adequate. If the desired reconstitution times were
measured in months rather than years, the infrastructure would require a limited,
but adequate, supply of basic components that could be assembled into a weapon.
The necessary parts include:safety-certified advanced fusing and firing systems
with permissive action links that must receive an authorized, pre-set code in order
to initiate implosion of the metal primary pits; neutron generators; the high
explosives that squeeze the nuclear-explosive material to

critical densities to start the fission chain reaction; parts that control radiation flow;
and gas-transfer boost systemswithsupplies of tritium gas that require regular
replenishment. Although a boosted primary would be adequate for a broad range of
targets, geometric constraints dictated by the designs of missile re-entry vehicles
might also require the retention of “on the shelf” parts for two-stage thermonuclear
designs. The delivery systems would also need spare parts, includingre-entry
vehicles for missile delivery. If intended for dual use with conventional bombs,
these parts need to be configured with compatible electrical-connection plugs for
the command, control, and firing signals. Although attracting and maintaining a
high level of nuclear weapons expertise will become more challenging as the
weapons are reduced to zero, an expanding array of demanding national security
problems require nuclear-weapons expertise. These include an increasing need for
means of assessing proliferation risks under a variety of scenarios; the need for
“nuclear forensics” to help identify the origins of nuclear material, radiological
dispersal devices, and nuclear explosive devices, whether obtained before or
sampled after explosions; the need for a capability to disarm and disable
interdicted devices; and an increasing need to be able to verify treaties and monitor
nuclear weapons-related technologies. Experimental science and collection of data
will remain of great value even after the end state is reached. One example is the
data gained from R&D on advanced reactor designs for civilian nuclear power.
New facilities also provide important data on the behavior of material subjected to
the extreme conditions of high pressure and temperatures that occur in nuclear
explosives; one illustration is the recently completed National Ignition Facility
studying inertial confinement fusion for basic as well as weapons science.
Expertise will also be required to

train the relevant inspectors regarding compliance with treaty restraints. In

addition, there is a need for close monitoring of agreements that expressly prohibit
certain activities. One example of a prohibited activity: the manufacture of new
metal pits for weapons primaries to add to an existing store being retained— even
if only temporarily—on the shelf. The traditional types of adversarial verification
tend to encourage cat and mouse-type games. As the nuclear-armed nations move
into the end state, cooperation in nuclear-related projects should replace
competition. The transparency this would afford would be the most effective way
of deterring surreptitious activities. Joint research programs where appropriate, as
opposed to adversarial inspections, would be the most effective way to proceed.
The above discussion indicates the important roletheweapons labs will continue to
play through all stages of implementing steps down to the end state and beyond.
The labs will be major contributors to nonproliferation and threat-reduction efforts.
To them will also fall the responsibility of ensuring that the nation’s shrinking
nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure, and reliable; and in the end state itself, that
the nation retains the ability to reconstitute a force if necessary. Since we do not
assume that perfect peace will have been achieved or a world government will be
put into place upon entering the end state, two considerations need further
examination: (1) how to defend a responsive nuclear infrastructure against a first
strike, possibly with non-nuclear arms, and (2) how to sustain the infrastructure in
terms of competition for budgets and in terms of highly qualified personnel.
Success of a conventional, perhaps terrorist, attack on the nuclear infrastructure
could give an immediate advantage to an

adversary that had concealed a few nuclear weapons.20 Suppose, for instance, that
as a result of such an attack, the United States had to undertake a time-consuming,
large-scale rebuilding of its damaged nuclear infrastructure before it could
reconstitute a small nuclear force. Even an adversary with very few nuclear
weapons would enjoy potential advantages in blackmail and in deterring a counter-
attack. One ready approach to securing the elements of the nuclear infrastructure
that are critical to maintaining the capability to respond would be to distribute them
in several hardened, underground structures, similar to command centers that were
constructed for the U.S. nuclear deterrent during the Cold War. The government
would reveal the individual locations of the chief elements of the infrastructure, but
their hardening and active defenseswouldprovide protection against attack. This is
not an insoluble problem in principle. Although sustaining a virtual or latent
deterrent presents difficulties, these are almost certainly less serious for the United
States than for other nations. Since 1992, the United States has maintained a safe,
reliable, and secure nuclear stockpile without relying on explosive underground
tests, relying instead on a science-based and well-supported stockpile-stewardship
program that has been more successful than many anticipated. There are two
fundamental measures of this program’s success: it has discovered potential causes
for serious concerns in the stockpile due to manufacturing errors, design flaws, or
aging— which is precisely its role; and it has addressed and removed the concerns.
Similarly, the Department of Defense is address

ing potential problems pertinent to the maintaining of effective performance of the

delivery systems. Looking ahead through the stages of continued draw-down of the
nuclear stockpile toward and in the end state, no technical grounds exist for
questioning U.S. ability to maintain confidence in an effective nuclear deterrent.
What will be required is preserving the essential ingredients of the current
program. As emphasized previously, these include excellent personnel engaged in
a vigilant search to discover and fix problems in the stockpile, and also a robust
experimental program to honetheir skills. Moreover, nuclear expertise will be
needed to meet an increasingly broad range of new challenges. The National
Nuclear Security Administration Administrator, Thomas D’Agostino, emphasized
that in testimony before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee in early 2008:

In addition, our 21st century enterprise will continue to leverage the scientific
underpinning of the historic nuclearweapons mission to respond to a full range of
national security challenges that we have, and beyond nuclear weapons
sustainment but shift those more towards nuclear counterterrorism and nuclear
nonproliferation activities. And as an example, we provide technical support to the
Defense Department and the FBI and emergency render-safe and postevent nuclear
technical forensics activities. And a lot more needs to be done in that area and
we’re going to be looking to shift more towards that area.21

These new challenges will be a major focus of the Stockpile Stewardship Program
in a post-disarmament environment. To

21. Marvin Adams and Sidney Drell, “Technical Issues in Keeping the Nuclear
Stockpile Safe, Secure, and Reliable” (paper presented at Nuclear Weapons in 21st
Century U.S. National Security, Washington, D.C., April 2008)
[Link]/[Link].?contentid1792 pg. 15.
gether with the critical need to retain the ability to reconstitute a force efficiently
and reliably, should the need arise, they would create incentives for scientific
personnel for many years to come. Disparities in the respective capabilities of
former nuclearweapons states and between them and the non-nuclear weapon
states, with respect to the lead time required for reconstitution, will remain for at
least some time because of corresponding scientific, technological, and
manufacturing [Link] weapons parity, even at zero, will not be
immediately established in the end state. We can expect, however, that major
differences will diminish over time. A careful judgment will have to be made
among nations of comparable technical capabilities regarding nuclear activities that
would be considered reasonable to retain in a state of latency, as opposed to those
that are impermissible because they would push the world dangerously close to a
reconstitution race. Compliance with agreed prohibitions could be monitored by
cooperative procedures, including sensorsdetectingactivities such as efforts to
assemble high explosives with radioactive nuclear material. There will also be a
need for international monitoring systems able to watch for and report promptly
any signs of attempts to fabricate nuclear warheads and mate them with delivery
vehicles. Responding to this threat quickly and effectively will require a degree of
international consensus that would be hard to obtain under today’s circumstances.
But that consensus can be expected to develop during the cooperative process of
building a rigorous nuclear-restraints regime. Deterrent measures other than
reconstitution, including the possibility of military actions, are available.
Admittedly, such actions would be more likely against weaker states, while a
breakout by big powers would very likely trigger a compen

31 a world without nuclear weapons: end-state issues

satory one. Is this situation more unstable than what the world faces nowadays?
Almost certainly not, since the time between a decision and the actual ability to
launch an attack would be measured in months. Currently, as emphasized at the
beginning of this study, that delay could be as short as minutes.

VII. International Relationships During the End State Ambassador Chester A.

Crocker, in his study of a prospective world order that vastly scales back the role
of nuclearweapons, has stressed the importance of the geopolitical context in
which reductions take place.22 He calls for “a sustained diplomatic effort to
construct and sustain the favorable geopolitical context without which steps toward
a nuclear weapons-free world will not flourish.” The end state we have portrayed
in thisstudy would require a geopolitical context very different from that which
exists today, yet not so different as some believe. World government is not a
necessary precondition for eliminating nuclear weapons; nor would nuclear
deterrence disappear. Crocker presents an extended discussion of engaging key
players at the beginning of the process. Our analysis will offer some thoughts
about the geopolitical context at the end of the process. But first, we would like to
stress that in our judgment, the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons can and should
direct attention to neglected areas of international relations. Indeed, that is one of
the most significant advantages of pursuing elimination. Schell put it well when he
spoke in the The Abolition of

the objective magnitude of the task that, without our willing it or wanting it, has
actually been imposed on us by nuclear weapons. This is the first requirement of
realism in the nuclear age, and, I believe, it is in a spirit of realism that we should
acknowledge that the abolition of nuclear weapons would be only a preliminary to
getting down to the more substantial political work that lies ahead. The size of the
predicament is not ours to choose; only the resolution is.

Approaching the end state, and after reaching it, the following questions arise:

● Are instabilities among the nuclear weapons states introduced at any stage? If so,
what are they, and can they be corrected? ● Would nuclear reductions on this order
invite aggression against one of the current nuclear weapon states by a nonnuclear
weapon state (Israel being the prime example)? ● What are the implications for
recourse to the use of conventional forces? ● What are the implications for
biological and chemical weapons? ● What are the implications for alliances? ●
What are the implications for international organizations?

We will offer our thoughts on each of these questions while acknowledging that
each deserves a more thorough analysis.

A. Instabilities Among Nuclear-Weapons States. Nuclear weapons may have

deterred the worst excesses of violence during the Cold War, but it is possible also
to conclude that possession of such weapons had a tendency to exacerbate rivalries
and animosities. Evidence gained from the U.S.-Russian experience

33 a world without nuclear weapons: end-state issues

after the Cold War seems to support that conclusion, because both nations, despite
warmer relations, have found it impossible to escape from the action-reaction cycle
of the Cold War. For both, the nuclear deterrence trap still exists. Eliminating
nuclear weapons would remove a divisive element in relations between the United
States, Russia, and China, freeing them to work together to create a regime of
cooperative security. Problems would certainly arise if reductions were carried out
too rapidly and without careful attention to the overall context of relations among
the nuclear weapons states. But such speed is not likely, especially since a wide
range of other restraint agreements will necessarily be in place before the end state
is reached. These include verifiable treaties for a comprehensive nuclear test ban, a
fissile material cutoff, and U.S.-Russian reductions in warhead levels. In addition,
other verifiable agreements will probably have been negotiated or renegotiated,
among them a global agreement on limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces and
a European conventional-forces treaty. Cooperative arrangements in ballistic
missile defense and early warning also may be in place. By the time reductions
approach the end state, it is likely that all nations will have installed new
leadership, and it is entirely possible that the Iranian and North Korean nuclear
weapons programs will have been terminated or reduced to a latent stage. That
said, we must be mindful of current territorialdisputes in Asia, such as the status of
Taiwan, that could involve the United States and China. Serious instabilities might
arise from the triangular relationship involving China, India, and Pakistan. Other
such issues exist between Japan and Russia, and between Japan and Korea. The
dispute over Kashmir between India and Pakistan is fundamental for both
countries. It is unlikely that the absence of nuclear weapons would affect these
disputes, but it would be necessary to find some modus vivendi

between the nations involved before reaching [Link] that can be done: a
good example was the successful RussianChinese effort to eliminate border
disputes. In general, for nations that want improved relations, the removal of
nuclear weapons as an issue between them should ease the process.

B. Aggression Against Former Nuclear Weapons States by Historically Non-

Nuclear Weapons States. Israel is the only serious example of such instability. It is
questionable whether aggression of this type is a realistic possibility in light of that
nation’s military advantages. But under present circumstances, Israel certainly
believes that its nuclear deterrent induces caution on the part of its neighbors. That
deterrent also serves as a lightning rod for other countries, serving to justify their
own nuclear ambitions. The Israeli government’s most detailed listing of
conditions under which it would subscribe to a nuclear weapons-free zone in the
Middle East cites a settlement with the Palestinians, and presumably with all Arab
states, as a prerequisite. Today, the Israeli government would of course also require
that Iran be part of such a zone and probably would insist as well on a definitive
end to Iran’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas. As in the case of arguments among
nuclear-armed states, disputes between Israel and its neighbors would have to be
greatly moderated before entering the nuclear end state. An issue that this
discussion raises is whether a nuclear weapons-free world could be achieved
incrementally through regional settlements, perhaps accompanied by nuclear
weapons-free zones. It would be a pity if that were not possible. The elimination of
nuclear weapons in one region—say, northeast Asia or south Asia—should not be
delayed until all other regions have reached a similar agreement. Of course,
thisasymmetric approach to a nuclear weapons-free world raises questions about
extended nuclear deterrence. It also raises the issue

35 a world without nuclear weapons: end-state issues

of the role security assurances play in advancing the prospects for a nuclear
weapons-free world. In some cases, those assurances would certainly help. One
other nation should be singled out for consideration: rightly or wrongly, given its
history, Russia might feel threatened by historically non-nuclear weapons states all
along its borders; Russia’s retention of a substantial arsenal of shortrange nuclear
weapons systems is evidence of that. Its membership in regional security
organizations or other security assurances would be a partial remedy. Resolving
any lingering disputes would be another.

C. Implications for Conventional Forces. It is already clear that at least in Europe,

balanced restraints on conventional forces will be necessary if nuclear weapons are
to be reduced significantly, let alone eliminated. Russia has suspended the Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), and new terms will probably
have to be negotiated. Additional limitations on missiles will also probably be
necessary. In short, deep reductions leading to elimination of nuclear weapons will
also require limitations on other military forces, and Europe will not be alone in
requiring this. Nations in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia also will raise
the issue of limiting missiles and conventional forces.

D. Implications for Biological and Chemical Weapons. It will be more important

than ever to ensure that the bans on development and use of chemical and
especially biological weapons remain in force and that verification measures for a
ban on the latter are instituted. Biological weapons have been called the “poor
nation’s atom bomb” because they are cheaper and easier to produce than their
nuclear counterparts. Some nations that agree to give up or forgo nuclear weapons
may be tempted

to replace them with biological ones as their ultimate deterrent, and any outcome
that encourages the development and proliferation of biological weapons must be
avoided. For this reason, high priority should be given to negotiating a verification
protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention at the earliest possible date.
Verification machinery should be in place onaglobal basis long before nuclear-
armed nations enter the end state in a nuclear-reductions program. We note that in
today’s world, a capability to create biological weapons serves as a deterrent
against creating them. This idea, transferred to the nuclear arena, shows how a
latent capability to build nuclear weapons can serve as a deterrent against doing so.

E. Implications for Alliances. Alliances are one means of preventing nuclear

proliferation. Nations that promise to come to the aid of other nations in case they
are attacked make it easier for the latter to forgo nuclear weapons. This is the case
with Japan, which emphasizes the American nuclear umbrella as part of its
defensive policy vis-a`-vis its neighbors. Arguments are made that elimination of
U.S. nuclear weapons would remove one of the most important pillars of Japan’s
non-nuclear posture. Generally, however, nations like Japan that live under the
U.S. umbrella are well disposed toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. But
two other factors figure in the case ofJapan. One is that China, Russia, and Korea
obviously would no longer present nuclear threats in a world without
nuclearweapons. The U.S.-Japan security treaty would remain in force, and the two
nations’ combined air, naval, and ground forces should certainly be capable of
defending the Japanese home islands and sea lines of communication against any
conceivable threat. If this commitment is not credible, despite being backed by the

capabilities potentially available, the use of nuclear weapons in Japan’s defense

also lacks credibility. In any case, the quality of the political relationship with the
United States, notthenumber of nuclear warheads instantly available, is the real
measure of credibility. Second, Japan has long favored nuclear disarmament and
will support deeper reductions in U.S. nuclear weaponry if Russia and other
nuclear-armed nations take commensurate actions. What is important to Japan is
that it be consulted as reductions proceed. The end state is still years in the future,
and it is safe to assume that the world—including Japan’s relations with China,
Russia, and North Korea—will have changed considerably by the time the end
state materializes. Although we have examined Japan, similar situations will arise
in Europe and the Middle East. Similar answers to the challenges posed will then
be in order, with nuances of course differentiating one case from another.

F. Implications for International Organizations. Crocker suggests that the Obama

administration “has the opportunity to propose an updated version of the 1946
Acheson-Lilienthal report blended together with a reconfigured version of the
grand bargain contained in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.”23 If pursued, this
approach would lead to new organizational arrangements that would be in place by
the time the end state, as we have defined it, is reached. Just as we assume that
many, perhaps all, of the restraint agreements postulated above will be in place by
then, so do we assume that new organizations will be available to deal with what
Crocker calls “future nuclear governance.” Extracting nuclear weapons from the
world’s inventories of

weapons will be a wrenching experience for a number of countries, perhaps more

so for the Permanent Five of the UN Security Council than for the newer, de facto
nuclear-weapons states. The P-5 did not become permanent members of the
council because they possessed nuclear [Link] status of these
nations has become almost as much associated with their being the only
recognized, de jure nuclear-weapons states, under the Nonproliferation Treaty, as
with their permanent Council membership. Complicating this painful withdrawal
from the ranks of “legitimate” nuclear-weapon states will be the expectation that,
in return for surrendering its nuclear arms, India will also become a permanent
member of the council. If that happens, Japan would certainly demand entry, and
so probably would Brazil. Both nations, not coincidentally, have uranium
enrichment facilities. The politics of Security Council membership exemplify the
ways in which a “level playing field” in nuclear arms will have a leveling effect in
other areas as well. If the United States decides to take the lead in working
seriously toward a world without nuclear weapons, it will also have to design
policies that will compensate for the lost pride of place that causes resentment
among the less powerful of the present nuclear weapons states. And that may
include all of the other de jure nuclear weapons states, too. Russia and China, in
particular, may well suspect that the United States is urging nuclear disarmament
on the rest of the world in order to gain unilateraladvantages— a suspicion that has
already been voiced semi-officially. The general posture of the United States, faced
with these circumstances, must be either to strengthen the international institutions
in which it participates or, as Crocker suggests, to create new ones.24 He argues
that “there may be no more im

portant issue than identifying the mechanism and the institutional formula for
addressing what one expert [Jayantha Dhanapala] has described as ‘the
institutional deficit in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.’” Crocker recommends “the
establishment of a new, overarching framework—a place for consultation—a
directorate to oversee specific functions and processes entailed in denuclearization
—a forum to provide a voice and a stake in governance of the NPT.”25

VIII. Getting Started This study has reviewed the range of challenges and
requirements that must be met before approaching the gates to the end state—and
after they’ve been entered. The authors mean to underscore the fact that nothing
less than heroic efforts and strong global leadership will be required, starting with
the United States and Russia, the two dominant nuclear powers that possess most
of the nuclear weapons as well as the largest infrastructures for maintaining,
modernizing, and reconstituting an arsenal. Whether or not the vision of
eliminating nuclear weapons is accepted as an achievable—or even desirable—
goal, the world needs unparalleled cooperation in establishing an effective
verification regime if it is to succeed in reducing nuclear dangers and keeping the
most deadly weapons ever invented out of dangerous hands. We believe that
significant progress toward achieving this vital result will be possible only if the
vision of zero nuclear weapons is accepted as a goal that can be reached. We have
heard that message loud and clear from many of the non-nuclear nations around the
world, and we believe their

cooperation can be expected only if the nuclear powers convince others of their
true commitment to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. Many nations have
been specific in rejecting a future that preserves today’s model of a world with two
tiers of nations, those with and those without nuclear weapons. We are encouraged
to think that the prospects for a global consensus about this future has been greatly
enhanced by the words of Presidents Obama and Medvedev quoted in the
Introduction of this book, and by the strong commitment President Obama
declared in Prague on April 5, 2009: Some argue that the spread of these weapons
cannot be stopped, cannot be checked—that we are destined to live in a world
where more nations and more people possess the ultimate tools of destruction.
Such fatalism is a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear
weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use
of nuclear weapons is inevitable. . . . So today, I state clearly and with conviction
America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear
weapons. . . This goal will not be reached quickly— perhaps not in my lifetime. It
will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who
tell us that the world cannot change.26

Is Nuclear Non-Proliferation still a realistic

goal?
Recently, the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference (MNC) was held in Russia where delegates from around 40 countries
met to discuss the rising threat of using nuclear weapons in the potential interstate conflicts.

The diplomats contemplated on the goals of denuclearisation and disarmament at a crucial time when the nuclear non-
proliferation has received severe and numerous adverse blowbacks. For instance, the US and North Korea’s talks on
denuclearisation, in exchange of the lifting of sanctions, have stalled; Russia and the US have abandoned the 1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty and lastly, in the wake of the US’s withdrawal from 2015 Iran nuclear
deal, Iran now plans to move towards enriching its uranium. Given the contemporary dark scenario, was the
nonproliferation conference in Russia meant to reduce nuclear weapons? Can the nuclear non-proliferation be achieved in
an era when nations are ruled by the fervour of nationalism and nationalistic tendencies? Is there a political will to abolish
nuclear weapons? Is the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty (NPT) still relevant?

Currently, there are around 14,500 active nuclear weapons round the world, according to the UN, in the hands of nine
countries. Five of them are de jure nuclear states and signatories of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). They are
the US, UK, China, Russia and France. While the other four, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, are de facto nuclear
states and not the members of the NPT.

Under Article VI of the NPT, “All Parties undertake to pursue good-faith negotiations on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race, to nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament.”

Principally, as per the signatories of the NPT, the actual goal of denuclearisation and disarmament was laid on five nuclear
states. But under Trump’s current “pull back from every past agreement,” it seems nuclear nonproliferation is a lost goal.

Trump has continued his streak of slashing all the past accords irrespective of how beneficial they may look. The US and
Russia are the only two countries in the world with 4,000 active nuclear warheads each. During the Cold War, they had
nuclear warheads in thousands, which have been reduced over time by successive bilateral treaties of numerous types. INF
was one such treaty aimed to limit down nuclear weapons. Under the treaty, the US and Russia had destroyed around
2,692 missiles. Sadly, the US President Donald Trump pulled back from the INF treaty on August 2 on the pretext that
Russia was secretly violating the accord.

Perhaps, in this age when the world is ruled by an egoist, narcissist, nationalist and ultra-nationalist disarmament, a
complete dismantling of nuclear weapons has been reduced to nothing

Where does this retreat from an age-long pact barring nuclear arms race between the US and Russia leave the goal of
disarmament and complete annihilation of nuclear weapons?

In this new world order, where the US fears a rising China as well as its cold-war-era foe Russia, perhaps, this US’s move
is a harbinger of the new geopolitical scenario of the world where she believes that the limitation and disarmament are
divergent to its national interests. It seems that the nuclear disarmament has come to end and a new era of the arms race is
likely to start.

Ironically, the moment the US officially backed away from the INF treaty, the pentagon conducted its very first test of the
new missile system on August 18 by firing a ground-launched ballistic and cruise missile (GLCM) with a range of above
500 km. It seems the US is hell-bent on exceeding their nuclear arsenals as the US Defense Department had requested for
a sum of around $100 million in the upcoming fiscal year of 2020 from the White House to uplift and develop three brand
new missile systems which will surpass the range set down by the INF. What is more concerning to the general
disarmament goal is the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty between US and Russia “START” is also set to expire
in February 2021 and news is it might not be renewed further. If that happens then there will be nothing legal to bar
countries from an impending arms race.

Besides, the US-North Korea nuclear talks have also stalled. Since the stalemate North Korea has continued its trajectory
of testing new missiles; the latest being its super large multiple launch rocket system. Apart from that, the US unilateral
withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and subsequently imposing severe crippling sanctions have hurt the Iranian
economy adversely. With no strong measure to back the 2015 Iran nuclear deal by the rest of the members, Iran is also
sliding towards a point where it could renew enriching its uranium. Not to forget that India and Pakistan have come neck
to neck threatening the other with nuclear weapons over Kashmir’s problem.

Perhaps, in this age, when the world is ruled by egoist, narcissist, nationalist and ultra-nationalist disarmament, a complete
dismantling of nuclear weapons has been reduced to nothing.
‫پوپ فرانسس کی دنیا سے ایٹمی ہتھیار تلف کرنے کی اپیل‬
‫مسیحی برادری کے روحانی پیشوا پوپ فرانسس نے اتوار کے روز جاپان کے شہر ناگاساکی میں عالمی برادری سے ایٹمی ہتھیار تلف کرنے کی اپیل کی ہے۔‬

‫خبر رساں ادارے روئٹرز کے مطابق پوپ فرانسس نے ناگاساکی کے ایٹم بم ہائپوسنٹر پارک‪ ،‬وہ مقام جہاں پر ایٹم بم گرایا گیا تھا‪ ،‬پر خطاب کرتے ہوئے ایٹمی عدم‬
‫پھیالؤ کے معاہدوں کے خاتمے پر بھی افسوس کا اظہار کیا۔‬

‫جاپان کے شہر ناگاساکی اور ہیروشیما ہی صرف دنیا کے وہ شہر ہیں جنھیں اب تک ایٹمی حملوں کا سامنا کرنا پڑا ہے۔‬

‫ناگاساکی پر ‪ 9‬اگست ‪ 1945‬کو امریکہ کی جانب سے دوسری عالمی جنگ میں ایٹم بم گرایا گیا تھا جس میں یک دم ‪ 27‬ہزار افراد ہالک ہو گئے تھے۔‬

‫اس سے دو دن قبل ‪ 7‬اگست کو جاپان کے شہر ہیروشیما پر ایٹم بم گرایا گیا تھا جس سے یک دم ‪ 78‬ہزار اور بعد میں ایٹمی تابکاری سے چار الکھ کے قریب افراد‬
‫ہالک ہوئے تھے۔‬
‫یہ بھی پڑھیے‬
‫ناگاساکی پر ایٹم بم گرانے کا فیصلہ کیسے ہوا؟‬
‫’نئے جوہری معاہدے میں چین کو بھی شامل ہونا چاہیے’‬
‫کیا ٹرمپ کے پاس واقعی جوہری بٹن ہے؟‬

‫تیز ہواؤں اور بارش کے دوران دھیمی آواز میں گفتگو کرتے ہوئے پوپ فرانسس کا کہنا تھا ’ہماری دنیا میں ایک قابِل نفرت تفریق پائی جاتی ہے جس میں خوف اور‬
‫‘عدم اعتماد کے ذریعے تحفظ کے جھوٹے احساس کو فروغ دے کر استحکام اور امن یقینی بنانے کا دفاع کیا جاتا ہے۔‬

‫‘ان کا کہنا تھا ’باہمی تباہی یا انسانیت کے مکمل خاتمے کا خوف اور امن و بین االقوامی استحکام آپس میں مطابقت نہیں رکھتے۔‬

‫پوپ فرانسس نے اپنی تقریر اس تصویر کے سامنے کھڑے ہو کر کی جس کو ناگاساکی دھماکے کے کچھ وقت بعد ہی ایک امریکی سپاہی نے کھینچا تھا۔ اس تصویر‬
‫میں ایک جاپانی بچہ اپنے چھوٹے بھائی کو آخری رسومات کے لیے لے جا رہا ہے۔‬
‫پوپ فرانسس جاپان کے شہر ناگاساکی میں خطاب کر رہے ہیں‪GETTY IMAGESImage caption‬تصویر کے کاپی رائٹ‬

‫انھوں نے ایٹمی ہتھیاروں پر مکمل پابندی کے سنہ ‪ 2017‬کے معاہدے کے لیے اپنی حمایت کا ایک مرتبہ پھر اظہار کیا‪ ،‬جس پر اس وقت اقواِم متحدہ کے تقریبًا دو‬
‫تہائی ملک راضی ہو چکے تھے مگر بڑی ایٹمی قوتوں نے اس کی مخالفت کی تھی۔‬

‫مخالفت کرنے والے ممالک کا کہنا تھا کہ ایٹمی ہتھیاروں کی وجہ سے روایتی جنگوں کا خطرہ اب ٹل چکا ہے۔‬

‫مگر پوپ فرانسس نے ناگاساکی کے ہالک شدگان کے لیے دعا کرنے کے بعد ان کی یاد میں شمع روشن کرتے ہوئے کہا کہ ’ایٹمی اور وسیع پیمانے پر تباہی پھیالنے‬
‫‘والے دیگر ہتھیار (امن کی خواہش) پوری نہیں کر سکتے۔‬

‫‘انھوں نے کہا ’ایٹمی حملے کے تباہ کن انسانی اور ماحولیاتی اثرات جھیلنے والے اس شہر میں ہتھیاروں کی دوڑ کے خالف ہم چاہے جتنا بھی بولیں‪ ،‬وہ کم ہے۔‬

‫ایک ایسی دنیا جہاں کروڑوں بچے اور خاندان غیر انسانی حاالت میں رہتے ہیں‪ ،‬وہاں تباہ کن اسلحے کی تیاری‪ ،‬اپ گریڈ‪ ،‬مرمت اور فروخت پر پیسے ضائع کرنا اور'‬
‫‘اس سے دولت کمانا خدا کے غصے کو دعوت دینا ہے۔‬

‫یاد رہے کہ رواں برس اگست میں امریکہ نے روس پر سٹریٹجک ہتھیاروں کے متعلق ایک معاہدے انٹرمیڈیٹ رینج نیوکلیئر فورسز ٹریٹی (آئی این ایف) سے خالف‬
‫ورزیوں کا الزام عائد کرتے ہوئے علیحدگی اختیار کر لی تھی۔‬

‫ماسکو نے امریکہ کے اس الزام کی تردید کی تھا۔‬

‫امریکہ کے صدر ڈونلڈ ٹرمپ نے اگست میں ہی کہا تھا کہ وہ چاہتے ہیں کہ ہتھیاروں کی روک تھام کے لیے نئے جوہری معاہدے پر چین اور روس دونوں دستخط‬
‫کریں۔‬
‫سابق امریکی صدر رونلڈ ریگن اور سابقہ سوویت یونین کے سربراہ میکائل گورباچوف آئی این ایف معاہدے پر ‪AFPImage caption‬تصویر کے کاپی رائٹ‬
‫دستخط کرتے ہوئے‬

‫‘انھوں نے کہا کہ وہ اس معاملے پر دونوں ممالک سے بات کر چکے ہیں اور دونوں ہی اس حوالے سے ’بہت‪ ،‬بہت پرجوش ہیں۔‬

‫سرد جنگ کے دور میں طے پانے والے ’انٹرمیڈیٹ رینج نیوکلیئر فورسز! (آئی این ایف) معاہدے نے ‪ 500‬سے لے کر ‪ 5500‬کلومیٹر تک مار کرنے والے میزائلوں‬
‫کی تیاری پر پابندی عائد کر دی گئی تھی۔‬

‫یہ معاہدہ سنہ ‪ 1987‬میں سابق امریکی صدر رونلڈ ریگن اور سابقہ سوویت یونین کے سربراہ میکائل گورباچوف کے درمیان طے پایا تھا تاہم ‪ 30‬سال سے زیادہ‬
‫عرصے کے بعد اس کے خاتمے سے اسلحے کی نئی دوڑ کا خدشہ پیدا ہو گیا ہے۔‬
 ‫امریکہ کی جانب سے دستبرداری سے پہلے واشنگٹن نے الزام لگایا کہ روس نے ایک نئی قسم کا کروز میزائل بنا کر اس معاہدے کی خالف ورزی کی ہے تاہم ماسکو‬
‫نے الزام کی تردید کی۔‬

‫اس وقت نیٹو کے سیکریٹری جنرل جینز سٹولنبرگ اور امریکی وزیر خارجہ مائیک پومپیو نے سرد جنگ کے معاہدے کے خاتمے کے لیے روس کو مورِد الزام ٹھہرایا‬
‫تھا۔‬